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10th Armd Div in the CRAILSHEIM Ope~ation

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loth Armored Division in the Crailshelm Operation, 4 -10 Apr 45. Arnrored School , Student researoh .report. llay 60 .

This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION

LIBRARY SERVICES

fOltT LEAVENWORTH. KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.N-2146.58 COpy NO. . 1

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A RESEARCH REPORT

PrepClred at

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

Fort Knox Kentuck y

1949 1950

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CRAILSHEIM

OPERATION

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10th ARMORED DIVISION IN THE CRAU.SHEIM OPERATION

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

BY

COMMITTEE 8 OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1949-1950

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CECIL HIMES, CAV.

MAJOR CHARLES T. KRM:PITZ, CAV.

MAJOR HUGO Vi. HEFFELFINGER, CAV.

MAJOR CARROLL Me FALLS, Jr. J CA V.

MAJOR MORRIS C. STOUT, FA.

MAJOR WILLIAM J. BOEHMER, CAV.

CAPTAIN STEP'1EN K. PLUI\1:E, CAV.

CAPTAIN GEORGE D. STYER, CiI.V.

CAPTAIN JhMES M. HUDDLESTON I CAV.

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

MAY 1950

PREFACE

Tho lOth ~rmor6d Division orossed the RtUNE River

as part of the United States Seventh Army in Maroh 1945.

The division spearheaded the driv~ of the VI Corps to the

W?st bank of the NECKl~R River against feeble German nsist

(lnCG. Arriving in front of HEILBRONN the corps vias halted

by stiffening German resistnnoe. The 10th Armored Division

was dirGcted to move to th6 north in an attempt to outflank

HEILBRONN Elements of the division Viere successful in re

aching CR:I.ILSHEIM, forty air miles to th(;) e!lst. Failing

to move back tOVlClrd HEILBRONN und after defending CRAILSHEIM

for tuo days the division '.-IUS forced to \Ji thdraw. This

study COVE;rs the drive for, oapture of and 'iJithdrQ:~J(),l from

CR.c~ILSHEIM: by tho 10th Armored Division during the period

4-10 l~pril 1945.

Our main purposo in studying this particular action

1::QS to incrcuse our lmm71cdgc of armored operations in

three types of action: penetration, defense, and ,'Jith

drawul. Besides increasing our lmo':!ledgG Vie ,'Jere trying

to determine udhGrence to or violation of armor cd doctrine,

any lessons to bo learnod from this particular operation,

und to make recommcnd:ltions on the future Gmployment of

armor cd uni ts.

.Ll

Tho main sources of information D.v,lilable to us ywre

llfta ;'.c tion Reports, 0. Report by Captain Hnmel~ a member

of tho Adv~ncGd Officers Class of 1948, on this same sub

ject, and letters and interviel"ls YIith former members of

the 10th .

ilerman C. Jacobs

Jrsderict:: r. Haas

Syl \fes tel' r. H sr p;6r

Carl E. Michael

I;;alcol:i1 ::liIerr itt

'IUilliam Hartline

Jcim Vi. Sheffield

Fi.ichard -\1. Ulrich

v~heeler hll. Tha.ckston

In addi-:ion we would like to express oru appreciation

for the work of Hrs. i{jlliam J. B06hw,r on the cover, charts

and rr.aps of this r epor t.

TABLE OF CCNTEN'IS

0' :\PTF. R Page

1 TIJ TRODUC TI CN . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . I , 1

2. TJ-fE CAPTlFE OF ,CRAIl SI-TT!::IM , ." 7

Evef;1ts l.eadi~ up to the drive on Crailsheim , 7

Combat tonmapd l\. ;, . " 12

Combat Cotntnand Bl ,e, 19

Reserve Cohmahd am 90th Cav. Ren. Sq. Mecz. 24

;. OFFENSIVE (FH.:Rcl.TIO"lS ThT T~:q; CRAILSU;EIM-llSHOFEN MEA. 30

Canba t Comnand A. e 30

Reserve Corrm:md and 90th Cav. Ren. Sq. Meea .. 37

Combat Gomnand .-\. (w ith des erve Comnand under oper ational

Combat Corrmand ~ (with Reserve Conmand under operational

centrol) 8 ~pril , 39

control) 9 April. .. 47

90th Cavalry Reconnais Sd.'.ce Souadron, Mechanized. 51

4 TF~ ROI I ~l BAF~J. . . . . . . . 55 The fight along the MSR , .. . . . 55

Air re supply ope rations . . . . . . 62

5 THS ',H'WDRA"~L FRO!" C::,.-iFS' EDi 65

Combat Con-mand A (wit); Reserve Corrmand under operational

centrol) 10 April. " 65

Combat Comnand B. .. '. . 72

90th Cavalry Reconnaissa'ce Squadron, Mechanized ' . 74

6 StJ'.'l"ARY . '.' , ........... _. 77to Elnt'loyrrent of the lOn l-1.rmored Division. 77

Conclusions and lessons learned 79

APP~TDICES,' ... ~ I. Order of Battle a,ld. Troop List 85

II. Terrain &twy. 91

III. Li ivl s ion, Corps, at'.d ;1.rmy Order s 94

IV. Personalities. 111

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CHAPTE.'R 1

INTRODUCTION

Tho lOth Armored Division, under the comm:md of

M:,-j or GcnerLll Paul W. Newgo.rden, 'was ac tiVQ ted on 15 July

1942 at Fort Benning, Georgia from elements of the 3d and

11th Cavalry Regimen ts. The newly orgo.nized division

took over the area und somo of the equipment which ho.d

formerly belonged to the 2d A.rmored Division.

The 10th h.rmorcd Division perfonned the usual

l,GF training progrurn \-;hilo u.t Fort Banning, and was soon

known :.1S a "hot" outfit. Concurrently, the niclmumo of

"Tiger" W:.1S acquire,d. When the bas ic :.1nd uni t tro.ining

cycle >''D.s c0mpleted, the ~ntire division spent almost

four ;uonths pl.:.rticipCtting in thE; Ten..'1esscG Maneuvers

CLnd tilen moved to C[;.mp Gordon, Georgi...:. to proc(;ss for

ovcrscCLS dut:y. ;, serious bl07! ':(,:1.3 dC:J.l t the di 'lis ion

by the unti:noly dco.th of General Hcwgarden in :.1 pl:.1ne

crLlsh nc.:o.r Chl tto.noog;' 1 TennessGe on 14 July 1944, almost

t,vo yc._crs to the day after he hetd D.ssu.rncd comrrr:tnd of tho

division. M:.1jor Genera.l W'lillin.m H. Horris, an officer

of livide experience, succeeded to comm:.;.nd of the division

~nd led it through all of its subsequent c ombclt on the

contLlcnt.

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SJ::.arpencd by tra.ining" the division loft for Europo

from CD1l'.p Putrick Henry, Virginia. on 13 September 1944,

6YJ.tGring the continent through the port of CHERBOURG on

23 September 1944. After its arrivo.l in Europe, tl& di'l

ision wus moved to TEURTHEVILLE and underwent a. month of

intensivo truining and comb:lt conditioning prior to enter

ing combat.

Tho division moved to the front in the MAR LA TOUR

area. on 23 October 1944 where it first suw combat on 1 Nov

ember in support of the XX Corps. The corps miosion o.t

this timo W:.!S to conblin c!1cmy troops in the arco.. In

mid-November" the di7ision flS a unit 1'10nt on tho offen

sive, crossing the MOSELLE 'lnd };!fl.LLING and driving to the

SA."-R Rivc.r north of the fortress city of METZ.

As part of the., fo.mous Third J;l-rmy" the 10th Armored

Di 7isicJ:l w:.ts ffi2..king prep:\r~tti()!1s for the dr ive to the

RHINE when it recoived the urg.::;nt cl,ll to go north to

,l.ssist in stopping tbc Germun ,,:intcr offonsive in tho

XEWE1'NES. Tha division rush,)d into the gClP to stop

tho Germo.n onsla.ught on 17 December 1944, und held

defensive posi tions ne(~r Bf.STOGNE, NOVILLE, Clnd BR.:iS

until tile 'i'cutonic tide ha.d receded. Liko other div

isions 'ahich hD.d hClstily moved to tho ARDENNES, the lath

sustt:dncd considcro.ble casualtics in both men ;J.nd equip

ment, and aftor tho action withdrew to rest o.roas.

:Ster 0. brief r0st in J::muo.ry, the division roturned

to he attack and took part in the clco.ring of the SAAR-MOS

ELLE Triangle as part of tho Third Army, and th(;n turned

north to capture TRIER on 15 March 1945., At the end of

March, tho division bec~e part of tho Seventh Army"

crossed the RHINE River at l{,LlI..NNHEIH on 28 March 1944, and

took part in the April Offensive ago.inst the hc[,rt of GER

IvIANY. Under VI Corps the division had the principal rolo

in the battlG of tho HEILBRONN-CR.AILSHED.1-SCHi'JABISCH HALL

Tri~~glG, ~s the combined :llied armies drove toward the

heo.rt of GERM,ANY.

l...fter the failure of the ARDENNES Offensive, it

was incrGo.si!lg1y o.pp::.\rellt th",t it ,1ould be only 0. mo.tter

of time beforo thG once omnipotent Germ::n war mnchine

;v,')ulcJ crumble. Desie:ncd to ho.st611 the fD.ll of GERl1ANY,

the 0.11 iGd Spritlg Ofi'rons i V6 of 1945 envisi oaed o.dv::mc ing

C1.cross tho RHH;'E on n. brwd front and striking deep into

t:le hco.rt of VlC Gerrrnn n'J.tion. Stratogicdly the allied

pl:1,ns cc.llod for tllroe pb),ses. Tho first p11Cl.sc vw.s the

c:lCirclcmcnt or tht. industrial RUI-lR by '). doubl", cmvclop

ment. The ,n0vcment was to be carried out by Field h~~rsho.ll

Sir Bor~1.Clrd L. 1,:oCltgomery's Tvvcnty-first Army Group in the

north,. and General Omur Bradley I s T:'Jelfth Army Group in the

south. The second and third ph~sGS of the overall plan,

after the central armic::s made D. jUllction wi th the Russians

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somewhere along the ELBE, called for a rapid advance on each

flc.nk. The northern armies would cut off DENMARK, and the

southern armies would drive to the southeast through GERMANY

into AUSTRIA. In summing up this plan in 0. radio message

to GcnGr.~l lVLi.RSH';'LL, Gl1eral EISENHOWER said the. following:

I propose, at thE. en.rliGst possible inoment, in conjunction 'with the SOVIETS to divide ilIld destroy the GERMAN foroc;s by launching my mo.in attack from the KASSEL arc8. straight eastward tow:J.rd the heart of Wh:,lt remains of the GERlviAN industrial power until that thrust has attained the general area of LEIPZIG and including that city, unless the RUSSLiN advance meets us west of that point. The second. main fe:ture of the battle is to bring MONTGOMERY'S forces along on tho left and as quickly as the above has been accomplished to turn Ninth h.rmy to the left to flssist him in clen.niEg out tho '17:;'010, OIGCl. from KIEL and LUBECK westward.

