1

Questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policy

François Héran

I N E D

Institut national d'études démographiques, Paris

“Europe and the demographic challenge”

6th Munich Economic Summit Panel 3: "Europe's childless societies:

Go forth and multiply"

CESIfo / Herbert Quandt Stiftung, Munich, 21-22 June, 2007

2

Do we have a clear vision of the objectives of a family policy?

Filling the gap between people's wishes and behaviour concerning the number of children ("fertility gap")?– To invoke the interest of the State is not sufficient– Possible justification: filling the "fertility gap" contributes to

the well-being of the couples and can be a goal for the State

Compensating for the additional costs of childbearing and child raising (micro-level)?– Objection: it is up to each couple to decide. Why should the

State interfere with people's preferences? See the US case

Ensuring the active population renewal? – Could be done also through immigration: a collective choice

Ensuring the replacement of generations?– As a duty towards the next generations? But no such thing as

a "right to be borne" for the future generations or a "right to find a successor" for the present one

3

Necessity of further research

No definite answers to these philosophical questionsBut the necessity of accumulating better knowledge on the implications and consequences of each choice:1/ explaining the different mechanisms of population ageing: to what extent are they "avoidable" or "unavoidable"?2/ having a better comprehension of the micro-motives and the macro-factors which influence the fertility behaviour– See the recent calls launched under the 7th EU

Framework-programme: they explicitly address these demographic issues for the first time

4

I.- The three factors of population ageing

First of all: population ageing high up the age pyramid (in French: "vieillissement par le haut")– Due to increased longevity (a 4th floor added to the pyramid) = the unavoidable part of ageing

Less important : population ageing generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas")– Secular decline of fertility under replacement level

less than 2.05 children per woman ("2nd demographic transition")

= the avoidable part of ageing, open to pro-active policy

Strong but limited in time: the backlash of the baby boom (present impact of temporary rise of fertility)– At the beginning large birth cohorts rejuvenate the pyramid

but make it older 60 years later = unavoidable ageing

5

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

1/ Population ageing at the bottom (before)

6

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

1/ Population ageing at the bottom (after)

7

2/ Population ageing high up the pyramid

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

8

2/ Population ageing high up the pyramid (additional floor due to

longevity)

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

9

3/ A temporary additional fertility (baby-boom) which first rejuvenates the population…

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

10

…but 40 years later makes it older

-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

11

The French case: Age pyramids in 2005 and 2050 (INSEE demographic prospects)

Effectifs en milliers Effectifs en milliers

0100200300400500

Hommes

0 100 200 300 400 500

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Femmes

Âge

France, 2005 2050, scénario central

12

An illustration of the divide between "avoidable" and "unavoidable" ageing

UN demographic prospects (2006) in a selection of EU countriesThe graphs give the growth of population aged 65+ and that of population aged 15-64, indexed to 100, over 2000-2050Basis: the "medium scenario", prolonging the present trends, with a convergence close to 1.8 children per woman in 2050The "high variant" = an additional fertility of 0.5 child eventually 2.35 instead of 1.85 (a considerable change)

The widening gap between the 65+ and the 15-64 curves displays the relative population ageing– countering population ageing would mean closing the gap

between the two curves!

The slim difference between "medium" and "high" fertility variants illustrates the capacity of a pro-natalist policy to maintain the active population over time– A limited impact, compared to the impact of increased longevity

13

Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 SWEDEN 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

SWEDEN 65+

SWEDEN 15-64

High variant 15-64

14

Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 UK 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

UNI TED KI NGDOM 65+

UNI TED KI NGDOM 15-64

High variant 15-64

15

Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 FRANCE 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

FRANCE 65+

FRANCE 15-64

High variant 15-64

16

Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 ITALY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

I TALY 65+

I TALY 15-64

High variant 15-64

17

Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 GERMANY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GERMANY 65+

GERMANY 15-64

High variant 15-64

18

Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 POLAND 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

POLAND 65+

POLAND 15-64

High variant 15-64

19

Conclusion of part I

Sweden, UK or France: a population policy supporting the fertility rate is able to maintain the active population over the next decadesItaly, Germany, Poland: it will fill but a part of the gapIn all EU countries, however, the increased longevity accounts for most of the population ageing process (France is no exception)Immigration policy cannot hinder population ageing; it brings but a slight retrospective correction to the fertility rates of 30 years ago– nevertheless, immigration contributes to the working of home

care and institutional care

Finally, population ageing cannot be compensated by any population policy– neither policy immigration– nor family policy

20

II.- Some questions about the micro-motives and macro-

conditions of the fertility decision-making

To assess how policy initiatives could influence the free decisions of the individuals in the number and time of births, we need to understand:– the real costs and benefits of having a child (an additional

child)– the individual perceptions of the economic and non-

economic constraints– the decision-making process within the couple

But also the macro-factors of the fertility decision

including the micro-perceptions of the macro-conditions

Many difficulties in the micro-macro articulation

21

Macro-level factors (1): Economic circumstances

Since the 80's, fertility is higher in European countries with high female labour-force participation, possibly due to policies in favour of work/family life conciliationHowever, further research is needed to bridge the macro-micro divide and elucidate some paradoxes– the French paradox: high fertility, despite high unemployment– the American paradox: high fertility, despite weak family policy

And a more general paradox – At the micro-level, unemployment, atypical working hours, and

economic uncertainty negatively affect the fertility decisions– However, except for mega-crises (e.g. the fall of Communist

regimes), aggregated data in time series show few correlation between the economic ups and downs and the fluctuations of fertility

– Attempts to take into account meso-determinants (such as the "economic morale" of the households) are not very conclusive

