137a-u8policyvsoffice

8/10/2019 137a-U8PolicyvsOffice

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UNIT 8: PARTY GOALS:

POLICY VS. OFFICELijphart, Laver and Schofield, Dalton and WattenbergCH 9Mueller and Strom pgs. 36-62 or 63-88*


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Guiding Questions

What is coalition theory?

How do we explain which parties get into

government?

What do office based theories hypothesize?

What do policy based theories hypothesize?


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Parties at the Center of

Government

Strom 1999

Parties remain at the core of government

Democracies vary in terms of how they vest

executive and legislative authority Attempt to prevent unchecked executive or legislature rule.

Classic theories predicated on the US(presidential) and the UK (parliamentary) models.

A long history in political theory. Presidential and parliamentary systems posit very

different relationships between the executive andthe legislature.


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Reviewing Presidentialism and

Parliamentarism

President: head of stateand head of government

Separate origin Executive and legislativebranches are electedseparately.

Both branches are electedfor a fixed term.

Cabinet members do notsit in the legislative branch.

Separate survival Neither branch can remove

the other except inextraordinarycircumstances.

Prime Minister: head ofgovernment

PM/Cabinet-collectiveexecutive

Monarch/president: head of state

Shared origin:

Only legislature is directlyelected.

Terms are not fixed.

PM /Cabinet come from thelegislature

Shared survival:

Confidence relationship exists

between executive andlegislature

PRESIDENTIALISM PARLIAMENTARISM


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Confidence Relationship

Concept of responsible government definesparliamentary systems.

PM and his or her government must have theconfidence of the chamber (majority support). Legislature possesses authority to express no

confidence in the executive.

Governments must resign if they lose a vote ofconfidence.

Executive (PM) has powers of dissolution. PM can typically dissolve the parliament and call for

new elections at any time.

Strong party discipline is critical in parliamentarysystems.


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Coalition Theory

Many parliamentary systems use proportional representation toelect representatives.

This makes it difficult for one party to win more than 50% of the seats.

Parties wishing to enter government have to create a coalition thatcannot be defeated on a confidence vote.

Coalition theory examines why certain parties enter governmentand others do not.

Following an election there are many possible coalitions.

But not all are feasible.

Some parties are always in government while others are always inopposition.

Why are certain parties more likely to enter government whileothers do not seek to enter government at all?

Literature offers both office based and policy based motivations forentering government


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Office Seeking Theories:

Minimal Winning Coalitions

Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953 Theory is policy blind

Conceives of government formation as a zerosum game over the spoils of office

Hypothesis: Minimal winning coalitions will form. Minimal winning coalitions: Coalitions where every party is critical to maintaining

a majority (i.e. no superfluous parties).

Observations: From 1945-1987, 35% ofcoalitions formed followed this pattern.


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Office Seeking Coalitions: Minimum

Winning Coalitions

In large systems, several minimal winningcoalitions are possible.

How do parties choose between minimal

winning coalitions? Riker 1962

Hypothesis: Parties want to boost theirbargaining weight within a coalition, thus

minimum winning coalitions will form. Minimum winning coalitions:

Coalitions consisting of parties with the smallest totalweight.


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Iceland 1983

WL-3 SD-6 SDF-4TOTAL SEATS: 60

PA-10 PP-14 IP-23MAJORITY: 31

63 possible coalitions.

7 possible minimal winning coalitions (no superfluous parties): 37: IP/PP

34: PP/PA/SD/SDF

33: IP/PA; IP/SD/SDF; PP/PA/SD/WL

32: IP/SD/WL

31: PP/PA/SDF/WL

1 minimum winning coalition (minimal winning with smallest weight): 31: PP/PA/SDF/WL

End result: IP and PP coalition.

WL
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Althyduflokkurinn.gifhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Samfylking4.jpghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Peoples_alliance.jpghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Framsokn.gifhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Independence_party.jpg


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Office Seeking Theories:

Minimal Connected Winning Coalitions

Questions of which minimal coalition should be chosen stillplagued these theories.

