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F A C U L T Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y U N I V E R S I T Y O F O X F O R D

FHS Philosophy 2012: report of the Convener of Conveners

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................................. 2

List of examiners and assessors ................................................................................................................................................ 2

Prizes ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 2

Take-up and performance statistics ......................................................................................................................................... 4

Take-up by option, by school ................................................................................................................................................ 4

Performance by option, by school ........................................................................................................................................ 5

Mark distribution by option .................................................................................................................................................. 6

Performance by option by gender ........................................................................................................................................ 6

Take-up of submitted work options ...................................................................................................................................... 7

Individual paper reports ........................................................................................................................................................... 8

101 History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant ............................................................................................................... 8

102 Knowledge and Reality ................................................................................................................................................... 9

103 Ethics ............................................................................................................................................................................ 11

104 Philosophy of Mind ...................................................................................................................................................... 12

105 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Psychology and Neuroscience..................................................................... 13

106 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Social Science .............................................................................................. 14

107 Philosophy of Religion .................................................................................................................................................. 14

108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language ........................................................................................................................ 15

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism .................................................................................................................. 16

110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas ..................................................................................................................................... 17

112 The Philosophy of Kant ................................................................................................................................................ 17

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy .............................................................................................................................................. 18

114 Theory of Politics .......................................................................................................................................................... 19

115 / 130 Plato, Republic .................................................................................................................................................... 22

116/132 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics .............................................................................................................................. 24

117 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein .................................................................................................................................. 26

118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein .......................................................................................................................... 28

119 Formal Logic ................................................................................................................................................................. 28

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics ............................................................................................................................. 30

122 Philosophy of Mathematics ......................................................................................................................................... 31

124 Philosophy of Science................................................................................................................................................... 33

133 Aristotle, Physics .......................................................................................................................................................... 34

135 Latin Philosophy ........................................................................................................................................................... 35

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Introduction This is the subject report for Honour School Philosophy in 2012. The report will be of use to future candidates, who should when revising read the subject reports on the papers they are offering. The report will also be inspected by the Philosophy Facultys Undergraduate Studies Committee as part of its review of the years examining business.

Prof Cecilia Trifogli

Convener of Conveners

List of examiners and assessors The following Faculty members served as examiners in the Honour Schools in 2012: Philosophy, Politics and Economics: Prof Ursula Coope, Dr Antony Eagle, Dr Joseph Schear (convener), Prof Derek Matravers (Cambridge/Open, external). Literae Humaniores: Dr Anita Avramides, Prof Roger Crisp (convener), Dr Peter Kail (chair), Prof Angie Hobbs (Warwick, external). Mathematics and Philosophy & Physics and Philosophy: Prof Harvey Brown (chair in MP part B, PP), Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Dr Christopher Timpson (convener), Dr ystein Linnebo (Birkbeck, external). Psychology and Philosophy & Philosophy and Modern Languages & Philosophy and Theology: Dr Tim Bayne (convener), Prof Stephen Mulhall, Prof Scott Sturgeon, Dr Sarah Patterson (Birkbeck, external). The following served as assessors: Dr Pamela Anderson, Dr Brian Ball, Dr Stephen Blamey, Prof John Broome, Dr Daniel Came, Dr Laura Castelli, Prof David Charles, Prof Martin Davies, Dr Manuel Dries, Dr Robert Frazier, Dr Edward Harcourt, Dr Brian King, Dr Grahame Lock, Prof Adrian Moore, Dr Michail Peramatzis, Dr Roger Teichmann, Dr Stephen Williams. The Convener of Conveners, responsible for the overall administration of Philosophy Finals examining, was Prof Cecilia Trifogli.

Prizes The Henry Wilde Prize for the outstanding performance in Philosophy across all joint schools was awarded jointly to Olinga Tahzib (Lady Margaret Hall, Physics and Philosophy) and Benjamin Zelenka Martin (Brasenose College, PPE). The Duns Scotus Prize for best performance on the Medieval Philosophy papers was shared by Katherine Moe (Exeter College) and Maximus Marenbon (St Hughs College).

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The Elizabeth Anscombe Prize for the best undergraduate Philosophy thesis was won by Jacob Williamson (Somerville College) for his thesis on How Kantian is Rawls A Theory of Justice?. The Gibbs Prize winners for the best performance in Philosophy in each school were as follows: PPE Vicente Solera Deuchar, Balliol College Lit. Hum. Rebecca Lees, Worcester College MP, part B Cosmo Grant, Merton College PP, part B James Read, Oriel College PP, part C Christopher Hadnutt, St Edmund Hall PPP Jingkai Chen, The Queens College (proxime accessit Rebecca Hewstone, St Johns) PML No prize awarded PT Christopher Smith, Keble College

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Take-up and performance statistics

Take-up by option, by school

School 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115 116 117

PPE 62 38 154 14 2 6 32 12 22 1 6 18 38 56 30 1

Lit Hum 10 6 22 1 1 5 3 6 1 3 4 12 18 12

MP 8 15 9 5 1 9 6 1 7 8 5 3

PP 4 15 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1

PPP 13 4 3 18 2 9 1 1 3 1

PML 14 5 12 2 1 6 4 11 1 6 10 7 2

PT 16 13 14 4 24 2 7 3 5 3 1

Theology 4

Maths 1

COS 1

Total 128 96 215 48 4 8 82 31 54 3 11 40 72 91 49 5

School 118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141 180 Total

PPE 16 3 2 1 514

Lit Hum 2 1 25 8 1 9 1 3 154

MP 4 2 23 3 2 1 112

PP 2 2 17 2 17 70

PPP 2 1 7 65

PML 1 1 2 85

PT 1 93

Theology 4

Maths 1

COS 1 2

Total 27 6 19 2 23 26 10 1 25 8 1 9 1 4 1 1100

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Performance by option, by school Figures are not given for cohorts of less than 5.

School 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115 116 117

PPE 64.1 65.6 63.3 64.5 - 66.8 65.6 67.9 64.7 - 67.3 67.5 66.8 65.7 65.1 -

Lit Hum 64.0 59.2 63.0 - - 65.6 - 61.5 - - - 65.8 65.6 63.8

MP 66.1 66.3 66.4 65.8 - 68.9 65.5 - 63.4 64.4 69.8 -

PP - 65.4 - - - - - - - -

PPP 65.1 - - 65.0 - 64.9 - - - -

PML 62.4 66.0 63.1 - - 66.2 - 63.7 - 68.3 63.2 67.1 -

PT 63.6 62.6 66.3 - 65.9 - 66.0 - 65.8 - -

Theology -

Maths -

COS -

Overall 64.2 64.5 63.7 64.6 - 65.0 65.5 66.6 64.4 - 66.5 66.8 65.8 66.0 64.6 68.4

School 118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141 180 Overall

PPE 67.4 - - - 64.8

Lit Hum - - 67.2 65.9 - 69.7 - - 65.3

MP - - 65.6 - - - 66.3

PP - - 66.8 - 64.9 66.2

PPP - - 64.6 64.3

PML - - - 64.3

PT - 65.0

Theology -

Maths -

COS - -

Overall 66.1 63.0 66.9 - 65.6 64.7 64.1 - 67.2 65.9 - 69.7 - - - 65.0

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Mark distribution by option Figures are not given for cohorts of less than 5.

Range 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115 116 117

0-39 1

40-49 1 4

50-59 26 14 34 4 1 8 2 10 1 10 9 8

60-69 81 62 143 36 6 59 18 34 8 29 46 60 32

70-100 21 18 34 8 1 15 11 10 3 10 16 22 9

Total 128 96 215 48 4 8 82 31 54 3 11 40 72 91 49 5

Range 118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141 180 Total

0-39 1 2

40-49 5

50-59 1 1 3 4 1 3 1 1 143

60-69 19 3 14 14 17 8 14 4 5 1 722

70-100 7 2 4 6 5 1 8 3 4 2 228

Total 27 6 19 2 23 26 10 1 25 8 1 9 1 4 1 1100

Performance by option by gender

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115 116 117

Female 64.6 64.8 63.4 64.4 65.5 64.5 63.8 67.0 66.9 66.1 67.4 66.1

Male 63.9 64.4 63.9 64.8 65.0 65.4 67.8 65.2 66.3 66.8 65.5 65.2 63.3

Overall 64.2 64.5 63.7 64.6 - 65.0 65.5 66.6 64.4 - 66.5 66.8 65.8 66.0 64.6 -

118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141 180 Overall

Female 65.8 62.0 68.5 67.5 66.8 65.7 68.8 65.0 70.8 65.2

Male 66.2 63.2 66.5 64.6 64.3 63.4 66.5 68.5 68.8 64.9

Overall 66.1 63.0 66.9 - 65.6 64.7 64.1 - 67.2 65.9 - 69.7 - - - 65.0

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Take-up of submitted work options Theses There were 16 Philosophy theses submitted this year: this is relatively few, with normally 20 or 21 being offered. The average mark of the theses was 69.5. No candidate scored below the II(i) band. Extended Essays There were 31 Extended Essays from Mathematics and Philosophy candidates, with an average mark of 66.9; 12 Essays were submitted by Physics and Philosophy students, who averaged 67.2.

