1992 annual rept in accordance w/10cfr50.59.' w/931231 ltr. · 2020. 3. 16. · annual report...

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CP84____.

'C-arolina Power & Light Company

wilM.rzM22MuwcnwtwNun

Brunswick Nuclear PlantP.O. Box 10429

Southport, NC 28461-0429

DEC 31 1993 SERIAL: BSEP 93-0232 !

10CFR50.59-,

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTENTION: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555 ,

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 -

DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62ANNUAL REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59

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Gentlemen:;

The purpose of this letter is to transmit the annual report for 1992 in accordance with the 'requirernents of 10 CFR 50.59 for the Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP). This reportcontains brief functional summaries of procedures and plant modifications which arechanges to the facility as described in the FSAR during 1992. The report also containssummaries of those tests or experiments conducted in 1992 which are not described in -the FSAR. As required by 10 CFR 50.59, records of these changes in facility, changes in

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procedures, and tests or experiments are available for inspection at Brunswick NuclearPlant.> .

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Enclosure 2 provides a List of Regulatory Commitments contained in this submittal. Pleaserefer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. G. Honma at (910) 457-2741.

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Very truly yours, J

W. Levis, Manager-Regulatory Affairs;Brunswick Nuclear Plant

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Enclosures

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region 11.

Mr. P. D. Milano, NRR Senior Project Manager - Brunswick Units -1 and 2Mr. R.' L. Prevatte, Brunswick' NRC Senior Resident inspector.

9401070056' 921231'g@N[PDR ADOCK-05000324 f .

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Enclosure 1

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BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2

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DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62

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1992 ANNUAL REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59

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Table of Contents

Lttro P_agels)

En_gineerina Desian PackanesEDP 92-005, Unit 2 - Decommissioning Spent ResinPump Pressure Switch, 2-G16-PSL-4392 1. . .... ........ . . .... ....

Direct Replacement PackanesDR 89-0348, Unit 2 - Replacement of GateValve 2.B32-V22 With Globe Valve 2-... . .. . . ....... . . . .

DR 90-0122, Unit 2 - Replacement of Stuffing BoxExtension for Heater Drain Pumps 3. ......... . .. . ... .. . ......

DR 91-0055, Unit 2 - Direct Replacement of 2-E41-F022 ............. 4.

DR 91-0097, Unit 2 - Replacement of TBCCW Heat ExchangerVelan Gate Vent and Drain Valves with Conval Globe Valvec .5.... .. .......

DR 92-0293, Unit 2 -Installation of ReplacementGasket - MSIV F028D Only . . . . . 6'.. ..... . . .. . ... .. ...

Plant Modification PackanesPMs 80-260 and 80-261, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Addition

of Plant Air Compressors 7.. .. .. ....,. ... . ..... .. .... . ..

PM 86-084, Replacement of Diesel Generator Cell FireProtection Ionization Protectors with Flame and Heat Detectors . . . . . . ...8. .

PM 87-002, Unit 2 - Modification of Control Circuits for E11-F068 Valve . .......9

PM 87-203, Unit 1 - Modification to the Unit 1 Turbine Building Sample SystemPM 87-204, Unit 2 - Modification to the Unit 2 Turbine Building Sample System . . . . 10

PM 89-029, Unit 2 - HPCl/RCIC Reliability improvements . . . . . . . . . 11...........

PM 91-044, Unit 2 - Circulating Water Alternate Biocideinjection and Sampling Points - . 12-. ... . ... , . ................

PM 92-108, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Control BuildingEmergency Air Filtration System improvements . . . 13... ... . ........... ..

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Enaineerina Evaluation RerlpftsEER 90-119, Evaluation of the Requirement / Necessity of Cable TrayCovers on "D" Level Cable Trays . . . . . . . . 14....... ... ............ ...

EER 90-0182, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Evaluation of CAC/ CAD PCIS FunctionBased Upon Separation Discrepancies Found . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15................

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EER 91-0299, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Operational Requirements forAT-4409/4410 Hydrogen / Oxygen Analyzer 16.. . .. . .. ...... . .

EER 91-0400, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Battery Room Chart Recorder installation . . . 17 -

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EER 91-0449, Unit 2 - Temporary Repair of Recirculation Drain Lines . . 18.........

iEER 92-0048, Unit 1 - Use Of Fire Protection Water For Battery Testing 19... ....

EER 92-065, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Suppression PoolOxygen increase During RCIC Operation 20.. .. ... ... . ..... ....

EER 92-0076, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Raising Discharge Temperature'

Switch Setpoints for Joy Compressors 21. . .. ... . . .. . .

EER 92-0090, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Turbine Building Power RoofVentilator Temporary Blank-Off . 22. . .. . . . .... . . . . . . r

iEER 92-0186, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Permanent Repair of TurbineBuilding Cooling Tower . . . .... .. .. ...... ... ... . 23

EER 92-0261, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Standby Gas Treatment SystemHeat Detection Circuit Fuse Assessment . . 24..... .. .. ........

EER 92-0300, Unit 1 - Control of Reactor Building Static PressureEER 92-0228, Unit 2 - Control of Reactor Buildint, Static Pressure . . . 25

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EER 92-0305 Unit 2 - RHR "B" Temporary Flow / Pressure Instruments . 26. .. .

EER 92-0370 and EER 92-0371, Unit 1 RHR "A" & Unit 1 RHR "B"Temporary Flow / Pressure Instruments 27........ .......... ........ ......

EER 92-0387, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Radwaste HVAC Abnormal Fan Lineups . . . ....28

EER 92-0392, Unit 1 - Temporary Alternate Reactor Level AlarmInstalled Due to Work on PM 89-001 29..... .. .................. .. ..

