G H A J P T E l E t — I

I I S f T R O D U C T I O N

The ffiOEit debated question in Psychology is 'What

Intel iigence is?' (Howards 11993) . There is much disputts and

controversy over the definition o-f in tei 1 igence (Sternberg ?.<

Dettermaii 5 1986) and exactly what things could be termed

"intelligent" (e.g. Schull, 1990)^ Such de-f ini tionai

controversies go back a long way, example^s being the 192.1. Journal

of Educational Psychology symposium (Ryle ^1949; and Miles,,

1957),, Recently,, socne researchers have said that the term is

vague arid ifteavfS so many tt'iivigs ttu-st it has iimited scieviti f ic

value in the study of mental abilities. (Howe,, 1988, 1989,

Mackintoshf 1987).

Be-forc the technical discourse, ordinary conriotation o-f

the t€?rm "intevl 1 igence" may be? presented. The term is singular

rather than plural, hence, whatever intelligence is it fnust bt

orte thing rattier thaif! marry thirigs* It .may be coristrued as a

dteasure o-f the ability to acquire knowledge. It must "partly" be

construed as iridependent arid different froo! achievement and what

is actually learned. Tiius, intel 1 igersce siiould not be fixed or

invariarvt t:barac teristic of a pei'Sor>. Rather, it should be

f? !.!:*'! as a result of e:>;perienctH'» It also xmpl.ie& that measur>3B

of intelligence? ought fcc? foe di-fferent and independent r<f those

assess knowledge. ^Brody, i985).

Ther-e are three approacf-fes to view descriptiof) of the

intelligence, the traditional (pragmatic) the -factor-analytic.

< psyc.hometric/structural > and the cognitive (componential)« Here

a brief dt^scription o-f all the three approaches, is provided,

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

The traditional approach to define intelligence is

heavily loaded with functional and pragmafcic characteristics.

The fliain objectives of tfie followers of this approach was to

construct or devise use and interpret the intelligence tests,,

Sal ton, as&9) 'Cattell, JMCK, (1890)^, Bi.net and Simon, (1905),

T€!rmmi,, U.91h) , Wechsler <1939) <Review by Jenkins and

Patterson, 196:!.) were aiftong the- workers of historical

signif icance. Little was givers to describe the

construct. However, it was assumed as a capacity or potevitial .

Binet with his pragmatic approtiicit to the nature of

intelligence implicity acknowl€?dged the presence of 'g' through

his wil .1 irigi'iesB to obtair-f psychometric sum of the measures of

tests and in scales of intel 1 igence« The fiiental age (MA) does

not tell whether- the child is -fast or slow -for his age. There?

wi;is a need for anather measure o-f rate of growth cf Intel J Igence-

Williafii Sterct (1912) sugge^sted the I.Q. as such a (iieasure, Tt^rman

<1916) devi&ed the -formula to account for the I.Q« foy the rc-stio

o-f MA and CA as&uming :100 score for pe r-fect average child»

Weehs 1 er^ < 1939) defined Intel 1 ig€H-jCty and devised the test to

flie a su r e it. F o r i i?f i rt t e 11 i g eri c e w a s a n a g g r e g a t e o r' g 1 o b a 1

capacity o-f the individual to act purp/osefully to think

rationally and to deal effectively with his environment. It is

aggrE gatft? or global bcicause it is coniposed of ele^nients or

abilities (-features) which, although not c^ntirely independent

a r e qvA a 1 i t a t i v e; 1 y d i f f e r eri t i. a b 1 e»

In traditional approach by the contevit analyses of test

items the construct of intel 1 iger-ice could posBibl-y,, but

subjecti-v-ely described. However, assumirtg intelligence as

capacity or potential in itself cr«vated a problem^ f-'or example,,

whether the capacity or potential is congruent with measurement

operation as well as with the Ejcores of intelligence test^

Whatever be the status of the construct of intelligence

and its measures, the traditional approach did not deviate from

intelligence as such a single entity or 'g'.

