cookcountyjudges.files.wordpress.com · web viewwhere relief is sought under article x of this act...

IN THESUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________________________________

Case No. 11-10814_________________________________________

In re DR. LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON, Petitioner_________________________________________

DR LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON,Plaintiff - Petitioner,

v.THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY AND

HONORABLE JUDGE PEGGY CHIAMPOS,Defendant - Respondent.

______________________________________________________________

SCR 15(8) & 20(2) SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

____________________________________________________________

DR LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.Oak Lawn, IL 60453-3539(708) 952-9040

Petitioner, Pro Se

SCR 15(8) & 20(2) SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

NOW COMES, Petitioner (“Shelton”) who respectfully supplements her

Petition for writ of Mandamus, in order to keep this Honorable Court updated

as to status of all issues, as well as to include two (2) more Questions or

Issues for the Court, required as a result of the direct and recent

actions of Respondents:

i

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW RESULTING FROM ACTIONS OF RESPONDENT

9. May the Circuit Court of Cook County (“CCCC”), on misdemeanor

cases, refuse to issue a case number, docket, file, and schedule for

hearing in a timely fashion a petition for writ of habeas corpus or is

this a violation of the Suspension Clause of the United States

Constitution, a violation of 14th Amendment right to due process and

a violation of Illinois Statutes, 735 ILCS Article X?

10. May the Federal District Court summarily, without a due process

evidentiary hearing or further briefing, dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, when the defendant claims

violation of the 4th Amendment right to be free of arrest without

probable cause, violation of the 6th Amendment right to speedy trial,

gives detailed dates and evidence from the docket and court orders

proving that speedy trial has been violated, but on the initial form

requesting a writ of habeas corpus only cites Illinois Statutes and

case law, fails to state her stricken motion for dismissal due to

speedy trial violations has federal case law, states no federal case

law, but cites the 6th Amendment or is this a violation of the

defendant’s 6th Amendment right to speedy trial as applied by 28

U.S.C. § 2241, 14th Amendment right to due process, and the

suspension clause, as violation of speedy trial means that the

defendant is being tried without jurisdiction?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OPENING STATEMENT i

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW RESULTING FROM ACTIONS OF RESPONDENT

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES viii

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED xiii

INTRODUCTION 1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES OF CASE SINCE FILING OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITH ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF MANDAMUS

1

A. Arrest Warrants Void as Issued by Judge with NO Jurisdiction

1

B. State Habeas Petitions Ignored 5

C. Federal Habeas Petitions Illegally Denied 6

D. Lack of Jurisdiction of Trial Court Judges Due to Facially Invalid Complaints

8

E. Judge Chiampas’ Further Misconduct 9

F. SOJ for Cause Motion 11

CONCLUSION 14

APPENDIXTABLE OF CONTENTS

State Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus with attached proposed Motions which were not Allowed to Be Filed Under Separate Habeas Case Numbers or Scheduled for Hearing A1-125

CCCC Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on 09 MC1 223774 A1

iii

Criminal Complaints 09 MC1 223774 A2-4

2nd Amended Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy TrialStatute A5-14

Petition and Demand for Court to Comply with ExceptionsTo Schmidt Discovery Case Law and the Sixth and FifthAmendments by Striking her Previous Orders from March 21, 2012 A15-20

Demand for Court to Comply with ADA and Accommodate Defendant A21-29

Motion to Compel Sheriff Dart to Comply with Subpoena A30-31

Motion and Demand for Court to Strike Court’s PreviousOrders from March 21, 2012, as a Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process, Including Adherence to the Mandates of the ADA, and Eight Amendment Right to Be Free from Excessive Bail A34-44

CCCC Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on 09 MC1 238219A45


Motion to Strike Charge of Criminal Trespass to StateSupported Land as Facially Invalid A49-52

Motion to Strike Charge of Disorderly Conduct as Facially Invalid A53-56

Petition and Demand for Court to Strike Court’s PreviousOrders from March 21, 2012, as a Violation of FifthAmendment Right to Due Process, Including Adherence to the Mandates of the ADA, and Eighth Amendment Rightto be Free from Excessive Bail A67-68

Petition and Demand for Court to Comply with ExceptionsTo Schmidt Discovery Case Law and the Sixth and Fifth Amendments by Striking Court’s Previous Orders from March 21, 2012 A69-76



iv

Motion to Strike Charge of Criminal Trespass to StateSupported Land as Facially Invalid A82-83

Motion to Strike Charge of Disorderly Conduct asFacially Invalid A84-96



Criminal Complaint 09 MC1 260540 + unsworn andAltered Complaint A100-101

Motion to Strike Complaint as Legally Insufficient and Vacate Case Nunc Pro Tunc as Void A102-110



Criminal Complaint 09 MC1 261096 A114

CCCC Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on 09 MC1 286184A115 Criminal Complaint 09 MC1 286184 (same as 09 MC1 261096 A16

Petition to Strike Case as Violation of Double Jeopardy andOther Relief A117-119

CCCC Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 11 MC1 241978 A120


Federal Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus on seven (7) cases B1-63

Affidavit of attorney J. Nicolas Albukerk that CCCCHas NO Procedure to File or Hear, in a Misdemeanor Case

v

in the First Municipal Division CCCC, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and that he therefore filed the Petitionsunder the Criminal Case Numbers Knowing they would NOTbe Heard B8-9

Order of Judge Robert W. Gettleman dismissing FederalPetitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus in Seven (7) Cases

(Please note all orders the same for all Seven (7)Case numbers but only one inserted here) C1-5

Sue Sponte Order of MC1 Presiding Judge E. Kenneth WrightOrdering that Shelton’s Motion for Substitution of JudgeChiamas for Cause be Heard by Judge Edward Harmeningon June 20, 2012 D1-3

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause Due to CriminalActs of Complainant Against Defendant at Time of AllegedOffense Including Harassment of a Federal Witness and Failure to State a Cause of Action E1-6

