aphorism 1-100 from wittgenstein's philosophical investigations

8/11/2019 Aphorism 1-100 From Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

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Commentary on Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations by Lois Shawver

http://www.postmoderntherapy.com/Wittgenstein/

Wittgenstein's book is written in numbered aphorisms. The following links will take you to

each set of aphorisms.

Shawver Commentary:

This commentary in the pages of this website is not meant to replace your reading of

Wittgenstein in the original. For that, of course, you will need to acquire the book.

This commentary is meant to give you a taste of Wittgentein, or, if you are really ready, to

help you get started. The problem is that while Wittgenstein's writing style is quite beautiful,

almost poetic, it is so unusual, that all of us, it seems, need a little help in the beginning. It is

my hope that after you read this commentary, however, that his meanings will appear

transparent to you when you hold your copy of this wonderful book in your hands.

One of the most difficult or misleading aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigationsis the way in which he uses multiple voices to converse with himself. To have a sense of

understanding Wittgenstein, you need to be able to hear these different voices.

The Philosophical Investigations is written in aphorisms, short numbered passages that are

loosely tied together in terms of theme. He often begins an aphorism with a quoted passage.

For example, he begins the first aphorism with a quotation from Augustine. Most quoted

passages are not actual quotes, however, but rather Wittgenstein's construction of a kind of

interlocutor. This interlocutor might be thought of in terms of Augustine, Plato, characters in

Plato, Bertrand Russell or even early Wittgenstein, or perhaps just a vague composite of these

various figures. At any rate, this voice (and it is not always in quotes) represents the problem

that Wittgenstein tries to think through. I will call this the voice of tradition and symbolize it

at times as "T".

It is useful to think of there being two additional voices. One is the voice that discovers

perplexities or aporia. This voice is often, but not always, introduced with a dash and it

often, but again not always, begins with the word "But". I will call this the voice of aporia

and symbolize it at times as "A".

Then, there is a third voice in which Wittgenstein makes an incisive point in the face of the

tradition and aporia. Wittgenstein wanted this voice to be completely clear. I will symbolize

it at times as "C".

Of course, these examples greatly simplify the content of all Wittgenstein will say, and, not

every passage has quite this form. But if you look for these different voices, it should assist

you making sense of what you find in these pages.

I suggest that you never presume that these voices are all there in any given passage. He

sometimes introduces, for example, a thought experiment that he calls "language games", and

in those cases it does not make much sense to speak of these three voices. But, you might

examine a passage to see if thinking of it in these terms helps that passage make sense to you.

If it does, then you're probably right in presuming that the passage in question adopts this

standard format.
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When I see this format being used, I will often call your attention to it, referring to it at times

as "LW's standard format."

Aphorism 1-10 from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

with commentary on the right by Lois Shawver

Wittgenstein:

(Emphasis in bold is inserted by Shawver to

enhance commentary.)

Shawver commentary:

1. "When they (my elders) named some

object, and accordingly moved towards

something, I saw this and I grasped that that

the thing was called by the sound they uttered

when they meant to point it out. Theirintention was shown by their bodily

movements, as it were the natural language of

all peoples; the expression of the face, the

play of the eyes, the movement of other parts

of the body, and the tone of the voice which

expresses our state of mind in seeking,

having, rejecting, or avoiding something.

Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in

their proper places in various sentences, I

gradually learnt to understand what objects

they signified; and after I had trained mymouth to form these signs, I used them to

express my own desires."

This is a quotation that Wittgensteinn has

taken from Augustine (Confessions, I.8.).

Visualize Augustine's picture of how

language is learned and notice how natural

and complete it sounds as a total explanationfor how language is learned.

These words, it seems to me, give us a

particular picture of the essence of human

language. It is this: the individual words in

language name objects--sentences are

combinations of such names.--In this

picture of language we find the roots of the

following idea: Every word has a meaning.

The meaning is correlated with the word.It is the object for which the word stands.

Now, Wittgenstein is beginning his

commentary. The emphasis is mine. It is the

deconstruction of Augustine's picture of

language that is the focus of this entire book.

(Although, I should say, that many others

beside Augustine have shared this picture of

language. As we will see, it is a cultural

illusion) Once deconstucted, new andstrikingly different ideas about language

begin to emerge.

Augustine does not speak of there being any

difference between kinds of word. If you

describe the learning of language in this way

you are, I believe, thinking primarily of

nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'bread', and of

people's names, and only secondarily of the

names of certain actions and properties; and

of the remaining kinds of word as somethingthat will take care of itself.

Here the deconstruction begins. Looking at

the Augustinian picture of language we see

that Augustine has explained only one type of

word.


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Now think of the following use of language: I

send someone shopping. I give him a slip

marked 'five red apples'. He takes the slip to

the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer

marked 'apples', then he looks up the word

'red' in a table and finds a colour sampleopposite it; then he says the series of cardinal

numbers--I assume that he knows them by

heart--up to the word 'five' and for each

number he takes an apple of the same colour

as the sample out of the drawer.--It is in this

and simlar ways that one operates with

words--"But how does he know where and

how he is to look up the word 'red' and what

he is to do with the word 'five'?" ---Well, I

assume that he 'acts' as I have described.

Explanations come to an end somewhere.--

But what is the meaning of the word 'five'? --

No such thing was in question here, only how

the word 'five' is used.

This scenario is a thought experiment. To

what extent do you think the language in this

scenario is explained by Augustine's picture

of language? Think of the shopkeeper

counting out the apples, one through five.

Did he learn to do this by someone pointingto five apples? Hardly. The teaching of

language by pointing cannot explain learning

to count. What about using written languge

to communicate what is wanted? Someone

had to teach him how to read before he could

make sense of the note and translate it into a

order. And to follow the order, he had to

know much more than was specifically

contained in the note - which just said 'five

red apples.' The shopkeeper had to be able to

find the apples, even to know to look for

them, and also to know to put them in a sack

and accept money in exchange for them. He

had to be able to recognize various coins our

bills and add them together. It would be hard

to explain all of this within the Augustinian

picture of language.

2. That philosophical concept of meaninghas its place in a primitive idea of the way

language functions. But one can also say that

it is the idea of a language more primitive

than ours.

By "that philosophical concept of meaning"Wittgenstein means the Augustinian picture

that he gave us above. Look at Augustine's

picture again:

The individual words in language

name objects--sentences are

combinations of such names. Every

word has a meaning. The meaning is

correlated with the word. It is the

object for which the word stands.