""ftcr the requiremel~ts of' these two moves h:..ve Deen mGt, I ,Jill thrust colwnns suutho!:lstw8.rd in un attempt to join up wi th the RUSSIA.NS in the DANUBE Valley ::l.nd prevent tho Gst,1olishmcnt of a NAZI fortress in southern GEillLANY.

Natur;llly l,ly pLms flre flGxi ble c.nd I mus t ret:1in freedom of action to meet changing situ~tions. Maxi:nu:n flexibility VJi~.l result from cJncentr~,tion of maxLm.rril forco in the center.l

On 31 March" the lOOth Ia'o.ntry Divisio!'1 of ttL VI

Corps crossed the RHINE river near IV1ANNHEDIl. On 1 April,

the 63d Inf cutry Division and the 10th [.rmored Division

joined the corps cmc] the attQck jumpod off to the oG.st

with the proponderance of the attack on the southern flank

of corps. ~G['Lr!1ead8d by elements of the 10th Armored

DivisiO!J the corps mado re.pid progress for throe days aga.11lBt

sporadic Germ

By tho 4tt of April the 63d Infantry Division, on

the north, had advanced eastward 8.S far as aiD MERGEN-

TRETIvl and WClS poised to str ike south across the JAGST Rbror.

Thi s division lnd followed Reserve Commnnd of the lOth

i;..rmored Division cmd noY. had its three inf:::cntry r6giments

sproZld along t:1. north bnnk of the JAGST River. The c om

mUllic~~tions center of HEILBRONN apP6arod to have been out

flanked by the swift ~,ction of this flank.

~~hile the maneuver to th6 north had bean progressing,

Comb~~ t Command .tl. of thE; lOth Armored Division, followed by

the 100th Ini'mtry J.)ivisioll" had been attc.cking west from

HEIDELBERG townrd HEILERONN. Theso southern forc6s had

bcem meeting stiffening resistance on the 2d ;).nd 3d of

l~pr il. By the niEht of the 3d of l~pril this force was

dr::;,vJn up along th:: NEClbR before HEILBRONN and hLld c leured

OllOUgh of the. west brlnk befon, the. city to plzm :J. cros

for the follo\ving d::

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o.ppi1rO:1 t th::1 t he intended to m:J.ko r:.. stand for HEILBRONN

along the JAGST and NEC&\R River lines.

Tile VI Corps had no t n.nticipLl. ted :l. long de hy in

crossing these rivers. On 3 .Jl.pri1 the corps issued orders

for thG 10th "rmored vivi s ion 2.nd the 100th Infantry Div----------~----------

ision to seize HEILBRONN and continue the attc..ck 6L1st}

}JOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

1D-i:lir,ht D. EisG~1ho,Jer, Crusuade in Europe (G:l.rden City, NOH York: Dou~)lcd::,-y fend Co., Inc., 1948) p 401.

2Report of Opero.tions, The Seventh United States Army, 1944-1945, Vol III, P '79.

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CEAPTER 2

THE CAPTURE OF CRAlLS JElE

On the night of 28 March 1945, the lOth Armored Div

ision crossed thE: R1IINE River at EANN_=::EILI, GerIrfmy. During

the period 29 March - 4 April tho diviwion was in

exploi totion operations in the area 30ut11 of the NECKAR River

bet'iJ6Cn ~iIA1:U\P.ElI:I and HEILDROliN (08.5-61.5). The division

carried out this mission, advancinG swiftly against incre

asing resistunce with Com-bat Co:r:ur.ands A and alJreast, CCA

on the left (north). Combat Command A drove the general

(91.3-04.5), lIELHS1'l,DT (90.0..81.5), ~jJIT'E:'.r-JARDT (98.0-77.9),

and KBCmIAUSEN (00.0..66.0). Combat Command 1:3 moved along

the axis HAIF(mElM, SClrvYETZ E:GLN (61.0.. 87.5), 1iVALLDORF (66.0

78.6), STETTFILD (66.3-65.3), GROSSGARTACE (01.0-61.5), and

LA1.?l'EN (03.5-54.0). (See Fir:ure 1.) Combat Cornrr.a.nd Reserve

movE;d t;18 same general axis as t ;,s.t of eCA vii th the

mission lito e:"1gaf;e in a reconnaissa.nce in force with the 90th

Cavo. Reconnaissance Squadron to t:!'l.E: oi ty of ROT?ErWERG

"l(7'1.5-89.4). The Re::lerve Command moved to ASSAl'iST~\DT (41.5-S3.e) on 4 A.pril a.nd raade contact viJ.th the 90th

Cavalry ::~GconnQissance Squadron w!lich had preceded them.

Plans Yller8 [-;ade for a coordinated atta.ck st

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enemy defenses in the vicinity of STUPP~CH (46.0-95.8).

This o.tto.ck wo.s bunched ut 1430B on 4 April 1946 from

ASShlJ[STADT with the Reserve Command on the south und the

90th Cuvo.lry on the nor th. STUPPACH und HACHTEL (49.0-93.0)

were to.ken despite moderate enemy resist~nce Q.nd the fo.ct

reported to division he0.dqu8.rters o.t 1600B hour s. Reserve

Comrn..'"lnd WfJ,S or dered :'y divi s ion to hold the ground t~1. ken

::::.nd block to the north n.nd northeast.

lilihile the Reserve Comm~Uld and the 90th Cavulry

wore fig;,ting in the vicinity of ASSiJl~:STADT ::md STUPPACJ,

COA and CCB Vlere engtlg.:od in oper:\tions in the vicinity of

HEILBRONN designed to clen.r thE; 0ner:1Y from thG west b.cmk

of the NEC:K:.aR cmd to loco.te crossings n.cross this major

bQ.rr i6r. Combat Comm;.md A ','JUS oper:

the 3d Battalion" 398th Fiegimeuto.l COl"l:lJ,t Te:l:n ot the loath

Infantry Division. These phns were never carried out, lor

f',t 1030 llOuts Combat COl;r

While CCA was conducting its movement to the vicinity

of ABSA SI'ADT" General Morris, Corrnnand Genee aI, 10th

ed Division" issued an oral field order to General Piburn.

'rIds fiGld order directed Combat Conmand A to continue the

( \ attack to the southeast, capture (70.5-62.5,) , turn to t~1.e southwest and west and seize the line CRAILSEE1J.,1, SC~'~dABISCH HALL (46.0-59.Q)" BACKHAHG (24.0-40.0) 3 General

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Piburn then issued verbal crders to t~~e task force conunanders )

(/ to carry out this mission. His plan ,-nas to attack with Task Force Hankins in thE lead" followed by Task Force ley.

JTask Force Roberts was given the initial mission of clear ( the enemy from the sector between ASSAIMSTADT and DORZBACH

(43.0-89.0). Considerable enemy resistance had been devel

oped at DORZBACH during the evening of 5 April by the 90th

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

Combat Command A - 6 April 1945

Having quickly refueled" r ecei ved its order s, and pre

pared f'or the attack" Task Force :-~ankins passed through the

lines of tile 90th Cavalry in the northeastern outskirts of

REHGBHSI-IAUSEH and cormnenced the a ttack toward CRAILSHEIM.

The initial movement VJas extreme ly d ifficul t. This was

occasioned by the poor road net, enemy road blocks, dark

ness, and t -~e fact that Task Force Hankins had to remain

on the roads becau.se of the. heavy woods. This made it

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very simple for the enemy to cons.truct effective roadblocks

by felling trees across the roads He took full advantage

of this and Task Force Hankins struggled throughout the

night to get the attack moving. Terrain was the major

enemy, as only sporadic small arms and mortar f.ire, larg

ely' ineffective, was encountered by the column.4 Bypasses

were used to get uro~nd the extensive roadblocks but, since

the ground was very soft, vehicles continually mired and

had to be pulled out~ Despite these difficulties Tusk Force

Hankins continued its slow movement forward. Daybreak found

them approaching HOLLENBACH (50.3- 88.4) ~ (See Figure 3.) . Since .TaskForce Hankins was having so much trouble

traversing the route between RENGERSiIAUSEN and HOLLENBACH

(50.3~88.4), General Piburn ordered Task Force Roberts

to attack to the south toward DORZBACH and reconnoiter a

route to the west 0 f Task Force Hankins, bypass him, and

5 get the attack moving. The Task Force moved from the sou

thern outskirts of ASSAMSTADT at 004513 hours, 6 April 1945.

They took the wrong road in the darkness and advanced into

undefended HORRENBACH (39.5-91.9) 6 Discover ing their

mistak;e they turned east and advanced to LAIBACH (41.9

90.8); thence to DORZBACH. Here they encountered det

erLlined enemy resistance in the form of roadblocks and

heavy small arms, antitank, and artillery fire. The tusk

force spent the remainder of the nifh t attempting to find

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a bypass around DORZWiCH but was unsuccessful.. They

attacked bORzBl~CH after daylight andj after a severe .' ,fire fight, took the toWn that evenirlgt

Arter ~aptu~e of the town, it was discovered

that the main road from DORZBhCH to HOLLENBACH, via

HOHEBACH (45.0-86.7) and AILRINGEN (46.2-87.8), was blocked by a destroyed bridge across a small stream

which ran through the town-. They were unable to find

a bypass and this fact was inunediately reported to Combat

Command A. Task Force Roberts was then ordered to move

back to its original assembly area in ASSiiMSTADT. This

move was accomplished without incident. (See Figure 3J ~vhile Task For C6 Hankins was attacking toward

HOLLENB.t~CH n.nd Task For ce Roberts was engaged ilt DOR

ZBACH, Task Force Riley had remained in liSSAMSTADT

with Combat Comm~nd A Heudquarters. They were prepared

to follow e i th6r Task Ii orce Hankins or Task For ce

Roberts, depending upon ~hich tusk force found a suitable

route and bogan to move 'with the speed \vi th which an 7

ar.morcd task force is cffpable of moving. This opport

unity did not present itself during the night of 5-6

April because of th6 conditions already stated.

