1.7 - stanojevic, miroslav - self-management in the context of the disintegration of 'real-existing'...

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Self-Management in the Context of the Disintegration of "Real-Existing"Socialism

Self-Management in the Context of the Disintegration of "Real-Existing" Socialism

by Miroslav Stanojevi

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1+2 / 1990, pages: 90-103, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=467d4faf-0559-446f-94e8-db67f71c7a00http://www.ceeol.com/


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SELF-MANAGEMENT INOF THE DISINTEGRATION"REAL-EXISTING" SOCIALISM

Miroslav Stanojevic

I. Self-Management and the MarketThe project of economic self-management in Yugoslavia has failed. This is the

thesis of Prof. Dr. Josip Zupanov, a persistent advocate of the idea of selfmanagement and one of the most prominent representatives of Yugoslav criticalsociology in "Samoupravni socializem - konec neke utopije" (' 'Self-managementsocialism - the end of a utopia").The structure of the argument Zupanov uses to explain the failure of theproject of self-managed socialism is as follows: (1) Yugoslav society is one ofthe societies of the east-European type; the latest crisis has unambiguously revealedi ts ' 'real-existing socialist" substance. 1 (2) The definitive attribute of any' 'real

existing socialist" society is the essentially non-market regulation of its economiclife. (3) The development of self-management, in contrast, is feasible only in amarket economy: "real-existing socialism" is (therefore) incompatible with selfmanagement. (4) The key to the proof that (the development of) self-managementin "a society of self-managed socialism" is impossible, is the thesis of the fullcompatibility of self-management and the market.Zupanov criticizes the basic attributes of self-managed socialism from thepoint of view of the logic of market-regulation of social reproduction. This is theperspective from which the economic irrationality of self-mangement socialismis demonstrated.Zupanov further questions the project of self-managed socialism from the point

of view of advanced (market-oriented, of course) form of self-management. Hedetects inadequacies in the motivation system and in societal support for the projectof self-managed socialism.

According to Zupanov, the project of socialist self-management was bound tofail, first, because it had been derived from an incorrect theory of social change,2second, because it contained a series of construction defects (misplaced focus,3inadequate regulation of interrelations between administrative and participativestructures at the level of the work organisation, inaccurate identification of thesubstance of motivation for self-management), and third, because it evolved inan inappropriate (ideological, economic, political, social and cultural) environment, so that it would probably not have succeeded even if it had been derivedfrom a more advanced theory of social change and been without any constructiondefects.Inadequate regulation of the interrelations between participative and administrativePraxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 91structures constitute the construction defects in the project of socialist selfmanagement at the level of work organisation. 4 This inadequate regulation maybe recognized in the exaggerated emphasis on participative structures and thenormative subordination of managerial functions to these structures: an enterpriseis defmed as a social group (work collective), and enterprise management is defmedas the amateur activity of all workers (workers' assembly, workers' council). Theimplications of these construction defects were far-reaching: with regard to theprimary position of the working collective and its objectives, the social functionsof the enterprise were pushed into the foreground. The amateur character ofmanagement ensured the fulfillment of precisely these functions: the administrative structureoccupied itself with the maintenance of social peace in the work organisation andwith survival at all costs (personal incomes), while economic performance waspushed into the background.The consequence of inadequate regulation of the relation between participativeand administrative structures at the level of the work organisation is that conflictsat this level have not been regulated. Whereas in the market context, conflicts- which are (in the relationships between managers and the managed) inherentto any industrial organisation - are regulated through the mechanisms of collectivebargaining; in the institutional system of self-management these conflicts cannotbe regulated because their subjects are normatively and organisationally undifferentiated. The result of the absence of a clear distinction between the positionof the enterprise (as a market institution) and the working collective (as a socialgroup) is that an autonomous trade union cannot be conceived, and hence systematicconflict regulation through a trade union is not possible; in other words, the conflictsare shifting to other levels (structures) of the work organisation. A quite clearoutcome is the immobilisation of management and chaotisation of the enterprise. 5The environment in which the projected system of self-managed socialism hadbeen installed was, according to Zupanov, extremely unfavourable for thedevelopment of self-management. The ideological environment of self-managedsocialism never surpassed the scope of the bolshevik ideological matrix. That iswhy the definitive attributes of this context were reduced to: a consistently negativeattitude toward private ownership, ambiguous conceptualizations of the market,treating farmers as unreliable allies (latent enemies), the theory of class struggleand (the world-historical mission ot) the working-class, dictatorship of the proletariat, avant-garde (one-party system, party monopoly) and democratic centralismin the party. According to Zupanov such (bolshevik) ideology "cannot be anadequate framework for the advancement of self-managemeD:t and self-managementsocialism. ' , 6The economic environment of self-management was subject to changes (the centralplan model of the economic system and its abandonment), but it never achievedthe quality of an essentially market regulation of social reproduction. In otherwords, self-management was installed and forced forward in an essentially nonmarket context. In Zupanov's opinion, this context is entirely unsuitable for thepromotion of self-management: self-management is possible only in a marketeconomy. Zupanov explains the compatibility of self-management and the marketin the following way: first, the basic condition of self-management is the economicindependence of economic subjects, and this condition is "by definition" fulfilled