This concept of meaning, Wittgensein says,

has its place in helping us understand

primitive language, language more primitive

than English, German, French, etc. It is also

the case, Wittgenstein explains, that there are

regions of our developed language in which

language works just as Augustine portrays it

Let us imagine a language ...The language is

meant to serve for communication between a

builder A and an assistant B. A is building

with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars,

This is an important thought experiment.

Although he does not call it a language-game

in this passage, it will become clear shortly

that this passage describes the prototypic


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slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones,

and that in the order in which A needs them.

For this purpose they use a language

consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab',

'beam'. A calls them out; --B brings the stone

which he has learnt to bring at such-and-sucha call. -- Conceive this as a complete

primitive language.

primitive language-game. He will refer to it

often, sometimes in its present form, or in

one of a multitude of variations he will give

us shortly.

We will often refer to this as language

game(2), using the number of the aphorism

to index the number of the language game.

I picture a work supervisor at the front of a

site with a worker responding to the

supervisor's commands. There are piles of

pillars, slabs, blocks and beams. The

supervisor calls out "Slab!" and the worker

brings a slab and sets it at the supervisor's

feet. Pretty simple.

Wittgnstein puts forth language-game(2)in

order to try to envision a language in which

Augustine's picture of language works.

Does Augustine's picture of language work

here? How did the worker learn this

language by teachers pointing and naming the

slabs and beams as Augustine suggested? An

exercise like Augustine suggests might

explain how the worker knew which object to

fetch, but how did the worker learn to fetch?As opposed, say, to taking objects behind the

fence? Crushing them? Or tapping them with

a stone?

3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a

system of communication; only not

everything that we call language is this

system. And one has to say this in many

cases where the question arises 'Is this anappropriate description or not?' The answer

is: 'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this

narrowly circumscribed region, not for the

whole of what you were claiming to

describe."

It is as if someone were to say: "A game

consists in moving objects about on a surface

according to certain rules..." --and we replied:

You seem to be thinking of board games, but

there are others. You can make your

Somehow Augustine's picture of language,

although appropriate for a subsection of

langauge, is not as all inclusive an

explanation of language as we are, at first

glance, inclined to believe.

As Wittgenstein says in(1),we tend to sweep

under the rug all the uses of language that do

not fit the Augustinian picture that seems to

capture our imagination.

Although language-game(2)restricts the

vocabulary to words that seem to refer to

objects, the Augustinian picture cannot

explain everything that happens.
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definition correct by expressly restricting it to

those games.

4. Imagine a script in which the letters were

used to stand for sounds, and also as signs of

emphasis and punctuation. (A script can be

conceived as a language for describing

sound-patterns.) Now imagine someone

interpreting that script as if there were simple

a correspondence of letters to sounds and as

if the letters had not also completely different

functions. Augustine' conception of language

is like such an over-simple conception of the

script.

How might this be? Suppose we taught a

parrot to say "Polly wants a cracker," and

whenever it says it, we gave the parrot a

cracker. On the surface this looks like

language. The parrot is asking for and

receiving a cracker. However, on closer

examination it is not. We could have taught

the parrot to say "Get lost!" and give it a

cracker each time it does. Then, it would not

have looked as though the parrot were

speaking English.

To think that simply saying the words "Polly

wants a cracker" constitutes "language" is to

have this sort of over-simple conception of

the language. Something profound is missing

from this conception although it is not yet

clear exactly what this is. Still, it is a

beginning to say that when the parrot says,

"Polly wants an cracker" he doesn't quite

know what this sentence means in English. It

amuses us because, nevertheless, it seems asthough he does.

The same would be true if we taught a two

year old to answer the question "What is 450

divided by 366?" by saying "One point two

three." It would be a correct answer in

English but the child would not know what

she was saying because she would not know

how to count, know wha this number means,

or know what division means. There is more

to language than stringing together correctwords.

5. If we look at the example in (1), we may

perhaps get an inkling how much this general

notion of the meaning of a word surrounds

the working of language with a haze which

makes clear vision impossible. It disperses

the fog to study the phenomena of language

in primitive kinds of application in which one

can command a clear view of the aim and

functioning of the words.

But although the parroted sentences are not

language in the richest sense of the term, they

help us to understand how language begins,

the roots of language.


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A child uses such primitive forms of

language when it learns to talk. Here the

teaching of language is not explanation, but

training.

6. We could imagine that the language

of(2)was the whole language of A and B;

even the whole language of a tribe. The

children are brought up to perform these

actions, to use these words as they do so, and

to react in this way to the words of others.

An important part of the training will consist

in the teacher's pointing to the objects,directing the child's attention to them, and at

the same time uttering a word; for instance,

the word "slab" as he points to that shape.

Although the word "slab!" is not tied to any

particular activity in English, in the language

we are imagining in(2)it is always a

command to fetch a slab. What tends to

confuse us is that we can imagine something

like this taking place in English. It is just that

the word "slab!" would not be confined to

only this use.

However, in the community we areimagining, this is the only use for the term

"slab!" And how might children be taught

the use of the term? We can well imagine

that the Augustinian picture of language

training might be involved. The child's

attention will be directed to the different

shapes and the child will learn to expect each

shape to be associated with a particular

sound.

( I do not want to call this "ostensive

definition", because the child cannot as yet

ask what the name is. I will call it "ostensive

teaching of words".-----I say that it will form

an important part of the training, because it is

so with human beings; not because it could

not be imagine otherwise.)

What is the difference between ostensive

teaching of words and ostensive definitions?

In ostensive definitions someone points and

gives a name of something and this serves to

make clear how the term is to be used. When

someone points to a cracker and says

"cracker" those who know what a cracker is

(but not the name for it) can receive this as anostensive definition. But if a child has not

yet learned language, it is like the parrot. It

does not know what is being pointed to on

what the word cracker means. (Maybe the

word "cracker" means "square" or "salty". Or

maybe it means "food".) However the child

understands the term, the child can be taught

to say it, in assocition with the object. As

Augustine imagined things in(1) . As

Augustine imagined things the child without

any language was able to "grasp"
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This ostensive teaching of words can be said

to establish an association between the word

and the thing. But what does this mean?

Well, it can mean various things: but one

very likely thinks first of all that a picture

of the object comes before the child's mind

when it hears the word. But now, if this

does happen---is it the purpose of the

word?

The emphasis here is mine. I want to show

what I will call Wittgenstein'saporetic voice.

He is reminding us of the cultural ways we

think so tht he can deconstruct them. Here

Wittgenstein is talking about the cultural

illusion that is related toAugustine's pictureof language and what we are likely to say that

supports this illusion.

---Yes, it can be the purpose.---I can imagine

such a use of words (of series of sounds).

