1 aristoteles und die vernetzte welt barry smith

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1 Aristoteles und die vernetzte Welt Barry Smith http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/ faculty/smith

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1

Aristoteles und die vernetzte Welt

Barry Smithhttp://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/faculty/smith

2

JOBS FOR PHILOSOPHERS

3

PUT YOUR PHILOSOPHY TRAINING TO USE IN THE HI-TECH WORLD !

“is looking for people who can organize information into carefully defined hierarchical categorization schemes.

The information architecture model we employ is rather like an Aristotelian category schema in which information is grouped into genus-species relationships.”

www.kanisa.com

4

www.kanisa.com

“We are looking for people with at least a Masters degree, Ph.D. preferred,in philosophy or a related field, e.g., linguistics.”

Contact:[email protected]

6

What do ontological engineers do?

They build catalogue systems for given domains of reality

for example: meat.com... a catalogue system for an entire industry

7

... a catalogue system

... designed to allow customers, suppliers, insurers, subcontractors, shippers, and so on

to find their way about the world of

meat

... as readers find their way about the world of books in a library

8

Varieties of information system ontology

Business ontology

Legal ontology

Military ontology

Art ontology

Archeology ontology

Image ontology

...

9

there are too many individuals ...

10

Therefore:

catalogue systems must rest on general concepts

11

able about account acid across act addition adjustment advertisement after again against agreement air awake all almost among amount amusement and angle angry animal answer ant any apparatus apple approval arch argument art arm army as at attach attempt attention attraction authority automatic baby back bad bag balance ball band base basin basket bath be beautiful bed because bee before behavior belief bell bent berry best between bird birth bit bite bitter black blade blood blow blue board boat body boiling bone book boot bottle box boy brain brake branch brass bread breath bridge brick bright broken brother brown brush bucket building bulb burn burst business but butter button by cake camera canvas card care carriage cart cat cause certain chainchalk chance change cheap cheese chemical chest chief chin church circle clean clear clock cloth cloud coal coat cold collar color comb come comfort committee common company comparison complete complex condition connection conscious control cook copper copy cord cork cotton cough country cover cow crack credit crime cruel cry cup curtain current curve cushion cut damage danger dark daughter day dead dear death debt decison deep degree delicate dependent design desire destruction detail development disease different digestion direction discovery discussion disgust distance distribution division dirty do dog door doubt down drain drawer dress drop dry drink driving dust ear early east earth edge education effect egg elastic electric end engine enough equal error even event ever every example exchange existence expansion experience expert eye face fact fallfalse family far farm fat father fear feather feeble feeling female fertile fiction field fight finger fish fire first fixed flag flame flat flight fly floor flower fold food foolish foot for force fork form forward fowl frame free frequent friend from front fruit full future garden general get girl give glass glove go goat gold good government grain grass great green grey grip group growth guide gun hair hammer hand hanging happy harbor hard harmony hat hate have he head healthy hearing heart heat help here high history hole hollow hook hope horn horse hospital hour house how humor i ice idea if ill important impulse in increase industry ink insect instrument insurance interest invention iron island jelly jewel join journey judge jump keep kettle key kick kind kiss knee knife knotknowledge land language last late laugh law lead leaf learning leather left leg let letter level library lift light like limit line linen lip liquid list little living lock long look loose loss loud love low machine make male man manager map mark market married mass match material may meal measure meat medical meeting memory metal middle military milk mind mine minute mist mixed moon money monkey month morning mother motion mountain mouth move much muscle music nail name narrow nation natural near necessary neck need needle nerve net new news night no noise normal north nose not note now number nut observation of off offer office oil old on only open operation opinion opposite or orange order organization ornament other out oven over owner page pain paint paper parallel parcel past paste part payment peace pen pencil person physical picture pig pin pipe place plane plantplate play please pleasure plough pocket point poison polish political poor porter position possible pot potato powder power present price print prison private probable process produce profit property prose protest public pull pump punishment purpose push put quality question quick quiet quite rail rain range rat rate ray reaction reading ready reason receipt record red regret regular relation religion request representative respect responsible reward rhythm rice right ring river road rod roll roof room rough round rub rule run rush sad safe sail salt same sand say scale school science scissors screw sea seat second secret secretary see seed seem selection self send sense separate serious servant sex shade shake shame sharp sheep shelf ship shirt shock shoe short shut side sign silk silver simple sister size skin skirt sky sleep slip slope slow small smash smell smile smoke smoothsnake sneeze snow so soap society sock soft solid some son song sort sound soup south spring spoon sponge spade special space stage stamp star start statement station steam steel stem step stick sticky stiff still stitch stocking stomach stone stop store story straight strange street stretch strong structure square substance such sudden sugar suggestion summer sun support surprise sweet swim system table tail take talk tall taste tax teaching tendency test than that the then theory there thick thin thing