Memorandum of [Case] Law [Pertaining to Cases Included in PWM] F1-15

Orders of Judge Chiampas on March 21, 2012 G1

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Authority Pages

Curtis v. Lofy,394 Ill.App.3d 170 (2009) 3, 9

Hill v. Daily,28 Ill.App.3d 202, 3228 N.E.2d 142 (1975) 9

In re Jennings, 68 Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977) 9

Jiffy Lube Int’l v. Agarwal, 277 Ill.App.2d 722, 214 Ill.Dec. 604, 6661 N.E.2d 463 (1996)

3

Lombard v. Elmore, 134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480 N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985)

9

Morrell v. Mock, 270 F.3d 1090 (2001) 13

Woods v. Nierstheimer , 328 U.S.211 (1946) 15

U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980

8

_________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FOR APPENDIX FMEMORANDUM OF CASE LAW

Page

1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c

F6

7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. F13

Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858 (1945) F2

Bd of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 2000)

F4

Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930)

F3

Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.234, 88 S.Ct 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968)

F11, 12

Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill.App.3d 441, 618 N.E.2d 554 (1st Dist. 1993)

F4

Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29, 37 S.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966 (1917) F4

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) F2

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)

F8

Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill.App.3d 170, 176 (2009)

F1

Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)

F9

Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896)

F14

Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398 F15

Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

F5, 7

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 121 , n. 21 (1982)

F9

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 67 (1991)

F9

Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861 F6

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=US&vol=456&invol=107&pageno=121


Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill.2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985) F3,

12

Galena, etc., R.R. Co.. v. Durham, 134 Ill. 195, 25 N.E. 7745 F13

House v. Bell, 47 U.S. 518, 522 (2006)

F9

In Re Custody of Ayala, 344 Ill.3d 574, 800 N.E.2d 524 (1st Dis. 2003)

F1

In re D.W. (People v. Lisa M.), 214 Ill.2d 289, 827 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. 2005)

F2

In re Estate of Luer, 348 Ill.App. 324, 329, 108 N.E.2d 792, 793 (1952)

F13

In re Estate of Rice, 77 Ill.App.3d 641, 656-57, 396 N.E.2d 298(1979)

F1

In re Jaime P., 223 Ill.2d 526, 540, 308 Ill.Dec. 393, 861 N.E.2d 958 (2006)

F3

In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 529, 670 N.E.2d 710, (Ill. 1996)

F2

In re Marriage of Stefiniw, 253 Ill.App.3d 196, 625 N.E.2d 358 (1st Dist. 1993)

F1

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75, 619 N.E.2d 702, (Ill. 1993)

F2

In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.3d 393 (1962) F3, 14

Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed 370

F6

Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968)

F13

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780 (1990)

F9

Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill.App.3d 701, 637 N.E.2d 633(1st Dis. 1994)

F1

Martin-Tregona v. Roderick, 29 Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975)

F1, 4

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996)

F8

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791

F12

Moore v. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929)

F14

Morrell v. Mock, 270 F.3d 1090 (2001)

F4

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)

F15

O’Sullivan v Boerckel 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999)

F7


Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 at 585, 80 S.Ct 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960)F11

People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) F2, 5

People v. Brown, 225 Ill.2d 188, 199, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163 (2007)

F2-3

People v. Gosier, 205 Ill.2d 198, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 275 Ill.Dec. 493 (2001)

F7

People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448]

F6

People v. Loftus, 400 Ill 432 (1948) F7

People v. Manion, 67 Ill.2d 564, 10 Ill.Dec. 547, 367 N.E.2d 1313 (1977)

F14

People v. Meyers, 158 Ill.2d 46, 51 (1994) F1

People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934)

F12, 14

People v. Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 23, 805 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ill. 2004)

F2

People ex. re. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App.2 Dist. 1994). F13

Petrillo v. O’Neill, 428 F.3d 41, 44 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2005) F8

Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194.

F15

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010)

F10

Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)

F3

Rybak v. Provenzale (1989), 181 Ill.App.3d 884, 899, 130 Ill.Dec. 852d, 862, 537 N.E.2d 1321, 1331 F13

Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461 F15

Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 103, 776 N.E.2d 195, (Ill. 2002) F2

Scarpa v. DuuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994) F8

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)

F12

Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949) F14

Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935). F14

Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 85 U.S. 457, 469, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873) F4

United States v. County of Cook, 167 F.3d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1999)

F4

United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222, 226 (2nd Cir. 2008)

F10

Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, F141 S.Ct. 116 (1920)

Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870) F5

Williams, 325 U.S. at 2299-31, 65 S.Ct 1092

F4

Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U. S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, F9178 L. Ed. 2d 276 (2010)

Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) F7

Woods v. Nierstheimer , 328 U.S.211 (1946) F7

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)

F11

Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962)

F5 Young v. Ragen 337 U.S. 235 (1948)

F7

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Page

28 USC § 2241 - Power to grant writ ii, 6

(a)Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.(b)The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.(c)The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—(1)He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or(2)He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or(3)He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or(4)He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or(5)It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.(d)Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and determination.

28 USC § 2254 - State custody; remedies in Federal courts 6, F8, (a)The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(b)(1)An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—(A)the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or(B)(i)there is an absence of available State corrective process; or(ii)circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.. . . . (d)An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2)resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), F8, 10Pub.I. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. – refers to changes made in above

code

725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) 9

(d) In addition to the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section the State or any defendant may move at any time for substitution of judge for cause, supported by affidavit. Upon the filing of such motion a hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible after its filing by a judge not named in the motion; provided, however, that the judge named in the motion need not testify, but may submit an affidavit if the judge wishes. If the motion is allowed, the case shall be assigned to a judge not named in the motion. If the motion is denied the case shall be assigned back to the judge named in the motion.

