The National Interest—Winter 2003/04 5

FOR THE next several decades,the most volatile and dangerousregion of the world—with the

explosive potential to plunge the worldinto chaos—will be the crucial swathe ofEurasia between Europe and the Far East.Heavily inhabited by Muslims, we mightterm this crucial subregion of Eurasia thenew “Global Balkans.”1 It is here thatAmerica could slide into a collision withthe world of Islam while American-European policy differences could evencause the Atlantic Alliance to comeunhinged. The two eventualities togethercould then put the prevailing Americanglobal hegemony at risk.

At the outset, it is essential to recog-nize that the ferment within the Muslimworld must be viewed primarily in aregional rather than a global perspective,and through a geopolitical rather than atheological prism. The world of Islam isdisunited, both politically and religiously.It is politically unstable and militarilyweak, and likely to remain so for sometime. Hostility toward the United States,while pervasive in some Muslim countries,originates more from specific political

grievances—such as Iranian nationalistresentment over the U.S. backing of theShah, Arab animus stimulated by U.S. sup-port for Israel or Pakistani feelings that theUnited States has been partial to India—than from a generalized religious bias.

The complexity of the challengeAmerica now confronts dwarfs what itfaced half a century ago in WesternEurope. At that time, Europe’s dividingline on the Elbe River was the strategicallycritical frontline of maximum danger, withthe daily possibility that a clash in Berlincould unleash a nuclear war with theSoviet Union. Nevertheless, the UnitedStates recognized the stakes involved andcommitted itself to the defense, pacifica-tion, reconstruction and revitalization of aviable European community. In doing so,America gained natural allies with sharedvalues. Following the end of the ColdWar, the United States led the transfor-mation of NATO from a defense alliance

Hegemonic QuicksandZbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski is former national security advi-sor to the president. This article is excerptedfrom his forthcoming book, The Choice: GlobalDomination or Global Leadership © 2004, to bepublished this March by Basic Books, a memberof the Perseus Books Group. All rights reserved.

1This phrase is meant to draw attention to thegeopolitical similarity between the traditionalEuropean Balkans of the 19th and 20th centuriesand the unstable region that currently extendsfrom approximately the Suez Canal to Xinjiang,and from the Russo-Kazakh border to southernAfghanistan—almost like a triangle on the map.In the case of both areas, internal instability hasserved as a magnet for external major powerintervention and rivalry. (For fuller discussion,see Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, chapter 5.)

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into an enlarging security alliance—gain-ing an enthusiastic new ally, Poland—andit has supported the expansion of theEuropean Union (EU).

For at least a generation, the majortask facing the United States in the effortto promote global security will be thepacification and then the cooperativeorganization of a region that contains theworld’s greatest concentration of politicalinjustice, social deprivation, demographiccongestion and potential for high-intensi-ty violence. But the region also containsmost of the world’s oil and natural gas. In2002, the area designated as the GlobalBalkans contained 68 percent of theworld’s proven oil reserves and 41 percentof the world’s proven natural gas reserves;it accounted for 32 percent of world oilproduction and 15 percent of world nat-ural gas production. In 2020, the area isprojected to produce roughly 42 millionbarrels of oil per day—39 percent of theglobal production total (107.8 millionbarrels per day). Three key regions—Europe, the United States and the FarEast—collectively are projected to con-sume 60 percent of that global production(16 percent, 25 percent and 19 percent,respectively).

The combination of oil and volatilitygives the United States no choice.America faces an awesome challenge inhelping to sustain some degree of stabilityamong precarious states inhabited byincreasingly politically restless, sociallyaroused and religiously inflamed peoples.It must undertake an even more dauntingenterprise than it did in Europe morethan half a century ago, given a terrainthat is culturally alien, politically turbu-lent and ethnically complex.

