zizek unbehagen in der kultur

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Field Note

Unbehagen and the subject: An interviewwith Slavoj Zizek

Slavoj Zizeka, Maria Aristodemoub, Stephen Froshc andDerek Hookd,*aThe Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, Birkbeck, University of London,Malet Street, London WC1E7HX, UK.

bSchool of Law Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street,London WC1E7HX, UK.

cDepartment of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck College, Malet Street,London WC1E7HX, UK.

dSocial Psychology, London School of Economics, Houghton Street,WC2A 2AE, London, UK.

*Corresponding author.

Abstract This article is an edited transcript of an interview with Slavoj Zizekconducted by Stephen Frosh and Maria Aristodemou at the Birkbeck Institute for the

Humanities on the 18 June 2008. The focus of the interview was Slavoj Z

izeksengagement with psychoanalysis.Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2010) 15, 418428. doi:10.1057/pcs.2010.22

Keywords: Lacanian subject; primordial father; paternal authority; Unbehagen in derKultur

Stephen Frosh: The focus of todays conversation is psychoanalysis. Slavojsencounter with psychoanalysis has been far ranging since the beginning of

his writing. It has encouraged a burgeoning interest in the application of

Lacanian thinking to the political and cultural spheres. One of the things we

might talk about later on is the effect of the Zizekification of Lacan, that is,

the issue of reading Lacan outside of Zizek.

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Slavoj Zizek: Let me be critical towards Lacan. When you told me earlier

that not only am I focusing too much on Lacan within the broader realm

of psychoanalysis and that I exert too much influence in that people read

Lacan through my, probably narrow, perspective, it is true. But there is at

least one thing that I always try to do, to render palpable the openness not inany positive nondogmatic sense to put it in very simple terms, to show

how Lacan is totally unsure and, in an ironic way, cheats, changes his

position radically. For example, I discovered a new excellent source to Lacan,

Francois Balmess What Lacan Says about Being. It is a wonderful analysis

of how, when Lacan refers to the topic of being, basically to Heidegger,

he radically changes his position. It proves how, in the 1950s, Lacan was

flirting with Heideggers critique of subjectivity. Then, at a certain point, in

the early 1970s, Lacan made the choice for Descartes against Heidegger

and triumphantly returned to the cogito. He offers a nice reading of how

Lacan played all possible variations. He started with this standard rereadingof Descartes: I am not where I think. Then what he did in Seminar XI

(The Four Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis), already more intelligent, he

turns it around. The site of truth is not being but thought: I do not think

where I am. The unconscious is the thought without being, not being itself.

Then in his final position in the 66-67 Seminar on the Logic of Fantasy,

unfortunately not yet published, he returns to the cogito as unity of being

and thought, but the idea a very nice one is that it is neither being nor

thought. It is that the Cartesian cogito, this cogito ergo sum, is reduced to pure

thought, which is void, nonthought just I think I am nothing, no content, and

at the same time the being of cogito is void.

Lacan, of course, agrees with Heidegger that language is the house of being,

but, you know, Fred Jamesons book The Prison-House of Language for Lacan

should be Torture-House of Language. That is to say, Heidegger still has this

trust, not passivity, Open yourself to language, Language speaks through you.

But Lacans idea is that, at the most elementary, when language speaks to you,

you are tortured; there is radical discordance. Thats the beauty of Lacan. This is

why Lacan keeps the term subject. Subject is for Lacan precisely that x which

is the outcome of this torture.

This idea came to me. I started to appreciate the writer Elfriede Jelinek. She

had a wonderful, very Lacanian, phrase: we must torture language to make it

tell the truth. That is the big topic of her work, language as torturing. Hegel hasa wonderful passage in his Philosophy of History where he says that

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War is the game for humanity of

the real war. This is a totally crazy Hegelian idealist idea: that thousands had to

die, a war was fought, so a guy could write a book. I am tempted, in the same

tasteless way, to say that things like Josef Fritzl have to happen, so that Jelinek

can write.