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92 Praxis Internationalonly in a market system; second, a market economy alone ensures economicefficiency - "yet if self-management economy is not efficient then self-managementhas no future". 7

The political environment for the implementation of self-managed socialismwasa one-party system modelled on "the dictatorship of the proletariat". The stateparty centre, as the exclusive administrative subsystem, mediated all other executivesubsystems (economy, technology, social institutions, ideology). The only specificYugoslav feature was territorial decentralization of this system: several identical,territorially separated monoparty systems were formed . . . Pennanent (ideological)features of these systems were an understanding of self-management as a formof the dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism in the party and rejectionofpolitical pluralism. In the overall concept of self-managed socialism the obviousstarting point was the conviction that a monoparty, totalitarian or at least autocraticpolitical system is the only adequate framework for the advancement of selfmanagement. According to Zupanov, this view is unacceptable. 8The social environment of self-management is comprised of social groups thathave "invested" their interests in this social project. The system of institutionalizedself-management in Yugoslavia relied on a political bureaucracy and the traditional working class. The self-managed project was founded on the coalition ofthese two groups: the political bureaucracy - the demiurge of the Yugoslav selfmanagement system, its animating spirit, protector and undisputed arbiter - ensuresworkers have job security, low but regular personal income and the freedom towork poorly or be idle, while in return for this security, the physical labour force- playing the part of a world-historical subject - renders legitimacy to the politicalelite and gives it a free hand to manage society as it wishes. 9The cultural environment, too, was unfavourable for the promotion of selfmanagement. Yugoslav political culture is characterized by authoritarian valuesand intolerance, whereas in the complex of societal values radical egalitarism ispredominant. All this is incompatible with self-management. In view of the coalitionof physical workers with the politocratic elite, overall authoritativeness and the"philosophy" of "uravnilovka" (wage levelling) among this category of workershave broader implications. The mutual interdependence between the two socialgroups mentioned results in a merging of the patterns of behavior and values ofphysical workers with official ideology, and hence generates ideological hegemonythat enhances etatism. Zupanov stresses, however, that etatism does not favourself-management.Professor Zupanov unambiguously states that self-managed socialism was autopian project. However, he stresses that this assessment is not enough to provethat the very idea of self-management was utopian: despite the failure of projectof self-managed socialism, self-management itself should not be rejected as well.As a matter of fact, there exist economically efficient self-managed enterprisesin some advanced countries. Zupanov uses this as an argument in favour of histhesis that - in spite of the failure of the Yugoslav project - self-management ishardly irrelevant today.

Zupanov favours a reconceptualisation of self-management by which selfmanagement would be redefined as a system of industrial democracy. The focusof this system would be on the self-management ofautonomous working groups


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Praxis International 93(in the work process), combined with the institution of collective bargaining andwith a corresponding support of autonomous worker trade unions. Furthermore,self-management would imply full information for workers as well as theirparticipation in all phases of decision making at the enterprise level, includingparticipation in the supervision of the implementation of business decisions andproduction results.11. Etatistic Assumptions of Self-Management?

The implication of Zupanov's central thesis about the congruence of selfmanagement and the market on the one hand and his diagnosis about the essentially non-market character of the Yugoslav economy on the other results in theassessment that what we have been experiencing in Yugoslavia for the last fourdecades has not been real self-management but rather some sort of surrogatesimulation of self-man3;gement.I will try to criticize Zupanov's text by inverting his central thesis. Accordingto my thesis, self-management is feasible only in a non-market context. In myopinion, this thesis, according to which the project ofself-management socialismbelongs basically to 'real-existing socialism" explains the coincidence of thedisintegration ofYugoslav self-management and the present disintegration of "realexisting socialism"; provided this thesis stands at least by and large, that wouldmean that for the last 40 years real self-management has been in existence inYugoslavia. The final implication of this thesis could be that self-managementreached its peak in the seventies and that more optimal conditions for its development than those that existed then in Yugoslavia are hard to imagine.I will try to indicate the outlines of a pattern of interpretation that may be derivedfrom my central thesis. I will also present some relevant empirical findings that,in my opinion, unambiguously sustain that pattern. Finally I will confront this patternwith the basic theses of Zupanov. As part of my task, I will basically rely on themodels of work organisations from both market and non-market contexts asexplicated by M. Burawoy and J. Lukacs. The comparison of these two modelsreveals great differences in organisation and structure that are of crucial importance for confirmation of the thesis about the compatibility of self-managementand a non-market context. Let us examine those differences.In the market context (in the sense of a predominantly market model of theeconomic system as defined by Zupanov), a work organisation is the means forthe production of profit. Its regulative principle is the principle of private appropriation. Thus an oriented work organisation is an enterprise. An enterprise is anautonomous subject exposed to the competition of other similar subjects and henceconfronted with permanent uncertainty regarding the placing of its products (theproblem of demand uncertainty). This uncertainty produces a corresponding jobinsecurity within the organisation. Job insecurity is a function of the purposiverationality of the enterprise: the logic of operation on the principle of profitabilityimplies also business moves that in certain circumstances inevitably affect workers.The organisational implications of all this is the unity of ownership and supervision,lO along with a strict centralization of decision-making. This high degreeof centralization and concentration ofmanagement and knowledge at the top of the


