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Kant. Aphorisms

90

Notes

89

Kant. Aphorisms

Compiled and edited by Prof. V.N. Bryushinkin

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Kant. Aphorisms

90

Notes

89

Kant. Aphorisms







Kant Aphorisms

Kaliningrad 2010

UDK 1 BBК 87.3 (4г) К15

Kant. Aphorisms / Comp. and ed. by Vladimir N. Bryu-shinkin. — Kaliningrad: Immanuel Kant State Univer-sity Press, 2010. — 89 c. ISBN 978-5-9971-0077-3

The English collection of extracts from the works of Imman-

uel Kant was prepared by Prof. Vladimir Bryushinkin with assis-tance from Dr. Vadim Chaly, Anna Bryushinkina and in collabo-ration with Prof. Robert Howell (State University of New York).

UDK 1 BBK 87.3 (4г)

© Bryushinkin V.N., comp. and ed. 2010

ISBN 978-5-9971-0077-3

© Immanuel Kant State University Press

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TO THE READER1 “Yesterday just after dinner I went to visit the re-

nowned Kant, the profound metaphysician... I did not have a letter of introduction for him, but daring seizes a city, and I was admitted into the room” with these words Nikolai M. Karamzin described his visit to the Königsberg philosopher Immanuel Kant more than 200 years ago.

We, gentle reader, also do not have any letters of intro-duction, but the example of the famous Russian writer, historian and traveller encourages and inspires to half-open the door and to get a glimpse of the fancy world of Kant’s thought. It is fancy, for the convoluted exterior form often cloaks a pure miracle, one only has to unveil it.

Kant did not invent aphorisms. He is one of the most systematic thinkers in the history of philosophy. Every statement in his works has an inextricable link to the text and his system of his views in whole. Almost every phrase begins with “therefore”, “consequently”, “for”. So it is rather difficult to single out profound and com-plete thoughts interesting in themselves and giving an integral understanding of Kant’s philosophy. But due to their short form they offer us an insight, become sayings, worldly wisdom, a part of our world view.

1 Translation into English by Anna Bryushinkina.

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And as pieces of amber washed ashore inexorably at-tract us by the sunshine of bygone ages, the thoughts of the critical philosopher astonish again and again by their depth, unexpectedness and refinement.

Vladimir Bryushinkin

PERSONALITY

AND PHILOSOPHY

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Personality and philosophy

7

On Himself

I

I myself am a researcher from inclination. I feel the entire thirst for knowledge and the eager unrest to go further in it as well as the satisfaction with every acquisi-tion. There was a time when I believed that this alone could compose the honour of mankind and I despised the rabble that knew of nothing. Rousseau brought me around. This blinding preference vanished, I learn to honour human beings…

II

I will never forget my mother, for she planted and nourished the first seed of the Good in me, she opened my heart to the impressions of the nature; she awakened and widened my concepts, and her lessons have had an enduring healing influence on my life.

III

Never, not a single time, was I allowed to hear any-thing indecent or to see anything unworthy from my parents.

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IV

…so I remain henceforth obstinate in my resolve not to be tempted by any author’s itch into seeking fame in easier, more popular fields, until I shall have freed my thorny and hard ground for general cultivation.

V

…since from natural aversion I avoid anything that looks pompous (partly because those who praise often call forth those who reproach).

VI

I always hope to look at my judgements impartially from the standpoint of someone else, so as to derive a third view which is better than the one I had.

VII

However near or far the goal of my life may be, I will not end my career dissatisfied if I dare flatter myself that what was started by my modest efforts might be brought nearer and nearer to completion by skilful men who zealously work to perfect the world.


9

On Philosophy and Philosophers

I

Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one spe-cies of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.

II

... philosophy... is... the science of the relation of all cognition and of all use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must all unite to form a unity.

The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following questions:

1.What can I know? 2.What ought I to do? 3.What may I hope? 4.What is man?

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III

..the other [the value of philosophy] is that of moral-practical reason and is aimed at the final end, which is unconditionally (categorically) demanded, namely the end of creating people with an improved way of think-ing.

IV

Philosophy is the only science that knows how to provide for us this inner satisfaction, for it closes, as it were, the scientific circle, and only through it do the sciences attain order and connection.

V

I know that there are many people that find philoso-phy a great deal easier than higher mathematics. But what such people understand by philosophy is simply what they find in books which bear that title.

VI

..it is said of philosophy, for example, that she is the handmaiden of theology... But it is not clear whether «she bears the torch before her mistress or carries the train behind».


11

VII

Nothing can be more desirable to a philosopher than to be able to derive, a priori from one principle, the mul-tiplicity of concepts or basic principles that previously had exhibited themselves to him piecemeal in the use he had made of them in concreto, and in this way to be able to unite them all in one cognition.

VIII

To a philosopher two things chiefly pertain: 1) Culti-vation of talent and of skill, in order to use them for all sorts of ends. 2) Accomplishment in the use of all means toward any end desired.

IX

Consistency is the highest obligation of a philoso-pher, and yet the most rarely found.

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On Königsberg

A large city such as Königsberg on the river Pregel, which is the centre of a kingdom, in which the provincial councils of the government are located, which has a uni-versity (for cultivation of the sciences) and which has also the right location for maritime commerce — a city which, by way of rivers, has the advantage of commerce both with the interior of the country and with neighbour-ing and distant lands of different languages and customs, can well be taken as an appropriate place for broadening one's knowledge of human beings as well as of the world, where this knowledge can be acquired without even travelling.

WHAT CAN I KNOW?

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What can I know?

15

On Reason and Understanding

I

There are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.

II

If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sen-sibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing both representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding.

III

All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it under the highest unity of thinking.

IV

Reason in a creature is a capacity to extend, far beyond natural instinct, the rules and intentions of the use of all that creature’s powers; and its projects have no limits.