,L'it approximately 0900B hours, 6 April 1945, while

Task }< or ce Roberts was attacking DORZBAeH and Task Force

Riley was waiting expectantly in ASSAMST~DT, Task Force

Hankins captured and cleared HOLLENruiCH. The attack was

15

imrtwdid.tGly continuE;d toward GUTBACH (56.8-87'&2)-_ Two

roa.db1ocksdcfended by sttulli etiemy gkooupa d.rilibd with

smull arms and panzerfausts were 6TJ.countered between

HOLLENBACH and GUTBACH, but were swiftly oleared through

the coordinated a.~tion of the leading teams. GuTB8.CH fell at 1245B hours and the attack began to pick up

speed. RIEDBACH (58.2-85.7) was captured at l~OOB

against slight resistance and it became apparent that

Task Force Hankins had a brer:'kthrough. The ruce was on~

The column vV ith little or no int6rference from the enemy

pushed swiftly through DLAUFELDEN (62.5-80 ..0), 1443B

hours; BRETTENFELD (65.8-76.0), l515B hours; ROT AM SEE

( 66.6-74.7), 1550B hours; w-ALLHAUSEN (69.6-70.6), 1634B

hours; GRONINGEN (69.6-68 ..3), 1650B hours; SATT11iiEILER

(70.6-66.7), 1710B hours; SATTELDORF (71~2.66.2); l730B

hours; and NEIDENFELS BURLESTIAGEN (69.866.8) at 1745B 8hours. The main column of Task Force Hankins dashed

into CRf~ILSHEIM at the same time that elements of the

task force were clearing surprised, bewildered enemy out

of NEIDENFELS BURLESViAGEN. Ene!'.1Y resistance in CRAILSHEIM

was light and disorganized, and it was apparent that com

plete surprise had been acheived. The town was hastily

searched, since darkness was fast approaohing, and by

2100B hours Task Force Hankins Was disposed in CRAIL

SHEIM for defense.

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Tc.sk Force Riley, Vvhic~1 had remained in ASSAM

ST.d.DT C\.vJaiting the opportunity to exploit any success,

received the ttgo" signal fl'om Combat Contrna.nd 11 Head.

qJarters at appI'oximatei~ iSOOB hours. It was apparent from reports from Task }i'orce Hankins that a breakthrough

was in the ffi.::..king, and General Piburn wanted Task .r orC6

Ri ley to as s i st in the exp loi to. tion.. Task It orce hi ley

moved out at 1510B hour s.9 It was immediate ly apparent

that t~leir move was to be no mere "motor march". Th6

enemy had inf il tra ted behind Task For ce :tankins and

harrassed Task r'orce .hiley with small arms fire While

the task force was negotiating the stretch of bad road

through the woods northeast of RENGERSHAUSEN. The

task force continued a sl~1iv, steady advance following

the same route taken by Task }i'orce H:.lnkins. After

clearin~ the stretch of bad road the task force began

to roll, and at 2058B hours lead elements of Task Force

Ri ley entered CRAILSHEIM and made contact with Task Force

Hankins. Since radio communication between both task

forces and Combat Command A lieadquarters had been lost,

because of the distance involved, the commanders of

Task Force l1f.lnkins and Task :B' orce Riley conferred and

agreed upon a plan for the defense of the CRilILSHEIM

area. They decided to reinforce Task Force Hankins in

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CRll.ILSHEIM VJi th one team from Task Force Riley and to pI ace

the remaining two teams of Task Force Riley in S..;'TTIL

~;J-EILER and SATTELDORF. These dec isions were quickly carria:l

into abtion and by midi-iight th(3 CRJ~ItSI-I~!M area W~B firmly ~6sting in the hands of the assault task forces of Combat.

Command j~.

~-vhile preparations for the defense of the CRAIL

SHEIM area were be ing carri ed out, Combat Command A Head

quarters, which was still located in b.SSAI\~STADT .. received

orders from division to continue on its mission; .at the

same time holding CRAILSHEIM until relieved by the Reserve

Cornnand. General Piburn decided to follow his original

pI an of having Task l' orce ~{ankins block at CRAILSHEIM While

Task }i'orce b.iley passed thr ough and attacked toward SCH

Vll.BISCH HALL-B..:~CKNANG. These orders, hov.Jever, never

reached the troops in the CR;-I.ILSHED!I area due to the fact

that radio communication with them had been lost and, des

pi te repeated attempts involving the use of relay stations.

could not be reestablished. IO Consequently, the troops in

CR1~ILSH.J~IM did not move to accomplish this mission during

the night of 6-7 April .

It became apparent during the night that the enemy

had been completely surprised by the capture of CRAILSHEIM.

It "vas furthEr apparent that enemy forces in the area. were,

18

in most cases, unaware that CRAILSHEIMwas in American handSJ

This VJas proven by the faet that several command vehicles

and their occupants were ~aptur6d by ~he outpost~ of Task Force Hankins during the night . These vehicles had been

tr3.veling toward CRAILSHEIM and their occupants were ast

ounded to find CRi.ILSHEIM in American hands. At SATTiL-

DORF a German army bus passed unmolested through the outpoots

of Task Force Riley and Was stopped in front of the command

post by the task force S-4. The occupants of the bus stated

they h:~d been sent to pick up laundry.ll They never accomplished their 17lissionl

Com bo. t Cormn nn d B - 4, 5 and 6 Apr i 1 1945

On 4 April 1945 Comb~t Comm~nd B was probing the WGst b3.nk of the NECKA.R River seeking like ly bridgeheads

across tllO barrier.12 On the preceding day VI Corps had

or der-e d the 10th iirmor ed Divi s ion and th e lOOth rnf antry

Di vis), on to S6 ize I-{EILBRONN and to continue the attack east

into the heart of GERMANy.13 . The command post of Comba t

Command B Was located in the vicini ty of FRANKENBACH.

Elements of the combat command reconnoitered for bridges

in the HORKHEIM-KLINGE~CURGH-LAUFFEN (04.5-58.4) area.

Enemy resistance stiffened along the entire river line

as he sought fran ticnlly to guard his internal commun

ication and supply line s. Air and ground reconnaissance

19

shovved that all bridges; with the exception of the ee,st

bridge at HORKHEIM and the bridge at LA.UF'FENj were des.

troyed. 14: the lattet Were intndt but heavily defended.

Befote daylight on 4 April, in the northern sector of

HEILBROHN, the 398th Infantry Re giment of the lOOth Inf

antry Division had succeeded in establishing a limited

bridgehead on the far bank of the NBCKAR River. The

infantry, unable to expand its bridgehead, held tenaciously

to who..t Ii ttle they had against fanatical enemy counterattacks.

Upon expansion of the lodgement by friendly inf~ntry VI

Corps planned to erect a treadway bridge across the NECKAR

16River for the crossing of supporting armor. Elements of

the FRZlTCT{ First Army were attempting to force crossings

of the NECKAR south of LAUFf'EN on the right flank of Combat

Command B.

CombJt Command B, consisting of the 56th Armored

Infantry Battalion and the 11th Tanle Battalion wi th the

normal attachoonts of engineers, artillery, medics, ord

nance and tank destroyers, was organized into two reinforced

battcllions: Task Force Chamberlain :tnd Task F'orce Richard

son.

Oper:J.tions Order No. 19, issw:;d by the Commanding

General 10th Armored Division, was received at 2400B,

4 hpril 1945 by Combat Command B. The combat command was

20

ordered to continue its present mission of probing the river

line for crossings, and to be prepared oh division drder

to cross bridge No, 3 at k~uFFEN, bridge No~ ~ north of

HEILBRONN_ br bridge No.1 in the vicinity of NECKARELZ, a.nd a.ttack to the east. The combat oommand objective, regardless of "Nhere the crossing of tho NECKAR occurred

(S6C annex for division order), WQS to seize the line

SCH~IiAJ3ISCH Hil.LL-C.RJiILSHEIM. It Vlio.S apparent from thi s

ordor th(~ t VI Corps had all but givon up hope of success

fully eliminating the resist:lnce at HEILBRONN and foro

ing tho a.rmor cd support through in tha t c~r en.. Instf.1ad the

pIon bec~"Ile one of flD.nking the sali Gnt to the north and

o.ppro~ching the corps objective from the reur. The combat command, on 5 April, continued its mis

sion in the same :J.roCl.. Task Force Richa.rdson was engaged

wi th tllC enemy in the gener:.:.l vicini ty of LAUFFEN. Tnsk

Force Cho...rnberlain was enga.ged in tho vicinity of KLINGEN

BERG (03.6-58.8) and south to LAUFF'EN. The e'.lrly morning

hours werG m:,rked by slow progress and general confusion

in the comb:::..t command's sector. This was brought about

by the intermingling of French and Aoericun units using

the srune route for identical missions.16 During the

hours of poor visibility this condition became aggravated

by stiffening German resist:::..nce and sever e anti-tank and

artillery fire delivered from enemy posi tions on both sides

21

of the river. The b~o task forces suffored casunlties in

mell and vehicles from the heavy artillery fire delivered

from positions east of the NEC~~R River which could not I

be silenoed by our forc~s&17 In nt least one cn~G Pbrt~ ions of Task Force Chamborlain were forced to withdrClW

to locations of safety.

Shortly before noon Combat Command B was directed

to support ele~nGnts of the 397th Inf :mtry Regiment, which

Were to pass through the comoot cOlTIl7lnnd a.nd attempt 0. cros

sing of the NECKAR Rive~ at BOCKINGEN (05.5-60.5). In the afternoon one battulion of thG 397th Infantry succeeded in

crossing the NECKAR River, supportGd by their own division

fires a.nd those of Cor:1bat COmrrlr"..nd B, a.nd esta.blished a.

bridgehead on the southern edgo of nEILBRONN.18

Combat CO~~Qnd B passed to VI Corps control with

no chnnge in mission at 1700B, 5 .L~pril 45. Other elements

of the lOth Armored Division WerG given the mission of

reconnoitering in force to the line Bil.CKNA~JG, SCR,-ABISCH

HALL-CRAILSHEIM (see annex for Corps order). Comba t

Command B cOiltinued operations in the same general area

dur ing the rGmaindor of 5 April. Efforts to cross the

riv('r ceased ~)"nd gu ins were consolidated. Elements of

the FRENCH First Army had fought into NORDHEIM (01.5-57.5)

and Ll~UFFEN only to bo forcd back by tho he nvy resistance

of Ss troops in NORDHEIM. Another attack by the FRENCH

22

First Army ~t 1315B sccured both of those towns. I " Combut Command B reverted to division control at

1600Bi 6 .i~pril 45~ nnd waS o.lertGd to crcHH3 the NECKAR Ri\fer to tho north in the vicinity of NECKARELZ. After

crossing the NEC~~ River, Combat Com~and B w~s ordered

to move into an Q.sscr.1b1y urG':~ in the vicini ty of ASSAMSTADT and to be prepurcd for co~~itment on one hour notice.

Confusion arose as to the exact time th~t the bridge would

bo available. Division contacted corps~ and the division

G-3 notified Combat Cor.unund B that they wculd move across 19

tho.t night.. Comb'1t Com."nllnd B informed division that

they would move out nt 2118B with un ostimat6d t~e of

nrriv~l at the crossing of 2318B. The co~~and post of

Combat Command B cltared FRl!..NKENBACH at 2200B. The order

of march to the crossing site Was Task Force Richardson,

93rd ~rmor6d Field Artillery Battalion, Headquarters Combat

Conmand B, Task Force Chamberlain, 423d Armored Field Art

i11cry Buttalion, 141st '>I.rmorcd Field ;;\rti11ery Battalion, 20

and Battery B, 976th Field Artillery Battalion. The

route followed to the bridge site was KIRCHAUSEN, BON

FELD, Rl~PPENAU (99.5-72 .2) HOFF:SNHi~RDT, ViOLLENBERG

(94.5-77 .5). BARGEN (93.5-f9.4)., BEI.MSTADT"

AGLi.l.STER HAUSEN.21 (Se~ f:tgure2.) Progress of the crossing ~as slow due to poor visibility and road oonditions. The

lead elements of Combat Command B arrived at the crossing about

23

0525Bj 7 ll.ptil -i5 and started cro ssing the NECK.\R Rivcr.