22

Macro-level factors (2): Norms and values

A common theory: individualism, hedonistic values, dissociation of sexuality and marriage, gender equality, etc. tend to reduce fertilityConfirmed at micro-level, within the same country : individuals with "progressive" family values have lower fertility

However, the correlation is negative at the macro-level: – Fertility is higher in countries where individualism and

gender equality is highly valued (see World Values Survey)– Marital instability does not entail low fertility levels– "Lowest low fertility" prevails in countries with traditional

"familistic values" and rigid family structures (where it is still believed that parents should be married to have children, and mothers should stay home to raise them)

The new order: "familistic" values are anti-natalistic, family flexibility is pro-natalist

23

Macro-level factors (3): Cultural orientations

Cultural explanations of fertility variations (religion, fatalism, or patriarchy seen as "resistance to change") do not square with the facts E.g. the Maghreb case (or the Iranian case): – steep decline of fertility in 25 years (from 7 children per woman

in the 70's to 2.2 in 2000), despite the Islamic revival

E. g. the Sicilian case (or the Andalusian case)– Fertility variations across Italy (or Spain) imputed to the cultural

divide between North and South, Christianity and Islam– But how can you explain recent evolutions with multicentennial

factors? The chronological fallacy of anthropological ground

The Italian "mamma": an argument easily turned round– In the 60's, the Italian matriarch loved children so much that

she had many of them (multiplicative love)– Nowadays, she loves her children so much that she has few of

them and doesn't want them to leave home (exclusive love)

24

Macro-level factors (4): Public policies

To fill the "fertility gap" between people's wishes and behaviour, policies may support family formation and alleviate the costs of child-raisingSuch policies are not limited to the benefits of the Maternity or Children branch of Social protectionInclude also sector-based policies (much more relevant than the catch-all cultural factors), such as:– Housing policy (e.g. rented housing for the young couples

who wish to found a family, as a first step of the autonomy)– School policy (full-day elementary school, universal pre-

elementary school at age 3)– Policies of companies and administrations (parental leaves,

definition of working hours, involvement in child care centres)

– Child-friendly town-planning– Positive image of motherhood and fatherhood in the medias

25

Concluding remarks

Most of the population ageing process is due to the inexorable increase of longevity, as a consequence of permanent collective choices

Policy initiatives to increase the fertility rate will never overcome the "unavoidable" part of population ageing

They make sense only if their objective is to counter the "avoidable" part of population ageing, due to low fertility, alleviating the economic and non-economic constraints

However, there is no scientific rationale to justify the priority of internal growth (native births) on external growth (through immigration): the decision is merely political

In practice, the natural increase of European countries will decline, and immigration will turn out to be the first engine of demographic growth (even in France). Family policy is not a domestic alternative to immigration. Both are part of our future in Europe.

26

Annex 1.Family policy in France, in the European context

Source: Social protection counts elaborated by DREES (the Direction of statistics and studies of the French Ministry of Health)J. Bechtel and L. Caussat, in Études et résultats #376, Febr. 2005

27

Social protection benefits in France, 2003Distribution of risks (or functions)

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Old age

Sickness, health care

FAMILY, CHILDREN

Unemployment

Survivors

Disability

Housing

Work accidents

Poverty, social exclusion

% of social protectionbenefits

% of GDP

Total amount: 465 billions € = 30% of

GDP

28

Social protection benefits for the families in Europe: cash / in kind [education excluded] (in % of GDP)

0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4

SpainI taly

PortugalNetherl.Greece

DenmarkU. K.

I relandSwedenFinlandBelgium

FRANCEGermanyAustria

Luxemburg

Cash benefi ts

Benefi ts in kind

29

Some traits of the French family policy

Complex and not always consistent– More than 30 measures (not easy to evaluate)– Means-tested benefits (for social redistribution),

but also tax cuts (quotient familial, tax-splitting system")– Still wavering between extra support to the 3rd child

and benefits from the 1st child

But quite consensual and politically neutral– Unquestioned in the last electoral debates– Confirmed every year by la Conférence de la famille

More feministic then familistic– No need to be married; no need to stay home– Strong support to the one-parent families

A 60-year continuity that inspires confidence in the population

30

Annex 2. Two children per woman in France in 2006:

is this due to immigration?

Source: INSEE data, exploited by François Héran and Gilles Pison, "Two children per woman in France in 2006: are immigrants to blame?", Population & societies, 432, March 2007 (downloadable from http://www.ined.fr/en)

31

A large contribution to births may go with a limited impact on fertility

It is often claimed that the French fertility rate is due to foreign populationSurprising though it may seem, the foreign population brings a large contribution to births but a limited impact on fertility (see graph)– 2005: 94 000 babies born to a foreign mother out of 774 000 = 12 %– This raises the national fertility rate by just 0.10 child,

from 1.8 (for French women) to 1.9 (for women of all nationalities)Explanation: – Foreign women have 1.5 child more than the nationals– But represent only 7% of the female population of childbearing age the 1.5 additional child accounts only for 7% in the national rate– The impact of foreigners on the number of births depends more from

the extra number of foreign women than from their extra fertilityIf we take immigrant rather than foreign women, the contribution to births increases, while the contribution to fertility gets smaller– since the immigrants have arrived at an earlier age, they resemble

more native French women in terms of fertility

32

France 1980-2005: the limited impact of immigration on the national fertility rate

(Source: Population & societies #432, March 2007)

3,14

2,81 2,80

3,29

1,841,71 1,72 1,80

1,901,791,78

1,92

0

1

2

3

4

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Foreign women

TOTAL

French women