(Uttering a word is like striking a note on the

keyboard of the imagination.) But in the

language of(2)it is not the purpose of the

words to evoke images. (It may, of course, be

discovered that that helps to attain the actualpurpose.)

But although language may create images for

us, remember, the language in(2)was not

required to create images for the workers.

The worker in(2)would understand what was

being said to him if he simply fetched what

was called for, whether or not he had images

of what called for when it was called, or not.

But if the ostensive teaching has this

effect, ---am I to say that it effects an

understanding of the word? Don't you

understand the call "Slab!" if you act upon it

in such-and-such a way? -- Doubtless the

ostensive teaching helped to bring this about;

but only together with a particular training.

With different training the same ostensive

teaching of these words would have effecteda quite different understanding.

In(2) one understands the call "Slab!" if one

brings it when it is called. Pointing to

slablike objects and saying "slab" might have

faciliated this teaching but one could also

imagine learning to take the slab behind the

fence when it is called. A different training

would have resulted in the worker doing

different things with the slab, hitting it,

hiding it, burying it, and so forth.

"I set the brake up by connecting up rod

and lever."---Yes, given the whole of the rest

of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with

that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its

support it is not even a lever; it may be

anything, or nothing.

Unless one knows how to weave the word

into someform of human activity,the saying

of the word is not yet language. It is like a

break that is not yet connected with the entire

mechanism. The parts seem to be there, but

it does not yet have the connections to

function as it should.

7. In the practice of the use of

language(2)one party calls out the words,

the other acts on them. In instruction in the

language the following process will occur:

the learner names the objects; that is, he

utters the word when the teacher points to the

stone.---And there will be this still simpler

exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the

teacher-----both of these being processes

resembling language.

All of this sounds likeAugustine's picture of

learning language.
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We can also think of the whole process of

using words in(2)as one of those games by

means of which children learn their native

language. I will call these games "language-

games" and will sometimes speak of a

primitive language as a language-game.

Here Wittgensein introduces the concept of

alanguage game,but he will amplify this

concept later so that it does not merely apply

to language learning exercises. To anticipate

this amplification of the meaning of this term,

we might sometimes distinguish this meaningof the term by calling these language games

"primitive language games."

And the processes of naming the stones

and of repeating words after someone might

also be called language-games. Think of

much of the use words in games like ring-a-

ring-a-roses.

In ring-a-ring-a-roses, the child learns the

phrases without knowing what they mean, as

a parrot might learn to say "Polly wants a

cracker."

I shall also call the whole,consisting of

language and the actions into which it iswoven, the "language-game".

So, "the language game" is not merely

speech. In(2),he whole activity of fetchingthe objects was part of the "language game"

of(2).

8. Let us now look at an expansion of

language(2).Besides the four words "block",

"pillar", etc., let it contain a series of words

used as the shopkeeper in(1) used the

numerals (it can be the series of letters of the

alphabet); further, let there be two words,

which may as well be "there" and "this"

(because this roughly indicates theirpurpose),that are used in connexion with a

pointing gesture; and finally a number of

colour samples. A gives an order like: "d---

slab---there". At the same time he shews the

assistant a colour sample, and when he says

"there" he points to a place on the building

site. From the stock of slabs B takes one for

each letter of the alphabet up to "d", of the

same colour as the sample, and brings them

to the place indicated by A.---On other

occasions A gives the order "this---there". At"this" he points to a building stone. And so

on.

In(8)LW creates a new language game that

is a variation of(2).Now we will be able to

speak of bringing X number of slabs and we

will be abe to indicate where we want the

slab to be put. We understand these concepts

LW explains because they exist in English.

Notice, however, that LW does not say that

the slabs will be counted with numbers, butwith the letters of the alphabet. This helps us

get into the feel of what it would be like if we

had a more primitive system of counting, one

in which there was no arithemetic

possisilibities, for example.

9. When a child learns this language, it has

to learn the series of 'numerals' a, b, c, ... by

heart. And it has to learn their use.---Will this

training include ostensive teaching of the

words?---Well, people will, for example,

point to slabs and count: "a, b, c slabs".---Something more like the ostensive teaching

of the words "block", "pillar", etc. would be

How can we imagine the people of (8)

learning language? Can they learn it

ostensively as Augustine imagined? Take the

learning of numbers. We could imagine them

learning to distinguish numbers ostensively

as we might learn to distinguish two fromthree by distinguishing these configurations

of two and three:
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the ostensive teaching of numerals that serve

not to count but to refer to groups of objects

that can be taken in at a glance. Children do

learn the use of the first or six cardinal

numerals in this way.

o

o o o o

But this would be of limited use. We cannot

learn to distinguish, apparently much largernumbers in this fashion. Thus we count.

Are "there" and "this also taught

ostensively?---Imagine how one might

perhaps teach their use. One will point to

places and things---but in this case the

pointing occurs in the use of the words too

and not merely in learning the use.---

How will "there" and "this" be taught? This

is tricky, and LW does not answer the

question for us. Do you point to "this" and

say "this"? Does that clarify the use of the

word "this"? Hardly.

10. Now what do the words of this language

signify?---What is supposed to shew whatthey signify, if not the kind of use theyhave? And we have already described that. So

we are asking for the expression "This word

signifies this" to be made a part of the

description. In other words the description

ought to take the form: "The word . . .

.signifies . . . ."

.

What does "two signify"? Does it signify any

two objects? Say, two blocks? Well, weknow what the word "block signifies." It

signifies each of the two blocks. Does "two"

signifiy something other than what "block

signifies"? There are conceptual puzzles

here.

And what does "this" signify. It signifies

what I point to. But that can be anything.

How can a child learn to associate the naming

of anything by one term?

But, do we need to say what these words

"signify"? Isn't everything clear already?

Since we know their use? Why would we

require that all words "signify"?

Of course, one can reduce the description of

the use of the word "slab" to the statement that

this word signifies this object. This will be

done when, for example, it is merely a matter

of removing the mistaken idea that the word

"slab" refers to the shape of building-stonethat we in fact call a "block"---but the kind of

'refering' this is, that is to say the use of these

words for the rest, is already known.

In language-game(2)pointing and saying

"slab" may be helpful to show which slab is to

be fetched, but pointing and naming would

not show that the slab is to be fetched.

Equally one can say that the signs "a", "b",

etc. signify numbers; when for example this

removes the mistaken idea that "a", "b", "c",

play the part actually played in language by

"block", "slab", "pillar". And one can also say

that "c" means this number and not that one;

when for example this serves to explain that

the letters are to be used in the order a, b, c, d,etc. and not in the order a, b, d, c.