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Individual paper reports Reports are not provided where so doing might identify individual candidates.

101 History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant Overall, the performance of this paper was very solid, with few poor scripts. As ever, the significant majority of the answers were to the questions set on Descartes and Hume. Locke and Spinoza formed a second group in terms of frequency of questions attempted, followed by Berkeley and Leibniz. Very few candidates attempted the Kant questions. We only comment on the more popular questions. Question 1, In what sense, if any, is the cogito the foundation of the project of Descartes Meditations? attracted many answers. Some took it as an occasion to discuss whether or not the cogito was an inference, but the better answers distinguished not only different senses of foundation but also different interpretations of the aims of Descartes project. Question 2, Why, for Descartes, does human error need to be reconciled with Gods goodness? Is his reconciliation successful? again attracted many answers. All but the very best answers failed properly to criticize the plausibility of Descartes voluntarism. Question 3 was centred on a quotation: I can obtain some knowledge of myself without knowledge of my body. But it is not yet transparently clear to me that this knowledge is complete and adequate, so as to enable me to be certain that I am not mistaken in excluding body from my essence. (ARNAULD) Is Arnauld right to so object to Descartes argument for the real distinction between mind and body? Too many answers paid mere lip service to the quotation, choosing instead to rehearse general discussions of Cartesian dualism. However, the best answers really got to grips with the issue. The answers to both question 4 (What does Spinoza mean by claiming that besides God, no substance can be or be conceived?) and question 5 (Is Spinozas solution to the mind/body problem satisfactory?) displayed an admirable grasp of the relevant propositions from the Ethics ad their logical connection, with some answers to question 5 discussing whether Spinoza has a proper notion of the mental. Spinozistic freedom is no freedom at all Is this true? (question 6) attracted textually-informed answers but a number of answers were insufficiently critical of the conception of freedom. Many answers to question 13 (Is Lockes project doomed if his arguments against innate ideas and principles fails?) collapsed into discussions of the adequacy of Lockes attack on nativism rather than address the wider issue of Lockes constructive project. Question 17 (A belief is a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression (HUME) Discuss and evaluate) was the least popular of the Hume questions but the answers tended to be adequate, if unsympathetic. Question 18, Does Humes discussion of probable inference fatally compromise the project of A Treatise of Human Nature?, attracted a great many answers, many of a good to excellent standard. Too many answers to question 19, Must Hume think that there are no bodies? failed to address the question of whether the strictures imposed by his Copy Principle precluded any meaning being attached to the term body, but the best answers not only considered this issue but also Humes discussion of the external world in Of the modern philosophy.

PJK

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102 Knowledge and Reality

Some comments on the most commonly answered questions this year.

Q1 (The theory that knowledge is justified true belief is a simple and powerful proposal. Just as

we accept simple and powerful, but highly counterintuitive, theories in fundamental physics,

so too we may accept the knowledge proposal despite its counterintuitive consequences.

Discuss.): not well done for the most part; candidates did not use the opportunity to reflect

in any interesting way on philosophical methodology, except to assert without argument that

simplicity and strength have no part to play in conceptual analyses; quite why remains

unclear to me.

Q2 (Disjunctivism is untrue to the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Discuss.) Mostly

anti-disjunctivist. The best answers offered disjunctivist responses to the phenomenological

objection, often along adverbial lines.

Q7 ("When S knows that p, that is a non-linguistic fact about Ss mental state. That fact will obtain

regardless of the linguistic context, and, hence, S will know that p in every such context. So

epistemic contextualism is false." Discuss.). This was poorly answered for the most part

only a few candidates saw that the argument is invalid, since the premises arent relevant to

contextualism at all, with most trying to argueinevitably unsuccessfullythat the claim

that knowledge is a mental state is inconsistent with contextualism about the semantic value

of knows. No answers grappled to any real extent with the Williamsonian claim that

knowledge is a mental state. (Many candidates apparently didnt understand that EC is

ascriber contextualismand change of context for the ascriber need not involve any change

in the subject. One cannot argue that change in an ascribers context will induce a change in

a subjects mental state.)

Q9 (It is more useful to think of a priori status as attaching primarily to justified belief rather than

knowledge. Discuss.) Not well answered. Candidates did not know what to do with this

questionhardly surprising, since many of them defined a priori knowledge as knowledge

with an a priori justification. Better answers considered whether there was a priori

justification for falsehoods; the best answers would have considered the right way to

understand a priori truth independently of knowledge (e.g., Kripke,

Stalnaker/Jackson/Chalmers-style two-dimensionalism).

Q10 (An event A is a cause of a distinct event B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A

would be an effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B.

(MENZIES and PRICE) Is it?) Too few candidates engaged with the question; many attempted

to bring it around to counterfactual accounts of causation. There was little sympathy with

the approach, but objections to its use of free agency were mostly ill-targeted. The best

answers gave examples of causation without effectiveness, e.g., probability-lowering

causation. No one mentioned one of the major issues surrounding this theory in the

literature, namely, the non-reductive nature of a definition of causation which explicitly

makes use of the notion of bringing about.

Q12 (Is modality best understood using quantification over possible worlds?) was mostly

adequately answered. Many candidates appeared to think possible world is a synonym for

Lewisian possible world, but that means that various ersatzisms were inexplicably

discounted, and there was much (too much) discussion of the problems for concrete

possibilia. The best answers gave attention to the role of understanding in the question,

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arguing that graspability of the basic constituents of a theory of modality was an important

consideration. An ideal answer would have compared realist proposals with those views of

modality which make no reference to possible worlds at all, such as combinatorialism and

modalismunfortunately even the very best of the actual answers did not spend very much

time on these interesting and salient rivals. Many candidates assumed that an understanding

of modality must be a reductive understanding of it, something which is not presupposed by

the question and for which they did not argue.

Q13 (If you are a person, are you essentially a person?) Candidatesdrawing almost exclusively

on material from general philosophy, disappointinglyfocused on personhood at the

expense of attention to essentialism. Most argued from animalism to the falsity of the

essentialist claim, with greater or lesser competence.

Q14 (Can we make sense of change over time without appealing to temporal parts?) was the

most popular question. Many candidates spent far too long describing and evaluating

temporal-parts based accounts of persistence, even though the question did not ask about

them, or about whether a good account of persistence is possible at allit simply asked

whether there was a good account of persistence that did not make use of temporal parts.

The best answers kept discussion of temporal parts to a minimum. Most answers were

competent discussions of endurance, reviewing standard arguments from the literature.

Better approaches showed some snatches of originalityeither in perspective or in offering

less familiar objections and observations. Generally, though, this was answered in a merely

competent fashion. Very few to no answers discussed the notion of wholly present, a crucial

notion for endurantistsno one discussed the now-prevalent multiple location conception

of endurance. A few candidates interpreted the question as meaning whether we can make

sense of change over time without appealing to the A-theoretical determinations of past,

present and future, as if these determinations were what temporal parts referred to.

Q18 (If what is true depends on what exists, how can a presentist explain the truth of Dinosaurs

used to roam around in what is now Oxfordshire?) Mostly well done. A few candidates

strayed into more general evaluations of presentism, but in general the focus was rightly on

truthmaker objections, with the best answers distinguished by their degree of clarity and

incisiveness rather than differing in kind from other answers.

One suggestion for the examiners/USC: induction is on the syllabus for both 102 and 124/105/106.