An interview with Slavoj Zizek

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Pere-version

SZ: Here we can see how Freud was not an idiot. Freuds idea of the primordial

father is, of course, a stupidity if you read it as a literal anthropological hypothesis

but not if you read it as a fantasmatic feature that has what Freud calledpsychological reality. We have a symbolic father, that is, an authority, and a

castrated father, but these always have to be accompanied by this primordial

aspect, which can act in different versions. It can be a fantasy that determines your

dreams. Do you know Freuds dream of Irmas injection? Beneath it is this fantasy.

Freud hints somewhere that the fantasy is that Irma and the other three women are

all basically his daughters, that I will have them. This is one proof that Freud

really knew what he was doing. Isnt this a wonderful example of how Lacan was

right when he used the term pere-version, perversion as fathers version? We

should be very precise here. Did you notice how sociologists, to get rid of this

trauma How could this Fritzl happen? tried to relativize it by saying that itmust have something to do with Austrian oppression, Austrian Nazism.

No, it is too easy to relativize it in this way. There is something in the very

identity of being a father that points in this direction. I remember once when my

father was still alive I talked about changing my name. My father exploded

and started to shout at me, What are you saying? Dont you know that by

giving you my name I have given you everything? Dont you know that you owe

everything to me? This idea, that he totally owns mey I was shocked how, in a

respectable, normal father, this dimension exploded.

If we are looking for the Austrian feature of this Fritzl, we should look

elsewhere. Did you see one of the greatest films of all time, The Sound of Music?

They are one happy family. If you look at it, that fantasy, Fritzl is von Trapp

realized. It is the same dream, another psychotic element.

Maria Aristodemou: It is the same in Psycho, with the primordial id in the

basement.

SZ: In Austria they published a text of mine on the Fritzl case, but they

changed the title. My title was The Basements are Alive with the Sound of

Music. At this level, we can see where psychoanalysis is of use today. For me, the

Fritzl case is a clear example of how Freudian categories are operative in notions

like the primordial father, like two levels of paternal authority. The way I read

the Fritzl arrangement is architecturally; it is a kind of pure realization, thenormal, the ideal of the family and then the basement, the y

MA: The id.

SZ: It is literally realized. What interests me is how another Fritzl, the Fritzl of

the entire country, in Romania, proposed the same thing. The main river in

Bucharest (all the garbage goes into it) is dirty. Ceausescu wanted to build

beneath the river, which goes through the city, another river as a channel, so that

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underneath there would be all the dirt, and the upper level would be clean for

people to enjoy. This was a kind of Fritzl architecture for the entire country.

We have a long tradition of this purely architectural disposition. What about

Fritz Langs Metropolis? This for me is a nice example of how something Freud

was describing has literally appeared. Its too easy to dismiss this as Austrian. Itis also too easy to just say paternal authority as such. The thing to do would

have been to ask what would have been the Fritzl phenomenon in each country.

Each country has its own Fritzl. For example, the American Fritzl might be seen

in y a literary figure. The idea of the early big, brutal capitalists from the

nineteenth century was that they raped their daughters. Remember, for example,

Fitzgeralds Tender is the Night. Even Henry Jamess The Golden Bowl can be

implicitly read this way. So the point is to look at equivalents of Fritzl.

A feminist journalist friend of mine made the following criticism of me. She said,

OK, I agree with you about the decline of paternal authority, but you dont provide

a positive alternative; all you provide is a negative vision, some kind of pervertednarcissistic personality, we are go-getting, half-psychotic and so on. But, she

claimed, am I not aware that in Italy and some European countries the paternal

decline is counteracted, supplemented, by the new role of the mother? This has

nothing to do with the old patriarchal figure of the mother but is a totally new role

of the mother, who holds together, not the family, but the unit with children. She

even used the term Name of the Mother, claiming that a new entity is emerging.

Now my point is that this is nice if it is true, but to avoid misunderstanding, she is

not a Luce Irigarary follower my impression was that unfortunately, nice as such

corroborating texts are (and they are undoubtedly true and I totally support such

phenomena), this was just a kind of educational description of a phenomenon, of

mother takes care of children. It doesnt answer the same question.