In other words, we might want to explain that

"c" is not just another object like "slab" or

"block" and so we might need explain "a",

"b", and "c" signify numbers. But where does

this leave us? Does it teach the child in(8)to

learn to use numbers (by counting things) and

until the child learns to count does the child

really know what "numbers" means?
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But assimilating the descriptions of the uses

of the words in this way cannot make the

uses themselves any more like one another.

For, as we see, they are absolutely unlike.

So, although we can find a way to say that

"a," "b," "c," signify something, assimilating

these different kinds of words to the same

expression (they are instances if "signifying"

hides the enormity of the difference and

creates a over simplified picture language andhow language is learned.

Aphorism 11-20 fromWittgenstein's Philosophical Investigationswith commentary on the right by

Lois Shawver

Wittgenstein:

(Emphasis in bold is inserted by Shawver to


Shawver commentary:

11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a

hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler,

a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw.---The

functions of words are as diverse as the

functions of these objects. (And in both cases

there are similarities.)

Augustine was struck by the similarities of

different words and failed to note their

differences. Such an understanding would be

as superficial as learning that all the objects

in the toolbox were "tools" but not knowing

any of their different functions.Of course, what confuses us is the uniform

appearance of words when we hear them

spoken or meet them in script and print. For

their application is not presented to us so

clearly. Especially when we are doing

philosophy!

Look at the words on this page. Don't they

look alike? They look so much more like

each other than they look like your keyboard

or your hand. This is what confuses us.

12. It is like looking into the cabin of a

locomotive. We see handles all looking more

or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all

supposed to be handled.) But one is the

handle of a crank which can be moved

continuously (it regulates the opening of a

valve); another is the handle of a switch,

which has only a brake-lever, the harder one

pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the

handle of a pump: it has an effect only solong as it is moved to and fro.

We are mesmerized by the similarity in the

appearance of words. This keeps us from

noticing the vast differences in their uses.


11/97

13. When we say: "Every word in language

signifies something" we have so far said

nothing whatever; unless we have explained

exactly what distinction we wish to make. (It

might be, of course, that we wanted to

distinguish the words of language (8) from

words 'without meaning' such as occur in

Lewis Carroll's poems, or words like

"Lilliburlero" in songs.)

14. Imagine someone's saying: "All tools

serve to modify something. Thus the hammer

modifies the position of the nail, the saw the

shape of the board, and so on."---And what is

modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?-

--"Our knowledge of thing's length, the

temperature of the glue, and the solidity of

the box."-----Would anything be gained by

this assimilation of expressions?---

It seems we look for ways to disguise the

differences in different kinds of terms. We

try to assimilate them all to a particular way

of describing them. But the fact that we can

find an expression that treats them all the

same (e.g., all words are made of characters)

does not mean that they are as similar as we

think. We fail to notice their differences, and

this undermines our philosophy about

language.

15. The word "to signify" is perhaps used in

the most straight-forward way when the

objects signified is marked with the sign.

Suppose that the tools A uses in building bear

certain marks. When A shews his assistant

such a mark, he brings the tool that has thatmark on it.

It is in this and more or less similar ways

that a name means and is given to a thing.---It

will often prove useful in philosophy to say

to ourselves: naming something is like

attaching a label to a thing.

Well, does the word "signify" mean anything

at all? There is a exemplary case of our using

this term. It is used best when we mark

objects with a sign. Sometimes it is useful to

use such a model in understanding

language.


12/97

16. What about the colour samples that A

shews to B: are they part of language? Well,

it is as you please. They do not belong among

the words; yet when I say to someone:

"Pronounce the word 'the' ", you will count

the second "the" as part of the language-

game(8);that is, it is a sample of what the

other is meant to say.

It is most natural, and causes least

confusion, to reckon the samples among the

instruments of the language.

((Remark on the reflexive pronoun "this

sentence". - (502)))

There is a certain analogy between saying

"This is the color pillar I want you to bring,"

and "This is the way I want you to pronounce

the word 'the.'" We sometimes give samples

of how to say things, or what to call things,

with words, and sometimes we use

supplementary techniques, such as color

samples. Wittgenstein is urging us to count

all of these techniques, regardless of whether

they consist of words, "language."

17. It will be possible to say: In

language(8)we have different kinds of word.

For the functions of the word "slab" and the

word "block" are more alike than those of

"slab" and "d". But how we group words into

kinds will depend on the aim of the

classification,---and on our own inclination.

Think of the different points of view fromwhich one can classify tools or chess-men.

Treat this as an exercise. What kind of words

are there in(8). The way to classify words in

8 will vary, but one way that suggests itself is

we can count some words as names, some as

numbers, and some as pronouns. But

couldn't we also classify these words

according to whether they are one syllable ortwo? Aren't there other ways to classify

them?

18. Do not be troubled by the fact that

languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders.If you want to say that this shews them to be

incomplete, ask yourself whether our

language is complete;---whether it was so

before the symbolism of chemistry and the

notation of the infinitesimal calculus were

incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak,

suburbs of our language. (And how many

houses or streets does it take before a town

begins to be a town?) Our language can be

seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets

and squares, of old and new houses, and of

At what point does a language become

complete? Was our language completebefore we introduced the specialized

language of psychoanalysis? Before we

introduced the zero into our counting

system? And, for that matter, is our language

complete now?

We have no way to evaluate the

completeness of language. Each language is

more or less rich but the ways that it is rich

are different from that in other languages.
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houses with additions from various periods;

and this surrounded by a multitude of new

boroughs with straight regular streets and

uniform houses.

19. It is easy to imagine a language

consisting only of orders and reports in

battle.---Or a language consisting only of

questions and expressions for answering yes

and no. And innumerable others.-----And to

imagine a language means to imagine a

form of life.

Wittgenstein has already told us that

language games are not not just to be "words"

and our ways of responding with words. The

language game in(2)for example was woven

into a culture that fetched slabs and blocks.

Their words were woven into their activity,

their forms of life.

But what about this: is the call "Slab!" in

example (2) a sentence or a word?--- If a

word, surely it has not the same meaning as

the like-sounding word of our ordinary

language, for in (2) it is a call. But if a

sentence, it is surely not the elliptical

sentence: "Slab!" of our language.

How can it be an elliptical sentence? There

are no words possible in language-game (2)

except "slab" "block" "pillar" and "beam."

