Telematic International University UninettunoDepartment of StatisticsEconomics and Business AdministrationBachelor's thesis – academic year 2013/2014Emiliano Bigozzi

STRATEGIES FOR SUPPLY CHAINCOLLABORATION: BENEFITS AND BARRIERS

ABSTRACT

The supply chain collaboration strategies are increasingly studied by contemporary researchers in

Economics and Business Administration; moreover, the scientific literature can witness a large number of

case studies of successful cooperation. However, a closer examination reveals the lack of a generally

applicable model for the cooperation in a network of small and medium-sized enterprises, where there is no

dominant player who may take the responsibility to coordinate the collaboration.

In the present study, we put forward the hypothesis that the collaboration among the supply chains of small

enterprises shouldn't rely on a difficult and complex coordination; on the contrary, one have to build the

appropriate operating conditions, so that the supply chain collaboration will establish itself as a natural

balance, in the absence of an active coordination.

A basic requirement for the establishment of such conditions is an overall knowledge of the benefits and

barriers to collaboration inside small enterprises' networks; for this purpose, we've designed a questionnaire

for the collection of primary data by means of a survey.

To avoid emphasize some specific aspects of a single company or industry, we've selected a sample of

companies from different sectors, either of manufacturing and of services delivery, to which the

questionnaire was administered through mailing.

The number of received responses was too small to have a statistical significance, yet some qualitative

conclusions can be drafted: the respondents had generally a good sentiment about supply chain

collaboration, although some significant barriers of cultural nature emerged; moreover, the upstream

collaboration (with suppliers) appeared to be preferred rather than downstream one (with customers).

Summary

INTRODUCTION.....................................................................1

1 Supply chain collaboration..........................................................7

1.1 Why collaborating? Comparing strategies................................................7 1.1.1 Market and Value..........................................................................7 1.1.2 Building a standard: a consortium example.......................................9 1.1.3 A continuous improvement..........................................................11

1.2 Is it all a Game?...................................................................................13 1.2.1 Missed collaboration: the prisoner's dilemma..................................13 1.2.2 To sum it up: when you have to collaborate...................................16

1.3 The problems of exasperated competition..............................................18 1.3.1 A race to be the last loser..............................................................18 1.3.2 A whip to all...............................................................................20

1.4 When is collaboration unfitting?...........................................................23 1.4.1 Incentives against cooperation.......................................................23 1.4.2 The missing link..........................................................................25

2 Comparing models...................................................................27

2.1 Being driven: model with coordinator...................................................27 2.1.1 Supply chains with a dominant firm...............................................27 2.1.2 It's a pleasure working with you: case study Toyota.........................29 2.1.3 It's not easy to work for you: case study Walmart............................31 2.1.4 Who's pulling all these strings? The textile case...............................32

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2.1.5 You can't make it peer. the limits of coordination...........................33

2.2 We must trust: model with trustee........................................................35 2.2.1 Cooperatives and consortia...........................................................35 2.2.2 Application limits.........................................................................37

2.3 Small businesses: peer to peer models.....................................................38 2.3.1 Collaboration for few: networks of small businesses ........................38 2.3.2 Models for the case......................................................................39

2.4 The tird way: a difficult balance............................................................41 2.4.1 The invisible hand of collaboration................................................41 2.4.2 Obstacle Course. Barriers to collaboration......................................43 2.4.3 I did it my way. Cultural barriers...................................................44 2.4.4 Who gets the lion's share? The barrier of distribution.......................45 2.4.5 No escape! Barriers of constraint....................................................46 2.4.6 knowing them, avoiding them. How to remove barriers..................47

3 The sample survey...................................................................49

3.1 The data collection model....................................................................49 3.1.1 The sample..................................................................................49 3.1.2 The structure of the questionnaire.................................................50 3.1.3 Section A: the company...............................................................51 3.1.4 Section B: internal collaboration....................................................51 3.1.5 Section C: the supply chain...........................................................52 3.1.6 Section D: risks and benefits..........................................................53 3.1.7 Section E: the binding level..........................................................53 3.1.8 Section F: motivations..................................................................54

3.2 Validation of the questionnaire.............................................................54 3.2.1 Pilot survey: mode of application...................................................54 3.2.2 Pilot survey: results......................................................................55 3.2.3 Pilot survey: conclusions...............................................................55

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3.3 Questionnaire application.....................................................................57 3.3.1 Modes of contact.........................................................................57 3.3.2 Results of survey: responses..........................................................58 3.3.3 Results of survey: bivariate analysis of relations...............................85

4 Conclusions............................................................................93

Appendix A –Questionnaire.........................................................99

Appendix B –Letter of invitation to participate in the survey...........117

Bibliography.............................................................................121

III

INTRODUCTION

The modern Economy is based on the division of labour, which allows all of

us to benefit from the advantages of specialization: if everyone does their job to the

best, the ending result is a high quality product at an affordable cost.

However, this means that any product, even the simplest, is the result of a very

complex task sequence, called supply chain.

It's extremely difficult organizing, controlling and coordinating a supply chain. Due

to the inefficiencies of the supply chains, a large portion of the value generated

through the division of labour may be wasted.

Many problems of supply chain management can be solved, or their effects

mitigated, with a cooperation between the involved firms; for this reason, the

Business Administration science is increasingly studying in depth the collaborative

strategies as alternatives or complementaries to the more traditional competitive

strategies, and is capable of documenting some important cases of success.

Unfortunately, the supply chains of small and medium-sized enterprises are rarely

present neither in the theoretical works nor in the practical applications of

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collaborative strategies, perhaps because of their complexity and dispersion, the

objective difficulties in developing a general model of collaboration, or other

reasons. Yet, in this type of supply chain the collaborative strategies would be

particularly advantageous because they would allow to overcome the structure and

size limits.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the collaboration strategies in supply

chains of small firms, highlighting the potential benefits they stand to gain, together

with the barriers that can prevent their success.

In the first chapter, we frame the issue of collaborative strategies for the

industry in general; the theory on the subject is vast and almost impossible to

summarize in such a small space; therefore, we've selected a few basic theoretical

principles, fitted out with some examples.

First, we compare the competitive strategies with the collaborative ones, showing

that the former are related to the value appropriation, while the latter to value

creation. The concept is illustrated by a few historical examples: the establishment

of the consortium for the definition of the specifications of the Universal Serial Bus

and the development of the Toyota Production System.

Secondly, we introduce the Theory of Games, through which we show how the

equilibria of non-cooperative games are often unsatisfactory for every player. With

this powerful tool, we can prove either the benefits of collaborative strategies (they

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allow to obtain the best possible result for the whole group) and the difficulties

encountered in pursuing them (the natural competitive balance is almost always far

from this ideal result).

In the third part, we discuss some limitations of purely competitive strategies; the

products' and markets' life cycle analysis shows that competitive strategies are so

effective in the maturity stage, as they're poor during the decline; Moreover, with

the example of the Bullwhip Effect, we show how the pure competition between

individuals sharing a minimum of information can cause harmful side effects, which

have serious repercussions along the entire supply chain.

The chapter closes with a discussion of the difficulties involved in defining valid

models of cooperation within a supply chain; the Oligopoly example clarifies that

there is always a big incentive, for some individuals, to break the collaboration pact

in order to maximize their own benefit, but this behaviour causes the failure of the

entire strategy; a good model of cooperation must take account of these issues,

providing the missing link that is used to complete the chain.

The second chapter examines some basic models for the implementation of

collaborative strategies, through case studies drawn from the recent scientific

literature.

The first described model is the supply chain with a Dominant Company; at the

state of the art, it's also the most important model, because it guarantees the best

chance of success for the collaborative strategy; the two different examples of

Toyota and Walmart show how this model is very flexible and is applicable to very

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different collaborative philosophies; however, the example of textile industry allows

to highlight this model's main limitation: it needs that the dominant firm be actually

in a position of strength, as compared to the other actors, otherwise it cannot

impose its own organization and coordination throughout the supply chain; This

limit makes the model unusable in networks of small businesses.

The second model, the supply chain with a Trustee, can be seen as a more general

and abstract than the former; in this case, a third party acts as an intermediary

between the different actors of the supply chain, allowing them to overcome the

lack of mutual trust. Practical applications, in the form of Consortia and

Cooperatives, show that it's a valid model for small businesses, at least in the

solution of specific problems such as the purchase of raw materials or distribution of

products; However, the need to establish a Trustee is a major obstacle to

cooperation, because it's a very complex task.

The review of literature shows a lack of Peer to Peer models, the only one which

would be suitable for an open collaboration along the dynamic networks of small

businesses; the example of Digita Oy demonstrates that the case study driven

approach tends to propose models tailored for the specific companies analysed,

which often are nothing but specializations of previous general models.

In the last part of the chapter, we describe a radically different approach to Peer to

Peer cooperation models which, at the state of the art, it is nothing more than a

working hypothesis; all previously studied models are based on the principle that

cooperation must be coordinated, which is an almost impossible task to perform in

a network of small businesses. Conversely, if one had built the necessary conditions

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under which the supply chain's "cooperative game" has a stable equilibrium, he

would have eliminated the need for coordination at the root; In fact, systems with a

point of stable equilibrium are self-regulating.

To make the collaborative equilibrium possible, we must identify and remove the

barriers to collaboration: barriers of Trust, Culture, Share and Bond.

The experimental part of this work is directly related to the study of the benefits

and barriers in collaborative strategies.

In the third chapter, we present the experimental method that we used,

describing step by step the construction of the sample survey, and we discuss the

results. To avoid running into the same limits of the case studies focused on a single

firm, the survey is designed so as to be carried out on a diversified sample of varied

firms, either from the manufacturing sector, either from those of services.

In the first part, we describe the construction of the questionnaire, highlighting the

structure, consisting of several thematic sections, and the logical links between the

questions and issues being studied.

Then, we show how the questionnaire has been validated by a preliminary

investigation, during which it was administered to a small sample of respondents.

We summarize the results of the preliminary investigation and the information that

it provided.

In the third part, we describe the sampling method used for the collection of

primary data and we present the main findings of the survey.

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1 Supply chain collaboration

1.1 Why collaborating? Comparing strategies

1.1.1 Market and Value

The classical economic theories have always placed much emphasis on competitive

strategies, based on a model of a market economy where companies act simply as

individuals who tend to maximize their utility function.

Market mechanisms, competitive forces and competitive strategies are undoubtedly

a basic knowledge for any manager; no entrepreneur who aspires to the success of

his business will forget to consider its competitive position.

However, in recent decades, the attention of the research in Business Economy has

gradually moved to the phenomena behind the creation of value, many of which do

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not end in the simple market transactions nor can be explained in any satisfactory

way with the model of competition, perfect or imperfect it is.

To better understand the problem of the creation of value, we need to analyse the

limits of the competitive model, comparing the different scenarios of pure

competition with the cooperative or mixed ones; observing the image below

(Figure 1), you can guess that one of the limitations of the competitive model is in

its extreme simplification.

The matter of fact it's that the presented model doesn't contain anything that may

explain the greater or lesser value creation by an enterprise, but only as may set a

price in a situation of equilibrium between the supply and the demand of a

commodity. To be honest, the former is the simplest competitive model; many

others have been proposed, with an increasing degree of complexity, to take in

account of such phenomena as market's imperfections, products differentiation,

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Figure 1: The enterprise is simply seen as a production function, which buys its inputs in the market,through spot transactions, and similarly sells its product; the balance between the product's offer anddemand sets the selling price

ENTERPRISEProduction function

Q

Demand

p Offer

SU

PP

LIE

RS

Sp

ot

tra

nsa

ctio

ns

CU

ST

OM

ER

SS

po

t tr

an

sact

ion

s

information asymmetries, and so on (the level of realism of these more complex

models is undoubtedly much better); nonetheless, one must analyse the supply chain

in order to understand how the value is generated.

1.1.2 Building a standard: a consortium example

Year 1994: a group of seven companies of the Information Technologies (IT) and

Telecommunications (Compaq, DEQ, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, NEC and Nortel)

decided to initiate the development of a new technological standard, in order to

make it simple the task to connect different types of devices to any PC.

while some of the companies in the standardization consortium are

complementaries in their market, other are frankly concurrent (think about

Compaq and IBM); if they chose cooperation, it is because they have reason to

believe that the greatest value generated by the new standard will ensure everyone

benefits higher than those achievable with any competitive strategy.

The standard we're talking about is the USB (Universal Serial Bus). After nearly

twenty years since its conception, we can state with certainty that the project was a

complete success and its positive impact on the IT market has been considerably

higher than what one would have imagined, for it extended to an audience of

individuals much more wide respect to the inner circle of the companies in the

consortium.

What would have happened if Compaq, DEQ, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, NEC and

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Nortel had not chosen to collaborate? Surely the the market "pie" would have been

smaller. Figure 2 shows, qualitatively, the effect of the introduction of the USB

standard in the IT and telecommunications.

The figure depicts an important paradox of collaborative strategies: the trade-off 1

between value creation and appropriation of.

From the point of view of the individual firm, the choice of collaborating has a

negative consequence: its market share is subject to the real risk of being reduced;

had the firm adopted a good competitive strategy, it would have gained value at the

expense of its competitors.

1 The concept of "trade-off" is very important in decision theory; it's a scenario where one has to choose between two ormore alternatives, none of which dominates the others, so that it would be preferred, or it's dominated, so that it would bediscarded. In real life decisions, you'll need to seek a difficult compromise under conditions of incomplete information. Itmay happen that, in retrospect, one of the alternatives is found to be significantly higher than the other, but this is notknown at decision time; a naive use of "hindsight" often leads to underestimate the objective difficulties of decision-making process. Indeed, as will become clear later, one of the major barriers to collaboration might be the uncertaintyabout the consequences of the decision to cooperate.

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Figure 2: With collaboration, each company can increase its appropriated value even if itsmarket share is reduced, because the total market pie is larger

On the other hand, the value generated by the collaboration strategy can be so high

to override all the negative effects, increasing the value gained for all competitors.

Last but not least, a larger pie can be divided among several parties; there is no

doubt that a wide audience of consumers have benefited from the introduction of

the USB standard (broad range of devices with many different features, easy to

connect and easy to change, at a cost significantly lower than that of the 90s).

What's more, some goods, such as pen-drives or GSM keys for connecting to the

Internet, would not have existed without the USB; many new businesses have

sprung up to manufacture and sell these new products; many jobs have been created

due to the existence of this communication standard.

