1 aristoteles und die vernetzte welt barry smith
Post on 21-Dec-2015
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PUT YOUR PHILOSOPHY TRAINING TO USE IN THE HI-TECH WORLD !
“is looking for people who can organize information into carefully defined hierarchical categorization schemes.
The information architecture model we employ is rather like an Aristotelian category schema in which information is grouped into genus-species relationships.”
www.kanisa.com
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www.kanisa.com
“We are looking for people with at least a Masters degree, Ph.D. preferred,in philosophy or a related field, e.g., linguistics.”
Contact:[email protected]
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What do ontological engineers do?
They build catalogue systems for given domains of reality
for example: meat.com... a catalogue system for an entire industry
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... a catalogue system
... designed to allow customers, suppliers, insurers, subcontractors, shippers, and so on
to find their way about the world of
meat
... as readers find their way about the world of books in a library
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Varieties of information system ontology
Business ontology
Legal ontology
Military ontology
Art ontology
Archeology ontology
Image ontology
...
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There are too many general concepts
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From Species to Genera
animal
bird
canary can singis yellow
has wings
can fly
has feathers
has skin
moves
eats
breathes
species-genus hierarchyas inference machine
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From Species to Genera
animal
bird
canary can singis yellow
has wings
can fly
has feathers
has skin
moves
eats
breathes
fishhas finscan swimhas gills
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animal
bird
canary
From Species to Genera
can singis yellow
has skin
moves
eatsbreathes
has wingscan flyhas feathers
species-genus hierarchyas inference machine
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Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to represent our reasoning?
1. They capture the way the world is (Aristotelian realism)
2. They capture the natural ways we think (Kantianism) ... species are concepts
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Species-genusgenus trees can be represented also as map-like partitions
If Aristotelian realism is right, then such partitions are transparent to the reality beyond
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Perspectivalism
PerspectivalismDifferent partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other
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All veridical perspectives are equalEach veridical perspective (= transparent
partition) captures some corresponding domain of objects
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Scientific partitions (like the periodic table)
and database partitions (like the Dewey Decimal Classification System)
... are transparent to the hierarchical order of an associated domain of objects
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Question:
what other sorts of partitions have this feature of transparency?
the partitions of common sense (folk biology, folk physics, folk psychology ...)
Answer:
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Die Welt des gesunden Menschenverstands
= the world as apprehended via that conceptualization we call common sense
= the normal environment (the niche) shared by children and adults in everyday perceiving and acting
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our common-sense partition of the world of common sense is transparent
(common sense is true)
mothers exist ...
...but there is a problem
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From Species to Genera
animal
bird
canary can singis yellow
has wings
can fly
has feathers
has skin
moves
eats
breathes
fishhas finscan swimhas gills
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From Species to Genera
animal
bird
canary can singis yellow
has wings
can fly
has feathers
has skin
moves
eats
breathes
fishhas finscan swimhas gills
ostrichhas long thin legsis tallcan‘t fly
yy
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From Species to Genera
animal
bird
canary can singis yellow
has wings
can fly
has feathers
has skin
moves
eats
breathes
fishhas finscan swimhas gills
ostrichhas long thin legsis tallcan’t fly
yy
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Theory of vagueness
How can -based conceptualizations be transparent,if the world is shaped like this
?
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no such problems arise for the closed worlds constructed in information systems
hierarchies as reasoning tools work very well for the closed worlds of database engineers
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No borderline cases in the closed world of a database
Every book is assigned a determinate Dewey Classification Number at birth
111.560xxx
this yields a classificationthat is completely crisp
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Kantianism
There are no species-genus hierarchies in reality unless we put them there
The world -- insofar as it is accessible to us through our concepts -- is a closed system tailored by us to fit
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Kantianism
seems to work very well for the closed worlds of database environments (which are always finite)
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hard vs. soft categories
Kantianism: we constitute/shape (empirical) reality in such a way that it corresponds to our categories
Aristotelianism: reality in itself is messy, but our categories fit nonetheless
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that is:
when we apply our categories to reality we are aware that we have to deal with an opposition
... between standard or focal or prototypical instances
... and non-standard or ‘fringe’ instances
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animal
bird
canary
ostrich
fish
every cell in every common-sense partition is subject to this same kernel-penumbra structure:
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What is common-sense reality?