There are too many general concepts

12

Therefore:

concepts/genera must be hierarchically organized

13

Porphyrian Hierarchy

14

Linnaean Hierarchy

15

Desktop Hierarchy

16

From Species to Genera

canary

animal

bird

17

From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wings

can fly

has feathers

has skin

moves

eats

breathes

species-genus hierarchyas inference machine

18

From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wings

can fly

has feathers

has skin

moves

eats

breathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

19

animal

bird

canary

From Species to Genera

can singis yellow

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

has wingscan flyhas feathers

species-genus hierarchyas inference machine

XX

20

Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to represent our reasoning?

1. They capture the way the world is (Aristotelian realism)

2. They capture the natural ways we think (Kantianism) ... species are concepts

21

Species-genusgenus trees can be represented also as map-like partitions

22

From Species to Genera

canary

animal

bird

23

From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canarycanary

24

Species Genera as Tree

canary

animal

bird fish

ostrich

25

Species-Genera as Map/Partition

animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fish

canary

26

Tree and Map/Partition

27

Species-genusgenus trees can be represented also as map-like partitions

If Aristotelian realism is right, then such partitions are transparent to the reality beyond

28

Alberti’s Grid

c.1450

29

 

Coarse-grained Partition

30

 

Fine-Grained Partition

31

Map of US Stocks by Category

32

Map of US Stocks by Category

33

... a way of viewing the stock market

as we might view other parts and dimensions of reality

34Artist’s Grid

as through a transparent grid

35

Aristoteles und die vernetzte Welt

36

Net

37

Partitions come with a labelling and an address system

38

Periodic TableDie periodische Tabelle der chemischen Elemente

39

Perspectivalism

PerspectivalismDifferent partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other

40

Universe

41

Universe/Periodic Table

42

All veridical perspectives are equalEach veridical perspective (= transparent

partition) captures some corresponding domain of objects

43

Scientific partitions (like the periodic table)

and database partitions (like the Dewey Decimal Classification System)

... are transparent to the hierarchical order of an associated domain of objects

44

Question:

what other sorts of partitions have this feature of transparency?

the partitions of common sense (folk biology, folk physics, folk psychology ...)

Answer:

45

Aristotle

the ontologist of common-sense reality

Aristotle

46

Die Welt des gesunden Menschenverstands

= the world as apprehended via that conceptualization we call common sense

= the normal environment (the niche) shared by children and adults in everyday perceiving and acting

47

The world of mothers, milk, and mice ...

48

The Empty Mask (Magritte)

mama

mouse

milk

Mount Washington

49

our common-sense partition of the world of common sense is transparent

(common sense is true)

mothers exist ...

...but there is a problem

50

Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to represent our reasoning?

Recall our question:

51

From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wings

can fly

has feathers

has skin

moves

eats

breathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

52

From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wings

can fly

has feathers

has skin

moves

eats

breathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

ostrichhas long thin legsis tallcan‘t fly

yy

53

From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wings

can fly

has feathers

has skin

moves

eats

breathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

ostrichhas long thin legsis tallcan’t fly

yy

54

Theory of vagueness

How can -based conceptualizations be transparent,if the world is shaped like this

?