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EER 92-0406, Emergency Substation Tie Breaker ,

Undervoltage Trip Device Removal 30 )......... ........ ... . .. ... ..

EER 92-0534, Unit 1 - Temporary Modification for Equalization )of 1-SA PDIS-4489 31. .. .. . . . .... ... ........ .. ..

EER 92-0566, installation of Temporary Potable Water Supply . 32...........

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Chan.ges to Procedures As Described in the FSAR0-OP-37.2, Radwaste Building Heating and VentilationSystem Operating Procedure . . . 33...... ..... ... . ..... ..... .....

0-SP-92-003, Operations Support for OM-6 Qualificationof Service Water Pumps . . . 34 i. . .. ... .. ,.... .. ... ..

Tests or Experiments Not Described in the FSAR

OSP 91-011, Testing Instrument Air Dewpoint L 'i.. .... .. .

OSP-91-092, OM-6 Service Water Pump Vibration Testing . '2-. . ... .

2-SP 92-039, Unit 2 - Test of ClamTrol for MacrofoulingControl in Circulating Water System 37.... . .. ... . ... . . ... .

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DE!;CRIBED IN THE FSAR

TITLE: EDP 92-005, Unit 2 - Decommissioning Spent Resin PumpPressure Switch, 2-G16-PSL-4392

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:|

EDP 92-005 evaluates the feasibility of decommissioning the spent resin pump low suctionpressure trip function. .j

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SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION: ||

The Spent Resin Pump low suction pressure trip function protects the pump from damage Icaused by operating dry. This pump protection is also provided by an existing pump trip

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on low tank level, 'In addition, the affected equipment is non-Q and has no impact on plantoperation. Consequently, this change: (1) does not increase the probability orconsequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create thepossibility of a new or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR, i

and (3) does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical,

Specification. '

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR

TITLE: DR 89-0348, Unit 2 - Replacement of Gate Valve 2-832-V22 With Globe Valve

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This DR evaluated replacement of a 3/4" Volan gate valve with a Conval globe valve. Theexisting Velan gate valve failed the LLRT.

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:

The Conval valve installed in place of the Velan valve for 2-832-V22 was evaluated in DR89-0348 to meet design requirements for the specific application, meet all requirements of |the FSAR, and does not change the mechanical operating characteristics of the jRecirculation System. Tne valve replacement does not increase the probability of .

occurrence or conseque ices of any FSAR Chapter 15 accident.

Design considerations (including mechanical, electrical, seismic, interface, etc.) for theConval valve have been evaluated and shown to meet or exceed the original valverequirements. This DR (including EER 90-0023, Rev.1) has addressed the torquerequirements and operating margins of the valve and motor operator to ensure the safetyfunction of the valve is not affected. Thus this valve replacement will not reduce themargin of safety as defined in the bases of the Technical Specification.

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TITLE: DR 90-0122, Unit 2 - Replacement of Stuffing Box Extension for the HeaterDrain Pumps

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BRIEF DESCRIPTIO_N_:

This DR evaluates replacement of the existing stuffing box design for the Unit 2 heaterdrain pumps with the new three-element stuffing box design recommended by the pumpmanufacturer. The upgraded stuffing box design was not supplied with a quench typepacking gland as it was removed from the product line as obsolete. Consequently, this DRalso evaluates deletion and removal of the gland seal quench piping (smothering supply-line) to the pump packing gland.

StJMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:

The replacement stuffing box design performs the same design function as the existing [stuffing box. The replacement stuffing box design will increase the performance and

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reliability of the subject pumps, provide a more reliable pressure boundary, and reduce theprobability of a radiological release to the surrounding environment. The heater drain t

system is not classified as nuclear safety-related and would be isolated in an accidentsituation. The proposed stuffing box upgrade and smothering line removal will not affect t

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the operation of safety-related equipment. The heater drain pumps are not designed asequipment for mitigating an accident. The proposed change is of a manuf acturer'sstandard design and does not adversely affect equipment which is important to safety.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR >

ITITLE: DR 91-0055, Unit 2 - Direct Replacement of 2-E41-F022

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:P

This change is a direct replacement of a 2 inch Velan stop check valve with a 2 inch |Conval stop check valve.

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SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION: .

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The stop check valve in question is the HPCI Turbine EHX Drain Pot Valve to the toruswhich isolates on reactor vessel low level, high drywell pressure and individual system leak- ,

detection. The replacement valve satisfactorily performs the same functions as theoriginal valve and meets or exceeds the design requirements of the original valve. Thereplacement valve materials, size, and weight were reviewed and found to be acceptableto this application. Consequently, this change: (1) does not increase the probability or . i

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consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create thepossibility of a new or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR, j

and (3) does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical'

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TITLE: DR 91-0097, Unit 2 - Replacement of TBCCW Heat Exchanger Velan GateVent and Drain Valves with Conval Globe Valves '

BRIEF DESCRIPTION::

This DR evaluates replacement of 3/4 inch Velan gate vent and drain valves (VelanModel W4-254B-2TS) with 3/4 inch Conval globe valves (ConvalModel 0.75-11 G2J-105-5E).

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SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:!

These replacements are part of a program to replace Velan valves due to their high |maintenance, low reliability, and difficulty in obtaining spare parts. The replacementvalves perform the same functions as the valves to be replaced and meet or exceed thedesign requirements of Specification 248-117. The replacement valves will better ensure .ithe performance, reliability, and integrity of the subject valves is not degraded.

