1988 issue 2 - the inf treaty and us - ussr arms control - counsel of chalcedon

8/12/2019 1988 Issue 2 - The INF Treaty and US - USSR Arms Control - Counsel of Chalcedon

1/4

The INF

Treaty

and

US -

USS

rms Control

by Joe Morecraft, i l l

[Editor's n o t ~ - The following

ar-

ticle

w.as written

before the Summ.it

in

early December, 1987. It is already obvi

ous that

the

difficulties discussed by

Mr.

Morecraft have essentially proven

to

be correct.] :

t theSwnmitMeeting between

gan and Gorbachev on December 7,

1987,

the

US and the USSR m o s t l i k e ~ .

ly will enter into a new anns control

agreement called the IN Onternl.ediate:

Nuclear Force) Treaty. It is hailed as a

great breakthrough in the Cold War be

tween those two nations. This treaty

would eliminate .all US and Soviet '

land-:based missiles with ranges between

3d0 and3400 miles, inciuding 441 So- ;

viet SS-20s and

108

US Pershing

and ban the .future production of these

kinds

of

weapons as well.

~ e i U\e

pro

posed pact,

the

Kremlin wouid disman

tle three times a many warheads and

perrtrit intrusive; on-site inspection (and

verification).'' . (Huinan Eyents,

What Price theiN Treatj?'

1

.111518.7,

p.

8)

The treaty's

grial

of Global

Double Zero would reached f y 'the

supposedly to,tal elimination

o{ all

n t e r ~

mediate-range nuclear forces within five

years. .

There are several serious problems

and dangers about this

INF treaty, the

tenns ofwhich have already been agreed

upon by u.s.Secretary

of

State George' .

Sh1.1ltz

and U.S.S.R, Foreign M i n i s t ~ ~

Edward Shevardnadze.

First is the issue of compliance and

the

problem of verification. Any treaty

with the USSR

is

irresponsible

1

the suc

cess .of

which depends upon the trust

worthiness and honesty of the USSR:

Why should we expect the USSR to

keep this treaty when they have cheated

on the ABM Treaty, SALT I and SALT

ll? The Washington Tinies

re

ported

that:

Making a deal with them

(USSR) is like signing

op

with the

Mafia. They've broken every anns deal

we've ever made with

them.

Verifying Soviet compliance would

be a monumental, if not impossible,

task. This is so for several reasons. No-

body really knows

how

many missiles

the USSR has . The Kremlin has never

provided an account of its inventory.

Moreover, even i f it did, how could we

know if

it

were telling the truth?

he

vast majority of Soviet INF warheads

are on mobile missile launchers

bidden

in

bunkers, hangars,

tunnels,

garages,

etc. And each launcher can be reloaded

and reused. So, there is no way of tell

ing how many missiles they

have.

But

that is not

the

only problem.

f

verifica

ti.

on

is that difficult, enforcement is

even more

so.

How can the US force

the USSR

to

comply with

the treaty?

(The New American, 11/23/87,

Summit Time,

and

the living

is

easy,

pp.

Sf.)

Second

is

the effect of this treaty on

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza

tion). (It) would further upset

the

mili

tary balance between NATO and War

saw Pact powers and increase the likeli

hood

of

a Soviet invasion

of

Europe

sometime in

the 1990's. (The New

American,

11/23/87, Summit time

and the living

is

easy, pp. Sf.) This

would send the signal to our allies in'

Europe that the US is willing to write

offWestern Europe to . he Soviets. IIi

this same article Kirk Kidwell quotes a

foreign policy analyst as saying, Be.

cause this

prol>osal

removes

the

US nu

clear deterrent against the Soviet

conven-

tional superiority in Europe, the US

.must return to

the

nuclear trip-wire poli

cy .of

the

1960's. Should hostilities

break out n Europe the USis faced

with risking a homeland-to-homellmd

nuclear exchange with the Soviets. The

difference is, the US no longer

posses-

ses strategic superiority and therefore lit

tle credibility against a Soviet invasion

ofEurope.