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COGNITIVE APPROACH

In recent yearBj, tctteifipts havK- been made to de-fine

intts.1.1 itiencB in teftriS o-f fundamental cognitive

operations/procesBee. The represevitative definition with this

approach can be re ferred to Sternberg .(i935> that irrte.! iLigence

consist of those merital fu.nctions that one uses intentionally

when one adopts- to 5S-iape and select the Evrivironment to live lasid

•function. The -fundafflental unit o-f analysis in most cognitive

theories is the in format iovi processing ccsmponent. The component

is a unit of p>roces5, just as the factor i'5 a unit of structure^

DaS;, <.1.972) Das,, Kirby and Jarman, <.1.975); Dass and

Molioy, (1975).! Jarnian and .Dass, <1977) perceives intelligence

as the ability to ubb ififoriuation o!.:<tained thrDi..\gh the

simultaneous and successive transforiiiation procedures in order

to plan and structi..ire behaviour effectively for goal attainment..

Seve-jral cooiponents of cc'gviitive ability have be?en

identified alofig the^se lines;, e«g„ Carroll <1976,, .1.9B1 ) has

identified tentative list of ten types of cognitive processes

with five meta cognitive processes of importance™ Sternberg^

<1980,, 1985) distinguishe^s amotig three different kinds of

ii")formatiofi •••- processing comporients]! ten meta componeivts5 thr». e

per-forriiance cofiiponentsj three know ledge ac. qui sit.tori CQmpDrients,

I)) fact;, the current trend In cognitive pBychology is toward

emphasis on domain-speci-fie: abi i ities»

FACTOB-ANALYTIC APPROACH

Factor-anaiytic approach is based on the

INTE?r-corr€»3.atiDns o-f various measures of individual

di-fferevtces. Some o-f the prominent users o-f this approach are

represented as Spearman <1904, 1923, 1927) Thurstone (1938

Suil-ford (1961, 1967, 198S) Cattell, <1963) Horn <198S) etc, Xt

is note worthy that Spearman' b <1904) -f actor--anaiytic construct

o-f intelligence antedated the -first actual intelligence test o-f

Binet and Simon <1905) . fiunpfVreys <19S5) {'(as coriclud&d tivat -for

the last 80 85 years o-f -factor-analytic research is coricerned

witJ'i the conversion D-f Spearman's speci-fit:: to common -fav.;:tors and

ignoring constru-ing the ' Q'' »

Spearman, who was trained as an ei'igineer, thought about

psychological problems mcry - fnathematical ly than do

psychologists^ He developed a mathematical method iirjown as

•factor analysis, which proved to be hie (iiajor contribution to.

the behavioral 'Bciences- Factor asialysis is mathematically much

too involved to explain here. Tl'se important point is that it

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enablt^d Spearman to 'Extract' the 'g' -from ail the

inter-"Cr.:<rr€».latiDns among a col lev:;t,ion of dive riSie tests, and to

show precisely the cnrrelation between each te&t and this

hypothetical general ability -factor,, The correlation o-f a given

test with the 'g' -factciir comivion to all tests its the analysis is

termed the tejst's "g' loading.

Spearman originally hypottiesixed ttiat each test measure?B

only g plus some specific ability;, S., which is tapped only by

the particular test» This theory that aviy given test sccjre is

composed only of g»-S, as viell as measuremerit errfjr, was soon

refuted by the -finding that there are other comffion -factors

bedsides However^ they are not general -factors, because they

do not enter into axil tests, as does 'g' but enter ovily into

certain group o-f tests.-.

Spearman used ' g' to iderrti-<V the qv.iaiity t-f alrouvid

general sup<eriority or inferiority which show up in most test

correlations. But he uses 'S' to account for specific influences

which reduced ti'iese correla'^ians considerably below :!. „00„

Spearman thought that pec-ple differed by heredity in 'g' just as

they differed in height or VMeigtit. Iri the same;- way, wi'ief i<e foi;tnd

that several tests of intellectual performance correlated

closely, he postulated a hypothetical general and purely

quantitative •(•actor underl-ying all cognitive per•forifiances oiF any

kind- This was what he ffieant b y ' g' and this is still the correct

usages •for the term.

