AMEC experience in nuclear power

related projects

VII International School on Nuclear Power, Warsaw

David BoathVice President / Chief Engineer, AMEC

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Content

Who is AMEC

AMEC nuclear history and activities

Case study on introducing PWR technology into the UK (Sizewell B)

Current UK position

International harmonisation

Nuclear Safety responsibilities

Challenges for Owners / Licensees

Personal insights

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AMEC at a Glance

UK listed Market cap c.£3.6 billion

Revenues ~ £4 billion

Employees ~27 000

Working in Around 40 countries

* 2013 full year results

AMEC is one of the world’s

leading engineering,

project management and

consultancy companies

We design, deliver & maintain strategic assets for our customers, offering services which

extend from environmental and front-end engineering design before the start of a project to

decommissioning at the end of an asset’s life

Clean Energy

Nuclear

Renewables/Bioprocess

Power

Transmission & Distribution

Mining Environment & Infrastructure

Water/Municipal

Transportation/Infrastructure

Government Services

Industrial/Commercial

Oil & Gas

Conventional and

unconventional

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UK Commercial Reactor History

1990

1980

1955

1960

1970

Berkeley Magnox Reactors

NPPC EE/BW/TW APCGEC/SCAEI/JT

LA

TIN

A

BE

RK

ELE

Y

HIN

KLE

Y A

S

IZE

WE

LL A

WY

LFA

BR

AD

WE

LL

TR

AW

SF

YN

YD

D

HU

NT

ER

ST

ON

A

TO

KA

I

MU

RA

Heysham 1 AGR

Dungeness A Magnox ReactorsTNPG

OLD

BU

RY

HE

YS

HA

M 1

DU

NG

EN

ES

S A

HIN

KLE

Y P

OIN

T B

HU

NT

ER

ST

ON

B

HA

RT

LEP

OO

L

DU

NG

EN

ES

S

B

APC

NDC

BNDC

Sizewell B PWR

Torness AGR

Heysham 2 AGR

HE

YS

HA

M 2

TO

RN

ES

S

NNC

SIZEWELL B

Westinghouse JV

AMEC

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AMEC Nuclear Pedigree

. . . . 3,000 nuclear

professionals . . . .

. . . . a Nuclear New

Build partner for 60

yrs . . . .

1955

1990

1980

1970

1960

2000

2010EDF Partnership

Sizewell BWestinghouse JV

NSS/NCL

Canada

AMEC Czech Republic

NCI South Africa

AMEC Slovakia

Growth in

Clean-Up

NMP Sellafield

AGR Station

Design &

Construction

(all Consortia)

Magnox Station

Design &

Construction

(all UK Consortia)

Sizewell B PWR

Heysham 1 AGR

Dungeness A - Magnox

Sellafield

Bruce CANDU

Tokai 1

. . . . . a strategic role on

every civil NPP ever built in

the UK . . . .

. . . . a growing

international presence

AMEC Romania

Mactec (US)

AES (US)

ESRC (Serco) (UK)

GDA – EPR, AP1000, ABWRHinkley Point C

Ignalina RBMK

AMEC France

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Research reactors decommissioning

Magnox decommissioning (UK, France, Japan,

Italy)

Legacy clean-up

- Sellafield

- AWE

Vendor -independent support

O&M optimisation

Periodic Safety Reviews

PLEX

CANDU restarts

Safety upgrades, on-site assistance

Technology assessments

- post Sizewell

- Utility

preparedness &

selection

Vendor design support

UK Generic Design Assessments- EPR, AP1000, ABWR

ESBWR, ACR

Owner’s / Architect Engineer

Engineering & Consultancy

Technology assessments

HTR/VHTR

PBMR

Fast Reactors

Fusion / ITER

Nuclear reactor evolution – AMEC activities

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Sizewell B

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Introduction of PWR technology

• In 1978, the UK Government announced the intent to order a PWR

station, provided design work was satisfactorily completed and all

necessary Government and other consents and safety clearances were

obtained

• CEGB issued an Enquiry Specification for Sizewell B in April 1980.

• This specified the use of a 4-loop Westinghouse NSSS (Nuclear Steam

Supply System) and two turbines.

• CEGB applied to the Department of Energy for Section 2 consent and

deemed planning permission for Sizewell B in January 1981

• The Pre-construction Safety Report and the reference design for Sizewell

B were published in April 1982

• The project application was subject to a public inquiry under the Town and

Country Planning Act and the Electricity Act (Section 2 consent).

