[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT

OF D

IGITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

15

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT

OF D

IGITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

ASCE

NT O

F DI

GITA

L

TECH

NOLO

GY IN

CHI

NA 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN

CHIN

A 数

码科

技在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在

中国

的延

伸 [0

1] TH

E AS

CENT

OF DI

GITA

L TE

CHNO

LOGY

IN C

HINA

数码

科技

在中

国的

延伸

[01]

THE

CHINA’S FIRST EMAIL.On September 14, 1987, scientists from China and Germany together, sent China’s first email entitled “Across the Great Wall, we can reach every corner in the world.” The email was received in Germany six days later, on September 20.

17[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------数码科技在中国的延伸 | Clément Renaud--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overthelastfewdecades,theharshinternationalcompetitionbetweennationsfortechnologicaldominationhasshiftedtowardsdigitaltechnology.ThisglobalrivalryhaslargelycontributedtoframingtechnologyinChinaasadirectcontinuityof the Chinese state. Discourse around the Internet in China—the so-called“ChineseInternet”—hasbeenfueledbytechno-nationalismsbothinandoutsideofChina,enhancingtheneedfornation-statestoreasserttheirpower inthefaceofincreasinglycomplexproductionandcommunicationnetworks.

Historicalreferencesandanalogy(suchastheGreatWall)havebeenpresentsincetheearlydaysoftheInternetinChina,andprovidedahistoricalanchorfornationalclaimsovercomputernetworks.DigitaltechnologyhasoftenbeenrenamedafterDeng’ssocialismepithet,thefamous“withChinesecharacteristics.”Thisself-reinforcingnarrativeofdigitalChina’sothernesspleasedboththeChineseandnon-Chinesesides,asitofferedacomfortableframeofreferencefornationalorregionalissues.

Toconsider theworldof technologyas competing sides fails to address themost important underlying issues and questions we are facing. We need tounderstand how digital technology operates and contributes to our world’scurrentchanges—bothwithinChinaandelsewhere.TheprevalenceofanationalframeofreferencehelpssupportscientificandbusinessclaimsbutpreventsusfromexploringmorepreciselythepoliticalandsocietalnegotiationsexpressedinsuccessivetechnicaldecisionsthatcreateddigitaltechnologyinChina,andtheirrelevancetoourworldasawhole.

In this chapter, Iwill presentanoverviewof some importantmoments in thehistoryofdigitaltechnologyinChina.TheconstructionofChina’sdigitaledificehas involved a complex set of local, national and international actors, fueledbyvariousambitions.Thepresenttextaimsatobservingthesedynamicsandexposingtheirdiversitywithinandoutsideofthecountry.

THE ASCENT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA

MING KWAI CHINESE TYPEWRITER.Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Chinese language was considered cumbersome and unfit for the expression of modern ideas by many reformers both in China and abroad. The global expansion of the Remington ignited fervent discussion on the necessity to romanize it. Patented in 1952, the Ming Kwai (明快, mingkuai, literally “clear and fast”) was the first typewriter that allowed the retrieval of 8352 Chinese characters from the input of a compact keyboard (Mullaney 2017).

19[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

THEGLOBALRACETOWARDSINNOVATIONIntheglobaltechnologicalrace,therushtowards“innovation”seemstohavereplaced thepreviousquest for “progress”. Today, the concept of innovationacts as a catalyst for the political ambition of outperforming the neighbors.1Vast public andprivate investmentprogramsaimat buildingorganizations tocapturemarketsdefinedbyscientificandbusinessstrategies,wherenewnessandinventionarepursuedastechnologicalachievements,oftenattheexpenseofsocialimprovements.

Digitaltechnology,framedasamajorengineofinnovation,isusuallyreceivedbytwoopposingandcomplementaryviews:theutopianandthedystopian,claimingeitherredemptionordamnationbymeansoftechnology.Thistensionisomni-presentinmostdiscoursearounddigitaltechnologyinChinawiththecanonicalexample ofAlipay being alternatively introduced as a futuristic anddesirablemobilepaymentsystemoranOrwellian“socialcreditscore”systemenablingmasssurveillance.

Morethandebunkingoneortheother,toconsiderdigitaltechnologyinChinarequiresframingitasapartofthecountry’sexperienceoverthe lastseveraldecades.Thelivesofhundredsofmillionsofpeoplehavebeenradicallytrans-formedoverthisperiod,partlybymassiverelocationmovementsfromthecoun-trysidetomegacities.Theincrediblediversityoftheseexperiencesprovidesthehistorical,politicalanddailycontextofwheredigitaltechnologyoccursinChina,simultaneouslylocallyandwithnumerousconsequencesacrossourplanet.