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TITLE: DR 92-0293, Unit 2 -installation of Replacement Gasket - MSIV F028D Only,

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this DR is to install a replacement spiral wound gasket to suit the modifiedbody bore for MSIV 2-821-F028D. -


The subject MSIV body was align bored to improve the valves disk / piston stem alignmentwith the valve body bore and seat. This repair requires a replacement gasket with slightly I

enlarged inside and outside diameter to fit the finished dimensions of the repaired valve. |'

The function and operation of the MSIVs are unchanged by this spiral wound gasketreplacement. The valve will still be capable of isolating the primary containment within

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Tech Spec time limits while the overall reliability of the valve has been improved.

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TITLEi: PMs 80-260 and 80-261, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Addition of Plant Air '

Compressors

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

These modifications added compressors 1D and 2D to the plant compressed air system.

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SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION: 1

The added compressors increased the capacity of the existing compressed air system. Nochallenges to the plant barriers or transient initiators result from the changes; therefore, no

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unreviewed question is introduced by this change. j

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TITLE: PM 86-084, Replacement of Diesel Generator Cell Fire Protection IonizationProtectors with Flame and Heat Detectors.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

|PM 86-084 changed out the smoke detectors in certain fire zones in the Diesel Generator i

Building to flame and heat detectors. |


The NRC Staff has reviewed the proposed modification and associated TechnicalSpecification changes and agreed with the licensee's appraisal of the potential problemswith the existing type of the detection system instruments. The Staff found the proposedchanges to be consistent with the guidance of SRP BTP 9.5-1 and NFPA 72D, Standardfor the installation. Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Sianalina Systems, published bythe National Fire Protection Association.

The modifications proposed by the licensee for the fire detection systems in the*

emergency diesel-generator buildings and the corresponding changes to their operatingTechnical Specifications are, therefore, acceptable to the NRC Staff.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR [

TITLE: PM 87-002, Unit 2 - Modification of Control Circuits for Valve 2-E11-F068|

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:?

This modification replaces the automatic control loop for Unit 2 valve 2-E-11-F068B with amanual control switch. in addition, a key-locked switch will be installed that will allowmanual control of 2-E11-F068B under conditions of loss of DC control power and if bothRHR service water pumps are not running. The switch eliminates the need to performwire-fifts currently being performed under the system operating procedure.

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Replacement of the automatic controls with manual controls does not reduce the capabilityof the E11-F0688 valve to perform its design functions in the required time; therefore, nounreviewed safety question is introduced as a result of this modification. ,

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TITLE: PM 87-203, Unit 1 - Modification to the Turbine Building Sample SystemPM 87-204, Unit 2 - Modification to the Turbine Building Sample System |

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

PM 87-203 and PM 87-204 upgrade and relocate equipment in the Unit 1 and Unit 2Turbine Building Sample Stations (TBSS), respectively, and also install a dissolvedhydrogen analyzer for hydrogen water chemistry analysis in each Unit.


Modification and upgrade of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TBSS does not change any assumptionsor analyses in the FSAR. Functional capability of the existing systems is enhanced by thechanges being made. Technical Specification sampling requirements are not negativelyaffected by these changes. These modifications result in improved functional capability ofthe systems; therefore, no unreviewed safety question is introduced as a result of thesechanges. >

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TITLE: PM 89-029, Unit 2 - HPCl/RCIC Reliability improvementsi

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

Plant Modification 89-029 includes the following HPCl/RCIC reliability improvements: i

(1) removal of the auto open logic for valves E41-F002, E41-FOO3, E51-F007, andE51-F008; (2) installation of key lock switches in control room relay cabinets for valvesE41-F002, E41-F003, E51-F007, and E51-F008; and (3) changing the Steam Tunnel iTemperature High Alarm for the HPCI and RCIC systems from annunciating at 175 degrees !

''F to 155 degrees F.

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Removal of the auto open logic will not cause a failure of the HPCI or RCIC system to autoinitiate as required. The valves will be administratively maintained in the open positionexcept when performing maintenance. Administratively maintaining proper valve line-up toallow safety system operation is an acceptable control. In addition, two PRAs of increasedcore damage was performed. The first was without the modifications to the auto opensignals for the HPCI and RCIC systems. The second was with the modification. The PRAsconfirmed the engineering judgement that the change has an insignificant effect on coredamage frequency.

Installation and use of override switches for valves E41-F002, E41-F003, E51-F007, andE51-F008 will not degrade the function of the valves or the ability of the HPCI or RCIC ,

systems to operate. The override switches will keep the valves open in the event of a high'

differential pressure signal of the associated systems. If the HPCI or RCIC systems receiveauto start signals, the valves will be open and will not prevent the systems fromperforming their functions. The switches will be administratively controlled by procedure ,

and the key can only be removed in the normal position. Also, the valves receive an i

isolation signal from PCIS isolation signals downstream of the override switch. Thereforethe override switch cannot prevent the valves from performing their isolation functions. |

!The temperature switches (E41-TS-N600 and E51-TS-N600) for the Steam TunnelTemperature High Alarm have no safety related function, however, they can provide early- !

warning to the control room operators in the event of rising steam tunnel temperature. !

The HPCI and RCIC systems both isolate with steam tunnel temperature at 165 degrees F. .