Given that almost all candidates for the latter papers are candidates for the former too, having the

same topic provides a perverse incentive for difficult-to-police overlap; and there is no reason why

the papers should share this topic. My preference would be for it to be allocated to 124/etc., since

there it connects with issues about confirmation and evidential support that are central to the

subject. In 102, many candidates writing on induction make use of literature that doesnt

substantially differ from the material studied in general philosophy, and there is no natural way to

include better material in tutorials for 102 without overlap with tutorials in philosophy of science.

AE

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103 Ethics There were a few outstanding answers, and several more which, even if they were not outstanding overall, showed a pleasing originality of thought and/or a willingness to shape the answer very exactly to the question set. Q1. The requirements of morality are requirements of rationality only if I am rationally required to ask, of any maxim of action of mine, whether I can will it as a universal law. Discuss.

Many saw this simply as an opportunity to discuss whether all and only morally acceptable maxims meet some version of a universalizability test. This is certainly relevant, since if moral acceptability and universalizability dont coincide then it would not be enough to show that the requirements of morality are requirements of rationality that I am rationally required to ask, of any maxim, whether I can will it as a universal law. However, the minority of candidates who went on to address the latter question were rewarded for it. Q2. Even the best arguments for moral relativism succeed only in establishing moral scepticism. Discuss.

Candidates sometimes took moral skepticism to mean what Mackie means by this phrase, i.e. the error theory. That interpretation made the question more of a struggle than it would be if one took the phrase (surely more naturally?) to mean first-order moral skepticism.

Q3. The only intelligible way of relating moral properties to natural properties is to reduce the former to the latter. Discuss.

Decently answered on the whole.

Q4(a) The best explanations of moral beliefs explain them by appeal to factors that are incidental to their truth. So we cannot have any justified moral beliefs. Discuss.

Almost no candidates chose to answer this, though answers to the next disjunct showed that many were familiar with Mackies argument from relativity, which appeals to best explanation.

Q4(b) Should we be surprised if convinced moral error theorists continue to care about the difference between moral right and wrong?

A popular question, on the whole decently answered.

Q5(a) Just because reason alone is not a motive to any action of the will (HUME), it need not follow that moral attitudes cannot be beliefs. Discuss.

A popular question, which many took to be a straightforward invitation to discuss the Humean two-step, i.e. beliefs dont motivate, moral attitudes do, so moral attitudes arent beliefs as if every Ethics paper must contain this very question, and it is just a matter of identifying it through the different disguises in which it appears from year to year. But there can be more than one question about Hume and motivation! The point of italicizing alone was to get people to comment on the difference between reason alone isnt a motive (or beliefs alone dont motivate) and beliefs dont motivate, not to ignore the difference.

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Q5b. Could there be such a thing as moral perception?

This drew very few answers, despite the opportunity to make something of the comparison between moral properties and secondary qualities.

Q6. The distinction between intended and foreseen but unintended consequences is real enough, but it cannot bear any moral weight. Discuss.

Popular, and on the whole well answered.

Q11. Though I want to stay in bed, I decide it would be better to go to the lecture, so I go to the lecture. Though I want to stay in bed, I decide it would be better to go to the lecture but I stay in bed. Unless reason is practical, can we account for the difference between these two cases?

An oddity of the answers to this question is how few used the word weakness of will (or akrasia), suggesting that perhaps candidates did not see the difference between the two cases in the light of this concept.

Q12a. Must consequentialism misunderstand the value of close personal relations?

A very popular question. Some, wrongly, saw it as an invitation to discuss integrity. Others might have made more of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, and of differences between forms of consequentialism. But on the whole competently answered.

Q12b. Consequentialism can make no sense of excusable wrongs, so consequentialism is false. Discuss.

The better answers pointed out that consequentialism can distinguish wrong actions from blameworthy ones. Few, however, either explored whether this distinction is ultimately viable, or worried about whether there might be a pre-theoretical notion of an excusable wrong which consequentialism is required to make sense of.

Q13a. The problem with virtue ethics is that its not interested enough in what it is to be imperfectly virtuous. Discuss.

Candidates took several different approaches towards this question, but surprisingly few mentioned the unity of the virtues, i.e. the idea that you cant have any virtue unless you have them all.

Q13b. Being morally good and being excellent of ones kind are two quite different things, so virtue ethics cannot possibly tell us anything about moral goodness. Discuss.

Decently answered on the whole, though a few took this to be the (distinct) question whether being a morally good person is good for that person.

ERFH

104 Philosophy of Mind All questions except Q7a (What would it be to naturalize intentionality? Why might one want to do so?), Q12 (Are emotions properly conceived as propositional attitudes?), and Q13a (What does it mean to say that experience is transparent?) received at least one answer. The most popular questions were: Q2a (Is the mere multiple realizability of psychological kinds a good objection to the central state identity theory? 12 responses); Q3 (Is functionalism a real advance on behaviourism as far as the philosophical problems of consciousness are concerned? 27 responses); Q4a (I do

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not believe we can ever specify what it is about the brain that is responsible for consciousness, but I am sure that whatever it is it is not inherently miraculous. The problem arises ... because we are cut off by our very constitution from achieving a conception of the natural property of the brain (or of consciousness) that accounts for the link. (McGINN) Discuss. 19 responses); Q6 (Are bodily sensations intentional states? 7 responses); and Q8b (Can we accept the completeness of physics without being committed to epiphenomenalism about the mental? 24 responses). Candidates seem to have overlooked the inclusion of the word mere in Q2a, and few answers considered the implications of the distinction between multiple realizability as a (mere) conceptual possibility and multiple realization as an empirical claim. However, candidates did generally demonstrate a good grasp of the various options open to the identity theorist for responding to the challenge of multiple realizability, and they were able to discuss the limitations of those options in an intelligent manner. Answers to Q3 typically suffered from a lack of rigour in characterizing behaviourism and functionalism. Moreover, many candidates used this question as an opportunity to wax lyrical on the perceived shortcomings of behaviourism and/or functionalism in general, rather than focus on the question asked. Some of the best answers spent some time characterizing the philosophical problems of consciousness. Q4 was one of the most popular questions, although the quality of answers given to it was not commensurate with its popularity. Surprisingly few candidates demonstrated any appreciation of McGinns arguments for the position outlined in the quotation. Many candidates used this question as an opportunity to discuss Jacksons knowledge argument. This strategy met with mixed success, although some candidates were able to draw on their knowledge of the debate about phenomenal concepts to illuminate McGinns position. Answers to Q6 were somewhat one-dimensional, and candidates tended to give insufficient attention to objections to the view that they defended. For example, those who argued that bodily sensations are intentional generally paid little attention to the arguments that have been given for thinking that bodily sensations are non-intentional. Answers to this question also tended to suffer from insufficient attention to the question of what it is for a mental state to be intentional. Most candidates structured their answer to Q8Can we accept the completeness of physics without being committed to epiphenomenalism about the mental?around responses to Kims exclusion problem, focusing either on Davidsons token identity account or on treatments of causation that might allow one to avoid the exclusion assumption, such as counter-factual accounts. Candidates were generally well-prepared for this question, although few went significantly beyond the material presented in lectures.

TB

105 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Psychology and Neuroscience See also 124 Philosophy of Science. This paper was available for the last time in 2012 and was taken by four candidates. Ten other candidates took paper 125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science, which was available for the first time. Part B of the 105 paper offered ten questions of which Q17 (Why do questions about the degree to which the mind is modular matter?) attracted two answers and three other questions attracted one answer each: Q16 (What is the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis committed to, over and above

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realism about propositional attitude states? What grounds, if any, are there for this further commitment?), Q20 (What implications might the study of delusions have for accounts of the architecture of cognition and perception?), and Q21 (Is our everyday folk psychological conception of thinking and reasoning committed to any principles that are incompatible with connectionism? What evidence might there be for such a commitment?). The five Part B answers ranged from brief in extent and under-developed to articulate, well informed, and showing independent thinking.

MKD

106 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Social Science See also 124 Philosophy of Science. Eight students sat this paper. Only one student answered more than one Part B question (on Philosophy of Social Science), and there was only one overlap (one of the two questions answered by the only student answering two was also answered by another student). As such, there are no patterns in the answers to speak of. Two comments are worth making. The first that that candidates made a good effort to answer the question as set. I don't think that there were any "canned" answers at all. The second is that the strongest papers exemplified and explained theoretical ideas and claims using work with which they were familiar from their own studies within the social sciences.

