1951-1953, egypt: nasser, the "moslem billy graham"

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Page 1: 1951-1953, Egypt: Nasser, the "Moslem Billy Graham"

9May 2003 Issue # 51 Press for Conversion!

By Athar Jamil, Political Corre-spondent, Kcom Journal.

America wanted British influ-ence over Egypt to end. Butan openly pro-American cli-

ent government would be met withantipathy and anti-imperialist feelingsthat were dominant at the time.

The CIA-supported coup d’etatthat ousted the British puppet KingFarouk and brought the Free Officersto power is particularly important be-cause from 1952 to 1970 Gamal AbdelNasser dominated Arab politics.

Miles Copeland, a former CIAoperative specialising in the MiddleEast, wrote in his autobiography (TheGame Player), that in 1951 and 1952the CIA worked on a project known inthe secret annals of the CIA as “TheSearch for a Moslem Billy Graham.”

According to Copeland, whoactivated the project in 1953, the CIAneeded a charismatic leader who wouldbe able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was buildingup in the area. The CIA task was tocreate ‘something’ more menacingthan Israel, to be a substitute for theU.S. and the Jewish state.

Copeland describes the first se-cret meeting he had with three armyofficers, including Major Abdel Mon-eim Ra’ouf (a member of Gamal AbdelNasser’s inner circle). In March 1952,four months before the coup d’etat thatousted King Farouk, Kim Roosevelt(head of CIA Near East Operations)and Nasser began a series of meetingsthat led to the coup. After much dis-cussion it was agreed support from theIslamic groups was not required, andthat the army would take control andgain the support of the urban populace.

It was also agreed that futurerelations between the U.S. and Egyptwould publicly eschew phrases such as“re-establishing democratic proc-esses,” but privately there would be anunderstanding that the pre-conditionsfor democratic government did exist.

The CIA and Nasser agreed onIsrael. For Nasser, talk of war with Is-rael was irrelevant. Nasser’s prioritywas British occupation of the SuezCanal. Nasser’s enemy was Britain.

The U.S. could assist Nasser bynot opposing the coup. Right up to theday of the coup (July 23, 1952), CIAstation operatives stayed in very closecontact with members of Nasser’s“Free Officers.” Copeland says thecoup took place without a hitch, withGeneral Mohammed Naguib nomi-nally at its head. For the next sixmonths, the only U.S. contacts withNasser and the Revolutionary Com-mand Council were maintained by theembassy, not the CIA.

After the coup, the CIA assistedin the reorganization of the Mukha-barat (Egypt’s intelligence service).Key courses were set up to acquaintmembers of Egypt’s RevolutionaryCommand Council with what theycould reasonably expect from the U.S.Nasser agreed to all of this. In addi-

tion, the head of the Mukharabat sentan English-speaking officer, CaptainHassan Touhami, to Washington wherehe was shown the whole range of serv-ices that the CIA, FBI and police agen-cies could offer Egypt’s government.

The CIA’s relationship with theEgyptian government was kept secret.To assist this, Copeland’s employers,Booz-Allen & Hamilton, and the CIA,joined forces to give advice on organ-izing Egypt’s Interior Ministry. Thisentailed making improvements in theimmigration and customs services, andtackling the system of identity cardsand vehicle registrations. All this wasa cover for the CIA’s real agenda.

The CIA helped Nasser with hisanti-American propaganda by sendinga U.S. agent, Paul Linebarger, toEgypt, to coach the Egyptian-Ameri-can team that turned out the anti-American propaganda that poured outof Radio Cairo. Linebarger advisedboth the Minister of Information andNasser on how the Egyptian press andRadio Cairo could issue stories and edi-torials which were seemingly pro-So-viet but did the Soviets and Commu-nism more harm than good.

Despite differences, Secretaryof State John Foster Dulles and theCIA fundamentally agreed that Nassermust be kept in power. Nasser’s re-sponse to the withdrawal of the loanto finance the Aswan Dam was to na-tionalise the Suez Canal Company.This brought the Anglo-French-Israeliattack on Egypt, resulting in the U.S.government under Eisenhower to sup-port Nasser and forcing the coalitionforces to cease hostilities. Perhaps thisincident was one of the more explicitexamples of the true relationship be-tween the U.S. and Egypt.

Through agents such as Nasser,the U.S. was successfully challengingand undermining Britain’s position inthe region. At the same time, the U.S.was duping the Muslims and Arabsinto thinking that its puppet – Arabnationalism – was their saviour.

Source: Excerpt, “CIA: tool of Ameri-can colonialism, past and present,”KCom Journal, June 30, 2001. <www.k h i l a f a h . c o m / h o m e / c a t e g o r y.php?DocumentID=1764&TagID=1>

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