To say it another way, technology exists—in China and elsewhere—not asa standalone set of tools but as an integral part of our daily lives and as adirect product of political and societal settings (Feenberg 1991). The historyof technology is not a succession of innovations or inventions, but the longunfoldingofevolvingusesandsolutionsthatsocietiescreate(Edgerton1999).Theinheritanceofcenturiesofpractices,technologyexistsasacomplexformofhumanmemory (Leroi-Gourhan 1964)and thereforeshouldbeunderstoodoutside of any possible national boundaries.More than anything, technologyanditsartifactsemergedfromtheentanglementsandencountersofexistence,aprocesssometimesdescribedas“creolisation”(Nova&Vacheron2015).

ISINTERNETINCHINAREALLYDIFFERENT?Arguably, the most important learning from China is that digital technologyshould not simply be considered as a communication tool (the “media”), noras an infrastructure, but more as a new writing and control capacity. Thiscontrolcapacityexistsnotasamonolithic,top-downandunifiedforce,butasanegotiationbetweennumerousactors(governmentalbodies, investors,privatecompanies,manufacturers, end users, etc.) to distribute and delegate poweracrossavastnetwork.Inotherwords,writingatscaleallowsthecreationofa

1 ThistrendculminatesinglobalrankingssuchastheGlobalInnovationIndexpublishedbytheWIPOandusedtoevaluatethroughputsandoutcomesofnationalpolicies.

SEAGATE HARD DISK IN WUXI, JIANGSU.Workers at Seagate’s Wuxi Factory perform final testing and quality assurance on its 2.5-inch notebook drives before sending them off to customers.

21[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

deepandpreviouslyunknownadministrativestructurethathastheparticularityin China of explicitly matching part of the existing political organigram. Forinstance, the Cyberspace Administration of China—the country’s centralInternetregulatoryagency—answersdirectlytotheCentralCyberspaceAffairsCommission,whichisheadedbytheCCP’sGeneralSecretaryandPresidentofChina,assistedinthistaskbyhisPremier.

Beyondthisformaladministrativestructure,theInternetinChina—andelsewhere—evolvedfromthedailyproximityandcontradictionsbetweenstateadminis-trators,companies,technicians,users,etc.Sadly,thelackofacomprehensiveapproachacrossdisciplines inEnglish-speakingscientific literature(Herold&deSeta2015)hasproducedmostlycaricaturalnarrativesabouttheInternetinChina,itbeingaforceforeitherdemocratizationortotalitariancontrol—aswellasasplendidmarketingtool.

DebatingtheInternetinChinahaslongprovidedasafeframeworkforcritics,scientistsandeditorialiststodemonstratehowtheInternetcould“gobad,”whilepreservingenthusiasmabouttheirowntechnologicalcondition—andtheirownsalesplans.Recentlythough,thedystopiantonesolelyusedtodescribedigitaltechnology inChinahasgainedmomentumacrossotherareasofdiscussion,bringing new perspectives on the Chinese example. To make things easier,wecoulddatethisshiftinperceptiontoJune6,2013,whenEdwardSnowdenpublishedhisrevelationsonthesurveillancepracticesofseveralUSgovernmentoffices.OccurringinHongKong,the“Snowdenmoment”shedlightonunknownadministrative mechanisms and structures of digital networks, revealing theextentofcontrolwieldedbytheUSgovernmentoverthem.Asadirectconse-quence,itprovidedagreatopportunityforeditorialistsinChinatoreasserttheirnationalclaimsovertheInternet.2

The governability of digital systems has been a longstanding concern ofnation-states,andremainsatopprioritytoday—especiallyintherecentwakeof claims around election manipulation. Upon its inception, the Internet wasconsideredathreattosovereigntyasstateswereunfittoregulate“borderless”networks(Wu1997).Evenitsmostferventdefendersintroducedcyberspaceasa“competingsovereign”(Lessig1998),culminatinginthepublicationofBarlow’sDeclarationofIndependenceofCyberspacein1996tocountertheUSNationalTelecommunicationsAct.Whileregulatoryframeworksweregraduallybecomingclearer, agrowingnumberoffigures emerging from the “hackergeneration”rose to importantpoliticalpositions, exacerbating the importance fornationsandgovernmentstotransitionintoplatforms(O’Reilly2011).