RLF

107 Philosophy of Religion In 2012, the quality of scripts in Philosophy of Religion (FHS Philosophy 0107) bunched in the middle 60s. The least good scripts were not too bad, but the very best scripts were not great either. The main overall weakness of the scripts was the familiar tendency on this paper to offer fairly superficial summaries of arguments in answer to the most popular topics; and this year as in the past the popular topics continued to be the problem of evil, the ontological and teleological proofs for the existence of God and a divine attribute (e.g., omniscience). The weakness of the answers, then, is a serious philosophical weakness: that is, a failure to problematize core concepts and to engage philosophically in the debates raised by the questions. The choice of old-familiar topics and traditional answers also does not help the candidate demonstrate her or his analytical and critical skills on new or novel background issues in philosophy. Consider a few central examples from the specific questions on this years scripts. First, almost everyone answered question 11 on the problem of evil (To defuse the logical problem of evil, it is enough simply to point to the logical possibility that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. Discuss). However, almost no one actually engaged with the question which was intended to elicit discussion of logical possibility, what it is for a state of affairs to be logically possible, and how we determine whether a state of affairs is logically possible. No candidate addressed the issue of whether or not conceivability entails possibility. Instead candidates quickly rushed to discuss Mackie and Plantinga which is fine except when the background debates/issues were not assessed at all. Second, there was also a preponderance of answers to question 10, on the fine-tuning argument.

(Does God provide a good explanation of the so-called fine-tuning of the universe?) There were

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some philosophically impressive answers, but a large number of candidates wasted space rehearsing the history of the argument and its Paleyan predecessor. But, again here, summaries of arguments does not actually exhibit any philosophical skills, say, by assessing the comparative merits of theism and multiverse. Admittedly, most candidates who answered this question correctly identified the multiverse hypothesis as the main alternative explanation to the so-called fine-tuning. However, very few, if any, candidates raised the philosophical question whether theism or the multiverse hypothesis violates Ockhams Razor; furthermore, none actually looked in depth at the nature of Ockhams Razor. Third, the question of the possibility of God (Is God possible?) was the next popular question and many candidates correctly related this question of possibility to the modal ontological argument for the existence of God. Yet once more, standard arguments were rehearsed concerning the compatibility or not of the divine attributes. Much more could have been done philosophically and imaginatively with this question. Finally, the least answered questions were 4 on Dawkins (The robust muscular Christian haranguing us from the pulpit of my old school admitted a sneaking regard for atheists. ... What this preacher couldnt stand was agnostics. (DAWKINS) Discuss), and 5 on Kants transcendental argument (Transcendental arguments purport to identify the preconditions for the truth of something that is assumed by all parties. Does Kant have a successful transcendental argument for Gods existence?). Fair enough, since these topics were not directly covered in lectures and probably not in tutorials. However, it is a pity that no matter what the other questions are on the paper, candidates still tend to answer the very same core topics in Christian theism every year. In fact, the nature and content of questions 4 and 5 are totally different from each other. So, a candidate could have brought in some of their greater philosophical knowledge into at least

question 5, and similarly, into question 7 on unsurpassable knowledge (A being is omniscient if and only if it has unsurpassable knowledge. Discuss). But there is only the slightest evidence that candidates are endeavouring to think independently on the nature of the issues at the heart of a range of questions in philosophy of religion. To repeat, the quality of the scripts was not generally bad; but scripts did generally lack real, independent philosophical thinking. Instead text-book answers were often given. Perhaps, with this paper, part of the problem is that students think it ok to answer questions as if they were reproducing theology or defending Christian theism. However, this is a philosophy paper for which rigour, incisiveness and other critical skills are necessary!

PSA

108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language 31 candidates sat the paper of whom 11 received first-class marks, and 2 received lower second-class marks; the remainder received upper second-class marks. The overall standard was high. The most popular questions were Question 1 (Do sorites paradoxes show that classical logic is untenable?; 17 answers), 14a (Do proper names and definite descriptions ever mean the same thing?; 15 answers), and 14(b) (What is the logical form of sentences like The King of France is bald?; 11 answers). These were followed by Question 7 (Can metaphorical sentences and non-

metaphorical ones ever mean the same thing?; 9 answers), and 17(a) (Evaluate the following argument: if its true that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, then Sherlock Holmes exists; but Sherlock Holmes doesnt exist. So its not true that Sherlock Holmes is a detective; 9 answers).

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Questions 4 (Can basic logical principles be justified?), 9 (What is meant by the claim that translation is indeterminate? Is it true?), 17(b) (Is exists a second-level predicate?), 19 (Use determines meaning. Meaning determines truth-conditions. So truth-conditions cannot transcend use. Discuss), and 21 (Are pronouns variables?) received no answers. Of the popular questions, Question 1 was well and shrewdly answered, candidates often displaying a good knowledge of standard theories and criticisms; several showed awareness of the relevance of higher order vagueness and the difficulties it posed. Question 14(a) was not so well answered, too many candidates adopting an insufficiently critical attitude to standard problems with descriptivism. Question 14(b) elicited some very good answers, the best ones containing, rather than presupposing, at least a brief explanation of logical form. The questions on metaphor and empty names showed a sound knowledge of the literature. The other questions received too few answers to draw any substantive conclusion, though the examiners welcomed the fact that most questions received answers, indicating overall a reasonably wide coverage of the syllabus.

SGW

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism Few of the scripts submitted were flawed in serious ways: most candidates showed a reasonable familiarity with key texts and central issues, and were able to put together clearly expressed and well-structured essays under examination conditions. At the same time, however, few answers were genuinely outstanding: although a pleasing number displayed qualities of the kind expected from first class scripts, few of them invited us to use the higher range of first class marks; and few of the scripts in the high second class range encouraged us to consider them seriously for a first class mark. There were several reasons for this. 1. Of the four most popular questions on this paper - question 1 (Can a great work of art be immoral?), question 2 (Is work of art a family resemblance concept?), question 8 (If we restricted ourselves to non-representational art, we could avoid all of Platos criticisms of art. Discuss) and question 16 (Is the intentional fallacy a fallacy?) - it is striking that only one is author-based: the other author-based questions on the paper (question 9 on Aristotle, question 10 on Hume, and question 11 on Kant) attracted far fewer candidates. We suspect that this was because some effort had been made to ensure that these questions could not be answered simply by providing an exegesis of the relevant historical texts, but also required candidates to engage with broader conceptual or thematic questions. And we further suspect that the relative lack of excellent answers to the Plato question was due to the fact that most candidates failed to appreciate that the same was also true in that case (since question 8 could only be well answered by candidates willing to query whether mimesis was a synonym for representation, and willing to explore the question of what makes a work or genre or medium or art non-representational). Good candidates can put their exegetical knowledge to use in addressing matters of broader philosophical import; they do not write as if these authors were of essentially hermeneutic interest, and as if the authorities dimension of this paper was essentially distinct from its thematic concerns. 2. Few candidates made productive use of their work on other philosophy papers in answering questions on this paper whether by enriching their account of an authors view on aesthetics by linking it to his or her views on other matters, or by deepening their treatment of a topic in aesthetics by drawing on broader philosophical treatments of pertinent concepts. For example, few candidates addressing question 16 made any use of work on the concept of intention in the philosophy of mind and action, or of work on the concept of meaning in the philosophy of language; and even more surprisingly, few candidates who addressed question 10 (Humes approach to

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aesthetic judgement is subverted by his decision to model his account of good taste on his account of the sensory faculty of taste. Discuss.) could buttress their knowledge of Humes account of good taste with an equally detailed knowledge of his account of secondary qualities. 3. Few candidates showed much sensitivity to the historical context of art and aesthetics. Several questions on the paper invited them to consider the historical and cultural specificity of various aesthetic concepts, and indeed of the idea of the aesthetic as a distinct evaluative field; and they were amongst the least popular. Question 4 (Is the very idea of a literary canon politically or morally suspect?) received two answers; question 6 (The realm of the aesthetic is an invention of modernity. Discuss) received two; and question 7 (Modernism is an indispensable concept for understanding the history of art; our current need to resort to the concept of post-modernism indicates that we have reached the end of that history. Discuss.) was the only question on the paper to be entirely avoided. 4. Candidates were generally unwilling to draw on their personal interests in and engagements with to enrich their answers. Few discussed particular works of art in any detail, or any real familiarity with influential periods or movements or schools in the history of art, or figures or events in the contemporary art world. To judge from these scripts, very few candidates are drawn to this paper by anything other than a purely academic interest in philosophical aesthetics; we find this hard to believe.