735 ILCS 5/101 et seq. HABEAS CORPUS ii 735 ILCS 5/10-101Sec. 10-101. Action commenced by plaintiff. In all proceedings commenced under Article X of this Act, the name of the person seeking the relief afforded by this Article shall be set out as plaintiff without the use of the phrase "People ex rel." or "People on the relation of". 735 ILCS 5/10-102

Sec. 10-102. Who may file. Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, except as herein otherwise provided, may apply for habeas corpus in the manner provided in Article X of this Act, to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it prove to be unlawful. 735 ILCS 5/10-103 Sec. 10-103. Application. Application for the relief shall be made to the Supreme Court or to the circuit court of the county in which the person in whose behalf the application is made, is imprisoned or restrained, or to the circuit court of the county from which such person was sentenced or committed. Application shall be made by complaint signed by the person for whose relief it is intended, or by some person in his or her behalf, and verified by affidavit. Application for relief under this Article may not be commenced on behalf of a person who has been sentenced to death without the written consent of that person, unless the person, because of a mental or physical condition, is incapable of asserting his or her own claim. 735 ILCS 5/10-104 Sec. 10-104. Substance of complaint. The complaint shall state in substance: 1. That the person in whose behalf the relief is applied for is imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, and the place where - naming all the parties if they are known, or describing them if they are not known. 2. The cause or pretense of the restraint, according to the best knowledge and belief of the applicant, and that such person is not committed or detained by virtue of any process, or judgment, specified in Section 10-123 of this Act. 3. If the commitment or restraint is by virtue of any warrant or process, a copy thereof shall be annexed, or it shall be stated that by reason of such prisoner being removed or concealed before application, a demand of such copy could not be made, or that such demand was made, and the legal fees therefor tendered to the officer or person having such prisoner in his or her custody, and that such copy was refused. 735 ILCS 5/10-105 Sec. 10-105. Copy of process. Any sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner committed on any civil or criminal process of any court who shall neglect to give such prisoner a copy of the process or order of commitment by which he or she is imprisoned within 6 hours after demand made by the prisoner, or any one on behalf of the prisoner, shall forfeit to the prisoner or party affected not exceeding $500. This Section shall not apply to the Illinois Department of Corrections. 735 ILCS 5/10-106 Sec. 10-106. Grant of relief - Penalty. Unless it shall appear from the complaint itself, or from the documents thereto annexed, that the party can neither be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved, the court shall forthwith award relief by habeas corpus. Any judge empowered to grant relief by habeas corpus who shall corruptly refuse to grant the relief when legally applied for in a case where it may lawfully be granted, or who shall

for the purpose of oppression unreasonably delay the granting of such relief shall, for every such offense, forfeit to the prisoner or party affected a sum not exceeding $1,000. 735 ILCS 5/10-107 Sec. 10-107. Form of orders. If the relief is allowed by an order of a court it shall be certified by the clerk under the seal of the court; if by a judge, it shall be under the judge's signature, and shall be directed to the person in whose custody or under whose restraint the prisoner is, and may be substantially in the following form: The People of the State of Illinois, to the Sheriff of .... County (or, "to A B," as the case may be): You are hereby commanded to have the body of C D, imprisoned and detained by you, together with the time and cause of such imprisonment and detention by whatsoever name C D is called or charged, before .... court of .... County (or before E F, judge of, etc.), at, etc., immediately after being served with a certified copy of this order, to be dealt with according to law; and you are to deliver a certified copy of this order with a return thereon of your performance in carrying out this order. 735 ILCS 5/10-108 Sec. 10-108. Indorsement. With the intent that no officer or person to whom such order is directed may pretend ignorance thereof, every such order shall be indorsed with these words: "By the habeas corpus law." 735 ILCS 5/10-109 Sec. 10-109. Subpoena-Service. When the party has been committed upon a criminal charge, unless the court deems it unnecessary, a subpoena shall also be issued to summon the witnesses whose names have been endorsed upon the warrant of commitment, to appear before such court at the time and place when and where such order of habeas corpus is returnable, and it shall be the duty of the sheriff, or other officer to whom the subpoena is issued, to serve the same, if it is possible, in time to enable such witnesses to attend. 735 ILCS 5/10-110 Sec. 10-110. Service of order. The habeas corpus order may be served by the sheriff, coroner or any person appointed for that purpose by the court which entered the order; if served by a person not an officer, he or she shall have the same power, and be liable to the same penalty for non-performance of his or her duty, as though he or she were sheriff. 735 ILCS 5/10-111 Sec. 10-111. Manner of service. Service shall be made by leaving a copy of the order with the person to whom it is directed, or with any of his or her under officers who may be at the place where the prisoner is detained; or if he or she can not be found, or has not the person imprisoned or restrained in custody, the service may be made upon any person who has the person in

custody with the same effect as though he or she had been made a defendant therein. 735 ILCS 5/10-112 Sec. 10-112. Expense involved. . . . 735 ILCS 5/10-113 Sec. 10-113. Form of return. The officer or person upon whom such order is served shall state in his or her return, plainly and unequivocally: 1. Whether he or she has or has not the party in his or her custody or control, or under his or her restraint, and if he or she has not, whether he or she has had the party in his or her custody or control, or under his or her restraint, at any and what time prior or subsequent to the date of the order. 2. If he or she has the party in his or her custody or control, or under his or her restraint, the authority and true cause of such imprisonment or restraint, setting forth the same in detail. 3. If the party is detained by virtue of any order, warrant or other written authority, a copy thereof shall be attached to the return, and the original shall be produced and exhibited on the return of the order to the court before whom the same is returnable. 4. If the person upon whom the order is served has had the party in his or her custody or control or under his or her restraint, at any time prior or subsequent to the date of the order but has transferred such custody or restraint to another, the return shall state particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause and by what authority such transfer took place. The return shall be signed by the person making the same, and except where such person is a sworn public officer and makes the return in his or her official capacity, it shall be verified by oath. 735 ILCS 5/10-114 Sec. 10-114. Bringing of body. The officer or person making the return, shall, at the same time, bring the body of the party, if in his or her custody or power or under his or her restraint, according to the command of the order unless prevented by the sickness or infirmity of the party. 735 ILCS 5/10-115 Sec. 10-115. Sickness or infirmity. When, from the sickness or infirmity of the party, he or she cannot without danger, be brought to the place designated for the return of the order, that fact shall be stated in the return, and if it is proved to the satisfaction of the judge, he or she may proceed to the jail or other place where the party is confined, and there make an examination, or the judge may adjourn the same to such other time, or make such other order in the case as law and justice require. 735 ILCS 5/10-116 Sec. 10-116. Neglect to obey order. If the officer or person upon whom such order is served refuses or neglects to obey the same, by producing the party named in the order and making a full and explicit return thereto within the time required by Article X of this Act, and no sufficient excuse is shown for such refusal or neglect, the court before whom the order is returnable, upon proof of the service thereof, shall enforce obedience by attachment as