These slowly spreading considerations were accelerated by the “Snowdenmoment,”leadingtoaworldwideshiftinmanygovernments’tones.TheWuzhenDeclarationandthespeechbyChina’spresidentXiJinpingonDecember6,2015,

2 ThePeople’sDailypublishedonJune23,2014,aneditorialentitledCyberSovereignty,AQuestionDifficulttoAvoid(网络主权，一个不容回避的议题)

TOP: Cangjie (Chinese: 倉頡) is a legendary figure in ancient China (c. 2650 BCE), who claimed to be an official historian of the Yellow Emperor and the inventor of Chinese characters. Legend has it he had four eyes, and when he invented the characters the deities and ghosts cried and the sky rained millet.

BOTTOM: The Cangjie Input method was invented in 1976 for inputting Chinese characters on a standard keyboard.

23[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

urging countries to reassert their “cyber sovereignty”made a few converts,withthisChineseconceptfindingitswayuptotheEUcommission.3Whiletheexistenceofpiratesasacommonenemywas instrumental in thecreationofpeace inWestphalia,4 the consolidation of digital technology around nationaldefensesalso required the threatofpiratesandhackers—suchasSnowden.Here,Chinadoesnotappearasanoutlying,insulatedplayerinitscountry-widenetwork,butasaseductivemodelfornation-statesfeelingthreatened.

RECONSIDERDIGITALTECHNOLOGYBeforegoinganyfurther,weneedtoaddressthequestionofwhatwemeanbydigitaltechnology.Morethanjustanotherhumantool,weenvisiondigitaltech-nologyasadirectcontinuationofthehistoryofwriting.Technically,processessuch as photolithography on semiconducting materials inherits directly fromsuccessive generations of writing machines (lithography, micro-photographyandotherprintingprocesses).Sociallyandeconomically,practicesandorgani-zationsinhumansocietieshaveundergonetremendoustransformationsincetheapparitionofdigitalwriting,withradicalchangesinkeysectorssuchasscientificresearchoraccounting.Politically,itappearsthatmanyofthepowerstructuresobservableinthedigitalworldpresentsimilaritieswithpasttraditionsofwriting(Guichard2017).

Writing is more thanmerely a tool for territorial and resourcemanagement.Goody(1977)hasshownhowalphabetizationwasatransformativeexperienceof the mind—creating a new framework with which to visually and logicallyorder thoughts. Inmany regards,newwriting technologies transformthewaywethink—andthewaythinkingisregulated.DuringsuccessiveChineseempires,characters,measurementsystems,mapsandvirtuallyallwritingsystemswereusedtostandardizepracticesandunifytheChineseterritory.Thecurrentoffi-cialhistory inthePRCdatesthebirthofChinatotheinceptionoftheYellowEmperor,whosefirstactionafterseizingpowerwas toaska famousscholartocreateanewwritingsystemtounifytheterritory.IntheAnalects,Confuciusexplainstohisdisciplethatthefirstthinganewrulercomingintopowershoulddoisto“rectifywords”.5

TheearlyuseoftheChineseprintingpressalsogreatlyfacilitatedthecompi-lationofstudyingmaterialsforImperialexaminations.Thecirculationofthesetextswasan importantpoliticalconcern,andasteppingstonefor theemer-genceofagiganticbureaucracyundertheruleoftheMandarins.MaoZedonghimselfunderstoodthisverywell,makinghisLittleRedBookoneofthemostcirculated books in the world with an estimated billion copies in circulation.

3 See, for instance, the report Towards a European Digital Sovereignty Policy published in 2019bytheSectionforEuropeanandInternationalAffairs(ESEC).4 For more about pirates as hostis humani generis, see the excellent Mercenaries, Pirates,and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe byJaniceE.Thomson(1994)5 “必也正名乎”—“Tsze-lu said, ‘The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order for you toadministerthegovernment.Whatwillyouconsiderthefirstthingtobedone?’—TheMasterreplied,‘Whatisnecessaryistorectifynames.’”inConfuciusAnalects—13.3(JamesLegged,trans.)

CONSOLE OF THE 109C AT THE PEKING INSTITUTE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY.The Chinese inscription is a quotation from Chairman Mao (Science 1973).

25[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

Inmany regards,digital technology incontemporaryChinaemergedfromtheneed to rebuildanewformofbureaucracy.Like in Imperial times, thedigitalwritingsystemregulatesdifferentspheresofpublicandprivatelifebyprovidinganinfrastructureforterritorialadministration.