SM

110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas Three candidates sat this paper. The standard was higher than in the last couple of years. The best candidate showed a very high degree of engagement with Aquinas's texts. No questions from section B (Action and Will, Natural Law) were answered. The only question that received more than one answer was q. 3, Since wisdom and power are distinct accidents in creatures, then they are also distinct accidents in God. How would Aquinas reply?, which all three candidates answered. The weakest answer dealt almost exclusively with the simplicity of God, without addressing the specific question about the attributes of God.

CT

112 The Philosophy of Kant Eleven candidates sat this paper. As usual, the performance was very strong, with three of the candidates gaining a first-class mark, and the remaining candidates gaining an upper-second class mark. The most popular questions were Q. 2 (We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience; and yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality. (B44/A 28) Explain and evaluate. - six answers), Q. 7 (What are Kants arguments against the Humean sceptic? Are they convincing? - six answers), Q. 12 (Does Kants transcendental unity of apperception commit him to the rejection of any substantive notion of the self? - six answers) and Q. 10 (Why does the concept of synthesis play such an important role in the Deduction? - four answers). Other questions received two answers or fewer. Q.2 This question did not attract very good answers. Candidates generally provided an accurate explanation of the quotation but their evaluation of it was disappointing. The best answers showed a

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very good knowledge of the secondary literature but did not display a high degree of independent discussion. Q.7 Most candidates took this question as an occasion to discuss Kant's reply to Hume's scepticism about causality rather than addressing the issue in a more comprehensive way. Some attempts were made to consider Kant's defence of synthetic a priori arguments against the Humean sceptic, but they were insufficiently critical. Q.12 This question was generally well-focussed and also attracted some excellent answers. The best candidates provided a very articulated and subtle discussion of what a substantive notion of the self can mean and argued incisively for a negative answer. Q.10 There were some excellent answers that showed a detailed textual knowledge of Kant's Deduction, good argumentative skills, and effective use of the secondary literature. The weakest candidates tended to give a clear but too general and scarcely critical presentation of Kant's project in the Deduction.

CT

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy The exams on the whole were quite good. Many of the essays displayed a hard earned grasp of the texts and arguments. No less importantly, students for the most part approached these texts, not out of hero worship, but rather with their gloves off i.e. ready first of all to interpret the positions in the best possible light, but also ready where necessary to challenge those positions. The most popular questions were on Nietzsche, predictably, and Sartre, less predictably. Merleau-Ponty also enjoyed a significant uptick in attention compared to last year (6 essays, from 2 the year before), whereas Heidegger suffered a significant downtick (9 answers, from 15 the year before). Of the two general questions not directed toward any particular philosopher, question 29 (The traditional picture of human beings as rational animals must be overcome. Discuss with regard to one or more of the post-Kantian philosophers.) had 5 answers, several of which were bold, interesting, and creative. The better answers here focused on a single philosopher and gave traditional picture, rational animals, and overcome determinate interpretations. As for the Nietzsche questions, there were 9 answers to question 10 (What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphismsTruths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions. (NIETZSCHE) Is this true?), 10 answers to question 11 (What would it be like to live a life beyond good and evil?), 10 answers to question 12 (a) (Is Nietzsche a naturalist?), and only 1 answer to question 9 (According to The Birth of Tragedy, art is better guide to the true nature of things than philosophy. Discuss.) The best answers to question 10 addressed rather than ignored the idea of a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms. The weaker answers headed straight to the more familiar issue of whether there is some kind of paradox in asserting that truths are illusions. The best answers to question 11 accommodated, indeed pursued, the many remarks sprinkled throughout the Genealogy that make the following clear: Nietzsches picture of life beyond good and evil is not a nostalgic plea for a return to a pre-moral condition. The best answers to question 12 (a) disambiguated the term naturalist in careful and precise terms, and proceeded to give evidence for and against categorizing Nietzsche as a naturalist in the various senses. Many students unfortunately rehearsed standard secondary literature positions on the naturalism issue, which of course was not sufficient to earn first class distinction.

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The most popular Sartre questions were 22 (The problem with Sartres account of bad faith is that he leaves it unclear how we might avoid it, and what it might be like we did avoid it. Discuss.) and 23 (Sartre neither solves nor dissolves the traditional problem of other minds. Discuss.). Very few answers to question 22 actually took up the issue of what it would be like to avoid bad faith, if it is accepted that it is avoidable; the few that did were rewarded for answering the question. Several high quality answers rejected the idea that bad faith is avoidable, and explained clearly why such a rejection should be attributed to Sartre. The best answers to 23 were careful to address the sense of solves and of dissolves in the question, and careful also to spell out what precisely the problem of other minds is. There were 7 answers to the Hegel questions, and 11 answers to the Schopenhauer questions with questions 5 (5 answers) and 6 (6 answers) most popular. Questions 7 and 8 were entirely avoided. Like last years essays on these two 19th century giants, a fair amount of the essays this year displayed decent knowledge of the texts. However, many essays failed to motivate the issue addressed by the respective question, or assess the position held by the mighty dead systematic philosopher at issue.

JS

114 Theory of Politics As usual, there was a general tendency to fail to retain attention on the specific question throughout the answer. Many scripts used their introduction to address the question directly, only to deviate from it in subsequent paragraphs. Weaker scripts generally seemed to invoke points of analysis independently of one another whereas better scripts offered a stronger structure of argument. There was a high level of uniformity between answers. Nearly all candidates are well prepared with a repertoire of stock positions and points, gleaned mainly from textbooks and lectures, which they manage to some extent to orient to the question put. Candidates are generally unprepared or unwilling to engage in much independent critical analysis of the concepts, the arguments, or the intellectual problems posed. Those who seemed to be thinking for themselves, making but going beyond the familiar moves while retaining focus and control of their answers, did very well. This means that candidates, for instance, who answered the question on neutrality did very little to analyse that concept, turning the question instead to one about the freedom of the individual; candidates who answered the question on majoritarianism didnt notice the significance of decision procedure; candidates did nothing with the concept political in the obligation question beyond proposing the lecturers (Im guessing) argument that legal obligation is political. Candidates often failed to tackle both 'arms' or components of a question - for instance a good many candidates wrote about what the industrious might owe to the lazy, but not to the reckless (and one the other way around). Similarly, a number of answers to the obligation question were fairly stock responses to a question about whether we had an obligation to obey the law, and not about what political obligations citizens might have in general. Several candidates failed to clearly structure their answers, though there were notable exceptions who managed to produce excellent work in the conditions.

1. Does democracy require majority-rule as a decision procedure? A fairly popular question. Many candidates saw this as their opportunity to make general points about deliberative v aggregative conceptions of democracy. Candidates largely failed to distinguish

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the conceptual relation of majority-rule to democracy and the substantive question of whether the best forms of democracy involve majority-rule.

2. Poverty restricts freedom, disability does not. Do you agree? A very popular question not well answered for the most part, though most were familiar with the stock point that property rights are upheld by law. A surprisingly large number of candidates either agreed with the statement or argued that both/neither restrict freedom relatively few argued that either could represent restrictions on freedom depending on further factors. Many insisted that the constraints on the poor were human or social while those on the disabled were natural, missing the extent to which it is the interaction of natural capacity and human or social decision (e.g. construction of buildings, or jobs) that affects the options available to the naturally impaired.

3. EITHER: Do the industrious owe anything to the lazy or the reckless?

A fairly popular question producing a broad spectrum of quality in answers, the weaker ones answering only with respect to the lazy or the reckless rather than both. Most took the opportunity to offer general discussions of luck egalitarianism. A large number of candidates simply assumed the lazy and reckless to be in relevantly similar positions with respect to the industrious. Stronger answers reflected on possible different explanatory factors for industriousness, laziness and recklessness.

OR: What should egalitarians believe?

Again fairly popular and again a wide range in the quality of answers. Weaker ones tended to offer a general discussion of luck egalitarianism and the weakest took this as an excuse to discuss the metric of equality. Better answers either discussed the leveling down objection or contrasted the luck egalitarian view with status or relational views of equality. The distinction between telic and deontic forms of egalitarianism was sometimes introduced, though very few of the candidates that did so seemed to understand it.