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V

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions with-out concepts are blind.

VI

The understanding does not draw its (a priori) laws from nature, but prescribes them to it.

VII

They [Galileo, Torricelli, Stahl et co.] comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgements according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements...

VIII

A correct understanding is that which is lustrous not only owing to its great number of concepts but also ow-ing to the appropriateness of its concepts for cognition of the object; thus it contains the ability and skill to com-prehend truth.

What can I know?

17

On Truth and Delusion

I

The old and famous question with which the logi-cians were to be driven into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a miserable circle or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art, is this: What is truth?

II

Truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgement about it insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all.

III

Error is effected only through the unnoticed influ-ence of sensibility on understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgement join with the objective ones, and make the latter deviate from their destination, just as a moved body would of itself always stay in a straight line in the same direction, but starts off on a curved line if at the same time another force influences it in another direction.

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IV

It does not seem enough to us merely to have ex-pounded what is true, but also that which one has desired to know.

V

The truth is not the highest perfection of social life; the beautiful appearance drives it here just like it does more so in painting.

On Nature

I

Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and in the living world, takes place according to rules, although we are not always acquainted with these rules. — Water falls according to laws of gravity, and with animals lo-comotion also takes place according to rules. The fish in water, the bird in the air, move according to rules. The whole nature in general is really nothing but a connec-tion of appearances according to rules; and there is no absence of rules anywhere.

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II

By “nature”... is understood the sum total of appear-ances insofar as these are in thoroughgoing connection through an inner principle of causality.

III

We are not concerned with the nature of the things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions of both our senses and understanding, but with nature as an object of possible experience...

IV

…hence nature should be conceived in such a way that the regularity of its form harmonizes with the pos-sibility of the ends that are to be achieved in it according to the laws of freedom.

On Things in Themselves

I

We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in them-selves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own

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subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of ob-jects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with ob-jects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us.

II

...Our sensory representation is by no means a repre-sentation of things in themselves, but only of the way in which they appear to us.

III

In fact, if we view the objects of the senses as mere appearances, as is fitting, then we thereby admit at the very same time that a thing in itself underlies them, al-though we are not acquainted with this thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance, i.e., with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. Therefore the understanding, just by the fact that it accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things in themselves, and to that extent we can say that the representation of such beings as underlie the appearances, hence of mere intelligible beings, is not merely permitted but also unavoidable.

What can I know?

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On Cognition and Experience

I

...Although all our cognition commences with experi-ence, yet it does not on that account all arise from experi-ence.

II

...We will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience.

III

Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of ex-perience.

IV

...We can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.

V

All our cognition is in the end related to possible in-tuitions: for through these alone is an object given.

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VI

Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends with ideas.

On Knowledge and Faith

I

... No curiosity is more disadvantageous to the expan-sion of our knowledge than that which would always know its utility in advance, before one has entered into the investigations, and before one could have the least con-cept of this utility even if it were placed before one's eyes.

II

...When taking something to be true is both subjec-tively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing.

III

If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and it is at the same time held to be objectively insufficient, then it is called believing.

What can I know?

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IV

...I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith...

On Science

I

Every doctrine that is supposed to be a system, that is, a whole of cognition ordered according to principles, is called a science.

II

...The founder and his most recent successors often fumble around with an idea that they have not even made distinct to themselves and that therefore cannot deter-mine the special content, the articulation (systematic unity) and boundaries of the science.

III

...The science must always be dogmatic, i. e. it must prove its conclusions strictly a priori from the secure principles...

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IV

Mathematics has, from the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable people the Greeks, travelled the secure path of a science.

V

What a mass of knowledge, what discoveries of new methods would now be on hand if an Archimedes, a New-ton, a Lavoisier with their diligence and talent had been favoured by nature with a hundred years of continuous life without decrease of vitality! But the progress of the species is always only fragmentary (according to time) and offers no guarantee against regression, with which it is always threatened by intervening revolutionary barbarism.

VI

If there is any science humans really need, it is the one I teach, of how to occupy properly that place in crea-tion that is assigned to humans, and how to learn from it what one must be in order to be human.

WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?

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What ought I to do?

27

On Duty

I

Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces noth-ing charming or insinuating but requires submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threatening any-thing that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly work against it...

II

...Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law.

III

The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the en-joyment of life; it has its own law and also its own court, and even though one might want to shake both of them together thoroughly, so as to give them blended, like medicine, to the sick soul, they soon separate of them-selves...

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On Morals

I

Morals is of itself practical in the objective sense, as the sum of laws commanding unconditionally, in accor-dance with which we ought to act...

II

...morals is not properly the doctrine of how we are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to become worthy of happiness.

III

The threat of eternal punishment cannot be an imme-diate ground of morally good actions although it may be a strong counterweight against temptations to evil.

IV

This is the difference between false and healthy mo-rality: the former seeks only for antidotes for evil, while the latter is concerned that the cause of evil is not there at all.

What ought I to do?

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On the Moral Law

I

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increas-ing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.

II

But is man by nature morally good or bad? He is nei-ther, for he is not by nature a moral being. He only be-comes a moral being when his reason has developed ideas of duty and law.

III

...act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

IV

A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...

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V

So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a mean.

VI

The moral law is holy (inviolable). A human being is indeed unholy enough but the humanity in his person must be holy to him.

VII

But the moral law of itself still does not promise any happiness, since this is not necessarily connected with observance of the law according to our concepts of a natural order as such.

VIII

In this way the moral law leads through the concept of the highest good, as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions — that is, chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of another's will — but as essential laws of every free will in itself...

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On Will

I

It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be consid-ered good without limitation except a good will.

II

The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the representation of certain laws.