For Freud father is not only the father who takes care of the family. It has a

very precise structural place in how subjectivity is constituted. What I resist is

some conservative leftists, especially in France Adorno is close to this who

nonetheless think there was a good thing about traditional family that gets lost

in todays cheap commercial society. They implicitly claim there is, underlying

the mainstream Frankfurt School, a very strong antifeminist tendency that the

totalitarian family is either feminine or homosexual. There are some very

embarrassing remarks, incidentally, by Adorno here. I do buy the idea that the

decline of paternal law means superego fear, but I dont agree that this superego

is a feminine superego. It is a very fashionable idea in conservative leftists, thebest known example is Christopher Laschs The Culture of Narcissism. They try

to put the blame on the woman.

Freud and Social Change

MA: All right, so if women will not make up for the lack in paternal

authority, which you associate with the superego injunction to enjoy, then how




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does psychoanalysis help? You say that psychoanalysis is the only discourse that

allows us notto enjoy, the only space where we dont have a duty to be happy.

So how do you see psychoanalysis as rescuing us from the impasse of

modernity?

SZ: This is a very complex question. I try to be absolutely honest. I try not topromise what I cannot deliver. If beneath what you are asking me now is the big

question, where does Freud really stand with regard to politics, I think the

answer is pretty clear if you really look. I think Freuds position was, to put it

very simply, that psychoanalysis allows us, when you analyse a society, to

formulate, to articulate Unbehagen in der Kultur literally, the uneasiness in

culture, but more famously translated as Civilization and Its Discontents. It

does this basic symptomal job of showing how the failures, the pathological

malfunctions, are symptomatic of the whole. I think that, for a true Freudian,

it is totally wrong to distinguish the proper domain where you can use psycho-

analysis. For the true Freudian it is not that Freud did his true job in his clinicalanalysis but then got a little bit crazy when he was writing Totem and Taboo

and Unbehagen in der Kultur. No, because the whole point ofUnbehagen in der

Kultur is that these pathological phenomena are conditioned by the truth. They

are the symptom, the result of what is wrong in the entire social body as such. In

this sense, the two sides are necessarily connected. What is totally alien to Freud

is this purely clinical idea that there is the normal functioning of society, then

somebody doesnt work, then the psychoanalyst would have been like the

psychological mechanic, the repairman who will set me straight.

I think that Freud, to put it in fashionable terms, isolates a certain excess. He

calls it death drive, a certain excess of destructability that is, as it were,

undermining, destabilizing the social order, an excess that is ambiguous in

the sense that it can be a source of constructive energy or it can be purely

destructive. The idea is that Freud isolates this space of excess, which then, of

course, opens up the space for possible change. I think Freuds basic answer would

have been: psychoanalysis just does this elementary job of showing how there is a

gap, a failure, a nonfunctioning excess in society. But then, about what to do, he

leaves it open. We cannot jump from here directly to positive programs. This then

opens up all possible versions. You can have a conservative Freudian answer: the

whole point is to control this threat. You can have a Reichian, nave, Leftist answer:

what is a threat is only a threat from the ruling perspective and we should identify

ourselves with it. And you can have a liberal, middle-of-the-way game.

SF: The distinction you just made parallels a very old distinction that

conservative theorists like Philip Reiff made y the idea that psychoanalysis

remains true as long as it restricts itself to the analysis of individual and social

issues. But as soon as you start to fill that gap you get into a kind of ecstatic

state Reiff references Reich on this in which you are promoting certain kinds

of solutions that always turn out to be y

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SZ: Now we are coming to my point y What I was saying is that I dont

accept this conclusion.

SF: What positivity would you put in there? As you move past the stage of

using psychoanalysis to analyze ailments and instead use it to prescribe cures,what would you put in there?

SZ: I think the only consequent Freudian answer must be radical social

change. Freud points in this way. It is crucial that Freud was very well aware of

the proper dialectic tension between theory and practice. In what sense? In the

sense that psychoanalytic theory is not only a theory of practice, but a theory of

why the practice ultimately fails, has to fail. Or, as Freud put it, The only

society in which psychoanalysis would have been really possible, as successful,

is a society which wouldnt need psychoanalysis. So the theory is not only a

theory of practice, it is also a theory of why practice ultimately fails, and this

theory is of Unbehagen in der Kultur.If there is a conclusion from Freud, it is that of a move towards the social

domain. Now, it is all open as to what to do at this level. But clearly the problem is

there for Freud. Freud, I think, was a little like Lacan: uncertain, jumping here and

there. For example, between 1905 and 1915 Freud had a certain sexual liberation

where he thought we just need to give more freedom and so on. My favourite Freud

is it is very uncanny in his letter to Einstein where Freud I love him there

proposed a very weird formula (which people are almost embarrassed to refer to

today) about the brutal dictatorship of reason. My point is that I dont think you

would get an entire social programme from psychoanalysis. What you can get is

just this indication of how the key to the problem is social/symbolic global

organization itself, so that change has to be at that level.