4. Legislation by representatives is a form of aristocracy. Do you agree?

Very few takers for this question. Those who answered it did not handle the concept of aristocracy well.

5. Does the claim that gender is socially constructed help the feminist?

This feminism question with no obvious stock answer had few takers. The weakest answers did not know what socially constructed meant. The best reflected on the different ways in which the claim might help.

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6. Socialism and liberalism can be rendered compatible only by abandoning the essence of

each. Discuss. Another non-standard question, this time requiring candidates to talk about two isms at once, proved unpopular. Some clearly answering out of desperation talked almost entirely about one or the other but the few with the resources to discuss both produced some very good answers.

7. Should minority groups have cultural rights? A fairly popular question. The better answers managed to distinguish between rights for minority groups and rights specific to members of minority groups. Candidates tended to offer unnuanced yes or no conclusions. The weakest candidates wrote down anything they knew about rights.

8. Citizens have political obligations, but the obligation to obey the law is not one of them. Do you agree?

A very popular question answered by many keen to offer standard general discussions of possible grounds for the obligation to obey the law. Better answers tried to explain why the obligation to obey the law was indeed a political obligation, though often in a handwaving way suggesting they were regurgitating something from a lecture rather than something they really understood. Disappointingly few explored in any detail what other political obligations there might be (e.g. to engage in civil disobedience?).

9. How can we tell when people are subject to power?

Not a popular question. Most candidates invoked Lukes and answers often focused primarily on a discussion of when people are subject to power rather than the issue of how we can tell that they are subject to it. The best answers challenged the framing of the question.

10. Can conservatives offer coherent criteria for evaluating political options? A tricky question with correspondingly few takers and generally poor answers: little reflection on what might count as coherent criteria and rarely any discussion of the difference between philosophical conservatism and political conservatism.

11. Should political theorists be realistic? Not a popular question but this was generally answered very well perhaps the best of all the questions - with those choosing it showing good knowledge of the literature and control of the issues. There was some good discussion of why being realistic might be thought to be a good thing and on the whole answers came to balanced conclusions on the basis of interesting and coherent arguments.

12. The principles of justice that apply within nation-states are different from those that apply between them. Discuss.

This fairly straightforward question proved relatively popular and generally attracted solid answers. Most candidates offered a general discussion of associative v non-associative views of principles of justice, while better answers distinguished between different bases for affirming global principles of justice. There was, however, little reflection on possible differences between principles of justice and other normative principles. Weaker candidates seeing the word justice chose to write down what they knew about Rawls.

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13. Should the state try to be neutral with respect to its citizens views about how they should

live their lives? A mix of answers though overall this was answered better than other questions. Weaker answers neglected try and discussed the impossibility of neutrality in abstract terms. Better answers tried to get to grips with the motivation for trying to be neutral. The best tied this to a reflection on the unique role of the state.

DPIR

115 / 130 Plato, Republic Some of the more difficult questions on this paper drew excellent and imaginative answers. Weaker candidates tended to confuse simply presenting Platos views with defending them. References to texts of Plato other than the Republic were rare. In answering the gobbets questions, candidates often failed to mention the context (or where they did mention the context, did not specify it precisely enough). (Some comments on the more popular questions are provided below. The numerals refer to the question number in 115, with the 130 number in brackets.) 1. (2) Why is the notion of a ruler in the strict sense important in Republic I? Is the use that is made of this notion defensible? Most candidates were able to explain the way in which the notion of a ruler in the strict sense is used in Thrasymachus argument. In general, candidates needed to pay more attention to the role of this notion in Republic I, and to evaluating whether its use is defensible. 2. (3) Why is early education in music and gymnastics important for future guardians? Is this view of education plausible? Weaker answers simply said that this education prepares the soul for later education in mathematics. Better answers drew on a more detailed knowledge of the text, and attempted to show how exactly this education might act as such a preparation. Such answers considered, for instance, how listening to the right kind of music might contribute to developing a harmonious soul. 3. (4) Is the tripartite division of the soul useful for explaining human behaviour? Some good points were made in answers to this question. Among weaker candidates, there was a tendency simply to describe Platos own view, using his examples, as if this by itself answered the question. Better candidates were able to discuss, critically, how well Platos view might explain behaviour of various different types (beyond those mentioned in the examples with which Plato introduces the view in the Republic). 5. (4) Does Plato have any good reason for supposing that justice in the individual must resemble justice in the city? A surprisingly large number of candidates didnt mention the forms in answering this question. The better answers discussed the way in which the soul is structurally analogous to the city. Some of the better candidates also made use of the distinction between vulgar justice and Platonic justice. There could have been more discussion of whether there is a causal relation between a citys being just and its rulers being just (and whether, if there is, that suggests that justice in the two is the same).

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6. (7 ) Does Plato think it possible to have knowledge of the many beautifuls? Is he right? There were some good attempts here to explain the distinction between knowledge and true belief in Republic V. More consideration could have been given to the problems Plato needs to answer if he thinks that it is not possible to have knowledge of the many beautifuls (or would need to answer, if he thought this). For instance, if we cant have such knowledge, then how can knowledge of forms help philosophers to rule in the world of particulars? Some candidates didnt distinguish clearly enough between the claim (i) that we cant have knowledge of the many beautifuls, and the claim (ii) that we cant have knowledge of the many beautifuls unless we have knowledge of a form, beauty.

7. (8) In the divided line, what is thought (dianoia)? Does Plato present a plausible view about the importance of its role in intellectual progress? In answering this, candidates would have benefited from a more detailed knowledge of the relevant parts of the text. There was a tendency, moreover, simply to present Platos view without really evaluating its plausibility. 8. (9) Even if there is a form of the good, it cannot have any relevance to practical matters. How might Plato respond? Most candidates claimed that Plato would answer that an understanding of the form of the good is important for ruling, but few candidates really attempted to explain why having such an understanding is important for ruling. 9. (10) Does the Republic offer any good argument against the view that a calm and self-controlled criminal could be happy? Not all candidates noticed that Plato might object to the very possibility of a calm and self-controlled criminal. Of those who did notice this, most simply said that Plato doesnt think it is possible to be a self-controlled harmonious criminal, without explaining how Plato might defend this claim. Insufficient attention was paid to what might be meant, in this context, by a criminal. 11 (12). In modern Greece and Italy, governments of unelected economic experts are imposing austerity. If so, would Plato approve? There were some good, imaginative answers to this question, making excellent use of the text as a whole. Several candidates said that though Plato would approve of having unelected experts as rulers, he wouldnt think that a training in economics qualified one to be a ruler. Some candidates also went on to discuss whether Plato would approve of imposing economic austerity. 12. (13) Does Platos attack on imitation (mimesis) apply equally well to both poetry and painting? This was a popular question and was, in many cases, well answered. The best answers considered arguments from both books 3 and 10. 13a (1a) Passage from I.350 This question was very popular. Most candidates managed to give a plausible analysis of the argument, and raised objections to it. Several candidates failed to note the possible ambiguity in outdo (pleonektein) 13b (1b) Passage from IV.420 This question was also popular. The best answers explained the analogy between state and statue, and went on to raise questions about this. Several candidates discussed whether this analogy suggests that Plato is thinking of the state in an objectionably totalitarian way. Others discussed what notion of happiness (eudaimonia) is being employed here. Weaker candidates (especially those doing the English version of the paper, which gave less context) failed to identify the context of the

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passage, and hence failed to see that it is a response to a worry about whether the guardians will be happy. 13c (1c) Passage from VII.518 Many answers stressed the difficulty of education and the analogy drawn here between intellect and sight. The best candidates were also able to discuss what it means to say that the whole soul is turned around. A few good candidates also raised questions about claim made here that this power is in everyones soul. 13d (1e) Passage from VIII.553 This passage was frequently misidentified. The better candidates knew the context of the passage, and were able to discuss what it shows about Platos views on parts of the soul. 13e (1f) Passage from IX.585 Many candidates didnt focus enough on the argument presented in this passage, and attempted, instead, to rehearse all of Platos arguments about pleasure in Republic IX. 13f (1d) Passage from X.617 There were several excellent answers to this question, many of them containing interesting discussions of the roles of luck and responsibility.