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94 Praxis Internationalorganisation is derived - by way of the differentiation of managerial and supervisory functions vertically along the working body - from the technical divisionof labour. Together with the technical division of labour, it provides a structuraland organisational response of (individual) capital to the pressure of competition.In the market context, competition exerts hierarchical linking of all instances, 11their function adjusted to the basic production goal: such a linking ensures quickadjustments of the work process to changes imposed by competition and thus ensuresthe production of a surplus. Immanent to the market model of a work organisation - to an autonomous, closed organisation- is therefore an unceasing, rationalhierarchy - a necessary form of the transition of the market constraint into thelabour process.It is important to note here that a high autonomy of the economic subject - anautonomy suitable to a market economy only - is in line with the continuity ofthe decision-making hierarchy, frrm ties between strategic management and mediumand lower decision making agencies. With this linkage, the space for any workerautonomy - in principle, as a model - is minimal. A high level of organisationalautonomy is a crucial detenninant ofa strict, hierarchical structure ofpower which,in principle, does not tolerate polyarchic deviations at any of its levels.In a non-market context (in the sense of state or para-state regulation of socialreproduction) a work organisation is a means to enhance the power of the stateparty apparatus. That apparatus tends to appropriate and redistribute social wealth.By definition, in such a context, a work organisation is not independent. This lowlevel ofwork organisation autonomy (and a high level of openness to environmentalinfluences) is the key determinant of persisting polyarchic deviations in thehierarchical structure of power of that organisation.The organisation's openness or, in other words the fusion of its apparatus withthe apparatus of the state, involves a characteristic imbalance of power in theorganisation: the orientation of the strategic management to bargaining and negotiation with various segments of the state and party has its reverse side in the power

vacuum occurring within the organisation. Organisational and supervisory aspectsof strategic management in the system are loose: the lowest decision-makingagencies are left to themselves.Strategic management functions as a channel for environmental influence onthe organisation - it transfers the (arbitrary) demands of the environment to loweragencies of decision-making in the organisation. This constantly produces"bifurcations" in the line strategic - operational management, tending to deepenand determine structural and organisational discontinuity in the organisation'shierarchy.As opposed to the market model of organisation that is under the constantconstraint of demand uncertainty, non-market organisation is faced with an eternalproblem of supply uncertainty. This calls for improvisation at the plant level,constant adjustments of production' 'under way"; this is why initiative at the lowestlevels, a high autonomy of operational management is a condition without whichproduction could not continue at all. This initiative and autonomy of operationalmanagement fills the power vacuum in the organisation produced by systemic disturbances in the focus of strategic management power.So by absorbing strategic management, inducing' 'bifurcations" on the strategic


