CUPA 2009 Southern Chapter Annual Conference

Threat Assessment Teams and the Reduction of Risk on College

Campuses — Evidence From the Front Line

Outline• Introduction: Changing Face of Risk• State of Disruptive Activity on Campus• Current Risk Reduction Efforts using Background

Checks• Threat Assessment Teams (TAT) in Higher

Education– What is Threat Assessment?– Why do We Need This?– Current Data on Threat Assessment Teams

• Composition and Characteristics• Performance

The Changing Face of Risk on College Campuses

• 2009: University of Georgia: Professor kills 3 in off-campus theater• 2009: Virginia Tech: PhD Student kills Another in Campus Café• 2008 University of Washington: Staff Member Immolates Himself on Campus• 2008 University of Iowa: Professor Commits Suicide after Accusations of Sexual Misconduct• 2008 University of Georgia: Professor accused of sexually harassing students• 2008 Louisiana Technical College: Student Kills Two Classmates and then Self• 2008 Northern Illinois University: Former Graduate Student Murders 5 and then Self• 2007 Virginia Tech University: Student murders 32 fellow Students & Faculty• 2007 University of South Florida: Graduate Assistant Charged with terrorism after being

caught with bomb making equipment in car after a traffic stop.• 2007 University of Washington: Gunman kills staff member and then kills self.• 2006 Eastern Michigan University: Student with criminal history murders another Student in

Dorm Room.• 2006 University of Pennsylvania: Professor charged with bludgeoning wife to death

Total Crime Statistics on University Campuses: 2004-2006*

 Crime Categories 2004 2005 2006

Aggravated Assault 3,009 2,868 3,070Arson 1,059 1,019 970Burglary 30,451 30,819 32,051Forcible Sexual Offenses 2,649 2,704 2,704Motor Vehicle Theft 6,408 5,888 5,588Murder/Non-Negligent Manslaughter

15 11 8

Negligent Manslaughter 0 2 0Non-forcible Sexual Offenses 24 45 37Robbery 2,060 2,028 1,969

Total 45,675 45,384 46,397* Source: US Department of Education (Latest Year Data is Available 2006)

Total Crime Statistics (Including Arrests) on University Campuses: 2004-2006

 Crime Categories 2004 2005 2006

Aggravated Assault 3,009 2,868 3,070Arson 1,059 1,019 970Burglary 30,451 30,819 32,051Forcible Sexual Offenses 2,649 2,704 2,704Motor Vehicle Theft 6,408 5,888 5,588Murder/Non-Negligent Manslaughter 15 11 8

Negligent Manslaughter 0 2 0Non-forcible Sexual Offenses 24 45 37Robbery 2,060 2,028 1,969Illegal Weapon Possessions 1,314 1,425 1,415Drug Arrests 13,058 14,182 14,458Alcohol Violations 34,019 34,315 36,541Total 94,066 95,306 98,811

The Cost of Risk Financial*:

Financial Matters: $500,000 to $555 Million Breach of Contract: $33 Million Retaliation: $725,000 to $19.1 Million Negligence: $240,000 to $19 Million Child Abuse & Molestation: $175,000 to $4.6 Million Defamation: $3.5 Million Sexual Assault/Harassment: $1.1 to $2.85 Million Discrimination: $200,000 to $2 Million Tenure: $205,000 to $600,000

Non-Financial: Reputation Publicity Reduced Enrollment Reduced Donations Reduced Legislative Support

*2008, Demchak, Smith & Varady, “Emerging Trends in Litigation and Dispute Resolution”, 29th Annual National Conference on Law Higher Education

Implications of Clery Act Reported Violations

• While Overall Clery Act Numbers appear Stable, the Overall Number of Alcohol, Drug and Weapon Violations are Increasing Dramatically

• It has been Suggested that over 80% of Crimes or Disruptive Activity are Committed by Students

• More Effective Risk Mitigation and Management Policies and Procedures that Include a Focus across Students, Staff & Faculty are Required

• Many States have Reacted with Legislation Requiring Background Checks on Prospective Employees as One Way to Reduce Crime on Campus

• Many Admissions Offices are resorting to Novel Methods for Reviewing Applicants' Possible “Fit” with University Environment in the Absence of Quantifiable Data

Current State-Level Legislative Activity for Background Checks in Higher Education

• Momentum is Increasing across all States to Enact some form of Background Check Process on all Incoming Students.