for contempt, and the officer or person so refusing or neglecting shall forfeit to the party a sum not exceeding $500, and be incapable of holding office. 735 ILCS 5/10-117 Sec. 10-117. Order in case of neglect. The court may also, at the same time or afterwards, enter an order to the sheriff or other person to whom such attachment is directed, commanding him or her to bring forthwith before the court the party for whose benefit the habeas corpus order was entered, who shall thereafter remain in the custody of such sheriff, or other person, until the party is discharged, bailed or remanded, as the court directs. 735 ILCS 5/10-118 Sec. 10-118. Proceedings in case of emergency. Whenever it appears by the complaint, or by affidavit, that any one is illegally held in custody or restraint, and that there is good reason to believe that such person will be taken out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the application for a habeas corpus is made, or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the order can be enforced, the court may enter an order directed to the sheriff or other proper officer, commanding him or her to take the prisoner thus held in custody or restraint, and forthwith bring him or her before the court to be dealt with according to law. The court may also, if it is deemed necessary, order the apprehension of the person charged with causing the illegal restraint. The officer shall execute the order by bringing the person therein named before the court, and the like return and proceedings shall be had as in other orders of habeas corpus. 735 ILCS 5/10-119 Sec. 10-119. Examination. Upon the return of an order of habeas corpus, the court shall, without delay, proceed to examine the cause of the imprisonment or restraint, but the examination may be adjourned from time to time as circumstances require. 735 ILCS 5/10-120 Sec. 10-120. Denial of allegations in return. The party imprisoned or restrained may file a reply to the return and deny any of the material facts set forth in the return, and may allege any other facts that may be material in the case, which denial or allegation shall be on oath; and the court shall proceed promptly to examine the cause of the imprisonment or restraint, hear the evidence produced by any person interested or authorized to appear, both in support of such imprisonment or restraint and against it, and thereupon shall determine the matter according to law. 735 ILCS 5/10-121 Sec. 10-121. Seeking wrong remedy not fatal. Where relief is sought under Article X of this Act and the court determines, on motion directed to the pleadings, or on motion for summary judgment or upon trial, that the plaintiff has pleaded or established facts which entitle the plaintiff to relief but that the plaintiff has sought the wrong remedy, the court shall permit the pleadings to be amended, on just and reasonable terms, and the court shall grant the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled on the amended pleadings or

upon the evidence. In considering whether a proposed amendment is just and reasonable, the court shall consider the right of the defendant to assert additional defenses, to demand a trial by jury, to plead a counterclaim or third party complaint, and to order the plaintiff to take additional steps which were not required under the pleadings as previously filed. 735 ILCS 5/10-122 Sec. 10-122. Amendments. The return, as well as any denial or allegation, may be amended at any time by leave of the court. 735 ILCS 5/10-123 Sec. 10-123. When prisoner not entitled to discharge. No person shall be discharged under the provisions of this Act, if he or she is in custody: 1. By virtue of process of any court of the United States, in a case where such court has exclusive jurisdiction; or, 2. By virtue of a final judgment of any circuit court, or of any proceeding for the enforcement of such judgment, unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired; or, 3. For any treason, felony or other crime committed in any other state or territory of the United States, for which such person ought, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to be delivered to the executive power of such state or territory. 735 ILCS 5/10-124 Sec. 10-124. Causes for discharge when in custody on process of court. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the following causes: 1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum or person. 2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged. 3. Where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law. 4. Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case or under circumstances where the law does not allow process to issue or orders to be entered for imprisonment or arrest. 5. Where, although in proper form, the process has been issued in a case or under circumstances unauthorized to issue or execute the same, or where the person having the custody of the prisoner under such process is not the person empowered by law to detain him or her. 6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretense or bribery. 7. Where there is no general law, nor any judgment or order of a court to authorize the process if in a civil action, nor any conviction if in a criminal proceeding. No court, on the return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted.

INTRODUCTION

Two more issues should be reviewed because the denial of the right

to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus by the State both in the local court

and in the Illinois Supreme Court (“IL S Ct”) (amounting to waiver of

state’s right to insist on exhaustion of state remedies), along with a

federal district court’s dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

because Shelton did not “exhaust state remedies”, despite the district court

being informed of the above is so extraordinary and egregious, that this

warrants this Honorable Court’s discretionary powers to obtain relief.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES OF CASE SINCE FILING OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

WITH ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF MANDAMUS

A. Arrest Warrants Void as Issued by Judge with NO Jurisdiction

Shelton, as stated in her PWM1, on June 7, 2012, due to seven (7)

(although invalid) arrest warrants, issued without jurisdiction on May 29,

2012 (jurisdiction lost due to striking motion for SOJ for cause), surrendered

at the offices of the Chicago FBI, while attempting to provide their duty agent

a copy of this PWM, as well as evidence of felony federal crimes by the

Illinois Attorney General, several judges, and Cook County Sheriff staff. The

FBI turned Shelton over to the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”)

The FBI also refused to turn-over to the CPD a medication list and

summary of medical conditions document, including Shelton’s doctors’

phone numbers, that Shelton had prepared for the police to alert them to

details of her medical problems and needs under the American with 1 PWM = Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Therefore, the CPD would not listen to Shelton about

her medical needs and special food requirements.