III

Even if, by a special disfavour of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose — if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve noth-ing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control) — then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add any-thing to this worth nor take anything away from it.

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On Freedom

I

There can be nothing more terrible than that the ac-tions of one person should be subordinated to the will of another. Thus, no aversion can be more natural than that which a person has towards slavery. For the sake of this [aversion] a child cries and embitters itself if it has to do what others want, without someone having bothered to endear it to [the child]. It only wishes to be a man soon and act in accordance with its will.

II

The heart is freed and relieved of a burden that al-ways secretly presses upon it, when in pure moral resolu-tions... there is revealed to the human being an inner capacity not otherwise correctly known by himself, the inner freedom to release himself from the impetuous importunity of inclinations so that none of them, not even the dearest, has any influence on a resolution for which we are now to make use of our reason.

III

But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judge-ment that this may be the most important reason why

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learned people cry out so urgently for freedom of press. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our judgements, and we are exposed to error.

On Virtue

I

One need not be an enemy of virtue but only a cool observer, who does not take the liveliest wish for the good straightaway as its reality, to become doubtful at certain moments... whether any true virtue is to be found in the world.

II

To behold virtue in her proper from is nothing other than to present morality stripped of any admixture of the sensible and of any spurious adornments of reward or self-love.

III

Virtue signifies a moral strength of will.

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IV

Softness gets rid of more virtue than wantonness.

V

A man does not take part in the fortune or misfortune of others until he feels content. Thus bring it about that he is content with less, and you will create good people; otherwise it is in vain.

VI All human virtue in circulation is small change — it

is a child who takes it for real gold. — But it is still bet-ter to have small change in circulation than no funds at all, and eventually they can be converted into genuine gold, though at considerable loss.

On Benevolence

I

... one cannot, by any repayment of a kindness re-ceived, rid oneself of the obligation for it, since the re-cipient can never win away from the benefactor his pri-ority of merit, namely having been the first in benevo-lence.

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II

I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance with his concepts of happiness.

III

Do not accept favours you could do without...

On Evil

I

However, it must be premised here that a seed of the Good is left in its entire purity and cannot be destroyed or spoiled; it certainly cannot be egoism, which, taken as a principle of all our maxims, is the very source of all evil.

II

Evil is only the result of nature not being brought under control. In man there are only germs of good.

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III

The common opinion that previous times were better comes from the evil that one feels and the presupposition that otherwise everything would be good.

On Happiness

I

Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes accord-ing to his wish and will...

II

Whoever is able to be happy only according to an-other person's choice (no matter how benevolent this other person may be) rightly feels that he is unhappy.

III

To assure one's own happiness is a duty...

IV

One cannot therefore act on determinate principles for the sake of being happy, but only in empirical coun-

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sels, for example, of a regimen, frugality, courtesy, re-serve and so forth, which experience teaches are most conductive to well being on the average.

V

This ultimate purpose of pure practical reason is the highest good, so far as it is possible in the world, though it is to be sought not merely in what Nature can furnish (the greatest amount of pleasure); it lies, rather, in what is also the supreme requirement, or condition, under which alone reason can accord happiness to the rational world-being, namely that the latter's behaviour should simulta-neously conform to the utmost with the moral law.

VI

A person may tinker as much as he wants, but he cannot force nature to follow other laws. He himself must either work or others [work] for him, and this work will rob others of so much bliss that he will increase his own beyond the average

VII

Sympathy for the natural misfortune of others is not necessary, but it certainly is in the injustices suffered by others.

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On the Truth and Lie

I

... truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as a basis of all duties to be grounded on contract, the law of which is made uncertain and useless if even the least exception to it is admitted.

II

To be sure, I think much with the firmest conviction and to my great satisfaction that I will never have the cou-rage to say; but I will never say anything that I do not think.

III

Thus a lie, defined merely as an intentionally untrue declaration to another, does not require what jurists insist upon adding for their definition, that it must harm an-other (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alte-rius). For it always harms another, even if not another individual, nevertheless humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right unusable.

IV

By a lie a human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being.

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V

Lying makes a man the object of common con-tempt…

VI

Everyone who’s a coward lies but not vice versa. What makes one weak brings about lying.

On State

I

For a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (patrimonium). It is a society of human beings that no one other than itself can command or dispose of.

II

Now the republican constitution is the only one that is completely compatible with the right of human beings, but it is also the most difficult one to establish and even more to maintain, so much so that many assert it would have to be a state of angels because human beings, with their self-seeking inclinations, would not be capable of such a sublime for of constitution.

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III

The problem of establishing a state goes like this: “Given a multitude of rational beings all of whom need universal laws for their preservation but each of whom is inclined covertly to exempt himself from them, so to order this multitude and establish their constitution that, although in their private dispositions they strive against one another, these yet so check one another that in their public conduct the result is the same as if they had no such evil dispositions”.

IV

The desire for freedom and the exclusive force of a dominator is a great misfortune, but it becomes just as much an orderly system, in fact, there is actually more order, although less bliss than in free states.

V

With general luxury one complains about the divine rule and about the rule of the king. One does not consider that, as concerns the latter, just the same desire for honour and immoderacy that the civilians control can have no other form on the throne than as they have that such civil-ians cannot otherwise be ruled. The subject wants the master to overcome his inclinations of vanity in order to promote the good of his lands and [he wants] to think that demands of him do not occur in consideration of lowly

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things even with the law. Are wise people themselves in the first place righteous and moderate these virtues will soon rise to thrones and also make the prince good.

On Politics and Politicians

I

I can indeed think of a moral politician, that is, one who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals, but not of a po-litical moralist, who frames a morals to suit the states-man's advantage.

II

That kings should philosophize or philosophers be-come kings is not to be expected, but it is also not to be wished for, since possession of power unavoidably cor-rupts the free judgement of reason.