In the past, this remote region couldhave been left to its own devices. Untilthe middle of the last century, most of itwas dominated by imperial and colonialpowers. Today, to ignore its problemsand underestimate its potential for globaldisruption would be tantamount to

declaring an open season for intensifyingregional violence, region-wide contami-nation by terrorist groups and the com-petitive proliferation of weaponry ofmass destruction.

The United States thus faces a task ofmonumental scope and complexity. Thereare no self-evident answers to such basicquestions as how and with whom Americashould be engaged in helping to stabilizethe area, pacify it and eventually coopera-tively organize it. Past remedies tested inEurope—like the Marshall Plan or NATO,both of which exploited an underlyingtransatlantic political-cultural solidarity—do not quite fit a region still rent by his-torical hatreds and cultural diversity.Nationalism in the region is still at anearlier and more emotional stage than itwas in war-weary Europe (exhausted bytwo massive European civil wars foughtwithin just three decades), and it is fueledby religious passions reminiscent ofEurope’s Catholic-Protestant forty-yearwar of almost four centuries ago.

Furthermore, the area contains nonatural allies bonded to America by histo-ry and culture, such as existed in Europewith Great Britain, France, Germany and,lately, even Poland. In essence, Americahas to navigate in uncertain and badlycharted waters, setting its own course,making differentiated accommodationswhile not letting any one regional powerdictate its direction and priorities.

To Whom Can America Turn?

TO BE SURE, several states inthe area are often mentionedas America’s potential key

partners in reshaping the Global Balkans:Turkey, Israel, India and—on the region’speriphery—Russia. Unfortunately, everyone of them suffers serious handicaps inits capability to contribute to regional sta-bility or has goals of its own that collidewith America’s wider interests in theregion.

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Turkey has been America’s ally forhalf a century. It earned America’s trustand gratitude by its direct participation inthe Korean War. It has proven to beNATO’s solid and reliable southern anchor.With the fall of the Soviet Union, itbecame active in helping both Georgiaand Azerbaijan consolidate their newindependence, and it energetically pro-moted itself as a relevant model of politi-cal development and social modernizationfor those Central Asian states whose peo-ple largely fall within the radius of theTurkic cultural and linguistic traditions.In that respect, Turkey’s significant strate-gic role has been complementary toAmerica’s policy of reinforcing the newindependence of the region’s post-Sovietstates.

Turkey’s regional role, however, islimited by two major offsetting considera-tions stemming from its internal prob-lems. The first pertains to the still uncer-tain status of Atatürk’s legacy: WillTurkey succeed in transforming itself intoa secular European state even though itspopulation is overwhelmingly Muslim?That has been its goal since Atatürk sethis reforms in motion in the early 1920s.Turkey has made remarkable progresssince then, but to this day its future mem-bership in the European Union (which itactively seeks) remains in doubt. If the EUwere to close its doors to Turkey, thepotential for an Islamic political-religiousrevival and consequently for Turkey’s dra-matic (and probably turbulent) interna-tional reorientation should not be under-estimated.

The Europeans have reluctantlyfavored Turkey’s inclusion in theEuropean Union, largely in order toavoid a serious regression in the country’spolitical development. European leadersrecognize that the transformation ofTurkey from a state guided by Atatürk’svision of a European-type society into anincreasingly theocratic Islamic one wouldadversely affect Europe’s security. That

consideration, however, is contested bythe view, shared by many Europeans, thatthe construction of Europe should bebased on its common Christian heritage.It is likely, therefore, that the EuropeanUnion will delay for as long as it can aclear-cut commitment to open its doorsto Turkey—but that prospect in turn willbreed Turkish resentments, increasing therisks that Turkey might evolve into aresentful Islamic state, with potentiallydire consequences for southeasternEurope.2

The other major liability limitingTurkey’s role is the Kurdistan issue. Asignificant proportion of Turkey’s popu-lation of 70 million is composed ofKurds. The actual number is contested,as is the nature of the Turkish Kurds’national identity. The official Turkishview is that the Kurds in Turkey numberno more than 10 million, and that theyare essentially Turks. Kurdish nationalistsclaim a population of 20 million, whichthey say aspires to live in an independentKurdistan that would unite all the Kurds(claimed to number 25–35 million) cur-rently living under Turkish, Syrian, Iraqiand Iranian domination. Whatever theactual facts, the Kurdish ethnic problemand the potential Islamic religious issue