The movG!1ent to the crossing had been executed under con

trol of VI Corps, and the 10th At~ot6d Division provided

guides to lC:1d the elements of COl"JOO t COD."':lund J.j to their

Ilssembly area o.t l1.SSlt.l"lSTADT.. The actual crossing of the

river was slQl.v, and it Wo.s not until ll15B tha.t the last

element oleared the br.idge. At this time the cOI!lnand post

of Co::tbat CorJraand B was at ijjINDISCI-IBUCH (36.7-94.7) . Task

Force Richllrdson, which was the leading element of the

conbat cor.ll-:Iund, rea.ched the assenbly area ut ASSAMSTADT at

l020B.. and discovered that the area. Clssigned was too STI'lllll

and the surrounding fields were too soft fron recent rains

to support the weight of heavy vehicles. The remainder

of the COl-:lba.t cOITL.';l~l.nd continued to close in the ASS:i.M

STADT assembly are a.. (See Figure 4..) Reserve Cor:rrnand and 90th Cnvo..lry Reconnaissance

Squa.dron, 6 April 1945

The Reserve Command and the 90th Cavalry had not

been idle while Combat Command ~ was engaged in the capture

of' CRAILSHEIM. As previously stated they had captured a

line east of .t"SS;~MST.b.DT running generally tnrough STUP

PACH,. HA.CHTiliL, and RENGERSHI1.USEN They. held this line

24.

during the night of 5-6 April despite small groups of

ene8Y SS troops who attacked from the direction of BAD

MDRGENTHEn,l (47.5-01.0) and ROTHENBERG, The Reserve

COTrlr:'land wus pla.ced on a bvo hour alert prepared' to move

south following Combat Con:na.hd A.22 The German continued

his pressure against the line held by the Reserve Comnand

and the 90th Cava.lry. Forces of tho Reserve Command which

hud taken ROTH (50.6-91.3) against no opposition were

counterattacked by the enemy during the night. The enemy

VJus dr ivcn off with heuvy casualtie s, after an intense

fight which was conducted wi thin the to'Nn itself:. Shortly

beforo duylight on 6 April 1945 , n force, estimated one

hundred ~'.nd fifty strong', of SS troops infiltrated back

in STUPP.t~CH, drove out the defender s composed of both

Reserve Cor.UJund and 90th Cavalry troops, and set up n.

defense of the town. Some .ii.r:lcrican troops vvere cut off

and captured during this !J.ction. An attack, consisting of

elements of the Heserve Coml:Hlnd und Troop B (Reinforced),

90th Cuvc.lry, was launched against STUFPACH dur ing the

morning a.nd fighting continued throu~r~out the day'. As

a result of this action, the Reserve Command was relieved

from the two hour alert and ordered to hold their pos

i tion until they could be relieved by other units. As

soon as this raIief could be accomplished .. the Reserve

COl:nond Wa.s to proceed to CRAILSHEDh: and relieve Comba.t

26

CO!:1lTl'J.nd A. 23 As c.. result of the coordinated attack of

elcncnts of the Reserve COmrrll..'.Tlcl :lnd c lcrnents of the 90th

Cavalry) STUPPACH Was recn.pturcd by 1730B hours' Thirty-

five priSr)ncts t"-lcre taken UriC: seventy-five Germ:-.n dcad

counted'2/,1 The Reserve Corr~und and the 90th Cavalry held

their blocking positions throughout the night of 6-7 rtpril.

Small cnany patrols continually probed the outpost system

throughout the night, but no major att:l.ck developed. (See Figure 3.) The night of 6-7 Apri 1 found the 10th .tl.rnored Div

ision v.Jell along toward the occomplishr.lCnt of the mis sian

':I' ):J.ssigl1od to thGr.l by VI Corps. ~Sec l.gurc 4- The division

had, in approxinutely 40 hours, disongaged from the enemy in

tho vicinity of liE ILBRO}Jl'T , mnd"; a 90 change in direction,

and acccmplished Ll m2rch of approxinntely 59 miles from

the vicinity of BEILBRONN to ASSAMST.'l.DT. :lore they S'lIliftly

prepared for combQ.t, l:lunched a.r... ;.ttn.ck during hours of

darkness, turnbd 1800 from the tlircction followed during

the raa.rch from r:EILBRONN, Oond drove to ClliI.ILSIf.8IM, approxima

tely 31 miles behind the Gcr rn."1n lines and approxim,J.tcly 40

air milos from the major ele:nents of VI Corps fighting in

the vicinity of HEILBRONN. They had ca.ptured more than

300 prisoners 25 during this period, and had killed and wou

nded r.lD.ny nore l as well as capturinf; und destroying a large

~~ount of enGmy materiel - ~ateriel which he could ill

ufford to lose at this stage of the Vi'or.

27

In addition to the muteriel succoss of the division,

trw cnptux

70p cit, The Crn.ilshiem Operation of the lqtr Ar~ored Pivision, p 37.

8Aft6r Action Report, 51st Armored Infnntry Battalion, Conbat COI:una.nd A, 10th Armored Divi sion, entry for 6 April 45.

goP cit, AJ'ter ~~ction Report, Combat Con."land A, entry for 6 .April 45.

lOOp cit, The Crailsheim Operation 0Ff.~ 10th .ii.rmored Division, pp 37-38.

llIbid, P 38.

l2Aft6r Action Report, Co~bat Con~and B, 10th Armored Division, entry for 4 April 45.

l3Report of Operations, The Seventh United Stat6s Army, France and Gc~any, 1944-1945, p 779.

l4.Aftcr Acti'Jn Report, 11th Tank Bo.ttD.lion, 10th Armored Division, entry for 4 April 45.

l50p cit,keport of Operations, The Seventh United States Army,'P78O-;

16Qp ci t, After Action Report, 11th Tank Ba.ttalion, entry for 5 April 45.

l7Ibid, entry for 5 April 45.

l80p cit, Report of Operations, The Seventh United States l~rmy, p 782.

19G_3 Journal, lOth .i~rmord Division, entry for 6 .April 45. 20.After Action Report, 405th Field Artillery Group I April 45.

210p Cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for 6 l1.pr i1 45.

22.i~ftGr ~ction Report, 3d Tank Battalion" 10th Armored Uivision, entry for 6 April 45.

230perations Instructions No. 21, Headquarters, lOth Armored Division, 6 ~pri1 45, par 3.

24G_ 2 Periodic R(;port, 10th Armored Division, 6-7 April 45. 250p cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th ArmorGd Div

.- ' ision, p 38. 29

CHAPTER 3

OFFENSVE OPERATIONS IN THE CRAIlSHEIM-ILSHOFEN

AltEA,

Combat Command A - 7 April 1945

The morning of 7 April 1945 found bo th Task Foroe

Hankins and Task Force Riley in CRAILSHEIM. They were

reluctant to move out to continue the mission which, the

reader will remember, was to "seize the line CRAILSHEIM,

SCHNABISC~-I HALL, BACKNANG." Their reluctance was occas

ioned by the fact that they had been out of conmunicat

ion with Combat Command A Headquarters in ASSAMSTADT

since the night before,and both commanders were fearful

of becoming strung out and possibly defeated in detail

by the enemy.l An additional factor was the shortage of

fuel and ammunition. lA considerable amount of fuel had

been used during the march from HEILBRONN to ASruu!STADT

and refueling operations in ASSAMSTADT had used up most

of the fuel carried in the trains. , Operations during the

6th of April had practically depleted the fuel carried

in the unit trains and they had been sent to the rear

for resupply. They had not rejoined the task forces on the morning of the 7th. Consequently both task forces

redistributed their supplies equally among themselves but

neither had enough for more than a few hours of offensive

action.

Since General Piburn was out of communication with

elements of his cormnand in CRAILSHEIM, he flew in an art

illery liaison plane to join thGID during the morning of tho 7tH. Prib.r to ieaving his command post he ordered Task Force Roberts, which had remained in ASSAMSTADT

s inca returning from the ir fight u t DORZ BA.CS, and the

command post to move to CRAILSHEIM. He arrived at

CRAILSHEIM during tho morning, was informed of the sit

uation, and relayed the information by a.rtillery liaison

plane baok to the division headquarters.

Meanwhile both task forces in CRAILSHEIM had

begun to improve their positions by clearing out t~vns

in the vicinity. No effort was made to continue the

attack toward SCHflABISCH HALL. Team Hill of Task Force

Hankins cleared INGERSHEIM (71.0-60.7) at 1035B and returned to CRA.ILSHEIM. Team Havlovi tz of Task For ce

Hankins attacked the a.irfield areo. (69.0-62.5) west of CRL.ILSHEllvl and secured it by 1135B. In the process a

dual purpose 88-mm gun was knocked out and fourteen 2

enemy planes captured and destroyed. Terun. Holland of

Task Force Hankins cleared ALTENMUNSTER (69.3-61.3) and remained there all day in a blocking posi tion.

While Task Force Hankins was engaged in these operations,

Task Force Riley was preparing to attack toward SCH-

Wi.. BISCH HfiLL.

31

\.

) \

After being briefed on the s i tuo.tion, General

Pi burn ordered Task Fl orce Riley to attack SCH'.l1JABISCH

It~LL whi 10 Task Force Hankins continued its blocking ro Ie

in und around CRAILSHEIM. General Piburn established

his personal command post with the command post of Task

Foroe Hankins p~nding the arrival of his command post

personnel from ASS.l).MSTADT.

Task Force Riley commenoed its attack toward

SCI~ABISCH HALL shortly before noon and by l230B the lead~

ing team, Team Felice, had reached ROSSFELD (67 -62.5).

Shor tly befor e the ca.pture of ROSSFELD Team Fe lice sighted

a railroad train approaching CRAILSHEIM from the west. They

allowed the train to reach an advantageous position and then

stopped it with tank cannon fire. They then proceeded to

shoot up the entire train.3 Team Graham passed through

Team Felice at ROSSFELD and continued the attack through

M:AULACH (65.0-62.8) which fell at l400B. Enemy resistance

was light,consisting mainly of small arms fire from both

sides of the road and from the woods west of lVJAULACH.

