1 the entrepreneurial bureaucrat: locating state …restructuring in mumbai, india. based on a case...

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Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.

THEENTREPRENEURIALBUREAUCRAT:LOCATINGSTATEPOWERINGLOBALIZINGMUMBAI

LizaWeinstein

NortheasternUniversityThis paper considers the reconfiguration of state power in the context of global urbanrestructuring inMumbai, India. BasedonacasestudyoftheongoingDharaviRedevelopmentProject,atwo‐billiondollarefforttransformMumbai’sinfamousslumsettlementofDharaviintoa mixed‐use, mixed‐income township, it details the configurations underlying the project’splanning process. It highlights, in particular, the appropriation of state power by a privatedeveloper. Exploiting certain weaknesses in the state’s development institutions, this“entrepreneurial bureaucrat” was able to carve out autonomous role for himself and aprivileged place for the project, thus establishing a novel configuration of local state power.Althoughthesearrangementssharecertainfeaturesoftheneoliberalgovernancearrangementsand public‐private partnerships identified in other globalizing cities, the paper argues thatparticular features are grounded in Mumbai’s unique history and historical specificity. Thepapersituatesthiscaseinemergingunderstandingsofthechangingnatureofstatepowerinthecontext of globalization and global city formation. While this literature has contributedimportantinsightsabouttherescalingandreconfigurationofstateauthorityandresources,thepaper argues that remains disproportionately focused on transformationswithin the nationalstate. It concludes that a parallel set of transformations – including the new configurationsrevealed in the Dharavi case – may be evenmore important for understanding global urbanrestructuringwithinlargefederaliststateslikeIndiathatcontainconsiderableregionaldiversity.Introduction

Themid‐1990smarkedaturningpointinMumbai’slandpolitics,andparticularlyinthe

waythecity’sdenselypopulatedslumlandsandsquattersettlementswereviewed–and

ultimatelymanaged–bypoliticians,bureaucrats,anddevelopers.Longrecognizedasoneof

thecity’smostintractablesocialproblems,slumswouldsoonbereframedasadevelopment

opportunityandslumredevelopmentwouldbecomeanintegralpartofthecity’snew

developmentagenda(Nijman2008).Helpingtoframethisagendawasanewpopulistpolitical

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coalitionthattookcontroloftheMaharashtra1Governmentin1995.Oneofthefirstactions

takenbythenewgovernment(afterchangingthecity’snamefromBombaytoMumbai)wasto

instituteanewhousingschemeforresidentsofslumsettlements.Actingonacampaign

promisetoprovide“freeandquickhousing”tofourmillionslumdwellersthroughoutthe

MumbaiMetropolitanRegion,theprogramwouldprovideresidentswithsmalltenement

apartmentsinmidrisebuildingsforonlythecostofamonthlymaintenancefee(Hansen2001).

Apartmentsundertheprogramwouldbefinancedandconstructedbyprivatedevelopersin

exchangefortheopportunitytodevelopandsellotherpropertiesatmarketrates(Mukhija

2003).Althoughvariousmarket‐basedapproachestohousingconstructionhadbeendevised

overthepreviousdecade,theprogrammarkedadramaticexpansionoftheroleofprivate

developersinhousingconstructionforlowerincomegroups(Mukhija2003,Nijman2008).The

newprogrambecamemorethanawaytoimprovethehousingconditionsofthecity’smost

disadvantagedresidents;italsopushedhundredsofacrescentrallylocatedlandsontothecity’s

lucrativepropertymarket,thusenablingthecommercialandinfrastructuredevelopments

consistentwiththestate’semergingdevelopmentagenda.

Amongtheinvestorsanddeveloperswhorecognizedtheopportunitiesentailedinthis

newapproachwasMukeshMehta,aMumbai‐bornarchitectandpropertydeveloperwhohad

beenlivingandworkinginsuburbanNewYork.EnticedbacktoMumbaibyopportunities

associatedwithIndia’seconomicliberalizationandbyneweffortstoattractglobalinvestment,

Mehtarecognizedthenewslumpolicyasaplatformforalarger‐scaledevelopmentstrategy.

Overthenextdecade,MehtawoulddesignaplanfortransformingoneofMumbai’slargest–

andcertainlythemostfamousofits–slumsettlementsintoamixed‐use,mixed‐income

1MaharashtraistheregionalstateinwhichthecityofMumbaiislocated.MostinstitutionsofdevelopmentplanningforMumbaiarehousedatthestate‐level,intheGovernmentofMaharashtra.

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development.Afterattemptingtopursuetheprojectindependently,heeventuallysoldittothe

stategovernment.Eventuallyembracedbythestateandpromotedaspartofitsbroaderefforts

totransformMumbaiintoa“worldclasscity,”theDharaviRedevelopmentProject(DRP)

becamethecenterpieceoftheseefforts.AstheDRPtransformedintoagovernment‐sponsored

initiative,Mehta’sroleshiftedfromanindependentdevelopertoaconsultantemployedbythe

statetohelpmanagetheproject.

Puttingthiscaseatthecenteroftheanalysis,thispaperexaminesthenew

configurationsofstatepowercreatedoverthepastfifteenyearsaspartofIndia’seffortsto

promotethetypeofurbandevelopmentdesignedtoattractforeigninvestmentandimproveits

cities’positioninglobalurbanhierarchies.Thiscaserevealsonesuchconfiguration:the

appropriationofstatepowerbyasingleentrepreneurialindividual.Referredtohereasan

“entrepreneurialbureaucrat,”thepaperarguesthatMehtahasbothestablishedanew

approachtounderrestructuringinIndia’sglobalizingcitiesandproducedanovelconfiguration

oflocalstatepower.Exploitingcertainweaknessesinthestate’sdevelopmentbureaucracies,

heestablishedrelativelyautonomousroleforhimselfandaprivilegedplaceforhisproject.An

exampleofthetypeofstaterestructuringthathasenabledmegaprojectdevelopmentandelite‐

orientedurbanrenewalschemesincitiesthroughouttheworld,thiscaserevealsanattemptto

depoliticizedevelopmentanddisenfranchisetheurbanpoor.2Yetwhilethisconfiguration

sharescertainfeaturesoftheneoliberalgovernancearrangementsandpublic‐private

partnershipsidentifiedinotherglobalizingcities,itsparticularfeaturesaregroundedin

Mumbai’suniquehistoryandhistoricalspecificity.

2Ihavearguedelsewhere,however,thattheseattemptswererelativelyunsuccessfulandcertainsegmentsoftheurbanpoorandactivistsactingontheirbehalfhavesuccessfullyinsertedthemselvesintotheproject’splanningprocess(XXXX).

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Thepaperbeginswithabriefdiscussionoftheliteratureonstaterestructuringin

globalizingcitiesandinurbanIndiainparticular.Itsituatesthisnovelconfiguration–the

“entrepreneurialbureaucrat”–intotheseemergingunderstandingsofreconfiguredstate

power.Thisdiscussionsuggeststhatwhileimportantinsightshavebeenmadeaboutthe

rescalingandreconfigurationofstateauthorityandresources,thisliteratureremains

disproportionatelyfocusedontransformationswithinthenationalstate.Itarguesthata

parallelsetoftransformationsareunderwayintheorganizationoflocalstatepowerthatmay

beevenmoreimportantforunderstandingglobalurbanrestructuringwithinlargefederalist

stateslikeIndiathatcontainconsiderableregionaldiversity.

ThepaperthenmovesontoadetaileddiscussionoftheplanningprocessfortheDRP,

highlightingtheuniqueroleassumedbyMehtaasproject’schiefarchitect,managerand

advocate.Basedoninterviewswithpoliticiansandofficialsinthestategovernmentandthe

municipalcorporation,aswellaswithprivatedevelopers,includingMehtaandothersworking

inhisoffice,thenextseveralsectionsdetailtheprocessbywhichMehtainsertedhimselfinto

thestate’shousingandurbandevelopmentagenda.Thisdiscussionemphasizes,inparticular,

roleplayedbyelectedwardpoliticiansintheproject’splanningprocess.Itrevealsthatdespite

theirspecificandpotentiallyimportantknowledgeabouttheirconstituencies,localpoliticians

remainlargelyexcludedfromMumbai’songoingdevelopmenteffortsdespitecertainreforms

designedtodecentralizeurbangovernanceanddevelopmentplanning.Yetdespitethe

marginalizationofelectedpoliticiansandmunicipalofficials,itisnotaccuratetosaytherehas

beennolocalinvolvementintheproject’splanningprocessorthatMehta’sconsolidationof

powerovertheprojecthasgoneuncontested.Theempiricalsectionsconcludewitha

discussionoftheoppositionthathasemergedinrecentyears,revealingthecontestations

entailedinlocalstaterestructuring.Thepaperconcludesbyreturningtobroader

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understandingsofstaterestructuringinglobalandglobalizingcities,situatingthiscaseinrecent

analysesoftheprivatizationofurbangovernancefunctionsinMumbaiandoutsideofIndia.This

discussionarguesthatalthoughthiscasereflectsthepartialprivatizationofurbanplanningand

administrationactivities,itwouldbeinaccuratetocharacterizetheseshiftsasadiminishedstate

roleinurbandevelopmentandhousingconstruction.