55

no such problems arise for the closed worlds constructed in information systems

hierarchies as reasoning tools work very well for the closed worlds of database engineers

56

whether a file is in a given folder on your hard-drive is completely determinate:

57

Dewey Decimal Classification as Map

58

Dewey Decimal Classification (Detail)

59

No borderline cases in the closed world of a database

Every book is assigned a determinate Dewey Classification Number at birth

111.560xxx

this yields a classificationthat is completely crisp

60

Kantianism

There are no species-genus hierarchies in reality unless we put them there

The world -- insofar as it is accessible to us through our concepts -- is a closed system tailored by us to fit

61

Kantianism

seems to work very well for the closed worlds of database environments (which are always finite)

62

veiled reality

or:

Kantianism asMidas-touch epistemology

63

hard vs. soft categories

Kantianism: we constitute/shape (empirical) reality in such a way that it corresponds to our categories

Aristotelianism: reality in itself is messy, but our categories fit nonetheless

64

How ?

because they are made up, not of crisp (hard), but of open (soft) genera and species

65

that is:

when we apply our categories to reality we are aware that we have to deal with an opposition

... between standard or focal or prototypical instances

... and non-standard or ‘fringe’ instances

66

birds

ostrich

Natural categories have borderline cases

sparrow

67

... they have a kernel/penumbra structure

kernel of focal

instances

penumbra of borderline cases

68

animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fish

every cell in every common-sense partition is subject to this same kernel-penumbra structure:

69

Dürer

70

What is common-sense reality?

the mesoscopic space of everyday human action and perception

– a space centered on objects organized into hierarchies of species and genera

... and subject to prototypicality

71

but more:

72

in addition to objects (substances),

which pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists:

cow man rock planet

73

the common-sense world contains also accidents

which pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists:

red hot suntanned spinning

74

An accident

= what holds of a substance per accidens

75

Accidents, too, instantiate genera and species

Thus accidents, too, form trees

76

quality

color

red

scarlet

R232, G54, B24

77

and they are distinguished as between tokens and types

(which is to say: between genera and species on the one hand,

... and instances on the other)

78

Accidents: Species and instances

this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now)

quality

color

red

scarlet

R232, G54, B24

79

quid? substance quantum? quantity quale? qualityad quid? relationubi? placequando? timein quo situ? status/contextin quo habitu? habitusquid agit? actionquid patitur? passion

Nine Accidental Categories

80

= relations of inherence(one-sided existential dependence)

John

hunger

Substances are the bearers of accidents

81

Aristotle 1.0

an ontology recognizing:substance tokensaccident tokenssubstance typesaccident types

82

Aristotle’s Ontological Square

Substantial Accidental

Second substance

man

cat

ox

Second accident

headache

sun-tan

dread

First substance

this man

this cat

this ox

First accident

this headache

this sun-tan

this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

83

Aristotle’s Ontological Square

Substantial Accidental

Second substance

man

cat

ox

Second accident

headache

sun-tan

dread

First substance

this man

this cat

this ox

First accident

this headache

this sun-tan

this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

84

Aristotle’s Ontological Square

Substantial Accidental

Second substance

man

cat

ox

Second accident

headache

sun-tan

dread

First substance

this man

this cat

this ox

First accident

this headache

this sun-tan

this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

85

Aristotle’s Ontological Square

Substantial Accidental

Second substance

man

cat

ox

Second accident

headache

sun-tan

dread

First substance

this man

this cat

this ox

First accident

this headache

this sun-tan

this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

86

Aristotle’s Ontological Square

Substantial Accidental

Second substance

man

cat

ox

Second accident

headache

sun-tan

dread

First substance

this man

this cat

this ox

First accident

this headache

this sun-tan

this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

87

Alberti’s Grid c.1450

88

Some philosophers

accept only part of this ontology

89

Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b) ...

Substantial Accidental

Attributes

F, G, R

Individuals

a, b, c

this, that

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

90

Bicategorial Nominalism

Substantial Accidental

First substance

this man

this cat

this ox

First accident

this headache

this sun-tan

this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

91

Process Metaphysics

Substantial Accidental

Events

Processes“Everything is flux”

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

92

Aristotle 1.0

in fact however we need more than the ontological square

What is missing from Aristotle 1.0 asan ontology of common-sense reality?

93

Is everything in common-sense reality either a substance or an accident?

94

well, what about artefacts ?