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Introduction of PWR technology

• The inquiry was held under the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act which

included provision for a special, more wide-ranging inquiry where there were

either considerations of national or regional importance or complex technical

or scientific aspects

• Public Inquiry started in January 1983. It was expected to be a long inquiry

(lasting 9 -12 months). It actually lasted much longer.

• The Inquiry addressed a number of issues the principal ones being:

– The need and economic justification for Sizewell B

– The choice of design

– The safety and environmental impact of the plant

– Local issues

• Inspector reported to the Secretary of State, recommending consent in 1987.

• In parallel the licensing process had proceeded and NII issued an amendment

to the Site Licence in 1987.

• Preliminary site work started with first structural concrete being poured in July

1988.

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Sizewell design changes

Changes to SNUPPS design:

• additional provisions to reduce operator radiation exposure

• the adoption of two turbines

• coastal rather than inland site

• electrical frequency difference

• desire to use equipment of UK manufacture whenever possible

• include OEF and lessons learned from TMI-2,

• internal and external hazards - four train systems in the Sizewell B design

compared to two trains for the original SNUPPS design

• pressure vessel integrity requirements

• enhanced radiological protection standards

• introduction of secondary containment

• low cobalt materials

• reliability requirements - use of diverse as well as redundant equipment

• etc,etc,etc

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A Changing world….

Past:

• Investment by state-owned utilities in regulated markets

• Investment by national players

• Well established national suppliers

• ‘Custom-made’ reactors

Present - Future:

• Investment by privately-owned utilities in highly competitive markets

• More complex risk allocation in with more complex contractual models

• Emergence of national/ multinational utilities choosing among a smaller number of international designs

• Standardisation is required to facilitate new build on a global world wide basis with safer plants

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EPR GDA changes

• Changes to the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

systems

• Additional or suitably classified diverse reactor protection system trip

signals

• Improvements to the spent fuel cooling pool

• Changes to essential support systems

• Classification methodology and upgrade of the safety classification of

Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) important to safety

• Automation of certain actions

• Other modifications that provide additional diversity, defence in depth,

or other safety improvements

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AP1000 GDA changes

•Categorisation of systems as safety or non-safety

• Inclusion of all radioactive materials in the Deterministic Safety

Assessment and PSA

•Design codes and standards, particularly the justification of the

Modular design and Civil structural codes

•Design of the secondary containment against aircraft crash

•Use of Metric SI units in the GDA application / conversion of all US

(imperial units)

•Safety claims on computer control systems

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•Applicable and internationally recognised set of safety requirements

• IAEA standards underpin safety in all countries

• Higher level in standards hierarchy, not enforceable

• Supplemented by enforceable national regulations

• Need harmonised set of more detailed requirements

International Harmonisation

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The CORDEL Working Group

• Founded in January 2007

• Main aim: promoting international

standardisation

• Membership:

- all major vendors

- utilities interested in new build

- service companies

• Observers from international organisations

(SDOs, IAEA, EPRI, MDEP, WANO, others)

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Phase 3. Issuing international design certification

Phase 2. Validating and accepting design approvals of other countries

Phase 1. Sharing design reviews and assessments

“Internationalisation” of DESIGN APPROVAL process

CORDEL Roadmap

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IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle 1

“The prime responsibility for

safety must rest with the person

or organisation responsible for

facilities and activities that give

rise to radiation risks.”

3.5 The licensee retains the prime

responsibility for safety throughout

the lifetime of facilities and activities,

and this responsibility cannot be

delegated. Other groups, such as

designers, manufacturers and

constructors, employers,

contractors, and consignors and

carriers, also have legal, professional

or functional responsibilities with

regard to safety.

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IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle 1

“The prime responsibility for

safety must rest with the person

or organisation responsible for

facilities and activities that give

rise to radiation risks.”

3.6 The licensee is responsible for:

Establishing and maintaining the

necessary competences;

Providing adequate training and

information;

Establishing procedures and

arrangements to maintain safety under all

conditions;

Verifying appropriate design and the

adequate quality of facilities and activities

and of their associated equipment;

Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive

material that is used, produced, stored or

transported;

Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive

waste that is generated.

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Regulator’s expectations

“The licensee shall retain primary

responsibility for the safety of its

licensed facility, including

responsibility for those activities of

contractors and subcontractors

which might affect safety.”

“The regulatory body should,

through its regulatory activities,

provide assurance that the licensee

meets its responsibilities for the

safety of its facility. This includes

assuring that the licensee provides

the appropriate level of oversight of

all contractors and subcontractors,

commensurate with the safety

significance of the activity.”

