1980 - mansbridge - review (pateman) the problem of political obligation

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ReviewAuthor(s): Jane MansbridgeReview by: Jane MansbridgeSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 488-490Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960662Accessed: 23-11-2015 18:40 UTC

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2/4

488

TheAmerican

PoliticalScience

Review

Vol. 74

has

written,

and

necessarily

presuppose

the

existence

of

such

criteria,

which he

has

em-

ployed in

order

to resolve

these

problems.

An

interpretation

of

Locke's

ideas,

in

other

words,

always

points

in

two

directions

in

its

assessment of those ideas. It presents,in some

respect, a

contextual

view of

Locke's

intellectu-

al

surroundings

n

terms of which

the

meanings

of his

statements

are

explicated,

and it

assumes

some

basis for

the

recognition

by

the

reader

of

the

relevance

of these

views. These

undertak-

ings, of

course, may

be

carried

out

well

or

poorly in

terms of the

historical

evidence

presented

and the

conscious

attention

paid to

the

interpreter's

presuppositions.

Against

the

record

of

existing

scholarship

dealingwith

the

history

of

political

theory,

Parry

does reason-

ably well. He recognizes that placingLockean

ideas in

their

historical

context

is

necessary

if

readers

are

to

grasp the

dimensions

and

the

implications attached

to the

choices

they

face

with

respect to

the

many

and

varied Lockean

legacies,

which,

like the

ghost of

Hamlet's

father,

appear

now

and

then

to

urge

them

to

commit-or

not

to

commit-some

political ac-

tion.

There

is much

to be

said

for

both

the

relevance

and the

historical

accuracy

of

Parry's

Locke

who

opposed authoritarianism

n

intel-

lectual life (p. 2). Certainly,a good deal of

this

anti-authoritarian

erspective,

especially

in

philosophy and

religion,

depends

upon

and

reinforces

the

development

of

individuality

as

Parry

describes

it.

Still,

the

darker

shadows

of this

enlightenment

iberalism

begin

to

appear

when we

shift

the

meaning

of

Locke's

indivi-

duality towards

its

identification

with

those

who are

industrious,

or its

necessary

connec-

tion

with

private

property,

leading to the

conclusion

that

a

capitalist

market

economy is

undoubtedly that

which

is

most

congruent

with

Lockean civil society (pp. 42-43, 50, 123).

The

interpretive

problems in

John

Locke arise

for

Parry

because

his

view

of Locke

supposes

that the

meaning

of

express

consent

extends

to all

individuals and

therefore

beyond Mac-

pherson's

identification

of

that

term

with

a

defense

of

property

rights,

although

Parry

admits

that

he

has

no

textual

warrantfor

this

reading

(thus,

he

judges

Locke's

account of

express

consent

to be

seriously

inadequate )

(pp.

103-08).

At

the same

time,

Parryargues

for the

importance of a

moral

dimension

to

Locke's linkage of private property with the

development

of

individuality

(p.

50).

Yet

when later

liberals

(e.g.,

T.

H.

Green)

used

this

aspect

of

Lockean

liberalism

n defense

of

the

view

that

society ought

to

redistribute

its

resources

to

place the

deprived

n a

position to

cultivate their

individuality,

they

are

accused

by

Parry

of

having

taken

the

wrong

historical

turn

(p.

157).

It

is

true

that

Locke

did

not

assignthis

task

to civil

society,

but

it

is

far

from

self-evident that

it does more violence

to

his

intentions than the attempt to use his defini-

tion

of

private

property (in its

moral dimen-

sion?) in defense of the

social and

economic

power

of

IBM,

StandardOil,

or General

Motors.

Throughout John

Locke,

Parry is con-

cerned-almost

obsessed-with

arguing hat

civil

society

has

no right

to

redistribute

private

property in

order

to

lessen

social

inequalities

(pp.

120,

153-56).

This is

a

bit

odd,

since

no

one has

attributed

such

a view to

Locke. At the

same

time,

Parry enlists the

support

of

Hayek,

Banfield, and

Friedman in their

criticisms

of

the ends and achievements of welfare state

liberalism.