The Position and Role of the Psychoanalytic Critic

MA: You talk about language as torture, and yet you never stop talking. Its like

you have this undead drive to keep talking. Despite the fact that not everything

can be said, you keep adding more and more words, as if adding more signifiers

might enable you to say everything. At the same time, in your published work

you seek answers for what to do with ones symptom. On one hand, you enjoin

us to enjoy our symptom, but you also say that for a true hero the real ethicaltask is to renounce that kernel of enjoyment, to renounce the symptom. So,

should we renounce our symptom and traverse it, or should we hang on to it

and enjoy it?

SZ: First, I dont find any difficulty combining this, my incessant drive to

speak, to this idea of torture in language. We struggle with language. All the

great writers do this. Can we imagine I dont like him a greater torture of

language than Joyces Finnegans Wake? As to the final question, this is again a




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very difficult problem. Already in Freud, in Lacan, it is interesting how you find

totally different answers. Is it traversing the fantasy? Is it that you identify with the

symptom, and so on and so on? All these formulas are for me basically

problematic. More and more if you ask me I am maybe under the influence of

Badiou, I am doing something that will alienate me from some Lacanians I amconvinced that I am asking the wrong question here in the sense that what if

this ultimate dimension of authenticity, to put it very naively, cannot be

formulated? Maybe it is wrong to look at it from the level of psychoanalysis.

Until recently, the ultimate horizon for me was that of traversing the fantasy. The

question was, can we do it in politics? Jacques-Alain Miller implies here I disagree

with him, for Miller is now openly turning into a liberal, a kind of sceptical, ironic

liberal that politics y the public domain, collective domain, is the domain of

imaginary, symbolic identifications, illusions and so on. It is the domain of a lie.

Being authentic can occur only when you focus on your singularity, break with it,

and so on. So that all you can do, then, isy

you return to social life, but knowingthat its only an illusory game. Thats what I try to avoid.

MA: I wonder if you would accept this as a description of what you have been

doing: to begin with there was an emphasis on how to enjoy our hysteria, our

neuroses, but now more and more in your recent books you enjoin us to be

heroes. The notion of the hero that you and Badiou seem to return to is not one

that psychoanalysis is very familiar with. In your In Defence of Lost Causes you

even speak of heroic acts.

SZ: People who criticize me for this heroic act, perhaps Yannis Stavrakakis,

have noticed something strange, an interesting observation. They are right.

All the acts I really refer to as acts are not what you would have expected. For

example, from cinema, remember Atom Egoyans The Sweet Hereafter, in which

the girl who lies does so to sabotage, to win her case. They are very strange acts.

My act is from Toni Morrisons Beloved: a mother killing her children; a girl

telling a lie. Not exactly heroic acts. What I am saying I claim that Lacan,

towards the end, was approaching this when he struggled with the problems

of political organization is that when we have community, collective, what I

call public space, a certain collectivity is established. To put it in very simplistic,

Lacanian terms, the field is not organized through a master-signifier, we just

relate directly to object a, object a as the cause. I naively believe there are, in

things like theoretical communities todayother collectives, where I do get somekind of authentic collectivity. This is my wager.

I think Lacan was struggling with this. He ridiculously failed, of course, but

the struggle was the right one. You know all this: ridiculous rules, the Leninist

topic of how to organize a psychoanalytic society, and the like. This was his late

Leninist obsession: how to build a collective that would not be based on a lie, on

primordial crime and all that Freudian stuff. This is what interests me, the idea

of a religious collective as a collective that, paradoxically, doesnt need this big

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Other. I think the only thing I can tell you is that these things happen, you do get

collectives like that.