Spearman hoped that re5€?arch would some day •<\ind a riieasure

of brain fui"iction which corresponded to "g' but this was not.

essential to his analysis^ Spearman <1923, 192'?) , describes 'g'

as the mental energy i-e„ the energy a-vailfable? in corte>i for

•functioning o f a group o-f neurons or a potefttial =

Subsequent to Spearmasi's •factor analytic researcti led te-

ther belie f' in other group factors of dif^ferent degre^BS o f

generality- E^f-forts were made to see whether the-y could be

logically related^ The first efforts of this kind resulted in a

model O'f a hierarchical nature, as proposed by Burt <1.949);;

Vernon (1950)„ These models were alike in placing Spearman's 'g'

at the apex- They dif^fered otherwise,. In Vernon's model;,

immediately below 'g' were two broad abilities Vsed (Verbal

educational) and K.H- <Spatial and Practical) under V?ed were

verbal and riumerical abilities and under K.M, came spatial and

mec: h a i-i .i c. a 1 a b i 1 .i t i. e s.

J.P. Buil-ford <1961, 1967, 1985) has presented a three

dimensional model o f intellect or tlve basis o f •faf;:t«:jr aiialysis

a

of severe! 1 intelligence tests. Guilford propose?d that

per-farmance on a(»y cognitive test cari best bt? i.tfvderBtDDd by

analysing it into kinds o-f fiiental operatiDns or processes

performed;, the type o-f corrtent or test nfat€?ria3. on which the

mental operation is per-formed and the resulting product o-f

performing a particular operation on a certaivi type of test

content. Guilford said that every intellectual ability is

c:haracte)--i:?:ed by mental operations,, contents and products.,

Guilford <1961, 1967, 1985) speculates that there may be 150 such

fact.DJ's, yet tiiese performances are not tri.<ly independent of one

^Another and correlation of the factor scores lead us back to

Spearmaif's 'g' and the idea that people tend to be superior,

average or inferior in moE'tt if nc>t on all intellectual tasks,,

Cattell <1963) has propessed an alternative to Spearmari's

g -I" S and distinguished between two kinds of intelligence

crystal 1 i;,;ed and fluid. Fluid intelligence is the form of general

intelligence which is largely innate and which adapts itself to

all kiiids of material regardless of previous e>iperience with it.

' Crystal lii^ed' intelligence is a general factor, largely in a

type of ability learned at sci-iool, representirig the effects of

past application of fluid intel 1 igevice and amouitt and interisity

of schooling it appeals xri such tests as vocabulary and if umber

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of ability measures. Tests o-f Vocabulary and general in-formation

and other tests that requires the recall o-f previously acquired

in-formation or skills are said to measures crystal 1 i;?:ed

intelligence or crystallised 'g' symtaolised gc. The inferential

processes involved in the original acquisition depend upon -fluid

inte^l 1 igence g"f» For persons -fraiTi similar educational and

cultural backgrounds tests involving gc and g-f are highly

correliited that is, persons who score high on gc tests,, like

vocabulary also score high osi g-f tests., like fiiatrices or -figure^s

anologies and other novel reasoning problems»

Jensen, <1970, 1930) suggested two major classes o-f

mental abilitiess associative < level I) and cogrsitive (level II)

Associative ability involves rc>t€? learning and short--term

niemory. Cognitive ability involves reasoning and problem

solving. Little trans-formation o-f input takes place within level

IJ whereaSj level 11 processing involves a conscious

manipulation o-f the stimulus input in producing the correct

ou tpiut«

Horn < 1982a, :!.982b) has given a model which is mainly

cDJicordant witii hui«an abilities-, He considered a broad

organisation o-f several main intellectual -functions, among them

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ter'i major capacities have been identi-fiecl. These ten factors also

indicate the basic capacities of general intelligence; in BOfiiB

one's- theory.