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Praxis International 95- operational management line and production supply uncertainty, the non-marketenvironment of the organisation ensures conditions for a high level of autonomyat the lowest decision-making levels within the non-market organisation. Thecombined effects of the non-market environment induce polyarchic deviations inthe structure of power of a work organisation . . .This is not all, however: in a non-market model of a work organisation, jobsecurity of employees is also guaranteed. This of course stabilizes the employees'autonomy and, apart from the mentioned conditions of polyarchic deviations inthe structure of power, it closes the circle of assumptions substantiating the highlevel of autonomy of the lowest decision-making levels of a work organisationin non-market context.It can therefore be said that a positive correlation exists between the non-marketcontext of a work organisation and the high decision-making autonomy of the lowestlevels of that organisation. The characteristic organisational and structural distinction between the market and non-market model ofa work organisation is the highlevel o fautonomy in decision making at the lowest levels - (particularly) ofoperational management - in the non-market model of a work organisation.The classification of the basic types of factory regimes offered by Burawoy isinstructive from the point of view of the possibilities of development of industrialdemocracy within the two different models of a work organisation. 12 Thecriterion of his classification is the degree to which the state is "involved" in thestructure and operation of an enterprise. The institutional relationship between theapparatuses of factory and state can be conceived either as separation or fusion. 13These two kinds of institutional regulation of the relationship between state andenterprise belong to different models of social reproduction: institutional separation of the apparatuses of factory and state is immanent to the market model, whiletheir fusion is an essential attribute of a non-market economic system.The intervention of the state in a factory regime may be direct or indirect: the fu-sion of factory and state apparatuses does not exclude the possibility of the indirectintervention of state, nor does their separation exclude direct state intervention.Burawoy's thesis is that the combination of the two types of institutionalized regulationof the relationship between state and factory, and ofdirect and indirect state interventions in factory policy, render four principal types ofJactory regime: (a) Separationof the apparatuses of state and factory combinedwith indirect intervention of the statein factory policy results in a factory regime of market despotism. In conditions ofmarket competition (demand uncertainty, particularly labour market constraints),all power is in the hands of the owner/entrepreneur. (b) A combination ofinstitutional separation of state and factory apparatuses with direct state intervention in thepolicy of enterprises produces a hegemonic factory regime. This is an internalorganisational equivalent to a still essentially market regulation of social reproduction,but modified to some extentby direct state intervention. Among various interventions,state determination ofminimal wages and unemployment benefits are particularlysignficant. (c) The third possibility is a combination of the fusion of state and factoryapparatuses and direct state intervention in factory policy. The implication of sucha combination is a factory regime of bureaucratic despotism. (d) The fourth optionis a combination of the fusion of state and factory apparatuses and indirect interventionof the state in factory policy: this is the collective selfmanagement regime.


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96 Praxis InternationalSome of the mentioned factory regime types entirely exclude, while others implyindustrial democracy. The factory's market despotism and hegemonic regimescorrespond to an essentially market regulated model of social reproduction. Within

this model, limited fonns of industrial democracy are possible only in the hegemonicfactory regime. This type of factory regime implies an intervention of the statein factory policy: state fixing of minimal wages and payment of unemploymentbenefits undoubtedly increases the autonomy ofworkers and, in principle, enablessound forms of industrial democracy. 14The absence of such interventionism in the conditions of an institutional separationof the apparatuses of state and factory implies the full autonomy of economicsubjects. The organisational equivalent of such autonomy is a market despotismregime. In this kind of factory regime, industrial democracy has no chance at all.The bureaucratic despotism and collective self-management regimes are theinternal organisational equivalents of an essentially non-market regulated modelof social reproduction (fusion of state and factory apparatuses). Their commonstructural and organisational attribute is a high level of autonomy in decision makingat the lowest levels - this designation being a "reflection" of the non-market context(decentered power of strategic management, supply uncertainty and job security).The differences between these two types of non-market model ofwork organisation have their roots in the different nature of state intervention: indirect stateintervention in the case of the fusion of state and factory apparatuses results inthe growth of this autonomy, which is in any case structurally feasible in sucha context. This means that the inlplication of indirect state intervention in sucha context is the increasing autonomy at the lowest decision making levels. Indirectstate intervention in the context of the fusion of state and factory apparatuses providesconditions in which the lowest levels of decision making within a work organisation may grow into an autonomous working collective - in a structure of powerparallel to that of the work organisation.However, there is another prerequisite to the full development of this autonomywithin a work organisation: a fnechanisnl ofindustrial democracy. The introductionof this mechanism into the scope ofdecentered power (high autonomy of workingcollective/shifted focus of power of strategic management) inevitably results ina self-managed regime - an advanced fonn of industrial democracy; the autonomousworking collective is the subject, the reproduction of its autonomy the contentsof this democracy.Indirect state interventionism and the institutionalization of industrial democracyin a non-market context produce autonomy 0..( a working collective.This autonomy in no way implies the autonomy of the work organisation. Quitethe opposite: it is in inverse proportion to the level of autonollly of an economicsubject. An autonomous working collective is feasible only in a non-autonomouswork organisation; a working collective of an autonomous econofnic subject isnon-autonomous.Using the above systematization of the assumptions of self-management, we canidentify some kind of ttontologicalpropensity" toward self-management that existsonly in a non-market work organisation: an organisational and structural discontinuity - a polyarchic deviation in the structure of power (autonomy at the lowestlevels). The self-management option within this organisation is thus made realistic


