Invited Papers: Wittgenstein's Rejection of Scientific PsychologyAuthor(s): Meredith WilliamsSource: Noûs, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1984 A. P. A. Western Division Meetings (Mar., 1984), p. 90Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215028 .

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INVITED PAPERS

Wittgenstein 's Rejection of Scientific Psychology

MEREDITH WILLIAMS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

Wittgenstein concludes his Investigations with the remark that ".

.in psychology. . . . [t]he existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means of solving the problems which trou- ble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Most advocates of cognitivism would take Wittgenstein to have attacked an introspectionist, consciousness-oriented psychology, which no one takes seriously any more. They feel that contemporary cognitivism has been purified of all irrelevant and outmoded philosophical ac- cretions. If true, this would make Wittgenstein's criticisms of psychology of antiquarian interest only, but my view is that it is not true.

Firstly, I shall characterize Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of a scientific psychology. Secondly, I shall show the sur- prising extent to which advocates of cognitivism have come gradually to accept Wittgensteinian considerations though not to endorse Wit- tgenstein's nihilistic conclusions. Finally, I shall explore two attempts to accommodate Wittgensteinian strictures while drawing quite dif- ferent morals: Fodor's "rationalistic psychology" and Stich's "psychology of syntax." I shall argue that Fodor and Stich im- poverish psychology to such an extent that, contrary to their inten- tions, Wittgenstein's pessimistic view is fundamentally conceded.

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