95

Shoes

96

Temple at Corinth

97

Pipe

98

Standard Aristotelian theory of artefacts:

artefacts are mereological sums of substances

99

Positive and negative parts

positivepart

negativepartor hole

(made of matter)

(not made of matter)

100

Shoes

101

Temple at Corinth

102

Pipe

103

Some entities consist entirely of negative parts

places, spatial regions

institutions

laws, constitutions

104

quid? substance quantum? quantity quale? qualityad quid? relationubi? placequando? timein quo situ? status/contextin quo habitu? habitusquid agit? actionquid patitur? passion

Nine Accidental Categories

105

Places

For Aristotle the place of a substance is the interior boundary of the surrounding body

(for example the interior boundary of the surrounding water where it meets a fish’s skin)

106

Places are holes

107

Places are holes

108

Places are holes

109

Places are holes

110

niches, environments are holes

111

and holes can also be otherwise quite important

112

and holes can also be otherwise quite important

113

and holes can also be otherwise quite important

114

and holes can also be otherwise quite important

115

The metaphysics of holes

116

A hole in the ground

Solid physical boundaries at the floor and walls

but with a lid that is not made of matter:

hole

117

Holes involve two kinds of boundaries

bona fide boundaries which exist independently of our demarcating acts

fiat boundaries which exist only because we put them there

118

Examples

of bona fide boundaries:

an animal’s skin, the surface of the planet

of fiat boundaries:

the boundaries of postal districts and census tracts

119

Mountain

bona fide upper boundaries with a fiat base:

120

Architects Plan for a House

fiat upper boundaries with a bona fide base:

121

where does the mountain start ?

... a mountain is not a substance

122

nose

...and it’s not an accident, either

123

Aristotle 1.5

an ontology ofsubstances + accidents+ holes (and other entities not made of matter)+ fiat and bona fide boundaries+ artefacts and environments

is true

124

it’s truthmaker

= those parts and dimensions of reality which we call the common-sense world

knowledge of this common-sense world is, in relation to prototypical instances of the relevant species and genera, quite easy to come by

125

corrected

partition

126

folk biology

Aristotelian folk biology, folk physics, folk psychology, etc., are true of the common-sense world as it currently exists

(they have nothing to offer regarding its pre-history, its long term evolution, its position in the cosmos)

127

reference vs. theory

They have not much to offer, either, by way of good explanatory theories of the entities in their respective domains,

but they are transparent to those domainsnonetheless

128

reference realism vs. theory realism

this distinction applied not only to science (against T. S. Kuhn et al.) but also to common sense (against sceptics of various stripes)

the sun exists, and has existed for a long time – the very same object

129

Both scientific partitions and common-sense partitions

are based on reference-systems which have survived rigorous empirical tests

130

Criteria of quality of partitions

serves communiction

learnable (including via scientific training)

sensitive to nuances

serves prediction

131

The $64000 Question

How do those parts and dimensions of reality which we call the common-sense world

... relate to those parts and dimensions of reality which are studied by science?

132

Aristotle 2000

133

Universe/Periodic Table

animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fishfolk biology

partition of DNA space

134

Universe/Periodic Table

animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fish

both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality

135

many transparent partitions

at different levels of granularity

will operate with species-genus hierarchies

and with an ontology of substances (objects) and accidents (attributes, processes)

along the lines described by Aristotle

136

relative hylomorphism

substances and accidents reappear in the microscopic and macroscopic worlds of e.g. molecular biology and astronomy

(Aristotelian ontological zooming)

137

we do not assert

that every level of granularity is structured in substance accident form -- perhaps there are pure process levels, perhaps there are levels structured as fields

138

Perspectivalism

PerspectivalismDifferent partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other

139

An organism is a totality of molecules

An organism is a totality of cells

An organism is a single unitary substance

... all of these express veridical partitions

An organism is a totality of atoms

140

all express partitions which are transparent,

at different levels of granularity,

to the same reality beyond

141

 

Coarse-grained Partition

what happens when a fringe instance arises ?

142

 

Coarse-grained Partition

what happens when a fringe instance arises ?

Aristotle 1.0: you shrug your shoulders

143

 

Aristotle 2000:you go out to find a finer grained partition which will recognize the phenomenon in question as prototypical

144

The advance of science

is not an advance away from Aristotle towards something better.