UC

116/132 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics This paper was reasonably well done. Better candidates paid close attention to the question, argued independently, and used knowledge of the text as a whole (and occasionally other works by Aristotle and others). Essays (Question number for 116 first, followed by 131 in brackets) Q.1 (2) What does Aristotle mean by the claim that happiness is complete (teleios)? Is his claim correct? Many candidates didnt say clearly what they took Aristotle to mean by complete. A significant number of candidates confused completeness with self-sufficiency, or failed to distinguish between the claim that happiness is complete and the claim that it is most complete. Q. 2 (3) Since the gods as well as human beings are rational, Aristotles function argument is a failure. Discuss. Some good and imaginative answers on this, explaining why this claim might be raised as a criticism of the function argument, and then suggesting some reply (e.g. that godly rationality is different from human rationality). Some candidates failed to note that in book 10 Aristotle does recommend striving to be godlike. Q. 3 (4) Once the Doctrine [of the Mean] is literally expressed it becomes platitudinous (BARNES). Discuss. Not a popular question. Few of those who answered it discussed Aristotles own advice based on the mean in 2.9, or his own recognition in 6.1 of the doctrines possible emptiness.

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Q. 4 (5) Can Aristotle allow that some apparently vicious actions are to be excused when they result from mental illness? Some excellent answers, drawing distinctions between different forms of mental illness and relating them to various claims made by Aristotle in book 3 in particular. Q. 5 (6) Is Aristotle right to suggest that we are jointly responsible (sunaitioi ps) for our characters? Surprisingly unpopular. Better candidates showed good understanding of 3.5. Q. 6 (7) In what way is magnanimity an adornment of the virtues? This was a straightforward question. Its unpopularity is perhaps to be explained by its not concerning a standard tutorial topic. Q. 7 (8) Analyse critically Aristotles account of the relation between prudence (phronsis) and the virtues of character. Better answers showed signs of serious thought about the end of book 6, and were genuinely critical. Q. 8 (9) Is the idea of the practical syllogism helpful in explaining incontinence? Too many candidates answered Yes to this question, and then provided little more than a summary of Aristotles argument in 7.3. Few seemed aware of the question whether the bad syllogism concerns sweetness or some other property, such as unhealthiness. Q. 9 (10) Is Aristotle right that there is something lacking in friendships between vicious people? Popular and usually well done, including discussion of friendship for utility and for pleasure. Q. 10 (11) What is the role of pleasure in Aristotles account of the human good? Unpopular, though those who knew the text were able to offer wide-ranging and imaginative answers. Little awareness was shown of Aristotles position on false pleasures. Q. 11 (12) How might Aristotle advise someone undecided between a life of great political virtue and a life of contemplation? This was especially well done by those candidates with knowledge of the text as a whole, including books 1 and 10 in particular. Commentaries As often, many candidates did less well on gobbets than on essays. Misidentification was worryingly common. Some candidates would have benefited from more advice about how to approach gobbets (the need to say something about the context, and the need to try to find something philosophically interesting to say about the passage). Candidates should avoid merely paraphrasing the content of a gobbet, unless that is required for elucidation.

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Q. 12(a) (1(a)) 1.8: Aristotles methodology. Unpopular. The better candidates were able to provide examples of Aristotelian dialectic, as well as criticism of it. Q. 12 (b) (1(b)) 2.4: Acting in accord with the virtues. The best answers were able to explain the exact context of these remarks, as well as to comment on the particular conditions placed here on acting virtuously. Q. 12 (c) (1(c)) 3.3: Deliberation. The best answers explained why this remark might be puzzling, and discussed, e.g., whether there is any sense (for Aristotle) in which we do deliberate about ends. Helpful links were established by some candidates with work on Hume for paper 103. Q. 12 (d) (1(d)) 5.7: Natural justice. Quite frequently misidentified. Too many candidates brought in irrelevant discussion of universal justice. Q. 12 (e) (1(e)) 6.12: Value of prudence and wisdom. Rarely and then usually not well done. Few were able to explain the context. Q. 12 (f) (1(f)) 9.8: Sacrifice. Popular and often reasonably well done, though several candidates failed accurately to describe the context of the passage.

RSC

117 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein The exam had 17 questions, 6 with a and b parts, yielding 23 questions in total. With only 5 candidates sitting the exam obviously not all questions were answered. Most popular were Frege on Concepts and on Sense and Reference, Russell on Descriptions, and Wittgenstein on the Picture Theory; but the answers were fairly widely distributed with 10 of the questions having been attempted by at least one candidate. Below I comment on those questions which received more than one answer. In general, though, answers displayed good general knowledge of the material; stronger answers marshalled this knowledge effectively in directly answering the question asked. Q2 Answers: 1 Q3 Answers: 3 This question concerned Freges view that phrases of the form the concept F denote objects, not concepts. All answers correctly noted that if singular terms are complete, and complete phrases denote objects, then such phrases must denote objects and not concepts (which are denoted by incomplete predicate expressions). Stronger answers also recognized (a) that concepts belong, on Freges view, to the more general category of functions, and (b) that objects cannot serve as

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representatives for concepts since there are strictly fewer of the former than there are of the latter. Somewhat surprisingly, no answers explicitly mentioned Freges Law V, the truth of which requires (impossibly) a one-one relation between concepts and their extensions. Q6a Answers: 2 This question concerned Freges grounds for drawing a distinction between sense and reference; answers to it were particularly strong. Candidates wisely began by articulating some theses of Freges concerning sense and reference for instance, that the former determines the latter, and that senses are to be distinguished not only from referents but also from ideas. Freges concerns surrounding identity statements were taken to motivate the distinction; it was also recognized that his worries about differences in informational value between sentences involving substitution of co-referring terms generalize. A distinction was drawn between the cases of singular terms and of other expressions and in the former case between names and definite descriptions. General considerations from the philosophy of language were brought to bear (e.g. those surrounding Kripkes Paderewski case), as were considerations specific to those working in the period (e.g. whether Russells theory of descriptions might provide a better explanation). Q8a Answers: 2 Candidates were asked to explain how Russell avoided rejecting the law of excluded middle. Answers were solid, recognizing that he appealed to his theory of descriptions, and to the (scope) distinction between primary and secondary occurrences. Meinongs alternative was compared; Russells criticisms were upheld somewhat flat-footedly (in particular, without challenge). Q8b Answers: 1 Q10 Answers: 1 Q11b Answers: 1 Q14 Answers: 2 This question concerned Wittgensteins picture theory of meaning. Candidates distinguished pictorial form, representational form, and logical form, and recognized that isomorphism is a key component of the possibility of meaning in the Tractatus. Q15b Answers: 1 Q16 Answers: 1

BB

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118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein There were twenty-seven candidates for this paper. The paper contained fourteen questions. Pleasingly, every single question was answered. Indeed, every single question was answered at least twice. The most popular questions were Question 7on whether it would be possible for only one person, only once in a life-time, to follow a rulewhich was answered by seventeen candidates, and Question 9on whether there is any sense in which Wittgenstein thinks that sensations are privatewhich was answered by sixteen candidates. No other question received more than nine answers The marks ranged from 57 to 76. Apart from the one script that was awarded 57, every script was awarded at least 61. Nineteen scripts were awarded marks in the 60s, three were awarded 70, three were awarded 71, and one was awarded 76. This means that seven candidates (just over a quarter) were awarded a First Class mark. Only one of them, however, performed at a level significantly above the class borderline, as their marks testify. In general, the scripts had a solid Upper Second Class feel about them. On the one hand, the candidates tended to display good knowledge of Wittgensteins texts, together with good expository skills and a commendable ability to marshal their knowledge in response to the questions posed. There was little of the irrelevance that so frustrates examiners (with the notable exception of a tendency for candidates who answered Question 6on whether Wittgenstein thinks that understanding is akin to an abilityto focus on rule-following, despite the fact that there was another question, explicitly on rule-following, to which their answers would have been more relevant). On the other hand, the candidates tended to be somewhat unadventurous in what they wrote. Just as there was little irrelevance, so too there was little originality. The candidates also tended to do something that candidates for this paper nearly always do: they showed a certain reluctance to take issue with Wittgenstein (though it has to be admitted that the reluctance was less deeply rooted than in previous years, and their broad consensus was in many cases laced with points of incidental criticism). Overall, this was a year in which the answers were on the whole good, but where there was very little that was really outstanding.