the mesoscopic space of everyday human action and perception
– a space centered on objects organized into hierarchies of species and genera
... and subject to prototypicality
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in addition to objects (substances),
which pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists:
cow man rock planet
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the common-sense world contains also accidents
which pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists:
red hot suntanned spinning
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and they are distinguished as between tokens and types
(which is to say: between genera and species on the one hand,
... and instances on the other)
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Accidents: Species and instances
this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now)
quality
color
red
scarlet
R232, G54, B24
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quid? substance quantum? quantity quale? qualityad quid? relationubi? placequando? timein quo situ? status/contextin quo habitu? habitusquid agit? actionquid patitur? passion
Nine Accidental Categories
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= relations of inherence(one-sided existential dependence)
John
hunger
Substances are the bearers of accidents
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Aristotle 1.0
an ontology recognizing:substance tokensaccident tokenssubstance typesaccident types
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Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
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Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
84
Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
85
Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
86
Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
89
Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b) ...
Substantial Accidental
Attributes
F, G, R
Individuals
a, b, c
this, that
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
90
Bicategorial Nominalism
Substantial Accidental
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
91
Process Metaphysics
Substantial Accidental
Events
Processes“Everything is flux”
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
92
Aristotle 1.0
in fact however we need more than the ontological square
What is missing from Aristotle 1.0 asan ontology of common-sense reality?
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Positive and negative parts
positivepart
negativepartor hole
(made of matter)
(not made of matter)
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Some entities consist entirely of negative parts
places, spatial regions
institutions
laws, constitutions
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quid? substance quantum? quantity quale? qualityad quid? relationubi? placequando? timein quo situ? status/contextin quo habitu? habitusquid agit? actionquid patitur? passion
Nine Accidental Categories
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Places
For Aristotle the place of a substance is the interior boundary of the surrounding body
(for example the interior boundary of the surrounding water where it meets a fish’s skin)
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A hole in the ground
Solid physical boundaries at the floor and walls
but with a lid that is not made of matter:
hole
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Holes involve two kinds of boundaries
bona fide boundaries which exist independently of our demarcating acts
fiat boundaries which exist only because we put them there
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Examples
of bona fide boundaries:
an animal’s skin, the surface of the planet
of fiat boundaries:
the boundaries of postal districts and census tracts
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Aristotle 1.5
an ontology ofsubstances + accidents+ holes (and other entities not made of matter)+ fiat and bona fide boundaries+ artefacts and environments
is true
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it’s truthmaker
= those parts and dimensions of reality which we call the common-sense world
knowledge of this common-sense world is, in relation to prototypical instances of the relevant species and genera, quite easy to come by
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folk biology
Aristotelian folk biology, folk physics, folk psychology, etc., are true of the common-sense world as it currently exists
(they have nothing to offer regarding its pre-history, its long term evolution, its position in the cosmos)
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reference vs. theory
They have not much to offer, either, by way of good explanatory theories of the entities in their respective domains,
but they are transparent to those domainsnonetheless
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reference realism vs. theory realism
this distinction applied not only to science (against T. S. Kuhn et al.) but also to common sense (against sceptics of various stripes)
the sun exists, and has existed for a long time – the very same object
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Both scientific partitions and common-sense partitions
are based on reference-systems which have survived rigorous empirical tests
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Criteria of quality of partitions
serves communiction
learnable (including via scientific training)
sensitive to nuances
serves prediction
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The $64000 Question
How do those parts and dimensions of reality which we call the common-sense world
... relate to those parts and dimensions of reality which are studied by science?
