1 road network vulnerability important links and areas, exposed users erik jenelius dept. of...
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Road network vulnerability Important links and areas, exposed users
Erik JeneliusDept. of Transport and Economics
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)Stockholm
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The project• Dep. of Transport and Economics, KTH• Supervisor Prof. Lars-Göran Mattsson
Assist. supervisor Dr. Katja Vourenmaa Berdica• Time period 2007-2010• Funded by Swedish Road Administration and
Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems
http://www.infra.kth.se/tla/projects/vulnerability/index_eng.html
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Vulnerability analysis
Motivation• Events sometimes occur that severely disrupt
transportation services• Can have big impacts on individuals and
businesses• For individuals: reduced accessibility to social
services, loss of access to/time for work, school, daycare, shopping, recreation, etc.
• For businesses: loss of manpower/customers, delayed deliveries, increased freight costs, etc.
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Vulnerability analysis
Aim• Before occurrence, identify scenarios that
– would have severe consequences for society
– could occur in the future• Important sub-tasks:
– Identify critical points/areas where incidents are likely and/or could have particularly severe impacts
– Identify users/regions that would be particularly affected by an incident
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Vulnerability analysis
Value• In planning stage:
– Adjust location/structure of roads to risks– Support road projects providing
redundancy to existing network• In maintenance/operations stage:
– Probability of disruption can be reduced by upgrades and maintenance
– Consequences can be reduced by information and swift restoration
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Concepts
Importance• A link or larger area is important if disruption
there would have severe impacts for users overall• An operator’s perspective of vulnerability
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Concepts
Exposure• A group of users is exposed to a certain
scenario if it would have severe impacts for the group
• We study regional exposure: users grouped according to municipality/county of trip origin
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Analysis focus• Large-scale real-world road networks• Full-range analysis (”all links”)• Draw generalizable conclusions
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Impact model• Simple indicator: Delay with only route
adjustment• Users assumed to minimize travel time• In Swedish applications, link travel times
assumed unchanged by disruption• Data requirements:
– Network (nodes, links)– Link travel times– Travel demand between zones (demand
nodes)
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Impact model• Unsatisfied demand: Users unable to travel
during disruption• Calculate delay as waiting time until
reopening, assuming constant travel demand (to be revised in future applications)
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1. Regional disparities in vulnerability
Motivation• Study geographical variations in vulnerability• Can these differences be explained by network
structure and travel patterns?• Can we find simple proxy variables?
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Regional exposure and importance• Expected user exposure: Average delay per
traveller starting the region due to disruption of random link in the whole network
• Expected importance: Total delay for travellers in the whole network due to disruption of random link in the region
Delay in region
Delay in whole
Disruption in region
Importance
Disruption in whole
Exposure
170 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
utsatthet/resenär (10^-6 h)1.763 - 3.8463.846 - 5.3385.338 - 7.0247.024 - 9.8399.839 - 52.468
N
Gothenburg
Skåne
Stockholm Stockholm
Skåne
Gothenburg
N
betydelsefullhet (h)0.1 - 0.3220.322 - 0.4990.499 - 0.7720.772 - 1.5011.501 - 10.085
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
user exposure (10-6 h) importance (h)
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Regression analysis• Regress exposure and importance on variables
capturing network structure and travel patterns of the own region
• Both exposure and importance should be high if network density low
• Exposure high if average user travel time long• Importance high average link flow large
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Network density• Three measures of increasing simplicity and
data availability:1. Redundancy and scale:
#links / #nodes and average link length2. Road density:
Total network length / region area3. Population density
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0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
vägtäthet (km/km^2)0.073 - 0.5580.558 - 0.8340.834 - 1.0241.024 - 1.3531.353 - 7.306
N
Gothenburg
Skåne
Stockholm Stockholm
Skåne
Gothenburg
N
befolkn.täthet (inv./km^2)0.26 - 10.4810.48 - 19.6419.64 - 34.6834.68 - 81.9281.92 - 4021.67
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
beta index1.036 - 1.2771.277 - 1.3431.343 - 1.3881.388 - 1.4341.434 - 1.554
N
Gothenburg
Skåne
Stockholm Stockholm
Skåne
Gothenburg
N
länklängd (km)0.422 - 1.8381.838 - 2.4312.431 - 3.0253.025 - 3.8583.858 - 11.005
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
link length (km) road density (km-1)
210 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
genomsn. restid (h)0.118 - 0.2360.236 - 0.2750.275 - 0.3250.325 - 0.370.37 - 0.783
N
Gothenburg
Skåne
Stockholm Stockholm
Skåne
Gothenburg
N
genomsn. flöde (frdn/h)1.01 - 10.90310.903 - 17.72217.722 - 28.86428.864 - 54.82154.821 - 502.054
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
aver. user travel time (h) aver. flow (veh/h)
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Conclusions• Long-term vulnerability strongly determined
by network structure and travel patterns• Complex measures can be approximated with
simple variables• Difficult to affect patterns with infrastructure
investments
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2. Area-covering disruptions
Motivation• Extend single-link analysis to areas• Develop methodology for systematic analysis• Apply to large real-world road networks• Where are area-covering disruptions most
severe?• What differs from single-link failures?
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Methodology• Study area is covered with grid of equally
shaped and sized cells• Each cell represents spatial extent of
disruptive event• Event representation: All links intersecting cell
are closed, remaining links unaffected
Hexagonal Square
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Methodology• Multiple, displaced grids used to increase
accuracy
• No coverage bias: Each point in study area equally covered
• Avoids combinatioral issues with multiple link failures
• Easy to combine with frequency data
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Case study• Cell importance:
Total increase in travel time for all users when cell is disrupted
• Three square cell sizes: 12.5 km, 25 km, 50 km
Cell size # cells/grid # grids
12.5 km 3170 4
25 km 853 4
50 km 241 16
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Cell importance• 25 km grids• Each small square shows
mean importance of the four intersecting cells
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Cell importance• Unsatisfied demand constitutes on average 60% - 90% of
total delay• For most important cells, almost all delay due to
unsatisfied demand• Unsatisfied demand consists of internal,
inbound/outbound and crossing demand
I (veh h) Cell size (km) Mean Median Coeff. of
var.
Internal (%)
In+out (%)
Crossing unsat. (%)
Crossing detours (%)
Cell/link I
12.5 14600 224 4.90 4.20 49.2 7.15 39.4 282 25 47500 3790 3.57 13.5 60.2 5.73 20.5 701 50 148000 19700 2.51 30.6 56.1 3.77 9.56 1780
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Conclusions• Other factors behind vulnerability to area-
covering disruptions compared to single link failures: demand concentration
• Vulnerability reduced through allocation of restoration resources rather than increasing redundancy
• For important cells, unsatisfied demand constitutes nearly all increase in travel time
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Thank you!• Papers:
• Jenelius, E., Petersen, T. & Mattsson, L.-G. (2006), ”Importance and exposure in road network vulnerability analysis”, Transportation Research Part A 40, 537-560.
• Jenelius, E. (2009a), ”Network structure and travel patterns: Explaining the geographical disparities of road network vulnerability”, Journal of Transport Geography 17, 234-244.
• Jenelius, E. (2009b), ”Considering the user inequity of road network vulnerability”, Journal of Transport and Land Use, forthcoming.
• Jenelius, E. (2009c), ”Road network vulnerability analysis of area-covering disruptions: A grid-based approach with case study”, submitted.
http://www.infra.kth.se/tla/projects/vulnerability/index_eng.html