Third is

the

reality that ,;the proposal

will not affect

sttategiC

nuclear arms;

it

will not affect conventiona) forces; . t

will not affect basic Communist

g o a l ~

of world donrination. f all goes well,

the etimination of these ,weapons. will .

rid the world

of

no

more than 3 or 4 per

cent

of

the nuclear arsenal. (Ja111es

Kilpatrick

in

Human Events,

10/24/87. What

the

Agreement

will

NOT

accomplish . ,

p. 14) This

m ~ s

the

nuclear j m b ~ n c e in

favor

of

the Soviet Union still is basically un- .

changed. Between

1977

and

1986

the

USSR built 3000 long-range 'nuclear

m i s s i l e s

and.

the

us built . so he

USSR has deployed well .over 10,000

intercontinental strategic nuclear w E a ~

pons .

Between

1977

and

1986

. lhe

USSR build

140,000

surface-to-air ntis-

siles, while

the

US built 16,200.

While

the US was building 7100

tanks,

the .

USSR built

24,000,

etc., etc. For

the

best.

h


2/4

which will

shock you. [Editor's note

It is impossible for us to reproduce

these charts here. Suffice

t to

say that

the USSR far exceeds the US in vir

tually every category of military wea

ponry. Get a copy of the book

by

Crom

melin and Sullivan and see for your

self.]

Fourth is the greatest danger about

the INF treaty. It leaves Western Eur

ope naked to Soviet conventional at

tack. Warsaw Pact forces now outnum

ber NATO

roughly 2-1 in divisions, 3-

1 in tanks, 2-1 in aircraft, and in many

other conventional categories, 4 or 5-1.

The only real deterrent

to a

Soviet con

ventional attack against Western Europe

has been the NATO ability to hit back

at

the

Soviet homeland. The Soviets do

not want

to

take a nuclear hit on Mos

cow

as

a result

of

any future aggression

against Europe. Now this deterrent

is

removed."

(Daily

News

Digest,

9/30/87, p. 1).

In this same article in DaUy News

Digest, 9/30/87, entitled, '1NF Treaty

Dangerous, General Bernard Rogers,

fonnerly Commander of NATO,

who

was

highly critical of the treaty, andre

cently

retired

by

the White House ( ),

is

quoted

as

saying: "Soviet leader Mik

hail

Gorbachev is exploiting Western

divisions and public opinion to tip the

balance of power toward the East and

bring Western Europe under the Soviet

sphere of influence. The Soviets have

expanded their conventional-arms ad

vantage and Want the pact to pave the

way for a nuclear-free Europe that

would

be safer (for the Soviets) for con

ventional war. The Soviet Union's ob

jective is the intimidation, coercion,

anq blackmail of Western Europe." So

expect Gorbachev

to

promise anything

elimination of warheads, troop with

drawals

from eastern Europe--to get Rea

gan to go along with the treaty. He

may

not have

to

promise

much.

Fifth, this arms control process will

not stop with the INF treaty. Next will

be START (Strategic Anns Reduction

Treaty),,'f laybe by spring of

1988.

And

in , October a joint Soviet-American

press release stated that Reagan and Gor-

bachev will "consider thoroughly the de

velopment of instructions

to

delega-

' '

tions

on

a future treaty

on S

percent re

ductions in US and Soviet strategic of

fensive

arms

Sixth is the preservation of the Strate

gic Defense Initiative's Peace Shield.

Will it be traded away at the summit in

December? There is

no

doubt that Gor

bachev

is

pressing Reagan hard on

SDI

restrictions . In fact, our continued re

search and consideration ofearly deploy

ment of SDI is the "major obstacle" to

arms

control according to USSR For

eign Minister Shevardnadze. Gorbachev

has made clear that the completion of

an INF agreement at the upcoming sum

mit is tied to our buckling in on SDI

restrictions. (Human Events,

1117/87, p.