134
Universe/Periodic Table
animal
bird
canary
ostrich
fish
both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality
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many transparent partitions
at different levels of granularity
will operate with species-genus hierarchies
and with an ontology of substances (objects) and accidents (attributes, processes)
along the lines described by Aristotle
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relative hylomorphism
substances and accidents reappear in the microscopic and macroscopic worlds of e.g. molecular biology and astronomy
(Aristotelian ontological zooming)
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we do not assert
that every level of granularity is structured in substance accident form -- perhaps there are pure process levels, perhaps there are levels structured as fields
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Perspectivalism
PerspectivalismDifferent partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other
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An organism is a totality of molecules
An organism is a totality of cells
An organism is a single unitary substance
... all of these express veridical partitions
An organism is a totality of atoms
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all express partitions which are transparent,
at different levels of granularity,
to the same reality beyond
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Coarse-grained Partition
what happens when a fringe instance arises ?
Aristotle 1.0: you shrug your shoulders
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Aristotle 2000:you go out to find a finer grained partition which will recognize the phenomenon in question as prototypical
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The advance of science
is not an advance away from Aristotle towards something better.
Provided Aristotle is interpreted aright, it is a rigorous demonstration of the correctness of his ontological approach
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It still remains the case, that:
all sciences are perfect, to the extent that Aristotle treated of their subject-matters
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Kantianism
there is some unknown x, beyond all that can be grasped by our partitions
as our partitions get better and better they will approximate ever more closely to this x, but x itself will never be arrived at
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Summary of the argument against Kantianism
each coarse-grained partition gives only a partial view (no complete map)
but it is a partial view which is already transparent to reality: the objects themselves already fall within our grasp
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Open problems
how deal with ethical structures in the mesoscopic level -- to what do they correspond on the lower levels?
can the granularity based theory of vagueness be made to work here? (Brogaard)
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Open Problems
how deal with institutions, and other holistic structures on higher levels?
mind-body problem
freedom of the will
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Good conceptualizatons
Philosophical ontologists are interested in:
1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical perspectives on reality
2. which are at the same time interesting
= science, and what else
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two trees sharing the same set of leaves, for example the Dewey Decimal and the Library of Congress classification systems
As Furnas and Zacks note, genealogies, although frequently called "family trees", are in fact multitrees. Multitrees offer a natural notion of context (displaying ancestors) and content (displaying descendants), and are therefore very well suited for reusing hierarchical structure.
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Aristotle 2000
closed, open universe -- different layers of partitions. relative hylomorphism, plus a load der/die/das)‚ multitrees
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substance
one substantial categoryJohn, man
nine accidental categorieshunger, your hunger, being hungryyour sun-tanyour being taller than Mary
accidents
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substance
place (in the Lyceum)
time (yesterday)
position (is sitting)
possession (has shoes on)
action (cuts)
passion (is cut)
quantity (two feet long)
quality (white)
relation (taller than)
John
accidents
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substance
Substances are the bearers of accidents
accidents
John = relations of inherence(one-sided existential dependence)
Bearers
hunger
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Not in a SubjectSubstantial
In a SubjectAccidental
Said of a SubjectUniversal, General,Type
Second Substances
man, horse, mammal
Non-substantial Universals
whiteness, knowledge
Not said of a Subject Particular, Individual,Token
First Substances
this individual man, this horse this mind, this body
Individual Accidents
this individual whiteness, knowledge of grammar
Aristotle’s Ontological Square (full)
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Prototypicality amongsub-categories
some sub-categories of a given category are more typical, standard, than others
canary is more typical than ostrich
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Places
For Aristotle a place is a hole filled by a substance
The place occupied by you is the boundary of the surrounding air where it meets your body
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Question:
Are mountains bona fide or fiat objects?
Did mountains exist before human cognitive agents came along?