ReconfiguringLocalStatePower

Recentresearchonthescalartransformationsofstatehavehasofferedtheimportant

insightthatglobalizationdoesnotsimplyactuponthelocalscale,asaforcefromabove,but

thatglobalizationandstatepoweraremutuallyconstitutive(Brenner1999,Brenner2004,

Swyngedouw2004,Sassen2006).Ratherthansimplyappropriatingpowerpreviouslylocatedat

thenationalscale,thisresearchhasrevealedthatglobalizationentailstheterritorialde‐scaling

andrescalingofstatepowerwithinthenation.Contributingtothisperspective,Sassen(2006)

hasidentifiedseveralconfigurationsofstatepowerthathaveemergedsincethe1970saspart

ofglobalization.Specifically,shehighlightsthechangingbalanceofpowerbetweentheUnited

States’threebranchesofgovernment,theprivatizationofstatecapabilities,andchangingforms

ofcitizenshipandpoliticalmembershipasexamplesofreconfiguredstatepower.Sheexplains

thattheseshiftsarepartofglobalizationbecausetheyreflecttransformationsthat“are

orientedtowardglobalagendasandsystems”(Sassen2006,3).Whileparticularcomponentsof

nationalstatesaretransformedorunderminedbyglobalization,thestateremainsakey

“enabler”oftheseprocesses,sheargues.

NeilBrenner(2004)hasmeanwhileassertedthaturbanregionshaveemergedaskey

institutionalsitesofstatepoweramidsttheseshifts.Inresponsetobroaderstructuralchanges

underwayinWesternEuropesincethe1970s,suchasdeindustrialization,theretrenchmentof

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thewelfarestate,andEuropeanintegration,theeconomiccontextofEurope’scitieshave

changedandmajormetropolitanregionshavebeenforcedtoadoptentrepreneurialpoliciesto

attractcapitalinvestment.Althoughadministrativeboundariesremainfixed,changesinstate

practicesandregulatorypoliciesreconstitutethemeaningsofterritorialdivisionsand

intergovernmentalrelations.Insteadofadoptingaviewoflineardecentralization,Brenner

emphasizesthereshufflingofstatepowerandcirculationofresourcesbetweendifferent

geopoliticalscales.

Brenner’sandSassen’sworkhaveofferedtheimportantinsightthatglobalizationacts

uponurbanspaceandurbanpolitics,inpart,byrescalingtheauthorityandresourcesrequired

forurbanrestructuringwithinthenationstate.Buttheseauthors,andcorrespondinglymuchof

theworkinthisarea,havetendedtoneglectthetransformationsofstatepowerunderwayat

theurbanscale.Asurban‐leveltransformationsareparticulartolocalcontextsand,therefore,

difficulttoanalyzewithinamoregeneralframework,thesetheorizationshavelargelyscaledat

thenational‐statelevel.Whilethisemphasisisusefulforcontextsinwhichacoherentsuper‐

nationalornationalurbanpolicyisdiscernable,itdoeslittletorevealthepoliticaldynamicsof

urbanrestructuringinaregionallydiverse,federalistcontextlikeIndia.Consequently,after

presentingthedetailsofthecase,theconcludingdiscussionconsidersarguesthatthiscasecan

contributetoamoredecentralizedorlocalunderstandingofthereorganizationofstatepower

usefulforunderstandingtheIndiancaseandotherregionswithdiversesub‐nationalurban

contexts.

AManwithaPlan

Inthemid‐1990s,MukeshMehtawasworkingasanarchitectandpropertydeveloperin

suburbanNewYork.OriginallyfromMumbai,MehtahadsettledintheUnitedStatesandearned

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adegreeinarchitecturebeforespecializinginthedevelopmentofhigh‐endresidential

propertiesintheNewYorkarea.LikemanyNon‐residentIndians(NRIs)observingthepolitical

reformsandeconomicgrowthunderwayintheircountryoforigin,Mehtamadethedecisionto

returntoIndiaandexplorebusinessopportunitiesinthenewIndia.Morespecifically,Mehta

sawopportunitiesinMumbai’slucrativepropertymarketsandpossibilitiesentailedin

Maharashtra’snewslumhousingpolicy.

Justoneofmanybuilderanddeveloperswhosawthecity’sslumsettlementsasa

developmentopportunity,hisplanandhisambitionswerelargerthanoriginallyenvisionedin

theslumpolicy.Uptothatpoint,theSlumHousingScheme(SRS)hadbeenusedonlyona

piecemealbasis,tore‐housesinglehousingsocieties,comprisingroughlyahundredfamilies,at

atime.AlthoughmanybuilderswereworkingonseveralSRSprojectssimultaneously,nonehad

soughttoredevelopcontiguoushousingsocietiesaspartofalargerdevelopmentproject.Yet

Mehtacouldseenoreasonwhythepolicycouldn’tbeusedonalargerscale,allowingforthe

redevelopmentoflargerplotssimultaneously,thusfreeingupmuchlargeramountsofspacefor

marketratedevelopments.AconsultantworkingwithMehtaexplained:

TheSRA [SlumRehabilitationAuthority]had justbeen formed.And theyweregoingabout–well,theystilldotoday–goingaboutitinthispiecemealkindofapproach. Sohemetwithpoliticalpeopleat that timeandsaid, lookyouaregoing about this all wrong. When you have large areas, you should try todevelopthemassuburbs…Theywerelike,likewhat,areaslikeDharavi?Andhesaid,well,yes,areaslikeDharavi.Anditsortoftookofffromthere.3

AlthoughitisunlikelythatMehta’sideatoredevelopthesprawlingsettlementofDharavi

emergedfromthissingleconversation,thisstoryhastakenonsomethingofamythicalquality,

asMehtahasworkedtoportrayhimselfasDharavi’saccidentaldeveloper.

3DiscussiononJune19,2006.

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IfslumsarecharacterizedasMumbai’smostintractableproblem,Dharaviisportrayed

asitsmosttangiblerepresentation.Anareaofroughlyonesquaremilesituatedinthevirtual

centerofGreaterMumbai,thesettlementofDharavihousesupwardsofamillionpeoplein

housingofvaryingquality.Photographstakenfromnearbyhigh‐risebuildingsshowaseemingly

endlessexpanseofcorrugatedaluminumandblue‐tarpedrooftopsprecariouslysittingatop

squatshanties.Thisimagehasnowbeenseenacrosstheglobe,astheworld’sleading

newspapersandmagazineshavepublishedrecentprofilesofDharaviandseveralmemorable

scenesfromtheSlumdogMillionairewerefilmedinthesettlement.Yetmorethanjustavivid

depictionofMumbai’sslumproblem,Dharaviisalsoavisualrepresentedthegovernance

failuresthathavehinderedearliereffortstoupgradeslumsettlementsandimproveconditions

slumresidents.Everyfewdecades,anewefforthasbeendevisedto“solvetheDharavi

problem.”Thelastsucheffortwasamegaprojectproposedinthemid‐1980sbyRajeevGandhi,

thenPrimeMinisterofIndia.Earlier,whileasimilarlyambitiousschemeforDharaviwas

outlinedinthe1948BombayMasterPlan.Inthemeantime,piecemealeffortslikeSRShave

slowlyrebuiltsomeofthehousingandimprovedbasicinfrastructuresinthesettlement,but

havefailedtotransformeitherthesettlement’sbasicconditionsor,perhapsmoreimportantly,

itsnotoriousimageasoneofAsia’slargestslums.Therefore,whenMehtasethissightson

Dharaviinthemid‐1990s,hewasdismissedoffhandasoneofIndia’snowmanyambitious,but

ultimatelynaïve,return‐NRIs.

DeterminedtoredeveloptheentiresettlementofDharavi,Mehtasettoworkonland

useplansandfinancingformulas.Hesooncametorealize,however,thathisplanentailedtoo

greatafinancialriskforhimtotakeonalone.“Aprojectofthissizeneedsmoney.”heonce

explained.“Ifitgotobstructedbygovernment,Icouldhavelostalotofmoney.Thefinances

hadtocomefromsomewhereelse.Andgovernmentneededtoputaguaranteeonthe

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financing.”4Inadditiontothefinancialrisk,herecognizedthatthestate’sdevelopment

regulationswouldhavetobeamended.Consequently,hedeterminedthatprojectcouldonly

proceedifitsecuredgovernmentsponsorship.HebegansellinghisDharaviplantothestateof

Maharashtra.