5)

President Reagan has, in

the past, assured us that he will not al

low SDI to become a "bargaining chip"

at

any summit, because its deployment

is essential to the defending of America;

plus,

it

has the potential of making nu

clear weaponry obsolete. BUT , as

David Hoffman of

the

Washington Post

bas reported: ''For all his (Reagan's) rhe

toric insisting that the program will not

be stopped, Reagan has not ruled out

the possibility of delaying deployment

as part of a deal for deep cuts in strate

gic arsenals. Asked today

i f

he would be

willing to accept such a delay by agree

ing

to

a longer period of compliance

with the ABM treaty, (which would put

restrictions on SDI-jcmiii), Reagan re

sponded: 'I'm not going

to

discuss that

right

now

about SDI "

Seventh, the INF treaty will open the

door to increased American trade with

the Soviet slave-state. Gorbachev, and

our new Commerce Secretary William

Verity want expanded US-USSR trade.

Even before the summit, US business

men are being encouraged

to

enter into

joint business ventures with Commun

ists. Arm and Hammer has just joined

with two companies in Italy and Japan

to build the largest petrochemical plant

in the

USSR. Most certainly, after the

summit. Congress will be pressured

to

eliminate many of the remaining trade

barriers

to

the Soviet slave-state, where

many of their products made by

slave-labor.

In conclusion, I want to refer to two

masterful articles by M. Stanton Evans

in Human

Eve

nts. The flrst is entitled,

SDI:

The Answer to Europeans' Dilem-

ma, (10/10/87).

He writes: "The

truth

of the matter is that the INF (inter

mediate-ranged nuclear force) and SDI

(strategic defense initiative) disputes are

facets of the same strategic problem-

and that

th

e weapons systems involved

are actually ALTERNATIVE METII

ODS OF DEFENDING EUROPE (and

a good deal else). f both are denied-

which at the moment seems a realistic

The Counsel of Chalcedon, February, 1988

. Pag e

5


3/4

prospect--then the question of how Eur

ope is

to

be protected becomes quite

problematic.

SDI, of course, is a complete repu

diationofM D (mutual assured destruc

tion) and the ABM (anti-ballistic

mis-

sile) accord. Should President Reagan

somehow succeed in getting it devel

oped and

deployed, the Gordian knot

of

this dilemma would be severed at a .

stroke. By being able to defend OUR

SELVES from an attack by Moscow,

we would be able to renew,

in

credible

fashion, our guarantee to EUROPE.

Our defensive needs could once more be

linked to theirs, rather than 'de-coupled'

as is

now

thought to be the case, and

the importance of iNF accordingly di

minished.

As

matters are presently pro

ceeding, however, it

very much looks

as

though

INF

and SDI will BOTII

be

sacrificed on the altar of arms control-

in which event the defense

of

Europe

against the overwhelming strategic and

conventional power

of

the Soviets will

be provided by neither.

Evens' second article is entitled,

Puncturing

The rms Control Delu-

sion' (11/21/87). He refers to Sen. Mal

colm Wallop's paper, The

Arms

Con-

trol Delusion, as the most withering

critique

of

the 'anns control process'

ever put between two covers. This

study can

be

obtained for $16.95 plus

$2.40 postage

from

the Institute for

Contempor;rryStudies, 243 Kearny St.,

San Francisco, Calif., 94108. It is 220

pages in length.

In a nutshell; the authors' thesis is

that arms control is a vain attempt to

constrain the Soviet Union from threat

ening behavior with the parchment bar

riers ofsignedagreements (and some un

signed ones); that this attemptis in the

nature of the case foredoomed to failure,

and has accordingly failed; and, that our

refusal to recognize this primal fact--and

insistence

on

treating the

ill

effects

of

arms control with yet more arms con

trol--has resulted in a vast and growing

threat to our security.

' D)uring the quarter-century

during which arms control has been in

the forefront of our national agenda,' the

authors write, 'a massive change in the

balance

of

powerbetween the US and

Soviet arsenals

has

taken place in favor

of the Soviet Union. . . .by all mea

sures, the danger of war is greater now

than when the arms control process be

gan. Most important, because so many

Americans have been preoccupied with

the notion of arms control;

the

US has

built an arsenal peculiarly suited, not to

defending itself, but to senselessdestruc

tion. '

WHAT DOES THE BIBLE

SAY ABOUT THESE ISSUES?