SF: I found myself today wishing I were sitting behind you, to be the absent

interlocutor in a way, the one who listens. We are used to thinking about theteacher as the one who attracts transferences and hence has the place of the analyst.

But, in fact, like Lacan and like the way you speak, what happens

to the speaker, the intellectual, is that he speaks and has no idea what response

he is going to get from the audience. So, from a structural point of view, the speaker

is in the position of a patient, who speaks and doesnt know how what he says is

going to be heard. A simple question: what is the role of the intellectual if all the

intellectual can do is speak and not know how he or she is going to be heard?

SZ: If there were a difference that we have to accept from this classical

Marxist tradition of organic intellectuals, it is this: you are throwing bottles

with messages into the sea and you dont know who, if anyone, will read them.We theoreticians today have to accept this.

SF: If there were an analyst there, what should his or her response be?

SZ: Thats a nice question. I think that y there should be someone taking

this role of the analyst. Thats why I like your question. Lacan himself defined

his own position in his Seminars, not writings, like this: it is not that he is

analysing the public; the public is his audience, his big Other, and he literally

improvises there. That is maybe the key to Lacans inconsistency, that it really

is almost the analysands, the patients, improvisations, with all the paradoxes

that go with psychoanalysis. Freud describes how, when you retell your dream

and at the end you add theres just another detail, which is probably not

important, thats the crucial part. It is literally true of Lacan. If you look at

what he says about repetition in Seminar XI, its blah-blah, OK its good;

but then, in the first chapter of the next section of Seminar XI, the section

on the gaze as object a, it is only there that he gives the formula of repetition.

With Freud it is often the same. The best part for me, the key to the entire

Traumdeutung (Interpretation of Dreams) is one footnote towards the end of the

chapter on the work of dreams, where he proposes the famous, almost Marxist,

distinction that the crucial dimension of dreams is the form itself, not the content.

This is why, for Lacan, hysteria is not a dismissive term. Hysterical discourse is theonly productive one. New truth emerges there. Its great to be an analyst, but the

analyst is the stupid guy; analysis is basically what Lacan was doing. What Lacan

was doing its not a joke, I spoke with patients of Lacan who experienced this

three main activities of Lacan during analysis were having cakes and tea, counting

money, and interrupting with stupid questions. So the analyst is not productive.

The analyst is a purely formal function; all the productivity, all the truth is with the

hysteric. Hysteria is the place where something new emerges.




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MA: Hysterics are hysterical about the truth, and we are some of the people

who are able to resist ideological interpellation.

SZ: I have a problem here. I am for obsessional neurotics! Hysterics provoke,

master commands, analyst sits down and does nothing, we obsessionals do all

the work!

Questions from the Floor

Political implications of Lacans Seminar VII (The ethics of psychoanalysis)

Derek Hook: Seminar VII, is this the seminar where we see the best and worst

of Lacan? Towards the second half of the seminar there seems to be a kind of

political resignation, a fatalism of needing to accept ones position.

SZ: I totally agree with you because it is masked as radicality, and you knowin what sense? It is a celebration of Antigone breaking out. Its even true (maybe

you know it; its a nice pathetic detail) that, while Lacan was doing this seminar,

the daughter of his wife and Georges Bataille was in prison for aiding the

Algerian independence struggle. He was bringing her drafts of his seminar that

he was delivering OK, lets leave aside the problem how this is arrogant,

narcissistic of him. The point is that his fixation with Antigone had a certain

radical political dimension to it. Which is why, incidentally, Yannis Stavrakakis,

in his book The Lacanian Left with all my respect for him, I dont think he

is right when he reads Antigone, to cut a long story short, as politically useless,

a totally private suicidal gesture and so on. Stavrakakis mentions, as an evenmore crazy example, Oedipus at Colonus. My God, all the final part is pure

politics, how he will sell his death, his body as a political founding act. So I find

this very strange, how he can read Antigone and Oedipus at Colonus as some

kind of private suicidal, self-obliteration and so on.

So I totally agree with you about Seminar VII . Beneath this mask of flirting

with radicality it is basically this conservative vision, you know, we have these

moments of self-obliterating encounters with truth, but then we return to

normal life, servicing the good, and so on, and this vision, which is also todays

predominant reactionary vision of May 68 y

Stephen Frosh: But thats also the seminar with das Ding, which you use somuch.