Bytheendofthe1990s,Mehtawasreceivingsomeencouragementfromgovernment

officialsbuthewasyettogarneranofficialpledgeofsupport.Withitspoliticalbasefound

primarilyinMumbai,thecurrentgovernmentsituatedhousingandurbandevelopment

initiativesmoreprominentlyonitsagendathanhadpreviousadministrations.Infact,thestate’s

ChiefMinisteratthetime,ManoharJoshi,representedtheMumbaidistrictthatincluded

Dharavi.AlthoughMehtarecallsthatJoshiremainedsomewhatcriticalofhisplans,hewas

beginningtoelicitsupportfromotherswithinthegovernmentatthetime.YetinOctober1999,

thecoalitioninpowerlostthestate‐wideelectionsandtheoppositioncoalitionledbythe

CongressPartyformedanewgovernment.ThepoliticalgroundMehtahadgainedwaslost.

Becausethepreviousgovernmenthadbegunexpressingsupportforthescheme,thenewly

electedCongressgovernmenttookstepstopubliclydistanceitselffromit.Hewenttowork

againtobuildthenecessarypoliticalsupportwithinthenewgovernment.Notalignedwithany

ofthestate’spoliticalparties,Mehtafeltfreetoworkwithwhichevergovernmentwasin

power.Hiseffortsbegantopayoffin2001and2002whenhisplanwonfavorwiththestate’s

HousingSecretarySureshJoshi.Mehtarecalls:

Wehadbeenpetitioningthemforyears.EveryHousingSecretarythatcamein,wewould go straight to himand say,whydon’t you get involved?Whydon’tyou do this? And then [Housing Secretary] Dr. Suresh Joshi came to us. Theywereinterestedallofasudden.Maybeitwasdestiny,orwhatever…Rightthen

4DiscussiononNovember14,2006.

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the government had taken this huge initiative for infrastructure projects, so Iguessitallfellintoline.5

TheHousingSecretaryJoshiencouragedMehtatoapproachgovernmentasapartner,rather

tryingtosellhisplantothegovernment.TakingJoshi’sadvice,Mehtaclaimsthathewasableto

presenttheprojectasa“win‐win”situation.“Politiciansgotanewwaytolookatslums,andI

gottheprojectIwanted.”6Hebeganbuildingsupportthroughoutthegovernment,butthe

statestillrefusedtoofficiallybacktheproject.Overthenexttwoyears,however,aglobally‐

orienteddevelopmentagendacametogether,premisedontransformingMumbaiintoa“world

classcity.”Framedasacenterpieceofthisagenda,thestatewouldeventuallyembraceMehta’s

Dharaviplan.

MorethanjustavisualrepresentationofMumbai’sintractableslumproblemandthe

failuresofthestate’sresponse,muchoftheattentionDharavihasgarneredovertheyearsis

rootedintherecognitionoftheprimepropertyonwhichthesettlementsits.Whilean

insatiabledemandforlandhaslongplaguedthisislandcity,newcallstoconvert“underutilized”

slumlandsintodevelopablepropertiesweremadeinthisperiod,bolsteredbyanewdesireto

attractglobalinvestorsandimproveMumbai’sworldcitystanding.Whilethecity’spowerful

businesscommunityhadlonglamentedMumbai’sdecliningcompetitiveposition,theirconcerns

movedtothetopofthestate’spolicyagendauponpublicationoftheso‐calledMcKinseyReport

inlate2003.Althoughfewnewrevelationswerepresentedinthewidelyheralded“Vision

Mumbai:SummaryofRecommendationsforTransformingMumbaiintoaWorldClassCity,”

producedbytheinternationalconsultingfirmMcKinseyandCompany,theMcKinseyReport

restatedtheirconcernsandrenewedcallsforgovernmenttopromoteslumredevelopmentas

5DiscussiononJune19,2006.6DiscussiononNovember14,2006.

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partofabroaderdevelopmentagenda.Thestategovernmentimmediatelyadoptedthis

agendaandtheChiefMinisterformedataskforcetoexploretheimplementationofthe

McKinseyReport’smainrecommendations.AlthoughMehta’splanwasnotmentionedinthe

report,itsobjectiveswerecloselyaligned.TheChiefMinister’sTaskforcenotedthe

redevelopmentof“atleastthreesectorsofDharaviforcommercialorofficeuse”amongits

shorttermobjectives(StateofMaharashtra2004,14).SoonaftertheTaskforcewasconvened,

theChiefMinisterpubliclyendorsedMehta’splan.

InacabinetmeetinginFebruary2004,Maharashtra’sChiefMinistercommittedhis

politicalsupporttothecomprehensiveredevelopmentofDharavi’shousing,infrastructure,

industriesandcommercialspaces.AmidstmediafanfareandboldproclamationsthatMumbai

wouldbe“slumfree”andDharaviwouldbetransformedintoacultural,business,and

knowledgecenter,anewpubliccommitmentwasmadetoDharaviingeneralandMehtain

particular.AsMehtastoodatthepodium,detailinghisplaninaPowerPointpresentation,

completewithcolor‐codedlandusemapsandcatchyacronyms,themeetingresembledthe

launchofanewproductmorethanacabinetdiscussionofahousingprogram.Nowpartofthe

state’seffortstotransformMumbaiintoa“worldclasscity,”thispresentationrevealedthenew

objectivesofslumredevelopment,consistentwiththeoveralltoneandobjectivesofeconomic

liberalizationundertakenoverthepastdecade.

Althoughthestateendorsement’sMehta’splanstemmedprimarilyfromitscongruence

withthebroaderagendaofimprovingMumbai’scompetitivenessandworldcitystanding,the

project’sprofilewasalsoraisedbygrowingsupportfromthecentralgovernment.InJanuary

2004,Mehta’seffortstobuildpoliticalsupportwonanimportantvictorywhenthecentral

government—thenacoalitiongovernmentheadedbytheright‐wingBharatiyaJanataParty

(BJP)withtheformerChiefMinisterofMaharashtra(andDharavirepresentative)ManoharJoshi

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inthepositionofSpeakerofParliament—committedroughlyonehundredmilliondollarsfor

Dharavi’sredevelopment.TheinterventionoftheCentralGovernmentintoMumbai’surban

affairswasinterpretedasadirectchallengetothestategovernment’sauthority.Giventhat

urbandevelopmentisconstitutionallydefinedasa“statesubject,”itwasremarkablethatthe

centrewouldcommitfinancialresourcestoaprojectthathadnotyetreceivedthestate’s

backing.Morethanintergovernmentalconflict,thesubversionofthestate’sauthorityinthis

casealsorepresentsinter‐partyconflict,giventhatthecentralgovernmentwasruledbytheBJP,

whiletheCongressPartyheldpoweratthestatelevel.Thisactionlikelyshamedthe

GovernmentofMaharashtraintoofferingsupport,andtheStateannouncedthefollowingweek

thatitwouldpartnerwithMehtaontheprojectandprovidefinancialbacking.Laterthatyear,

theBJP‐ledgovernmentatthecentrelosttoaCongressParty‐ledcoalitionandthepromised

financialresourceswereneverdelivered.

Inadditiontotheplan’scongruencewiththeMcKinseyReportandthesupportit

garneredfromNewDelhi,thestate’sendorsementofMehta’splaninearly2004shouldalsobe

attributedtohisperseverance.AlthoughhehadsomeconnectionsinBombaywhenhereturned

inthemid‐1990s,hewasbasicallyanoutsidertostatepoliticsandhadfewtiestocity’spolitical

andbusinesscommunities.Yetoverthebetterpartofadecade,Mehtaworkedtoelicit

governmentsupport,portrayinghimselfasjustamanwithaplan.Reflectinguponthese

efforts,Mehtamused:

Iamanentrepreneur.IfirstdecidedIwasgoingtodoitmyself,buteventuallyIhadtocontractwithadeveloper–inthiscase,thegovernment.WhenIsold it

to them, I said, only pay me if I’m successful. I should only get paid on thesuccessoftheproject…Therewillbetwomeasuresofsuccess:firstgovernmenthadtoaccepttheplan.Then,thebuildershavetogivemoney toredevelopit.

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Only once the builders make the investments, can the project be deemed asuccess.7

OncethestateannounceditsendorsementoftheprojectinFebruary2004,MehtacreatedMM

ProjectConsultantsPvt.,anentitysubcontractedbythestatetosupporttheplanningforthe

newlylaunchedDharaviRedevelopmentProject(DRP).MehtawasnamedtheProject

ManagementConsultantandmostoftheactivitiesassociatedwiththephysicaldesigns,

regulatorychanges,andcommunityrelationsfortheDRPwerecoordinatedthroughhisoffice.

Fortheseefforts,hewouldbepaidaconsultancyfeeofonepercentoftotalproject

expenditures.Withtheprojectcostsinitiallyestimatedattwobilliondollars,Mehta’sfeewas

expectedtoberoughly$20million.Althoughhenotedthathisfeesshoulddepend“onthe

successoftheproject,”asoflate2010,Mehtahadbeenpaidroughly$3millioneventhough

theworkhadnottechnicallybegunandthebuilderswereyet“togivemoney.”Meanwhile,

Mehta’sroleasProjectManagerandthepaymentsreceivedwouldbecomeacontentious

politicalissueinthecomingyears,leadingtocallsforhisremovalandthegovernment’s

withdrawalofsupportfortheproject.