• State Legislatures that have passed Legislation Mandating some form of Background Checks for University Staff, Faculty & Some Student Groups– Kentucky: July, 2006: Background Checks on all New University Hires (Includes Student Workers)– Washington: 2001 (Applies to New Employees with Unsupervised Contact with Minors).– Utah: Implemented in 2007– North Dakota: Implemented in 2007– Illinois: Filed January, 2006– Wisconsin: Approved in April, 2006 (Applies to All Job Applicants)– Virginia: (Applies to All Student Applicants): Implemented January, 2007-Cross Checks Applicants

with Sex Offender Registries– North Carolina: (Applies to Incoming Students with Gap on Application or Admitted Involvement

in a Crime); To be Implemented Fall, 2007– Arizona: Board of Regents Approved Policy 6-709 for 3 major Arizona Universities (Applies to all

New Hires after July 1, 2005).

Implications of Application of Background Check Processes

• Currently, the approach in Higher Education is all Over the Board• All States Require Criminal Background Checks (CBCs) on Certain Categories of New Hires

such as Police Officers, Child Care Workers, Medical Professionals, etc.• Many States are now Requiring CBCs on all New Hires within Higher Education Regardless of

Position – Duty is to Provide Reasonable Background Checks on all New Hires• The Term “Reasonable” is Open to Interpretation; Some Schools Engage in much more

Aggressive Checks than Others• No Consistent Policies on how to Handle Contract Employees who Separate from University

on Regular Basis (i.e. Adjunct Faculty Positions)• Policies on Volunteer Positions are also Fairly Under-developed as well. • University Vendors are Often Required to Perform CBCs on their own Employees as Part of

their Contract with University-Quality of Check is Unknown • Most Universities Do Not Have Policies to Recheck all Employees Regularly Regardless of

Positions Held.• Most Universities Do not Perform any International Checks on either Prospective Students or

Employees at All

How Virginia Tech Accelerated More Advanced Risk Assessment Strategies

• Expansion of Training in Area of Behavioral Analysis, Emergency Preparedness and…..Threat Assessments-Hence Momentum behind Threat Assessment Team (TAT) Development

• Development of a Single Channel for Reporting Disruptive Student Behavior– Should be expanded to include staff and faculty as well

• Recommendation for Schools to Adopt an Anonymous Reporting System where university constituents can Report Threats or Dangerous Behavior to School and Campus Administrators

• Colleges should Develop New & Enhanced Campus Alert Systems

Behavioral/Threat Assessment Teams- A Newly Embraced Technique in Risk Mitigation

• Post Virginia Tech, there has Been a Significant Increase in the Formation of Behavioral/Threat Assessment (BAT/TAT) in the Higher Education Space

• BAT/TAT Teams are expected to help Administrators Review Available Information on an Incident, “Connect the Dots” between bits of Data & Decide on Action Plan Involving the Disruptive Behavior of Students, Staff & Faculty

• According to One Student Administrator of a Major Public University Campus, – “There is not one university out there that is not, at least, in the

beginning stages of forming a Threat or BIT team; No campus can afford to be without one now….”

What is Threat Assessment?

• Threat assessment is a risk management process utilized by [certain] institutions of higher education, that in its proper form receives, evaluates and acts upon perceptible and observable information obtained from various sources and by various means, with the intent to minimize, and to the extent possible, prevent, premeditated or opportunistic bodily harm to their constituents by individuals or groups of individuals from inside or outside of the organization (Weisenbach, Hertz & Hughes, 2009)

What are Threat Assessment Teams?

• Derived from Secret Service Model• Group of Campus Administrators with Specialized

Skill Sets • Ongoing Responsibility• Proactive versus Reactive Mindset• Intended to Investigate or Follow-up on

Information about a Perceived Threat• Make Assessments of Next Steps• Manage Situation/Person to Reduce Threat

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Data derived from 121 Online Surveys of University Behavioral/Threat Assessment Team (BAT/TAT) members.