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2How far the latter in such circumstances could gowas dramatically conveyed in a speech onMarch 7, 2002 at the Ankara War Academyby General Tuncer Kilinc, the secretary-gen-eral of the National Security Council, whobluntly stated that “Turkey hasn’t seen theslightest assistance from the EU” in its effortsto become part of Europe and that in seekingallies Turkey might hence do well “to begin anew search that would include Iran and theRussian Federation” (as reported by NicholasBirch, “Once Eager to Join EU, TurkeyGrows Apprehensive”, Christian ScienceMonitor, March 21, 2002; see also the analysisof the speech’s import by Hooman Peimani,“Turkey Hints at Shifting Alliance”, AsiaTimes, June 19, 2002).

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tend to make Turkey—notwithstandingits constructive role as a regional model—also very much a part of the region’s basicdilemmas.

Israel is another seemingly obviouscandidate for the status of a pre-eminentregional ally. As a democracy as well as acultural kin, it enjoys America’s automaticaffinity, not to mention intense politicaland financial support from the Jewishcommunity in America. Initially a havenfor the victims of the Holocaust, it enjoysAmerican sympathy. As the object of Arabhostility, it triggered American preferencefor the underdog. It has been America’sfavorite client state since approximatelythe mid-1960s and has been the recipientof unprecedented American financialassistance ($80 billion since 1974). It hasbenefited from almost solitary Americanprotection against UN disapprobation orsanctions. As the dominant militarypower in the Middle East, Israel has thepotential, in the event of a major regionalcrisis, not only to be America’s militarybase but also to make a significant contri-bution to any required U.S. militaryengagement.

Yet American and Israeli interests inthe region are not entirely congruent.America has major strategic and econom-ic interests in the Middle East that aredictated by the region’s vast energy sup-plies. Not only does America benefit eco-nomically from the relatively low costs ofMiddle Eastern oil, but America’s securityrole in the region gives it indirect butpolitically critical leverage on theEuropean and Asian economies that arealso dependent on energy exports fromthe region. Hence good relations withSaudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates—and their continued securityreliance on America—is in the U.S.national interest. From Israel’s standpoint,however, the resulting American-Arab tiesare disadvantageous: they not only limitthe degree to which the United States isprepared to back Israel’s territorial aspira-

tions, they also stimulate American sensi-tivity to Arab grievances against Israel.

Among those grievances, thePalestinian issue is foremost. That thefinal status of the Palestinian peopleremains unresolved more than 35 yearsafter Israel occupied the Gaza Strip andthe West Bank—irrespective of whosefault that actually may be—intensifiesand, in Arab eyes, legitimates the wide-spread Muslim hostility toward Israel.3 Italso perpetuates in the Arab mind thenotion that Israel is an alien and tempo-rary colonial imposition on the region. Tothe extent that the Arabs perceiveAmerica as sponsoring Israeli repressionof the Palestinians, America’s ability topacify anti-American passions in theregion is constrained. That impedes anyjoint and constructive American-Israeliinitiative to promote multilateral politicalor economic cooperation in the region,and it limits any significant U.S. regionalreliance on Israel’s military potential.

Since September 11, the notion ofIndia as America’s strategic regional part-ner has come to the forefront. India’s cre-dentials seem at least as credible asTurkey’s or Israel’s. Its sheer size andpower make it regionally influential, whileits democratic credentials make it ideo-logically attractive. It has managed to pre-serve its democracy since its inception asan independent state more than half acentury ago. It has done so despite wide-spread poverty and social inequality, anddespite considerable ethnic and religiousdiversity in a predominantly Hindu butformally secular state. India’s prolongedconflict with its Islamic neighbor,Pakistan, involving violent confrontations

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3Demographics play a role as well: The fact thatsomewhat more than 5 million Jewish Israelisdominate the somewhat less than 5 millionArab Palestinians (of whom about 1.2 millionare Israeli citizens) and that the latter areincreasing much more rapidly intensifiesIsraeli insecurity and Arab resentments.