1.1.3 A continuous improvement

1948: Japan was defeated in the World War II and its industrial system is on its

knees; Toyota, far from being the automotive giant we know today, is facing a

serious crisis due to a shortage of resources, and its management2 decides to

completely rethink their production system.

The actions taken in Toyota would have completely revolutionized the automotive

production systems in less than three decades: he was born the TPS (Toyota

Production System)3; at the same time, the traditional Fordist industry was

beginning its slow decline.

2 Toyoda Sakichi, Toyoda Kiichiro, Ohno Taiichi

3 Ohno Taiichi, Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production, Productivity Press, 1988, ISBN 0915299143

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The principles of the TPS have been studied, elaborated and applied also in most

large Western companies and an entire strand of the business organization, the lean

production, has seen the light.

Nowadays, Toyotism is more than a production system: it's a corporate philosophy.

What makes it particularly interesting, in this context, is the extensive use of

cooperative strategies inherent in its very principles: continuous improvement

(kaizen) and Total Quality Management leverage on the exploitation of the skills

and initiative of all stakeholders of the industry and the employees themselves4.

Another example of a collaborative strategy of Toyotism is in managing the

relationship with suppliers; Japanese companies do not waive having their suppliers

4 "The Toyota style is not to create results by working hard. It is a system that says there is no limit to people's creativity.People don't go to Toyota to work they go there to think " – Ohno Taiichi

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Figura 3: The Toyota method was created with the goal of eliminating all the waste in theproduction system, so as to optimize the use of resources; at least seven “muda” (source ifwaste) were identified. One of the operating arms of this system is the “kaizen”, orcontinuous improvement.

competing in the free market, but once that the best have been selected, they are

offered long-term contracts and relationships in which the exchange of views and

expertise is mutual.

Rarely will an Italian automotive sub-supplier be facing similar conditions: mostly,

its big clients will leverage the bargaining power to impose long delays on

payments, inventories and relative risk by supplier side and a continuous downward

pressure on prices.

What are the effects of such a "free" market on the competitiveness of the Italian

automotive sector is now quite evident, while it is less clear what were the benefits

of this purely appropriative strategy for those who have pursued it.

1.2 Is it all a Game?

1.2.1 Missed collaboration: the prisoner's dilemma

When, in 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published The

Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, the term "game" was first used in a

sense anything but playful5. Indeed, the Teory of Games has proved to be an

5 "A game is a situation of conflict (competition) in which the payoffs received by participants from their actions, choices,and decisions are at least partly determined by the actions, choices, and decisions of the other contestants” –http://www.businessdictionary.com. – game, therefore, is essentially a strategic interaction between the participants andthis definition applies either for chess than for war.

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extremely powerful tool in the analysis of the situations of strategic interaction, in

which the results are influenced by the choices of all subjects.

From this point of view, the competition on a market can be seen as an example of

a non-cooperative game, in which each participant tries to maximize its own utility,

given the knowledge of the possible choices of other competitors, as shown in

Figure 4.

The table is a normal form representation of the competitive game between two

firms, which must decide whether to implement a strategy to lower prices for

increasing sales; the numbers in the table are the payoffs (or winnings) of the two

enterprises in different combinations of strategic choices (bottom, for Company B).

Analysing the table, we note that for Company B it's convenient decreasing the

price, because it represents the best strategy given its competitor's behaviour6; the

6 Had company B reduced the price, it would have a payoff of 35 if company A had chosen to keep the price unchanged,while it would have a null winning if A had reduced the price. If B had kept the price unchanged, the payoffs were,respectively, 20 and -5. For company A a similar reasoning applies, even if the values of the winnings are different.

14

Figure 4: The decision of two companies to reduce the price of a product, to increasesales, or leave it unchanged, can be studied as a non-cooperative game.

30

20

Payoff matrix for A and BChoice: reduce the price

Company A

Unchanged Reduced

Com

pany

B Unc

hg.

Red

uced

35 0

-5

0

40

10

same applies to company A, so both decide to reduce the price.

Besides, once a decision is reached, none of these companies will want to retrace its

steps, because their payout would decrease; it's a stable condition called Nash

Equilibrium7.

The behaviour of the two firms is perfectly rational and yet, looking at the table, it

seems that their choice is far from being the best: if both had decided to keep the

price unchanged, their winnings would have been much higher (30 and 20 respect

to 10 and 0).

A very famous example, with the same game structure of the former, is the

Prisoner's Dilemma (figure 5), in which two suspects in a robbery are caught by the

police and held in separate cells; each is placed in front of the choice to confess or

not to confess the crime; if both confess, they're sentenced to six years in prison; if

none of them confesses, they'll still have to serve one year in jail for minor offences;

the most interesting situation is when one confesses and the other doesn't: in this

case, who has confessed is set free, while the betrayed partner will have to serve

seven years.

7 The Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which no player could improve his winnings by changing strategy if he werethe only one to do so.

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Again, the choice of confessing is a Nash equilibrium, while coinciding with the

worst result for the group (a total sentence of twelve year), when the choice not to

confess would have guaranteed the optimal result (two years).

1.2.2 To sum it up: when you have to collaborate

The above results are only apparently paradoxical, given that the context was a non-

cooperative game among players aiming to maximize only their utility and not that

of the group; is our point of view of parties outside the game that allows us to

capture the overall non-optimality of the choices of the players.

Not always the choice to only maximize one's utility is detrimental to the group;

let's rephrase the example of the two companies, that have to decide whether to

reduce prices or keep them unchanged, modifying the matrix of payments.

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Figure 5: The prisoner's dilemma. If the two prisoners had collaborated,choosing not to confess, the result for the group would have been the best;however, this situation wouldn't be an equilibrium, because each prisonerhad a strong incentive to betray the other, confessing in order to be released.Because the missed cooperation, each prisoner is sentenced for six years.

-1

-1

Prisoner A

Doesn't confess Confesses

Pris

oner

B

Doe

sn't

conf

ess

Con

fess

es

0 -6

-7

-7

0

-6

Even in this case, the choice of reducing prices is an equilibrium (Figure 6), but it

doesn't seem as paradoxical as before: firm A has lost a part of its profit to the

advantage of firm B, but it would have been worse if it had kept prices unchanged;

on the other hand, company B had a clear incentive to reduce prices, given that it

would have improved its payoff for any choice of A8.

The reason why the same balance seems consistent in this case and not in the

previous lies in the sum of the payments, which remains constant (50) for any

combination of strategies. In constant-sum games, the selfish behaviour of the

players does not harm in any way the outcome of the group.

The latter observation gives us an insight of when it's convenient to collaborate:

summing it up, we have to collaborate in all situations related to positive-sum

games.

8 In other words, company B had a dominant strategy; when there are dominant strategies, the game can be reduced byeliminating dominated strategies from the set of possible choices.

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Figure 6: In the competition between the two companies, you may be facedwith a constant-sum game; then the selfish behaviour of the players does notdamage the group.

40

10

Payoffs matrix for firms A e Bchoice: reducing prices

Firm A

Doesn't reduce Reduces

Firm

B Doe

sn't

redu

ceR

educ

es

35 20

5

15

45

30

1.3 The problems of exasperated competition

1.3.1 A race to be the last loser

While facing the competitive dynamics, according to the theory of games, we've

seen how the selfish behaviour of individual players leads, in certain cases, to a poor

result for the whole group; nor the players themselves can be satisfied with the

balance achieved, and yet they have no incentive to change it.

Returning to the supply chain, there are some competitive games that have as a

result to decrease the amount of value generated by a given sector; this was the case

of the "price war" game, in the non-constant sum variant, as described previously:

the exasperated competition between the two players ends up to deteriorate the

payoff for both.

This paradoxical situation is very common in supply chains and can be related to

the life cycle of products and markets (Figure 7).

In the early phase of a new product/market development, the generated value is still

relatively low; yet there are few competitors, so the redistribution of this value is

sufficient for the survival of the supply chain.

The growth phase is the one in which the value generated is growing so quickly,

that the "slice" appropriated by each subject of the supply chain is more than

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enough and quite all companies are enriching themselves, even though not in the

same proportion; the competition is almost absent, because competitors are too

busy to cope with the rapidly increasing market demand for going to war.

In the maturity stage, the growth of value stops and it's starting a efficiency-based

competition that, while penalizing many companies, allows the best to survive and

increase their market share; This type of selection can be brutal, but it is to be

considered physiological.

Sooner or later, for any market comes the stage of decline; the value generated

from the production process is no longer sufficient and it triggers a fierce

competition for survival, both among competitors that within the same supply

chain: between customers and suppliers, between employees and employers; this

makes it all a race for being the last loser.

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Figure 7: The life cycle of a market (or product) is closely correlated to the intensity of the competition; in the terminal phase(decline), the competition becomes exasperated: it's a negative-sum game, in which the moves of each competitor end uphurting everyone.

Market life cycle

MATURITY

GROWTH

START-UP DECLINE

Time

Demand

Often, this exasperated competition does nothing but accelerating both the decline

of the industry and that of the same players in the sector, while it would take

collaboration and investment to radically change the value system, developing new

products, new production processes or opening new markets .

1.3.2 A whip to all

There are even markets whose demand is quite stable; this may be due to the

specific characteristics of a particular product, such as long life cycle, its use function

that satisfies a basic need, the inability to modify the production technologies while

preserving quality, etc...

More often, a sufficiently stable market is built by aggregating many products with

different life cycles; a good example may be the large-scale distribution of consumer

goods: when a product declines, it is quickly replaced by another one; thus, the

aggregate demand is always similar to that of a mature market.

Even in this case, the supply chain is not exempt from inefficiencies and

dysfunctions that may be drastically reduced with collaboration; one of these is

known as bullwhip effect.

The bullwhip effect is caused by the fact that the supply chain's actors misunderstand

the signals coming from the market, particularly on the demand side; in case of long

supply chains, a modest peak of customers' demand is amplified up to determine

totally disproportionate oscillations in the production, as portrayed in figure 8.

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It all starts with the customer doing a modest extraordinary order, interpreted by the

retailer as an increased demand; this, along with the fear that the stock of the

product will run out, pushes him to increase his orders too; the wholesaler is then

required to manage a higher request than the programmed one, so he will

communicate an increase of the lead time to the retailer, who will thus have another

incentive to increase the level of inventories, ordering yet.

The effect propagates amplifying itself through the supply chain, up to the

manufacturer, who will be forced to significantly increase production, while the

unexpected demand is quickly depleting his inventories.

However, there wasn't a real increase of the market demand, except for the

temporary and modest extra order; very soon, the retailer discovers that his

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Figure 8: The actors don't share information about purchase planning and inventory management through the supply chain;everyone is left alone in parsing the market signals and this is cause of the bullwhip effect; the invoked metaphor is that of thewhip, whose small initial fluctuations are amplified to become very large at the end.

The bullwip effect: demand and inventory

WHOLESALERRETAILERCUSTOMER PRODUCER

time

Demand Inventory

warehouse is filling up with unsold and interrupts his orders, causing a similar rapid

growing of the wholesaler's inventory and so on, up to the producer; the latter, after

struggling to cope with the sudden increase of the production, finds himself with

machineries stopped, stores full and no order.

Fortunately, this disastrous scenario is not so frequent, because the effects of

unexpected orders on a product's aggregate demand tend to offset each other; the

fluctuations in production, where present, are within acceptable levels; but what if

an external event temporarily alter the aggregate demand for a product? For

example, in coincidence with a particularly hot day, it's likely to experience a

sudden increase in the consumption of soft drinks. In this case, since the instability is

inherent in the production chain, the bullwhip effect happens just as previously

described.

To avoid the bullwhip effect, it would be required cooperation between all the

supply chain's actors who should share between them more information about

market demand and stocks, in order to manage a sort of virtual warehouse9.

9 Matthias Holweg (op. cit. [6]) proposes several models of supply chain management, with increasing level of integration: a)traditional, exposed to the bullwhip effect; b) with exchange of information on the basic demand, through which theproducer can improve sales forecasts; c) VMR (Vendor Managed Replenishment), in which the manufacturer takes theresponsibility to replenish the wholesalers' stocks; d) Synchronized Supply, where the orders' intermediate decision points(wholesaler and retailer) are eliminated and it's like there were a single "virtual warehouse" that aggregates all the stocks inthe supply chain.

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1.4 When is collaboration unfitting?

1.4.1 Incentives against cooperation

According to what we saw in the previous sections, the benefits of cooperation are

such that collaborative strategies should always be crowned with success; seldom

does it happen in real world, unless under special conditions.

Let's take a case study of collaboration prohibited by law: the oligopolistic cartel10

between ostensible competitors (figure 9).

10 An oligopoly is a market where there are few manufacturers for a particular item (although not less than two); This is, byitself, perfectly fair and does not exclude (oligopolistic) competition between firms; what is not allowed (almosteverywhere) is the deal between firms to build a "cartel" in order to fix prices, the quantity produced or market shares,behaving, as a whole, as a monopolist; the antitrust legislation has the dual purpose of preventing these firms from formingcartels and punish them when they are discovered.

23

Figure 9: Two oligopolistic firms agree to set their own production quotas, in order to obtain monopoly profits; yet, in theabsence of penalties for the breach of the collusive pact, the equilibrium is unstable, because they both have an incentive toproduce more than the fixed quantity to increase profit

OLIGOPOLIST

q

p

Q

Whole marketquantity

MarketDemand

MarginalCostp

Typical companyquantity

UnitCost

MarginalCost

MarginalRevenue

CARTEL

pc

pm

pc

pm

qm

qc

QcQmq*

Let's assume that two producers oligopolists, A and B, had entered into a collusive

agreement to determine the price of a good, as if they were in a situation of

monopoly.

The former figure shows the points of view of the individual oligopolistic firm (left)

and that of the cartel (right); the cartel behaves like a monopolist, setting the

quantity produced or, equivalently, the selling price, in order to maximize their

profits (best result for the group)11.

However, the single oligopolistic firm has a strong incentive to break the covenant

of the cartel, because at the level of production allocated by the cartel, its marginal

cost is significantly lower than the monopoly price, then trying to produce more of

that determination would lead to increase his profits (best result for himself at the

expense of the group)12.

In the illustrated example, the failure of cooperation among the oligopolistic cartel

is a good thing, because it prevents the consumers to be harmed, but the

11 A monopolist maximizes his profits when the marginal cost of producing an additional unit equals the marginal revenuedue to its sale; in fact, as long as the former is less than the latter, increasing production increases profits, while when itbecomes higher, producing more is loosing profits, even if the revenues were increasing. In the figure, this balance isgraphically displayed by the intersection between the curves of marginal revenue and marginal costs of the cartel, resultingin the production volume of Qm (monopoly quantity). Given the demand of the market, this volume of product has to besold at the price pm (monopoly price). The whole production is distributed among the oligopolistic companies inpercentages established in the cartel's agreement; for simplicity we can assume that they are all the same and equal to qm(production of single oligopolistic firm).

