סמינר במכירות פומביות הרצאה 4
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סמינר במכירות פומביות הרצאה 4. מעביר: טל סימינוביץ בהנחיית פרופ' עמוס פיאט. מה נעשה היום?. מה נעשה היום?. דוגמאות Max-Profits Single bidder, one item Single bidder, two items Profit when values are correlated Purple pricing Google IPO auction Allocation and pricing mechanisms. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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? Max-ProfitsSingle bidder, one itemSingle bidder, two itemsProfit when values are correlatedPurple pricingGoogle IPO auctionAllocation and pricing mechanisms
1:Single bidder, one item
1:Single bidder, one item 1:Single bidder, one item
8 2:Single bidder, two items
9 2:Single bidder, two items10 2:Single bidder, two items
vi 11 2:Single bidder, two items
12 2:Single bidder, two items13 2:Single bidder, two items
14 2:Single bidder, two items15 2:Single bidder, two items16 2:Single bidder, two items17 2:Single bidder, two items18 2:Single bidder, two items19 2:Single bidder, two items20 2:Single bidder, two items21 3:Profit when values are correlated
22 3:Profit when values are correlated
23 3:Profit when values are correlated "" ., , .
24 3:Profit when values are correlated: , 10 100, :
25 3:Profit when values are correlated26 3:Profit when values are correlated
27 3:Profit when values are correlated
28 3:Profit when values are correlated
29 3:Profit when values are correlated30 3:Profit when values are correlated Second-Price Auction : 1 10, 30$ 2 1 100, 60$ 231 3:Profit when values are correlated
32 4:Purple pricing
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, 35 4:Purple pricing Purple pricing , :
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37 5:Google IPO (initial public offering) auction 2004 . , . IPO , " .38 ...
2. Allocation and pricing mechanisms
Allocation and pricing mechanisms . ., . ?- .- "" , .
:Spectrum Auctions . . (). ., , ( )
:Spectrum Auctions . ? , ., 2013:
Winning bidderSpectrum wonBase priceEverything Everywhere Ltd2 x 5 MHz of 800 MHz and2 x 35 MHz of 2.6 GHz588,876,000Hutchison 3G UK Ltd2 x 5 MHz of 800 MHz225,000,000Niche Spectrum Ventures Ltd (a subsidiary of BT Group plc)2 x 15 MHz of 2.6 GHz and1 x 20 MHz of 2.6 GHz (unpaired)186,476,000Telefnica UK Ltd2 x 10 MHz of 800 MHz(coverage obligation lot)550,000,000Vodafone Ltd2 x 10 MHz of 800 MHz,2 x 20 MHz of 2.6 GHz and1 x 25 MHz of 2.6 GHz (unpaired)790,761,000Total2,341,113,000:Sponsored Search Auctions
:Sponsored Search Auctions iphone case"". , "" . , , . . ( ) 2013: $50,578,000,000(http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html)
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Exercise 1.4.12. Use revenue equivalence (Corollary 1.4.3) and the equilibrium of the k-unit Vickrey auction to determine the expected price at which the tickets sell for a venue that holds k people, assuming that each person's value is drawn independently from prior distribution F. (You may assume that the population of possible ticket-purchasers has size n > k.)