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Regulator’s expectations

“It is essential that the licensee

retains the capability to be:

• The “controlling mind” of those core

activities for which the licence has been

granted. Ceding that control to other

parties would not be consistent with the

principle that the licensee retains primary

responsibility for safety.

• The “design authority” which understands

the basis of the safety case, and the

significance of ensuring that all activities

are designed so as to keep the facility

within the boundaries of the safety case.

• An “intelligent customer” or “smart buyer”

for the goods and services being procured.

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Design authority

“11. An operating organization must set

up internally a formal process to

maintain the design integrity as soon as

it takes control of the plant. This may be

achieved by setting up a design

capability within the operating

organization, or by having a formal

external relationship with the original

design organizations or their

successors. There must be a formally

designated entity within the operating

company that takes responsibility for

this process. This entity needs to

formally approve all design changes. To

do this, it must have sufficient

knowledge of the design and of the

overall basis for safety. In addition, it

must have access through a formal

process to all the underlying design

knowledge to ensure that the original

intent of the design is maintained.”

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UK regulatory approach to Design Authority

Design Authority – the defined function

of a licensee’s organisation with the

responsibility for, and the requisite

knowledge to maintain the design

integrity and the overall basis for safety

of its nuclear facilities throughout the full

lifecycle of those facilities. Design

Authority relates to the attributes of an

organisation rather than the capabilities

of individual post holders.

Responsible Designer(s) –

organisations which have a formal

responsibility for maintaining detailed,

specialised knowledge of all the

systems and components important to

safety, and a core capability in the

detailed design process.

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UK concept of design authority –

intelligent customer

The design authority may assign

responsibility for the design of specific

parts of the plant to other

organisations, known as responsible

designers.

Ref: ONR NS-TAST-GD-079 Rev 2

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Design knowledge required

The Design Authority should have the following knowledge:

A detailed understanding of why the design is as it is with knowledge of the

underpinning experimental/ research programme

The design inputs such as basic functional requirements, performance

requirements, safety goals and safety principles

The applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements, design

conditions, loads such as seismic loads, interface requirements etc

The design outputs such as specifications, design limits, operating limits,

safety limits, failure or fitness for service criteria

A detailed knowledge of the design calculations which demonstrate the

adequacy of the design

An understanding of the inspections, analysis, testing, computer code

validation and acceptance criteria used by the plant designer to verify that the

design output meets the design requirements

The assumptions made in all the steps above, including assumptions related

to operating modes or procedures and expected life history

The implications of operating experience on the design

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Increasing demands on safety documentation

No of safety

related

documents

10,000 -

5,000 -

1,000 -

1960s

Magnox

1970s

AGR

1980s

AGR

PWR

1990s

PWR

2000+

Windscale

TMI

Chernobyl

Fukushima Standardisation

/Harmonisation

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Some challenges for owners

Future vendor status

Limits on in-house capability (existing nuclear operator):

- loss of expertise, ageing of personnel with key experience

- stretch due to large concurrent programmes; plant life extension/ upgrade

especially with planned new build

- increasing demands from licensing authority; greater volume and complexity

of documents

- potential impact on design authority/ intelligent customer capability

For future licensees with no or very limited experience of nuclear power plant

operation:

- recruitment and capacity building

- safety culture and reliance on NPP designers/ supply chain

- technology challenges

- regulatory regime / international implications

Maintaining and/or increasing competition to reduce risk

- quality, budget and schedule

Access to expert nuclear services with global experience increasingly

important for world leading performance

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Strategic and Technical support

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Benefits brought by Independent Engineer

Pool of suitably qualified expertise across nuclear skill-sets, including

niche skills

Independent of NPP designer; verification, peer review, independent

assessment

Innovation due to wider experience; global projects, other sectors

Reference capability and projects check

Greater certainty on cost & schedule outcomes

Resource planning benefits

Allows licensee to focus on building or maintaining design authority /

intelligent customer key roles

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Insights on the benefits of the right

nuclear consultancy support

Understanding and managing regulatory expectations is the first

essential

Ensure country context is fully incorporated

Understand the intelligent customer relationship early on to plan an

effective organisational trajectory

The design of the Intelligent Customer relationships is key

The supply chain are crucial in developing technical knowledge transfer

The procurement strategy must allow for the access to the relevant IPR

at the right time

The transfer of Design Authority experience takes time

There are never enough SQEPs available to recruit directly

Its important that global and local suppliers are

embedded into the technical support infrastructure to

give lasting legacy in operations

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Internationalisation and culture