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8:41 AMTuesday, 04 September 2012

In the driving rain I drove here and there, too and fropropelled by truths at times and illusions at others,while the electricity drained when I browsed the greyshelves unaware then had to abort my approach intoRockingham City underground parking lot in favour of

Dix Myth at Phoenix far enough away to recharge thelead plate and acid device. There for double theadvertised price I found a wireless modem router touse with the ADSL2+ internet access service recentlypurchased after another delusional charge againreinforcing what Hegel experienced that day in Jenaafter all the killing by Prussians and French of one

another and whoever else got caught in the cross cutsand fire of lead and canon balls. To be an unconsciousinstrument of the Weltgeist was the fate of the generalofficer on horseback.

What do you men Georg Weltgeist? World-mind?World-spirit? I will not accept that you could have

meant the word Weltgeist to signify some objectiveentity that is external and thus alien to you, but rather

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you must have meant a state of mind a state of mindyou were conscious of a state of mind you observedas you suggested by your original choice of title foryour most famous literary work Science of theExperience of Consciousness (Wissenschaft derErfahrung des Bewutseins) that is how it came outin English but Verene explains that Erfahren althoughtranslated as Experience actually means come toknow and is in turn derived from fahren (to travel)so that movement is implied and in this context thetravelling is evolutionary and the subject that isevolving is Bewutseins. Hegel is recording his ownautonomopus empirical observations of cognitiveevolution specifically the cognitive evolution aphilosopher experiences. Coming to know or learning

is a process that is experience a type of movementfrom ignorance to knowledge.

I miss feeling the love I once felt with only one otherhuman a woman.

86This dialectical movement is what consciousness practiceson itself as well as on its knowledge and its object, and,insofar as, to consciousness, the new, true object arisesout of this movement, this dialectical movement is what isgenuinely called experience.

In this relation, there is a moment in the process whichwas just mentioned and which should be underscored evenmore dramatically.

Indeed, doing so will cast a new light on the scientific

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aspects of the following exposition.Consciousness knows something, and this object is the

essence that is, the in-itself.

However, the object is also the in-itself for consciousness.

As a result, the ambiguity of this truth emerges.

We see that consciousness now has two objects:

One is the first in-itself, and the second is the being-for-itof this in-itself.

The latter appears at first to be merely the reflection ofconsciousness into itself, that is, to be a representation notof an object but merely of its knowledge of that firstobject.

Yet, as was previously shown, in its eyes, the first object is

thereby altered; it ceases to be the in-itself and in its eyesbecomes the in-itself merely for consciousness.

However, what we thereby have is the truth, the being-for-it of this in-itself, which means that this is the essence,that is, its object.

This new object contains the nullity of the first, and it is

what experience has learned about it.

Being-for-it? What do you mean Georg. Being for theit that is the it in in-itself. I can only surmiseGeorg that you mean that being that belongs to the itthat is the it in in-itself the same in-itself that is in

things in-themselves that is applicable to noumena

but not to phenomena the appearance which are

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the phenomena that belong to the scientific logic ofphenomena in the phenomenology of spirit.

I was quite intrigued to discover the word dialectic inthis passage and especially in a statement to clarifywhat Georg means by what is genuinely calledErfahrung (ie Experience as in the science of theexperience of consciousness). Not only that, theGerman word Dialektik is assoscited by George withPlatos Parmenidesin the passage below 1.

71Since I have posited that science exists as a result of theself-movement of the concept, and since my way oflooking at all the aspects of this diverges from currentideas about the nature and shape of truth, all of which are

in fact quite opposed to my own views (and not merely theones I have cited but others as well), there does not seemto be much promise at all that an attempt to expound thesystem of science in terms of the characterization I havegiven of it will be received favorably.

In the meantime, I can bear in mind that, for example, theexcellence of Platos philosophy has sometimes been saidto lie in his scientifically valueless myths, and there havealso been times, which have even been called times ofreligious enthusiasm, in which the Aristotelian philosophywas esteemed for the sake of its speculative depth andwhen Platos Parmenides, perhaps the greatest work of artof the ancient dialectic, has been taken to be the truedisclosure and the positive expression of thedivine life.

There have even been times when there was a great dealof obscurity produced by ecstasy, and this misunderstood

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ecstasy was in fact supposed to be nothing but the pureconcept itself

Furthermore, what is excellent about the philosophy of ourtime is that it has posited that its very value lies inscientific rigor itself.