12 The oligopolistic firm A would increase the production up to the quantity q*, where his marginal cost equals themonopoly price, but this amount, purely theoretical, is not really attainable; in fact, the increase in the volume ofproduction will lower the market price; this would increase profits for A (although of an amount less than the theoreticalone), at the expense of the other oligopolistic companies in the cartel. In the absence of some kind of binding mechanismsto make the covenant mandatory, each oligopolistic firm will behave in an opportunistic way, until the price will drop tothe value pc, below which no one has advantage in increasing production.

24

mechanisms underlying this failure are common to all forms of cooperation: any

actor can benefit from opportunistic behaviour, violating to their own advantage

the terms of the covenant, unless there is some binding constraint to make it

mandatory.

1.4.2 The missing link

In the previous paragraphs, we've presented the collaborative strategies using a

variety of theoretical tools of Business Management, Microeconomics and Theory

of Games, together with some practical examples, such as consortia for

standardization and the Toyota's lean manufacturing.

We've seen how collaboration is closely related to value creation, while

competition is for value appropriation. If properly governed, the tension between

these two strategies can produce excellent results for all, integrating the effectiveness

of cooperation in increasing the value generated from the production process, with

the efficiency of competition in distributing it between different actors.

Moreover, even in competitive markets, information sharing can be used to

eliminate the inefficiencies and instabilities inherent in certain mechanisms of

production and distribution, as in the case of the bullwhip effect.

Finally, no purely competitive strategy can save a declining supply chain, no longer

able to generate value: in some cases, the cooperation may determine the sector

survival.

25

However, many obstacles stand between the ideal scenario and the reality: the

Prisoner's Dilemma and the Oligopolistic Cartel are examples of situations in which

individuals, opportunistically pursuing their own interest, end up hurting both the

group to which they belong and themselves.

Cooperation, without any regulating mechanisms which governs it and punishes or

discourages opportunistic behaviours, it's a situation of unstable equilibrium that at

any time can be broken if even one of the actors is pursuing his own interest at the

expense of the group. Therefore, the choice to implement a collaborative strategy is

always a big dilemma (figure 10).

In the next chapter, we discuss different models in which collaborative strategies can

work; each of these models adds a missing link between the actors in the supply

chain.

26

Figure 10: The collaboration's dilemma. Through cooperation one canachieve significant benefits for himself and for the group, but it can alsoexpose himself to big risks

BENEFITS

RISKS

2 Comparing models

2.1 Being driven: model with coordinator

2.1.1 Supply chains with a dominant firm

Most of the successful collaborative strategies rely on that some of the companies in

the supply chain is coordinating the cooperation; the active coordination, by one or

more subjects, can remove the major obstacles to collaboration and facilitates the

entry of new members into the value network13.

The case studies found in the literature, from which were extracted the examples of

the next few paragraphs, are based on the paradigm of the dominant firm, in which

13 The value network is a concept recently introduced in Business Management, in order to overcome the rigidity ofMichael Porter's value chain model, which explains the creation of value in an enterprise as a result of primary activitiesand support; the value network describes it better a supply chain where many activities take place outside of a businessboundaries and makes it possible to follow the dynamic development over the time, while depicting the complexbranching of reports – Cinzia Parolini, The Value Net: A Tool for Competitive Strategy, Wiley, 1999, ISBN 978-0-471-98719

27

one of the enterprises of the supply chain, superior to the others in size, quality of

management and organizational skills, takes care of defining the particular

collaborative strategy and verify its implementation at the partners (figure 11).

Some of the partners in the supply chain will be functional to strategic partnerships,

while others to tactics one; with the firsts, disputes will be mostly resolved through

joint discussion (voice), that will lead to shared solutions and strengthen the loyalty

of the relationship; for the latter, where the discussion isn't conclusive, there will be

an exit from the cooperative agreement14.

Even in a collaborative supply chain, many occasional transactions survive; in a spot

transaction the subjects are not linked by a special relationship and the contracts are

closed as an "auction to the highest bidder."

14 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, ISBN 0-674-27660-4

28

Figure 11: In a supply chain with a dominant firm, this is responsible for coordinating the collaboration with its partners; thecurved green arrows symbolize the numerous information flows of this coordination. Different actors, involved in differentlevels of collaboration, cohabit within the value network.

PARTNER- voice - PARTNER

- voice, exit -

Spot transactions- exit -

DOMINANTFIRM

2.1.2 It's a pleasure working with you: case study Toyota15

Since World War Two, the Toyota Production System (TPS), which has been

already discussed in a previous paragraph, has experienced many changes, in line

with one of its founding principles: continuous improvement. What has not

changed is the guiding spirit of the collaboration of supply chain, aimed at reducing

costs and waste and generating greater value for customers.

According to the Toyota philosophy, the generated value is closely related to the

15 Li, Maani, op. cit. [8]

29

Toyota Supplier

Advantages

Stability and efficiency of theproduction chain

Increase the generated value,through co-design and the exchangeof information and know-how

Long-term relationship

Sharing of know-how andinnovations by other actors along thesupply chain

Responsibilities

Long-term relationship

Training of suppliers on continuousimprovement

Consulting providers on eliminationof inefficiencies

Sharing information on the objectivesand sales forecasts

Reduction of the variability of thepieces

Co-design of particulars, packagingand production process

Long-term relationship

Efficiency and continuous reductionof costs and waste

Constant attention to adequatecapitalization of the company

Co-design of particulars, packagingand production process

Sharing their innovations throughoutthe supply chain

Figure 12:The collaboration in the supply chain cooperative model Toyota; both Toyota than its suppliers haveadvantages thanks to the collaboration, as well as the responsibility to make it work properly

stability of the supply chain, characterized by long-term relationships, based on

fairness and mutual exchange.

During the design and development of a new vehicle, Toyota's strategy is focused

on trying to identify, together with suppliers, all potential obstacles to mutual

satisfaction; no detail is overlooked: seemingly marginal aspects, such as the

packaging of the parties, could have a major relapse on the efficiency of the

production process; the information sharing regarding the planned volume of

production allows suppliers to choose solutions and investment levels are most

suitable.

After the launch of the production, the focus moves to make it easy and

economical, for providers, the maintaining and, where possible, the improving of

the quality levels and the defect rate of the supplied parts.

In order to achieve certain goals, Toyota can not be limited to defining and expect

certain standards of quality; suppliers, even if pre-filtered by a rigorous selection

process, must be "nurtured" by the philosophy of Toyota and trained in modern

techniques of production and development.

All this has a price: the providers have a responsibility to continuously seek

maximum efficiency in the production process, including through innovations that

will be shared throughout the supply chain (figure 12).

30

2.1.3 It's not easy to work for you: case study Walmart16

Walmart is a leading retail distribution enterprise in the United States and its

strategies of supply chain management, like for Toyota, have made the school.

Based on assumptions similar to Toyota, Walmart has developed its collaborative

strategies according to a different philosophy (figure 13), fully focused on the

customer/consumer who must experience the highest possible satisfaction level.

The exploitation of the benefits of collaboration is more focused on the short term;

some suppliers may encounter many difficulties in supporting the continuous

pressure to reduce costs, up to be eventually driven to the relocation or bankruptcy.

Yet, some of them have benefited from this collaboration, which has led them to16 Li, Maani, op. cit. [8]

31

Walmart Supplier

Advantages

Obtaining the best quality of productswith minimum expense

Optimization of the investments inthe supply chain

Sharing information on current sales,for better programming

Improving its efficiency andcompetitiveness

Responsibilities

Sharing analytical information onsales

Redesign of suppliers' processes,where they don't meet the expectedlevels of efficiency

Delivery of products within the strictlimits of time and quality required

Continuous reduction of the price,year after year

Figure 13: The collaboration of supply chain in Walmart's cooperative model; Walmart's supply chain behaves like a"extended enterprise"; the level of coordination by Walmart is so high to strictly define also the time of loading/unloadingof goods.

levels of efficiency and focus on the product which perhaps they wouldn't have

gotten by themselves; moreover, Walmart is the first to claim for itself a continuous

improvement of its efficiency and its ability to inventory management and handling

of goods, year after year. However, it may not be a coincidence that most vendors

who have benefited from this collaboration have big names such as Levi's or Procter

& Gamble.

2.1.4 Who's pulling all these strings? The textile case17

A final example of a model with coordinator is a case study of the Thai textile

industry. In this case, the dominant subject of the supply chain is, in turn, in a

subordinate relationship with respect to its main partner (figure 14).

The Oriental Garment Company (OCG) is a medium-sized Thai firm which

17 Ekkprawatt Phong-arjarn et al., op. cit. [9]

32

FigurE 14: The model with channel integrator is characterized by the dominant firm dealing a close cooperation with asecond firm which carries the responsibility of the supply chain's coordination; in practice, we have two dominant firms.

DOMINANTFIRM

CHANNELINTEGRATOR

manufactures apparel; its main partner is Adidas, which is also its largest customer.

OCG, which has a qualified management and a certified production process, has

established a close collaboration with Adidas, by which is coordinated according to

the model of the channel integrator.

Collaboration develops following multiple dimensions: the information sharing,

through an integrated information system; a shared decision-making, for example in

the choice of suppliers; joint processes, such as inspections for quality control; the

sharing of resources and expertise.

Nonetheless, the case study just examined highlights the considerable difficulties

one has to face in building an effective collaborative supply chain when so many

small businesses are involved, even in the case of coordination by a dominant

undertaking; OGC's management is very satisfied with the cooperative relationship

with Adidas, while they have many complaints about difficulties in establishing

similar relationships with their suppliers, mainly because of the different corporate

cultures and the lack of standardization of management tools and operational.

2.1.5 You can't make it peer. the limits of coordination

The example of the textile gives us an insight of the limit in the model with supply

chain coordinator: it's not compatible with a peer to peer18 report.

18 Usually abbreviated to P2P

33

Most likely, the Oriental Garment Company doesn't have the size (or purchases'

volume) sufficient to impose to the suppliers its corporate culture, its operational

organization and its IT standards. Respect to its suppliers, OGC is more structured

and can rely on a more skilled management, nevertheless it's perceived by them as

an "equal"; as a result, the suppliers don't accept to be coordinated by OGC.

In our example, if over time the OCG will prove to be a serious and reliable partner

over the time, some of its suppliers will gradually change their business culture and

will integrate some processes with the client, while not reaching the level of

cooperation that OCG has with Adidas.

On the contrary, if the coordinator proves to be unreliable or the other actors, in

the supply chain, suspect him to opportunistic behaving19, they won't have any

interest in getting involved in a medium or long term partnership and they'll prefer

to deal occasional (spot) transactions at market conditions.

Putting it simply, the model of collaborative supply chain with coordinator can give

excellent results and it's both applicable to strategic collaborations as well as tactic

ones20, assuming that to at least one of the actors in the chain is recognised (by virtue

19 A typical opportunistic behaviour, unfortunately widely diffused, is it to negotiate the prices for very high volumes ofpurchases, in order to gain deep discounts, and then to comfortably withdraw the goods in small batches, so that thesupplier has to sustain the largest part of the burden and the risk of stocks. Many providers have no choice but to acceptthese conditions, because they find themselves in a situation of weak bargaining power; yet, the level of trust within thesupply chain becomes very low.

20 In the article by Li and Maani (op. Cit. [8]), the collaborative strategies are classified in a range that varies from "pureexploitative collaboration" to "pure cooperative collaboration" (where Walmart is closer to the first extreme, while Toyotato the second one). Given that "collaboration" and "cooperation" are quite synonymous, we prefer to characterisecollaborations by their kind of partnership that could be more tactical ore more strategical. The collaboration of Toyota isstrategical because it focuses on long-term results and all the involved parties are able to stably profit from it, while that ofWalmart is tactical, because it's capable to give results from the beginning and tends to exploit Walmart's strongest position

34

of greater size, quality of management, sales' or purchases' volumes, etc ...) the

authority to coordinate the collaboration; therefore, it is a model that doesn't work

in an peer relationship.

2.2 We must trust: model with trustee

2.2.1 Cooperatives and consortia

In the previous section, we mentioned how trust is one of the keys to the success of

collaborative strategies, perhaps the main; sometimes, a high level of confidence can

be placed in one of the enterprises of the supply chain, which acts as a coordinator,

but it's very difficult unless this company is perceived as dominant by the other

parties; in an equal relationship, the model with the coordinator may not work,

partly because of the low level of trust in the relationship.

A possible alternative is the creation of a super partes entity that acts as a mediator of

trust between the actors of the supply chain: the trustee21 (figure 15); this

collaborative model is very general and it can be linked to different specific cases for

different purposes and types, such as mutualistic cooperatives and consortia.

in the long run (this exploitation takes place in an "honest" way, without opportunistic behaviours, hence this tacticcollaboration is a stable model, and some of those involved are also able to obtain long term advantages, as in the case ofLevi's).

21 I is a legal term; in this work, it's associated with cooperatives and consortia.

35

The cooperatives are created in order to ensure its members commodities or

services, in a better condition than they would get in the free market (aim of mutual

benefit); members of a cooperative have a high degree of confidence in it; in fact,

membership allows them to participate in collective decisions in a democratic way,

according to the principle of one head, one vote22.

The consortium is a contract that governs a voluntary aggregation which

coordinates joint initiatives for conducting certain business activities23 and in which

some resources are shared in order to pursue a common goal24. This time, the role

of trustee is played by contractual obligations that the parties have voluntarily

subscribed.

22 Art. 2538.II c.c. - Italian Civil Code

23 Art. 2602 ss c.c. - Italian Civil Code

24 "A consortium is an association of two or more individuals, companies, organizations or governments (or any combinationof these entities) with the objective of participating in a common activity or pooling their resources for achieving acommon goal" – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consortium

36

Figure 15: The different actors supply to the low level of trust, which would prevent the collaboration, through theintermediary of the trustee.

TRUSTEE

Degree of confidence

The consortium is one of the few effective tools to run a successful horizontal

collaboration between competitors in the same market; in one of the earlier

paragraphs we've mentioned the case of a consortium for the definition of

specifications for USB; when it comes to similar issues, the standardization

consortium is the most used form of collaboration.