There

is

nothing

wrong with

this,

but to

conclude, as

Parry

does, that

the

remedy

for the

political

problems of

con-

temporarysociety

must

be to turn

the

state's

activities

back to

something

akin to

those

of

Locke's civil

government

p. 158),

assumes he

construction

of a bridge

over

troubled

waters

for which

all the

necessary materials

are

not

provided

n

John

Locke.

RICHARD

ASHCRAFT

Universityof California,LosAngeles

The

Problem of Political

Obligation:A

Critical

Analysis

of

Liberal

Theory.

By

Carole

Pate-

man.

(New York:

John

Wiley,

1979.

Pp.xi +

205.

$21.95.)

Subtle insight, originality, and the dogged

pursuit of

an idea

markCarole

Pateman'snew

book on

political

obligation.

Obligation

for

Pateman can

only mean

self-assumed' bliga-

tion (pp.

12-13). This

assumption

leads her

to

conclude

that only a

fully

participatory

democracy-where each citizen

either wills

each

law

or actively

consents to a

majority

willing

that

law-can create

genuine

political

obliga-

tion.

oPateman's

onsideration

of different

versions

of

the

competing

liberal

heory

of

obligation

and the analogyshe developsbetween political

obligation and

the

social

practice

of

promising

form

the

strongest

parts

of

the

book.

Hypo-

thetical,

or

tacit,

consent cannot

produce

politi-

cal

obligation, she

argues,

because

'consent'

is

meaningless

if

people

do not

know

that

t6'

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/4

1980

Book Reviews:

Political

Theory

and

Methodology

489

perform

a certain act is

to consent (p. 73).

Neither

can

non-acts

like electoral

abstention

count as acts

of authorization

that

create

obligation.

Nor,

if one adds the criteria of

relatively

free or

consciousaction,

can voting

in

a polity

in which the government

significantly

manipulates public

opinion,

or in

which

the

policy consequences

of voting are difficult

to

decipher,

be

said to

imply consent.

Finally,

Pateman

considers the claim

that political

obligation

is a spuriousproblem

risingfrom

the

individualist's

nability

to understand what it

means to be a

member of a policy,

and

concludes that this conceptual

view says

nothing about specific

rules or forms of social

institutions (p.

107).

What

of the claim that we

are politically

obligated to obey just laws because they are

just? Patemandistinguishes

between actions

we

4 ought

to

perform

because

those actions

are

generally

right and morally

worthy to per-

form and actions

we are

obliged

to

perform

because we

have

voluntarily

assumed that obli-

gation.

In the first

case, she argues,the citizen

simply accepts

or

recognizes

an

already

existing

duty;

only

in the

second

case is there a

freely

created,

public, obligation (pp.

28-29). This

distinction

between

what

we

ought

to do and

the

obligations

we

have

voluntarily

assumed is

useful. But Pateman does not convinceme that

it

is useful to

restrict

the

term

obligation

to

that

which we have

voluntarily

assumed.

It

would

be more

plausible

to

argue

that

when

one's

voluntary assumption of

obligation

coin-

cides with one's

sense of

justice,

one's obliga-

tion is

clear;

when the two

conflict,

one's

obligation

s unclear.

Pateman does

not claim to

have

developed

a

full theory

of political obligation.

She claims

only

that the

problem

of

political obligation

can be solved only through the

developmentof

the theory and practice of participatory or

self-managing democracy (p.

1).

Yet in the

context

of

her

interpretation

of

Rousseau,

she

puts forth

the

first

tendrils of what she

pre-

sumably believes

to be a valid theory

of

political obligation.

This is

the

weakest section

of the book.

For Pateman

(or

Pateman-Rousseau),poli-

tical

obligation,

though

self-assumed,

is not

purely

procedural p. 92).

The mere

agreement

of

citizens does

not

(ever?)

create

political

obligation. Rather,

political

obligation presup-

poses substantiveprinciplesof politicalmorali-

ty,

like

the

principle

(the only

one Pateman

spells

out)

that

each

law must benefit

or

burden all

citizens

equally

(p. 152).