The issues surrounding the whole dis

cussion of INF treaty, SDI, arms con

trol, trade with the USSR,

etc

., are is

sues about which the Bible has much to

say. Let's focus on three of those is

sues: national defense, treaties with our

enemies, and trading with our enemies.

1). National Defense. Deuteronomy

20

and Romans

13

make clear' that the

purpose

of

civil

government is to use

deadly force, i necessary, including a

strong, godly, and disciplined military

to DEFEND and PROTECT its citizens

from those who would do them harm,

either within or c i u ~ i d e their national .

borders. And passages such as

II

Chron

icles 11:14; 11:5-12; 14:5-8; 17:1-2;

32:1-6 tell us thata national defense po

licy must be based on DEFENSE, NOT

RETALIATION; that PEACE COMES

TIIROUGH STRENGTH; and that the

BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN THE

PEACE IS TO BE PREPARED FOR

WAR. The policy of Mutual Assured

Destruction that has led to the disarm

ing of

our

defensive weapons and which

is based on the ability of the US and

the USSR to annihilate millions

of

civilians, is based on the principle of

retaliation and has left all American

families totally defenseless against mis

sile attack. The Strategic Defense Initia

tive, called High Frontier or Peace

Shield, is based on the biblical princi

ple of defense, and it is exactly that, a

DEFENSE WHICH DEFENDS.

(2). Treaties with our enemies (and

make no

mistake about it, the Soviet

Empire is

our

enemy, and must always

be considered as such)

. lf

you do not be

lieve that read: (a). Gulag Archipel

ago, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn; (b).

The

Day of

the

Cobra, by

Jeffrey

St. John; (c). You

Can

Trust the

Communists, by Fred Schwarz; (d).

Marxism, by Thomas Sowell; (e).

On Communism, by J Edgar

Hoover;

(f).

Communist Eschato

logy, by F. Nigel Lee;

(g). The

Communist Manifesto, by Karl

Marx; and (h). Witness, by Whittaker

Chambers.

Stalin said: We

h v ~

deposed the

Czars of Earth; we shall now dethrone:

the Lord of Heaven. Anti-christian

Cornmunisll\-is an enemy of freedom,

justice, and o'f God himself. For Com

munism, Christians are the enemies of

the

state, And the Bible makes clear

that Christian people and nations are

not

to

make pacts, alliances, or treaties

with anti-christian men or nations,

Isa.

28:15-19; T Chronicles 18:1-2; 19:1-2;

20:35-37. Furthermore, godly nations

are

not to

aide their ungodly enemies

in

any way for any reason,

IT

Chronicles

19:2. Whenever we forget this, we are

the ones who are trodden down by our

enemies.

(3). Tradin with .QUI enemies. The

USSR was made in the USA. Ninety

five percent of the technology used by

the military-industrial complex

of

the

USSR carne from the West, especially

from the US, according to the unrefuted

books (several volumes) by Anthony

Sutton, entitled, Western Technolo

gy and Soviet Economic Devel

o p m ~ n t

Lenin said: The capitalists

of the world and their governments, in

pursuit of

he Soviet market, will

close their eyes to the higher reality and

thus will turn into deaf-mute blindmen.

They will extend credits, which will

strengthen he Conununist party

nd, giving us the materials and tech-.

nology

we

lack, they will restore our

military industry, indispensable for our

future victorious attack on our sup

pliers. In other words, they will l b o r ~

for the preparations for their own sui-'

cide.

Under Reagan exports to the Com

munist bloc nations have averaged over

$2.5 billion per year. Under Reagan the

US Export-Import8ank authorized well

over $620 million in new credits to. the

Soviet bloc.

The

Communist nations

now owe American banks over $8.4

billion; and should they default, the

Page The Counsel of Chalcedon, February, 198$.


4/4

American taxpayers will pick up the

tab. And now with the appointment

of

William Verity as Secretary of Com

merce, we can expect stepped-up and ex

panded trade with our enemies.

But, once again, the Bible is clear:

we are forbidden to do business with

our

enemies, Chron. 19:2; Psa.

139: 19-22; Exo

1988 issue 2 - the inf treaty and us - ussr arms control - counsel of chalcedon

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