“One‐ManHandled”

Mehta’snewroleasProjectManagementConsultantrepresentsashiftintheway

governmentplansandcarriesoutdevelopmentplanningefforts.Althoughthestatehasalong

traditionofhiringconsultantstodesigntownplansoradvisepoliticiansondevelopment

projects,thepositionthatMehtacraftedforhimselfentailedamoresignificantscopeof

authoritythanistypicallyheldbyaprivateconsultant.Althoughherecognizedthathisrole

7DiscussiononAugust18,2006.

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shouldprobablybeperformedbyagovernmentofficial,hemaintainedthathisparticipation

hadbeenessentialfortheproject’ssurvival.

That’s where the bureaucracy comes in. But I don’t think we have creativebureaucrats; we have very few of them. We have the Dharavi project. It’svirtually one‐man handled…I even type letters for them, interdepartmental

letters!Why?BecauseMukeshMehtaistheonlyoneintheentireuniversewhowantsDharavitogoon!”8

InadditiontoensuringthatDharavi“goeson,”Mehtaoncedescribedhisroleasoneofa

coordinator.Giventhenatureofdevelopmentplanningtoday,heasserted,someoneis

requiredtobringtogetherthevariousactorsandinterestsinvolvedinaprojectofthisscale.

Equatingprojectmanagementwith“dealmaking”andadevelopmentplanwitha“business

model,”heexplained:

Iamfillingavoid.Thatvoidisofcoordinationfunction,tomakepeopletalkto

eachotherandmakedeals. Istartbyaskingthequestion:whatdoweneedtodo to redevelopDharavi?…And I am coordinatingwith groups tomeet theseneeds.We need urban designers, entrepreneurs, service providers.We need

thebestofthebestandmyjobistobringthemintotheproject.Iambringingabusinessmodeltoworkthroughtheseissues.9

Ultimately,Mehtaattributesthisvoid,aswellasotherweaknessesinthestate’s

developmentbureaucracies,tothesystemofplacinggovernmentofficersinpositionsand

providingthemwithrewards.

The typical government officerwon’t do this. They generally believe that if you

don’tdoanything,youcan’t lose your job–which is true in thecurrent system.They also don’t have deep knowledge on the issues they’re working on. Theymove fromposition to position. Theymaywork on education and thenhousing

andthenenvironment.Thoserunningministriesshouldbeexpertsinthoseareasofwork,butthey’renot.10

8DiscussiononJune19,2006.9DiscussiononAugust18,2006.10DiscussiononAugust18,2006.

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Yet,despitehisattributionofgovernment’sineffectivenesstostructuralweaknessesratherthan

toindividualpersonalities,Mehtarecognizesthatgovernment’scontinuedbackingforthe

projecthasdependedonindividualsupporterswithinthestate’sdevelopmentbureaucracies.

ThemostcrucialpositioninthisregardhasbeentheheadoftheSlumRehabilitationAuthority

(SRA),thestate‐levelagencyresponsibleforimplementingSRS.Atthetimetheprojectreceived

statebacking,theSRAwasheadedbysomeonethatMehtanoted“hadanagendatostopthe

project.”11HeclaimsthatturfbattlesandconcernsaboutrecognitionledtheformerSRAchief

tostalltheproject.EventuallyhewasreplacedwithsomeonethatMehtasawasaninitialally

butwhoheclaimsprovedsimilarlyunhelpful.Inmid‐2005,IqbalChahalwasappointedasthe

newheadofSRAandreceivedthedesignationof“OfficeronSpecialDutywithresponsibilities

fortheDharaviProject.”MehtadescribedChahalas“verysupportive,”notingthatheultimately

seestheDRPas“themostimportantprojectofhiscareer.”12

DespiteMehta’scharacterizationoftheprojectas“one‐manhandled,”theDRP

ultimatelybecameintegratedintotheSRA’sadministrativestructure.WhileMehtamaybe

fillingavoidbycommunicatingbetweenthevariousgroupsinvolvedintheproject,Chahal’s

mainrolewastocoordinatebetweenthestate’sChiefMinister,Mehta,andtheSRAstaff

assignedtohelpdesignandcarryouttheproject.(SeeFigure1).TwoSRAofficers,reporting

directlytoChahal,weregivenresponsibilitiesfortheproject’spoliticalandtechnicalsides.

RoopaShinde,13ChiefCommunityDevelopmentOfficer,waschargedwithcommunityrelations;

11DiscussiononAugust18,2006.12DiscussiononAugust18,2006.13Mehta,Chahal,highrankingbureaucratsandpoliticians(likeSureshJoshiandManoharJoshi)havenot

beengivenpseudonymsduetothehighprofilerolestheyhaveplayedintheprojectandthemediaattentiontheyhavereceivedfortheseactivities.Thenamesoflowerlevelbureaucratsandlocalelectedofficials,however,havebeenchangedandthedistrictstheyrepresenthavebeenobscured.

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whileRajeevTalreja,wasassignedtotheproject’stechnicalaspects,includinglanduseand

buildingregulations.GiventhecloseworkingrelationshipthatMehtaandhisstaffatMM

ConsultantsmaintainedwithChahal,Shinde,andTalreja,hischaracterizationoftheprojectas

“onemanhandled”didnotseemlikemuchofanoverstatement.

Figure1:DRPAdministrativeStructure

SpeakingtoRajeevTalrejaonedayinhisofficeattheSRAheadquartersnearDharavi,

heconfirmedthecentralroleMehtaplayedthroughouttheproject’splanningprocess.Talreja

explainedthatevenbeforethegovernmenthadendorsedtheproject,Mehtahaddonemuchof

thetechnicalwork,includingthoseactivitiesthatwouldtypicallybeperformedbyhisoffice.For

example,MehtahadacquiredthelandrecordsfromthecitysurveyorattheMunicipal

CorporationofGreaterMumbai(MCGM),includingtherecordsoflandownershipandthe

surveysofslumencroachment.Thisinformation,heexplained,wasusedtodeterminethe

areasofDharavithatcouldbedesignatedslumareasandincludedintheplan,aswellas

determinehowDharaviwouldbedividedintosectorsandassignedtothedevelopersselected

Officer on Special Duty (SRA) for DRP – Position later renamed CEO of the Dharavi Redevelopment Authority

Chief Minister of Maharashtra

Sub-Engineer (SRA) for DRP (technical aspects of implementation)

Project Management Consultant for DRP (Mukesh Mehta)

Chief Community Development Officer (SRA) for DRP (community relations)

17


tocarryoutthework.Mehtahadalsosurveyedthestructurestoidentifywhichwere

residential,commercial,industrial,orsomecombination.AccordingtoTalreja,theSRA’s

primaryrolehadbeensimplythatofaregulatoryagency,toensurethattheprojectcomplied

withthestate’sDevelopmentControlRulesandchangesweremadetothoseruleswhere

necessary.Buteventheseactivities,heacknowledged,hadbeenundertakenin“close

consultation”withMehta.OncetherevisedruleswereapprovedbyagroupofSecretariesin

theChiefMinister’scabinet,anexpressionofinterestdocumentwouldbeissuedanddeveloper

interestwouldbesolicitedontheproject.Outliningtheeachofthesesteps,Talrejaconfirmed

Mehta’scentralityintheprocessandhisassertionsthatitwashethatkepttheprojectmoving

forward.Meanwhile,conversationswithRoopaShindeconfirmedthatMehtaplayedanequally

centralroleonthecommunityrelationssidethroughouttheplanningprocess.

DiscussingtheseadministrativeissueswithMehta,hesuggestedthatthecontrolhe

maintainedthroughouttheproject’splanningprocesswasanadministrativenecessity.He

acknowledgedthathehadultimatelyconsolidatedtheauthorityoverdevelopmentplanning,

characterizingitasnecessarytoensuretheproject’ssurvival.Speakinginparticularabout

projectdelays,heexplained:

Dharaviisjustoneofthemillionprojectsthegovernmentisworkingon.Sofrom

theirpointofview,why isDharavimore important thansomething else? Thegovernmentclaimsthatitisahyper‐priorityproject.Thisistheirclaim.Butwhathappens is that the claimmight not bepercolating to all the people from the

lowest to thehighest rungs.So itmightbea superhighpriority for the PrimeMinister or theChiefMinister and the Secretaries, but their deputies and thedeputiesoftheirdeputiesmightnotthinkit’sthatimportant.14

14DiscussiononJune19,2006.

18


ForMehta,ontheotherhand,Dharaviwashisonlypriority.Andbyoverseeingeverystepof

theplanningprocess,hecouldn’tpreventdelaysbuthecouldmakesurethattheprojectwould

berealized.