For theChineseCommunistParty (CCP)who seizedpowerafter theSecondWorldWar,rebuildingthecountrywasnotonlyaneconomicendeavorbutalsoa grandstanding mission to reinvent China. Therefore, a new set of writingtoolswere needed. TheChinese languagewas reformed and simplified,withvast literacy campaigns conducted across the population. The goal was notonly to teach the people to read but also to increase the political outreachof official statements,which gradually evolved to claima continuation of theancientChinesecivilization(wenming).6Itwasnosurprisethen,thattheformi-dablewritingcapacityunleashedbydigitaltechnologywastobecomeamajorvectorofthecountry’spoliticalandsocietaltransformations—aswellaspartiallyreproducingImperialpowerandknowledgestructures.

THENEWLITERATI:THEDREAMOFTHEREDENGINEERSAttheendofthe1970s,theCulturalRevolutionhadleftthecountrybenighted.Researchcentersanduniversitieshadbeenclosedforadecade,andtheChineseAcademyofSciences(CAS),theheritageoftheSovietAcademyofSciences,was a small and powerless institution. On March 18, 1978, Deng Xiaoping,leading the vast Reform & Opening plan, announced in front of more than6,000 scientists freshly returned from the countryside, that science andtechnology were now considered at the forefront of China’s reconstruc-tion. Deng’s new doctrine of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” wasbased on an interpretation of Proudhon’s “scientific socialism.” Therefore,Chinese governance should rely on comprehensive scientific—instead ofideological—reasoning.

WhileMaoorDeng’s experiencewasmostlywith themilitary in thePeople’sLiberation Army, rebuilding the country required different skills. Hundreds ofthousands of engineers would have to build roads, bridges, ports and citiesforthewholecountryoverthefollowingdecades.Calledthe“RedEngineers”(Andreas2009)—incontrasttotheexpertsandpoliticalagitatorsoftheCulturalRevolution—this new generation pursued higher education in science andtechnology.

Chineseengineersrapidlygraspedtheimportanceofcomputers.Fromthenewpossibilities of information storage and computation to nationwide distribu-tion networks, the potential of the computer was virtually unlimited. In 1989,JiangZeminwasnamedGeneralSecretaryoftheCCPandwouldsoonbecomeChina’spresident,andthefirstengineertoeverholdthisposition.Havingstudiedelectrical engineering during the Japanese occupation, he understood the

6 InChinese,wen(文)meanswritingsandliteracy.Civilizationisoftentranslatedaswenming(文明),awordthatcanbeunderstoodaslightofwritingsortobeenlightenedbyliteracy.

INFORMATION HIGHWAYS AND GOLDEN PROJECTS.In parallel to the US, another main communication megastructure was developing— in China.

27[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

importanceoftelecommunicationnetworksforthecountry.7Earlyon,hevisitedUSfacilitiesinSiliconValleyanddecidedtosendhisownsonJiangMianheng,whowouldbecomeoneoftheleadingfiguresoftheearlyInternetinChina,tothemythicalXeroxPARC.

THEFARMERANDTHEENGINEER:TOBUILDANDCONNECTACHINESECOMPUTEREven during the Cultural Revolution, computers were already part of thecountry’sdevelopmenteffort.AgroupofAmericancomputerscientistsvisitingChinainthe70sweresurprisedtofindaproductionchainofcomputers:

“The factory that previously produced handles for doors and windows, withhousewives as workers, was reorganized in cooperation with the ShanghaiComputingResearch Institute inorder toproducean integratedcircuitdigitalcomputer. In all of our discussions, the Chinese referred to the factory as“the window handle factory”, and it was pointed out that most of the90employeesinitselectronicworkshopswerethesamehousewiveswhohadbeenthereduringthehandledays.”(Cheathametal.1973)

OnSeptember20,1987,ChineseandGermanteamsmanagedtoestablishanX.25connectioninordertosendthefirstemailfromChina.Themessagewasentitled “First Electronic Mail from China to Germany” and had for content“AcrosstheGreatWallwecanreacheverycornerintheworld.”Afewmonthslater,theTaiwanesecontractmanufacturerHonHaiPrecisionIndustryCompanyLtdopeneditsfirstplant intheShenzhenSpecialEconomicZonetoproducejoysticksforAtarivideogameconsoles.Thecompany(laterknownasFoxconnElectronics)wouldbecomeoneofthelargestemployersintheworld—employingonemillionworkersin2015—andtheplantoneofthelargestaswell—housingmorethan200,000workers.MeanwhilethecityofShenzhen,firstdesignedasapilotforChina’searlyexperimentswithcapitalism,wouldtransformfromasmallbordertownintoaglobaltechnologicalcenter.