III

Great people only glimmer in the distance that a ruler loses it in front of his valet comes from the fact that no man is great.

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On Right

I

Right is... the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.

II

Thus the universal law of right, so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law...

III

Right is the limitation of the freedom of each to the condition of its harmony with the freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in accordance with a universal law; and public right is the sum of external laws which make such a thoroughgoing harmony possible.

WHAT MAY I HOPE?

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What may I hope?

45

On Religion

I

Religion is the law in us, in so far as it derives em-phasis from a Law-giver and a Judge above us. It is mo-rality applied to the knowledge of God. If religion is not united to morality, it becomes merely an endeavour to win favour.

II

... true religion is not to be placed in the knowledge of what God does or has done for our salvation, but in what we must do to become worthy of it.

III

Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands.

IV

... to have a religion is a duty of the human being to himself.

V

There is only one (true) religion; but there can be several kinds of faith.

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VI

To begin with I accept the following proposition as a principle requiring no proof: Apart from a good life-conduct, anything which the human being supposes that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere reli-gious delusion and counterfeit service of God.

On God

I

... the universal true religious faith is faith in God (1) as the almighty creator of heaven and earth, i. e. morally as holy lawgiver; (2) as the preserver of the human race, as its benevolent ruler and moral guardian; (3) as the administrator of his own holy laws, i. e. as just judge.

II

To believe that grace may have its effects, and that perhaps there must be such effects to supplement the imperfection of our striving for virtue, is all that we can say on the subject...

What may I hope?

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On History

I

There is no other way out for a philosopher here than, since he cannot presuppose any rational intention to belong to people and the sum total of their deeds, to try to discover a natural intention in this meaningless course of human proceedings, from which nevertheless a history according to a certain plan of nature might be possible for creatures acting without their own plan.

II

The history of human race, viewed as a whole may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a political constitution, internally, and for its purpose, also externally perfect, is the only state in which all the capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully developed.

III

I shall... be allowed to assume that, since the human race is constantly advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived as progressing toward what is better with respect to the moral end of its existence, and that this will indeed be interrupted from time to time but will never be broken off. I do not need to provide this presupposition; it is up to its adversary to

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provide [his] case. For I rest my case on my innate duty, the duty of every member of the series of generations — to which I (as a human being in general) belong and am yet not so good in the moral character required of me as I ought to be and hence could be — so to influence poster-ity that it becomes always better...

On War and Peace

I

... a war of extermination, in which the simultaneous annihilation of both parties and with it of all right as well can occur, would let perpetual peace come about only in the vast graveyard of the human race. Hence the war of this kind, and so too the use of all means that lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden.

II

... yet reason, from the throne of the highest morally legislative power, delivers an absolute condemnation of war as a procedure for determining rights and, on the contrary, makes a condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured without a pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty...

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49

III

... there must be a league of a special kind, which can be called a pacific league, and what would distin-guish it from a peace pact is that the latter seeks to end only one war whereas the former seeks to end all war forever. This league does not look to acquiring any power of a state but only to preserving and securing the freedom of a state itself and of other states in league with it, but without there being any need for them to subject themselves to public laws and coercion under them (as people in the state of nature must do). The practicability (objective reality) of this idea of a feder-alism that should gradually extend over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be shown.

IV

Seek ye first the kingdom of practical reason and its justice, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will come to you of itself.

Kant. Aphorisms

50

On Revolution

I

Through revolution, the abandonment of personal despotism may be engendered and the end of profit-seeking and domineering oppression may occur, but never a true reform of the state of mind. Instead, new prejudice, just like the old ones, will serve as the guiding reins of the great, unthinking mass.

II

A change in a (defective) constitution, which may certainly be necessary at times, can there fire be carried out only through reform by the sovereign itself, but not by the people, and therefore not by revolution; and when such a change takes place this reform can affect only the executive authority, not the legislative.

III

Moreover, once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been established, the lack of legitimacy with which it began and has been implemented cannot release the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new order of things as good citizens, and they cannot refuse honest obedience to the authority that now has the power.

What may I hope?

51

On Enlightenment

I

Enlightenment is man’s leaving his self-caused im-maturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use one’s intel-ligence without the guidance of another. Such immatur-ity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelli-gence, but by lack of determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another. Sa-pere Aude! Have the courage to use your own intelli-gence! is therefore the motto of enlightenment.

II

The question now may be put: Do we live at present in an enlightened age? The answer is: No, but in an age of enlightenment.

III

An age cannot conclude a pact and take an oath upon it to commit the succeeding age to a situation in which it would be impossible for the latter to enlarge even its most important knowledge, to eliminate error and alto-gether to progress enlightenment. Such a thing would be a crime against human nature, the original destiny of which consists in such progress. Succeeding generations are entirely justified in discarding such decisions as un-authorized and criminal.

Kant. Aphorisms

52

On Upbringing

I

Education is either physical or ‘practical’. One part of physical education is that which man has in common with animals, namely, feeding and tending. ‘Practical’ or moral training is that which teaches a man how to live as a free being. (We call anything ‘practical’ which has reference to freedom.) This is the education of a personal character, of free being, who is able to maintain himself, and to take his proper place in society, keeping at the same time a proper sense of his own individuality.

II

…for with education is involved the great secret of human nature.

III

Man's duty is to improve himself; to cultivate his mind; and, when he finds himself going astray, to bring the moral law to bear upon problem himself.

IV

One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary, restraint with the child's capability of exercising his freewill.

What may I hope?

53

V

…by [discipline] we must understand that influence which is always restraining our animal nature from get-ting the better of our manhood, either in the individual or in man as a member of society. Discipline, then, is merely restraining unruliness.

VI

One principle of education which those men espe-cially who form educational schemes should keep before their eyes is this — children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man.