Morethansimplyamatterofpriorities,Mehtaalsoattributedthelackofsupporthe

hadreceivedtoconcernsaboutwhathetermed“turfstealing.”Heexplainedthatnotonlyare

bureaucratsunwillingtoundertakelargescaledevelopmentplanning,butthattheyalsowantto

undermineothers’effortstodoso.Heexplainedthattheoppositionhehadreceivedfrom

withinthegovernmentwas“notbasedonthemeritsoftheplan,butonwhattheyperceiveas

turf‐stealing.Powerfulpeopleareacceptingmymodel,”headded,“sothesepeopleare

beginningtofeelmarginalized.”15Mehtaspokewithsuchaclearsenseofownershipoverthe

projectthatIhadtoremindmyselfthat,butthispoint,theDRPwasagovernment‐sponsored

endeavor.Yet,operatingasan“entrepreneurialbureaucrat,”Mehtahasdevotedthealmosta

decadebythistimetohisplantoredevelopDharavi.Allthiswhile,hehadtocontinuelobbying

tokeeptheprojectontheChiefMinister’sagenda.Inthesameperiod,hehadbeenlobbyingto

elicitinvestorinterest,makingpresentationsabouttheschemeatconstructionindustry

symposiathroughoutIndiaandinmeetingsabroad.Determinednottolettheprojectfall

betweenthecracksofadministrativeauthority,Mehtahascarvedoutspaceforhimselfandhis

projectinsideofthestate’sdevelopmentplanningbureaucracy.

TheLocalPoliticsofDevelopmentPlanning

Meanwhile,thecentralizedauthorityMehtahasassumedovertheDRPstandsin

conflictwitheffortsundertakenoverthepasttwodecadestodecentralizeprocessesof

developmentplanningthroughoutIndia.In1992,thecentralgovernmentadoptedthe


19


Seventy‐fourthAmendmenttotheIndianConstitution,stipulatingthedevolutionofsubstantive

powersandresourcestomunicipalgovernments.Morespecifically,theAmendmentcharged

statelegislatureswiththedevolutionof:…powers and responsibilities upon the Municipalities with respect to

preparationofplans for economicdevelopmentand social justice,and for theimplementationofdevelopmentschemesasmayberequiredtoenablethemtofunctionasinstitutionsofself‐government.16

Althoughpredictionsweremadethaturbangovernancewouldbetransformed,localdemocracy

wouldbeinvigorated,andmunicipalrepresentativeswouldbeempowered,theAmendment

hashadlittleactualeffectontheplanningforprojectsliketheDRP.Thewordinginthe

amendmentwasweak,specifyingthatstatesshouldsimply“[put]onafirmerfootingthe

relationshipbetweentheStateGovernmentandtheUrbanLocalBodies,”aswellas

“recommendprinciplesfor”institutinggreaterrevenuesharing.Althoughsomereformswere

madebytheGovernmentofMaharashtra,mostobserversagreethattheSeventy‐fourth

Amendmenthasdonelittletoalterthedistributionofpowerbetweenthestateandmunicipal

levelsinMumbai.ThetimeIspentwithlocalpoliticiansdiscussingtheDRP’splanningprocess

confirmedtheseobservations.

IhadbeentryingforweekstosetupameetingwithSatishSheynde,theelectedMCGM

CouncilorforDharavi’s176thWard.IhadheardfromseveralpeoplethatSheyndehadpublicly

expressedhisoppositiontotheproject.ThisstoodincontrasttotheCouncilorsrepresenting

Dharavi’sotherfivemunicipalwardwhohadlargelyremainedsilentabouttheproject.Sowhen

Ifinallyreachedhimbyphoneandhetoldmetomeethimrightawayathiswardofficeinthe

industrialwarehousedistrictonDharavi’snortheastside,Irushedrightover.WhenSheynde

16GovernmentofIndia1992.

20


arrivedaboutanhourlater,accompaniedbyanentourageofsixmen,heapologeticallyushered

meintooneoftheofficesandinstructedmetotakeaseat.Wesatinfacingchairsandhissix

companionssatonbenchesbehindus,quietlylisteningtotheconversation.Withoutmuch

prompting,SheyndebegantellingmehisconcernsabouttheDRP.Firstofall,heexplained,“the

publicisconfusedabouttheplan.MukeshMehtaisnotexplainingitveryclearly.”Hewentonto

explainthattheresidentsinhiswardwereprimarilybusinesspeople–industrialists,leather

workers,tailors–andthatmanyofthemcurrentlyhavemuchmorespacethanispromised

undertheplan.Headdedthatsomeresidentscurrentlyhaveasmuchastwoorthreethousand

squarefeet.Heestimatedthatthirtypercentofthehouseholdsinhiswardhavemorethanthe

promised225squarefeet;fivepercenthavelessthan225squarefeet;andsixty‐fivepercent

haveroughly225squarefeet.“Ifthirtypercentofmyconstituentsaregoingtobeharmedby

theplan,howcanIsupportit?”heaskedrhetorically.Heexplainedthatthosewhohavemore

spacearebusinesspeoplewhoneedtheadditionalspacetodotheirwork.Heexplainedthe

Mehta’splan“looksnice,withitsgardensandhospitals.Buthowwillthepeopleliveifthey

cannotdotheirbusinesses?”17

IaskedSheyndehowhelearnsofhisconstituents’concerns.Dotheymeetwithhimto

discussthesespaceissuesandtheirotherconcernsabouttheplan?Thendoesheinturnbring

thoseconcernstoofficialsintheSRA?Herepliedemphaticallythatyes,hisconstituentscometo

himtodiscussallofthesematters.Buthequicklyclarifiedthattheirconcernswillnotbe

addressedintheDRP’sdevelopmentplan.“MukeshMehtaandtheSRAwillnotchangethe

plan.Theyaremakingallthedecisionsthemselves.”HefurtherexplainedthatasaWard

Councilor,hehaslittlesayin“howthecitygetsrun.”ThecityisrunbyMaharashtra’sChief

17MeetingtookplaceonAugust4,2006.

21


Minister,henoted,andlocalpoliticiansarenotveryinvolved.Heseemedresignedtothelittle

influencehehadintheDRPandovermunicipalaffairsmoregenerally.Butaswasapparentby

therespecthecommandedandtheentouragethataccompaniedhim,Sheyndewasan

importantfigureinDharaviandthereweremanydomainsoverwhichheclearlyhadinfluence.

SpeakinglaterwithMukeshMehtaabouttheparticipationofmunicipalpoliticiansinthe

DRP’splanningprocess,heconcurredwithSatishSheynde’sassessmentthattheyhavelittlesay.

Heexplainedthattheinfluenceoflocalpoliticiansoverdevelopmentplanningis“negligible.”18

“TheMCGMonlymatters,”henoted,“whenspeedmoney19isinvolved.Butspeedmoneyisn’t

importanthere.”Hequicklyclarifiedformethatpoliticiansandbureaucrats“donotoperateon

conviction,onlyonwhattheycanget.”ButbecausetheMunicipalCommissioner20isinsupport

oftheproject,therestoftheMCGMwilleventuallysupportit.“TheMunicipalCommissioner

willmakeeveryonefallinline,”heexplained.

Speakingmorespecificallyaboutthepoliticians,likeSatishSheynde,whorepresent

Dharavi’ssixMCGMCouncilorwards,heconcededthattheymatterbecausetheirconstituents

matter.Buthequicklyclarifiedthateventheydon’thaveasay.“Theyoperateonthekickand

licktheory.Youcanmanagethembymanagingthetoppartybosses.”Thismodeofparty

managementisparticularlyimportantinDharavi.IncontrasttomostotherareasinMumbai,

Dharavi’ssixwardCouncilors(atthetimeIwasconductingresearch)wereallmembersofthe

18DiscussiononNovember14,2006.19Speedmoneyreferstothepaymentofbribessometimesnecessarytogetpermitsapprovedorprojectsmovingalong.Whenbribesarenotpaid,projectscanbestalledand“speedmoney”getstheprojectmovingagain.

20TheMCGMoperatesona“weakmayorsystem.”Thismeansthatalthoughthereisanelectedmayor,hisroleislargelyceremonial.TheheadoftheMCGMisthemunicipalcommissioner,whoisappointedbythestate’sChiefMinister.Manymunicipalofficials,criticalofthestate’sinfluenceoverlocalaffairs,describetheMunicipalCommissioner’spowertobeanextensionofthestategovernment’s.