If

genuine

political obligation

s

to

be created,

each

citizen

at the

moment of

the

social

contract must

actively

will some

or all of

the

principles

of

political morality.

Citizens

come

to will the

principles

of political

morality whenever

their

previous experience

of political participation

(presumably

under either

the liberal social

contract or some

other imperfect

regime) has

had a

sufficient educative

effect for them to

see the

light (p. 156).

Whole

polities

can revoke

the

principle(s)

of political morality

(p.

154),

althoughperhaps

ndividualscannot

(p.

82).

Individuals

are, however,

remarkably

ree

in

this participatory

polity.

Even

within the social

contract, not

every individual

is obliged to

conform

to

the

mandate

of

every

law.

In

analogy with

the social practice of promising,

citizens

incur political obligation

only by know-

ingly

committing

themselves

to

their fellow

citizens through their votes on specific issues

(citizens

must

understand that to

vote .. . is

to commit oneself [p.

1611 ). Citizens who do

not themselves

vote on a specific

law

(e.g., by

referendum) remain

uncommitted.

The

mi-

nority who

vote against

a

winningproposal

also

remain uncommitted

unless they judge

indi-

vidually

either

(1)

that the majority

in

voting

followed the

principles

of

political

morality

or

(2)

that at

least the

majority

acted

in

good

faith, thinking

t was following

the

principlesof

political

morality.

In short, the only polity that could bind its

citizens

would be both based

on the

principle(s)

of

political

morality

and

a

truly

voluntary

association

(p.

155),

or

on

the

largest

scale,

a

political

association of

a

multiplicity

of

politi-

cal

associations

(p. 174).

Unfortunately,

such

a

polity

could not act

when

individual nterests

came

in

conflict. It

could

only act,

as Rousseau

said a

polity

should only act,

when

there was

an

overriding

common

good

on

a

given

issue.

Indeed,

if citizens

were

to

take seriously

the

principle

of equal benefit,

their polity

could

seldom act even when there was a common

good,

because

laws can seldom

avoid

producing

more

benefit

for

some

than

for

others.

Thus

it

seems

unlikely

that

a

polity

based on the

principles

Pateman

begins

to sketch out here

could

survive.

Its

low

degree

of practicalapplicability

may

lead

readers to dismiss

Pateman's fledgling

conception

of

political

obligation.

So

may

her

occasional

overstatement or careless

wording.

Such a dismissal

would

be a

mistake.

Her

attempt

to

push

the

analogy

with

promising

as

far as it can go, while not resulting in a

convincing theory

of

political

obligation, does

permit

a successful

challenge

to many of

the

shibboleths of

the liberal

tradition,

and lends

itself to

intriguing interpretations

of

Hobbes,

Locke, Hegel, Godwin,

and others. It

poses



4/4

490

The American

Political

Science

Review

Vol.

74

starkly

problems

that are

central

to

developing

a

coherent

theory of

democracy.

JANE

MANSBRIDGE

Universityof

Chicago

Emile

or

On

Education.

By

Jean-JacquesRous-

seau.

Translated

by

Allan

Bloom.

(New

York:

Basic

Books, 1979.

Pp. ix

+

501.

$18.50,

cloth;

$7.95,

paper.)

Unlike

his

Plato's

Republic,

Bloom

here

reserves

extended

commentary

to

another

pro-

ject,

adding

only

a

25-page

ntroductionand 14pages of notes

indicating

Rousseau's

sources

and

translating

Latinisms,

etc.,

inconveniently

left

standing

n

the

text.

Adherence

to

Leo

Strauss'

goals of

literal-

ness

and

consistency

strengthens this

transla-

tion.

Its

superiority

is

obvious

to

anyone

who

has

crowded

the

margins

of the

1911

Foxley

translation

with

corrections.

Apart

from

omit-

ting

at

least

one

paragraph

which

Bloom

re-

stores

(his

p.

272),

Foxley

loosely

phrased

even

the

famous

opening

of

Book

1.

Above

all,

Bloom

avoids

Foxley's exasperatingly incon-

sistent

renditions

of

central

terms.