VII

One must teach virtue to cherish the common under-standing as much for moral as for logical reasons.

VIII

I cannot make anyone better except by means of the residue of good in him; I may not make anyone more intelligent but by means of the residue of intelligence in him.

Kant. Aphorisms

54

IX

Can anything be more perverse than children who have hardly stepped into this world being instantly taught about the other one?

On Education

I

Since we belong to the animal kingdom and become people only through education, we would see absolutely different people in a short time, if there generally came into practice methods of education, which are wisely drawn out of nature itself and do not slavishly imitate the old habits of earlier and inexperienced ages.

II

He should not teach thoughts but to think; one should not carry but guide the student, if one wants him to go agilely on his own in the future.

What may I hope?

55

On Books

Among the harms wreaked by the flood of books that our part of the world is drowned in yearly, is one that has not the slightest bit of real usefulness and that is seen swimming here and back again over the wide ocean of book-scholarliness and must share the fate of decrepi-tude with the residual chaff.

On Beauty

I

…only he … admits, therefore, of an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in his person, as intelligence, alone admits of the ideal of perfection.

II

Flowers are free beauties of nature.

III

In forming an estimate of objects merely from con-cepts, all representation of beauty goes by the board. There can, therefore, be no rule according to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful.

Kant. Aphorisms

56

IV

The beautiful is what pleases in the mere estimate formed of it (consequently not by intervention of any feeling of sense in accordance with a concept of the un-derstanding).

V

…the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light … does it give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of every one else, whereupon the mind becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility to pleasure.

VI

A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing.

On Art

I

There is no science of the beautiful, but only a cri-tique. Nor, again, is there an elegant science, but only a fine art.

What may I hope?

57

II

…aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one hav-ing for its standard the reflective judgement and not or-ganic sensation.

III

Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature.

IV

Fine art is the art of genius.

On the Sublime

I

The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense.

Kant. Aphorisms

58

II

Intelligence is sublime, wit is beautiful. Boldness is sublime and great, cunning is trifling but beautiful.

III

Eloquence is beautiful, thoughtful silence is sublime.

IV

The rising sun is just as splendid as the setting sun but the sight of the former hits upon beautiful, the latter the tragic and sublime.

WHAT IS MAN?

Kant. Aphorisms

60

What is man?

61

On Respect and Dignity

I

Respect is a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want it or not...

II

Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things.

III

... morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.

IV

... the person who depends on [another] is no longer a human, he has lost this rank, he is nothing except a belonging of another human.

V

If a man estimates his worthiness by others, he tries either to raise himself over others or to diminish the wor-thiness of another. The latter is envy.

Kant. Aphorisms

62

On Character

I

Character consists in readiness to act in accordance with ‘maxims.’

II

A man who tells lies has no character…

III

The first step towards the formation of a good char-acter is to put passions on one side.

IV

Few people will endure their mockery and contempt with a peaceful mind if they are in front of a large crowd even though they know that the people in the crowd are all ignoramuses or fools. The greatest crowd always instils awe, indeed, even the onlooker shivers with fright about the false step of whoever compromises himself in its [the crowd’s] presence although each individual would find little disparaging in the speaker’s disapproval if he were alone with him. But if the great crowd is ab-sent then a steady man can inspect their judgment quite well with complete indifference.

What is man?

63

On Egoism

I

Egoism can contain three kinds of presumption: the presumption of understanding, of taste and of practical interest; that is, it can be logical, aesthetic, or practical.

II

The logical egoist considers it unnecessary to test his judgement also by understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (criterium veritatis externum).

III

The aesthetic egoist is satisfied with his own taste, even if others find his verses, paintings, music, and simi-lar things ever so bad, and criticize or even laugh at them. He deprives himself of progress towards that which is better when he isolates himself with his own judgement, he applauds himself and seeks the touchstone of artistic beauty only in himself.

IV

Finally, moral egoist limits all ends to himself, sees no use in anything except what is useful to himself, and as a eudaemonist puts the supreme determining ground of his will simply in utility and his own happiness, not in the thought of duty.

Kant. Aphorisms

64

V

The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world.

On Temperament

I

A man of melancholy disposition bothers little about the judgement of others, what they reckon good or true; thus he depends in this matter only on his own insight ... Friendship is sublime and thus conforms to his feeling. He can perhaps lose an inconstant friend, but the latter will be reluctant to lose him. Even the memory of an extinguished friendship is still venerated by him… He will not tolerate a base obedience, and his noble breast breathes freedom. All chains – from the gold ones at court to the heavy iron of galley-slaves – fill him with disgust. He is a strict judge of himself and others and is often weary both of both himself and the world.

II

He is resolute. Thus he subjects his feelings to principles.

What is man?

65

III

So the true virtue based on principles has something that seems to accord most with the melancholic disposi-tion in a tempered understanding.

On Cleverness

I

It is already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight to know what one should reasonably ask. For if the question is absurd in itself and demands unnecessary answers, then, besides the embarrassment of the one who proposes it, it also has a disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener into absurd answers, and presenting the ridiculous sight (as the ancients said) of one person milking a billy-goat while the other holds a sieve underneath.

II

I can never convince another except through his own thoughts. I must therefore assume that the other has a good and correct understanding, otherwise it is futile to hope that he will be capable of being won over by my reasons. I cannot even move someone morally except through his own sentiments; consequently, I must as-sume that the other has a certain goodness of the heart…

Kant. Aphorisms

66

On Imagination

We play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but imagination (as fantasy) plays just as frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently.

On Genius

I

Genius is a talent of discovering that which cannot be taught or learned

II

Genius, therefore, flashes like a momentary phe-nomenon, appearing at intervals and then disappearing again; it is not a light that can be kindled at will and kept burning for as long as one pleases, but an explosive flash that a happy impulse of the spirit lures from the produc-tive power of imagination.