And even though others take a different view, it is only byvirtue of its scientific rigor that the philosophy of our timehas in fact begun to make itself felt.

I can thereby also hope that this attempt to vindicatesciences right to the concept and to expound science in

this, its own distinctive element, will know how to force itsway through the crowd by way of the inner truth of what isat stake.

We must hold onto the conviction that it is the nature oftruth to prevail when its time has come, and that it only

appears when its time has come, and that it thus neverappears too early nor does it appear for a public not yetripe enough to receive it.

We must also hold onto the conviction that the individualrequires this effect in order to confirm for himself what isas yet for him still merely his own solitary affair and inorder for him to experience as universal what is initially

only something particular to him.However, on these occasions, the public should often bedistinguished from those who conduct themselves as itsrepresentatives and spokesmen.

The public conducts itself in many respects quitedifferently from the latter, indeed in some ways even asopposed to it.

When the public will good-naturedly put the blame upon

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itself when a philosophical work does not quite appeal toit, in contrast these representatives, so convinced of their

own authority in the matter, will put all the blame insteadon the authors.

The works effect on the public is more silent than the actsof these dead burying their dead.

If on the whole the general level of insight is nowadaysmore highly cultivated, and if its curiosity is more wakeful

and its judgment more swiftly determined, so that thefeet of them that shall carry thee out are already at thedoor, then it needs to be distinguished from a moregradual effect which rectifies the attention extorted bythose imposing assurances and their contemptuous acts ofcensure.

After a while, it thus provides for some a world of theirown, whereas after a certain period of time, for some

others there is simply no posterity at all.

In the meantimeI can bear in mind that

for examplethe excellence of Platos philosophy

has sometimes been said

to liein his scientifically valueless myths

and there have also been timeswhich have even been calledtimes of religious enthusiasm

in which the Aristotelian philosophywas esteemed for the sake of its speculative depth

and when Platos Parmenides

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perhaps the greatest work of artof the ancient dialectichas been taken to bethe true disclosure

and the positive expressionof the divine life

What do you mean Georg? Are you seeing thesimilarity in how the critics of Plato and your owncritics whore convinced of their own authority differfrom the public who modestly put blame onthemselves when a philosophic work doesnt quiteappeal to them as must be with aletheia, so far awayas it is from the paths of ordinary mortals and theirdoxa? Are you Georg?

You are hard to read Georg. Maybe that is becauseyou are writing for James. Joyce was stuck insideBloomin Dedalus exploring dada in 1922 before AndreBreton was hung so well that in 1924 with no wolf atthe door the portal was opened by the Manifesto ofSurrealism.

At the beginning of the Preface more than sixty A4pages before Plato and Parmenides appear with

Aristotle Georg introduces his stream of consciousrecord of the mind of one philosopher being Hegel,writing:

1In the preface to a philosophical work, it is customary

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for the author to give an explanation namely, anexplanation of his purpose in writing the book, his

motivations behind it, and the relations it bears to otherprevious or contemporary treatments of the same topics but for a philosophical work, this seems not onlysuperfluous but in light of the nature of the subject matter,even inappropriate and counter-productive.

For whatever it might be suitable to say about philosophyin a preface for instance, to give some historical

instruction about the biases and the standpoint of the text,or some talk about the general content and the resultstogether with a set of scattered assertions and assurancesabout the truth none of these can count as the way topresent philosophical truth.

Moreover, because philosophy essentially exists in theelement of universality, which encompasses the particularwithin itself, it might seem that in philosophy, indeed even

more so than in the other sciences, that what is salientabout its subject matter, even its perfect essence, wouldbe expressed in the goal of the work and in its finalresults, and that the way the project is in fact carried outwould be what is inessential.

In contrast, if a person were to have only a general notionof, for example, anatomy, or, to put it roughly, if he were

to have an acquaintance with the parts of the body takenin terms of their lifeless existence, nobody would therebythink that he has come into full possession of the salientsubject matter of that science, which is to say, its content.

One would think that in addition he would have to go tothe trouble to pay attention to the particularities of thescience.

Furthermore, that kind of an aggregation of little bits and

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pieces of information has no real right to be called science,and a conversation about its purpose and other such

generalities would be in no way distinct from the ordinaryhistorical and uncomprehending way in which the content,that is, these nerves and muscles, and so forth, is itselfdiscussed.