2.2.2 Application limits

The model with trustee is sufficiently general and abstract to adapt to many concrete

implementations; its main limitation is the necessity to establish an independent

juridical entity, which requires a high level of initiative and specific preparation,

hard to find in a pulverized network of small businesses; paradoxically, if small

businesses were able, by joint initiative, to set up a legal entity with specific goals

and responsibilities, they would have demonstrated to having already reached a level

of trust and cooperation such that make superfluous the trustee.

Another problem is the rigidity of the trustee with regard to the objectives and

methods of organization, which makes this model suitable for the management of

individual projects (e.g.: USB) or for repetitive tasks (e.g.: buying group), but it may

have a scarce evolutionary capacity in dynamic contexts in which the external

environment is constantly changing.

37

2.3 Small businesses: peer to peer models

2.3.1 Collaboration for few: networks of small businesses

The literature is particularly stingy of case studies on collaborative strategies in the

networks of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); it seems there are two

main reasons: the low diffusion of this practice in the real life and the lack of

theoretical tools of general validity (as we've seen, for various reasons, the main

models of collaboration are difficult to apply to SMEs).

Looking at the value network shown in figure 16, we understand the difficulties

you have to deal with in order to build a peer to peer model of collaboration.

First of all, the network of relationships and transactions between the various actors

outlines a highly complex and dynamic system that defies linear modelling as well as

stationary one; secondly, the characteristics of polycentrism and interdependence of

38

Figure 16: The value network, in the supply chains of small businesses, is a complex, multi-centered, interdependent andhighly dynamical system; the linear models or stationary ones are not able to grasp its fundamental aspects

Consumer

the system makes it particularly refractory to coordination25.

In fact, the collaboration between small businesses, rather than the result of a

deliberate and rational strategy, it is often a spontaneous phenomenon, based on

personal and informal relationships, involving only a small number of firms in the

supply chain and it tends to be unstable with the changing of the competitive

environment.

2.3.2 Models for the case

The present case study26 is an example of the difficulties that may be encountered in

the design of a collaborative strategy in a supply chain of small and medium-sized

enterprises.

Digita Oy, object of this study, is a small Finnish company that provides installation

services of communications systems at customer sites; in addition to having highly

specialized human resources in such activities, Digita Oy must manage purchases of

materials and all the related logistics. The collaboration throughout the supply chain

would allow Digita Oy to manage processes more effectively and efficiently,

focusing better on the customers' needs and drastically decreasing the stock

necessary to provide the service.

25 The polycentrism is incompatible with a traditional hierarchical coordination, while the newer technologies, successfullyused in the business organization, are based on the separation of activities in groups of minimal interdependence,something almost impossible in networks of small businesses.

26 Anssi Kaija, op. cit. [11]

39

The study was conducted with the support of interviews with internal and external

staff; its main conclusions regard the key factors of supply chain collaboration, areas

for improvement in supply chain management and collaboration model proposed.

The main limitation of this kind of work is due, paradoxically, to the excessive

knowledge in the firm that you study: the conclusions and the same elaborate

patterns come to depend crucially by the peculiarities of the particular case,

generating a plurality of ad hoc models, with no general validity.

Besides, the model developed for Digita Oy (figure 17) has characteristics similar to

those ones already examined, which are not compatible with peer to peer

relationships.

40

Figure 17: SCC model proposed for the case study "Digita Oy." The integrator partner (tird party logistics integrator) playseither the role of trustee, with respect to the sharing of information (dashed lines), and the one of co-ordinator, for whatconcerns the logistics operations.

Suppliers CustomersIntegrator partner

3PL

Enterprise

2.4 The tird way: a difficult balance

2.4.1 The invisible hand of collaboration

“Every individual... neither intends to promote the public interest,nor knows how much he is promoting it... he intends only his ownsecurity; and by directing that industry in such a manner as itsproduce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand topromote an end which was no part of his intention.”27

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or thebaker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their owninterest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to theirself-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of theiradvantages.”28

The world described by Adam Smith, full of individuals pursuing their own self-

interest, seems to be the farthest one from any cooperative logic, but the metaphor

of the invisible hand is extremely significant: even complex systems defying any

attempt at planning, coordinating, or governing, may regulate themselves.

The free competitive market is a good example of a complex system capable of self-

regulating; it would be impossible to plan the daily supplies of a big city, like New

York; the complexity of the system and the huge number of activities involved are

27 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations, 1776, Book IV, Chapter II

28 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations, 1776, Book I, Chapter II

41

an intractable problem with a centralized planning; and yet, not for this the people

of New York have reason to fear a famine: unless for wholly exceptional events, the

market will be able to meet almost all people's needs, thanks to the work of

thousands of totally independent businesses29.

The main reason why this system is self-regulating is the existence of a stable

equilibrium point30; although sometimes the system may suffer dysfunctions or be

disturbed by external extraordinary events, it always tends to return to its efficiency

(maybe not always with due speed), thanks to the stability of equilibrium.

Unfortunately, the model of perfect competition is not realistic: in real markets

there are many barriers to competition that make the market inefficient and, at

worst, they prevent the attainment of equilibrium; this is why numerous models of

imperfect markets are studied, such as, for example, the oligopolistic competition.

Supply chain collaboration between small businesses has some similarities with the

model of free market. First, the companies are small and no one is in a position to

influence, by itself, the success or failure of the collaboration, although this is the

result of the contribution of many. Second, each firm can benefit from the

collaboration, so there is a "collaboration demand" , while the network of

29 Given that free market is often the subject of criticism, because of its failures, we tend to forget that much of our daily livesand our well-being is due to its successes.

30 In the market model with perfect competition, there are many equilibria: First, the balance between supply and demand ofeach product allows you to set prices and production levels; similarly, the balance between capital and labour defines thetotal production capacity (frontier of the production capability); the interaction between this one and the preferences ofindividuals determines the efficient allocation of resources between capital, labour and production volumes of goods(which is also a stable equilibrium); finally, the exchange of goods in the market leads to distribution optimization (Paretooptimality).

42

companies, as a whole, can generate a "collaboration offer".

If we're able to find the conditions in which the supply chain collaboration is

established as a natural and stable equilibrium, this could operate between the small

business networks even in the absence of coordination; such a scenario, perfectly

compatible with peer to peer relations, would avoid the major limitations of the

previous models.

2.4.2 Obstacle Course. Barriers to collaboration

Market's “invisible hand” works without requiring, to those involved, nothing

more than pursuing their own interests; we cannot make a such strong hypothesis,

in a logic of supply chain collaboration: the enterprises must have some aptitude for

cooperative culture; on the other hand, the collaboration can be perfectly

compatible with the pursuit of individual interest, because the higher value

generated can increase the appropriated value for all.

Unlike the model of perfect competition, a cooperative equilibrium is an obstacle

course; there are numerous barriers to collaboration that may hinder its success,

even in cases where it would be a significant advantage to the parties involved.

Figure 18 depicts the effect of Trust Barrier; in the matrix of the game, in normal

form, we've assumed the payoffs for two companies, who may choose to cooperate

or not to (or, equivalently, not to be loyal in the cooperative agreement).

43

Unlike the apparently similar prisoner's dilemma, the strategy of cooperation is a

condition of stable equilibrium if both firms choose it; However, this balance may

not be achieved: if both companies start from a state of non-cooperation, the first

one that chooses to cooperate would incur in heavy losses if the other company

does not31.

This game has two theoretical equivalent Nash equilibria, but in real life, the

lacking of trust would result in a stalemate, in which neither firm wants to risk

making the first move.

2.4.3 I did it my way. Cultural barriers

The first barrier we face, when trying to develop any collaborative strategy in

supply chains of small businesses, is the lack of a collaborative culture within

companies.

31 However, company A may choose to cooperate, in the belief that it wouldn't be a rational choice, for company B, toremain uncooperative; In fact, if A cooperates, B's payoff increases, but it becomes even higher if B chooses to cooperate.

44

Figure 18: The barrier of trust to cooperation; both being loyal and being disloyal are conditions ofequilibrium; yet, the cooperative equilibrium may not be reachable

1

1

Payoff matrix for firms A and Bchoice: collaborating fairly

Firm A

Disloyal Loyal

Fir

m B D

islo

yal

Loya

l-5 50

15

15

-5

50

In the model with coordinator, the dominant firm will also coordinate the supply

chain, has the task of forming culturally the suppliers on the modern management

techniques of logistics, production processes and of the information flow needed in

a collaborative supply chain; moreover, in many cases the suppliers are preliminarily

selected based on the quality of their management and their own organization.

In networks of SMEs, on the other hand, it happens to deal with companies

without an effective Information System nor structured processes for the exchange

of information, neither for the supply chain management. However, the most

difficult barrier to overcome is not technological, but cultural; it's a matter of

resistance to change: "we've always done it that way" is the mantra that limits all

innovation.

2.4.4 Who gets the lion's share? The barrier of distribution

The barriers of distribution (or partition's barrier) are caused by the fear to not

receiving a fair share in the distribution of the value generated by collaboration.

The distribution problem is more complex than it sounds, as shown in figure 19; at

first glance, it seems a good sharing principle to allocate the value proportionally to

what firms would have generated by themselves32 and probably would it be

recognized so, in a hypothetical legal litigation. But is it really fair?

32 Surely, it's the method that most easily allows an unambiguous measurement, at least in the initial phase of thecollaboration, when the behaviour of the supply chain as a "group" is still unclear, while performance (eg. profitability) ofeach firm is well known.

45

Company A is likely to deem to be a fair mechanism rewarding proportionally to its

efforts or to the risks taken in collaborating; equally likely, this will not be

considered to be reasonable by company B, which has everything to lose with such

a distribution criterion.

2.4.5 No escape! Barriers of constraint

Paradoxically (but not too much), a significant barrier in entering a supply chain

collaboration could be the difficulty to exit from the cooperative agreement, once

it's subscribed.

For a company having no previous experience of collaboration, a too binding pact

could be an insuperable disincentive; what if the partnership doesn't give the

expected results (or the firm doesn't succeed in establishing good relations with

other actors in the chain) and the company cannot exit the cooperative agreement?

46

Figure 19: A fair distribution of the value generated by the supply chain collaboration should be proportionate to the risktaken by each company in collaborating or to the actual contribution it gives to the collaboration, rather than to itsindividually generated value

Company A

Company B

Individually generated value

Individually generated value

Risk/cost ofcollaboration

Risk/cost ofcollaboration

higher value, generated by collaboration

Likely value share of

company A

Likely value share of

company B

Moreover, when the collaboration is at early stages of development, its goals have

yet to be clearly defined nor there is consensus on the concept of supply chain

collaboration between the actors; by contrast, costs and benefits of the collaboration

are not known, except by rough approximation; as a further complication, the level

of trust between companies is still very low.

This is the time when the barrier of constraint is stronger: each of the parties

involved might want a very binding cooperative agreement on all the companies

except for their own; it's clear that, on this basis, it's difficult to agree.

2.4.6 knowing them, avoiding them. How to remove barriers

The primary goal of this work is to study benefits and barriers to collaboration in

networks of small businesses.

A systematic and thorough knowledge of the barriers to collaboration can provide

the right tools to remove them; understanding what are cultural barriers and where

do they intervene, how to measure benefits and costs of collaboration and how the

payoff is to be divided, what is the "fair" level of constraint for a given strategy allows

you to build up appropriate training programs, develop a shared system of SCC

monitoring and measurement and prepare terms of collaboration agreement

properly structured.

The full knowledge of what is hampering collaboration can be useful to remove all

the barriers and ensure that the collaboration will become the natural equilibrium of

47

the system; it can be used during the collaboration, for observing its state of health

and providing early warnings when things do not work properly; finally, it can

improve the estimate of the collaborative strategy's costs and benefits, highlighting

when it's convenient and when it's not.

48

3 The sample survey

3.1 The data collection model

3.1.1 The sample

Most of the literature studies the supply chain collaboration through individual

business cases; this approach allows to significantly deepen the problems treated and,

sometimes, even to interact directly with the staff of the company, with great

advantage in the understanding of the processes; on the other hand, it becomes

difficult to synthesize a model of general validity: very often, in the conclusions of

the case studies, it's stated that collaborative strategies are specific to each sector and

must be tailored to the peculiarities of the involved companies. We believe that this

kind of conclusion is driven by the method used to gather information.

Aiming to conduct an experimentation of general validity, the only alternative is to

49

study a numerous and varied sample of companies from different sectors. Thus, it's

inevitable to lose a lot of detail, but you will gain a greater vision that could bring

out some patterns common to all sectors.

3.1.2 The structure of the questionnaire33

The questionnaire for data collection is structured into six distinct sections, each of

which relates to a specific aspect of the collaboration of supply chain; the questions

are, as far as possible, in closed response, in order to facilitate the quantitative

analysis of the gathered data.

Given that the response rate to this kind of questionnaires is always very low, we

tried to make the compilation as simple as possible, minimizing its "cost"; on one

hand, the questionnaire can be answered only on the web34 and you're not

prompted for authentication, eliminating two powerful disincentives to reply: the

need to send a hard copy by mail or fax, and the unnecessary complication of the

logging procedures; on the other hand, the compilation is anonymous: neither the

person nor the company on whose behalf you are responding are traceable35.

Below, we analyse the different sections of the questionnaire, relating them to the

questions we ask on supply chain collaboration.

33 See Appendix A - Questionnaire

34 For the questionnaire design, we chose Google Forms of the cloud platform Google Drive; you can find the questionnaireat https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1SKVDLS8z6SbE4u_VzrmDnJVNhgp88PmrzwDGwF98cTc/viewform (in Italian)

35 Some people may give up to fill in the questionnaire, even if willing to do it, for fear of revealing "sensitive" data of theenterprise or because they are afraid that their personal data is used for other purposes.

50

3.1.3 Section A: the company

In section A36, we gather information on the company which the respondent works

for; the company is framed in absolute (size, organizational structure, etc.) and in

relation to the supply chain to which it belongs (product, industry, etc.);

Furthermore, we identify functions and role of the respondent (eg: if he's a

contractor or an engineer, if he belongs to the research and development or to

commercial, etc.) that could have a relationship with his vision and understanding

of supply chain collaboration and with his preferences about it.

3.1.4 Section B: internal collaboration

Also this section collects data "internal" to the company, but was separated because it

has a direct link with one of the barriers that you want to study: the cultural barrier;

if a company has a very low level of internal collaboration, hardly can it collaborate

with other companies.