Shelton was held by CPD for two days while they tortured her with

excessive cold, withholding of her medication for severe intractable pain and

vertigo, as well as denied food that she could eat, except bread and water2.

The CPD refused to take Shelton to court on June 8, 2012 because they

said she looked too ill and took her to a hospital emergency room, but she

did not receive necessary treatment every six hours as required by her

chronic illnesses3.

On June 9, 2012, by then sleep-deprived, in great pain, very dizzy,

nauseated, dehydrated and very hungry, the CPD decided to take Shelton to

court despite her ill appearance and turned Shelton over to the Cook County

Sheriff Courtroom Services Department at the Criminal Court building in

2 She was held in a cell that had a temperature around 55- 60 degrees F [this is a purposeful act of torture done by the CPD year-round] causing many of the officers to wear sweaters and jackets in the lock-up – and causing great shock to those detainees dressed in skimpy summer outfits and flip-flops – as well as endangering the health of and causing great pain from muscle spasm in those such as Shelton who have medical issues, denied any blanket or sheet, but provided a two (2) inch mattress (not properly sanitized) on a stone slab, that she used like a cocoon while propped up in a corner to try to stay warm and sleep – as she is unable to sleep lying down or her intractable severe headache worsens.

3 In the ER, the doctor committed malpractice, as well as aided and abetted this institutionalized torture, by refusing to give Shelton the narcotic pain medications (Tramadol®), unusually high salt supplements, and special diet, prescribed by her physicians at the University of Illinois, while awaiting further neurosurgery (and considering her cardiovascular disorders and neurological disorders as well as chemical sensitivities) – they also refused to contact these doctors to confirm her prescriptions, stating that it was the policy of this hospital, Mercy Hospital and Medical Center which services the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) Central Lock-Up, to NOT prescribe any narcotics to patients brought in by the CPD for administration of their regular medications, which the CPD are forbidden, by policy, from providing to prisoners – including forbidden from allowing the prisoners to take their own medications, as well as refused to put these necessary treatments into writing for the CPD. The FBI’s withholding of Shelton’s medical summaries, that she had carried with her, from the CPD prevented Shelton from confirming with the CPD in writing her medical needs, so they just laughed at her moans and cries for treatment, as well as were physically brutal to her in retaliation for her complaints.

Chicago, where Shelton was brought before CCCC Judge Brown for a bond

hearing.

Shelton stated in open court (transcripts not yet available and

excessively costly for indigent defendant) that the arrest warrants were

invalid as Judge Chiampas had stricken her motion for SOJ for cause (PWM

Appendix R) rendering all subsequent orders from her void4, including the

arrest warrants.

Shelton also had a good reason to defy the court in an act of civil

disobedience - so that she could write her habeas petitions and this PWM,

knowing that she would not have access to pen, paper, or legal resources

once incarcerated, nor would she be well enough, with withholding of

medication to write legal documents. She also therefore could not write

grievances through the required grievance procedure.

Shelton also stated that there was a duplicate arrest warrant as the

Court Clerk had given two (2) case numbers to one case. Judge Brown

refused to examine the arrest warrants with their files for validity by looking

at the complaints in each of the two separate cases as Shelton requested,

whereupon he would have noted that one case, by error of the Court Clerk,

had been given two (2) different case numbers (with two (2) warrants and

two (2) bails) and five (5) of the cases were on hold and not before the court,

as the state had elected to prosecute one case and the others were thereby

summarily stayed pending disposition of the first (1st) case, in addition to the

4 Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill.App.3d 170, 176 (2009) and Jiffy Lube Int'l v. Agarwal 277 Ill.App.3d 722, 214 Ill.Dec.609, 6661 N.E.2d 463 (1996) [Failure to transfer motion for SOJ to another judge causes trial judge’s orders to be void.]

fact that all orders issued after a SOJ motion is denied, when it is facially

valid, are void. Judge Brown also refused to wait for the appearance of

attorney Albukerk, on the seventh (7th) case, despite the fact he had a

schedule conflict. Shelton represents herself pro se on five (5) of the six (6)

cases.

Judge Brown summarily, on June 9, 2012, without any due process

whatsoever, ordered without discussion that Judge Chiampas had issued

$5,000 bails on all seven (7) cases and that he would not entertain any

discussion of the issues, that all discussion would have to wait for a hearing

from Judge Chiampas on June 11, 2012. Shelton was then remanded to Cook

County Jail, as she was unable to pay the increase of bails from $1,000 I-

Bonds (personal recognizance) or $1,000 D-Bonds (requiring 10 % payment

or $100 to walk). Thus, on these misdemeanors the total bail was

excessively increased from a few hundred dollars to $35,000.

Prior to the issuance of arrest warrants on May 29, 2012, a courier filed

Shelton’s motion for SOJ for cause (PWM Appendix R) and Shelton’s attorney

on the 7th case, Albukerk, informed Judge Chiampas that Shelton would

surrender to the presiding Judge of the Municipal 1 Division (“M1D”) of the

CCCC that day or the next day if he would hear or assign the motion for SOJ

for cause to a judge other than Judge Chiapas. As Judge Chiampas

endangered Shelton’s life on both March 6 and 21, 2012, Shelton, in an act

of self-defense, refused to come before her.