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Praxis International 97- it actually enables a relatively simple transformation of its internal structure intoadvanced forms of industrial democracy.This means that non-autonomous, non-market organisations open to theirenvironment are (at least potentially) more democratic, i.e. in principle more infavour of self-management than autonomous, market organisations closed towardtheir environment. These correlations were fully confirmed by empirical surveysof industrial democracy (and of the process of decision making in industrial organisations), conducted in the seventies in Yugoslavia and in several west-Europeancountries. 15 According to these research findings, the level of industrialdemocracy depends on (a) the openness of work organisations toward theirenvironment and Cb) on the basic features of this institutional and socio-politicalenvironment. It hs been demonstrated unambiguously that a lower autonomy ofwork organisations, i.e. their higher openness toward (the influence of) theenvironment, coincides with a higher stage of industrial democracy.Within a general pattern of hierarchical distribution of power in any industrialorganisation, these surveys register characteristic deviations in the amount ofpowerheld by diverse social groups within these organisations, as well as deviations inthe intensity of participation in decision-making of those diverse social groups.In the case ofmore open organisations, signs of polyarchic deviations in the distribution of power were detected; this resulted in a higher total amount of participationin decision making in those (more open) organisations . . .What is ofmost interestto us here is that Yugoslav work organisations "on average" are more open thancomparable organisations in the West: the findings revealed a higher level ofdemocracy in Yugoslav work organisations.A specific feature of the decision-making process in Yugoslav work organisations is/was the distribution of different phases of the decision-making process tovarious social groups. The most characteristic difference was observed in the third,decisive entrepreneurial phase of decision making (in the phase of selection andconfirmation of one of the offered alternatives). In western companies this phaseinvolves the highest participation of strategic management, whereas in Yugoslavorganisations, the participation of self-management bodies in this phase is veryhigh. 16

In addition to all this it is necessary to say that analyses of various interlinkingdimensions of participation in decision making have revealed the formation of akind of specific coalition block within Yugoslav work organisations. This coalitionblock consists ofworkers, low management (operational management) and workers'representative bodies (self-management organs).Empirical investigations, therefore, convincingly demonstrated that Yugoslavwork organisations of the seventies were more democratic than (comparable)organisations in theWest, that through self-management bodies, the workers wereinvolved particularly in the decisive, strategic, entrepreneurial phase of the processof decision making, and that the social carriers of self-management were operational management and workers. These facts testify to an advanced form of industrialdemocracy that existed in Yugoslav work organisation of the seventies. There existsno (rational) reason why this higher stage of industrial democracy could not becalled self-management.


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98 Praxis InternationalIll. Critique

According to Zupanov's central thesis, self-management can prosper only ina market economy: the basic condition of self-management is the independenceof economic subjects, and this condition is ensured only in a market system.In consideration of Burawoy's typology of factory regimes, self-management,or any other form of industrial democracy, has no chance at all in a "pure" marketmodel: the basic condition of self-management is not economic independence but- on the contrary - the dependence ofwork organizations; the level of democracyin a work organisation is in proportion to the level of its openness (non-autonomy).In this point theoretical findings and empirical research results are indeedunambiguous.

State interventions into the market model indeed produce "contextual supports"which, in principle, may bring about a certain level of industrial democracy evenin a market context. This level encompasses also a system of industrial democracywhose point of gravity would lie in working groups (in the context of the everyday production process) and would involve the participation ofworkers in all phasesof decision making at the enterprise level and the functioning of autonomousworkers' trade unions (a reconceptualization suggested by Zupanov). Selfmanagement, understood in this way, can exist in a modified market context.The problem with self-management is, however, that it implies a higher, advancedform of industrial democracy, expressed as - in terms of the market - the intolerableautonomy of the working collective and its high participation in decision-making(entrepreneurial decision-making in particular). Such a higher form of industrialdemocracy is possible only in a non-market context.The key determinant of a society of the east-European type is exactly this context.An advanced form of industrial democracy is therefore feasible solely in a society

of that type. Socialist self-management is a terminological combination throughwhich the inseparability of those higher forms of industrial democracy and of that(east-European) type of society are precisely expressed. Self-management is,therefore, comprehended as industrial democracy in "real socialism": as a certainlevel of industrial democracy, which, in principle, is not achievable in a marketeconomy.Viewed from this vantage point, Zupanov's assessment of a significantdivergence between an autocratic political system and self-management is problematic. Creators of the self-management system departed from the hypothesisthat self-management can evolve in such a political system: this hypothesis was

in no way mistaken. The non-market regulation of social reproduction simply impliesa non-distinction between state and society, the fusion of state and factoryapparatuses. An inevitable implication of such a non-market regulated mode ofsocial reproduction is the aggregation of power in the' 'administrative subsystem":the "crystallization" of oligarchic macro-power. Such concentration of social powerin one point of the social system cannot avoid being institutionalized as (in themost modest variant) an autocratic political system. Monopartism is just one ofthe easily recognizable signs of that system.An autocratic political system is in full accordance with non-market regulatedsocial reproduction. Since a non-market economy is a postulate ofselfmanagement,