• Findings:– Existence of Team:

• BAT/TAT in Place: 78.5% (95)• Not in Place: 21.4% (26)

– Tenure of Team: • 0-2 years: 47.7%• 3-8 years: 33.7%• 9 years or more: 9.3%• Unknown: 9.3%

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Findings:– Size of Team:

• 1-4: 7.7% (6)• 5-9: 59% (46)• 10-14: 21% (16)• 15-19:7.7% (6)• Over 20: 5% (4)

– Departmental Representation:• Human Resources: 10.6% (36)• Dean of Students: 17.6% (58)• Chief of Police/Public Safety: 19.23% (65)• Student Affairs:19.23% (65)• Residential Life: 15.6% (53)• Other: 18% (61)

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Findings:– Why is HR Not Represented on Team?:• Focus on Students not Employees: 36%• Brought in on a Need to be Basis: 13%• HR is Already a Member of Team: 18%• Not Sure: 23%• Limited Staff: 2.5%• Never Had to Be: 5%• Have their Own Team: 2.5%

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Findings:– Rotation Pattern:

• Hold Permanent Position: 77.6% (52)• Rotate On and Off on Periodic basis: 2.9% (2)

– Frequency of Team Meetings:• Daily: 2.7% (2)• Weekly: 26% (19)• Every other week: 12.3% (9)• Monthly: 15% (11)• As Needed: 35.6% (26)• Other: 8% (6)

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Findings:– Do you utilize an Online Incident Reporting

System?:• Yes: 12% (14)• No: 36% (44)• Other: 52% (63)

– If not, Why?:• Confidentiality Concerns: 50% (31)• Wrongly Accused Concerns: 25% (15)• Resistance to Learning Another new System: 25% (15)

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Contextual Findings:– The lack of a Dedicated Reporting System is due to the fact that most

Universities:• Rely on Email Submissions or Forms Downloaded from Website to Submit

offline• Anonymous Reporting is Considered Problematic but Increasingly Groups

are Considering Use of Anonymous Reporting– Big Fear is that Allowing Anonymous Reporting will Lead to Flood of Incident

Reports and a Higher Level of Fraudulent Reports.

– Most Reports are Paper-Based• Notes are Not Always Secured in a Single Location• Raises Issues of Liability

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Contextual Findings:– Most teams do not Currently Track and Trend

Incidents for Proactive Intervention and Training• Since Reports are Primarily Paper-based, there has

been little ability to do this– Most Groups Feel They Need More Training to

Deal with the Diversity and Complexity of the Problems they are Experiencing• Most Training is done in-person conducted by experts

already on staff at university– Most Groups Feel They Need More Tools to Assist

Them in Effectively Carrying out the Mandate of the Threat Assessment Team.

Characteristics of Threat Assessment Teams In Higher Education

• Additional Contextual Findings:– FERPA Issues – Most teams Need More Training on Legal Issues

Surrounding The Handling of Incident Data– Better Overall Training on Investigative Techniques and Follow-up:

• Lack of Consistency in How Threat Teams Manage the Follow-up on these Reports

– Need to Build Awareness of Team so Team gets more and Better Data before an Incident Escalates into a Real Threat

– Need a Long-term Plan for Staffing Threat Assessment Teams because of Possibility of Burnout of Team Members

Do these Models Work?

• Currently, little Quantifiable Data Exists to Determine if Team Approach is Working to Reduce Disruptions, Suspicious Activity or Crime on Campus

• Anecdotal Evidence suggests that these models work but not enough data exists yet

• We are Currently working to Compile the data to demonstrate Effect of these Teams on Reducing Disruptive, Suspicious and Criminal Activity on Campuses

Success is Dependent on a Number of Factors

– Addressing Possible Issues before they Actually Arrive on Campus through More Aggressive Checks on the Front End

– Awareness and Involvement of Campus Community to Report Issues Involving Suspicious, Disruptive or Criminal Behavior when it Occurs

– Mechanism to Allow Anonymous Reports Facilitates More Data Rather than Less

– The Aggressive Investigation and Management of Incident Reports by School Administrators Including Allocating Appropriate Resources towards Mitigating the Threat

– Targeted Communication with Relevant Stakeholders about the Actions Taken to Resolve the Threat

– An Increase in Resources Devoted to Managing Mental Health Issues among University Population

For More Information on the Research Presented Please Contact:

Dan Pattersondan.patterson@riskaware.com

OrLynn Schuman

lschuman@riskaware.com(877) 552-8907