Judge Chiampas, on May 29, 2012, decided, instead of transferring the

motion to the presiding judge, as required by Illinois statute, to strike the

motion for SOJ for cause. Shelton then, in contact with the court through a

cell phone call with Albukerk, refused to surrender until she had time to write

and file state and federal habeas petitions, as well as this PWM, as she knew

she would not be allowed access to paper and pen in the jail. A week later,

as Shelton expected, in Cook County Jail Shelton was informed that she

would not be allowed access to paper and pen until she had ordered

the paper and pen from her commissary funds which were at $ 0.

She would first have to contact someone to donate her money to write her

documents before she could order paper and pen from the commissary,

which again could take weeks to accomplish and other weeks to order.

Grievances were also therefore not possible.

The law librarian had previously told Shelton in 2010 that she would

not bring her any legal case law or documents unless Shelton told

her the exact citation and paid for the cost of the documents, as ALL

detainees in medical and psychiatric units are barred from access to

the law library, de facto denying access to courts.

Shelton therefore knew that she had to write her legal

documents PRIOR to being incarcerated as she would be cut off from

the courts, and she had no assurance that her friends would be able

to access money to pay a bond.

B. State Habeas Petitions Ignored

Shelton’s friends and attorney Albukerk agreed to attempt to file state

and federal habeas petitions that Shelton wrote prior to surrendering, as well

as this PWM. However, as clear from Albukerk’s affidavit (PWM Appendix T)

the CCCC made it clear that they would not entertain a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. After eight (8) days of daily attempts to obtain the

procedure for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus on cases in the CCCC

M1D without success, followed by a statement by the presiding judges’

secretary/clerk, as well as the Court Clerk’s staff that there was no such

procedure, Albukerk on June 8, 2012 filed seven (7) petitions for writ of

habeas corpus under the criminal case court numbers (Group Appendix A).

As of this date, the CCCC Clerk and judges still refuse to schedule or hear

these petitions for writ of habeas corpus (32 days after they were filed).

The majority of the argument in the habeas petitions is that the Illinois

Courts have no jurisdiction over the criminal complaints as most of

them are legally insufficient on their face and the rest of them were

void due to fraud upon the court by the complainants, and speedy

trial violations. Therefore, Illinois’ very narrow reasons for granting habeas5

had been met, but were doomed not to be heard due to the CCCC’s

ingrained policy of not hearing any petition for writ of habeas corpus on a

misdemeanor case in the M1D.

C. Federal Habeas Petitions Illegally Denied

5Illinois habeas statute, 735 ILCS 5/10-124, limits habeas petition for cases of lack of jurisdiction or actions that occur after sentencing such as the finishing of a sentence.

Shelton’s friend Bambic, after waiting for days for and obtaining

Shelton’s jail ID number attempted to file federal habeas petitions under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(B)(I & ii) [erroneously instead of the appropriate 28

U.S.C. § 2241] on June 11, 2012, but the Clerk of the Court (Northern Dist. of

IL) refused to file them, although he date stamped them and said he would

forward them to the Executive Committee, as Shelton was barred from filing

any documents in that court on new cases, per illegal ex parte order (PWM

Appendix G) of Chief Judge Holderman6.

The District Court Clerk refused to assign case numbers to the Petitions

for Writs of Habeas Corpus. On June 13, 2012 Bambic brought Judge

Holderman’s illegal and void ex parte orders, from March 31, 2010 and April

8, 2010, barring Shelton from the federal courthouse or filing anything but

documents on previous cases and habeas petitions to the Federal District

Court Clerk and demanded that the Clerk correct his error and issue case

numbers on the habeas petitions. The Court Clerk finally complied.

(Appendix B).

On June 20, 2012 Judge Gettleman, issued identical orders (Appendix

C) on all the seven (7) federal habeas petitions illegally dismissing them

without prejudice, falsely stating that Shelton should have filed a petition

with the Illinois Appellate Court to reduce bail and that she had not raised

6 Judge Holderman issued this order without any due process evidentiary hearing, as well as issued it based on his false statements quoting a letter from Shelton’s psychiatrist that she suffered from non-violent flashbacks due to beatings from officers, where she briefly “misinterprets ongoing events”. Judge Holderman in his order stated that the basis for his order was Shelton’s “mental illness” which he considered a danger to the employees of the federal building – a blatant misstatement and purposeful harassment of Shelton as well as purposeful denial of her constitutional rights. See PWM Appendices C1-2 and G.

any issues such as jurisdiction or speedy trial that justified granting the

habeas writ. This statement is patently false if one examines the habeas

petitions, as well as the amended motion to dismiss complaints due to

speedy trial violation (Appendix A5-14) filed with the CCCC attached to the

state habeas petitions. This was necessary because Judge Chiampas would

not allow Shelton to file any motions on March 21, 2012 and she struck all

pending motions concerning speedy trial and failure to state a charge

(Appendix G – no probable cause) [i.e. no jurisdiction]. Amended and new

motions therefore were attached as proposed motions to the state habeas

petitions (Appendix A) when they were date stamped and filed under the

criminal case numbers as offers of proof, but with no opportunity to schedule

them for hearing.

Therefore, Judge Gettleman’s orders dismissing her habeas cases must

be vacated as void because his basis for dismissing them is patently false.

Shelton hopes this Honorable Court will order so.

D. Lack of Jurisdiction of Trial Court Judges Due to Facially Invalid Complaints

All CCCC judges on these misdemeanor cases, since 2009, from Judges

Kenworthy, Fletcher, Skryd, Rivkin-Carothers, Ryan, Burch, Chiampas, to

Judge Brown have failed in their continuing obligation to make sure they

have jurisdiction7 on these cases and that there is probable cause before

7 The judge has a duty to continually inspect the record of the case, and if subject-matter jurisdiction does not appear at any time from the record of the case, then he has the duty to dismiss the case as lacking subject-matter jurisdiction. Should a judge act in any case in which he does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, he is acting unlawfully, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980).

allowing the cases to continue. (see Shelton’s motions attached to state

habeas petitions in Appendix A and Shelton’s Motion for SOJ for Cause, PWM

Appendix R, as well as the docket from the CCCC for the first misdemeanor

case, No 09 MC1 223774 (PWM Appendix S)). Judges in M1D appear ignorant,

new and drunk with power.