Team Felice passed through Team Graham near 1~ULACH and adv

anced thr ough ILSHOFEN (59.3-65.6), scene of a hasty with

drawal by the headquarter s of a German corps. Task For ce

Riley was strafed and bombed by a small group of ME 109

fighter-bomber s in the vicinity of ILSHOFEN; this del ayed

but did not stop their advance~4 Team Felioe continued 32

the attack and captured WOLPERTSi~USEN (53.7-65.2). While the task force was in W~OLPERTSF..AUSi!JN II lia ison plat;ie repor ted that a bridge across the KOCHER River at CROFFELBACH

(52.1-64.3) was intact. Lt Col Riley immediately dispatched a team (apparently Felice) to take the bridge. This bridge

Vias loco. ted in a defile and was blown up by the enemy jus t

as the l6ad tank of the team reached it. Intense resistance

quickly developed. Enemy mortar fire began to fall around

the approaches to the bridge# and small arms and panzerfaust

fire was deliver ed on the colunm from the hi ~h ground on both

sides of the road near the bridge. I:)ince they Were tra.pped

in a defile, the team could not maneuver to attack the enemy

and were forced to withdraw. This they accomplished wi th

considerable difficulty since it was necessary to back ~~

tanks out# trlere being insufficient room in which to turn

them around. One tank was destroyed by panzerfaust fire

from the high ground when a round penetrated its engine

comf;urtment.5 The team withdrew to WOLPERTSHAUSEN and re

ar ganized.

Thi s conc I uded the offensive oper at ions of Task r arc e

Riley for the dQy. As night was fast QPproaching, Lt Col

Riley decided to hold wrat he had gained. Consequently he

ordered Team Felice to or ganize t re defense of WOLPERTSHAUSEN

while the remainder of the task force defended I LSHOfEN

The task force command post was located in 11S~OFEN and

33

the 4l9th Armored }ield Artillery B~ttalion, the direct

support artillery battalion for the task force, Was in

position in the vicinity of ILSHOFEN. Task Force Riley

was reinforced at ni ghtfClll in the ~iOLPERTSF..AUSEN-ILSHOFEN.

area. by the Reserve Comnand. These positions were held

without incident by Task Force Riley_ reinforced, throughout

the night.

Task F' orce Hankins improved their bloc king posi tions

around CRAILSHEIM during the day but made no major attack~

due to a shortfl.ge of supplies and the nature of their mission.

~ihi Ie Task Force Ri ley was' bear ing the brunt of the

fighting insofar as the division and Combnt Cormnand A were

concornod, Task Fores Roberts and the commClnd post of

Combc~ t Command A were moving south toward CRAILSHEIM. The

column departed from ASSAMSTADT at l045B on tLe 7th ~f

April, following the route taken by Task Forces Hankins

and Riley. It was pl~ned to make this route the main

supply route although it actually became the MSR in name

only. As future events will sho;,;, enemy infiltration and

action along this routes Vias to prevent its ever becoming the

MSR in practice.

Task }orce Aoberts, accompanied by the Headquarters,

Combc.t Command A, moved from ASSAMSTADT to HOLLENBACH with

out incident. Near HOLLENBACH they ran into the tail of

the Re serve Command which had precded them from ASSAMSTADT

and had been stopped by intense enemy fire in the woods

34

northeast of HOLLENBACH. At l3l5D ti1ey bypassed the Reserve

Cbmn:lnd, which was engaged in clearing a roure through the

WbodSj and pushed on toward HARTENSTEIN (~5.5-86.5). As

the column. was moving through the woods northwest of

BARTENSTEIN at approximately l530B, they were strafed by

6 ME 109 aircraft and two jet p~pelled aircraft and halted.6 They resumed their :ldvance and reached n. point in the woods

at (56.0-87.3). Here they began to receive heavy small anns, antitank and flak fire from both sides of the road. Sevbral

personnel cn.sU!llties were sustained and one light tank, one

half-track, and one i ton truck iNere destroyed. The enemy was engnged vi th tank, tank destroyer I ar.d ma.chine gun

firo, and the enemy fire was silencE:.d. The column then

continued its advance and moved swiftly tovJD.rd CRAILSHEIM

which they entered at approximately 1800B. (See Figtre 5J Upon arrival in CRAILSHEIM Task :r orce Roberts was

ordered by lcenerfll Piburn to attack and seize KIRCHBERG

(63.7-69.5). The task force moved out at 1830 B. Team

Reilly and the command post moved to and remained at

WALL[{[~USEN whi Ie Team Mc Intosh pus hed on toward KIRCHBERG. This team took HORNBERG (64.7-70.1), but did not continue the advance ~ince they could not find a route

7 from HORNBERG to KIRCHBERG. Team McIntosh therefore rem

ained at HORNBERG throughout the ni ght.

35

Raserve COrron'lnd and 90th Cavalry Reconn~issunce

S9\lag,9!:. 7 April 1945,

The Reserve Command was ordered to disengage from

the enemy on the morning of 7 April and proceed to CRAIL8SHEIM. Their neW mission was to relieve Task Force Hankins

,~md to block enemy approaches into CRAILSREilvI from the south

and southeast. The 90th CavC'clry wns order6d to extend their

blocking positions to take over the positions occupied by

the ReservE: Comm:::md. Elements of the Reserve Commn.nd exp

erienced grc:1t difficulty in withdra.wing from ROTH becnuse

of o.n Gnemy countoro.ttack. The disengc.gement wns finally

accomplis hod by deli berately setting fire to 0. por tion of

ROTH 1l.."1Cler co vcr of ,~rhich the c omlT1nnd withdrew. 9 (See Fig 5.) The 90th Cavalry completGd their relief by 0630B,

::1"t which time the squadron was disposed as follows:

nquo.dron headquarters, I~CHTEL;Troop A, attached to Combat

Command i .. in CRAILSHEIMi Troop B, HL.CHTELJ Troop C~ ROTH;

Troop D, HOLLEN:a~CH; HGD.dq u::~rter sand Servi ce Troop, SCH-

WABHhUSEN (35.2-96.8). The light tc.nk plo.toons and assault

gun (75-nun HOW) platoons of Troops E and .t, were !J.ttached to

Troops B, C, and D. the h6adqu::'.rters of these attached troops

remained with squadron headquarters in H1CHTEL. The squo.d

ron held these blocking positions all day with little dif

ficu1 ty, the only [lct ion being from small groups of Germans

who made no determined attacks. (See Figure 5.) J7

After b(;ing relieved by the '::JOth Cavnlry, the Reserve

Commnnd moved out along the route followed by Combat Command

A, The column ran into intense enemy resistance in the woods

northeast of HotLEN~iCH. As a result of this enemy res

istanc6, which included smull arms, 88-mm antitank, and aut

ornntic vleapons fire, the column Wi.lS split. The woods were

finally cleared with the loss of two light tanks, and the

column resumed its advance. After moving through the woods

into more open cOWltry, the column vms unable to pick up

the des ired speed bec~"use of road blocks and intense enemy

air action. This nir action, in the form of bombing 'lnd

strafing, continued throughout the dc~y. Despite this enemy

air f'..nd ground action, the ReservG Command continued to

move and late in the afternoon re nchud CRAILSHEnv.r." Upon

arrival they were unable to accomplish their mission of

relieving Combat Command a, due to the fact that the all-day

fight along the route to CRAILSHEIM hnd caused a severe

shortage of supplies, especially ummunition and fuel.

Accordingly they were placed under opera ti ona 1 centro 1 of . 10Comba t Cornmand he, Team Connolly of Task Force Thackston".

the only tusk force in the Reserve Comnand, was sent to

WOLPERTS~~~USEN and set up blocking positions, in conjunction

with Team Felice of Task Force Riley, to the south'lnd

west., TeL~m Griswold proceeded to the vicinity of MAULACH

and cut the main east-west railroad leading into CRAILSHEIM.

'38

~he main body of this team moved into ILSHOFEN, where they

strengthened the defense organized by Task Force Riley_

H6Qdquarters, Reserve Command was set up in CRAILSHEIM.

Meanwhile, the 90th Cavalry continued on their block

ing mission throughout the day. They were ordered to assemble

~s soon as relieved and move to CRAILSHEIM to take over the

line C&~ILSHEIM-SCHN1~BISCH HALL" as soon as that line had 11

beGn secured by Combat Command ii. At the conclusion of

tho day's'operation in the CR~ILSHEIM arsa, it was becoming

apparent that the enemy was recovering from his initial

surprise nt the capture of CR1~ILSHEnn:. Increasing enemy

resistance to the forces operating in the GU~ILSHEIM area,

togcth8r -,';i th repented attempts by the ene:ny to cut the

main supply route betV!een ASSAMSTADT and CRAILSHEIM. were

only indicrtions of future violent enemy action to re

capture this vital area.

Combat Command A (with Reserve Command under operational

control) - 8 April 1945

Eo..rly on the morning of 8 .!~pril, at approximately

0530 B-, the 1. i rst 1 :.x ge SCQ Ie enemy attack agains t thE:.

CRAILSHEIM area was launched.. It cOInnenced wi th an intense

rocket o..nd mortar preparation, under Iii hose cover simultaneous

att~cks were delivered from the east, southeast, ~nd north-

Gast~ (S66 Figure 6 ... ) This enBmy attack was conducted by :m estimated 400-700 SS engineer troops.. The northeastern

39

column VlO.S repulsed immedi~ tely. The Gnemy was a.pparent ly

un~WJC\r8 of tho true dispositions of Task Force Hankins in this

o.rc:\ . ., for he moved into th 6 attn ck in o.n undeployed forntl. tion ~

The entire attacldng formation Was ldlled., wounded, capt

urcdj or di sper sed.

The attacks from the east and southeast proved a

different story from the northeastern attack, for the enemy

pressed his assault skillfully 'lnd determinedly. He over

ran the outposts ~nd penetrated into the outskirts of CRAILSH

ElM. fighting developed and continued throughout the

morning. Shortly before noon Task Il orce Hankins gained the

upper hund and forced the enemy b~ck. The enemy suffered

severe casual tics in this nct ion. Team Holl::.nd followed the

withdrawing German troops, mr.:tintr-.ining ~\. constant pressure on

them. The team cle1.red .i\.LTEm.!f1JNSTER for thtJ sec ond time and

established 0. bloc position in thn.t tovm. (They held

this position throughout the day and moved back to CRAlLSHEDJ.

as night fell.) CRhlLSHElM wa.s o.go.in sGJ.rched to insure

tho.t no enemy hLld infiltrn.t6d into the town. nt tl1G same

time T6:1111 Hi 11 again searched INGERSHElM and Team Havlovi tz

the J.irfield areCl. e. By noon 0.11 German attacks on CRhILSHEIM

had been defeated and the task force was again in its

origin~l blocking positions.

General Piburn's plan to carry out the division

mission, tho capture of the line SCHVITABISCH HALL-BACKNANG,

WQS to h~ve the Reserve Command (Task Force Thackston) rel

ieve Task Force Hankins in CRAILSHEIM. T~sk Force Riley waS

to continue the attack in the vicinity of SCHJlTABISCH HALL,12

Due to enemy pressure this plan could not be accomplished.