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with guerrillas and terrorist actions inKashmir by Muslim extremists benefitingfrom Pakistan’s benevolence, made Indiaparticularly eager to declare itself afterSeptember 11 as co-engaged with theUnited States in the war on terrorism.

Nonetheless, any U.S.-Indian alliancein the region is likely to be limited inscope. Two major obstacles stand in theway. The first pertains to India’s religious,ethnic and linguistic mosaic. AlthoughIndia has striven to make its 1 billion cul-turally diverse people into a unifiednation, it remains basically a Hindu statesemi-encircled by Muslim neighborswhile containing within its borders a largeand potentially alienated Muslim minorityof somewhere between 120–140 million.Here, religion and nationalism couldinflame each other on a grand scale.

So far, India has been remarkably suc-cessful in maintaining a common statestructure and a democratic system—butmuch of its population has been essential-ly politically passive and (especially in therural areas) illiterate. The risk is that aprogressive rise in political consciousnessand activism could be expressed throughintensified ethnic and religious collisions.The recent rise in the political conscious-ness of both India’s Hindu majority andits Muslim minority could jeopardizeIndia’s communal coexistence. Internalstrains and frictions could become partic-ularly difficult to contain if the war onterrorism were defined as primarily astruggle against Islam, which is how themore radical of the Hindu politicians tendto present it.

Secondly, India’s external concernsare focused on its neighbors, Pakistan andChina. The former is seen not only as themain source of the continued conflict inKashmir but ultimately—with Pakistan’snational identity rooted in religious affir-mation—as the very negation of India’sself-definition. Pakistan’s close ties toChina intensify this sense of threat, giventhat India and China are unavoidable

rivals for geopolitical primacy in Asia.Indian sensitivities are still rankled by themilitary defeat inflicted upon it by Chinain 1962, in the short but intense borderclash that left China in possession of thedisputed Aksai Chin territory.

The United States cannot back Indiaagainst either Pakistan or China withoutpaying a prohibitive strategic price else-where: in Afghanistan if it were to optagainst Pakistan, and in the Far East if itallied itself against China. These internalas well as external factors constrain thedegree to which the United States canrely on India as an ally in any longer-termeffort to foster—let alone impose—greater stability in the Global Balkans.

Finally, there is the question of thedegree to which Russia can becomeAmerica’s major strategic partner in cop-ing with Eurasian regional turmoil. Russiaclearly has the means and experience tobe of help in such an effort. AlthoughRussia, unlike the other contenders, is nolonger truly part of the region—Russiancolonial domination of Central Asia beinga thing of the past—Moscow neverthelessexercises considerable influence on all ofthe countries to its immediate south, hasclose ties to India and Iran and containssome 15–20 million Muslims within itsown territory.

At the same time, Russia has come tosee its Muslim neighbors as the source ofa potentially explosive political anddemographic threat, and the Russianpolitical elite are increasingly susceptibleto anti-Islamic religious and racistappeals. In these circumstances, theKremlin eagerly seized upon the eventsof September 11 as an opportunity toengage America against Islam in thename of the “war on terrorism.”

Yet, as a potential partner, Russia isalso handicapped by its past, even its veryrecent past. Afghanistan was devastated bya decade-long war waged by Russia,Chechnya is on the brink of genocidalextinction, and the newly independent

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Central Asian states increasingly definetheir modern history as a struggle foremancipation from Russian colonialism.With such historical resentments stillvibrant in the region, and with increasing-ly frequent signals that Russia’s currentpriority is to link itself with the West,Russia is being perceived in the regionmore and more as a former Europeancolonial power and less and less as aEurasian kin. Russia’s present inability tooffer much in the way of a social examplealso limits its role in any American-ledinternational partnership for the purposeof stabilizing, developing and eventuallydemocratizing the region.