In the 'iiodel, the?re xb hierarchy o-f functions. The ten

intellectual -functions -from top to bottom ares G^ <-fluid

ability), and (Crystal 1 i;? ed ability), G < broad visualization)

GS (Clerical speed), TSR (long term shortage retrieval), SAR

(short-term acquisitiofi retrieval ) , VSD (visual sensory

detectors) and ASD (auditory sensory detectors)^

With the abos^e three approaches to de-fine general

intelligence, it is clear that cognitive as well as -factor

analytic/structural approaches steiii -from the traditional

approach^ However, the d3.stinc:tiDn iri three approi-scfies dcjes not

i€ ad to contradiction! As Stern (1985) has stated that

psychometric and cognitive approaches to study intelligence are

comple-'mentary and mutually bene-ficial . It is -fruitless to claim

that either a -factor or a component i.s more basic, becaiA'Be it. is

possible to do -factor analysis o-f Identified components o-f human

intelligence^ on the other harid it is also possible to do

componential analyses of idertti-fied -factors o-f human

I. n t B11 I g bvi C e „

11.

DGBcription of the three appro£-(CheB does riot lead to

contrive the not i on o-f gsmerai inteJ 1 igence, rather to

consolidate the nation. Jensen (•i98&) e.(3. advocates that evti n

the structure and approaches- o-f factor analysiB with its three

methods confirm the 'q'. Hierarchical faictor analysis ge^nerates

the apex o-f hierarchy as 'g' as above the three dimensions of

SOI o-f Guil-ford and --''f Cattell, what will be derived?

Similarly the first principal coiiiponents o-f a principal

components arialysis arid the -first -f-actor o-f a common -factor

analysis will be 'g'. However, Jensevi < 3.986) , -further concluded

that despite the evidences independejrt and dependent o-f both

psychometrics and -factor analysis, tfie sc:ienti-f ical ly

satisfactory theory o-f 'g' will probably have to be -formulated

iri terms o-f brain physiology as envisaged by its inventor.,

Spearmaii „

Several attempts have been made to relate intelligence to

per-for«(ance in laboratory settifigs with respect to their

implications -for understanding the validity o-f the intelligence

tests. Hendricksof) U9S2a(. 1982 b) has rBportBd the results o-f

a series o-f studies relating evoked potential measures derived

•from the re5pD?")se to auditory stimuli as meaBv.treB o-f

general intelligence. .Blinkhorn arid Hevidrickson <1982.'i reported

that th& correlation betweevi the EEG measure and the Raven's test

was ,47- More^over(I there has been some d.i-f-ficu.!ty in replicating

soiTie D-f the claifiis of a relationship between EEG measures and

intelligence <Ertt and Scho-fer^ 1.969? Rust^ 1975)- Eysenck

(1982) has argued that Hendrickson' s iTieasures are foore

•fundamental and more accurate indices;, o-f general intelligence

than standard psychometric tests- They prove to be consistently

correlated with psychoiijetric ijidices of intelligence are

privileged and are to be constrv.icted as pure measures of 'g' that

are more -fundamerrtal and ujibiased tha?-) more psychoi^etric

indices»

Attempts have also beeri made to de^fine intelligence in a

conceptual frame work- Eyseinck (1988) argue that intelligence is

a scientific concept and it contains three major related concepts

I«G„, Biological and Social ivrtelligence- Jensen (1937) reported

that the word intelligence l a b e l S ; , three di-fferent major

concepts 'g'? the sum of t!ie individual kiiowledge and skill and

the specific mental abilities important in a giveri culturte-

Recently, Howard (1993) argued tiiat therei are three major

concepts, each with several variants into which most researchers

concepts seems to fit- Each concept is represented in a some what

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idealized -form,, holds soffie what di-f'ferent. categoriejs but all