In 1991, just a few years after that first email, the Clinton administrationlaunched its Information Highways program. The Chinese administrationquicklyfollowedin1992,withthelaunchofadozenmajorinitiativesknownasGolden Projects to build communication infrastructures across the country(Lovelock et al. 1996). While the most famous is the Golden Shield—nicknamed theGreatFirewallofChinabyCalifornianeditorialists (Ye&Sang1997), theGolden Projects coveredmultiple aspects of the country’s admin-istration: customs,banking, taxes, reportingofpublic spending, etc. Like theInformationHighwaysfortheUS,thiscomprehensive investmentplan laidouttheblueprintsforChina’sdigitalworldaswenowknowit.

7 “The electronics industry plays an extremely significant role in modernization, and we shouldplacegreatemphasisonitsdevelopmentandprogressivelyuseelectronictechnologyinallsectorsof thenationaleconomy.”(September11,1983;p.73)—inZemin,Jiang.2010.OntheDevelopmentofChina’sInformationTechnologyIndustry.Singapore:AcademicPress.

TENCENT QQ.In 2014, Tencent QQ had more than 800 million active accounts. More than just a messaging tool, the application includes games, blogs, online avatars and many services that became a central part of daily life on the Internet in China.

29[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

APUBLICINFRASTRUCTUREOFWRITINGAs shown by Ang (2018), local bureaucracy in China has developed as anadaptive system,where largemaster plans encounter unplanned events, andtacticsinheritedfromtherevolutionwereusedtoattractforeigninvestments,reformlands,etc.TheSpecialEconomicZoneofShenzhenisaprimeexampleofthisdynamic.Originallydesignedasamodelcityandazoneforexperiments,itquicklybecameanEldoradoforthosewillingtoreapthebenefitsofChina’srecentopening.MillionsofChineseworkersrelocatedtotheSEZ,whereanewdagonglifestyleemergedaroundfactoriesandspreadacrossChina(Florence2017).Thislifestylewasassociatedwiththehi-techimageoftheelectronicsthecityproduced.Aprototypeofalargersocietalandeconomicproject,Shenzhenwashi-techsinceitsinceptionandwouldcontinuetostandatthecrossroadsofthecountry’surbananddigitaltransformation.

China’surbanpopulationhasgonefromslightlyover100milliontomorethan800millionpeople8atthetimeofwriting.Lookingattheseincrediblenumbers,itcanbearguedthatoneofthemajorfactorsofInternetadoptioninChinawastheneed forpeoplearriving in newcities to stay in touchwith their familiesandfriendsathome.Untilrecently,themobilephonewasknownasthe“firsturbanpurchase”forruralmigrantsarrivinginaChinesecity(Wallis2013).Whatbetteropportunityfor Internetcompaniesthanhundredsofmillionsofpeopleon themovewhoneed tocommunicate?Fromapps tocable laying,manyofthecompaniesthatemergedaroundtheInternetinChinahavereliedontasksusuallyassociatedwithinfrastructurebuilding(Plantin&DeSeta2019).

TencentoffersaninterestingcaseoftheinterrelationbetweenurbananddigitaldevelopmentinChina.Atatimewhereintercityphonecallswerestillrelativelyexpensiveonthemainland,thecompanybeganprovidingamessagingservicecalledQQthatallowedfortextandcallchatonline.BasedinShenzhen,itquicklygrewto reachhundredsofmillionsofusers,expanding to includeabloggingplatform,onlineavatars,andevenadigitalcurrencyin2005—theyearFacebookofficially launched.With the arrival ofmobile technologies, a newapplicationcalledWeChatwascreatedasasideprojectthateventuallybecameacentralpieceinalmosteveryaspectofdigitalpersonalandprofessionallifeinChina,withchat,apps,paymentandbookingsystems,etc.

Alibaba, another famous company, has taken up the task of facilitatingcommerceacrossChinawithdigitaltechnology.Originallyknownasthefirstdigitalcompany inChina toattractsubstantial foreign investment, itarrivedatatimewhenitwasstilldifficulttosource,buyandsellproductsoutsideofafewmajorcitiesinChina.Alibabatookuptheroleofintermediarybetweenfactories, resellers and consumers, building the spine of China’s logisticsand distribution network.Moreover, theChinese populationwas discoveringconsumption after years without private property. Online marketing and

8EstimationbytheWorldBank,2018.