Provided Aristotle is interpreted aright, it is a rigorous demonstration of the correctness of his ontological approach

145

It still remains the case, that:

all sciences are perfect, to the extent that Aristotle treated of their subject-matters

146

Kantianism

there is some unknown x, beyond all that can be grasped by our partitions

as our partitions get better and better they will approximate ever more closely to this x, but x itself will never be arrived at

147

Summary of the argument against Kantianism

each coarse-grained partition gives only a partial view (no complete map)

but it is a partial view which is already transparent to reality: the objects themselves already fall within our grasp

148

THE END

1

149

Open problems

how deal with ethical structures in the mesoscopic level -- to what do they correspond on the lower levels?

can the granularity based theory of vagueness be made to work here? (Brogaard)

150

Open Problems

how deal with institutions, and other holistic structures on higher levels?

mind-body problem

freedom of the will

151

Good conceptualizatons

Philosophical ontologists are interested in:

1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical perspectives on reality

2. which are at the same time interesting

= science, and what else

152

Problem with process metaphysics

arises only if it comes along with the claim to be complete

153

Multitree

154

Multitree

any directed acyclical graph which satisfies: the descendants of any node form a tree

155

two trees sharing the same set of leaves, for example the Dewey Decimal and the Library of Congress classification systems

As Furnas and Zacks note, genealogies, although frequently called "family trees", are in fact multitrees. Multitrees offer a natural notion of context (displaying ancestors) and content (displaying descendants), and are therefore very well suited for reusing hierarchical structure.

156

Aristotle 2000

closed, open universe -- different layers of partitions. relative hylomorphism, plus a load der/die/das)‚ multitrees

157

there are too many individuals ...

158

siamese

mammal

cat

organism

substancespecies, genera

animal

instances

frog

159

Common nouns

pekinese

mammal

cat

organism

substance

animal

common nouns

proper names

160

siamese

mammal

cat

organism

substancetypes

animal

tokens

frog

161

substance

one substantial categoryJohn, man

nine accidental categorieshunger, your hunger, being hungryyour sun-tanyour being taller than Mary

accidents

162

substance

place (in the Lyceum)

time (yesterday)

position (is sitting)

possession (has shoes on)

action (cuts)

passion (is cut)

quantity (two feet long)

quality (white)

relation (taller than)

John

accidents

163

substance

Substances are the bearers of accidents

accidentsBearers

164

substance

Substances are the bearers of accidents

accidents

John = relations of inherence(one-sided existential dependence)

Bearers

hunger

165

s

substance

166

Aristotelian Ontology of Weather

Substance = earth

Accidents = wind, thunder

167

substance accidents

Substance + Accident = State of Affairs

States of Affairs

168

Substance + Accident = State of Affairs

setting into relief

States of Affair

s

169

Not in a SubjectSubstantial

In a SubjectAccidental

Said of a SubjectUniversal, General,Type

Second Substances

man, horse, mammal

Non-substantial Universals

whiteness, knowledge

Not said of a Subject Particular, Individual,Token

First Substances

this individual man, this horse this mind, this body

Individual Accidents

this individual whiteness, knowledge of grammar

Aristotle’s Ontological Square (full)

170

Lake Tahoe Land Cover

171

Lake Tahoe Land Cover

172

Cerebral Cortex

173

Mouse Chromosome 5

174

Constitutions of 158 States

world’s first database

175

Prototypicality amongsub-categories

some sub-categories of a given category are more typical, standard, than others

canary is more typical than ostrich

176

instances

Prototypicality among instances too

albino frogalbino frog

177

What is missing from Aristotle?

Gibson: affordancesnichesgeometry of surface layout

178

Places

For Aristotle a place is a hole filled by a substance

The place occupied by you is the boundary of the surrounding air where it meets your body

179

Varieties of Controlled Airspace

180

Question:

Are mountains bona fide or fiat objects?

Did mountains exist before human cognitive agents came along?

181

Filled Holes

182

Superficial Objects?

183

184

Fields

185

Cognition imposes upon fields a division into objects

Are all objects fiat objects

186

Aggregates

187

Der Bevölkerung

188

Dem Deutschen Volke

189

Dem Deutschen Volke

190

Business Objects

191

Summer Forms, Winter Forms

192

Alps

193

Alps

194

Alps

195

Alps

196

Mountain is the most prominent kind of geographic thing in the common-sense ontology. But it is absent from the scientific ontology as a kind of thing.

Scientific ontology = topography as a field, represented by sampled values and interpolation functions, or by simple geometric forms such as triangles. The scientific ontology includes slope steepness and direction at every point, but even hillslopes are represented as fields.