Rousseau's

generic

term

for

preoccupation

with

one's

standing in

the

eyes

of

others is

wisely left

untranslated

as

amour-propren

Bloom

but

was

obscured

by

a

half-dozen

English

substitutes

n

Foxley.

Joining

sound

translationsof

the

politi-

cal

writings,

Bloom's

version

of

Rousseau's

masterpiece

diminishes

handicaps

for

students

with little

or no

French.

Strauss'

influence

weakens

Bloom's

intro-

duction, which

works

the

familiar

pattern

of

magnifying contrasts of Ancients and Moderns

by

exaggerating

consensus

within each

group.

Rather

than

training

rational

souls

to

master

bodily

passions,

the

Moderns

engineer

environ-

ments

to

control

results

of

passions

which

inevitably master

reason,

neutralizing

what

is

nasty

in

the

passions

and

anointing

what

is

nice

(these

ground

rights

and

derivative

duties).

Like

Strauss

and

Roger

Masters,

Bloom

thinks

Rous-

seau's

dualism

of

matter/body

and

spirit/soul is

dubious

or

detachable.

Objection:

Dualism

is

necessary

for

the

coherence of

Rousseau's

otherwisecontradictoryusagesof natural. As

merely

physical

beings

we

naturally

tend to

subordinate

general

interests to

the

particular

and

exempt

ourselves

from

general

rules,

but

as

spiritual

beings we

naturally

ought

to

subor-

dinate the

particular o the

general, sometimes

even

sacrificing our

lives.

But the

soul's

reason

is

motivationally barren

and

conscience

is

weak

unless

bodily

passions

of

(sublimated)

sexuality

and

(redirected)

amour-propre

become

allies

rather

than

antagonists

of

compassionate

rea-

son.

Bloom

perversely

views

compassion

as

a

selfish

passion

(p.

18),

claiming that

Rous-

seau

merely derives

duties from

different

pas-

sions

than

Hobbes' fear

of

death,

which

is

beyond

experience

before

conceptualized.

Bloom

should

say

that the

intensity

rather

than

the

existence

of

self-preservation

motivation is

held

unnatural

(cf.

pp.

9,

82).

Bloom

accents

discontinuities

more

than

continuities

between

a favored

Plato and

the

democratizing

Rous-

seau, but if

Plato's

sexual

equality was

ironical

we expect Bloom to warm to Rousseau when

clearly

sexist

(pp.

23-24).

Bloom

complains

that

Rousseau

invented the

disadvantaged

by

assessing claims on

society

by

negative

lacks

rather

than

positive

contributions

(p.

18).

His

sexism

aside, Rousseau

could

respond:

the

capacity to

give to a

society

is a

consequence

of

what

one has

got

from it.

TERRENCE

E.

COOK

Washington State

University

Marx's

Method:

Ideology,

Science

and

Critique

in

Capital. By

Derek

Sayer.

(Atlantic

High-

lands,

N.J.:

Humanities

Press,

1979.

Pp.xi

+

197.

$20.00.)

Derek

Sayer's

intent was

to write

a

clear

book

that

would

be

accessible

to more

than

a

specialist

audience

(p. x).

Though

a

detailed

knowledge of Marx is not a prerequisiteof

what

follows,

nonetheless

Sayer

concedes

that

some

readers

might

prefer

to

pass

over

some

of

the

more

technical

discussions

first

time

around

(p.

x).

Midway

through

chapter

2,

the

Language

of

Commodities, the

reader

is

confronted

with

the

Marxist

concept

of

the

value

of

commodity

expressed

as

(p.

27): Z

com

A

=

u com

B

=

v

com

C

=

w

com

D

=

x

com E

...

etc.

Unfortunately,

there are

some

other

instances

(pp.

116,

168)

of

Marxist

hierograms hat

contradict

the

author's

stated

purpose of writinga clearbook.

To

compound the

problem,

the

writing is

rather obscure

and

jargon-laden.

magine

what

would have

become

of

Christianity

f

Jeremy

Bentham

had

written the

parables.

One

can

sense

the

result

by

reading

Sayer's

book.

The


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