CYBER CAFES, CHINA.Before mobile connectivity, cyber cafes (wangba, 网吧) were the most important venue for Internet access in China’s urban and rural communities. Reports from the China Internet Network Information Center estimate more than 400 million people accessed the Internet from cyber-cafes between 2006 and 2010.

31[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

sales played an important role in training Chinese city newcomers toconsume in the urban environment by delivering advertisements and goodsclosertothem.

Interestingly, both companies evolved to provide digital payment services. InChina, the relatively low penetration of credit and debit cards allowed themtoaddresscashmanagementdirectlywiththeirownInternet-basedsolutions.Morethanjustprofitable“start-ups,”theirmissionwasunderstoodaspartofalarger—national—agendaofdevelopment:toprovideaccesstobankingandcash facilities to themajorityof thepopulation.China’s regulatorssupportedthesecompanieswithnationalpolicies,andinreturnoutsourcedtaskssuchasdatacollectiontotheircare.9

Tosomeextent,thesecompaniescanbeperceivedaspublicserviceprovidersforthecountry.ComparedtoWesterncounterpartsthathaveoftenfocusedonmiddle-class urban users, Chinese big tech companies serve a billion highlydiverse people, from farmers in remotemountains to the highest spheres ofChina’surbanelite.

Supporting versatile life experiences, Chinese Internet companies provideinfrastructure,capitalandoccasionallyhigh-profilerolemodels—likeJackMafromAlibabaorPonyMafromTencent.Theirserviceshavebecomenotonlyadailyhabitbutanimportantconstituentofsocialstability.Asbuildersofthekey infrastructuresofanewChinesesociety, theyoperatenotonlycloser tothegovernmentbutasan integralpartof thecountry’sadministration—eventhoughtheymayhavebeenprivatelystructured.TheexclusionofUS InternetplayerssuchasFacebookorGoogle,oftenpresentedascensorshiporeconomicprotectionism,couldalsobeconsideredasawaytobuildandretainanationalinfrastructureofservices.

THEADMINISTRATIONOFCONTROLTheintegrationofthesediversifiedprivatecompaniesintothecorecompetenciesof public institutions somehowcontradicts the imageof digital technology inChinaasacentralizedgovernment.Companies,asprovidersofadvancedwritingandloggingsystems,havemandates—eithersolicitedorimposed—toperformtasksforpublicservice.Forinstance,Alibabanowoperatesonlinesemi-autono-moustribunalstosettlethenumerousconflictsthatariseduringpaymentlitiga-tionsandfraudulentactivitiesonitsownplatforms.Caseinstructionprocessesareautomated,andhearingsarehandledbyswornjudgesviaremotevideocalls.

In many regards, the build-up of China’s legal and administrative system ishappening in the digital age. Compared to centuries of jurisprudence in theUSorEurope,thePRC’slegalsystemisrelativelynew,withconceptsimportedfrom traditions as different as Germanic-style civil law, socialist law and

9 Forinstance,byinstitutingamandatoryclearancebyastateinstitution.SeeWildau,Gabriel.2017.“ChinaTargetsMobilePaymentsOligopolywithClearingMandate.”FinancialTimes,August9,2017.

BITCOIN MINING FARM PROTOTYPE, BEIJING, CHINA.The first “baby mining farm” built in a suitcase of 20 stacked FPGAs in an apartment in Haidian district, Beijing, in 2012.

33

[01] TH

E A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

Chinese Imperial law. To cope with the lack of extended jurisprudence, theadministrationisrelyingmoreandmoreonthevastamountsofdataproducedbythepopulation,via techcompaniesor theadministration itself.10The inte-gration of data into a national infrastructure allows the Chinese governmentto create new bureaucratic solutions to regulate its territory—partly realizingLessig’sclaimsthatCodeisLaw.