Since the involved topics (management of information flow, interdependence of

processes, etc.) were not simple, and we had to keep the questionnaire accessible to

a wide audience of respondents, we've limited this section to only two questions,

accompanied by detailed explanation.

Internal collaboration reappears in section D (risks and benefits), as a strategic

alternative; we expect the respondent to be consistent in the two different sections;

36 This section has been modified after the analysis of the pilot survey results.

51

for example, if his answers showed a remarkable lack of internal collaboration, he is

expected to indicate it as the most advantageous collaborative strategy.

3.1.5 Section C: the supply chain

The framing of the company in the supply chain has mainly the aim to determine

the relative size compared to the ones of customers and suppliers; in fact, relative

sizes could be strongly linked to either the perception of risk (section D) and the

type of bond of the collaborative pact (Section E); for example, if a company is

smaller than its suppliers, it might consider very risky an upstream collaboration,

whose pact may be preferred asymmetric, more binding for its suppliers.

The belonging sector of suppliers and customers identifies the position of the

company within the production cycle, including the extreme cases of companies

selling to final consumers, as well as companies whose only "providers" are the

workers.

52

3.1.6 Section D: risks and benefits

In Section D we focus the questions that are more directly related to the topic being

studied; on one hand, we try to understand how much a collaborative strategy is

perceived to be advantageous and where it should be oriented (if upstream, with its

suppliers, downstream, with their customers, or internally to the company itself); on

the other hand, we examine the risks of collaboration, which often are inseparably

linked to the benefits themselves.

The combination of different answers should also give us an idea of how risks and

benefits are divided, and if there is some asymmetry between the company and its

counterparts (customers and suppliers).

3.1.7 Section E: the binding level

This section is devoted specifically to the barriers of constraint; this separation was

recommended, because the barrier of constraint is very complex: a too low binding

level can prevent collaboration, due to the lack of confidence, while a too high one

may discourage to even start it. In this section, there are questions that, more than

others, can bring out the internal contradictions in the subjects themselves: in fact,

the level of binding that you want for the other subjects is often greater than that to

which we are willing to obey.

Finally, section E should provide a measure of the degree of consensus that the

collaborative strategy would enjoy within the company.

53

3.1.8 Section F: motivations

Section F only contains optional open questions; in fact, it was not designed for a

quantitative study, but for a qualitative analysis of the motivational aspects; these

influence the success or failure of any strategy, more so if collaborative, but they are

difficult to pin down in a systematic way.

The questions in this section want to highlight what the respondent values and what

he feel is lacking, both in his daily work, that in the relationship with customers and

suppliers.

3.2 Validation of the questionnaire

3.2.1 Pilot survey: mode of application

For the validation, the questionnaire was applied to a small sample of the writer's

work colleagues; of course, the sample was devoid of statistical significance, given

that respondents all belonged to the same enterprise37, but it was equally suitable to

check if all the questions were complete, properly interpreted and self-consistent

(did not lead to contradictory answers).

37 Bimatech - Bottero Spa (Pesaro - Italy) is a company for designing and prototyping numerical control machines for glassand stone processing; it's a small working group of just over twenty people, completely controlled by the holding, Bottero,by which it also depends for the administrative, logistical and commercial services, while production is shared. During thedesign, it's usual to have informal working relationships with the major suppliers, but otherwise the level of supply chaincollaboration is very low.

54

3.2.2 Pilot survey: results

About half of the sample has participated to the pilot survey, for an overall of eleven

questionnaires delivered; in order to check whether the questions were properly

phrased, no additional explanation was provided to the respondents but the one

already integrated into the form.

Almost everyone has answered at least one optional question from section F (the

majority answered it all), thus demonstrating a remarkable sensitivity regarding the

motivational aspects.

3.2.3 Pilot survey: conclusions

Although lacking statistical significance, we want to summarize some qualitative

results: first of all, we can state that the theme of collaboration is at least recognized

as important, regardless of one's own personal evaluation on the feasibility of

collaborative strategies.

Most of the respondents indicate a preference for downstream cooperation with

customers; the internal collaboration, within the company, gains the second place,

while few respondents look favourably on the upstream collaboration with

suppliers, primarily because of an unfavourable risk to benefit ratio. This could also

suggest that the main perceived problem is the properly setting of goals, rather than

the efficiency (and perhaps the effectiveness) of their pursuing.

55

Moreover, the pilot survey has highlighted some shortcomings in the structure of

the questionnaire:

1. the closed answers related to the role in the enterprise were not sufficiently

clear; in particular it was not obvious that the roles of the workmen were

aggregated with the homologue ones of technicians and employees;

2. given that the firm in question is the branch of a larger company, the

indication of the company's size was somewhat ambiguous, so that who had

duties related to services common to the entire group indicated a number of

employees of "250 and more", while the others responded "20-49 ";

3. the above problem was also reflected in the indication of the relative sizes of

customers and suppliers, with the additional complication that, on this

matter, quite a half of those who had responded "20-49" now thought in

terms of holding company, applying a practical consistency (the holding

maintains all the relationships with customers and suppliers), but not a

logical one (because it contradicted the previous answer).

It was decided to modify the questionnaire to overtake these issues, making explicit

the roles of workmen and adding three questions that make it clear whether the

firm is independent, is controlled by other companies or it is part of a larger group

and, if so, who maintains the relations with customers and suppliers.

56

3.3 Questionnaire application

3.3.1 Modes of contact

The sample of companies for the statistical research has been selected from a

database freely accessible on the Internet38; it resulted in more than 25,000 e-mail

addresses, which were divided by macro-sector; they've been the subject of a

mailing, requesting the participation to the survey.39

About one third of the addresses used were no longer valid (probably they belonged

to companies now closed); besides, this type of mailing has typically a very low

response rate; However, it was still possible to get nearly ninety responses, which

can be considered an acceptable sample, considered the exploratory purposes of the

study and the limited amount of time available to carry out the investigation.40

38 This is the archive of Italian companies on http://www.guidamonaci.it/dir/; There are many similar lists whose the mostconsulted is probably that of the yellow pages (http://www.paginegialle.it/ ); However, the site of "Guida Monaci" ischaracterized for being made up of static HTML pages, all with an identical structure, which made it quite easy to write aC# program that sailed automatically on the site, extracting the names of individual companies, classified either by sectorand macro-sectors; doing the same with the yellow pages would have been vastly more difficult, since they are dynamic;doing it manually, would have been nearly impossible. Once the companies were indexed, their email addresses wereextracted by each company site itself, where existing.

39 See Appendix B – Letter of invitation to participate in the survey

40 The pilot survey had a duration of ten days, while the mailing and the collection of the responses to the final questionnairetook place over a period of about a month.

57

3.3.2 Results of survey: responses

Below is shown an analysis of each survey question41, in the form of percentage

frequency distributions of categoric variables; the sample has a size of 89

respondents.

(Q1) – §A – How many employees are working for your company?

The majority of the sample (60.7%) is made up of small businesses with less than 20

employees; medium-sized enterprises, up to 249 employees, account for nearly all

of the remaining portion (38.2%); indeed, only one company in the sample can be

41 For the sake of readability, the long answers are presented in summary form; the original formulations can be compared inthe questionnaire in Appendix A. For the same purpose, modes with frequency below a certain threshold (for example,2%) are grouped together under the heading "other".

58

Question n.1: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – pie chart

4.5%

34.9%

21.4%

23.6%

14.6%

1.1%

1

2-9

10-19

20-49

50-249

250 or more

defined as big, having more than 250 employees.

(Q2) – §A – What is the main sector of activity of your business?

The distribution of the sample in the different sectors of activity is quite varied;

although more than half of the companies belong to the macro-sector of

59

Question n.2: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

A-AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING 4 4.5%

2 2.0%

7 8.0%

3 3.5%

2 2.0%

7 8.0%

5 5.5%

2 2.0%

8 9.0%

2 2.0%

9 10.0%

2 2.0%

4 4.5%

I-SERVICES OF ACCOMMODATION AND RESTAURATION 2 2.0%

6 6.5%

2 2.0%

3 3.5%

N-HIRE, TRAVEL AGENTS, SUPPORT SERVICES FOR BUSINESSES 3 3.5%

P-EDUCATION 2 2.0%

S-OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SERVICES 8 9.0%

OTHER 6 6.5%

Answer Frequency Percentage

C-MANUFACTURING : Manufacture of food products and beverages

C-MANUFACTURING: Textile and packaging of clothing

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of paper and paper products, printing and reproduction of recorded media

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of chemical products

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of rubber and plastics

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of electrical and non-electrical equipment for domestic use

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of machinery and equipment not otherwise classified

C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of furniture

C-MANUFACTURING: Other manufacturing

F-CONSTRUCTION: Other construction activities

G-WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES

J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: Production of software, IT consultancy and related activities

J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: Other services of information and communication

M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES: Other professional, scientific and technical activities

manufacturing (52.8%), they are divided, in turn, in several areas whose the most

represented are the textile industries, the manufacturing of rubber and plastic

materials and those of machinery (we don't give a mention to "other

manufacturing", with 10.1%, since it's likely to be a rather heterogeneous

aggregate). Service activities are also well represented; in particular, as it's best

depicted by the answers related to the type of product, they're mainly about

software design, marketing consulting and market research.

(Q3) – §A – Is your company independent?

Almost all of the sample (88.8%) consists of independent firms, while only 9

respondents (10.1%) indicated that their company is either controlled by other

companies or part of a group; this means that the next two questions provide little

60

Question n.3: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Don't know

It's controlled by one or more companies

It belongs to a group of companies

It's a branch of a larger company

It's independent

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

1,1%

6,8%

3,4%

0,0%

88,8%

information, because they are significant for only a small portion of a sample yet

numerically small.

(Q4) – §A – Who maintains relationships with the suppliers?

Given the results of the former question and the information provided with the

questionnaire, only 10% of respondents (the nine not independent companies) were

supposed to answer this question; therefore, we retain that the results for this

question are substantially devoid of information content.

61

Question n.4: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – pie chart

68,6%

1,1%

5,6%

24,7%

Your company

The holding

Don't know

[Not responded]

(Q5) – §A – Who maintains relationships with the customers?

The same as in the commentary to the results of the former question.

(Q6) – §A – What is your company's main product/service?

62

Question n.5: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – pie chart

69,7%

2,3%

28,1%

Your company

The holding

Don't know

[Not responded]

Question n.6: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

The products were grouped retrospectively in similar categories, based on the actual responses

12 13.5%

12 13.5%

Software 7 7.9%

7 7.9%

6 6.8%

6 6.8%

5 5.6%

5 5.6%

5 5.6%

4 4.5%

4 4.5%

16 18.0%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Textiles, leather and footwear

Machines and components

Marketing and promotion

Materials for industry

Farming and food

Logistics and transport

Industrial packaging

Furnishing

Tourist accommodation

Training and consulting

[Other]

Once the products were grouped into categories, their distribution of frequencies

allows to integrate the information related to each particular sector (Q2), identifying

better the supply chain. Almost half (45%) are products of manufacture (textiles and

leather, machinery, materials for industry, industrial packaging and furnishing),

while services (software, marketing and promotion, logistics and transport, tourist

accommodation, training and consulting) represent one quarter of the total (25.8%);

finally, 6 companies (6.8%) belong to the food supply chain and the remainder are

dispersed in a multitude of heterogeneous products.

(Q7) – §A – What is the key Function in your company?

For the vast majority of companies in the sample (83.2%), the key function is

production or sales; this is consistent with the size of the companies and the type of

products seen in the table above; let's compare, for example, the exact

correspondence between the number of respondents who indicated "marketing and

63

Question n.7: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

[Other]

Logistics and Product Support

Administration and Finance

Marketing and Communications

Research and Development

Sales

Production

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

3,4%

1,1%

1,1%

7,9%

3,4%

16,9%

66,3%

communication" as key function (7) and "marketing and promotion" as product.

(Q8) – §A – What Function does your activity belong to?

You may notice a difference between the function whose the respondents belong to

and the one indicated as key function of the company (for example, production gets

now only 43.8% of the responses, against 66.3% of the former question).

This apparent inconsistency can be explained by comparing the responses to the

question about the role played in the company, where we can see that many

respondents belong to the ownership or management.

For the survey, it's very useful having answers also from individuals not directly

involved in the key function, because they are bearers of a different point of view.

64

Question n.8: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

[Other]

Logistics and Product Support

Administration and Finance

Marketing and Communications

Research and Development

Sales

Production

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

6,8%

3,4%

10,1%

9,0%

3,4%

23,6%

43,8%

(Q9) – §A – What is your role in the company?

55% of the respondents belongs to the property in a broad sense, as entrepreneurs,

managing partners, members of a cooperative or self employed workers, while

about one-fifth (21.4%) has a directional role (executives, managers and officials); it's

even a good sign that an almost identical fraction (20.3%) is made up of technicians,

employees and workers, despite the complexity of the questionnaire.

65

Question n.9: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

[Other]

Unskilled worker

Clerk

Highly qualified Technician / Employed

Framework / Officer

Executive

Self-employed

Member of a Cooperative

Associated / Administrator

Entrepreneur

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

3,4%

0,0%

13,5%

6,8%

10,1%

11,3%

2,3%

1,1%

29,2%

22,5%

(Q10) – §B – What is the level of horizontal communication in your activity?

The communication level is high or very high for 59.6% of the cases, while only

14.6% of respondents indicate a communication level low or very low; this is fully

compatible with the role of the respondents: in fact, low levels of horizontal

communication are more common between the unskilled workers.

(Q11) – §B – What is the level of integration of your activity in the company's processes?

The results are similar to the former, regarding to the level of integration of one's

activities in business processes; in fact, both characteristics should depend strongly

66

Question n.10: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

4,5%

10,1%

25,9%

33,7%

25,9%

Question n.11: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

2,3%

11,2%

32,6%

36,0%

18,0%

on the type of business organization, but we can assume that many of the

respondent's companies are structured according to a traditional functional form, in

which the level of horizontal communication and integration processes are almost

exclusively related to the role.

(Q12) – §C – How do you rate the size of the main customers, compared to your company?

Two-thirds of respondents (66.3%) believe that customers have larger size than their

own company; given that the majority of the firms in the sample are small, it's

understandable the little fraction (10.1%) indicating that a smaller size for the

customers; however, we could expect a higher percentage of companies of size

comparable to the customers' one, this could indicate that small businesses tend to

have few large customers.

