09.kantian duty ethics
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KANTIAN ETHICS
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There are two different approaches in moralphilosophy:
• the moral value of ouractions depends on their
purpose (utilitarian ethic)
teleological
approach
• the moral value of ouractions depends on theirconformity with the moralduty (Kantian ethic)
deontologicalapproach
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A BASIS FOR MORAL RIGHTS: KANT'S ETHICS OF DUTY
1724-1804
How do we know that people have rights?This question can be answered in a straightforward
way when it is asked about legal rights: A personhas certain legal rights because the person liveswithin a legal system that guarantees those rights.However, what is the basis of moral rights?
UTILITARIANS People have moral rights because thepossession of moral rights maximizes utility.
It is doubtful, however, that utilitarianismcan serve as an adequate basis for moral
rights. To say that someone has a moralright to do something is to say thatperson is entitled to do it regardless ofthe utilitarian benefits it provides forothers. Utilitarianism cannot easily
support such a nonutilitarian concept.
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A more satisfactory foundation for moral rights is providedby the ethical theory developed by
IMMANUEL KANT
There are certain moral rights andduties that all human beings possessregardless of any utilitarian benefitsthat the exercise of those rights and
duties may provide for others.Kant's theory is based on a moral principle that he called the
categoricalimperative Everyone should be treated as afree person equal to everyone else.
Kant provides at least two ways of formulating this basic moralprinciple. Each formulation serves as an explanation of the
meaning of this basic moral right and correlative duty.
A BASIS FOR MORAL RIGHTS: KANT'S ETHICS OF DUTY
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The first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F1]
Act only at that maxim whereby youcan at the same time will that it shouldbecome a universal law.
maxim = the reason a person in a certainsituation has for doing what he or she plans to do.
A maxim would “become a universal law” if everyperson in a similar situation chose to do the same thingfor the same reason.
An action is morally right for a person in acertain situation if, and only if, the person’sreason for carrying out the action is a reasonthat he or she would be willing to have every
person act on, in any similar situation.
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Sometimes it is not even possible to conceive of having everyone act on a certain reason,
much less be wil l ing to have everyone act onthat reason.
Suppose that I am considering breaking a contract because it hascommitted me to do something I do not want to do. Then I must askwhether I would be willing to have everyone break any contract thatthey did not want to keep. But it is impossible to even conceive ofeveryone making and then breaking contracts in this way because ifeveryone knew that any contract could be broken, then people wouldcease making contracts altogether (what possible purpose would theyserve?) and contracts would no longer exist.
Consequently, because it is impossible to conceive of everyonemaking and breaking contracts in this way, it is also impossiblefor me to be willing to have everyone act like this (how can Iwant something I cannot even conceive?). It would be wrong,therefore, for me to break a contract simply because I do not
want to keep it.
The first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F1]
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Suppose that I am trying to decide whether to fire a femalesecretary because she's got married. I must ask myselfwhether I would be willing to have an employer fire anysecretary whenever she gets married (including my mother,wife, sister, daughter, niece, etc.) In particular, I must askmyself whether I would be willing to be fired myself shouldmy employer not like that I'm not single.
A person's reasons for acting, then, must be'reversible': One must be willing to have allothers use those reasons even against oneself.
There is an obvious similarity, then, between thecategorical imperative and the so-called GOLDENRULE: 'Do unto others as you would have them dounto you'.
If I am not willing to have everyone act in this way, even toward me,then it is morally wrong for me to act in this way toward others.
The first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative [F1]
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F1 incorporates two criteria for determining moral right and wrong:
UNIVERSALIZABILITY
The person's reasons for acting must be reasonsthat everyone could act on at least in principle.
REVERSIBILITY
The person's reasons for acting must be reasonsthat he or she would be willing to have all othersuse, even as a basis of how they treat him or her.
Unlike the principle of utilitarianism, Kant's F1 focuses on a person'sinterior motivations and not on the consequences of external actions.Moral right and wrong are distinguished not by what a person
accomplishes, but by the reasons the person has for the action.To the extent that a person performs an action merely because it willadvance the person's own future interests or merely because the personfinds the action pleasurable, the action 'has no moral worth'. A person'saction has 'moral worth' only to the degree that it is also motivated by asense of 'duty', that is, a belief that it is the right way for all people tobehave.
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The second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F2]
Act in such a way that you always treathumanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, never simply as ameans, but always at the same time as an end.
'Treating humanity as an end' = everyone should treat each humanbeing as a being whose existence as a free rational person shouldbe respected and promoted.
An action is morally right for a person if, and only if, in performingthe action, the person does not use others merely as a means foradvancing his or her own interests, but also both respects anddevelops their capacity to choose freely for themselves.
F2 implies that human beings have an equaldignity that sets them apart from things such astools or machines and that is incompatible withtheir being manipulated, deceived, or otherwiseunwillingly exploited to satisfy the self-interests
of another.
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The principle in effect says that peopleshould not be treated as objects incapableof free choice.
By deceiving a person into making a contract thatthat person would not otherwise freely choose to
make, I fail to respect that person's freedom tochoose and merely use the person to advance myown interests.
Both F1 and F2 come down to the same thing:People are to treat each other as free and equal in
the pursuit of their interests.
By failing to lend needed and easily extended helpto another person, I limit what that person is free tochoose to do.
The second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative [F2]
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PROBLEMS WITH KANT
Kant's moral philosophy is providing us with probably thestrongest arguments supporting the idea that human beings do
have moral rights. The categorical imperative, however, cannot byitself tell us what particular moral rights human beings have.
Insofar as free speech is critically important,humans must leave each other equally free tospeak as they choose: everyone has a moralright to freedom of speech.
There is substantial disagreement concerning what the limits ofeach of these rights are and concerning how each of theserights should be balanced against other conflicting rights.
Kant's theory does not help us resolve these disagreements.
However, insofar as free speech conflicts withanother human interest that can be shown to be ofequal or greater importance (such as our interest innot being libeled or defamed), the right to freedomof speech must be limited.
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There are cases where the requirementsof the categorical imperative are unclear.
One difficulty lies in trying to determine whether one would (asF1 requires) 'be willing to have everyone follow' a certain policy.Suppose I am a thief. Would I then be willing to have everyonefollow the policy that all thieves should be punished? In a sense Iwould be willing to because I would want to be protected fromother thieves, but in another sense I would not be willingbecause I do not want to be punished myself.
PROBLEMS WITH KANT
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PROBLEMS WITH KANT
It is also sometimes difficult to determinewhether (as F2 states) one person is usinganother 'merely as a means'. Suppose that Mr.Jones, an employer, only pays minimum wagesto his employees and refuses to install thesafety equipment they want, yet he says he is
'respecting their capacity to freely choose forthemselves' because he is willing to let themwork elsewhere if they choose. Is he thentreating them merely as means or also as ends?