At 0900B.. Gener:ll Piburn received orders from div

ision headquQrters, which had moved to ASSll.IvISTL.DT late in

the afternoon of thE 7th of .April. These orders directed

Comba t Conrmand i'.. to c ontinuG the tl ttnck from SC}~NABISCH

HALL and continue to the west to conto.ct the lOOth Inf:.ntry

13Division moving east from HEILBRONN. In order to carry

out this mission Goneral Piburn ordered To.sk Force Riley

to continue the attack to the west. They 'Noro to be followed

by Task ~orce Hankins when relieved. It soon became apparent

that Task force Hcmkins could not be relieved by the Reserve

Comr.1D.nd unless that command was rGinforced. The Reserve

Command had beGn given the mission of keeping the road open

between '(~OLPERTS~ii~USEN and CR11.ILSHEIM. This proved to be

D. difficult task, since the enemy continu~lly infiltrated

behinc. elements of the cOTIUnJ.nd 80S they cle'1red the road,

necessitating t:1at the clearance be continually repeated.

Nevertheless Task Force Riley undertook the mission.

Task} orce rtiley attack6d from ~~OLPERTSHA.USEN toward CROFFELBACH, but was soon stopped by heavy small arms und

bazooka fire. 'l'he terrain in this area was not suitable

for tank employment because of numerous defiles. The tlnks

42

were practically ro~dbound. Since the task force h~d only

one company of o.rmored infantry I it was not pos sible to launch

a.n inf2ntry o..ttack in suffieistlt strength to ole at the area.

For 'the foregoing reasons, and the fact that reports from

civilians and PW's indic:lted n strong buildup of enemy forces

:'.nd probable a.ttacks in the CRAILSHEIM a~en., Task Force

Riley Was ordered to break off its D.tt~ck and establish a.

perimeter defense in the vic inity of ViOLPERTS:a;'U:;>EN. v~hi Ie

engo..ged in prepr.ration for 0. perimeter defense" Task Force

Riley VIets ordered to send one teom to GEISLINGEN (49.6-65.3)

to seize ~ bridge across the KOCHER River reported int'1ct by

0. liaison pls~ne.. Team Gr::..hum moved out to accomplish this

mission. lhey encountered sroll ::lrms and panzerfaust fire at

the edge of GEISLINGEN. Resist'lnce was overcome and they

Were ',rv ithin sight of the bridge v>then it was blown.14 The team

then returned to ij~OLHERTSHA.USEN. This proved to be the far

thest penet:1tion to the west of any element of the 10th

....rmor6d Division during offensive oporn.tions in the CRii.ILSHEIM

n:re[~. (See Figure 7.) Task Force Roberts, which had spent the night of 7-8

I..pril in tho vv.LiLLfL'\.USEN...HORNBERG area" cormnencod offensive

opero.tions ut 0730B on the 8th. Te:,J!l.s McIntosh and Reilly

occupied KIRCH1)ERG n.t 1100B. No onemy resist:.::.nce VJUS en....

countered. The task force was ordered to hold the line

~'f.L\'LL~Y~USEN-KIRCH5ERG during the afternoon. This was in accord..

anC6 wi th the combat C01TDJlf..lnd pla.n to temporarily assume the

43

defensive in anticipation of enemy J..ttacks. The task force

was accordingly disposed to defend against possible enemy

attncks from the northwest. Task Force Roberts spent the

remainder of the afternoon qui6tly, awaiting enemy- attacks

which never came.

;l.fter defea t of the enemy attacks on CRAILSHEIM

proper and restoration of their blocking positions, Task

Force {-bnkins was ordered to locld all prisoners of war

on all av~ilable Class I and V supply vehicles and evacuate

them to 11.SS.:...MST.L\.DT" This procedure had been ordered by

VI Corpse Since the MSR was not open betv~een 'i~SSAMSTADT and

CRAILSH.l1iIM" Combat Command .0 being engaged in attempting to

open it, it Was considered very unlikely thut the convoy could

reach .L~SSliMSTi~DT. nm'1ever, the supply trucks and pri soner s.,

numbering approximately 550, 'Were assemblGd in CRAILSHEIM

and the prisoners loaded. Combat Commnnd A ordered Troop

A, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron to escrot the convoy..

It was :..nticip:l ted th:.lt the convoy could fight its W0..Y thr ough

to Comh:.lt Command B ... The convoy proceeded to the vicinity

of BL.i1.UFELDEN where i t was ambushed by the enemy. Several

supply vehicles were destroyed and several personnel cas

ualties were suffered. During the fight most of the prisoners

war e killed or escaped. The convoy could not breD. k through"

~nd returned to CRAILSHEIM with the rennining vehicles and

prisoners. The mQin supply route was still cut and supplies

were fas t running out ..

4.5

To allevi:tte the ori fical supply si tu~:. tion, General

Piburn requested that the troops in the CRi"l.ILSPEIM area be

resupplied by air. Engineers were sent to the airfield to

Gnl8Xge the strip. The request for air resupply was approv

ed, but the operation could not be mounted on the 8th.

Meanwhile enemy activity and reports from civilians

and prisoners had indicated an all-out attack was being plan

ned to rcc~pture CRAILSHEIM. Accordingly General Piburn had

ordered all ~~sk forces, as previously discussed, to assume

the defensive in anticipation of the attac'k. Orders were

received from di vision at 1545B to Itpush Task F'orce ROBERTS 15

to tr.c northvvGst between K9CHER and JAGST Rivers". Ta.sk

Force Roberts WQS ordered to abandon its defensive positions

and carry out this mission. General Pi burn reported to div

ision tho.t av~il~1.ble supplies would support an attack of

only fot~ hours dur~tion. He also requested night fighter 16 prot~ction but it Was not received.

Task Force Roberts assembled in KIRCHBERG at 1900B

ctnd moved via ALL1I[ERSPl1.N (61.0-66.0) to I LSHOFEN Here

the t2sk force received fuel and sane ummunition from

the 419th Armored J:t'ield Artillery Battalion. Supplies were

redistributed among all vehicles in the task force in order

to make an attack. Battery C of the 419th .L1.rmored Field

Arti llery Bo.tt~lion joined the task force to provide close

46

artillery support. By 2400B hours Task Force Roberts Was

reo.uy to begin its assigned mission, (See Figure 7~) IvIe:::L1'.vhile Task Force Hankins had been reinforced in

CRJiILSHEIM. During tIle night I enemy patro Is continua lly

probed the defenses of CRi~ILSHEIM. These patrols set off

fllrlny of the fl Dr6S c.nd booby traps and Were engaged by fire

on num6rous occasions. They did not infiltrate through the

defenses.

CombQt Command A (with Reserve Command under operat

ional control) - 9 April 1945

The suspected enemy attack on CIlliILSIfEIM during the

night of 8-9 .April did not take plo..ce. Just prior to da.wn,

however I intense enemy rocket o.nd artilJe ry fire was deliv

ered on Clli\ILSHEIM, ILSHOFEN, and WOLPERTSBAUSEN. The cOITll'Tk'1nd

post of Combat COIn...'Tlnnd .n. received direct hits nnd was forced

to move to the northern part of CRAILSHEIM. CRAILSHEIM received

a bombing und stro.fing attack from ME 109 and jet aircraft

at 0635B.17 .At daylight Task 110rc6 H~.~nkins searched the nref:< surrounding CRAILSHEIM for enemy, n.nd Team Hollund

was o.g~in dispatched to ~-"LTENMUNSTER. They cle.';.red this town for the third time_.to..king some prisoners. The tea.m

o.gc'tin remained in ALTENMUNSTER throughout the day, returning

to CRAILSHEn~ at nightfall. The rernn.indel of Task Force Hankins remained in their blocking positions during the 9th

of .a.pril without serious interference from the enemy. Friendly

47

aircraft bor.lbed and strafed roads (74-64) east of CRAIL

SI-:EIM and it was believed that this action disor ganized 18

enemy forming for an attack.

Hhile Task Force Hankins was engaged with enemy

patrols, awaiting the suspected Gnemy night attack, Task

ForcG Roberts Was atto.cking to the northwest from ILSHOFEN.

As the to.sk force was moving out, they received word that

Comb:--.t COJTI:1:J.nd B hod finally brokt>n through to CRAILSHEIM

with supplies .The task force was halted and all of its

vehicles resupplied. lifter being resupplied the task force

attr.cked RUPPERTSHOF'EN (58.5-68.2) nnd encountered small

arms and punzerf~ust fire. The task force wi thdrew to allow

an :"rti11ery prepnrD. tion to be fired on the toYW'"n. They

o.g,'lin att~1ckcd illlder cover of the o.rtillery fir e rmd ent ered

the tmm without opposition. (See Figure 7.) TO,sk Force Riley ho.d been ordered by Gener'll Pi burn

to wi thdraw from positions around VlOLPERTSHl\.USE}! and to

fcll)v: Tusk Force Roberts. This .....JClS in accordo.nce v.rl. th

instructions issued by division he~dquarters for T~sk Force

Riley to assist Tusk Force 1\oberts.19 The task force with

dreVl, ;'J.ssembled in ILS30FEN, \Vas r(:3supplied, and joined the

t

was bombGd and strafed by approximo. te ly t'JlJenty-five (25) enemy

planes. J-.. considerable number of c~sual ties in both men

;""lnd materiel Vlo.S suffred by Task Force RQberts. Immedia

tely ufter the ~ir uttuck the leading eiements of the col-Q~ were subjected to hGQvy artillery ~nd mortar fire~ and

b0CD.mC involved in Q. seriE:S of sm[lll fire fights. During

the confusion occasioned by the air and ground attack, the

re::'..r cler:lcnts of Task Force Rob6rts took thG wrong roa.d and

advnnced towc..rd LEOFELS (59.0-69.9), while lead clements of

the colu.mn proceeded trl1"ough DUNSBACH in the direction of

NESSELE.tl.CH (53.8-71.8). As the rear elements of the column

reac hed ,:1 pos i tion :lpproximate ly 300 yards from LEOFELS,

he~lV'J c.utorrl.C4tic 'weapons':tnd rifle fire was received. The

column Was momentarily thrown into confusion as, believing

tho.t they V'Jere following ths lead elements of the task force,

tl1e fi re \,1.).S unexpected. Lt Col Roberts, who had been uccomp

nnying the roar colurnn., order ed thE. colunm reversed and exp

osed himself ,r..h ile personally reorg:tnizing his troops. He 20

V1('1S kiJ.led. by u sniper. The co lurnn mn.no.ged to turn around

o.nd proceeded" under fire, bGck to RUPPERTSHOFEN. Here the

senior officer of the task furce, Co.ptain Ulrich,. the 8-3,

W[lS notified of wha t had transpired. C:lptCl.in Ulrich was

-"'1. th the leading elments of Task Force Roberts 'uhich had

captured NESSELBL.CH. He outposted the town and returned to

RUPPERTSJOFEN where he leurned the situation and requested

49

orders from Comret Cono.mand A. He vvus ordered to assume

cormn;:..nd of the task force D.nd continue on his ~ssion.