What is man?

67

III

Genius also seems to have different original seeds within itself and to develop them differently, according to the difference of national type and the soil where it was born. With the Germans it strikes more in the roots; with the Italians, in the foliage; with the French, in the blossoms; and with the English, in the fruit.

On Craftiness

I

Craftiness, a head for intrigue, is often regarded as great though misused understanding; but it is only the way of thinking of very limited human beings and is very different from prudence, whose appearance it has.

II

Craftiness, cunning, slyness (versutia, astutia) is skill in cheating others. The question now is: whether the cheater must be more clever than the one who is easily cheated, and whether it is the latter who is the stupid one?

Kant. Aphorisms

68

III

That people allow themselves to be taken in by treas-ure seekers, alchemists, and lottery agents is not to be attributed to their stupidity but to their evil will: the de-sire to get rich at others' expense without a proportionate effort of their own.

On Wit

I

He who shows judgement in business is shrewd. If at the same time he has wit, then he is called clever. He who merely affects one of the qualities, the joker as well as the prig, is a disgusting subject.

II

To be witty (in speech or writing) cannot be learned through the mechanism of the school and its constraint, rather it belongs, as a special talent, to the liberality of the temperament in the mutual communication of thoughts...

What is man?

69

III

Wit snatches at sudden inspiration; the power of judgement strives for insight.

IV

Wit goes more for the sauce; the power of judge-ment, for the sustenance.

V

Wit in wordplay is insipid; while needless subtlety... of judgement is pedantic. Humorous wit means one that comes from a mind disposed to paradox...

On Fashion

I

The human being has a natural tendency to compare his behaviour to that of a more important person (the child with adult, the lower-ranking person with those of higher rank) in order to imitate the other person's ways. A law of this imitation, which aims at not appearing lower, especially in cases when no regard to utility is paid, is called fashion.

Kant. Aphorisms

70

II

But it is always better, nevertheless, to be a fool in fashion than a fool out of fashion...

On Love

I

It is quite ridiculous to say you should love other peo-ple, instead one must rather say you have good reason to love the ones near you. This even goes for your enemies.

II

Others’ love of honour is so highly valued because it indicates so much renunciation of other benefits.

What is man?

71

On Women

I

Feminine ways are called weaknesses. One jokes about them; fools ridicule them, but reasonable people see very well that they are just the levers women use for governing men and using them for their own purposes.

II

As concerns scholarly women, they use their books somewhat like their watch, that is, they carry one so that it will be seen that they have one; though it is usually not running or not set by the sun.

On Innocence

There is something splendid about innocence; but what is bad about it, in turn, is that it cannot protect itself very well and is easily seduced.

Kant. Aphorisms

72

On Men and Women

I

The bravery of a woman consists of the patient bear-ing of evil for the sake of honour or love. That of a man in the eagerness to defiantly drive it [evil] away.

II

It is ridiculous that through understanding and large income a man wants to make a woman fall in love with him.

III

A man must depend on no one else so that the wife depends entirely on him.

IV

The man has his own taste, the woman makes herself the object of everyone's taste.

V

A married woman becomes free; a married man loses his freedom.

What is man?

73

VI

Our current constitution makes it so that women can also live without men, which ruins everything.

On Health

I

One can feel healthy (judging by the comfortable feeling of one’s life) but can never know that one is.

II

Recollecting oneself (collectio animi) in order to be ready for every new occupation promotes mental health by restoring the balance between one's powers of soul.

III

The bed is a nest for a whole flock of illnesses.

Kant. Aphorisms

74

On Death

A reason why the idea of death does not have the effect that it could is because as busy creatures by nature we are hardly meant to think about it at all.

On Pleasure and Pain

I

... pain must always precede every enjoyment; pain is always first. For what else but a quick death from joy would follow from a continuous promotion of the vital force, which cannot be raised above a certain degree anyway?

II

Pain is the incentive of activity, and in this, above all, we feel our life; without pain lifelessness would set in.

III

One way of enjoying ourselves is also a way of cul-tivating ourselves; that is, increasing the capacity for having more enjoyment of this kind, and this applies to

What is man?

75

the sciences and the fine arts. However, another way is overindulgence, which makes us increasingly less capa-ble of further enjoyment.

IV

The Arcadian shepherd’s life and our chivalrous life of the court are both in bad taste and unnatural though alluring. For true pleasure cannot take place when it is done out of occupation.

On Being Civilized

... the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by that. And it is also very good that this happens in the world.

Kant. Aphorisms

76

On Man’s Ends

I

What are the ends that are also duties? They are one's own perfection and the happiness of

others.

II

…if there is a final end, which reason must indicate a priori, this end can be nothing other than a human being (every rational being in the world) guided by moral law.

III ... filling our time by means of methodical, progres-

sive occupations that lead to an important and intended end... — is the only sure means of becoming happy with one's life and, at the same time, weary of life.

Notes

77

NOTES

This collection of Kant’s aphorisms was initially compiled

in Russian by Prof. Vladimir Bryushinkin for the edition: I. Kant. Izrecheniya, Kaliningrad, Knizhnoye Izdatel’stvo, 2001. The English translations were collected by Vadim Chaly, those unavailable were translated by Anna Bryushinkina, who also edited the English texts. New English translations were edited by Prof. Robert Howell (State University of New York).

The English translations of Kant’s works are cited accord-

ing to: 1) Cambridge Edition: v1 – Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770. Cambridge:

CUP, 1992. v2 – Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: CUP, 1998. v3 – Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Cambridge: CUP,

2002. v4 – Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: CUP, 1996. v6 – Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: CUP, 1996. v9 – Lectures on Logic. Cambridge: CUP, 1992. v11 – Lectures on Ethics. Cambridge: CUP, 1997. Anth – Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view.