-----As far as the first question goes you can

call "Slab!" a word and also a sentence;

perhaps it could be appropriately called a

'degenerate sentence' (as one speaks of a

degenerate hyperbola); in fact it is our

'elliptical'

sentence.---But that is surely only a shortened

form of sentence "Bring me a slab", and there

is no such sentence in example (2).---But

why should I not on contrary have called

the sentence "Bring me a slab" a

lengthening of the sentence "Slab!"?---

Even in English it is biased to say that

"Slab!" is an elliptical form of "Bring me a

slab." If we began by learning the command

"slab!" (and maybe we did), then wouldn't

"Bring be slab!" be a lengthened form of

"Slab!"?

Because if you shout "Slab!" you reallymean: "Bring me a slab".---

Here is LW's aporetic (or Augustinianvoice). Let's unpack what we mean by

"really mean."

But how do you do this: how do you mean

that while you say "Slab!"? Do you say the

unshortened sentence to yourself? And why

should I translate the call "Slab!" into a

different expression in order to say what

someone means by it? And if they mean the

same thing---why should I not say: "When he

says 'Slab!'"? Again, if you can mean "Bring

And here are some observations that are

meant to shed clarifying light:

How do you have this other meaning "Bring

me a slab!" going on? In what way is this

what we really mean? We don't say "Bring

me a slab!" to ourselves while we say

"Slab!" Why not say that "Bring me a slab!"
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14/97

me the slab", why should you not be able to

mean "Slab!"? -----But when I call "Slab!",

then what I want is that he should bring me a

slab!----- Certainly, but does 'wanting this'

consist in thinking in some from or other a

different sentence from the one you utter?---

really means "Slab!"

This notion "really mean" is confusing here.

We do not "really mean" a particular sentence

in this case. Or, we might just as well say

that we really mean "slab!" as to say that we

really mean "Bring me a slab!"

20. But now it looks as if when someone

says "Bring me a slab" he could mean this

expression as one long word corresponding to

the single word "Slab!" ----Then can onemean it sometimes as one word and

sometimes as four? And can one mean it

sometimes as one word and sometimes as

four? And how does one usually mean it?----

-

And, when a person says "Bring me a slab!"

it is not the same as if a peson said "bring-

me-a-slab!" as if it were just one word. What

is wrong with our analysis here?

When is "Bring me a slab!" four words and

when is it one?

I think we shall be inclined to say: we mean

the sentence as four words when we use it in

contrast with other sentences such as "Hand

me a slab", "Bring him a slab". "Bring two

slabs", etc.; that is, in contrast with sentencescontaining the separate words of our

command in other combinations.-----

When we have a variety of sentences that use

most of the same words but are variations on

a theme, then we will say that the sentence

has four words.

But what does using one sentence in contrast

with others consist in? Do the others,

perhaps, hover before one's mind? All of

them? And while one is saying the one

sentence, or before, or afterwards?---

No. Even if such an explanation rather tempts

us, we need only think for a moment of what

actually happens in order to see that we aregoing astray here. We say thatwe use the

command in contrast with other sentences

because our language contains the

possibility of those other sentences.

Someone who did not understand our

language, a foreigner, who had fairly often

heard someone giving the order: "Bring me a

slab!", might believe that this whole series of

sounds was one word corresponding perhaps

to the word for "building-stone" in his

language. If he himself had then given this

The clarifying voice:

Our temptation to use an explanation that

requires us to think of the other sentences"hovering" is instructive. It teaches us to

stop and look and not base our conclusions

on "what must be." When we stop to look,

we see that the other sentences are no in

anyway hovering in our minds. What make

one way of saying "Bring me a slab!" a

sentence and the other way, "Bring-me-a-

slab!" a word has something more to do with

the fact that we can make sentences that are

variations on the theme "Bring me a slab!"


15/97

order perhaps he would have pronounced it

differently, and we should say: he

pronounces it so oddly because he takes it for

a single word.-----

But then, is there not also something differentgoing on in him when he pronounces it,---

something corresponding to the fact that he

conceives the sentence as a single word?-----

But what is going on with him? Must he bepicturing the "slab" when he hears it? Or

must he say this sentence to himself "Bring

me a slab!"

Either the same thing may go on in him, or

something different. For what goes on in you

when you give such an order? Are you

conscious of its consisting of four words

while you are uttering it? Of course you have

a mastery of this language---which contains

those other sentences as well---but is thishaving a mastery something that happens

while you are uttering the sentence?---And I

have admitted that the foreigner will probably

pronounce a sentence differently if he

conceives it differently; but what we call his

wrong conception need not lie in anything

that accompanies the utterance of the

command.

We we issue a command "slab!" what goes

on in us? Introspectively, need there be

anything private? There might be something

present when we utter the command, but

there need not be.

The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it

leaves out something that we think when weutter it, but because it is shortened---

in comparison with a particular paradigm

of our grammar.---

In our culture we create the paradigm of the

full sentence as the "real." Therefore we say"Slab!" is a shortened form and not "Bring

me a slab!" is a lengthend form. But this

paradigm that calls the longer form the real

form is arbitrary.

Of course one might object here: "You grant

that the shortened and the unshortened

sentence have the same sense.---What is this

sense, then? Isn't there a verbal expression

for this sense?"-----

And if they have the same sense, then isn't

one form of the sentence the "right" or "real"

form?

But doesn't the fact that sentences have the

same sense consist in their having the same

use?---(In Russian one says "stone red"

instead of " the stone is red"; do they feel the

copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it

in thought?)

Maybe not. Maybe we say that the sentences

have the same "sense" only because they

have the same use in the language-game.

They cause one person to fetch the object,

and both the same regardless of which form

we use.

Aphorism 21-30 fromWittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

with commentary on the right by


16/97

Lois Shawver

Wittgenstein:

(Emphasis in bold in Wittgenstein's text has

been inserted by Shawver to enhancecommentary.)

Shawver commentary:

21. Imagine a language-game in which A

asks and B reports the number of slabs or

blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of

the building-stones that are stacked in such-

and-such a place.--- Such a report might run:

"Five slabs". Now what is the difference

between the report or statement "Five slabs"

and the order "Five slabs!"?---

That is, what is the difference between "Five

slabs" (in language-game 21) and ("Five

slabs!" in language game8? )

Well, it is the part which uttering these

words plays in the language-game.Emphasis mine. But isn't the important thingthat "Five slabs!" in (8) causes the worker to

bring 5 slabs? While "five slabs" in (21) only

causes the supervisor to have information?