Lowering the Steam Tunnel Temperature High Alarm setpoints to 10 degrees F below theisolation point provides this early warning and has no adverse effect on either system. ;

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The safety analysis' determined that PM 89-029:(1) does not increase the probability or |

consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create the -possibility of.a new or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR, !and (3) does not reduce the' margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical |Specification. j

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED !N THE FSAR f

TITLE: PM 91-044, Unit 2 - Circulating Water Alternate Biocide injection and SamplingPoints )

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: j

This modification adds piping to the Circulating Water (CW) System to f acilitate thecontrolled injection of a biocide downstream of the CW Intake Pumps. The modification

]also adds tubing and valves from the condenser outlet water boxes drain tap valves to a ;

location outside the turbine building to facilitate sampling CW without entering a locked,

high radiation area during normal unit operation, 1

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The changes made by this modificatica do not change the system or component functionsin a manner that would adversely affect safety. No effects on the CW system wouldaffect any analyzed transients; therefore, no unreviewed safety question is introduced bythis modification.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR-I

TITLE: PM 92-108, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Control Building Emergency Air Filtration ~ ,

System Improvements ,

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

PM 92-108 corrects two potential single f ailures which could adversely impact the ControlBuilding Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) system.

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION: )The changes to the BSEP CBEAF System implemented by PM 92-108 were evaluated andaccepted by the NRC in their " Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation Related to Amendment No.161 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 and :

Amendment No.192 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-62, Carolina Power & Light !

Company, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2," issued March 22,1993 (TAC :

Nos. M85143 and M85144). I

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TITLE: EER 90-0119, Evaluation of the Requirement / Necessity of Cable Tray CoversOn "D" Level Cable Trays In The Cable Spread Room (Cont. Bldg.)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

EER 90-0119 evaluated the feasibility of non-replacement of cable tray covers on Type IV("D Level) cable trays, except for divisional separation requirements, in the cablespreading rooms.


Based on cable characteristics (EMI and RFI protection), administrative controls (physicalprotection), the f ad itat the cable spreading rooms are mechanical projectile free, and thatthe covers do not serve as a fire barrier, the EER determined that the cable tray covers arenot required in the cable spreading rooms except for divisional separation or cable traycrossover. Consequently, this change: (1) does not increase the probability orconsequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create thepossibility of a new or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR,and (3) does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical

"'Specification.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR'

TITLE: EER 90-0182, Unit 1 and Unit 2 ' Evaluation of CAC/ CAD PCIS Function BasedUpon Separation Discrepancies Found

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

EER 90-0182 evaluated the impact of discrepancies found in the Division I and Division 11physical wiring separation in the Unit 1/2 CAC System Containment isolation Valves on

2 nerting, air purge, and purge / exhaust lines to and from the Drywell and theithe NSuppression Pool. The concern was that there might exist a f ailure mode whereby theisolation valve (s) would not perform their safety related function.

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:,

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Based upon a review of the as-installed system wiring, no single f ailure mode (using the'

single f ailure analysis) was identified which could prevent containment isolation upon aLOCA signal for the affected valves. Additionally, if one of the valves failed to open upon jthe receipt of a LOCA signal override command, the DC-powered redundant vent / exhaust ;path would provide the venting capability. Consequently, the identified discrepancies: |

(1) do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in !

the FSAR, (2) do not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident thanpreviously evaluated in the FSAR, and (3) do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in

'the basis of any Technical Specification.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR!

TITLE: EER 91-0298, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Operational Requirements for AT-4409/4410Hydrogen / Oxygen Analyzer

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: }

This EER evaluates a change in the operation of the drywell hydrogen / oxygen analyzers i

from continuous operation to standby operation (operate for sampling and post-accidentmonitoring).

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The hydrogen / oxygen analyzers are designed to provHe measurement of hydrogen andoxygen concentration in the drywell following a loss of coolant accident, as well as

'providing intermittent sampling of the drywellin accordance with the TechnicalSpecifications. Operation of the analyzers in standby during normal operation does notaffect the capability of the system to perform its design functions; therefore, no

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unreviewed safety question is introduced as a result of this change. .

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TITLE: EER 91-0400, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Battery Room Chart Recorder Installation

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

EER 91-0400 evaluates the feasibility of temporary installation of chart recorders for the125/250 VDC batteries to assist in ground detection.


EER 91-0400 reviewed temporary installation of four Chessel Model 345 chart recordersfor the purpose of ground detection. The EER concludes that the chart recorders are non-safety related and are connected to the 125/250 VDC batteries through the non-safetyrelated ground detectors. The ground detectors are isolated from the system via safetyrelated fuses, thereby also isolating the recorders. The recorders are connected betweenthe PN Bus and ground and will not add any additional load to the DC system. Themounting of these chart recorders was also reviewed with respect to seismic loadings.The installation of the chart recorders does not impact other plant systems. Consequently,this change: (1) does not increase the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create the possibility of a new or differenttype of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR, and (3) does not reduce themargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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TITLE: EER 91-0449, Unit 2 - Temporary Repair of Recirculation Drain Lines

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ,

This EER evaluates the temporary repair of the two inch Reactor Recirculation SystemPump A Suction Header Drain Line by capping the line downstream of valves 2-B32-F051 A |and 2-832-F052A which are leaking past the seats.


The cutting and capping of the Reactor Recirculation System Pump A Suction Header Drain.

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Line will not af fect the normal operation or safe shutdown capabilities of BSEP Unit 2.During normal operation of the Reactor Recirculation System, these valves are closed.Therefore cutting and capping the line downstream of these valves has no effect on theability of the Reactor Recirculation System to perform as designed. These valves and lineare only used to drain the A Recirculation line for maintenance of the A Recirculation pumpor for other purposes such as chemical decontamination when the reactor is shutdown forrefueling and/or maintenance. The design safety margins for the Reactor RecirculationSystem are maintained with this line cut and capped.