Cambridge: CUP, 2006. They are presented in the notes as follows: СЕ, 1, 34 for

the first volume, etc. 2) The English translation of Kant’s treatise “Bemerkun-

gen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen” Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Translated by Matt Cooley and Patrick Frierson. Whitman College, 2005, located on the web-site: http://people.whitman.edu/~frierspr/kants_bemerkungen1.htm, this translation is referred to as ‘Remarks’.

Kant. Aphorisms

78

3) Some English translations of biographic remarks are cited according to Cassirer E. Kant’s Life and Thought. Trans. by James Haden. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, they are referred to as: Cas, 13.

4) Kant on Education. Boston, 1900. Reference: Educ, 108. 5) The translation of Kant’s aphorisms produced by Anna

Bryushinkina for this edition are referred to as AnnaBryu. 6) CofJ = Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement,

translated with Introduction and Notes by J.H. Bernard (2nd ed. revised) (London: Macmillan, 1914).

7) The excerpts from Kant’s treatise “What is Enlightenment?” are cited in accordance with the translation located on the website: http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html. Refer-ence: Enl.

8) Kant’s treatise “The Conflict of the Faculties” is cited in accordance with the English translation: Kant I. The Con-flict of the Faculties, University of Nebraska Press, 1992. Reference: Conflict, 138.

Page indices by chapters

№ п/п Page Source

ON HIMSELF

I 7 Remarks II 7 Cas, 13. III 7 AnnaBryu IV 8 AnnaBryu V 8 AnnaBryu VI 8 AnnaBryu VII 8 AnnaBryu

ON PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS

I 9 CE, 3, 99 II 9 9, 538

Notes

79

III 10 AnnaBryu IV 10 CE, 9, 539 V 10 CE, 1, 255 VI 10 CE, 4, 338 VII 11 CE, 3, 114 VIII 11 CE, 9, 538 IX 11 CE, 4, 158

ON KÖNIGSBERG

12 CE, Anth, 4

ON REASON AND UNDERSTANDING I 15 CE, 2, 152 II 15 CE, 2, 193 III 15 CE, 2, 387 IV 15 AnnaBryu V 16 CE, 2, 195—196 VI 16 CE, 3, 112 VII 16 CE, 3, 109 VIII 16 CE, Anthr., 90

ON TRUTH AND DELUSION

I 17 CE, 3, 197 II 17 CE, 3, 384 III 17 CE, 3, 385 IV 18 CE, 3, 355 V 18 Remarks

ON NATURE

I 18 CE, 9, 527 II 19 CE, 3, 466 III 19 CE, 4, 114 IV 19 AnnaBryu

ON THINGS IN THEMSELVES

I 19—20 CE, 3, 185 II 20 CE, 4, 82 III 20 CE, 4, 107—108

Kant. Aphorisms

80

ON COGNITION AND EXPERIENCE I 21 CE, 3, 106 II 21 CE, 3, 137 III 21 CE, 3, 140 IV 21 CE, 3, 111 V 21 CE, 3, 633 VI 22 CE, 3, 622

ON KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH

I 22 CE, 3, 355 II 22 CE, 3, 686 III 22 CE, 3, 686 IV 23 CE, 3, 117

ON SCIENCE

I 23 CE, 3, 183 II 23 CE, 3, 692 III 23 CE, 3, 119 IV 24 CE, 3, 107 V 24 CE, Anth., 231 VI 24 Remarks

ON DUTY

I 27 CE, 4, 209 II 27 CE, 4, 55 III 27 CE, 4, 211

ON MORALS

I 28 CE, 4, 338 II 28 CE, 4, 244 III 28 Remarks IV 28 Remarks

ON THE MORAL LAW I 29 CE, 4, 269 II 29 Educ., 108

Notes

81

III 29 CE, 4, 73 IV 29 CE, 4, 56 V 30 CE, 4, 80 VI 30 CE, 4, 210 VII 30 CE, 4, 243 VIII 30 CE, 4, 244

ON WILL

I 31 CE, 4, 49 II 31 CE, 4, 78 III 31 CE, 4, 50

ON FREEDOM

I 32 Remarks II 32 CE, 4, 268 III 32—33 CE, Anth., 17

ON VIRTUE

I 33 CE, 4, 62 II 33 CE, 4, 77 III 33 AA, VI, 405/ 4(2), 390/ IV 34 Remarks V 34 Remarks VI 34 CE, Anth., 44

ON BENEVOLENCE

I 34 CE, 4, 574 II 35 CE, 4, 573 III 35 CE, 4, 558

ON EVIL I 35 AnnaBryu II 35 Educ, 15 III 36 Remarks

Kant. Aphorisms

82

ON HAPPINESS I 36 CE, 4, 240 II 36 CE, Anth., 168 III 36 CE, 4, 54 IV 36 CE, 4, 71 V 37 CE, 3, 383 VI 37 Remarks VII 37 Remarks

ON THE TRUTH AND LIE

I 38 CE, 4, 613 II 38 AnnaBryu III 38 CE, 4, 612 IV 38 CE, 4, 552—553 V 39 Educ, 102 VI 39 Remarks

ON STATE

I 39 CE, 4, 318 II 39 CE, 4, 335 III 40 CE, 4, 335 IV 40 Remarks V 40 Remarks

ON POLITICS AND POLITICIANS

I 41 CE, 4, 340 II 41 CE, 4, 338 III 41 Remarks

ON RIGHT I 42 CE, 4, 387 II 42 CE, 4, 388 III 42 CE, 4, 290

ON RELIGION

I 45 Educ, 111 II 45 CE, 6, 160 III 45 CE, 6, 177

Notes

83

IV 45 CE, 4, 564 V 45 CE, 6, 140 VI 46 CE, 6, 190

ON GOD

I 46 CE, 6, 166 II 46 CE, 6, 193

ON HISTORY

I 47 AnnaBryu II 47 http://www. litera. co. uk/t/NDA5Mg III 47—48 CE, 4, 306

ON WAR AND PEACE

I 48 CE, 4, 320 II 48 CE, 4, 327 III 49 CE, 4, 327 IV 49 CE, 4, 344—345

ON REVOLUTION

I 50 Enl. II 50 CE, 4, 465 III 50 CE, 4, 465

ON ENLIGHTENMENT I 51 Enl. II 51 Enl. III 51 Enl.