67

Question n.12: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Don't know

They're individual consumers

Smaller

Similar or equal

Larger

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

2,3%

5,6%

10,1%

15,8%

66,3%

(Q13) – §C – What sector of activity do your customers belong to?

Respect to the sector of the companies, customers belonging to manufacturing

activities are less frequent, while wholesalers and retailers are increasingly significant.

(Q14) – §C – How do you rate the size of the main suppliers, compared to your company?

68

Question n.13: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

Manufacturing 34 38.2%

16 18.0%

7 7.9%

4 4.5%

4 4.5%

13 14.6%

11 12.4%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Wholesale and retail trade

Construction

Public Administration and Defense

Other activities of service

[Other]

[Not responded]

Question n.14: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Don't know

They're individual workers

Smaller

Similar or equal

Larger

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

2,3%

0,0%

14,6%

27,0%

56,2%

As for the customers, the majority of the respondents (56.2%) indicate suppliers of

greater dimensions, while a more balanced proportion (27%) answered "similar or

equal"; finally, the suppliers are perceived to be smaller by 14,6% of the sample,

perhaps it's not a coincidence if this number matches the fraction of medium-sized

enterprises.

(Q15) – §C – What sector of activity do your suppliers belong to ?

Also for the suppliers, we see a decreasing in the rate of who belongs to

manufacturing (although less markedly than customers); if we aggregate the services

of information and communication (software) with the professional, scientific and

technical ones (design) and other service activities, we reach the significant share of

18%; by linking this fact with the proportion of those who have indicated as main

function production or sales, we could infer that some of the other business

functions are outsourced.

69

Question n.15: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

Manufacturing 42 47.2%

8 9.0%

7 7.9%

5 5.6%

4 4.5%

3 3.4%

8 9.0%

12 13.5%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Wholesale and retail trade

Wholesale and retail trade

Professional, scientific and technical activities

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

Services of information and communication

[Other]

[Not responded]

(Q16) – §D – What is the main benefit that your company could achieve through a supply chain collaboration?

The results for this response should be evaluated very carefully; the majority of

respondents (57.4%) indicates that the main advantages are the improvement of the

product quality, the decrease of production cost, or the increase of internal

expertise; these objectives are all compatible with a positive sum game and,

consequently, with a supply chain collaboration; however, we should not

underestimate the fact that the relative majority of the sample (29.2%) indicated, as

main advantage, the increase of bargaining power of the company; this is a

potentially harmful aspect for the supply chain cooperation, because it increases the

level of internal competition and tends to transform the relationship in a zero-sum

game (in this case, the competitive strategies are more efficient).

70

Question n.16: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

[Other]

Improvement of working conditions

No appreciable advantage

Increase of internal expertise

Decrease of production costs

Improvement of product quality

Increase of bargaining power

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

9,0%

1,1%

3,4%

11,3%

19,1%

27,0%

29,2%

(Q17) – §D – What is the main risk which the supply chain cooperation could expose your company?

We immediately notice that the highest perceived risk (33.7%) is the reduction in

the freedom of action for the company, thus indicating a strong barrier of constrain,

while one fifth of the sample (20.2%) fears the loss of specific knowledge; nor the

latter is only a perceived risk: it's a real one; however, it is functional to the creation

of value: especially with regard to innovations of product or process, sharing

knowledge and skills becomes a key aspect. So the barrier of constrain could be of

an irreducible kind, because it's necessary for the operation of the collaboration

itself.

We believe that the decrease in profit margins and the loss of bargaining power are

two related aspects; the perception of this type of risk, indicated by 20.3% of the

sample, may be the direct result of a conceptual misunderstanding about the supply

71

Question n.17: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

[Other]

Unfavourable share of benefits

Loss of bargaining power

Decrease in profit margins

No appreciable risk

Sharing of specific knowledge

Restrictions on freedom of action

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

1,1%

6,8%

9,0%

11,3%

18,0%

20,2%

33,7%

chain collaboration (in the same way as having chosen the increase of bargaining

power as a major advantage);

Nevertheless, it's comforting that a rather high percentage (18%) doesn't see any risk

in the collaboration; while barriers of distribution seem to play a minor role, given

that only 6.8% of the sample fears an unfavourable distribution of benefits.

(Q18) – §D – What kind of strategy is expected to be most advantageous for your company?

Upstream and downstream collaboration are perfectly matched in the preferences of

the respondent enterprises; together, they represent more than four fifths of the

sample (81%); only 16.8% believe that the cooperation should start from their own

company (but we must remember that the majority of the respondents belongs to

leadership roles or to the property and, maybe, they tends to underestimate the

72

Question n.18: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

None of the above

Internal collaboration

Downstream collaboration

Upstream collaboration

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

2,2%

16,8%

40,5%

40,5%

difficulties inherent to their business; it's likely that the executive employees and

workers don't share the same opinion).

(Q19) – §D – What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?

Upstream and downstream collaboration receive similar rates, even as regards the

perception of risk; together they account for the 77.6% of the indications of the

sample, while 6.7% doesn't foresee risks in any case (given that 18% of the sample

had not shown appreciable risk in question n.17, this figure seems to be not fully

consistent).

Finally, it's really surprising that not less than 15.7% of the sample fears internal

collaboration to the enterprise; this could be an indicator of a strong cultural barrier.

73

Question n.19: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

All of the above

Internal collaboration

Downstream collaboration

Upstream collaboration

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

6,7%

15,7%

40,5%

37,1%

(Q20) – §D – If your company had set an upstream collaboration with its suppliers, who would be the one gaining greater advantages?

The fraction of the sample that believes its company can gain greater advantages by

an upstream collaboration with suppliers is quite small (11.2%), lower than in those

who fear that the suppliers will get most of the benefits (15.8 %); However, the

striking figure is the huge proportion of respondents indicating "both" (71.9%); in

this case, the collaboration is correctly interpreted as positive sum game; of course it

is not given to know if suppliers see things the same way, unless we interpret in this

sense the answers to question n.23 (but it doesn't seem to be a correct extrapolation,

even by the prospect of a qualitative survey).

74

Question n.20: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

No one

Both

Your company

The suppliers

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

1,1%

71,9%

11,2%

15,8%

(Q21) – §D – If your company had set an upstream collaboration with its suppliers, who would be the one running greater risks?

Apparently, the perception of risk seems to reflect the vision of having equal

benefits by the upstream collaboration, with 64% indicating "both" or "no one";

however, 30.4% of the sample believes that its business be exposed to higher risks,

against a much smaller proportion (5.6%) who believes that suppliers be more

exposed.

75

Question n.21: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

No one

Both

Your company

The suppliers

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

37,0%

27,0%

30,4%

5,6%

(Q22) – §D – If your company had set a downstream collaboration with its customers, who would be the one gaining greater advantages?

Compared to the answer on upstream collaboration, we note that it's decreased the

percentage of those who believe that collaboration downstream is equally beneficial

for their companies and for the customers (60.6%), while it's increased the gap

between their own company (advantaged for 7.9% of respondents) and external

parties (28.1%).

76

Question n.22: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

No one

Both

Your company

The customers

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

3,4%

60,6%

7,9%

28,1%

(Q23) – §D – If your company had set a downstream collaboration with its customers, who would be the one running greater risks?

Even more telling about the perception of risks and benefits, in case of downstream

collaboration, it's the 42% who see their own company more exposed to risks,

against 5.6% who indicates the customers; however, the majority of the sample

(51.8%) thinks that the risk is balanced (“both” or “no one”).

Compared to the upstream collaboration, the downstream one seems to be

underdog; this aspect could be related in some way to the kind of advantage you

expect to achieve from the collaborative strategy; upstream collaboration is more

closely tied to questions of production efficiency (lower costs, increases profits,

etc.), while downstream collaboration can give better results on product quality;

even if sometimes it can help to lower costs, certainly it's not ideal for increasing the

bargaining power of the company.

77

Question n.23: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

No one

Both

Your company

The customers

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

36,0%

15,8%

42,7%

5,6%

(Q24) – §E – Do you support the choice of your company (to collaborate)?

Despite the difficulties in its implementation, a collaborative strategy is well seen:

the majority of the sample (50.6%) approves it unconditionally, while 41.6% would

like to do at least one attempt (reversible choice; we should remember the high

number of respondents who fear a restriction of freedom of action because of the

collaboration).

78

Question n.24: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – pie chart

50,6%

41,6%

5,6%2,3%

Yes

Only if reversible

Don't know

No

(Q25) – §E – What kind of collaborative pact do you prefer for your company?

On the type of collaborative pact, it prevails the choice of an intermediate level of

constraint (56.2%) that defines the general guidelines of cooperation; it's also high

the percentage of those who prefer an informal pact, based on personal relationships

(28%), while only 15.8% would opt for a binding contract.

(Q26) – §E – What kind of collaborative pact do you prefer for the suppliers of your company?

79

Question n.25: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Binding contract

Written agreement

Informal

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

15,8%

56,2%

28,0%

Question n.26: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Binding contract

Written agreement

Informal

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

22,5%

55,1%

22,5%

The preferences of the respondents for the level of constraint for the suppliers are

very similar to those for their own company, even if it slightly decreases the

proportion of those preferring an informal pact (22.5%) in favour of a binding

contract (22.5%).

(Q27) – §E – What kind of collaborative pact do you prefer for the customers of your company?

Also with regard to the customers, we obtain similar indications, with a majority of

preferences for an intermediate level of constraint (54%); the ratio between low and

high level of constraint increases again, with 25.9% of the sample that favours an

informal agreement, against 20.2% who prefers a binding contract.

80

Question n.27: Percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – histogram

Binding contract

Written agreement

Informal

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

20,2%

54,0%

25,9%

(Q28) – §F – In your current job, what wouldn't you definitely want togive up?

First, we note the high response rate (55%) to this question which belongs to the

optional section and, being open, takes longer to respond; this figure remains more

or less unchanged for all the questions in Section F; this should indicate a strong

sensitivity to the motivational aspects.

Not surprisingly, the majority of respondents (27% of the sample) indicate that

autonomy, decision-making power, freedom and independence are essential: in

fact, as we've seen previously, the sample consists largely of executives and

entrepreneurs.

It's not negligible the percentage of those who don't want to give up personal

relationships (9%), especially when compared to the search for personal gratification,

which gets only 4.5%.

81

Question n.28: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

The open-ended responses were grouped retrospectively into homogeneous thematic categories

12 13.5%

12 13.5%

8 9.0%

4 4.5%

8 9.0%

45 50.6%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Autonomy and decision-making power

Freedom and independence

Human relationships

Personal gratification

Other

[Not responded]

(Q29) – §F – What do you miss in your current job?

The share of respondents is slightly below that of the previous question (48.3%) and

the answers are much more dispersed, even after being aggregated in homogeneous

categories; a significant percentage of the sample indicates organizational or

structural deficiencies (14.7%), while a few (5.6%) simply ask to "work harder" (they

are probably entrepreneurs who suffer a drop in sales).

82

Question n.29: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

The open-ended responses were grouped retrospectively into homogeneous thematic categories

Organizzazione 10 11.3%

7 7.9%

6 6.8%

5 5.6%

4 4.5%

4 4.5%

3 3.4%

4 4.5%

46 51.7%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Economic aspects

Market objectives

More work

Skills

Public policies

Structure

Other

[Not responded]

(Q30) – §F – In the current relationship between your company and its suppliers, what wouldn't you want to give up?

The percentage of respondents is lowered again (40.4%), however, the answers are

quite interesting; most of them (28.2%) indicate that quality of relations is essential

(trust, collaboration, professionalism and loyalty, human relationships), against a

4.5% which gives priority to economic aspects (bargaining and discounts).

(Q31) – §E – What would you like to improve, in the relationship between your company and its suppliers?

83

Question n.30: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

Trust 9 10.1%

Collaboration 6 6.8%

6 6.8%

4 4.5%

4 4.5%

7 7.9%

53 59.6%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Professionalism and loyalty

Bargaining and discounts

Human relationships

Other

[Not responded]

Question n.31: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

10 11.3%

9 10.1%

7 7.9%

4 4.5%

5 5.6%

54 60.7%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Contractual aspects

Collaboration and integration

Nothing

Transparency

Other

[Not responded]

Even in this case, the percentage of respondents is lower than that of the previous

question: 39.3%; in addition, 7.9% of the sample believes that there be nothing to

improve about relationship with suppliers, while 14.6% thinks that more

transparency, collaboration and integration would give benefits to the relationship;

finally, 10 respondents (11.3%) would like to revise the contractual aspects

(especially with respect to the timing and terms of delivery).

(Q32) – §F – In the current relationship between your company and its customers, what wouldn't you want to give up?

41.5% of the sample responded to this question; even for the upstream side

(customers), the quality of the relation (trust, direct and human relationships),

scoring 18%, prevails over the quantity (payments), with 6.8%; however, it's

possible that timely payments be not a hallmark of the current relationship with

customers, as it can be inferred from the responses to the next question.

Finally, many answers (15) are dispersed in heterogeneous categories; therefore,

they are quite difficult to analyse.

84

Question n.32: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

Trust 5 5.6%

6 6.8%

3 3.4%

8 9.0%

15 16.9%

52 58.5%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Payments

Direct relationship

Human relationships

Other

[Not responded]

(Q33) – §F – What would you like to improve, in the relationship between your company and its customers?

We got the same response rate (41.5%) compared to the previous question, yet the

answers are quite heterogeneous; 24.8% of the respondents would deepen the

relationship with customers (respect and consideration, loyalty, widening of the

offered range, joint programming), while some are disappointed by contractual

aspects (2.3%) and payments (5,6% ).

3.3.3 Results of survey: bivariate analysis of relations

In order to identify possible relations between the answers, we decided to examine

all the possible combinations, applying to the pairs suitable tools of statistical analysis

that would allow to hint out the stronger associations, to be analysed in depth.

Specifically, we used the non-parametric test of independence for categoric

85

Question n.33: Absolute and percentage frequency distribution of the responses on a sample of 89 respondents – table

Loyalty 6 6.8%

6 6.8%

5 5.6%

5 5.6%

5 5.6%

5 5.6%

3 3.4%

2 2.3%

52 58.5%

Answer Frequency Percentage

Joint programming

Widening offered range

Communications

Payments

Respect and consideration

Nothing

Contractual aspects

[Not responded]

variables (best known as Chi-squared test42), applied to the contingency tables built

by all pairs of categoric variables. It's a one-sided test, which measures the degree of

confidence with which we can reject the null hypothesis H0 (i.e. assuming that

between two variables there is no relation)43.