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Praxis International 99selfmanagement is in full accordance with an autocratic political system. Nonmarket regulated social reproduction and its organisational and political explication,an autocratic political system, is matched by ambiguous doctrinaire understandingof a market economy, the principled rejection of private ownership, the theoryof a world-historical mission of the working class, the derived dictatorship of theproletariat, the theory of the avantgarde (one-party system, party monopoly) anddemocratic centralism in the party. This is the cycle of bolshevik ideology thathas not (yet) been pierced in Yugoslavia. According to Zupanov, this ideologyis an entirely inadequate framework for the promotion of "self-management andself-n1anagement socialism".Our approach shows that key elements of this ideology are in correspondencewith an autocratic political system which is in full accordance with non-marketregulated social reproduction. As we have found out, non-market regulated socialreproduction is an essential presumption of self-management. The only possibleconclusion is that bolshevik ideology is adequate frame for development of "selfmanagement and self-managed socialism".Authoritarianism and intolerance are essential features of the Yugoslav politicalculture. According to Zupanov, such a culture is unfavourable for the development of self-management. If to this we add radical egalitarism (dominant in thecomplex of societal values), then self-management in Yugoslavia - owing alsoto its cultural context - had no particularly good chances to succeed.Authoritarianism and intolerance probably have a negative, blocking effect on thesolidarity and horizontal cooperation at the level of working groups in workorganisations. Research has actually confirmed that at this micro-level, the participation ofworkers in Yugoslav work organisations is in many cases lower than theparticipation at the same level in comparable west-European work organisations. 17In spite ofthese facts, polyarchic deviations in the structure ofpower and a higherintensity in worker participation in decision making can be found in Yugoslav workorganisations than exists in western systems of industrial democracy. This canmean only that a self-management association - an autonomous working collective- in a Yugoslav work organisation is structured on an authoritarian pattern; thataccording to this matrix coalition blocks of operational management and physicalworkers are being formed. These coalitions formulate their interests within thecoordinates of radical egalitarism: a self-management association or autonomousworking collective is a group, structured in an authoritarian way and supplementingworker representative bodies. By means of the mechanism of self-managementdecision making, it endeavours to implant its objectives into the work organisation's goals. With regard to the fact that the phase most accessible to this groupis "the selection of alternatives", it endeavours to build such (in fact the mostindicative) demands into this - by definition - entrepreneurial decision. Theconsequence is the blocking and suppression of professional management, amateurisation of decision making in the enterprise and chaotisation of the organisation.We can conclude that authoritarianism and "uravnilovka" are not at all in oppositionto the autonomy of a working collective and that they do not block the participation ofworkers in decision making: an authoritarian culture, intolerance and radicalegalitarisln do not, therefore, mitigate against self-management.Coalitions that are formed at the lowest levels of decision making in work


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100 Praxis Internationalorganisations, coalitions that are made structurally possible through the higherautonomy of these lowest levels of decision making in work organisations in anon-market context - according to the logic of the (technical) division of labour- are dominated by operational management (plant managers, technicians andexperienced workers). The articulation of these coalitions' interests is the actualsubstance of the process of self-management. The true, direct subject of selfmanagement is the coalition block ofphysical workers and operational management.

That is the traditional working class, one of the two key components of the(unfavourable) social environment of self-management that Zupanov is writingabout. The second crucial support of the system of self-management in Yugoslaviais (was) the political bureaucracy.The great coalition between the working class and political bureaucracy - as

stressed by Zupanov - is inherent to all societies of "real-existing socialism".It is the social base of etatism, or else it is the key anti-reformist force in thosesocieties. In that great coalition, the political elite accepts the philosophy ofuravnilovka generated in the "basement", while the "basement" , on the otherhand, takes over elements of the official ideology. The consequence afthat significant interdependence is the strengthening of etatism. Etatism, however - asZupanov points out - does not encourage self-management. 18This conclusion is debatable: self-management association is a mode of existenceof the coalition block of physical workers and operational management - selfmanagement is an instrument of that block. Concurrently, the political bureaucracy,the author of self-management project, functions pennanently as its animating spirit,protector and arbiter: self-management, obviously, is of vital importance to thepolitical bureaucracy.

The result of the mechanism of industrial democracy, installed in the structureof the Yugoslav work organisation - as it was shaped by way of classic non-market,state-party regulated social reproduction - was worker self-managelnent: an initial,rapidly achieved, relatively high autonomy of a working collective within a nonautonomous work organisation.This initial strengthening of the autonomy of the lowest levels of decision makingdid not basically jeopardize the position of the director: even in those circumstancesthe director's commitment to higher agencies was expressed as undisputed authority- as a channel to import power into the organisation - that secured order appropriateto a (factory) regime of bureaucratic despotism.