ON UPBRINGING

I 52 Educ, 30 II 52 Educ, 7 III 52 Educ, 11 IV 52 Educ, 27 V 53 Educ, 18 VI 53 Educ, 14 VII 53 Remarks VIII 53 AnnaBryu IX 54 AnnaBryu

Kant. Aphorisms

84

ON EDUCATION I 54 AnnaBryu II 54 AnnaBryu

ON BOOKS

55 Remarks

ON BEAUTY I 55 CofJ §1 II 55 CofJ, §15 III 55 CofJ §8 IV 56 CofJ, § 29 V 56 CofJ §59 VI 56 CofJ §48

ON ART

I 56 CofJ, §44 II 57 CofJ §44 III 57 CofJ §45 IV 57 CofJ §46

ON THE SUBLIME

I 57 CofJ §25 II 58 AnnaBryu III 58 AnnaBryu IV 58 Remarks

ON RESPECT AND DIGNITY

I 61 CE, 4, 202 II 61 CE, 4, 202 III 61 CE, 4, 84 IV 61 Remarks V 61 AnnaBryu

ON CHARACTER

I 62 Educ, 84 II 62 Educ, 98 III 62 Educ, 96—97 IV 62 Remarks

Notes

85

ON EGOISM I 63 CE, Anth., 16 II 63 CE, Anth., 17 III 63 CE, Anth., 17 IV 63 CE, Anth., 18 V 64 CE, Anth., 18

ON TEMPERAMENT

I 64 AnnaBryu II 64 AnnaBryu III 65 AnnaBryu

ON CLEVERNESS I 65 CE, 3, 197 II 65 Remarks

ON IMAGINATION

66 CE, Anth., 68

ON GENIUS I 66 CE, Anth., 220 II 66 CE, Anth., 220 III 67 CE, Anth., 122

ON CRAFTINESS

I 67 CE, Anth., 92 II 67 CE, Anth., 99—100 III 68 CE, Anth., 99

ON WIT

I 68 CE, Anth., 99 II 68 CE, Anth.,115 III 69 CE, Anth.,116 IV 69 CE, Anth.,116 V 69 CE, Anth.,117

ON FASHION

I 69 CE, Anth., 142 II 70 CE, Anth., 143

Kant. Aphorisms

86

ON LOVE I 70 Remarks II 70 Remarks

ON WOMEN

I 71 CE, Anth., 205 II 71 CE, Anth., 209

ON INNOCENCE

71 CE, 4, 59

ON MEN AND WOMEN I 72 Remarks II 72 Remarks III 72 Remarks IV 72 CE, 4, 209 V 72 CE, 4, 209 VI 73 Remarks

ON HEALTH

I 73 AnnaBryu II 73 CE, Anth., 101 III 73 Conflict, 183.

ON DEATH

74 Remarks

ON PLEASURE AND PAIN I 74 CE, Anth., 126 II 74 CE, Anth., 126 III 74—75 CE, Anth., 132 IV 75 Remarks

ON BEING CIVILIZED

75 CE, Anth., 42

ON MAN’S ENDS I 76 CE, 4, 517 II 76 AnnaBryu III 76 CE, Anth., 130

[

Notes

87

CONTENTS

To the Reader ........................................................................3

Personality and Philosophy On Himself............................................................................7 On Philosophy and Philosophers...........................................9 On Königsberg ......................................................................12

What can I know? On Reason and Understanding..............................................15 On Truth and Delusion..........................................................17 On Nature..............................................................................18 On Things in Themselves......................................................19 On Cognition and Experience ...............................................21 On Knowledge and Faith ......................................................22 On Science ............................................................................23

What ought I to do? On Duty.................................................................................27 On Morals .............................................................................28 On the Moral Law .................................................................29 On Will..................................................................................31 On Freedom...........................................................................32 On Virtue ..............................................................................33 On Benevolence ....................................................................34 On Evil ..................................................................................35 On Happiness ........................................................................36 On the Truth and Lie .............................................................38 On State.................................................................................39 On Politics and Politicians ....................................................41 On Right................................................................................42

What may I Hope? On Religion ...........................................................................45 On God..................................................................................46

Kant. Aphorisms

88

On History.............................................................................47 On War and Peace.................................................................48 On Revolution .......................................................................50 On Enlightenment .................................................................51 On Upbringing ......................................................................52 On Education.........................................................................54 On Books ..............................................................................55 On Beauty .............................................................................55 On Art ...................................................................................56 On the Sublime......................................................................57

What is Man? On Respect and Dignity ........................................................61 On Character .........................................................................62 On Egoism ............................................................................63 On Temperament...................................................................64 On Cleverness .......................................................................65 On Imagination .....................................................................66 On Genius .............................................................................66 On Craftiness.........................................................................67 On Wit...................................................................................68 On Fashion ............................................................................69 On Love ................................................................................70 On Women ............................................................................71 On Innocence ........................................................................71 On Men and Women .............................................................72 On Health ..............................................................................73 On Death ...............................................................................74 On Pleasure and Pain ............................................................74 On Being Civilized................................................................75 On Man’s Ends......................................................................76

Notes .....................................................................................77

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