concei;)tB are related, becausfs they der ive -from the satTie starting

poifit, individual di-f •fGrefVices ^n a adaptive behaviour „

Intel 1 igei-fce I is Howard's n.993) first concept and this

is basically Spearman's "g' quite close to Cattell's "fluid and

tvlienr.: k' 5 intelligence The mair! idea is or a biolcfgical

di-f-ferejnces between people which correlates with performance oii

V ± r t u ally a 11 men 1;. a 1 t e s t s „

Regarding what in-formation does the concept containss

Howard argued that it holds the knowledge o-f defiiiing feature's

and Bome fiietaphors. Defining feature-relates to a property that

human brains have irt varying degrees* Res>earc.hers who holds tlfis

concept have different versiovis of this feature); some appears to

see it as a Predoiiiinantly Physiological feature^ Er!-) $?nck <1988)

said that 'g' is a kind of 'neural' efficiericy (softte brains works

better tisan others) Jevssen (1937) it appears to covnceive of 'g'

as mental speed. Sternberg <1985) holds that 'g' incltides a set

of information processing comporient.

Referent category of intelligence 1 as stated by Howard

are human brains and mathematical abstraction/numbers-. Tiie first

category is of a property of hufttan brain in which brains differs

i4

e.g. by weight. Some brains -fv ll tit high g end and some at the

low g end« The second category relates to results that emerge

•from a given table of inter-corre?!ation o-f p€?rformanne on various

mental tasks^ Much of the controversy regarding intelligence

will be resolved i-f researchers make a clear ffiention o-f the

referent category, e.g. i-f one ask a quEJstion doesj 'g' e^Mist? It

is easy to question whether there is a biological difference

<i„e„ 'g' as a property of the brain) but it is hard to dispute

the e>!istence of mathematical abstraction.

Intelligence II is the secojtd concept of Howard <1993)»

By ifitel 1 igence II Howard (1993) means that it is not a thing in

a head but a ctiaracteristics of beiiaviour analogous to an

object's colour. Red or not Red „ As Aviastasi (1986) has said that

. ij- tel 1 igence is a quality of behaviour but not an entity with iii

the organism, Estes (1982) argues that intelligence refers to

the adaptive beiiaviour of the ividividual „ Intelligence II

represents the category of behaviours. However, there is dispute

over thf3 boarder inte?lligent and noii intelligent behaviours^

Howard's third concept of Intelligence, is that

intel 1 ige)u;e is a set of abilities» Jensen (1987) labels it the

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sum total D-f all oiental abilities and the eritifG repertoire o-f

ci person's tinowledge and sk.iJ Is- The general cognitive-science

conception o-f intelligence is based oii this definition.

Re^garding the category to w}"fi<::h intel 1 Igence III

represents; Howard said that these are things with abilitiejs,

what things with abilities? is again a source o-f controversy in

researchers. Some researchers (e.g^ Gardner, 1933) include oiily

humans while some other include animals.-, A current p>erspective

in comparative psychology sees intelligence as the set o-f

abilities possessed by a given species Hack in tosh, 1.987).

Vi'vidness and multiple o-f components o-f intelligence

skill does not lead to believe -tha-t Spearman's concept o-f

intelligence as a single entity is substantially false. Because

measurable components o-f ta.sk performance are highly c.€.u-relat.ed

with general intel 1 igence?, . it is expected that a corre^lation

matrix of such measures would have a gerneral factor. Therefcire;,

compont^^ntial approach to intelligence permits the rediei-covery

and redefinition of Spearman's general factor albeit wit!?

greater precision of understanding of soHie of the componerits of

general intelligence. It should be recogni:s:ed that in the

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cDfiiponent c- ipprDach the? individual di-f'-ferfet'ices in aencral

intelligence «(ay be due to dl-fferences iri under'.lying compDnents

and not necessarily the- safde components,-for same ievc l of 'g'.

ThefB are individual di-f-fertsnc.efij in average ability to

pro-fit from various types o-f instructions and to acquire

now ledge ufider coftditiorts ivi wi'iich ifistruc. t.iona 1 procedures are

less than optimal. And it is this general ability that de-fines

general ifitel ligence» Thus intelligence is both many different

things, indeed, even idiographical ly presents within an

Ifidividuai and is also in a coheresit arid iiieaningful sense.-, one

thing„