Axelrod 1970

Policy compatibility reduces the number of viable

coalitions and eases bargaining. Hypothesis: Minimal connected winning coalitions will form.

Minimal connected winning coalitions:

Minimal winning coalitions made up of parties which areideological neighbors

Loss of one party leaves a coalition which is either:

1) no longer winning

2) no longer connected


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Italy 1972

PCI 179 PSI 61 PSDI 29 PRI 15 DC 267 PLI 20 MSI 56

127 coalitions were possible.

3 were minimal connected winning (MCW): PSI/PSDI/PRI/DC

PSDI/PRI/DC/PLI

DC/PLI/MSI.

Any coalition including the MSI or the PCI was not an option.

Five coalitions formed before new elections were held.

630 TOTAL SEATS-MAJORITY IS 316-3 OTHER
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Italian_Social_Movement.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_PRI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Italian_Liberal_Party.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Scudocrociato.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_SDI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Italian_Socialist_Party_logo_1993.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Partito_dei_comunisti_italiani.png


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Italy 1972-Revolving Coalitions

1st: DC minoritygovernment (267).

2nd: DC coalition(minimum winning-316).

3rd: DC coalition(minimal connectedwinning-372).

4th: DC coalition

(surplus majority-357seats)

5th: DC minoritygovernment (282).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_PRI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Scudocrociato.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Italian_Socialist_Party_logo_1993.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_SDI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Scudocrociato.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Scudocrociato.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_SDI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Italian_Socialist_Party_logo_1993.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_PRI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Scudocrociato.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Logo_SDI.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Italian_Liberal_Party.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Scudocrociato.png


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Evaluating Office Based Theories

Pure office based theories cannot address:

1) Why surplus parties are ever included in a

governing coalition?

Example: Israel

2) Why minority governments form?

Example: Denmark

But policy based theories of coalition formationcan.


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Policy Based Theories: Issue Dimensions

Laver and Schofield 1998.

Parties enter winning coalitions that will adopttheir preferred policy.

Party controlling the median voter serves as thepivot within the legislature.

Sees the party holding the median voter as apolicy dictator

Hypothesis: Coalitions will include the partyholding the median legislator.


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Denmark 1966

179 SEATS TOTAL. 8 OTHERS. MAJ = 90

The median legislator is a Social Democrat (SD).

Any viable coalition would require SD support. Result: SD formed a minority government.

Defeating the SD would require parties of the left and theright to coalesce. Unlikely. So a party could govern without holding a majority

of seats.

SFP 20 SD 69 RV 13 V 34 KFP 35
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Konservative.gifhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Dk-v-logo.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Radven.JPGhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Dk-sd-logo.pnghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Sflogo.JPG


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Conclusions

Median parties are well placed in coalitionbargaining talks.

Laver and Schofield 1998:More than 80% of coalitions from 1945-1987

included or were supported by the median party. To suggest that parties care about policy does

not mean that they do not possess officeseeking goals.

Understanding government formation requires usto look at BOTH policy and office goals.


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Case Study: Ireland

Examine

How the Irish political environment shapes party options.

How do Irish parties typically rank policy, office, and votes?

Labourscoalition decisions

What were the tradeoffs made between policy and votes innegotiations with Fianna Fail and Fine Gael?

Fine Gaels (FG) Tallaght Strategy

What did FG get out of supporting its nemesis in government?

Fianna Fails (FF) decision to form a coalition. Why did a party that used to govern alone become willing to

share the spoils of office?


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Case Study: Denmark

Examine:

Why were minority governments so viable within

the Danish case?

That is, why would a party seek to form a minoritycoalition?

Why would other parties prefer to remain in opposition

rather than defeat a minority government?

Why do parties prefer to be seen as advancingpolicy rather than office based motives?


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Next Lecture

Theme: Party Systems

Ware pgs. 5-13

Theme: Party Systems (Competition Models)

Ware CH 5

Electronic Reserves: Sartori

Mueller and Strom pgs. 141-171

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