AWM

119 Formal Logic There were six candidates: three PPE, two PP (one Part B and one Part C), and one PML. Two scripts were Ist-class; three scripts were in the II.1 band; and one got a mark a little below the III/Pass borderline. An erratum sheet was provided to correct a misplaced occurrence of nonempty in the statement of the Axiom of Countable Choice in question 8. Propositional and Predicate Logic Two candidates answered three questions (and answered none from any other section). Four candidates answered two questions.

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Question 1 (expressive adequacy and non-standard connectives): 2 answers. Question 2 (axiom systems and the Deduction Theorem): 5 answers. In part (c) the exercise was to show that all theorems of a system S1 were theorems of a system S2, where the systems were exactly the same except that S1 had an axiom scheme (B1) where S2 had an axiom scheme (B2). Three of the answers (more than half) set out to show this with a back-to-front argument, attempting to show that instances of (B2) could be derived in S1 using (B1), which it was impossible to do anyway, since S2 was strictly stronger than S1. There was also a lot of sloppiness in answersespecially in parts (d) and (e)because of not distinguishing between an axiom and an axiom scheme. Question 3 (first-order semantics): 3 answers. There was some unfortunate use/mention confusionor, at least, sloppinessin one of the answers. Question 4 (the expressive power of first-order languages): 3 answers. One answer went seriously astray because of confusion over the Compactness Theorema weirdly off-key statement of the theorem was offered. Another went wrong by supposing that an infinite set of sentences could be conjoined to form a single sentence. Question 5 (the construction of a maximally consistent set of first-order sentences): 1 answer. Set Theory Only one candidate answered a question from this section. Question 6 (the Axiom of Foundation): 1 answer. The answer insisted that the empty set has no subsetand claimed that therefore part (b) was ill formulated. But the empty set does have a subset: the empty set. Question 7 (orderings): 0 answers. Question 8 (the Axiom of Choice): 0 answers. Question 9 (ordinals and cardinals): 0 answers. Metamathematics Three candidates answered a question from this section. Question 10 (primitive recursive functions): 1 answer. The answer claimedfalselythat a function was primitive recursive if it was URM-computable, and went on to do everything with URM programs. Question 12 (computable functions; no effective enumeration of total ones): 0 answers. Question 12 (axiomatization of specified theories in the language of arithmetic): 0 answers. Question 13 (a variation on Gdels First Incompleteness Theorem): 2 answers. In parts (c) and (d) both answers fudged things: they both jumped straight from the theoremhood in T of an arithmetized statement of the existence of a proof in T to the actual existence of such a proof, rather

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than appealing to the definition of what it is for a theory to express (represent) an arithmetical relation and to the -consistency of Tboth of which had figured explicitly earlier in the question. They appeared to be making the assumption that the standard model of arithmetic was a model of the theory T, but they didnt say so; and such an assumption was in any case inappropriate.

SB

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics 19 candidates took this paper. The overall standard was solid (average mark 67), but less distinguished than sometimes, with no mark above 75 in the first class bracket and a general clustering at the upper end of the 2.1 bracket. Answers were rather unevenly distributed between sections A and B, with only a little over 1/3 of answers from Section A (1/3 is the minimum possible). Section A: The following questions received one answer each only: 2. How can it be that inertial coordinate transformations have empirical content? 3.Henceforth space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows... (MINKOWSKI) To what extent, if any, does the Special Theory of Relativity vindicate this pronouncement? The most popular question (13 answers) in section A was 4 (Why would an explanation of the Twins Paradox which rested on appeal to the relativity of simultaneity be a bad explanation?) and this was well handled overall. The best answers noted the significance of simultaneity conventions (possibly distinct) in both frames and included discussion of various relevant senses of explanation. Some answers showed impressive recall of the Debs and Redhead discussion of conventionality of simultaneity, which was very relevant to the question. Next most popular in section A (4 answers) was 1 (Is it any more than a convention that force-free bodies move with uniform speed in straight lines?). While all answers had a decent grip on the issue, some struggled to organise the material effectively. Q 5 (The late Einstein stated the core content of the Special Theory of Relativity as being that the laws of non-gravitational physics are Lorentz covariant. Was he right to prefer this to his earlier formulation in terms of the 1905 postulates?) received only two answers. Strong answers would distinguish both constructive from principle-theory approaches and different forms of constructive approach (e.g. geometric vs. dynamical). Section B Q6. (What is the nature of the hypothetical de Broglie-Bohm corpuscles and what active role, if any, do they play in the theory?) This was the most popular question in Section B. Reasonably well done overall, better answers took care to introduce the features of the de B-B theory carefully (while avoiding the danger of sliding into a generic essay on the pros and cons of de B-B). The Everett in denial objection was reasonably popular. Quite a few slips in detail throughout, however. Q 7. (What should a proper account of the measurement process in quantum theory look like?). With only three answers, a somewhat unpopular questions. Good answers avoided the temptation

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to reproduce a standard measurement problem essay and looked in detail at the physical analysis of measurement procedures. Q. 8. (Bells theorem is not required in order to show that quantum theory is non-local. Do you agree?) The second most popular question of this section (10 answers). While the majority of answers had a decent grip on the dialectic, details were often weak or muddled; or where they werent, the discussion tended to be rather too brief. Q 9. (Does it matter for questions of quantum ontology that decoherence is not a precise process?) Six answers; rather mixed. Weaker answers were hand-waving about what decoherence was (indeed no answer really adequately characterized decoherence) and tended to endorse a Dennett/Wallace approach without much argument. Q 10. (Is quantum theory an intrinsically probabilistic theory?) Four answers. By and large not handled that well, with a notable exception. Overall comment on the paper: While a good general grip of the issues was on show from candidates, overall there was a disappointing lack of attention to detail, particularly technical detail, which was often missing (rendering answers rather thinner than one would like) or muffed. More ambition in this direction would have led to better answers overall and is to be encouraged.

CGT

122 Philosophy of Mathematics The examination consisted of 15 questions, two of which (qq. 8 and 11) were disjunctive. The examiners were pleased by the fact that every question was attempted by at least one of the 23 candidates, all of whom belonged to the Mathematics & Philosophy Final Honours School, Part B. There were six Firsts (26%), fourteen Upper Seconds (61%), and three Lower Seconds (13%); the mean mark was 65.6 and the standard deviation was 5.2. Qq. 2, 3, 9, 12, and 15 were each attempted by only a single candidate. Q. 1, 'What can we learn about the nature of mathematics from Socrates exchange with the slave-boy in Platos Meno?', (6 attempts): Generally not well answered. Candidates either focused on a general exposition of Platonic philosophy of mathematics or on questions surrounding contemporary platonism. Almost every candidate failed to focus on the significance of the slave-boy's proof. Q. 4, 'Assess the view that the most interesting differences between mathematical knowledge and natural-scientific knowledge are all differences of degree, not of kind.', (10 attempts): The second most popular question. This question was too often used as an excuse for an automatic answer on Quine or on empiricist philosophy of mathematics more generally. The best answers made good use of Quine as a proponent of this view without forgetting that the view, and not he, is the object of the question. Q. 5, 'Does logicism rest on an inappropriately robust conception of logic?', (6 attempts): Largely poorly answered with garbled accounts of Quine's and Boolos' pronouncements on second-order logic or an automatic essay on logicism. At their best they considered what evidence might be adduced for and against a conception of logic. Q. 6, 'Does consistency, in a mathematical context, guarantee existence?', (5 attempts): There was a

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wide range of marks for answers to this question. Some used it as an opportunity for automatic essays on Hilbert and were duly punished; others considered the question on its own merits, using a broad range of ideas and arguments (including Hilbert's), and were duly rewarded. Q. 7, 'Can the structuralist give an account of mathematical epistemology without relying on the existence of abstract objects?', (15 attempts): By far the most popular question, with most candidates attempting an answer. Unfortunately, very few candidates focused on mathematical epistemology, as the question required, preferring instead to offer automatic (and irrelevant) essays on structuralism. As with q. 5, there was a certain amount of attempted restatement of Boolos' views on plural semantics for second-order logic. Q. 8a, 'Taking the principle of the excluded middle from the mathematician would be the same as prohibiting... the boxer the use of his fists. (HILBERT) Discuss.', (3 attempts): Answers tended to offer a rather vague di