Because of the limitations due to the small sample, the chi-squared test is only used

as a coarse filter; we don't give an excessive emphasis to the confidence level

calculated: we've just established a very high threshold (99%) of it for the pair of

variables to be passed to the deepening phase44.

In the following comparisons, we analyse in detail some of the relations between

the characteristics most linked to the theme of this work: the benefits and barriers of

a supply chain collaboration.

42 David S. Moore, op. cit., p.510

43 For the test to be statistically meaningful, there shouldn't be very low frequencies (below a few units) in the distributions;unfortunately, the sample size is small if compared to the number of modes of the variables, thus it happens in many casesthat this condition is not respected.

44 Besides, some of the filtered pairs are still little significant semantically, because we already know they are related; forexample, the pair "is your company independent" and "who maintains relationships with the suppliers", has a rather trivialcorrelation, easily guessable without the need for a statistical comparison (not even reliable, because the vast majority ofthe companies in the sample are independent and this causes numerous boxes with zero or low frequencies in thecontingency table).

86

COMPARISON N.1:

"What kind of strategy is expected to be most advantageous for your company?"

vs."What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?"

In figure 20, we show the double entry table for the two distributions; the value of

chi-squared is 23.9, with 9 degrees of freedom; therefore, the comparison allows us

to reject the null hypothesis H0 with a confidence level of 99.5%..

A second look to the table shows that the relationship is largely due to a preference

(perfectly consistent) for the upstream collaboration, by those who fear greater risk

by a downstream collaboration and vice versa; the correspondent boxes are

highlighted, and the coincidence of numbers, even if totally incidental, allows us to

capture perfectly the symmetry of this relation (the theoretical frequencies would

have been very similar: 13.3 and 14.5).

87

Tabella 1– "Quale tipo di strategia pensa che sia più vantaggiosa per la sua impresa?" vs."Quale tipo di strategia pensa che siapiù rischiosa per la sua impresa?"

Figure 20: Contingency table – "What kind of strategy is expected to be most advantageous for your company?" vs."Whatkind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?"

6 22 7 1 36

22 6 5 3 36

5 6 2 2 15

0 2 0 0 2

33 36 14 6 89

What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?

What kind of strategy is expected to be mostAdvantageous for your company? U

ps

tre

am

co

llab

.

Do

wn

str

ea

m c

olla

b.

Inte

rna

l co

llab

.

All

of t

he

ab

ove

To

tal

Upstream collaboration, with the suppliers

Downstream collaboration, with the customers

Internal collaboration within the company

None of the above

Total

COMPARISON N.2:

"What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?" vs."In case

of upstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?"

As in the previous case, the relation emerging by this confront is consistent: those

thinking that the upstream collaboration strategy is riskier, also believe that the risks

of collaborating with suppliers are distributed mainly on their business; a less trivial

further relation emerges: who perceives a high risk in the downstream collaboration

seems to believe that neither his own company nor the suppliers have anything to

fear from an upstream collaboration.

88

Figure 21: Contingency table – "What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?" vs."In case of upstreamcollaboration, who is the one running greater risks?"

1 21 6 5 33

1 4 10 21 36

0 0 0 0 0

1 0 3 2 6

2 2 5 5 14

5 27 24 33 89

In case of upstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?

What kind of strategy is expected to be mostRisky for your company? T

he s

uppl

iers

You

r co

mpa

ny

Bot

h

No

one

Tot

al

Upstream collaboration, with the suppliers

Downstream collaboration, with the customers

Internal collaboration within the company

All of the above

Other

Total

COMPARISON N.3:

"What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?" vs."In case

of downstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?"

This comparison can be interpreted in the same way as the previous one, except for

a curiosity: the Pearson's test indicates that frequency of 7, at the intersection

between 2nd row and 4th column, is lower than the theoretical one (12.9); yet, we

think that this frequency should have been even lower because it's bounded by a

consistency constraint, for having considered downstream collaboration as the most

risky

89

Figure 22: Contingency table – "What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company?" vs."In case ofdownstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?"

5 8 5 15 33

0 24 5 7 36

0 0 0 0 0

0 3 2 1 6

0 3 2 9 14

5 38 14 32 89

In case of downstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?

What kind of strategy is expected to bemost risky for your company? T

he c

usto

mers

Your

com

pany

Both

No o

ne

Tota

l

Upstream collaboration, with the suppliers

Downstream collaboration, with the customers

Internal collaboration within the company

All of the above

Other

Total

COMPARISON N.4:

"In case of upstream collaboration, who is the one gaining greater advantages?"

vs."In case of upstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?"

In this comparison, it's worth noting that those who fear mostly the risks of an

upstream collaboration, more frequently believe that, under the same condition, the

suppliers should reap the greatest benefits; this seems to suggest that the advantage of

the latter is the risk of the former, in the way of a zero sum game (which, as seen in

precedence, is not conducive to collaborative strategies).

90

Figure 23: Contingency table – "In case of upstream collaboration, who is the one gaining greater advantages?" vs."In case ofupstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?"

0 13 1 0 14

0 3 3 4 10

5 11 20 28 64

0 0 0 1 1

5 27 24 33 89

In case of upstream collaboration, who is the one running greater risks?

In case of upstream collaboration,who is the one gaining greater advantages? T

he s

uppl

iers

You

r co

mpa

ny

Bot

h

No

one

Tot

al

The suppliers

Your company

Both

No one

Total

COMPARISON N.5:

"Favoured kind of collaborative pact for your company" vs."Favoured kind of

collaborative pact for the suppliers"

This comparison shows a strong symmetry in the preferences for the level of

constraint: if you prefer an informal pact for your own company, the same applies to

suppliers; even with higher levels of constraint, this attitude does not change;

therefore, you are willing to share the same responsibilities that you require to the

other partners.

91

Figure 24: Contingency table – "Favoured kind of collaborative pact for your company" vs."Favoured kind of collaborativepact for the suppliers"

19 5 1 25

1 41 8 50

0 3 11 14

20 49 20 89

Favoured kind of collaborative pact for the suppliers

Favoured kind of collaborative pactfor your company In

form

al

Written c

ontr

act

Bin

din

g c

ontr

act

Tot

al

Informal

Written agreement

Binding contract

Total

COMPARISON N.6:

"Favoured kind of collaborative pact for the suppliers" vs."Favoured kind of

collaborative pact for the customers"

Also in this case, the choice of the respondents is coherent: they tend to ask for the

suppliers the same type of constraint that they require for the customers.

92

Figure 25: Contingency table – "Favoured kind of collaborative pact for the suppliers" vs."Favoured kind of collaborative pactfor the customers"

13 7 0 20

10 35 4 49

0 6 14 20

23 48 18 89

Favoured kind of collaborative pact for the suppliers

Favoured kind of collaborative pactFor the customers In

form

al

Written c

ontr

act

Bin

din

g c

ontr

act

Tot

al

Informal

Written agreement

Binding contract

Total

4 Conclusions

The main goal of the present work was the study of the supply chain collaboration

within small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), with a special focus on the

aspects more related to the benefits obtainable by supply chain collaboration and to

the barriers that may hinder it.

We believe that scientific literature on this subject, although vast and rich in

successful cases for collaborative strategies, doesn't cover adequately the supply

chains of small businesses: first of all, the proposed models are mostly based on the

coordination by either a third party or a dominant subject, thus they are

incompatible with the equal relationships between firms in a SME network; second,

almost all works keep a survey methodology for business case studies, that highlights

the unique characteristics of individual firms to the detriment of the overall picture.

To avoid running into similar limitations, we collected primary data with a sample

survey, conducted on a variety of firms belonging to different sectors, while the

questions were designed to spot the very features (advantages and barriers) whose

knowledge is essential to elaborate a supply chain collaboration model for SME, that

93

should be compatible with equal relationships and able to function even in the

absence of an active coordination.

The sample of companies that participated in the survey is not large enough to

extrapolate quantitative relationships of statistical significance; nevertheless, it's well

representative of the sectors under study; in fact, it consists of small and medium

enterprises from different industries, both of manufacturing and services.

Almost all companies are independent and they manage relationships with

customers and suppliers directly; the key functions of the sample firms are mainly

related to the production or to the sale of the main product.

Responses were given mostly by entrepreneurs, executives and managers, but there

have also been technical, employees and workers, certainly carriers of a different

point of view. Respondents claim to have a medium/high level of horizontal

communication and a good integration of their work in the production processes.

Suppliers and customers are typically larger than the firms in the sample; yet, the

sectors they belong to are slightly different, although we still see a prevalence of

manufacturing activities, compared to the services.

The supply chain collaboration is judged equally beneficial, both if it's set

downstream, with the customers, than upstream, with the suppliers; however, the

latter is considered less risky or, alternatively, characterized by a more favourable

distribution of risks and benefits.

94

Anyway, the majority of the respondents admit that, regardless of the collaboration

side (upstream or downstream), the risks would be distributed fairly evenly between

the company and its counterparts.

The general attitude towards supply chain collaboration is quite positive; however,

it hides some dangerous contradictions; an excessive proportion of the respondents

fear the internal collaboration to their own company, while three in ten are

expecting an increase in the bargaining power, as a result of the collaborative

strategy; finally, many are scared by a drastic reduction of autonomy.

The strongest barrier that this study seems to reveal is the cultural one: in most

cases, the cooperation does not yet seem to be well understood in its nature of

positive sum game, where all subjects expose themselves to big risks (one of all, the

loss of specific knowledge) in the order to gain benefits in excess of what they could

have achieved individually.

Even barriers of constraint are strong, given that one of the main concerns about

supply chain collaboration, for the respondents, is to loose their autonomy and

independence; besides, a good part of the large consent that would be awarded to

the collaborative strategies is conditioned to their reversibility.

However, this kind of barrier is ambivalent; indeed, in case of collaboration the

majority of respondents would opt for an intermediate level of constraint (likewise

accepting the same level for the counterparts); therefore, they demonstrate to

95

recognize the importance of the equality in a symmetrical relationship and, not

least, the greater protection offered by a written agreement, compared to an

informal pact.

Distribution barriers don't appear to be particularly significant; generally, the

respondents did not indicate much difference in the distribution of risks and benefits

between the partners.

There's some evidence supporting that upstream collaboration be more favoured

than the downstream one; despite that both customers and suppliers mostly are

larger than the sample companies, the relationship with suppliers seems to be

perceived as more equal. To explain this singularity, it's useful to take into account

the questions about motivational aspects, which outline a greater habit of the

companies with their suppliers: with them, human relationships are stronger and

there is a greater mutual understanding and loyalty; conversely, the relations with

customers are much more detached and characterized by scarce loyalty and little

consideration.

Considering the results obtained, we believe that the theme of this research may be

worthy of further study, both through surveys conducted in a similar manner,

honing the questions thanks to the insights provided by this one, either with a

different methodology, analysing the detail of a specific supply chain.

96

With regard to the latter, in the field of textiles and leather goods it was found a

response rate much higher than the average. We guess that this supply chain can be

made up of enterprises culturally more mature and open to experimenting with

collaborative strategies than, for example, the mechanical industry which, even if

boasting the largest number of companies in the sample, has given less contribution

to the survey.

A study focusing on the supply chain collaboration in textile and leather industry

(among other things, connected to a typical compartment of Made in Italy, such as

haute couture) would not result in an excessive loss of generality; in fact, this sector

includes a lot of companies and the tasks involved, as well as their complexity, are

partly common to many manufacturing enterprises.

97

98

Appendix A – Questionnaire45

SECTION A – Information on the companyThe information on the company is required to situate it in absolute terms and in relation to itssupply chain

(*) Mandatory questions

1. How many employees are working for your company? *

Consider anyone who is in service on an ongoing basis, regardless by the type of contract

● 1● 2-9● 10-19● 20-49● 50-249● 250 or more

45 The questionnaire is available on line at https://docs.google.com/a/students.uninettunouniversity.net/forms/d/1SKVDLS8z6SbE4u_VzrmDnJVNhgp88PmrzwDGwF98cTc/viewform (in Italian)

99

2. What is the main sector of activity of your business? *

Classification reworked on the basis of Istat - Ateco 200746

➢ A-AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING➢ B-EXTRACTION OF MINERALS FROM CAVE AND MINES➢ C-MANUFACTURING : Manufacture of food products and beverages➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Textile and packaging of clothing ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of paper and paper products, printing and reproduction

of recorded media ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of chemical products ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of rubber and plastics ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Metallurgy ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and

equipment)➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of electrical and non-electrical equipment for domestic

use ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of machinery and equipment not otherwise classified ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of other means of transport ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Manufacture of furniture ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Repair, maintenance and installation of machinery and equipment ➢ C-MANUFACTURING: Other manufacturing ➢ D-ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING➢ E-WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION➢ F-CONSTRUCTION: Waste collection, treatment and disposal of waste; recovery of materials ➢ F-CONSTRUCTION: Construction of buildings ➢ F-CONSTRUCTION: civil engineering ➢ F-CONSTRUCTION: Other construction activities ➢ G-WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND

MOTORCYCLES➢ H-TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE: Land transport and via pipelines ➢ H-TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE: Warehousing and support of activities for

transportation➢ H-TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE: Postal and courier activities ➢ H-TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE: Other transport services ➢ I-SERVICES OF ACCOMMODATION AND RESTAURATION➢ J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: Telecommunications ➢ J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: Production of software, IT

consultancy and related activities

46 http://www.istat.it/en/archive/17959

100

➢ J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: Other services of information and communication

➢ K-FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE➢ L-REAL ESTATE➢ M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES: Architectural and

engineering activities; technical testing and analysis➢ M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES: Scientific research

and development ➢ M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES: Advertising and

market research ➢ M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES: Other professional,

scientific and technical activities➢ N-HIRE, TRAVEL AGENTS, SUPPORT SERVICES FOR BUSINESSES➢ O-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENSE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL

INSURANCE➢ P-EDUCATION➢ Q-HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK➢ R-ARTS, SPORTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION➢ S-OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SERVICES➢ T-ACTIVITIES OF HOUSEHOLDS AS EMPLOYERS FOR HOMEWORKERS;

PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES UNDIFFERENTIATED FOR OWN USE OF HOUSEHOLDS

➢ U-EXTRATERRITORIAL ORGANISATIONS AND BODIES

3. Is your company independent? *

Companies can be independent, belonging to a group controlled by a parent company (holding), orbe participated by other companies that own the economic control, by law or as a matter of fact. Insome cases, a firm may be only a detachment (branch) of a larger undertaking.