Therefore, Judge Brown on June 09, 2012 by refusing to take notice of

Shelton’s claim that there were jurisdictional issues at the bond hearing after

she surrendered, regarding Judge Chiampas’ void arrest warrants, refused to

follow the holdings of higher courts regarding judges’ responsibility to

continually examine the case for jurisdictional issues. He should have held

the case to the end of his bond call and ordered the clerk to immediately

produce the court files so he could examine them to determine if Judge

Chiampas had issued the arrest warrants without jurisdiction, not continued

the case for two (2) days for Judge Chiampas to determine this issue,

especially since a motion for SOJ for Cause was pending and her order to

strike it was void on its face as a violation of statute8.

The CCCC judges apparently as standard practice do not consider

motions for SOJ to have any validity, don’t follow SOJ statutes or read them,

as was illustrated by Judges Burch (who refused to transfer a motion for SOJ

for cause to another Judge on August 26, 2011), Judge Chiampas (who struck

motion on May 29, 2012), as well as Judge Brown (who refused to examine

8 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) requires that when there is a motion for SOJ for cause, it must be transferred to another judge for hearing, or the judge’s orders are void (Curtis, supra).

the record on this issue on June 9, 2012). The party line is: “denied,

unhappiness with orders don’t justify SOJ.”

A Judge may not claim jurisdiction by fiat. If there is no jurisdiction, the

judge’s orders are void9. When judges violate statutes, orders resulting

from such violation are void (See Appendix F for case law). Therefore, Judge

Chiampas’ seven (7) arrest warrants were void.

E. Judge Chiampas’ Further Misconduct

Of note, this PWM was then served on Judge Chiampas and Chief CCCC

Judge Evans on June 9, 2012. Shelton believes the following only occurred

due to Judge Chiampas being afraid of repercussions of her illegal acts

against Shelton due to this filing, which exposed her illegal acts and bias.

Shelton also believes that Judge Chiampas was ordered to give some due

process by Chief CCCC Judge Evans and Presiding M1D Judge Wright,

resulting in the following changes in acts by Judge Chiampas. Of note also,

her speech slowed and she was kinder and explained more to other

defendants following the filing of this PWM.

On June 11, 2012 Judge Chiampas, although she did not vacate

her March 21,2012 dismissal with prejudice of Shelton’s Oral Motion to

9 All orders or judgments issued by a judge in a court of limited jurisdiction must contain the findings of the court showing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, not allegations that the court has jurisdiction. “. . . in a special statutory proceeding an order must contain the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute.” In re Jennings, 68 Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977) A judge’s allegation that he has subject-matter jurisdiction is only an allegation. Lombard v. Elmore, 134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480 N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985), Hill v. Daily, 28 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 328 N.E.2d 142 (1975). Inspection of the record of the case is the controlling factor. If the record of the case does not support subject-matter jurisdiction, then the judge has acted without subject-matter jurisdiction. “If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it had no authority to make that finding.” The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) Without the specific finding of jurisdiction by the court in an order or judgment, the order or judgment does not comply with the law and is void. The finding cannot be merely an unsupported allegation.

Compel Sheriff Dart (written motion prepared but not filed on March 21, 2012

because Judge Chiampas took Shelton into custody and refused to allow her

to talk or file any motions) and written Motion to Compel Clerk Brown to

comply with subpoenas and produce names of witnesses (motion pending for

at least eight (8) months), ordered Sheriff Dart and Clerk Brown to produce

their attorneys in court on June 13, 2012. She allowed Shelton to make a

statement about why she did not appear in Court on May 29, 2012 including

that Judge Chiampas struck motions needed for witnesses, complaining that

there were two cases for two years that were duplicates, of dilatory practices

of the Court not hearing Shelton, as well as that Shelton was ordered to

come to trial on May 29, 2012 without compulsory process.

Judge Chiampas also ordered the State’s Attorney (“SA”) to speak to

Shelton privately about the one case with two case numbers and Shelton in

the lockup was able to show the SA that one case had two case numbers.

The SA then nolle pros’d the duplicate case, 09 MC1 286184. Bail then stood

at $30,000 as there were no longer two (2) $5,000 bails on one case.

On June 13, 2012, Judge Chiampas ordered Sheriff Dart and Clerk

Brown’s attorney to speak to Shelton about her subpoenas and Shelton

described the people whose names she needed as witnesses and the

attorneys promised Judge Chiampas to provide Shelton with these names.

Judge Chiampas also sue sponte reduced Shelton’s bail from $5,000 D-Bonds

(bail requires 10% paid to walk) on each of the six (6) cases to $5,000 I-

Bonds (personal recognizance bails). Shelton was then released from jail on

Bond and over the next week began to recover from the ordeal of lack of

sleep, lack of food, and constant pain due to lack of sufficient medication.

F. SOJ for Cause Motion

On June 13, 2012, Judge Chiampas read a letter from Presiding Judge

Wright (Appendix D) who ordered young, new Judge Harmening to hear

Shelton’s Motion for SOJ for cause. Judge Chiampas also asked Shelton if she

was requesting leave to refile the motion for SOJ for cause. Shelton said she

didn’t need leave to refile it as Judge Chiampas May 29, 2012 order striking it

was void for violation of statute. Judge Chiampas then stated she was

“granting leave to file the motion for SOJ for cause”, stepped off the bench

and Judge Harmening came on the bench. He scheduled a hearing on the

motion for SOJ for cause (PWM Appendix R) for June 20, 2012, when he heard

Shelton’s argument and the SA’s response that Shelton was just angry at

Judge Chiampas’ rulings and that was not cause for SOJ. Judge Harmening

stated he would take a week to make his decision.