22


CongressParty,thepartyinpoweratboththestateandnationallevels.21BecausetheShiv

SenapartyholdsamajorityofseatsintheMCGM,mostlocalwardsarerunbyShivSainiks,

whichcreatescertainconflictsbetweenthemunicipalityandthestategovernment,makingit

moredifficultforhigherlevelpartyofficialsto“manage”localrepresentatives.Butbecause

SatishSheyndeandDharavi’sotherfiveWardCouncilorswereCongressmembers,Mehtafeltit

wouldbeeasierto“manage”them.HeelaboratedthattheMemberoftheLegislativeAssembly

(MLA)22andtheMemberofParliament(MP)23–afatheranddaughterpairwhoarealso

membersoftheCongressParty–“willmakethemtoetheline.”

AlthoughDharavi’sMunicipalCouncilorslikeSatishSheyndeacceptthattheyhavelittle

sayoverthedraftingoftheproject’sdevelopmentplan,theycontinuetoexpressfrustration

aboutthesituation.InthatfirstmeetinginDharavi’smunicipalwarehousedistrict,Sheyndehad

describedsomeoftheparticularitiesaboutlandownershipandDharavi’ssocialstructurethat

hesuspectswillmakeDRP’simplementationmoredifficultandcausehardshipforthe

residents.24Henoted,inparticular,thedifficultiesresidentsfacewhenlivinginthetransit

camps.“ButMukeshMehtaandtheSRAdon’tknoworcareabouttheseproblems,”hesaid

angrily.“Theyhaven’tthoughtthroughtheseproblems.Theyaresittinginair‐conditioned

officesandaren’tthinkingabouthowitwillactuallywork.”Hesuggestedthathisknowledgeof

thelocalcontextshouldmakehimaresourceintheplanningprocess,implyingthatMehtaand

theSRAwillfacechallengesbecausetheyhaven’tvaluedtheparticularknowledgeandpotential

contributionsofSheyndeandtheotherCouncilors.

21Municipalelectionswereheldin2007andtwoofDharavi’sCongress‐heldseatswerelost,onetotheShivSenaandonetotheBahujanSamajParty(BSP).

22MLAisarepresentativeinthestate‐levellegislativebody.23MPisarepresentativeinthenationallevel‐legislativebodyorLokSabha.24DiscussiononAugust4,2006.

23


ThisintimatelocalknowledgewasrevealedoneeveningasIsatinthewardofficeof

VishnuDamle,theelectedCouncilorofDharavi’s177thwardandlistenedtohimspeakwithhis

constituents.25Hisofficeisasmall,unornamentedroomadjacenttotheAmbedkarMunicipal

SchoolonthedirtpathcalledDharaviCrossRoad.DamlesatbehindhisdeskwhileIsatonthe

otherside,leavingroomforhisconstituentstositrightinfrontofhimwhentheycameinthe

office.Betweenmeetings,Damleturnedtomeanddiscussedhisopinionsabouttheproject.

Thefirstpersontocomeintotheofficewasasmall,thinwomanwhosewrinklesmade

herlookmucholderthanheryears.SheexplainedinMarathithatherhusbandhadlefther

withnomoneyandnofamilyhereinMumbai.Shewantedtoreturntohervillage,whereshe

hadfamilyandpeoplewhowouldhelpher,butshehadnomoneyevenforthetrainticket

home.Sheexplainedthatherchildrenwerehungryandhadnothingtoeat.AsDamlelistened

toherstory,heworealookofmildfrustrationratherthanoneofconcern.Asheaskedher

questionsaboutthesituation,itwasclearthathewastryingtofindholesinherstory.“Soyou

havenoonehereinMumbaiatall?”heaskedwithskepticism.No,shereplied,whichiswhyshe

wasaskinghimformoneyforthetrainticket.Afterafewmoreminutesofquestions,Damle

saidthathewouldbuysomefoodforherandherchildren,buthewouldnotgivehermoneyfor

theticket.ShethankedhimasshewasusheredoutbyDamle’sassistantandtakentoanearby

foodmarket.Whentheyleft,hetoldmethathedidn’tbelieveawordofherstorybutthatshe

wasclearlyinadifficultsituation.Iaskedifmanyofthepeoplewhocomeseehimaskfor

similarfavors.Heexplainedthat,yes,thisisthemajorityofhispoliticalwork.Hisassessment

seemedaccurateasIlistenedtohisconstituentscomeinanddescribesimilarhardshipsall

evening.

25DiscussiononSeptember11,2006.

24


Giventheconditionsofhisconstituents,heexplained,thepromisesbeingmadeby

MehtaandtheotherpromotersoftheDRPdidnotmatchtheactualneedsinDharavi.He

describedthetroubleshisconstituentshavefacedbecauseoftheirquasi‐legalstatusandthe

government’sdisinterestinaddressingtheirbasicneeds.Heexplained:

Governmenthasopposedthepeopleandnotallowedthemtoconstructanicespace.Therearenomarkets inDharaviorcollegesorevenfootpaths.ButnowtheyaremakingafullplanforDharavi,abigplan.But itwouldbenice ifthey

justdidsmallthingstoimprovetheconditionshere.

“But,”Damlesighed,“thattypeofdevelopmentwouldnotmakethekindofmoneythatthisbig

projectwill.”HecommendedMehtaforgettingthegovernmenttoacceptthisredevelopment

planwhensomanyearlierschemesforDharavihadfailedtogenerategovernmentinterest.But,

heexplained,it’snotthetypeofthingthehisconstituentsneed.

WhileSheyndeandDamleexpressedtheiroppositiontotheDRPbecauseitdoesnot

adequatelyaddresstheneedsoftheirconstituents–inSheynde’scase,thelargerproperty

ownerswhooperatebusinessesfromtheirhomesor,inDamle’scase,thepoorerresidentswho

needbasicservicesmorethanhigh‐enddevelopments–mostofDharavi’sotherWard

Councilorsweregenerallymoresupportiveofthescheme.Severalofthemsawtheirroleonthe

projectasintermediariesbetweenDharavi’sresidentsandthestategovernment,helpingto

maketheresidentsfeelcomfortablewiththedevelopmentplan.Thisrolewasexplainedtome

bySubashKale,aMCGMadministratorassignedtotheDRP.SittingwithhimintheG‐north

administrativewardofficeaboutthreemilesfromDharavi,heexplainedthattheMCGMasa

wholehasaverysmallroleintheproject’splanningprocess.26Heexplainedthathisonlyrole

wastoworkwiththeSRAandhelpthemdeterminewhichresidentsareeligibletoparticipatein


25


theproject.HesaidthatneithertheMCGMadministratorsnorelectedCouncilorswillhavea

sayaboutwhattheprojectwillactuallylooklike.TheCouncilors’role,heexplained,isto

convincetheresidentsthattheprojectis“agoodthing.”“First,theCouncilorswillconvincethe

peopleandtheactivists.Andthentheactivistswillconvincethepeople.”Heexpressed

confidencethattheresidentswouldeventuallycometosupporttheplan.

UlkaKorde,theCouncilorofDharavi’s178thwardconcurredwithSubashKale’s

assessmentofherrole.Sheacknowledgedthatherprimaryroleontheprojectwasto“explain

ittothepeople.”Sheexplainedthattheprojectisagoodthingandwillimprovetheconditions

ofDharavi’sresidents.Itwasherjobtohelpherconstituentsunderstandthis.Shesuggested

thatitwouldnotbetoodifficulttodobecausetheprojectisperceivedasaCongressParty

projectand“thepeopletrusttheCongressParty.”SheexplainedthatthisgoesfortheMember

ofParliament(MP),theMemberoftheLegislativeAssembly(MLA),andtheWardCouncilors.

TheyknowthatCongresswilldoagoodjobforthepeople. Fromabout1985,this has been an all Congress area…The Shiv Sena and BJP are saying thatCongress wants to pull you out of Dharavi. But people have full trust in the

CongressParty.Sotherewillnotbeaproblem.Theywillnotbesuccessful.27

ShefeltitwouldberelativelyeasytohelpDharaviresidentsunderstandhowtheprojectwill

benefitthem.

Inspiteofthisperceivedroletoconvincetheconstituentsandexplainthefeaturesof

theproject,itstruckmeinmostofmyconversationswithwardCouncilorsthattheyknewvery

littleabouttheproject.AlloftheCouncilors,evenSheyndeandDamle,spokeinbroad

generalitiesabouttheprojectanddodgedmyquestionswhenIprobedformoredetailsabout

itsspecificfeatures.InoticedthismodeofavoidancewhenIwastalkingtoShivdasMane,


26


CouncilorforDharavi’s175thward.28Afterdodgingseveralofmyquestionsaboutwhich

Dharaviresidentswouldbeeligiblefortheprojectorhowmuchspacetheeligibleresidents

wouldreceive,Iaskedwherehegetshisinformationabouttheprojectandhowhelearnsabout

thefeaturesandrulesastheyevolve.AssoonasIaskedthequestion,hisassistantsittingnext

tohimjumpedinandsaid,“he’stheWardCouncilor,ofcourseheknowsabouttheproject.”

“Yes,buthowdoesheknowabouttheproject?”Iinsisted,turningbacktowardMane.