196
Mountain is the most prominent kind of geographic thing in the common-sense ontology. But it is absent from the scientific ontology as a kind of thing.
Scientific ontology = topography as a field, represented by sampled values and interpolation functions, or by simple geometric forms such as triangles. The scientific ontology includes slope steepness and direction at every point, but even hillslopes are represented as fields.
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Process vs. Form in Geomorphologywith thanks to Bernard Bauer
The interest of geomorphologists in processes is motivated by attempts to understand form (morphe = Greek ‘form’)
Form has to do with boundary conditions
Forms = mountain, river, valley, bay, etc.
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Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Hypothesis:
1. Processes occur at small scales (examples: entrainment and transport of sediments, groundwater effluxes, weathering, etc.)
2. Eventually they manifest themselves as forms (which exist at larger scales and change much more slowly through time)
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Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Question: Is the dynamics of how a particular form changes through time (e.g., how a meander bend shifts or how a hillslope degrades) to be considered ‘process’?
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Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
We can after all interpret sedimentary strata and make inferences about changing meandering patterns and flood sequences – floods are then the 'processes' that lead to the form known as a floodplain
Form and process at different levels of granularity
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Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Microprocesses (erosion) involvingMicroforms (gravel)
Macroprocesses (flooding) involvingMacroforms (rivers)
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Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Object Process
floodplain
valley
delta
flood
glacial motion
sedimentation
this floodplain
this valley
this delta
this flood
this glacial motion
this sediment transportT
oken
Typ
e
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Different ways of slicing up reality
Fields vs. Objects
1. landscapes are continuous (fields) – view of contemporary geomorphology
2. landscapes consist of assemblages of objects falling under natural kinds – view of ordinary cognitive agent
What is the relation between these two ?
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Cognitive Contexts:
language-communitiesorganizationssciencesreligionsinformation systemsbusiness firms
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= a system of concepts pertaining to a given domain
... concepts that are more or less coherently specified
Each involves a certain conceptualization
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‘An ontology is a specification of a conceptualization’ (Tom Gruber, SRI)
Tom Gruber’s Definition
... designed to provide a stable forum for translation and interoperability asbetween different conceptualizations
Ontolingua = Esperanto for Information Systems
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Ontology, for Gruber, starts with our conceptualizations, and sees how far we can push through from there to a description of a corresponding domain of objects
conceptualizations are associated with:stories, sciences, organizations, etc.
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Ontology, for Gruber,
deals with surrogate created worlds
with ‘models’
... with the generated correlates of both good and bad conceptualizations
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Two sorts of conceptualizations
bad = those which relate merely to a created, surrogate world
good = those which are transparent to some independent reality beyond
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Not all conceptualizations are equal
Bad conceptualizations: ... lying, story-telling, dreaming, astrology, metaphysical error ...
Good conceptualizations: sciencewhat else?
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Scientific conceptualizations
= those based on reference-systems which have survived rigorous empirical tests
Referential realism
vs. Theory realism
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Good conceptualizatons
Philosophical ontologists are interested in:
1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical perspectives on reality
2. which are at the same time interesting
= science, and what else
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Internet Ontology
Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Datentabellen. Welt und elektronische Erfassung sind untrennbar.
Die Medien der e-Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig
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Kantian Idealism
Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Bewußtseinsakten. Welt und Erfahrung sind untrennbar.
Die Medien der Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig
(die Wirklichkeit ist verschleiert)
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hard vs. soft categories
Kant: wir prügeln die Wirklichkeit, bis sie unseren Kategorien entspricht
Aristoteles: Die Kategorien in der Welt sind offene (sanfte) Kategorien, d.h., sie werden auch Grenzfällen gerecht
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... are our scientific partitions truly transparent to an independent reality ?
(second Kantian argument)
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D’Espagnat: Die verschleierte Wirklichkeit
die Heisenberg’scheUnschärferelation
(die Medien der Erkenntnissind im Grundbereich der Physik undurchsichtig ...)