NOTE: Eerenfter Task Force Roberts vd 11 be referred to as

Task ForcG Roberts (Uirich). Captain Ulrich then ordered an

attack of LOEFELS. This attack, led by light tanks, vms

successful and the task force was assemblod in NESSELBACH.

They resumed the advance and pushed through LASSEACH

(50.9-76.0) to BUTTELBRONN (47.5-80.3).

T:-.sk Force Riley had follo'wed Task Force Roberts

(Ulrich) to tIE vicini ty of DUNSBACH. Here they moved out on

a parallel route to the west (left) of Roberts (Ulrich).

By 1500B they had re!.lched F.J~SSFELDEN (54.5-66.8). They

continued to udv8.nce p8.rallel to the route t .ken by Task

ForcG Koberts (Ulrich). (See Figure 7.) j~fter passing tnrough BUTTELBRONN, Task Force Rob

er ts.. (Ulric h) I ::lt 'lpproximnt61y 1530B I enc ounter ed a wash

out on the rCIc.d towo.rd EERMUTHAUSEN (45.0-81.1). They

received eneI'!1.Y s!n::..ll D.rns fire which 71::1S quickly eliminated.

The column attempted to advr:.nce 8.round the. w:J.shout on a new

route" but recei VE:G. iHortu.r fire which WD.S identified as

friendly.. It was believed th:-::.t this fire vns from elements

of' the 63d Infantry Division driving dovIn townrd CRf~ILSHEIM

from the northwest ..Since contact vvi th the 63d Division

wus now imrnin6nt, CCtpt Ulrieh decided to stop his adva.nce.

The task force moved into position on the high ground sur

rounding BERNDSHhUSEN (48.-0-78.8) and WOLFSOLDEN (48.2-79.8)

50

to block the retr6o..t of any en6my forces from in front of 21

the 63d Infantry Division.

Throughout the day Task Force Thackston was engaged

in keeping the supply routes be~veen Cfu\ILSHEIM and Task

Forces Riley and Roberts (Ulrich) open and in protecting

"t:1C ",ir' icld near CRJ\ILS!1EIM. Team Griswold, 'which had

been assisting Task Force Hankins in the defense of CRhIL-

SHEIM during the night of 8..;9 April,. moved to the airfield

during the morning. The ir mis s ion VIas to secure the air f ie ld

so thn t o.ir re supply operations could be carri ed out. They

continued on this mission throughout the day. MeanWhile

Teo.m Connolly VJO,S engaged in pf.l.trolling the roads between

CRAILSHEIE D.nd ILSeOFEN, ::.nd between ILSHOFEN and Task

Forcos RilGY und hoberts (Ulrich). Elements of Task Force

Thackston renJ.in6d in ILSHOI'EN, defending thr1.t to'i~n from

Gner;lY throats from the south und west .

~othCnvalry Reoonnnissnnoe Squadron - 9 April 1945

The 90th Cavalry Reconnuissunce Squadron, which had

entered CRiI.ILSHElIvI during the night ~of 8-9 April, reinforced

the tr oop s in the CRil.ILS ;EIM arGo.. Troop D (r einf orced)

joined Troop A, which was :.1lrec.. dy o.ttuched to Combat CorYml':lnd

A,. in p~, trolling roads in the immedif.l. te vicinity of CRAILSHEIM.

Squo.dron headqu:.rters 'was established in W"OLLMERSHAUSEN (67.5

66.4).- Troop B (reinforced) and the heudqu~rters of Troops E und F wore 0.1 so Ioca td in ~~OLLMERSHAUSEN. Troop C

51

(reinforced) was based in ILSHOFEN, c.nd Q.ssisted Tc..sk Force

Thackston throughout the day in patrolling the roads between

ILS~~IOFEN o.nd the advancing locntionS of Task :boreas Riley

and Roberts,' (Ulrich)' All ttoops met continuous li ght

resistance tl~oughout the day, but the enemy did not seriously 22

intorfere with the o.ccomplishment of the squadron mission.

The night of the 9th of April concluded the offensive

oper~ltions of the 10th lirmored Division in the CRAILSHEIM area. These operations were actually concluded when Task Forces

Riley and L\.oberts (Ulrich) halted for the night in the BERN

DSF..AUSEN area.. (See Fi gure 7. ). Tho d i vis ion had co. ptur ed CRl~IL31.1EIMJ but all efforts to continuG the o.ttack to capture

the line SCHv1f1.BISCH HALL-B..'lCKNANG had been unsucce ssful due

to sco.rcity of supplies, lack of o.dequn.tG troops;, and enemy

re~ction. The enemy continued to build up his strength in

the CIL~ILS.1EnE arE-a. Prisoners of WQr nnd civilians reported

lcrge num.b3rs of enemy troops concentro.ting in the BEUERLBACH (71.7

64.7) area. This concentration vms estimated as bEdng 23

3000 strong. These reports were a factor 'which prevented

the use of Tnsk } orce Rich'U'dson in offensiv operations

upon the. ir arr iva 1 in CR[\.ILSHEIM. As sOOl1 be seen, this

ener!1Y thren.t and other concurrent enemy action was to

prevent the 10th .d.rmored Division;and therefore VI Corps,

from exploiting th6 price16ss tacticnl advantage gained

wi th the c aptur 6 of CR~ ILSHEIM

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

lCo.ptn.in GGor ge F. Bamel" The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th Armored Division, (Richmond: Armored Cavalry Journal, March-April 1949) p 38.

2After Action Report, 61st Armored Infantry Battalion, lOth Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.

30p__~it, The Crailsheim operatio~f the lOth Armored Division, p 39.

4 ~",p 39. 5Ibid , P 39.

6After Action Report, Combat Cownand A" 10th Armored Division, entry for 7 .t1pr il 45.

7After Action Report, 54th Armored [nfantry Battalion, lOth Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.

8After Action Report, Reserve Command, lOth Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.

9Op cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th Armored lJivision, p 39.

lOOperations Instructions No. 23, Headquarters, lOth Armored Division, 8 April 45, par 3.

110perations Instructions No. 22, Headquarters, 10th Armored Division, 7 April 45, par 4.

12After Action Report, Comba t Command A, 10th Armored Division, entry far 8 April 45.

l30p cit, Operations Instructions No. 22, par 1.

140p cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th Armored Divisior}., p 40.

150p cit, Operations Instructions 1'10.23, par 1. -.;;.,-

160p cit, After Action Report, Combat Command A, entry for 8 April 45.

17 Ibid, entry for 9 April 45.

53

180p cit, After Action Report, 61st Armored Infantry BattalicriJ entry for 9 April 45.

190p cit, Operations Instructions No. 23, par 1.

20Letter Interview, Major Richard W. Ulrich, 3 Febl'"Uary 50. 2l0p cit, After Action Report, 54th Armored Infantry Battalion,

eutry for 9 April 45.

22After Action Report, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, lOth Armored Division, entry for 9 April 45.

23 Op cit, After Action Report, Comuat Comnand A, entry for

9 Apr il 45.

54

CHAPTER 4

'!HE ROLLa;BAHN

Fight_A!.~---.!:h~ ~~ hs units ot Task F'oi"ce .h.ichardson were closing in

the ASS.i\IvlST..\DT assembly area, Combat Corrmand B was ordered

by the lOth Armored uivision to move from their present

location with its leading task force to CRAILSHEIM. There,

contact was to be made with elements of Combat Command A or

the Reserve Command. Task Force Richardson was instructed by

Combat Command D at l120B to move out immediately to CRi~IL

SHEIM, via STUPPACH , W.t1.CHB.~CH (49.0-95.6), and HERBSTHAUSEN 1( 51 .8-91 .7).

Combat Command B was issued further fragmentary orders

at 1340B which Ie. ter were confirmed by Operation Instruction

No. 22" 072200B April 45 (see annex No ..IIl),. The combat command was assigned the mission of securing and holding

open the highway from CRAILSHEIM to BI1.D MERGENTHEIM. This

was to be used as the division main supply route, support

ing elements of Combat Connnand A v~hich by a swift move had

piercGe;. the enemy defenses and entered CRi~ILSHEIM. This

action cut the German lines of communication to HEILBRONN

from the east. 00ntact was to be maintained with elements of

the 4th Infantry Divi si on on the nor th and VJi t h Reserve

Command, lOth Armored Division on thG south. Meanwhile

Task Force Chrunberln.in closed in ASSAMSTADT and continued to

follmv the route of Task Force Richardson, Which was reported

b'.f division 55

at this time to be between LUSTERONN (44.2-96.1) O-nd 2

STUPPACH. Combat Command B, on division orders, sent

Task l!'orce hichardson on to CRl1..ILSHEDJI, where contact was

to be made 'wi th either the Reserve Command or Task Force

Roberts of Combat Connnand A. Task}.i orce Chamberlain was

orderod to move in U10 columns and secure the road net in

tho vicinity of BAD MERGENTHEIM and STUPPACH.. maintaining

contact with clements of the 4th InfDntry Division at BAD 3

MERGENTHEIM and the 90th Cavalry at STUPPACH. (See Figure 5) In oral orders the 10th Armored Division G-3 stated

that he 1vanted a continuous "chain of armor" down the road

4from Bi1.D MERGENTHEIM to CRAILSHEIM. Since thi s "chain of

armor" was to extend some thirty miles" Combat Command B"

at 1845B, requested clorii'ico.tion and interpretation of this

term" as the combat cornm~nd had insufficient vehicles to

form the continuous line of armor which was desired. The

pr 0 blem appGared to offer two alternJ.tive s: either string

the vehicles out at wide int6rv~ls ~long the road, Or Gstab

lish a series of strong points in critical areas. Feeling

that extending the vehicles would be inviting enemy infiltra

tions" division suggested setting up strong points at every

like ly ave nue of approa.ch and filling the gap between strong

points with light mobile patrols. This began a phase of

action between BAD MERGENTHEIM and CR~I.ILSHEIM which centered

around the effort of keeping the main supply route open

and free of enemy.

Thi s phase of action, to mai:ltlJ.in the main supply

route be~Je6n BAD MERGENTHEIM and CRAILSHEIM, became known

to the Germuns in succeeding days as the nRollenbahn." The

GermClns aptly applied this de scr iptive phrase, which me!3.ns

Bowling Alley. (See Figure 8.) Task Force Ri~hardson moved from STUPPACH to WACH~iCH

aguinst very light enemy resistance. The route, however,

from Wl.. CIfBil.CH south to HERBSTHtl.USEN was characterized by

increQsing enomy resist~ce. It must be remembered that

this Bnme rond had been passed over by other elements of

th~ loth il.rmored Division on their drive into CH.L\.ILSBEIM.