However, the moment when obvious deregulations - explained by the need "torespect market laws more" - dissipated the director's everyday, most immediatedependence on the superior state organ, the source of power of bureaucraticdespotism withered away: the working collective's autonomy could increaseradically.It happened that a work organisation whose director ought' ' in times past" havegone to some central-planning agency in order "to coordinate matters", and thework organisation to which he returned after the dissolution of the entire mechanismof central-planning coordination, was no longer the same: a powerful self-managingworking collective now existed in this work organisation.

This autonomous working collective was (institutionally) defined as an autonomous work organisation. A working collective, however, is not the same as a work


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Praxis International 101organisation. An autonomous working collective in particular - both in terms ofhistory and logic - has nothing in common with an autonomous work organisation.It is understandable that the most an autonomous working collective - a collectiveassigned part of the work organisation - was able to do was simulate the autonomyof an economic subject. Self-managers acted as if they were good managers.This new' 'collective entrepreneur" was directly determining the field of actionof strategic management and, in general, the limits of autonomy ofa work organisation. As opposed to the rigid system of command economy, this time the autonomyof the work organisation was limited from below, not just by the activity of thecells of party and trade-union organisations but considerably also by the selfmanagement will of the working collective. Self-management was functioning asa control of the low autonomy of the work organisation: it reproduced a nonautonomous work organisation. The real result of the (process of) self-managementreproduction ofhigh autonomy ofworking collectives was to keep the autonomyof the work organisation low. 19

Being successful in blocking any perceptible increase in the autonomy of thework organisation, self-management actually reproduced the need for non-marketregulation of social reproduction: at the micro level - in the capillary segmentof the overall system of social power - it produced the bases for oligarchic macropower. Rendering political support in exchange for job security and "the rightto idle" - this is the most general pattern of interest coalition between the traditional working class and the political bureaucracy; it works in all countries of "realsocialism". In the case of self-management socialism, however, the matter is slightlydeeper: self-managemnent facilitates oligarchic macro power. The self-managementthat we are talking about is the ultimate consequence of etatism: the very mechanismof the latter's induction. In this sense it is also a vital mechanism of the anti-reformistcoalition. Of all the countries of "real existing socialism", only the anti-reformistforces in Yugoslavia have this mechanism at their disposal.The conclusion is indisputable: self-management goes with a non-market context.Self-management socialism is the most advanced fonn of "real existing-socialism" .This is why in the Yugoslav case the way out of it is so difficult.

NOTES1. J. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem - konec nekeutopije", Studijski dnev 1989 Socializem in demokracija (Ljubljana: FSPN), p. 83.2. According to the theory of social change from which the project of socialist self-management

in Yugoslavia was derived, change is conceptualized as discontinuity, a clean break, introducedinto society "from above"; the motive power and regulator of the change is the revolutionaryvanguard. According to this theory, the projected changes are imposed by new institutions, andthese new institutions are defined by legal norms: the setting of legal nonns is the main mechanismof social change. A great social change is first projected and then carried out. Zupanov sketchestwo basic courses for the criticism of this theory: historical sociological criticism would show unambiguously that no big change in human history has followed the scheme' 'project: realization",while sociological criticism from the point of view of law would point to the departure from thebasic functions of legal norms: legalization, systematization and sanctioning of the existing societalstate of affairs. Future conditions and relationships cannot be the object, and the creation of socialrelations is not the function of the setting of legal norms. See: Zupanov, "Samoupravnisocializem," pp. 94-5.


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102 Praxis International3. In the project of self-managed socialism, the crucial point of self-management was moved

to the mezzo (work organisation) and macro level (global society). The problem, however, is thatthe best information (about production and business process) and the highest motivation for participation in the self-management process are at the micro level of a work organisation, in the workinggroup. Workers can influence global social processes only as citizens (by way of a democratic politicalsystem) and as members of a trade union: self-management outside (and beyond) autonomous workinggroups is pure utopia. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem," p. 97.4. Zupanov already formulated this interpretation matrix in the sixties, most clearly in his workSamoupravljanje i drustvena moc (Self-management and social power) of 1969. According to thisconceptualization, a work organisation is a combination of 'a relatively fixed work systenl and arelatively spontaneous social system. " Zupanov, (Samoupravljanje i drustvena moc (Zagreb:Globus, 1985). Based on this distinction, the theory of "self-management organisation" atten1ptedto identify the factors of democratization, Le. the changes in the oligarchic structure of power ofindustrial organisations that would increase (or at least that would not considerably decrease) theperformance of this organisation. In this perspective, the central problem is to find the optimalrelationship between rational organisation of the work system and spontaneity of the social systelnwithin a work organisation. Rational organisation of the work system is denoted by the tenns structure,hierarchy and enterprise, spontaneity of the social system by the term (working) collective. Participation of workers in the decision-making process rests on the spontaneity of the social system; inother words, it is directed toward the interests of the (working) collec tive. A working collectivedenoted by high participation - a collective reproduced by way of advanced worker participationin the decision-making process - is a highly autonomous self-management \!vorking collective orselfmanagement association. A developed form of the interpretation matrix just described isformulated in terms of a dual organisational design: participative (self-management collective) andhierarchical structure (enterprise). Yugoslav sociologists widely accept it as a proper "sumnlary"of the defining features of a Yugoslav work organisation. See Zupanov, Marginalije odru.hvenojkrizi (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), p. 1.5. V. Rus and F. Admam, No'/:: in nemo'/:: samoupravljonja (Ljubljana: 1986). p. 227.

6. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem", p. 103.7. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem", p. 103-4.8. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem", p. 105.9. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem", p. 106.

10. The concentration of these functions in the hands of one agent - as has been confirn1ed byhistory - is in no way a necessary presumption for the preservation of unity.

11. The classic formulation of this interdependence is " . . . in a society of capitalist rllode ofproduction the anarchy of the social division of labour and the despotisn1 of the n l a n l ~ l a c t u r a l divisionof labour depend on each other" (Marx, K., Kapital I, 1947). This is the point of departure fro111which Braverman attempts to develop terminological definitions of a production process that wouldbe totally congruent with the results of the development of monopoly capitalisn1. Bravern1an seesthese additional definitions of capitalist production process in the systematic subdivision of workand in the concentration of knowledge of the labour process as the exclusive preserve of n1anagement (Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital (NY: 1974) p. 119). He places this structure ofthe labour process in a context of political economy categories: in this context he sees this structureas a reflection, or materialization, of market constraints in the production process. It is, sinlply,an internal, structural and organisational equivalent of generalized commodity production. It seemsthat most of Braverman's critics failed to consider this level of his analysis. A good overview ofdiscussion results, initiatived by Braverman, can be found in the study The Nature o j ' ~ V o r k byThompson (London: 1989).

12. M. Burawoy, The Politics of Production (London: 1985).13. Burawoy defines political and ideological apparatuses of production as the key non-econon1ic

moments of the product ion process regulating relat ions in production. These apparatuses varyanalytically - and are (even) independent - from the working process; they are connected with theapparatus of state. Ideological and political apparatuses of production, in addition to the ideologicaland political effects of the (organisation of the) work process, determine the field of articulationof interests of various social groups in production - factory (or production) reginlcs. See Burowoy,The Politics of Production (London: 1985), pp. 7-8, 87.


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Praxis International 10314. The mode of the reproduction of labour force, most closely connected with the charcter ofstate intervention, is defined by Buraway as one of the key (apart from the work process, relationsbetween enterprises and their attitude toward the state) determinants of factory regimes. All forms

of despotic production policies rely on the exclusive dependence of the reproduction of worker'slife on his participation in production. The entire pattern changes radically from the point in whichthe state interferes with the process of manpower reproduction: due to the development of a systemof social insurance and labour legislation, the labour force no longer depends directly on participationin the production process. State guaranty of a certain level of labour force reproduction substantiatesa formerly inconceivable level of labour force autonomy. See: Burawoy, The Politics ofProduction,pp. 125-6.15. V. Rus, Odlocanje in moc (Maribar: 1986), p. 147.16. In one of the surveys mentioned, Rus divided the process of decision making into the followingphases: defining of goals, (expert) formulation of options, selection of available options and carryingout of the decision. Due to the allocation of particular phases to various social groups in the caseof decision making in Yugoslav work organisations, the possibility of (the emergence ot) irresponsible domination is great. Strategic management in Yugoslav work organisation is - otherwise - morepresent in the first and fourth than in the third, most entrepreneurial, phase of decision making.See V. Rus, Odlocanje in moc (Maribar: 1986), p. 147.17. For this reason, in the conclusion of one of the investigations mentioned, Rus stresses thatthe development of this direct participation - participation at the level of the everyday productionprocess - is "the key to further development of self-management in Yugoslav enterprises". SeeRus, Odlocanje in moc, pp. 100-1.18. Zupanov, "Samoupravni socializem", p. 108.

19. One of the most important - rarely thematized, almost unperceived - "by -products" of thisprocess has also been the radical emancipation, increase of autonomy, of the political bureaucracy:its withdrawal into the leisure of provisional long-term planning of "the transition period" .

1.7 - stanojevic, miroslav - self-management in the context of the disintegration of 'real-existing'...

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