No doubt the tone of voice and the look with

which they are uttered, and much else

besides, will also be different. But we could

also imagine the tone's being the same---for

an order and a report can be spoken in a

variety of tones of voice and with various

expressions of face---the difference beingonly in the application. (Of course, we might

use the words "statement" and "command" to

stand for grammatical forms of sentence and

intonations; we do in fact call "Isn't the

weather glorious to-day?" a question,

although it is used as a statement.) We

could imagine a language in which all

statements had the form and tone of

rhetorical questions; or every command the

form of the question "Would you like to. .

.?". Perhaps it will then be said: "What he

says has the form of a question but is really a

command",---that is, has the function of a

command in the technique of using the

language. (Similarly one says "You will do

this" not as a prophecy but as a command.

What makes it the one or the other?)

On the surface the difference might be a

matter of how it is voiced. But we could

imagine them being voiced with the same

intonation. The intonation is, after all, only a

clue as to what the differences are, not the

difference itself.

Besides, we could imagine a language in

which everything stated or commanded was

put in the form of a question.

22. Frege's idea that every assertion containsan assumption, which is the thing that is

Still, there is the dream (such asFrege had)of including some sort of notation in the body
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17/97

asserted, really rests on the possibility found

in our language of writing every statement in

the form: "It is assert that such-and-such is

the case."--- But "that such-and-such is the

case" is not a sentence in our language---so

far it is not a move in the language-game.

And if I write, not "It is asserted that . . . .",

but "It is asserted: such-and-such is the case",

the words "It is asserted" simply become

superfluous.

of the sentence saying how it was used. For

example, one might include a statement such

as "It is asserted that" and complete the

sentence any such way. Or, alternatively, one

might do the same thing by saying "It is

asserted:" and complete the sentence any

way.

But isn't it clear, at least in the last case, that

the notation "It is asserted:" is superfluous?

We might very well also write every

statement in the form of a question followed

by a "Yes"; for instance: "Is it raining? Yes!"

Would this shew that every statement

contained a question?

Besides, there is nothing to guarantee that a

notation "It is asserted:" will in fact be

attached to an assertion. After all, don't we

use questioning grammatical forms to make

statements? Don't we say "It is a wonderful

day, isn't it?" Even when we use formulations

that seem to tell us how a sentence is being

used, they need not accurately do so.

Of course we have the right to use an

assertion sign in contrast with a question-

mark, for example, or if we want to

distinguish an assertion from a fiction or a

supposition. It is only a mistake if one thinks

that the assertion consists of two actions,

entertaining and asserting (assigning the

truth-value, or something of the kind), andthat in performing these actions we follow

the prepositional sign roughly as we sing

from the musical score. Reading the written

sentence loud or soft is indeed comparable

with singing from a musical score, but

'meaning' (thinking) the sentence that is read

is not.

Frege's assertion sign marks the beginning of

the sentence. Thus its function is like that offull-stop. It distinguishes the whole period

from a clause within the period. If I hear

someone say "it's raining" but do not know

whether I have heard the beginning and the

end of the period, so far this sentence does

not serve to tell me anything.

But we can try to construct language so carry

such a notation accurately. The mistake is in

thinking that it is the notation that makes it

so. What is in question is whether the

sentence is a question, and the notation does

not make it so. The notation is only a label

and a label can be correct or misleading.

This means, when we determine that a

statement is an assertion or a question, it is

not enough to look to see what the notation

(or punctuation) tells us. This information is

not contained in the words, but in the way

these words are being used in the language-

game.

Frege's notation that a sentence is an

asssertion is like the full stop of a period at

the end of string of words. Just as a period

does not assure you that the sentence

functions as a statement, however, so Frege's

notation does guarantee that the sentence

functions as the notation says.

See inserted comment of LW's.

23. But how many kinds of sentence are The rules of language games are not
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there? Say assertion, question, and

command?--- There are countless kinds:

countless different kinds of use of what we

call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And

this multiplicity is not something fixed,

given once for all; but new types oflanguage, new language-

games, as we may say, come into existence,

and others become obsolete and get

forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this

from the changes in mathematics.)

unchangeable laws. There is a continuous

evolution not only in how many language

games there are, but evolution, too, as to the

kind of language games thee are.

Here the term "language-game" is meant to

bring into prominence the fact that the

speaking of language is part of an activity, or

of a form of life.

We have seen this concept of langauge being

woven in a form of life before. In (19), he

said that to "imagine a language meant to

imagine a form of life." And in(2) he

pointed out that the slab language of thatlanguage-game involved not only words but

activities, specifically, the activity of fetching

objects on command.

Review the multiplicity of language-game in

the following examples, and in others:

Now that LW has taught us something about

"language-games" he is going to give us

samples to count. This serves as a kind of

ostensive definition of language games,

although, note, these examples differ from

the primitive language games he talked about

in7 (which was illustrated by the slablanguage of2

* Giving orders, and obeying them--- *

Describing the appearance of an object, or

giving its measurements--- * Constructing an

object from a description (a drawing)--- *

Reporting an event--- * Speculating about an

event--- * Forming and testing a hypothesis--

- * Presenting the results of an experiment in

tables and diagrams--- * Making up a story;

and reading it--- * Play-acting--- * Singingcatches--- * Guessing riddles--- * Making a

joke; telling it--- * Solving a problem in

practical arithmetic--- * Translating from one

language into another--- * Asking, thanking,

cursing, greeting, praying.

---It is interesting to compare the

multiplicity of the tools in language and of

the ways they are used, the multiplicity of

kinds of word and sentence, with what

logicians have said about the structure of

It is a useful exercise to imagine a sentence

of any sort functioning in several of the

different language games. When it does this,

it takes on a different meaning. For example,

"There was a storm today." Imagine how a

sentence like this might function in

"reporting an event" "speculating about an

event" "presenting results from an

experiment" "play acting" "singing catches"and so forth. Some sentences, of course, do

not make sense in all language games, but

whenever they do, they mean something

different in different language games.

Of course, Wittgenstein is himself the authorof the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. And,

in that book, as well as in works by other

authors of that era (e.g., Russell) language

was seen as much more stable and finite.
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language.( Including the author of the

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)

24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of

language-games in view you will perhaps be

inclined to ask questions like: "What is a

question?"---Is it the statement that I do not

know such-and-such, or the statement that I

wish the other person would tell me. . . .? Or

is it the description of my mental state of

uncertainty?---And is the cry "Help!" such a

description?

Questions such as these, LW tells us, come

about from the Augustinian (Platonic and

confused) understanding of language that is

our heritage. Why is this confused?

In my reading LW, it is because a "question"

is just a grammatical form. It does not get at

the activity of "asking". We can ask with

cries such as

Oh, I wish I had someone to go tothe movies with! (wink).