Aninterestingexamplecanbefoundinbankingregulation.Chinesepeoplehavetraditionallyaccessedcreditthoughtheirfamilyandsocialnetworks—throughtontines and shadow banking. Recently, banking and social networks havemerged,givingrisetoaP2PlendingsectorwhereindividualslendmoneytoeachotherthroughmobilemessagingappssuchasAlibaba’sAlipay.Tofacethefast-growingissuesofinsolvencyandbankruptcy,thegovernmenttaskedAlibabatocreateascorethatlinkedcredithistorydatawithuseraccountsinordertomakesurepeopleweresolventandinsurable.InspiredbyitsAnglo-Saxonequivalent,Alibaba’s SesameCredit ismeant to recreate a buyer-seller or buyer-lendertrustandverificationsystem.Itisbasednotonlyoncredithistory,butalsoonpayments,previous litigationsand in-appsocial relationships.Poor ratescanleadtobeing“blacklisted”whichcangoasfarasblockingtheuser’saccesstohisbankaccount,orreportingthemtothepoliceincasesofrecurrentfraud.

Beyond the quest for efficiency via automation stands the larger project ofbuilding a technological system able to transform not only society but eachindividual.Socialappsandwebsitesexistinthisprocessasmajorinstrumentstoredefinenotonlypracticalabilitiesbutalsospacesofrepresentationswherenewpossibilitiesappear.Likethenovelsof19th-centuryEurope,thenewdigitalwritingsystemaimsatmakinghumansmoreprolificandexemplarybyspreadingmoral,behavioralandfinancial injunctions.While the in-appcreditscore isaprominent example in China, it echoes the case ofmillions of drivers, free-lancers,shopownersandworkersworldwidewhoseworkincreasinglydependsonsocialplatformrankings.

TOWARDSAGLOBALWRITINGSYSTEMThe emergence of a civil society in China has been supported by onlinediscussionsandcampaigns(Yang2003),andsodiditscontrolandregulation.Notonlycanregulatorsnowaccessvastamountsofdatafordecisionpurposes,but they can also rely on digital interfaces to enforce these decisions. Thisintegrativewriting systemoffers a new level of control to theadministrators.Navigatingcitiesreliesextensivelyondigitalapps,fromtaxis,payments,videosurveillanceandevenfacialrecognition,providingdatatorefineandenactnewformsof statistics-basedpolicies.Beyond smart city narratives, urbanareasalsoactasa largedatafield that informstherestof thecountry.WhileverylargecompanieshaveemergedfromChina’sfirstwaveofcoastalurbanization,thecountry’sdevelopmenttowardsinnerandruralcountrysideiscreatingnew

10SeveralexistingandplannedapplicationswerepresentedduringtheWorldArtificialIntelligenceRuleofLawForum(世界人工智能大会法治论坛)organizedbytheShanghaiLawSocietyinSeptember2019.

CHINESE NEW YEAR’S EVE CHOREOGRAPHY WITH 540 ROBOTS & 29 DRONES.The Chinese New Year Gala is broadcast on Chinese TV every year. An integral part of the Chinese Spring festival experience, it is the most watched TV show in the world (eclipsing even the final of the World Cup). In 2016, 540 robots & 29 drones danced to the lyrics of a famous singer.

35

[01] TH

E A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

privateoperators.Firms likePinduoduohavefocusedonthirdandfourth-tiercities, developing new links between local production and national resellernetworks. Alibaba has also reinforced its TaobaoVillages program to extendexistingsupplychainstoruralareasviadirectonlinesalestowardsthemainlandandabroad.Onceagain,digital technology isusedasadirectvector for thecountry’seconomic,industrialandadministrativeintegration.

China’swritinginfrastructurehasexpandedfaroutsidethecountry.ThecityofShenzhenstandsasthestorefront11ofvastinvestmentprogramsfacingtowardstheMiddleEast,EasternAfricaandEurope—suchastheBeltandRoadInitiative.For policy planners, the Shenzhen SEZwas originally designed as aworkingprototype of the (post) industrial city. Today, SEZs following thismodel haveopenedindifferentplacesaroundAfricaandSoutheastAsia.ThewholePearlRiverDelta region is being integrated into a single giant urban hub, bringingtogethertensofmillionsofpeopleandthebiggestindustrialcapacityonEarth,with heavy investments in sectors like robotics, genomics and energy. Suchgigantic integrative dynamics rely not only on projections in time and space,butalsoontheextensionofdigitaltechnologiestoadministernewdomainsofactivitiesandlifeinaworldoflimitedresources.