In many inst:"'lnces, s:nnll groups of Germons would strike

out, harass the colUL'1ll1, ~lnd thon melt back into the darkness,

unly to reappEar ilgain at some other pl

o__-"__~1C--"'C-~'__-l'___ '"--J!__-'.c--"'__-,. MllE.5

south as rapidly as possible in order to get the supply

vehicles, which had been intermingled in his column, to

the belG~guered troops of Combat Command J.l. in CRAILSHEIM.

Ec.rly the morning after Task Force Ricb.o.rdson passed, the

enemy succeeded in cutting the ma.in supply route where it

passed through the woods, about four miles north of B.n.R

TENSTEIN 4 Fighting the-ir way to the south, Task Force

Richardson's entire column was held up by intense small 8

arms fire L"'..nd morto.r fire at 1350B. Friendly air strikes

and column cover flown in the afternoon materially assisted

in keeping the revi tJ.lized Lufuvaffe from D.ttacking the

troops using the road. SevcrQl times during the use of the

mQin sup~:ly route the Luftwaffe bombed and strafed the road.

Task Force Ch;J.mterlain, me8.nwhi le, W:J.S c Ie rUling up

isolated, stubborn pockets of enemy rGsist~nce, which had

been bypassed by task Force Richardson. An estinnted 200-400

0nemy infantry had duZ; in clnd occupied the woods bordering

the main supply route north of BartGnstein in the vioinity

of (53.0-89.0). These troops were stubbornly contesting

the usc of the MSR. Heavy J.rtillery fire from the northeast

Was falling on the main road junct ion at (52.5-89.9). Team

Maher of Task Force Chamberlain was ordered to clear the se

woods of the enemy, while Team O'Grady continued south in

contact wi th the rear elements of Task II'orce Richardson

which 'Were moving s 10"Nly south ugD.inst dogged resist3.nce.

59

Team Maher completed the clearing of these vIooas by

14l5B and continued sout~.9, The enemy had succeeded in infiltrating behind the

head of the Comb~t Command B column south of N~CHBACH. This, cou.pled with the appearance of the Luftwaffe, mat

erio.lly slowed down the colwnn. In o.ddition to the fire

of artillery, mortars, and small arms, the Germans had

constructed abutis across the road. 'In one case about

100 yards of abs.tis had to be cleQred before the columns

could continue. German artillery, occupying high ground

be uveen HERRENZ INlNIERN (54.4-94.3) and NEIDERSTETTEN (58.2

91.5), comrrl.::lnded Q. long stretch of the rond wi th their

f , II oxt rem6 1y accurnt e ~re. At 1700B one of our o.ir OPs

reported twelve enemy tmks moving tovJard the hG

rapidly towo.rd CRAILSHEIM. After clc::\ring a fev! roadblociks

and brushing aside iight resistance, Tdsk :B orce rt:lohardson 11

entGI'ed CRAIL~HEiM before daylight of 9 Apr.il. Having delivered the supply vheiclos, Task Force

Richo.rdson was

The hours of darkness remained generally quiet with

only oocasional outbursts of fighting along the MSR. Friendly

infantry continued occupying the northern sector as far

south as the towns of BARTENSTEIN and ADOLZHAUSEN (54,1-91.4). Friendly supply col~ns were repotted moving southward with very little difficulty.15 ~tom the stillness and luck or resistance along the main supply route it appeared that the

struggle to open and maintain the route had terminated.

Air Supply during the CRAILSHEIM Operation

No narrative of the 11th Armored Division's action in

the CRAILSHEIM-ILSH FEN area would be complete without ment

ion of the part played by the air supply to the forces of

Combat Command A within CRAILSHEIM.

The breakthrough of Combat Conrnand A in the Crail

she im are:3. momentar ily tr.rew the Germans off balance. : The

enemy reaction to this swift advance was to seal off the

land corridor leading into CRAILSHEIM from the north, thus

effectively isolating the troops in CRAILS:~IM from the

remainder of the division and supplies, there is no doubt

that the tactical advantage which had been gained by Com

bat Corrunand A's bold act ion had been dulled by the almost

impossible task of maintaining an adequate supply route

against the pressure of the enemy. It must also be remem

bered th at the bridges over the NECKAR and JAGST Rivers

had been blown by the enemYI and the temporary bridges

62

which had been erected were under hostile fire6

FortunateiYJ just to the east of CRAILSHEIM was located a good airfield. During the period 9.10 April

fifty C...47 transports of the 9th Troop Carrier Corrunand,

escorted by P-47 ',s, flew in fuel, food, and ammunition., 16

:And ovacuated the 'IN ounded. In the two-day period of air

supply 20,000 gallons of ~asoline, 7,000 rations, 1,000

rounds of l05mm. and 100,000 rounds of small arms wnmunition . 17

were f1 own In. This operation was successfully and skill

fully co~ducted. Although the airfield was under constant

enemy artillery and small arms fir.e" the operation terminated

with the loss of only one aircraft which was destroyed on

the ground by hostile artil1e ry fir.e.

'NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

lAfter Action Report, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, entry for 7 April 1945.

2G- 3 Journal, lOth Armored ~ivision, entry for 7 April 1945. 3 bAfter Action Report, 11th Tank a ttalion, 10th Armored

Division, entry for 7 ~pril 1945.

4 up cit, G-3 Journal, entry for 7 April.

50p cit, After Action Report, Combat Command B, entry for 7 Aprl.I.

60p cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for '1 April.

7up 'cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for 8 Apri-l.

Sup Cit, After Action Report, Combat Command B, entry for e April.

90p cit, After ~~ction Report,. 11th Tank Battalion; entry fot 8 April'

lOup pit, After Action Rt3pcr t, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for 8 April ~

110p cit, After Action Report, Com('at command B, entry for 9 April ... '

12up cit,. After Action Re~ortl 11th Tank Battalion, entry for 9 i1.pr11.

13After .L~cti,on Report, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized,. 10th Armored Division, entry for 9 April 1945.

14 Op cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for 9 April.

15 Op cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank ButtQlion, entry

for 9 j'~pril ~

16 Be.;ichhead News, 11 April 1945.

17Report of Operations, The Seventh United States Army,. 19441945, Volume III p 784.

CH!'i.PTER 5

Combat COIT~and A (with ReSErve Command under __._,_, ____ ___...... ........r-..__ _ - .. _ ..... , ___~~__..._ ._~_~_"

As has been recounted, the e!.'.e~ll~r continually probed

t~lf; defenses of CllfiILS:-::EUl with patrols tllr the ni ght

-10 l..pr il. These pa trols were appar see information

o thE- n;l.ture of the defenses, for at approximately 0430B

on of 10 April the enemy launched a coordinated

attack a t the CRb.ILSHEIM area, attack developed from

the 30u.tl1, east, and northeast, and contained an estimated 6eO

8n8~O;V soldicrs. l (See Figure 9.) Task Force Hankins bore t11e brunt of' the attack sine e Were still occupying their

Cl ensive positions in CR,,\ILS'JBIIl. The te:.sk force was disposed

wit.l Team T:ill defendin:: t~le soutl1ern sector of CRAILS'(lETII,

1l carn ::~avlovitz t l l6 ea::3tcrn and northCl.lstern sector" and Team

in res 8r '1{6 ( Se e Ii' 9. ) " '1'>.6 attack on 'I'c\m Havlovitz was pressed determinedly

the German forces. They were !CGn under fire by all team

we:::.-[;Wl1S and by tj-1(: p;uns of the 420th li.rlil0red It'ield Artillery

Battalion. The artillery fire was extremely effective and tIE

attack was repul sed after small numbers of the enemy had s uc

cecded in breaking throuGh the main line of resistance. They 2

were taken care 01 by the tea:rr.. reserve.

The thrust against Teum Hill in the south was much

more serious than the attack against Team :--Iavldvi tit. The I ,

enGmy btoke thr ough thE.. outposts and penetra ted the main t

line of esistance. Hard fighting at extremely close range

developed within Team Hill's posi ti.on and ragvd thr oughout

the streets in the area. To overcome this en6lTlY penetration,

which threatened to disrupt the entire defensive system of

the task force ... Major Hankins conuni tted a pIa toon from his

reserve team, Team Holland, to support Team Hill. This

pI atoon,. together wi th the reserve from Team Havlovi tz.t attac

ked the enemy penetration. The enemy was prevented from

reinforcinE his engaged troops by artillery concentrations

'INhich nere fired on his avenue s of appr oach to CRAILSHEIM

from the south. Supported by fire from the elements of

Teom l{ill in contact with enemy,. the reserve force proceeded

to clear out the are~. They advanced through the contested

area and reached the outpost line., destroying or capturing

all enemy forces in their Zone. The lines were reestab

lished. Team Holland attncked and cleared ALTEN'MUNSTER

for the fourth time .. By noon all positions in the CRAIL-

SHED.l area had been restored. The enemy attack had been

repulsed and he had suffered severe casualties.

In coordination with the assault on CRAILSHEIM,

German troops attacked Task 1< orce Thackston in ILSHOFEN.

This attack began at approximately 0630B and came from

67

the nort!1. and northwest. (See Figure 10.) It consisted of approximately 200 German infnntry supported by at ieast ohe

ass~1ult gun.:3 The enemy was engaged by ail elements of the task force and by tite ftb~ the ~19th hr,mored Field Artil

le~y Battalion. The enemy attack was pressed with vigor and

determina tron, but VJo.s f ina lly repuls ed at 0900B. Enenw

,losses were very heavy, consisting of fifty killed, seven

teen wounded, ~md sixty-five captur cd, inc luding the com4

mc..nder of the attn..king forces. One hostile assault gun

w:::\.s destroyed. After the termination of the attack, Task

Force Thackston improved its positions and awaited devel

opments.

~hile lOth Armcired Division troops were defeating

the German attempts to recapture CRAILSI1EIM, Task Forces

Riley and Roberts (Ulrich) were occupying their defensive

positions in the BihNDSP~USEN area. At 0845B Task Force

Roberts (Ulrich) made conto.ct with Company I, 254th Inf

antry Rogiment, 63d Infantry Division in the vicinity of

\IOLFSOLDEN. Elements of this division ha.d been given the

5mission of D.tto.cking toward CRAILSHEIM from the northwest.

An air resupply mission had been scheduled for

Comb:}.. t Corrmand A during the morning of 10 Apr il. .tiS a

result of the enemy attacks, during w mch the airfield

Was subjected to heavy artillery fire, division was

notified at 0600B that the supply planes could not be

68

r6ceived i111til the attack had been defeated. This message

Was not reeeived in time, ~nd at 0630B the planes began

l:--nding. Tec.lm Griswold of Task Force Thackston was holding

the airfield, ~nd despite the intense artillery fire the 6

pI Dnes VJerG u..'1.1oaded.

After defGating the enemy assault on CRAILSHEIM,

General Piburn requested th'1t infL';.ntry reinforcements be

sent to assist Combat COmm':tnd I. if the 'J.reD. was to be

retained. The g6neral was becoming alarmed at the increasing

enemy reQction. This, coupled with the facts that his troops

had suffered serious losses" hld bce