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The configuration of the piping remains unchanged for structural design purposes, the -

material downstream of the valves up to and including the cap was upgraded with materialt

suitable for reactor coolant system temperature and pressure, the function of the valves to ,

isolate the reactor coolant pressure boundary remains unchanged.

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TITLE: EER 92-0048, Unit 1 - Use of Fire Protection Water for Battery Testing

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

EER 92-0048 evaluates the feasibility of temporarily asing the fire protection system tosupply cooling water to the Hi-Rate Discharge (HRD) test used for capacity testing of plantbattery / chargers.

'SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:

EER 92-0048 reviewed the flow rates needed under worst case conditions to cool the HRDtester, minimum flow rates and pressure required for fire protection system operability, theamount of water required during each capacity test, and the volume of water available inthe fire protection storage tank. Based on this review, it was concluded that the use ofthe teniporary fire protection connection will not adversely affect previous FSARevaluations, nor willit result in adverse operating conditions for the fire protection system i

since Technical Specification water levels are maintained and the hose station used for thetemporary connection remains operable. The use of fire protection water at the hosestation does not prevent use of the station for fire fighting efforts. Consequently, this |change: (1) does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously .

evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create the possibility of a new or different type ofaccident than previously evaluated in the FSAR, and (3) does not reduce the margin of !

safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. |

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR ,

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TITLE: EER 92-065, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Suppression Pool Oxygen increase DuringRCIC Operation >

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This EER evaluates temporarily enabling the vacuum pump and closing the E51-F002 valveto prevent addition of oxygen into the suppression pool. This change was implemented inorder to satisfy the actions requested by NRC Generic Letter 84-09. It also evaluatestemporarily enabling the RCIC Vacuum Pump to improve RCIC reliability, using the installedvent line on the Barometric Condenser Vacuum Tank to meet the vendor recommendationintended to minimize subsequent corrosion of the control system linkage assembly.


This EER allows continued RCIC operation with the vacuum pump enabled followingtransient responses and pressure control using the previously installed vent line. The GEdesign does not take credit for the gland exhaust systems, thus spurious actuation of thesteak leak detection equipment will not occur due to the increased steam leakageassociated with no vacuum pump operation. The vent line installation will help maintainoperability of the control valves and meet the intent of the vendor recommendation for '

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drain lines from the control valves to be connected to less than or equal to atrnospheric'pressure.

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RCIC inadvertent injection is an analyzed event; enabling the vacuum pump and routing its +

discharge to the -17 f t. level will have no potential for increasing the probability of this oevent. Enabling the RCIC Vacuum Pump willimprove RCIC reliability. This temporary -

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change will assure compliance with vendor recommendations for control valve leakoff |

provisions as needed to avoid corrosion of the control system linkage assembly. J

Consequently, RCIC will be available as assumed to mitigate the consequences of an eventand perform its Technical Specification function.

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TIT _LE: EER 92-0076, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Raising Discharge Temperature SwitchSetpoints for Joy Compressors

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This change raises the setpoints of the Joy compressor discharge temperature switches, -

both alarm and tnp. The change is necessary to prevent unnecessary trips while the -

compressors are operating at or near full load.


This change increases the reliability of the Joy standby service / instrument air compressors.Prior to this charige, if the compressors were operating at or near full load, the dischargetemperature could reach the trip setpoint without any associated malfunction as the cause. iif the baseload "D" compressor was out of service, a trip of one or more Joy compressors icould cause a loss of pressure in the instrument air system, thus causing a scram. '

This change increases the reliability of the plant compressed air supply system.Consequently, this change has no negative effect on plant safety. The change istemporary and will be made permanent via plant modification in the future. ;

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ICHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR 1

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ITITLE: EER 92-0090, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Turbine Building Power Roof VentilatorTemporary Blank-Off !

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:,

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EER 92-0090 evaluated the feasibility of temporarily installing blank-offs on the Unit 1 and ,

Unit 2 turbine building power roof ventilators (PRVs). "


The turbine building HVAC system is a non-safety system. The turbine building PRVs 1

were originally part of a summer ventilation mode for the turbine building which operatedautomatically for cooling purposes. When the turbine building ventilation was changedfrorn a once-through system to the current recirculation system, the purpose of the PRVsbecame heat and smoke removalin the event of a fire. Sealing the PRVs eliminates apotentially unmonitored release path and assists the HVAC system in developing the >

required building negative pressure. No credit for the PRVs is taken in the Fire Protection ,'

Plan. Consequently, this change: (1) does not increase the probability or consequences of '

an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) does not create the possibility of a new '

or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR, and (3) does not .,

reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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' CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR

TITLE: EER 92-0186, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Permanent Repair of Turbine Building CoolingTower

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This engineering evaluation evaluates repair of the turbine building HVAC cooling towerstructural problems which were discovered during maintenance of the tower.This change involves substitution of alternate tower truss attachment components (tiedown straps) for corroded anchor attachments on the Turbine Building HVAC CoolingTowers, and installation of an additional treated wooden member to provide for completeembedment of the torque tube to tower attachment bolts for the purpose of structuralintegrity.


The cooling towers only support cooling for the turbine building chillers which are non-safety-related. The cooling towers are located in the North yard and are non-seismic, non-EO, and non-fire protection qualified. The repair does not create a new accident initiator.No credit is taken for turbine building cooling as an accident mitigator. The cooling toweris not safety-related equipment and is not located near safety-related equipment. No creditis taken for turbine building cooling as a safety-related equipment operability parameter.Since secondary structures have been evaluated for accident scenarios, this design doesnot create a new accident type. The towers are not included as part of the margin ofsafety of the Technical Specifications.