● It's independent● It's a branch of a larger company● It belongs to a group of companies● It's controlled by one or more companies● Don't know

101

4. Who maintains relationships with the suppliers?

Respond only if your company is part of a group, or it's the branch of a larger undertaking(considered as a holding, for the purposes of this response)

● Your company● The holding● Don't know

5. Who maintains relationships with the customers?

Respond only if your company is part of a group, or it's the branch of a larger undertaking(considered as a holding, for the purposes of this response)

● Your company● The holding● Don't know

6. What is your company's main product/service?

Briefly describe what product or service is the main result of the company activity (for example:"Machine tools")

102

7. What is the key Function in your company? *

The activities of an enterprise can be grouped by Function; choose the Function you consider themost important one of your firm, from the list below, or specify a different one

● Production of the main product / delivery of the main service● Sales of the main product / service● Research and Development● Marketing and Communications● Administration and Finance● Logistics and Product Support● Other: [specify]

8. What Function does your activity belong to? *

Choose the Function to which your activity belongs, according to a prevalence criterion, or specifya different one

● Production of the main product / delivery of the main service● Sales of the main product / service● Research and Development● Marketing and Communications● Administration and Finance● Logistics and Product Support● Other: [specify]

9. What is your role in the company? *

The role is different from the activity one performs as well as from the Function to which it belongs,but it's an indicator of one's degree of autonomy in decision-making

● Entrepreneur

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● Associated / Administrator● Member of a Cooperative for production or services● Self-employed (trader / craftsman)● Executive● Framework / Officer● Highly qualified Technician / Employed● Clerk● Unskilled worker● Other: [specify]

SECTION B - Level of internal collaborationThe questions in this section are intended to assess the level of internal collaboration in yourcompany; it's a key aspect, because a low level of internal collaboration it's likely to be a firstimportant barrier to the supply chain collaboration

10. What is the level of horizontal communication in your activity.*

Vertical communication follows the hierarchical chain, while the horizontal one is establishedbetween collaborators placed at the same level, who may be part or not of a single functional group.While the first form of communication is essential in almost all businesses, the second one is adistinctive feature which depends on the type of corporate culture, on the management style and, ofcourse, on ones' duties. Choose the level of horizontal communication related to your employment,defined as exchange of information necessary to achieve the objectives of your task.

● Very low (no relevant communication)● Low (only within your functional group)● Medium (occasional communications with other functional groups, at formal

meetings)● High (frequent communications with other functional groups )● Very high (extensive and continuous communications with most functional

groups)

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11. What is the level of integration of your activity in the company's processes? *

Functional groups divide the enterprise in specialized activities; in this sense, each employee belongsto a function (sales, production, etc ...); at the same time, each process is a combination ofspecialized activities, coordinated for achieving a certain goal (e.g. selling, manufacturing, deliveryand launch of a plant at a customer). Some activities are, by their nature, highly integrated inbusiness processes; conversely, others can be carried out even without any information or awarenessof the processes; however, the actual level of processes' integration is also a consequence of thespecific corporate culture. Choose the level of integration related to your activity.

● Very low (total separation between activities and processes)● Low (activities are partly influenced by the different processes)● Medium (for the effective performance of the activities, at least a rough

knowledge of the processes is needed)● High (it's required a deep understanding of the processes and a continuous

interaction with them)● Very high (the activity itself consists in the coordination of processes)

SECTION C - Information on supply chainThe information on the supply chain is integrated with that of Section A, for completing theframework of the enterprise.

12. How do you rate the size of the main customers, compared to your company? *

There can be different parameters for rating the size of a company (number of employees, turnover,etc.); evaluate the sizes based on the parameter that you know best.

● Larger● Smaller● Similar or equal

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● They're individual consumers● Don't know

13. What sector of activity do your company's principal customers belong to?

(Not to be responded if you answered the former question: “individual consumers”)

➢ A-AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING➢ B-EXTRACTION OF MINERALS FROM CAVE AND MINES➢ C-MANUFACTURING➢ D-ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING➢ E-WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION➢ F-CONSTRUCTION➢ G-WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND

MOTORCYCLES➢ H-TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE➢ I-SERVICES OF ACCOMMODATION AND RESTAURATION➢ J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION➢ K-FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE➢ L-REAL ESTATE➢ M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES➢ N-HIRE, TRAVEL AGENTS, SUPPORT SERVICES FOR BUSINESSES➢ O-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENSE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL

INSURANCE➢ P-EDUCATION➢ Q-HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK➢ R-ARTS, SPORTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION➢ S-OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SERVICES➢ T-ACTIVITIES OF HOUSEHOLDS AS EMPLOYERS FOR HOMEWORKERS;

PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES UNDIFFERENTIATED FOR OWN USE OF HOUSEHOLDS

➢ U-EXTRATERRITORIAL ORGANISATIONS AND BODIES

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14. How do you rate the size of the main suppliers, compared to your company? *

There can be different parameters for rating the size of a company (number of employees, turnover,etc.); evaluate the sizes based on the parameter that you know best.

● Larger● Smaller● Similar or equal● They're individual workers● Don't know

15. What sector of activity do your company's principal suppliers belong to?

(Not to be responded if you answered the former question: “individual workers”)

➢ A-AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING➢ B-EXTRACTION OF MINERALS FROM CAVE AND MINES➢ C-MANUFACTURING➢ D-ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING➢ E-WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION➢ F-CONSTRUCTION➢ G-WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND

MOTORCYCLES➢ H-TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE➢ I-SERVICES OF ACCOMMODATION AND RESTAURATION➢ J-SERVICES OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION➢ K-FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE➢ L-REAL ESTATE➢ M-PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES➢ N-HIRE, TRAVEL AGENTS, SUPPORT SERVICES FOR BUSINESSES➢ O-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENSE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL

INSURANCE➢ P-EDUCATION➢ Q-HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK➢ R-ARTS, SPORTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION

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➢ S-OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SERVICES➢ T-ACTIVITIES OF HOUSEHOLDS AS EMPLOYERS FOR HOMEWORKERS;

PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES UNDIFFERENTIATED FOR OWN USE OF HOUSEHOLDS

➢ U-EXTRATERRITORIAL ORGANISATIONS AND BODIES

SECTION D – Benefits and risks of collaborationIn this section, we consider two factors that play a key role in collaborative strategies: the benefitsthat can be achieved through collaboration (positive action) and the risks to which collaborationexposes (negative action); the success of the strategy is largely due to the correct balance of these twoantithetical forces.

16. What is the main benefit that your company could achieve through a supply chain collaboration? *

The following list summarizes some of the typical benefits of a collaborative strategy; choose the onewhich best suits your business unless you specify a different one.

● Decrease of production costs● Improvement of product quality● Increase of internal expertise● Improvement of working conditions● Increase of bargaining power of the company● No appreciable advantage● Other: [specify]

17. What is the main risk which the supply chain cooperation could expose your company? *

The following list summarizes some of the typical risks of a collaborative strategy; choose the onewhich best suits your business unless you specify a different one.

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● Loss of bargaining power of the company● Decrease in profit margins● Restrictions on freedom of action● Sharing of specific knowledge with other companies collaborating● Unfavourable share of benefits, compared with other companies collaborating● No appreciable risk● Other: [specify]

18. What kind of strategy is expected to be most advantageous for your company? *

Choose one of the listed answers, according to a criterion of prevalence.

● Upstream collaboration with suppliers● Downstream collaboration with customers● Internal collaboration within the company itself● None of the above

19. What kind of strategy is expected to be most risky for your company? *

Choose one of the listed answers, according to a criterion of prevalence.

● Upstream collaboration with suppliers● Downstream collaboration with customers● Internal collaboration within the company itself● All of the above

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20. If your company had set an upstream collaboration withits suppliers, who would be the one gaining greater advantages? *

Choose one answer from the list, regardless of the fact that the collaboration be hypothetical, or thatyour company be actually following this kind of strategy.

● The suppliers● Your company● Both● No one

21. If your company had set an upstream collaboration withits suppliers, who would be the one running greater risks? *

Choose one answer from the list, regardless of the fact that the collaboration be hypothetical, or thatyour company be actually following this kind of strategy.

● The suppliers● Your company● Both● No one

22. If your company had set a downstream collaboration with its customers, who would be the one gaining greater advantages? *

Choose one answer from the list, regardless of the fact that the collaboration be hypothetical, or thatyour company be actually following this kind of strategy.

● The customers● Your company● Both

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● No one

23. If your company had set a downstream collaboration with its customers, who would be the one running greater risks? *

Choose one answer from the list, regardless of the fact that the collaboration be hypothetical, or thatyour company be actually following this kind of strategy.

● The customers● Your company● Both● No one

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SECTION E - The level of binding within the supply chain collaboration

A very important barrier to supply chain collaboration is the difficulty to get out of the "collaborativepact" by a company that experiences an unfavourable benefits to risks ratio. Some collaborativestrategies require a high level of constraint and involvement, others allow a freedom of action almostequivalent to that which would occur in the absence of cooperation; nor is it a discretionary choice,but it's the nature of the type of strategy to determine the level of binding. As a first approximation,it can be assumed that in a collaborative strategy the level of constraint, the benefits achievable andthe risks involved should be proportionate to each other. In the following questions, assume thatyour company has decided to start some form of supply chain collaboration and it's evaluating thestrategy to be adopted and the relative level of constraint (if it actually happened, refer to what youthought when you were informed or participated the decision)

24. Do you support the choice of your company? *

● No● Yes● Only if it is a reversible decision● Don't know

25. What kind of collaborative pact do you prefer for your company? *

If you don't agree with the decision of your company, choose the option that you consider lessunfavourable.

● Informal and based on personal relationships● Based on a written agreement, which sets objectives and general guidelines● Based on binding contracts, which specify all the details and the breakdowns of

risks and rewards

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26. What kind of collaborative pact do you prefer for the suppliers of your company? *

Assume an upstream collaboration and choose the alternative that you consider more favourable toyour company.

● Informal and based on personal relationships● Based on a written agreement, which sets objectives and general guidelines● Based on binding contracts, which specify all the details and the breakdowns of

risks and rewards

27. What kind of collaborative pact do you prefer for the customers of your company? *

Assume a downstream collaboration and choose the alternative that you consider more favourable toyour company.

● Informal and based on personal relationships● Based on a written agreement, which sets objectives and general guidelines● Based on binding contracts, which specify all the details and the breakdowns of

risks and rewards

SECTION F – Motivational informationMotivational aspects can have a significant influence in the success (or failure) of any strategy, evenmore so if it involves a collaboration between different subjects. The ways in which this influenceoccurs are complex and difficult to evaluate in terms of quantity, but it was considered equally usefulto gather information that could give qualitative clues. The questions in this section are all open andoptional. If you don't want to answer, you can skip this section and send the questionnaire, which isconsidered complete.

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28. In your current job, what wouldn't you definitely want to give up?

Briefly describe one aspect (if any) that you believe truly fundamental, in the absence of which youwould like to change jobs. It can concern both tangible elements, such as duties and wages, andintangible ones, such as personal relationships and skills.

29. What do you miss in your current job?

Briefly describe an aspect that is missing in your work and you consider just as important than theprevious.

30. In the current relationship between your company and its suppliers, what wouldn't you want to give up?

Briefly describe one aspect (if any) that you believe truly fundamental, in the absence of which youwould like your company to choose different suppliers.

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31. What would you like to improve, in the relationship between your company and its suppliers?

Briefly describe how could it be improved, in your view, the relationship between your companyand its suppliers.

32. In the current relationship between your company and its customers, what wouldn't you want to give up?

Briefly describe one aspect (if any) that you believe truly fundamental, in the absence of which youwould like your company to operate in a different market.

33. What would you like to improve, in the relationship between your company and its customers?

Briefly describe how could it be improved, in your view, the relationship between your companyand its customers.

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Appendix B – Letter of invitation to participate in the survey

FRM: EMILIANO BIGOZZI <e.bigozzi@students.uninettunouniversity.net>TO: < void >CCN: < ... mailing list ... >

SUBJECT: Survey on Supply Chain Collaboration - <SECTOR>

Dear Sirs,

With this mail, we invite you to participate in a research project by the UniversityUninettuno (http://www.uninettunouniversity.net), aimed at drafting a thesisentitled "Strategies for supply chain collaboration: benefits and barriers"; theexperimental part requires filling out a simple online questionnaire that will collectthe primary data for subsequent statistical analysis (go to the questionnaire).

Our main goal goal is gaining knowledge the benefits derivable from collaborativesupply chain strategies and the barriers that hinder their success, especially amongnetworks of small and very small enterprises.

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In particular, we try to answer the following questions:

1. What are the benefits of collaboration and how are they shared?

2. What are the barriers to collaboration and where are they stronger?

3. Would it have a good level of consensus, within the company, the choice ofa collaborative strategy? Under what conditions?

The questionnaire consists of six sections, divided by topic, with structuredquestions regarding the company, its organization and corporate culture, the supplychain context, risks and benefits of collaboration and motivational aspects.

Questions are designed to gather the views of several employees of each company;in addition, to encourage as many responses as possible, we've decided to make itanonymous the online form (go to the questionnaire).

Each response is valuable by itself. Nevertheless, it's important to achieve a highnumber of responses for the findings to be statistically significant.

If you aren't interested in or you don't have time to respond personally, we kindlyask you to forward this message to the largest possible number of employees of yourcompany.

The questionnaire can be filled online only, at the address accessible by clicking onthe following link: SUPPLY CHAIN COLLABORATION –QUESTIONNAIRE ("LA COLLABORAZIONE NELLE FILIEREPRODUTTIVE – QUESTIONARIO")"47

47 https://docs.google.com/a/students.uninettunouniversity.net/forms/d/1SKVDLS8z6SbE4u_VzrmDnJVNhgp88PmrzwDGwF98cTc/viewform (in Italian)

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Read more: Supply chain collaboration ("Indagine sulle strategie collaborative difiliera")"48

Thanks in advance for your kind collaboration.

Best Regards

-- Bigozzi EmilianoEconomics and Businesses ManagementNumber: 0775HHHCLEGI

48 https://googledrive.com/host/0B2_6VPXs-V_BbDJZcHNjcjN3SHM/index.htm (in Italian)

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[9]. Ekkprawatt Phong-arjarn, Chawalit Jeenanunta, "Supply ChainCollaboration: A case study of Thai Textile-Apparel Industry", The 1stInternational Conference on Logistics and Transport 2009: Innovative

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