1 exclusive quality (work in progress) johan stennek research institute of industrial economics,...
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Exclusive Quality(work in progress)
Johan StennekResearch Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm
CEPR
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Example:Sweden
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Example:U.S.
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Example:Summary
1. Exclusive distribution – Competition
2. Exclusive distribution – Quality
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Questions
1. Why and when exclusive distribution?– Role of quality?– Competing distributors
2. Effect of ban on exclusive distribution?
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The Model:Agents
One producer of (a single) TV-channel
Two TV-distributors
Viewers
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The Model:“Timing”
1. Producer invests in quality
2. Producer and distributors negotiate over distribution rights
3. Distributors compete for viewers
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3. Competition for viewersSetup
• Given– Quality– Distribution (prices fixed)
• Timing– Two distributors set subscription fees– Each viewer subscribes to one distributor
• Hotelling
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3. Competition for viewersSubscription revenues
Quality
Aggregate subscription revenues
Non-exclusive dist.
Exclusive dist. se se
2sne
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3. Competition for viewersAdvertising revenues
Quality
Advertisingrevenues
Non-exclusive dist.
Exclusive dist.
ane
ae
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3. Competition for viewersSubscription vs. advertising revenues
Quality
Revenues
Loss of advertising rev.
Gain in subscr. rev.se se 2sne
ane ae
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2. Bargaining for Distribution RightsSetup
• Given– Quality
• Timing– Alternating offers
– Offer = price & type of distribution rights
– If non-exclusive rights, bargaining continues
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2. Bargaining for Distribution RightsForm of distribution
• “Efficiency”
• Exclusive rights if – High quality – Intense competition
• Intuition: Quality ↑ – Gain in aggregate subscription revenues ↑– Loss of advertising revenues ↓
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2. Bargaining for Distribution RightsPrices
• If exclusive rights– Fierce bidding competition
• In non-exclusive rights– Distributors don’t have to compete
• Note: • Note: Increased quality
– Exclusive distribution ”more likely”– Price for distribution rights ↑
p e se se
p ne sne se /2 ane ae/2
p e 2p ne
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1. Investment in QualitySetup
• Producer chooses quality– Benefits
1. Price for distribution rights ↑- Better bargaining position- Increased subscription revenues (if exclusive)
2. Advertising revenues ↑ (if exclusive)
• May induce exclusive distribution
– Costs
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1. Investment in QualityOptimal qualities, given distribution
Optimal quality
Marginal cost of quality
Optimal quality is always higherunder exclusive distribution thanunder non-exclusive distribution,given any cost
Optimal quality is higherthe smaller is the costof quality
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1. Investment in QualityOptimal quality
Optimal quality
Marginal cost of quality
threshold
Positive relation: Quality – Exclusive Dist.
1. low cost → high quality → exclusive dist.2. exclusive dist. → high quality
low high
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PolicyExperiment
• Given quality: – Ban on exclusive distribution good for all viewers
• Reduced quality: – Ban may harm all viewers
__________________________________
Excluded households• No ban: - can’t watch high quality channel
- but very low price• Ban: - can watch low quality channel__________________________________
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PolicyImplications
• “Efficiency defense”– Especially important when quality is high– Investment incentives may be too strong– Time consistency