“DoyoumeetwithofficialsattheSRA?DoyoumeetwiththeChiefMinisterdirectly?Howdo

WardCouncilorsgetinformationabouttheproject?”

Aftermuchprodding,hefinallyexplainedthattheMLA,VarshaGaikward,toldhim

abouttherecentchangesanddevelopmentswiththeplan.Althoughitwasnotclearthatthey

wereoperatingonthekickandlicktheory,”asMukeshMehtahadsuggested,itdidappearthat

WardCouncilorsgottheirinformationfromhigherlevelelectedofficialsintheirparty.Yetwhen

IaskedthesamequestiontoanotherofDharavi’sWardCouncilors,SeemaJoshi,theCouncilor

forDharavi’s179thward,sheadmittedthatnoonesharesinformationabouttheprojectwith

her.Shestatedplainlythatthegovernmentdoesnotdiscusstheprojectwiththepoliticiansor

withthepublic.

Inspiteoftheirintimateknowledgeoftheirconstituents’conditions,Dharavi’selected

wardCouncilorshavenotbeenconsultedabouttheplansforDharavi’sredevelopment.While

manyCouncilorsseetheirprimaryroleasintermediariesorprojectadvocates,theygenerally

haveonlylimitedaccesstotheinformationthey’resupposedtobesharing.Thisinformation

hasremainedtightlycontrolledbyMehtaandhighrankingstategovernmentofficials,

disseminatedthroughthepoliticalsystemalongthefederalisthierarchy.Consequently,with


27


theSeventy‐fourthAmendmentimplementedinonlyaverylimitedmanner,development

planningingeneralandtheDRPinparticular,appearstoremaininthepossessionofthestate

governmentandmorespecificallyintheofficeoftheProjectManagementConsultant.

ChallengingtheEntrepreneurialBureaucrat

DespitetheresignationexpressedbysomewardcouncilorsandDharavi‐basedactivists,

MukeshMehta’spositionandthecentralizedplanningprocesshecreateddidnotgo

uncontested.Between2008and2009,asmallbutinfluentialgroupofhousingadvocatesand

formerhigh‐rankingbureaucratsraisedconcernsaboutMehta’sroleontheproject.Petitioning

theChiefMinistertoremovehimfromhispostandspeakingcandidly–althoughmostly

anonymously–tonewspaperreportersabouttheirconcerns,manywithinMumbai’s

developmentcommunityopenlyresistedtheascendanceofDharavi’s“entrepreneurial

bureaucrat.”AlthoughtheChiefMinisterchosetomaintainhissupportforMehtaandhisplan,

thepublicchallengesraisedbythisgrouprevealedthepoliticalcontestationsentailedinthe

ongoingreconfigurationsofMumbai’sdevelopmentplanninginstitutions.

Bymid‐2007,itappearedthatMehta’sdecade‐longefforttoredevelopDharaviwould

finallyberealized.InJanuaryofthatyear,thestategovernmenthadfinalizedthenecessary

amendmentstoMumbai’sDevelopmentControlRules,thusputtingintoformalpolicythe

processandproceduresfortheDRP.Bytheearlyspring,theExpressionofInterest(EOI)

documentwasdrafted,outliningtheproject’sobjectives,financingarrangements,andthe

detailsoftheinternationalbiddingprocessthatwouldselectthefivedeveloperstocarryoutthe

work.OnJune1,2007,theEOIdocumentwasmadepublicwhennewspapersthroughoutthe

worldprintedahalf‐pagecoloradvertisementinviting“internationaldevelopstotransform

Dharavi,oneofthelargestslumpocketsintheworld,intoanintegratedtownshipofMumbai

28


withallmodernamenitiesandcompleteinfrastructure”(SlumRehabilitationAuthority2007;

IndianExpress2007).AsdomesticandinternationaldeveloperspreparedEOIapplications,

Mumbai’shousingadvocatesmobilizedanoppositionandactivatedtheirtransnational

networks(Weinstein2009).InaletteremailedtofriendsandcolleaguesinIndiaandabroad,

SheelaPatel,DirectorofSPARC,aprominentMumbai‐basedNGOworkingonhousingand

livelihoodissues,articulatedthepositionofmanyoftheproject’scritics,writing:

Dharavi, we believe is symbolic of the struggle between local struggles

overcomebyglobalinvestmentinfrontofwhomourgovernmentsbowdowntodeliverprojectswhichareoftenatthecostoflocalconcerns.Weseriouslyfeelconcerned about the capacity of the present state institutions to arbitrate

betweentheinterestsofthecommunitiesofthepoorandinternationalcapitalandlocalandnationalrealestatebusinesses,whoareinfactthenewplannersofcities.29

InresponsetoPatel’semail,aletter–signedbyprominentactivistsandacademicsbothinand

outsideofIndia–wassenttoIndia’sPrimeMinisterrequestingthattheprojectbeplacedon

holdwhiletheinterestsofthelocalcommunitieswerebetteraddressed(Weinstein2009).The

projectmovedforward,asdozensofEOIapplicationswerereceivedthatsummer,butthe

oppositionremainedvocal.

Inadditiontoraisingconcernsabouttheinfluenceofglobalinvestorsandcertain

featuresoftheplan,theactivistsmadeadirectchallengetotheproject’splanningprocess

includingtheprominentpositionheldbyMukeshMehta.InAugust2008,adelegationof

Dharaviresidents,ledbyrightwingpoliticalleaderUddavThackeray,madethischargeina

meetingwiththestate’sChiefMinister.Meetingsomeofthedelegate’sdemands,theChief

MinisteragreedtoestablishacommitteecomprisedofDharaviresidentstohelpensureamore

openplanningprocess(TimesofIndia2008,DNA2008).Soonafterthemeeting,aten‐person

29PersonalemaildatedMay30,2007.

29


committeewasestablished;butratherthanacommitteeofDharaviresidents,itwas

establishedasa“CommitteeofExperts,”madeupofprominenthousingactivistsandformer

bureaucrats,includingSheelaPatel,aswellasthestate’sformerChiefSecretaryandtheformer

ChiefPlanneroftheMetropolitanMumbaiRegionalDevelopmentAuthority.

WhiletherelationshipbetweenMehtaandtheCommitteeofExpertshadneverbeenan

easyone,theseconflictscametoaheadinJune2009whenthecommitteereportedlysenta

lettertotheChiefMinisterrequestingMehta’sresignation.Theletterwasnevermadepublic,

butmembersofthecommitteediscussedtheletteranditscontentsinaJune9articlepublished

intheTimesofIndia(Bharucha2009a).Accordingtothearticle,theletterexpressedconcerns

aboutthewaythatMehtahadbeenselectedasprojectconsultant,hisqualificationsforthe

position,andthecompensationhewouldbereceiving.

Thestandardprocedureofgoodgovernance requiresa transparentprocessofselection, which includes an invitation of expression of interest by agencies

which fulfill certain basic pre‐qualifications and experience, a rigorous processofscrutinyandobjectiveevaluation.Wewerehowever,shockedtofindthatnosuchprocedureshadbeenfollowedandthepresentconsultantswerearbitrarily

andhastilyappointedonacolossalfeetobepaidfromthepublicexchequer.30

NotingthatMehta’s“furthercontinuancewillbedetrimentaltotheinterestsoftheprojectand

thecity,”membersofthecommitteecitedinconsistentinformationprovidedintheEOIbidding

document,aswellasinmeetingswithbiddersastheirprimarymotivationforwritingtheletter

(Bharucha2009b).Thefollowingmonth,theCommitteeofExpertsraisedanewsetofconcerns

abouttheprojectinanopenlettertotheChiefMinister.Makingthisletterpublic,itnotesthat

“earlierletterstoGovernmentregardingourstrongreservationsabouttheDharavi

30QuotedinBharucha2009a.

30


RedevelopmentProject(DRP)havenotbeenacknowledged.”31NotmentioningMehta,“the

presentconsultants,”orspecificconcernsabouttheproject’splanningprocess,theJulyletter

detailedthecommittee’sconcernsaboutthecurrentplanandidentifiedrevisionsthatwould

betteraddresstheresidents’needs.Apparentlyunmovedbythepublicnatureofthe

committee’saction,theChiefMinisterissuednoresponsetotheletter.