On July 2, 2012 Judge Harmening ruled that the motion for SOJ for

cause (PWM Appendix R) was denied because Shelton was just angry at

Judge Chiampas’ rulings and there was no cause for SOJ. Shelton asked to

make an “offer of proof” (“OOP”). Judge Harmening denied her request. He

also made an ad hominem attack against Shelton stating that if an attorney

had made the statements including name-calling in such a motion he would

have held him or had cause to do something against the attorney. Shelton

objected, stating that Judge Harmening’s statements were “total lies” and

she wanted to make an offer of proof. He failed to quote any case law, quote

any statement made by Shelton in her pleading, mention any of the

extensive case law quoted by Shelton or the numerous acts violating the

ADA and violating compulsory process, speedy trial, and statutory right to

SOJ that Judge Chiampas violated ensuring an unfair, illegal trial and de facto

proving bias.

Judge Chiampas came back on the stand with a smirk and tried not to

allow Shelton to speak, stating that status hearing would be held on July 23,

2012. Judge Chiampas, every time Shelton asked to speak, nastily said that

Shelton was “interrupting her”, thus implied threat to hold Shelton in

contempt. Shelton was therefore denied the right to speak as pro se counsel.

Shelton asked then to make an “offer of proof” instead of asking to speak on

the record. Chiampas repeatedly refused to answer Shelton. Then Shelton

said: “Please answer Yes or No, may I make an offer of proof?” Judge

Chiampas then dramatically threw her arms in the air stating: “Go ahead, but

it must be very brief.”

Shelton then stated that she was not recognizing Judge Chiampas’

jurisdiction as Judge Chiampas, through her conduct (striking motions with

prejudice to dismiss for speedy trial violation, striking motion to compel

witnesses to comply with subpoenas, striking motion for SOJ for cause - see

PWM Appendix A, S) had forfeited her jurisdiction and that this was detailed

in Shelton’s PWM. Shelton then stated that she objected to any proceedings

held by Judge Chiampas as they were all therefore void. Shelton ordered the

transcript for July 2, 2012, which will be sent to this Hon. Court as a

supplement to the PWM when available.

Under Illinois case law a void order/case is void prior to it being

declared void and can be attacked at any time in any court. In fact refusing

to go to court when there is lack of jurisdiction as Shelton did on May 29,

2012 was appropriate (See Appendix F, particularly Morrell v. Mock, 270 F.3d

1090 (2001) at Appendix F4). Therefore, it is appropriate to attack all the

trial court proceedings since August 26, 2011 (when Judge Burch refused to

transfer a SOJ motion to another judge, insisted on hearing it and denied it

illegally).

The elected case no 09 MC1 223774 was then continued without

jurisdiction, in violation of speedy trial rights with the Motions for

Dismissal Due to Speedy Trial having been stricken WITH PREJUDICE

on March 21, 2012 (PWM Appendix A4) and the Amended Motion to

Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation (Appendix A5-14) filed in the case

as an attachment to the Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which

the CCCC has refused to hear (Appendix A).

CONCLUSION

Judge Chiampas’ bizarre, arbitrary, capricious rulings striking with

prejudice motions to dismiss for speedy trial and to compel compliance with

subpoenas, violating ADA rights by sanctioning Shelton for becoming ill,

issuing arrest warrant on a case Shelton won last year, issuing duplicate

arrest warrants and bail orders, raising bail to outrageous amounts, ignoring

motion for SOJ for cause until the CCCC Presiding M1D Judge Wright sue

sponte ordered another judge to hear it (presumably because the Chief CCCC

Judge informed him about the filing of this PWM), justifies Shelton’s

allegation that she cannot obtain a fair trial or even pretrial hearings on

motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation, motion to dismiss for legally

insufficient complaints, or motions to dismiss for fraud upon the court by

complainants (Appendix E).

Although some of the issues are now moot (2, portions of 4 & 5, 6 & 8)

due to the CCCC Presiding M1D Judge de facto vacating Judge Chiampas’

order striking motion for SOJ for cause and Judge Harmening hearing and

improperly denying this motion, the circumstances of this case are so

extremely unconstitutional and extraordinary (continuing refusal to

hear speedy trial motions, arbitrary denial of motion for SOJ for cause while

ignoring Shelton’s arguments, while making an ad hominem attack on

Shelton, continuing the cases despite legally insufficient complaint, repeated

denial of ADA rights, unlawful arrests, outrageous bails, including duplicate

warrants and bails, and a warrant in a case that Shelton had won) that in the

interest of justice, because these pervasive and continuing unconstitutional

actions have the strong potential to be repeated, as well as used against

others, the exception to the mootness doctrine is warranted on

issues that now are moot, as well as the consideration of the two issues

raised in this supplement are warranted as the actions ignoring the State

habeas petitions and dismissing the Federal Habeas Petitions are

unconstitutional and contrary to established federal law as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States (5th & 6th Amendment violations,

suspension clause violations, ADA violations) as explained in the PWM, this

supplement and the attached memorandum of law.

The unconstitutional ignoring of Shelton’s State habeas petitions and then

Judge Gettleman’s dismissal of Shelton’s federal habeas petitions with false

statements such as that she did not exhaust state remedies (no appeal of

habeas available in Illinois per Niersheimer line of cases) or that she should

have appealed the bail issue as well as that she stated no federal issue

(when she made arguments for lack of jurisdiction due to speedy trial

violations and legally insufficient complaints in conjunction with

unconstitutional orders of Federal Seventh Circuit Court denying Shelton

right to file in forma pauperis (without due process, despite her indigency)

justifies the review of this case’s issues by this Honorable Court, even the

dismissal of all cases for speedy trial violations and insufficiency of

complaints.

Respectfully submitted,

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Pro Se

cookcountyjudges.files.wordpress.com · web viewwhere relief is sought under article x of this act...

Documents