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TITLE; EER 92-0261, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Standby Gas Treatment System HeatDetection Circuit Fuse Assessment

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This EER was written to determine the size, type, and manuf acturer for the fuses to beused in the SBGTS Heat Detection circuits for all four trains. There are two fuses in eachtrain, one in the positive leg and one in the negative leg of the 125 VDC power source.


This EER analyzed the characteristics of the SBGT heat detecuon circuit and determinedthat the existing Bussmann NON-10 fuse has adequate voltage and interrupting ratings forthe DC system supplying the control power and has acceptable amperage rating and timecurrent characteristics to ensure that the fuse will not spuriously open during normaloperation of the circuit.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

TITLE: EER 92-0300, Unit 1 - Control of Reactor Building Static Pressure ;

EER 92-0228, Unit 2 - Lontrol of Reactor Building Static Pressure,.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This EER evaluates disconnection of the differential pressure controller (PDC) output fromthe exhaust vortex damper operators and reconnection of the PDC to the supply fan vortexdamper operators to throttle the supply air to create the air flow differential necessary to '

develop Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Building negative pressure.


The FSAR states that airflow patterns are designed to confine potential airbornecontamination to their source and from which they will be rernoved by exhaust ductwork.In general, the ventilation design ensures air movement from clean areas to areas withprogressively greater contamination potential.

The negative pressure control will be removed from the exhaust fan vortex dampers andapplied to the supply fan vortex dampers. This will ensure that the supply air volume willbe maintained less than that of exhaunt, thus minimizing the potential of the building goingpositive. Maintaining the building negative will also ensure that releases to the atmosphere ,

are monitored. Altering the building pressure control to the supply side of the system willnot increase the probability of occurrence of a previously evaluated _ accident. By

imaintaining effective control of the building negative pressure, the activity does notincrease the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed activityhelps decrease the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to ,

safety by helping maintain ambient temperature conditions for plant equipment.Effectively maintaining the reactor building at negative pressure does not increase theconsequence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. As the system isdesigned to maintain a building negative pressure, altering the control to the supply side '

still maintains a negative condition which does not create a different type of accident orcreate the possibility of equipment malfunction different than that previously evaluated.

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'The proposed change does not alter components that would reduce the margin of safety.

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TITLE: EER 92-0305, Unit 2 - RHR "B" Temporary Flow / Pressure Instruments

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: |.

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The Unit 2 Instrument Rack upr,rade project replaces Instrument Racks PO21 on the .-17'Elevation of the Reactor BuilcCng. This EER evaluates a temporary change which providesfor temporary instrumentation to be in place prior to the removal from service of theinstruments on the rack. This temporary instrumentation will give flow indication in the

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control room and a local pressure gauge for reading the combined RHR "B" Pumpsdischarge pressure.

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:,

The temporary flow indication loops will not provide any control but will be used by theoperators in performing other control functions. The RHR pumps are used to maintain coldshutdown and the flow indication is necessary to the operator in maintaining normaloperating limits for the RHR System. The local pressure gauge provides additional .

information regarding the performance of the RHR pumps and for maintaining RHR-SWpressure greater than the RHR pressure to limit the consequences of a heat exchangertube leak.

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The mounting of the transducers and the temporary power supply have been reviewed andevaluated as adequate. The RHR loop shall be used for the Shut Down Cooling (SDC)

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mode only, while the temporary instruments are installed. This will cause the LPCI to beinoperable and therefore there are no seismic constraints on the system. Consistent withcurrent plant philosophy, an alternate mode of decay heat removal shall be maintained, andthe plant operators will ensure this as a part of routine operation.

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The ultrasonic flowmeter is a state of the art system that is designed for permanent dutyservice. The +/- 5% accuracy is adequate for this short term service to ensure thesystem operates within normal operational limits. ,

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TITLE: EER 92 0370 and EER 92-0371, Unit 1 RHR "A" & Unit 1 RHR "B" TemporaryFlow / Pressure Instruments

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

The Unit 1 instrument Rack upgrade project is intending to replace Instrument Racks PO21and PO18 on the -17' Elevation of the Reactor Building. Prior to removing the instrumentsfrom service, Operations requested that temporary instrumentation be in place giving Flowindication in the control room and local pressure gauge for reading the combined RHR "B" -

and RHR "A" Pumps discharge pressure.

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATIONi

The temporary flow indication loops will not provide any control but will be used by theoperators in performing other control functions. The RHR pumps are used to maintain coldshutdown and the flow indication is necessary to the operator in maintaining norrnaloperating limits for the RHR System. The local pressure gauges provide additionalinformation regarding the performance of the RHR pumps and for maintaining RHR-SWpressure greater than the RHR pressure to limit the consequences of a heat exchangertube leak.-

The mounting of the transducers and the temporary power supplies have been reviewedand evaluated as quite adequate. The RHR loops should be used for the Shut DownCooling (SDC) mode only while the temporary instruments are installed, this will cause theLPCI to be inoperable and therefore there are no seismic constraints on the system.Consistent with current plant philosophy an alternate mode of decay heat removal should {be maintained, and the plant operators will ensure this as a part of routine operation. :

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IThe ultrasonic flowmeters are state of the art systems that are designed for permanentduty service. The + /- 5% accuracy is considered adequate for this short term service toensure the systems operate within normal operational limits.

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TITLE: EER 92-0387, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Radwaste HVAC Abnormal Fan Lineups

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of the plant HVAC systems is to maintain areas of the plant at temperatureconditions which provide optimum operation of equipment and comfort and safety ofpersonnel, and to limit the spread of contamination during power operation and shutdownoperation of the plant.