In the case of philosophy, this would give rise to thefollowing incongruity, namely, that if philosophy wereindeed to make use of such a method, then it would haveshown itself to be incapable of grasping the truth.

Although it is customary George says its inappropriateand counter-productive to use the Preface of aphilosophical work to explain the authors purpose inwriting the book, his motivations behind it, and therelations it bears to other previous or contemporary

treatments of the same topics. I take this as anexpression of self-emancipation from all formulas andexpectations. There is another way to presentphilosophical truth and this is it.

Perhaps Marx was as much an Hegelian as Aristotlewas a Platonist. Where do you go after such a teacher

has left so little room for autonomy.

George was not nearly as Kantian as Marx wasHegelian and perhaps that is where he became amaterial girl.

2.

Determining the relation that a philosophical workprofesses to bear vis-vis other efforts at dealing with the

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same object also introduces an extraneous interest, and itthereby merely renders obscure what is supposed to be at

stake in taking cognizance of the truth.

The more that conventional opinion holds that theopposition between the true and the false is itself fixedand set, the more that it customarily expects to find itselfin either agreement or in contradiction with any givenphilosophical system, and, if so, then in any explanation ofsuch a system, the more it will merely see the one or the

other.

It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophicalsystems as the progressive development of truth as muchas it sees merely contradiction within that diversity.

The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, andone might say that the former is refuted by the latter.

Likewise, by virtue of the fruit, the blossom itself may bedeclared to be a false existence of the plant, since the fruitemerges as the blossoms truth as it comes to replace theblossom itself.

These forms are not merely distinguished from each other,but, as incompatible with each other, they also supplanteach other.

However, at the same time their fluid nature makes theminto moments of an organic unity within which they are notonly not in conflict with each other.

Rather, one is equally as necessary as the other, and it isthis equal necessity which alone constitutes the life of thewhole.

However, in part, contradiction with regard to a

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philosophical system does not usually comprehend itself inthis way, and, in part, the consciousness which appre-

hends the contradiction generally neither knows how tofree the contradiction from its one-sidedness, nor how tosustain it as free-standing by taking cognizance of itsreciprocally necessary moments, which themselves takeshape as conflicts and as apparent incompatibilities.

Quite so Georg. Quite so and so it goes. Thirst formoney. Send your clothing. You were more radical

revolutionary and bohemian than Marx or Nietzsche.

3. Those who demand both such explanations and theirsatisfactions may well look as if they are really in pursuitof what is essential.

Where else could the inner core of a philosophical work bebetter expressed than in its purposes and results, and howelse could this be more determinately discerned than bydifferentiating it from all the other things that this ageproduces in the same sphere?

But if that sort of activity is supposed to count for morethan just the beginning of cognition, that is, if it issupposed to count as actual cognition itself, then it is infact to be reckoned as being little more than a contrivance

for avoiding what is really at stake, that is, as an attemptto combine the semblance of both seriousness and effortwhile actually sparing oneself of either seriousness oreffort.

This is so because the subject matter is not exhausted inits aims; rather, it is exhaustively treated when it isworked out.

Nor is the result which is reached the actual whole itself;

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rather, the whole is the result together with the way theresult comes to be.

The aim on its own is the lifeless universal in the way thatthe tendency of the work itself is a mere drive that stilllacks actuality; the unadorned result is just the corpse thathas left the tendency behind.

Likewise, differentiatedness is to a greater degree the limitof the thing at stake.

It is where the thing which is at stake ceases, that is, it iswhat that thing is not.

To trouble oneself with such purposes or results, or tomake distinctions and pass judgments on one or the otheris thus an easier task than it might seem to be.

Instead of occupying itself with what is at stake, this kind

of activity has always thereby gone one step beyond it.

Instead of dwelling on what is at stake and forgetting itselfin it, that sort of knowledge is always grasping atsomething else; it persists in being at one with itself.

The easiest thing of all is to pass judgment on what issubstantial and meaningful.

It is much more difficult to get a real grip on it, and whatis the most difficult of all is both to grasp what unites eachof them and to give a full exposition of what that is.

Georg thank you and good bye or au revoir.

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-fin-

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1

Preface Page 66-68

The Phenomenology of Spirit

Science of the Experience of Consciousness

First Part: System of Science

Ge. Wilh. Fr. Hegel 1807

Bamberg and Wrzburg, Joseph Anton Goebhardt

Translated by Terry Pinkard 2008

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