Relationsbetweenthegovernment,Mehta,andthecommitteeremainedstrainedover

thenextseveralmonths.InOctober2009,whenfinaldocumentationfromtheproject’sbidders

wastobesubmittedtothestategovernment,sevenofthefourteenremainingdevelopers

withdrewfromconsideration(Bharucha2009c,Mehta2009a).Althoughnoexplanationswere

publiclygiven,oneofthedevelopers,speakingtoaTimesofIndiareporterontheconditionof

anonymitysimplystatedthat“it’samessyaffairandwe’vedecidedtostayout”(Bharucha

2009c).ReportsbegantosurfaceofstrainedrelationsbetweenMehtaandtheCEOofthe

DharaviRedevelopmentAuthority(Mehta2009a),assomepoliticalleaderswerereportedly

lobbyingtheChiefMinistertodisbandtheCommitteeofExperts(Mehta2009b).TheMP

representingtheMumbaidistrictthatincludesDharavireportedlyraisedconcernstotheChief

MinisterthatthecommitteewasobstructingtheDRPplanningprocess.Heexplainedtoa

newspaperreporterthat“ifthecommitteeisfulfillingitsroleforwhichthememberswere

appointed,Ihavenoobjection.”Hecontinuedthat,“theprojectismeantforthepeople’s

benefitandthelocalresidentshavereposedtheirtrustinmebyelectingmefromthis

constituency”(Mehta2009b).Thesepublicfightsultimatelyservedtounderminetheproject

andbothMehta’sandthegovernment’scredibilityontheproject.

31PubliclettertoHonShriAshokChavanfromCommitteeofExperts,dated7July,2009.

31


Discussion

CertainreconfigurationsassociatedwithIndia’seconomicliberalizationandeffortsto

positionMumbaiasaglobalcityhavealteredthenatureofstateinterventionintheareasin

urbandevelopmentandhousingconstruction.Throughoutthesecondhalfofthetwentieth

century,developmentschemewereperiodicallyproposedforslumsettlementsingeneraland

forDharaviinparticular,butmanyoftheseprojectswereeitherleftunimplementedorhadonly

limitedtransformativeeffectsonthephysicalandsocialconditionsofslums,dueinparttoa

lackofresourcesandauthorityatthelocallevel(Sharma2000,Shaw2004,Dossal2010).

AlthoughofficialswithintheIndianGovernmentintheearly1990sacknowledgedtheseissues

andadoptedtheSeventy‐FourthConstitutionalAmendmenttobegintoredressthem,therehas

beenonlylimitedcomplianceintheStateofMaharashtraandalocalpowervacuumhas

remainedinthedevelopmentplanningagenciesforMumbai.Despiteanewagendaforslum

redevelopmentemerginginthemid‐1990s,persistingpoliticalweaknesseshave,tocertain

extent,preventedinterestsfrombeingtranslatedintopolicyandprogrammaticinterventions.

AsthecaseofDharavi’splanningprocessreveals,however,MukeshMehtasteppedin

tothelocalpowervacuumandsimplyseizedtheauthorityneededtoplanaprojectofthisscale.

Givenhisdeterminationinspiteofalargelydisinterestedstategovernmentandvarious“turf”

battles,Mehtainsertedhimselfintothisprocess,actingasanentrepreneurialbureaucrat.His

roleintheDRPbroadlyresonateswithgovernanceshiftsidentifiedbySassen(2006),Shatkin

(2007),andothersofprivatesectoractorsassuminggreatercentralityinactivitiesthathad

previouslybeentheexclusiveorprimarypropertyofpublicactorsactingonbehalfofthestate.

Furthermore,inadditiontoanentrepreneurialbureaucratengagedinplanningfortheDRP,this

projectalsoentailsaprivatefundingmodelbasedontheleasingofpubliclandtoprivate

developers.Aninnovativeapproachtosharingthecostsofdevelopmentbetweenpublicand

32


privateinstitutions,thesearrangementsarepossibleonlywherethestateeitherownsorhas

theauthoritytoseizelandandlandpricesareexpectedtoremainhighenoughfordevelopersto

recouptheirinitialinvestments.

Whilesomehavesuggestedthatarrangementssuchasthese,entailinganincreased

scopefortheprivatesector,reflectthewithdrawalofthestatefromdevelopmentplanning,the

historicalcomponentofmyresearchshowsthat,underthesearrangements,thestatemay

actuallybeassumingamoreactiveroleinurbandevelopmentthanithashadbefore.Yetby

forming“strategicpartnerships”withbetterresourcedactorsandinstitutions,suchasMehta

andtheprivateinvestorsanddeveloperswhowillprovideresourcesnecessarytocarryoutthe

project,MaharashtraandMumbaihave,toacertainextent,bolstereditscapacitytoundertake

developmentplanningactivities.Somescholarshaveassociatedtheincreasedauthorityofthe

privatesectorandNGOswithadeclineinstatepower–withsomeevensuggestingthatsuch

initiativesrepresent“politicsbeyondthestate”(Wapner1995,Evans1997).Althoughthis

associationofincreasedprivateinvolvementwithdecreasedpublicresponsibilitymaybe

relevantinsomecontexts,thisviewofstatewithdrawalpresumesthatthestateonceplayeda

centralroleindevelopmentactivities.HistoricalresearchonhousingschemesinDharaviand

Mumbai,however,donotsupportthisclaim(Dossal2010,Weinstein2008).AsMukeshMehta

hasbeengiventhechargeofdraftingtheDRP’scomprehensiveplan,overseeingthe

consultativeprocesswiththevariousstakeholders,andmanagingtheproject’simplementation,

somestateofficials,includingcertainindividualswithinthestate‐levelSRA,havealsoengaged

moredeeplyintheseactivities.

Thesefindsareconsistentwithrecognitionsmadebyexaminationsoftheongoingshifts

underwayinMumbai’sdevelopmentcontextandparticularlyinthepoliticsofslumhousing

construction.AnthropologistArjunAppadurai(2000,2001),forexample,hasidentifiedtherole

33


ofnon‐stateandincreasinglynon‐localactorsinslumredevelopmenteffortsinMumbai,buthas

emphasizedthecontinuingroleofthelocalstateintheseactivities.Detailingtheactivitiesofan

allianceofthreeMumbai‐basedhousingadvocacyorganizations,Appaduraifindsthatthrough

theAlliance’sconnectionstoglobalnetworksofhousingadvocatesandpro‐poororganizations,

thelocalstatehasbeencompelledtocreateamoreopenanddemocraticprocessforre‐

housingslumdwellers.JanNijman(2008)hasalsoexaminedthemannerinwhichneoliberal

globalizationhasalteredthenatureofstateinterventioninhousingconstructioninMumbai,

concludingsimilarlythatthestatecontinuestoplayamuchlargerroleintheseactivitiesthan

mostanalysesofneoliberalurbandevelopmentwouldsuggest.Ratherthantakingpoweraway

fromthestate,thisresearch,aswellasthecasepresentedhere,revealsthatthelocalstatehas

undergoneaninternalreconfigurationinthewayitplansforandcarriesoutdevelopment

projects.ItfurthermoresupportstheclaimsmadebySassen(2006)andBrenner(2004)that,in

thecontextofeconomicglobalization,theinternaldynamicsofstatepowermaybereorganized

andnewinstitutionalconfigurationsmaybeproduced.

Conclusion

Thebasiccontentioninthispaperisthatongoingreconfigurationsinglobalizing

Mumbaihavebeguntoalterthenatureoflocalstatepowerandthecapacityofthestateto

promoteurbanrestructuringandglobally‐orientedurbandevelopments.Dueinparttothe

relativelydisempoweredinstitutionsoflocalgovernanceinurbanIndia,apowervacuumhas

existedinthefieldofurbandevelopmentanddevelopmentplanninginthecity.Yetavarietyof

politicalshifts–shapedinpartbyIndia’songoingeconomicliberalizationandeffortstoraise

Mumbai’spositioninglobalurbanhierarchies–havecreatedtheconditionsforan

“entrepreneurialbureaucrat”toinserthimselfintothepowervacuumand,withstatesupport,

34


buildthebureaucraticinfrastructurenecessarytoplanandpromotealarge‐scaleurbanrenewal

effort.Incertainimportantways,thiscaserevealsthepartialprivatizationofurbanplanningand

municipaladministrationfunctions.Theseassertionsareconsistentwiththewidelycited

observationintheglobalcityliteraturethatidentifiestheincreasedparticipationofprivate

actorsandinstitutionsinurbangovernanceasoneofthefundamentalwaysthatneoliberal

globalizationhasledtothespatial,political,andeconomicreconfigurationsofurbanspace

(Mayer2001,BrennerandTheodore2005). Withaweakmunicipalgovernmentandcompetingprioritiesthatcontinuetodivertthe

state’sattentionandresourcesawayfromurbanaffairs,localpowerinMumbairemains

fragmented.Itiswithinthislocalpowervacuum,thatMukeshMehtahasbeenableto

consolidatethepowerandresourcesneededtocarryoutDharavi’sredevelopment.Takingona

projectthatfewstateofficialshavetheinterest,authority,andresourcestomanage,Mehtahas

beenintimatelyinvolvedineachstepoftheproject’splanningprocess.Andrecognizingthe

inertiaandprojectdelaysthatcanoftenresultfromadministrativeandpoliticalfragmentations,

hehasretainedatightgriponthispower,believingtheproject’ssuccessdependsonhistight

administrativecontrol.Politiciansandbureaucratscontinuetolackthepower,resources,and

administrativecapacityneededtocarryoutdevelopmentschemes.

35


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