The abnormal f an lineups described will not affect the performance of plant safety systemsand will maintain a building negative static pressure; which will ensure that potentiallycontaminated air is filtered and monitored before being released to atmosphere, andprovide for partial heat removal from the building. Therefore, operating two exhaust f ansand one supply fan is an acceptable lineup for continuous operation and operating oneexhaust f an and no sup,'ly tan is acceptable provided pump areas are monitored fortemperature.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR i

TITLE: EER 92-0392, Unit 1 - Temporary Alternate Reactor Level Alarm installed Dueto Work on PM 89-001

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This EER evaluates a temporary modification to convert the 9-10 contacts of E51-K52 to,

normally closed in order to make the A21-4 annunciator useful to Operations personnel inavoiding an undesirable low level transient. Additionally, the window for A21-4 wasreplaced with one reading RX WTG LVL BELOW 200". |


This temporary modification provides for a temporary alternate alarm to help preventundesirable level transients during removal from service of Unit 1 feedwater control per-Plant Modification 89-001, Feedwater Level Control Modification. The condition wastemporary with the Unit 1 vessel in cold shutdown. The normal minimum vessel waterlevel of 200" provides a margin above the level where the LL1 instrumentation wouldactuate, approximately 166". With the changed configuration resulting from thistemporary modification, the annunciator would alarm at 195" and reset at 196" With therevised window, this will assist Operations personnel in avoiding an unwanted low leveltransient. This condition is temporary and the normal configuration will be restored priorto needing the normal function of the affected equipment. .

This EER only affects RCIC while it is in a condition where it is not required to be operableor where it cannot mitigate an event. RCIC will be restored to normal configuration prior

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to the plant being in a conditior; where RCIC is required. This EER will not affect any ,

assumed initial conditions with regard to evaluated malfunctions of equipment. Changing,

the function of this annunciator has no potential for causing any condition that would ''

initiate an event.

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TITLE: EER 92-0406, Ermrgency Substation Tie Breaker Undervoltage Trip DeviceRemoval

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:1

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The BSEP Emergency Substation ITE type K1600 tie breakers were being refurbished by |iBBC when it was discovered that they were equipped with DC control power undervoltage

trip devices. Replacing the existing DC undervoltage trip devices would have delayeddelivery of the refurbished breakers unless CP&L approved removal of the existing devices ,

from the tie breakers. :

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION:.

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Specification 9527-01-145-3, Revision 4 gives no indication that the DC control power |undervoltage trip devices were specified for the BSEP Emergency Substation electricallyoperated breakers, even though it was an option available on K-Line breakers. In the case 1

of Emergency Substation t';e breakers, it is not desirable to maintain this feature because ,

during a Station Blackout scenario, when these breakers would be used to " cross-tie"Emergency Substations, it would defeat the one remaining source of AC power to ;

equipment needed to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR )!

TITLE: EER 92-0534, Unit 1 - Temporary Modification for Equalization of )1-SA-PDIS-4489 ;

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This temporary modification will disable the alarm for pressure switch 1-SA-PDIS-4489 inorder to clear a nuisance annunciator in the Control Room. This switch monitors pressure ;

across the Service Air Dryer. Other alarms for monitoring / alarm initiation will not beaffected.


Differential pressure switch 1-SA-PDIS-4489 has a setpoint of 2 psid, but with normalflow through the Service Air Dryer, the switch sees a differential pressure of about 3.4psid. Although this valve had been valved out per shift supervisor clearance for about atwo year period, lif ting of such clearance created a condition whereby the exposure of theswitch to the relatively constant DP of 3.4 resulted in the switch remaining in the alarmstate af ter the clearance was lifted.

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Other Control Room indication will be used to alert the operators of possible service airdryer or system problems (such as temperature and level monitoring / annunciation for thedryer, Joy air compressor auto start, low service air pressure alarm, or low instrument airpressure alarm) while this temporary modification is in place. This temporary modificationwill not contribute to the reduced reliability of the service and instrument air systems for >

the plant, or impact accident likelihood. Service and instrument air systems are not safety-related, they are not addressed by the Technical Specifications, and no credit for theiroperation is assumed during evaluated accidents. Loss of instrument and service air arebounded by existing safety analyses. Eliminating alarm initiation based on service air dryerDP will not reduce the previously analyzed safety margin.

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iTITLE: EER 92-0566, installation of Temporary Potable Water Supply

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This EER evaluates installation of a temporary jumper to provide a method of temporarily !maintaining the potable water supply to the Brunswick Nuclear Plant by connecting a tank ;

truck and portable pump to the station water supply. ~

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SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION: *

The potable water system provides and distributes water for drinking and sanitary uses; ;

however, it is a non-safety-related system and provides no function important to safety.The temporary jumper installation involved in this change makes no permanentmodification to the existing piping system and/or flow path. The installation of the jumperprovides a method of temporarily maintaining the potable water supply by connecting a :

tank truck via an existing flanged tee for the old pH-meter downstream of Valve 2-PWT-V4 1and using the existing piping. The tank truck is certified as to cleanliness and acceptability jfor storage of potable water. Additionally, the truck is charged with a chlorine solution, ,

and the charge is maintained for a 24 hour period prior to use, for bacterial control. This '

will ensure that no contaminants are introduced into the system. This tempt try -

arrangement is only for use during such time periods that the county water supply is out '

of service for repairs. The installation of the jumper is acceptable because of: (1) the non-safety-related status of the potable water system, (2) the non-modifying effect of the jjumper installation, and (3) the protection against the introduction of contaminants into thesystem.