CONCLUSIONTechnologiesdevelopedinChinahavenowbecomecentralpiecesofourglobalwritinginfrastructure.Tounderstandtheirsignificancerequiressteppingbackfromnational contexts and considering themas an expressionof a commonandplanetaryhistoricalmomentum,wheretheemergenceofanewwritingandcontrolcapacitycoincideswithmajorchangesinnaturalecosystems.TheearlyframingoftheInternetinChinaasaremotemanifestationoftechnocratichubrishascontributedtorecreatingthetraditionalviewofChinaasaself-centeredand isolated area of theworld. This discourse provided comfortable supportfordifferenteconomicandpolitical interests inChinaandworldwidebuthasalsopreventedusfromconsideringtheimportantentanglementsandsimilaritiesbetweenwritingsystemsworldwide.

Withthedwindlingofnaturalreservesandautomationgrowingworldwide,digitalnetworksareincreasinglybeingusedtoregulatebehaviors.Thesenewwrittenformsareredefiningnotonlybordersandboundaries,butgenerallyregulatingourrelationshipswithoursurroundingsandenvironment.Beyondnation-states,ournewconditionsofexistencerequirethebuildingofnewcriticalnarratives,wheretheascentofdigitalwritingstandsasacommonendeavor.

11Shenzhen is home to some of the largest tech companies in China such as Huawei, Tencent,DJIorBGI.

CLAP FOR XI JINPING.The application Clap for Xi Jinping (为习近平鼓掌) was released on October 18, 2017, by Tencent Media for the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress. Users could watch the president’s speech and had 19 seconds to tap the bottom of the screen as many times as possible to clap along. The game was played hundreds of millions of times just a few hours after its release.

37[01] T

HE A

SC

EN

T OF D

IGITA

L TEC

HN

OLO

GY

IN C

HIN

A

REFERENCESAndreas,Joel.2009.RiseoftheRedEngineers:TheCulturalRevolutionand theOriginsofChina’sNewClass.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.Ang,YuenYuen.2016.HowChinaEscapedthePovertyTrap.IthacaNY:Cornell UniversityPress.Cheatham,ThomasE.,WesleyA.Clark,AnatolW.Holt,SeveroM.Ornstein, AlanJ.Perlis,andHerbertA.Simon.1973.“ComputinginChina:ATravel Report.”Science182(4108).Edgerton,David.1999.“FromInnovationtoUse:TenEclecticTheseson theHistoriographyofTechnology.”HistoryandTechnology16(2):111–36.Feenberg,Andrew.1991.CriticalTheoryofTechnology.Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.Florence,Eric.2017.“HowtoBeaShenzhener:RepresentationsofMigrant LaborinShenzhen’sSecondDecade.”InLearningfromShenzhen:China’s Post-MaoExperimentfromSpecialZonetoModelCity,Chicago:Chicago UniversityPress,86–103.Goody,Jack,andJohnRankineGoody.1977.TheDomesticationoftheSavage Mind.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Guichard,Éric,ed.2017.Écritures:SurlestracesdeJackGoody.Papiers. Villeurbanne:Pressesdel’Enssib.Herold,DavidKurt,andGabrieledeSeta.2015.“ThroughtheLookingGlass: TwentyYearsofChineseInternetResearch.”TheInformationSociety31(1): 68-82.Leroi-Gourhan,André.1964.LeGesteetLaParole.Paris:AlbinMichel.Lessig,Lawrence.1998.“TheLawsofCyberspace.”ReadingsinCyberethics 134:136.Lovelock,Peter,TheodoreC.Clark,andBenA.Petrazzini.1996.“The‘Golden Projects’:China’sNationalNetworkingInitiative.”InformationInfrastructure andPolicy5(4):265–77.Mullaney,ThomasS.2017.TheChineseTypewriter:AHistory.1sted. CambridgeMA:MITPress.Nova,Nicolas,andJoëlVacheron.2015.Dadabot:AnIntroductiontoMachinic Creolization.IdPure.O’Reilly,Tim.2011.“GovernmentasaPlatform.”Innovations:Technology, Governance,Globalization6(1):13–40.Plantin,Jean-Christophe,andGabrieledeSeta.2019.“WeChatas Infrastructure:TheTechno-NationalistShapingofChineseDigital Platforms.”ChineseJournalofCommunication,February.Wallis,Cara.2013.TechnomobilityinChina:YoungMigrantWomenandMobile Phones(CriticalCulturalCommunication).NewYork:NYUPress.Wu,TimothyS.1997.“CyberspaceSovereignty—TheInternetandthe InternationalSystem.”HarvardJournalofLaw&Technology10(3).Yang,Guobin.2003.“TheCo-EvolutionoftheInternetandCivilSociety inChina.”AsianSurvey43(3):405–22.