197

Process vs. Form in Geomorphologywith thanks to Bernard Bauer

The interest of geomorphologists in processes is motivated by attempts to understand form (morphe = Greek ‘form’)

Form has to do with boundary conditions

Forms = mountain, river, valley, bay, etc.

198

Process vs. Form in Geomorphology

Hypothesis:

1. Processes occur at small scales (examples: entrainment and transport of sediments, groundwater effluxes, weathering, etc.)

2. Eventually they manifest themselves as forms (which exist at larger scales and change much more slowly through time)

199

Process vs. Form in Geomorphology

Question: Is the dynamics of how a particular form changes through time (e.g., how a meander bend shifts or how a hillslope degrades) to be considered ‘process’?

200

Process vs. Form in Geomorphology

We can after all interpret sedimentary strata and make inferences about changing meandering patterns and flood sequences – floods are then the 'processes' that lead to the form known as a floodplain

Form and process at different levels of granularity

201

Process vs. Form in Geomorphology

Microprocesses (erosion) involvingMicroforms (gravel)

Macroprocesses (flooding) involvingMacroforms (rivers)

202

Process vs. Form in Geomorphology

Object Process

floodplain

valley

delta

flood

glacial motion

sedimentation

this floodplain

this valley

this delta

this flood

this glacial motion

this sediment transportT

oken

Typ

e

203

Different ways of slicing up reality

Fields vs. Objects

1. landscapes are continuous (fields) – view of contemporary geomorphology

2. landscapes consist of assemblages of objects falling under natural kinds – view of ordinary cognitive agent

What is the relation between these two ?

204

Cognitive Contexts:

language-communitiesorganizationssciencesreligionsinformation systemsbusiness firms

205

= a system of concepts pertaining to a given domain

... concepts that are more or less coherently specified

Each involves a certain conceptualization

206

‘An ontology is a specification of a conceptualization’ (Tom Gruber, SRI)

Tom Gruber’s Definition

... designed to provide a stable forum for translation and interoperability asbetween different conceptualizations

Ontolingua = Esperanto for Information Systems

207

Ontology, for Gruber, starts with our conceptualizations, and sees how far we can push through from there to a description of a corresponding domain of objects

conceptualizations are associated with:stories, sciences, organizations, etc.

208

Ontology, for Gruber,

deals with surrogate created worlds

with ‘models’

... with the generated correlates of both good and bad conceptualizations

209

Two sorts of conceptualizations

bad = those which relate merely to a created, surrogate world

good = those which are transparent to some independent reality beyond

210

Not all conceptualizations are equal

Bad conceptualizations: ... lying, story-telling, dreaming, astrology, metaphysical error ...

Good conceptualizations: sciencewhat else?

211

Scientific conceptualizations

= those based on reference-systems which have survived rigorous empirical tests

Referential realism

vs. Theory realism

212

Are there transparent conceptualizations outside science?

213

The Empty Mask (Magritte)

214

Good conceptualizatons

Philosophical ontologists are interested in:

1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical perspectives on reality

2. which are at the same time interesting

= science, and what else

215

Internet Ontology

Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Datentabellen. Welt und elektronische Erfassung sind untrennbar.

Die Medien der e-Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig

216

Kantian Idealism

Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Bewußtseinsakten. Welt und Erfahrung sind untrennbar.

Die Medien der Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig

(die Wirklichkeit ist verschleiert)

217

hard vs. soft categories

Kant: wir prügeln die Wirklichkeit, bis sie unseren Kategorien entspricht

Aristoteles: Die Kategorien in der Welt sind offene (sanfte) Kategorien, d.h., sie werden auch Grenzfällen gerecht

218

But what about science ?

219

... are our scientific partitions truly transparent to an independent reality ?

(second Kantian argument)

220

D’Espagnat: Die verschleierte Wirklichkeit

die Heisenberg’scheUnschärferelation

(die Medien der Erkenntnissind im Grundbereich der Physik undurchsichtig ...)

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There are no veridical (transparent) partitions at the quantum level

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concepts vs. categories

on the Kantian reading species are concepts

on the Aristotelian reading the world itself exhibits a species-genus structure independently of how we conceive it