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CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR

TITLE: 0-OP-37.2, Radwaste Building Heating and Ventilation System OperatingProcedure

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

A change to the procedure was performed to allow operation of different combinations ofventilation fans to maintain a negative pressure in the radwaste building. This change willnot affect the performance of the plant safety systems.


The abnormal fan lineups resulting from this procedure change will not affect theperformance of plant safety systems and will maintain a building negative static pressure,which will ensure that potentially contaminated air is filtered and monitored before beingreleased to atmosphere, and provide for partial heat removal from the building. Therefore,operating two exhaust hans and one supply fan is an acceptable lineup for continuousoperation and operating one exhaust fan and no supply fan is acceptable provided pumpareas are monitored for temperature.

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CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR:

TITLE: 0-SP-92-003, Operations Support for OM-6 Qualification of Service WaterPumps

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: f

This special procedure provides the prerequisites, precautions, limitations, and instructional [guidance for operation of the service water system to support performance of sections of

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Special Procedure 0-SP-91-092, OM-6 " Qualifying of Service. Water Pumps." The purpose i

of Special Procedure 0-SP-91-092 is to acquire the necessa y data to quantify the amountof resonance vibration for the service water pumps. This w'll allow calculation of correctallowable values for vibration limits in implementing vibration monitoring of the pumps.


'This special procedure operates the Service Water System in the same general method asOperating Procedure OP-43. The SW headers are left aligned to their normal supplysource, pumps are started and stopped in the same way, and RBCCW and TBCCW flows

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are lef t at their normal flow rates. RHR-SW loops are started up to allow a convenient ,

method of varying service water header flow rates for testing. However, the test does !

place the system in various configurations as far as number of pumps and flowrates which,

are unusual. This varying system configuration is discussed in the safety analysis for |Special Procedure 0-SP-91-092 and sufficient precautions and limitations are taken to :

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assure no safety concerns exist. Therefore, the proposed performance of this procedure i

will not place the plant in an unsafe plant position and no unreviewed safety questionexists.

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TEST OR EXPERIMENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR

TITLE: OSP-91-011, Testing instrument Air Dewpoint ]i

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION: iiJ

This procedure involves temporarily placing a hygrometer and chart recorder downstreamof service and instrument air dryers to determine their performance over time. |

SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY EVALUATION: ,

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The proposed activity tests the instrument air system dowpoint at various places in the- *

instrument air system in order to determine the performance of the instrument and service i

air dryers. The dryers performance (dewpoint) will be plotted against time for several,

cycles to ensure the instrument air is being dried to an acceptable level. The presence ofmoisture in the instrument air system has a negative impact on reliability and maintenance ,

of components served by the instrument air, and no quantitative method existed prior tothis test method to check their performance. Simpiing alone does not give a completepicture of the dryer performance as the dewpoint varies considerably over the dryer cycle,and it is difficult to determine where in the cycle th9 dryer is at any given time point.

The proposed activity does not change the operating conditions of the plant. _ The testdraws an insignificant amount of air from the instrume * air system which will not causean adverse effect on the operating plant. This procedt.re does not have a significant effect'

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on the instrument air system, which is not safety related. Therefore, the consequences ofan accident evaluated previously in the S fety Analysis Report has not been increased.

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TITLE: OSP 91-092, OM-6 Service Water Pump Vibration ~ Testing

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

This procedure provides instructions and guidance in acquiring the necessary data toquantify the amount of resonance vibration being exhibited in the Unit 1 and 2 nuclear andconventional service water pump assemblies. The implementation of the testing will placethe service water pumps in operational configurations which deviate from normal operationas described in FSAR Section 9.2.1.

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The implementation and performance of this procedure will require the Unit 1 and 2nuclear and conventional service water pumps to be operated in various configurations andalignments to record anticipated changes in pump vibration responses. Although bothunits' service water systems are affected, each unit's system will remain completelyindependent while providing flow to essential plant equipment. Although the performanceof this special procedure will place the service water pumps in abnormar operatingconfigurations, the automatic designed safety features of the system will not be defeated.The safety evaluation determined that the probability of increase of safety-relatedequipment damage / failure is small relative to the uncertainties. Therefore, the proposedperformance of this procedure will not place the plant in an unsafe plant condition.

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TITLE: 2-SP-92-039, Unit 2 - Test of ClamTrol for Macrofouling Control in CirculatingWater System

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ):

This specific procedure provides for injection and evaluation of effectiveness of Betz |ClamTrol chemical for macrofouling control in the Circulating Water System. The |procedure covers the following actions: placement and removal of concrete test substrates !

in the circulating water system, injection of ClamTrol on a periodic basis, includingcirculating water sample during injection, and inspection of circulating water systemfollowing specified ClamTrol injections. 1


The ClamTrol is being tested as a substitute for chlorination for macrofouling control. The;

chlorination process for the Unit 2 Circulating Water System will be terminated during theperformance of this procedure. The product has been used by other nuclear plants insimilar applications. The design and installation of ClamTrol injector assemblies and plant i

sample points were evaluated under PM 91-044 and no unreviewed safety questions were ,

identified. Internalinspections and cleaning of the circulating water system is a normal )plant maintenance function, and presents no new safety concerns.

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Enclosure 2List of Regulatory Commitments

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Carolina Power & LightCompany in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent

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intended or planned actions by Carolina Power & Light Company. They are described to .jthe NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the |Manager-Regulatory Affairs at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant of any questions regarding this |document or any associated regulatory commitments.

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CommittedCommitment . date or

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outage~

1. NONE ,

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1992 annual rept in accordance w/10cfr50.59.' w/931231 ltr. · 2020. 3. 16. · annual report...

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