And a sentence in the form of of a question

might not be an asking.

Would you mind going to get me a

slab?

We want to get beneath such grammatical

form (which LW calls"surface grammar")

and move down to the depth, that is

something more important than language

than the form we use to express it. Asking

"What is a question?" betrays a concern with

the way things look on the page, or sound in

the voic, and not a concern with the deep

structure, that is, the way the language is

working and having an impact on what is

happening.

Think how many different kinds of thing are

called "description": description of a body's

position by means of its co-ordinates;

description of a facial expression; description

of a sensation of touch; of a mood.

If asking what a question is reveals a hidden

confusion, what about asking what a

description is?

Of course it is possible to substitute the form

of statement or description for the usual form

of question: " I want to know whether . . . ."

or "I am in doubt whether . . . ."---but this

does not bring the different language-games

any closer together.

Here, too, with descriptions, we find there is

a surface form that does not tell us much

about how the sentence is being used. Just as

practically anything can be put in a

questioning formt, so practically anything can

be put in a descriptive format.

The significance of such possibilities of

transformation, for example of turning all

statements into sentences beginning "I think"

LW gives an account of pain language later

that I think this refers to, but it is too early to

get into this now. The important thing now
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or "I believe" (and thus, as it were, into

descriptions of my inner life) will become

clearer in another place. ( Solipsism.)

to feel at home in his distinction between the

surface of language (such as "What is a

question") and the questions about the depth

of language (how is the sentence functioning

in the language game?)

25. It is sometimes said that animals do not

talk because they lack the mental capacity.

And this means: "they do not think, and that

is why they do not talk." But---they simply

do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use

language---if we except the most primitive

forms of language.--- Commanding,

questioning, recounting, chatting, are asmuch a part of our natural history as walking,

eating, drinking, playing.

Here, LW is looking back at this cultural

imagery that he has been deconstructing.

According to this imagery, to be able to

"talk" one must be able to think -- because

"talking" is the expression of our internal

ideas.

Don't try to deconstruct this imagery at thismoment. Just notice that it is a natural thing

to think here. Dogs do not talk, because they

do not think internal thoughts.

But note the parenthetical that I have

emphasized. A dog can be taught to fetch on

command, just as the worker in (2) could

fetch slabs on command. Why are we

leaving this kind of language outside the

scope of "language"? Because this is an

aporetic voice, the voice of the fly-bottle.

Still, we are indlined to say that "dogs do not

talk" and by this we mean that they also "do

not think."

26. One thinks that learning language

consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to

human beings, to shapes, to colours. to pains.

to moods, to numbers, etc. To repeat-namingis something like attaching a label to a thing.

One can say that this is preparatory to the

use of a word. But what is it a preparation

for?

What is naming a preparation for? Imagine a

culture that could only name. It had no other

use for language. People simply sat around

and named things, or else they did thingswithout language. All that this culture would

lack in its language is what naming is a

preparation for.

27. "We name things and then we can talk

about them: can refer to them in talk." 'As if

what we did next were given with the mere

act of naming. As if there were only one

Isn't this exactly what the Augtinian picture

of language in(2)implies? We name things

and then we can talk about them. It is as

though this is all that is required.
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thing called "talking about a thing". Whereas

in fact we do the most various things with our

sentences.But naming things, we have come to see,

does not show us what to do with them. The

workers might be able to name the beams,

pillars, blocks and "slabs" and still not know

to fetch them. Language is not just the

uttering of words. It is the use of words in

the activity of language.

Also, the illusion that all we need to do to be

able to talk is name things neglects how few

of the words we use are actually names.

Think of exclamations alone, with their

completely different functions.

* Water! * Away! *

Ow! * Help! * Fine!

* No!

Are you inclined still to call these words

"names of objects"?

In languages(2)and(8)there was no such

thing as asking something's name. This,

with its

correlate, ostensive definition, is, we might

say, a language-game on its own. That is

really to say: we are brought up, trained, toask: "What is that called?"-upon which the

name is given. And there is also a language-

game of inventing a name for something, and

hence of saying, "This is ...." and then using

the new name. (Thus, for example, children

give names to their dolls and then talk about

them and to them. Think in this connexion

how singular is the use of a person's name to

call him!)

Look at exclamations. Are these just names

of objects? Do you want to say that there is

something internal that these words name?

Of course, someone uttering an exclamation

like this might have a image, but are they

required?

In(2)and(8)the worker simply brought the

objects required. There was no language for

asking what something was called. Pointing

and naming is a language game of its own.

One must learn how to do this.

And, in addition to learning to give theexisting name of an object, one can learn how

to invent names.

28. Now one can ostensively define a propername, the name of a colour, the name of a

material, a numeral, the name of a point of

the compass and so on. The definition of the

number two, "That is called 'two' "--pointing

to two nuts-is perfectly exact. --But how can

two be defined like that? The person one

gives the definition to doesn't know what one

wants to call "two"; he will suppose that

"two" is the name given to this group of nuts!

He may suppose this; but perhaps he does

not. He might make the opposite mistake;

Where, for example, is this hand pointing? Isit pointing to both of the diamonds? Or one?

Or is it pointing to the color red? Or is it

pointing to the side of one of the diamonds?

Wittgenstein says that in every case the

object being pointed to is ambiguous. Can

you think of an exception? If not, does this

not undermine Augustine's picture of how we
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which it is given, and on the person I give it

to.

Then I ask for two balls and the child learns

to fetch two balls. This always pleases me.

And how he 'takes' the definition is seen in

the use that he makes of the word defined.

But, if he "takes" it in the right way it will

become a powerful and reinforcing tool.

30. So one might say: the ostensive

definition explains the use--the meaning--of

the word when the overall role of the word in

language is clear. Thus if I know that

someone means to explain a colour-word to

me the ostensive definition "That is called'sepia' " will help me to understand the word.

In 30, Wittgenstein continues to investigate

the Augustinian model and its problems as

the total explanation for our developing

language. This model, you'll recall, is based

on the picture of words being defined

ostensively, that is by naming and pointing.

--And you can say this, so long as you do not

forget that all sorts of problems attach to the

words "to know" or "to be clear".

Someone from another country wants to

teach you a word in her native language. She

points to a pillow and make a strange sound

"upapal" and your question is, "What is she

pointing to? Is it the pillow or the shape of

the pillow, or what?" But if you knew

somehow that she was pointing to the color

of the pillow, then that would make all the

difference in the world. But that is becauseyou know what "color" means. Imagine,

then, how difficult it must be to learn a color

word from an ostensive definition if you don't

even have a concept of color. And, of course,

all of us were in that place initially. isn't it

remarkable that we learned anything at all

from the experience?