Slavoj Zizek: I think the danger with this seminar is two things. First, it is still

at the level of this transgressive passion of the Real. I think that this is the

seminar that is closest to Bataille. No wonder there are so many parallels

between this seminar and Bataille. I dont think this is Lacans last word. There

is a hint in this direction. We all quote, even me, as Lacans motto Do not

compromise with regard to your desire. Jean-Claude Milner made a nice

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observation here: everyone refers to this formula, but people forget that

whenever Lacan uses certain formulas they are usually part of his doxa; he

returns to them, reinterpreting them. But it is only one or two times in the last

chapter that he mentions this Do not compromise your desire; he never returns

to it. And the reason is because it is not the true formula; he dropped it,basically. I think that it is absolutely crucial to read Antigone together with the

next seminar, Seminar VIII, Transference, where you get Sygne de Coufontaine,

Claudels character in his Coufontaine-trilogy. Alenka Zupancic developed it

already nicely in her Kant with Lacan book. Antigone is still a hero, there is

narcissistic pleasure in self-sacrifice, there is a glorious spectacle, and so on.

Alenka Zupancic focuses on this, how the moment she enters this domain, Ate,

between the two deaths, she is an aesthetic object. You cannot say this for Sygne

de Coufontaine; it is a much more radical, tragical position.

The whole point of the last chapter of Seminar VII is to define an ethics

of desire, which would have been an ethics of pure desire for Lacan, Antigonesle desir pur (pure desire). I think it is absolutely clear that, in the final chapter

ofSeminar XI, when Lacan emphasizes Le desir de lanalyste nest pas le desire.

[The desire of the analyst is not the pure desire], the target is himself, earlier. I

think it is a totally impossible position, the position of pure desire, where, as it

were, the symbolic falls into the real, a kind of radical desire of a pure signifier.

A Law of the Mother?

Lisa Baraitser: The issue about the law of the mother y I agree that it is

probably pretty hopeless to build a law of the mother based on maternal

practice compared to paternal practice and what people actually do with their

children. If there was a way to articulate theoretically, in an adequate sense, a

law of the mother, does it matter anymore, might there be a difference between

maternal and paternal law y?

SZ: Thats a good question. My reproach is not that women cannot be the

law y Paternal law for Lacan is not just that father has the authority.

It involves a very specific inter-relation of desires, of prohibitions and so on.

I would just like to get a precise description of how this would function in the

mothers case. Is it basically the same structure that mother takes over, or is it

different? How does identification work here identification in the sense of the

formation of the subject? The trick is that we silently presuppose what we aretrying to prove. What do I mean by this? I will give you an example: Judith

Butler. You remember that she claims that sexual difference is constructed, but,

wait a minute, in what I think is her best book, The Psychic Life of Power,

she has this theory that the primordial object of passionate attachment is of

the same sex. She literally applies the Freudian lesson that identification is

identification with a lost object, in the sense that you become your lost object,

you become what you have to renounce. Ok, so, in other words, you become a




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woman by abandoning the woman as object and so on. Of course, her idea is

that homosexuals retain a fidelity, a melancholic fidelity. OK, no problem.

The problem is that if, according to her and I asked her this once and didnt

get a clear answer if sexual difference is later constructed, then how is it that

you can choose the same sex? If you choose the same sex, then at that level youmust already have some experience of the different sexes. Its a little bit too

circular for me.

About the Authors

Slavoj Zizek (interviewee) is a Slovenian Marxist philosopher and cultural critic

who is the author of over forty books and the subject of two major films: The

Perverts Guide to Cinema and Zizek! He is currently the international director

of the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at Birkbeck College at the

University of London.

Maria Aristodemou (interviewer) is a senior lecturer in Law at Birkbeck

College, London.

Stephen Frosh (interviewer) is a Professor of Psychology and Pro-Vice-Master,

Department of Psychosocial Studies, School of Social Sciences, History and

Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London.

Derek Hook (transcriber and editor) is a lecturer in Social Psychology at The

London School of Economics and a visiting associate professor in psychology atthe University of the Witwatersand.

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zizek unbehagen in der kultur

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