One has already to know (or be able to do)

something in order to be capable of asking a

thing's name. But what does one have to

know?

If I already am quite clear about what a color

word is, then I can begin to ask what the

color of something is. If I know the term for

color and my teacher knows the term for

"color", too, then I am indeed a smart

student. Just pointing and saying "that is the

color sepia" should surely do it. But without

those tools, things are going to be a lot

tricker.

footnote: Could one define the word "red" by pointing to something that was not red? That

would be as if one were supposed to explain the word "modest" to someone whose Englishwas weak, and one pointed to an arrogant man and said "That man is not modest". That it is


24/97

ambiguous is no argument against such a method of definition. Any definition can be

misunderstood.

But it might well be asked: are we still to call this "definition"?-- For, of course, even if it

has the same practical consequences, the same effect on the learner, it plays a different part

in the calculus from what we ordinarily call "ostensive definition" of the word "red".

Aphorism 31-38 from

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigationswith commentary on the right by

Lois Shawver

Wittgenstein:

(Emphasis is bold is inserted by Shawver to


Shawver commentary:

31. When one shews someone the king in

chess and says: "This is the king", this does

not tell him the use of this piece-unless he

already knows the rules of the game up to

this last point: the shape of the king. You

could imagine his having learnt the rules of

the game without ever having been strewn an

actual piece. The shape of the chessman

corresponds here to the sound or shape of a

word.

Suppose someone showed you an Xray and

said to you, "see that tumor?" It might be

evident to all who have learned to read

Xrays, but just pointing to it is not enough to

enable this kind of seeing. So it is with

handing a child a chess piece and saying

"This is a king." The background for making

sense of this pointing and naming has not be

laid down.

One can also imagine someone's having

learnt the game without ever learning or

formulating rules. He might have learnt quite

simple board-games first, by watching, and

have progressed to more and more

complicated ones. He too might be given the

explanation "This is the king",-- if, for

instance, he were being strewn chessmen of a

shape he was not used to. This explanation

again only tells him the use of the piecebecause, as we might say, the place for it

was already prepared. Or even: we shall

only say that it tells him the use, if the place

is already prepared. And in this case it is so,

not because the person to whom we give the

explanation already knows rules, but because

in another sense he is already master of a

game.

The emphasis in this passage is mine. It

represents a key concept, the concept of an

ostensive definition being made possible by

the place for the definition being prepared.

But the primary point, I believe, is that if weknew the rules of the chess game, knew that

losing your king meant that you lost the

game, for example, or how the king can move

within the rules of the game, then havingsomeone say, "This is the king in a chess set"

would mean a lot more, would clarify more,

than if you had never heard of chess or board

games. Sometimes, one does not know

enough about a subject to even ask useful

questions.

Consider this further case: I am explaining

chess to someone; and I begin by pointing toa chessman and saying: "This is the king; it

There are a family of ways one might go

about preparing a person to understand "Thisis a king" when showing them a chess piece.


25/97

can move like this, .... and so on." -- In this

case we shall say: the words "This is the

king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a

definition only if the learner already 'knows

what a piece in a game is'. That is, if he has

already played other games, or has watchedother people praying 'and understood'-and

similar things. Further, only under these

conditions will he be able to ask relevantly in

the course of learning the game: "What do

you call this?"--that is, this piece in a game.

We may say: only someone who already

knows how to do something with it can

significantly ask a name.

It would help, perhaps, if a person knew how

to play checkers and knew, in addition, that

in chess, losing the king meant losing the

game. Still, this would not prepare the

listener to understand his statement as much

as if he learned to play chess with pieces thathad a different kind of king.

And we can imagine the person who is askedreplying: "Settle the name yourself"-and now

the one who asked would have to manage

everything for himself.

If you did not have the concept of what isbeing named, that is, if the place for this

name is not prepared, then perhaps it would

be as well for you to name it for yourself.

Learning the "name" of something (instead of

naming it) is important precisely in those

cases that learning the name will connect

with what we already know and allow us to

learn what we are seeing more completely.

Say you go to the doctor with a skin rash and

ask, "What is this called?" And suppose the

doctor gives you an unintelligible technical

name. Not helpful. But suppose the doctor

says, "This is a measles rash." Then, because

you have an idea as to what measles is, you

have learned quite a bit. But if you didn't

have the concept of measles, things would be

different. You could call it whatever you

wanted. It would be just as meaningful to

you. However, it might prepare you less well

for talking with others.

32. Someone coming into a strange country

will sometimes learn the language of the

inhabitants fromostensive definitionsthat

they give him; and he will often have to

'guess' the meaning of these definitions; and

will guess sometimes right, sometimes

wrong.

I remember Harry describing learning a

foreign language like this. He was in a

foreign country and people would teach him

the names of things by pointing and naming.

This seems like a very easy way to learn the

names of things in a foreign tongue.

And now, I think, we can Isn't it so? Augustine describe this kind of
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say:Augustinedescribes the learning of

human language as if the child came into a

strange country and did not understand the

language of the country; that is, as if it

already had a language, only not this one. Or

again: as if the child could already think, onlynot yet speak. And "think" would here mean

something like "talk to itself".

pointing and naming as the way that the child

learns language? But we have been working

on why this explains so little in the learning

of language, and noticing the limits to this

kind of learning, for example, that pointing

and naming "blue" doesn't mean that thehearer recognizes what we are naming --

even if the hearer then can point at the blue

object and say "blue."

Also, such an ostensive definition can hardly

expain how we learn the word "the" or "for"

or, in fact, most words. Look back at this

paragraph and see how many words could be

taught to the child byostensive definition.

The problem is that the young child, in thebeginning (picture baby Augustine), does not

have a place prepared for learning by

pointing.

What kind of background is necessary to

prepare such a place? How would you train a

child so that it understood that you are

naming a chess piece, for example? Or the

color "blue"?

33. Suppose, however, someone were to

object: "It is not true that you must already be

master of a language in order to understand

an ostensive definition: all you need --of

course!-- is to know or guess what the person

giving the explanation is pointing to. That is,

whether for example to the shape of the

object, or to its colour, or to its number, and

so on." -- And what does 'pointing to theshape', 'pointing to the colour' consist in?

Point to a piece of paper. --And now point to

its shape -- now to its colour -- now to its

number (that sounds queer). --How did you

do it? --You will say that you 'meant' a

different thing each time you pointed. And if

I ask how that is done, you will say

aphorism 1-100 from wittgenstein's philosophical investigations

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