Ultimately, America can look to onlyone genuine partner in coping with theGlobal Balkans: Europe. Although it willneed the help of leading East Asian stateslike Japan and China—and Japan will pro-vide some, though limited, material assis-tance and some peacekeeping forces—neither is likely at this stage to becomeheavily engaged. Only Europe, increas-ingly organized as the European Unionand militarily integrated through NATO,has the potential capability in the politi-cal, military and economic realms to pur-sue jointly with America the task ofengaging the various Eurasian peoples—on a differentiated and flexible basis—inthe promotion of regional stability and ofprogressively widening trans-Eurasiancooperation. And a supranationalEuropean Union linked to America wouldbe less suspect in the region as a returningcolonialist bent on consolidating orregaining its special economic interests.

America and Europe together repre-sent an array of physical and experientialassets with the capability to make the deci-sive difference in shaping the politicalfuture of the Global Balkans. The questionis whether Europe—largely preoccupiedwith the shaping of its own unity—willhave the will and the generosity to becometruly engaged with America in a jointeffort that will dwarf in complexity and

scale the earlier, successful joint American-European effort to preserve peace inEurope and then end Europe’s division.

European engagement will not occur,however, if it is expected to consist of sim-ply following America’s lead. The war onterrorism can be the opening wedge forengagement in the Global Balkans, but itcannot be the definition of that engage-ment. This the Europeans, less trauma-tized by the September 11 attacks, under-stand better than the Americans. It is alsowhy any joint effort by the Atlantic com-munity will have to be based on a broadstrategic consensus regarding the long-term nature of the task at hand.

Somewhat the same considerationsapply to Japan’s potential role. Japan, too,can and should become a major if some-what less central player. For some time tocome, Japan will eschew a major militaryrole beyond that of direct national self-defense. But despite its recent stagnation,Japan remains the globe’s second-largestnational economy. Its financial supportfor efforts designed to enlarge the world’szone of peace would be crucial and ulti-mately in its own interest. Hence Japan—in conjunction with Europe—has to beviewed as America’s eventual partner inthe long-term struggle against the manyforces of chaos within the Global Balkans.

Formulating a Strategy

IN BRIEF, America may be pre-ponderant, but it is not omnipo-tent. It will need a broadly coop-

erative strategy for coping with theregion’s explosive potential. But as thesuccessful experience of shaping theEuro-Atlantic community has shown,burdens cannot be shared without shareddecision-making. Only by fashioning acomprehensive strategy with its principalpartners can America avoid becomingmired, alone, in hegemonic quicksand.

Given that the area’s problems involvean almost seamless web of overlapping

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conflicts, the first step in a comprehensiveresponse is to define priorities. Threeinterrelated tasks stand out as central: (1)resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, whichis so disruptive to the Middle East; (2)transforming the strategic equation in theoil-producing region from the PersianGulf to Central Asia; and (3) engagingkey governments through regionalarrangements designed to contain WMDproliferation and the terrorist epidemic.

Arab-Israeli peace is the most urgentneed, because it is essential to the pursuitof the other two. Immediately at issue isthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whose spe-cific resolution has to be the proximategoal. But there is also the larger reality ofArab hostility toward Israel, which breedstension in the Middle East and ricochetsMuslim hostility against America.4 Thatcondition can only be ameliorated by afair and viable peace that eventually fos-ters constructive Israeli-Palestinian coop-eration, thereby diluting Arab animus andinducing Arab acceptance of Israel as apermanent fixture on the Middle Easternscene.

Adding urgency to the issue is the riskthat the Euro-Atlantic alliance could splitasunder on the Middle Eastern rock.Although America is the dominant exter-nal power in the Middle East, its relationswith Europe could come under severeduress as transatlantic views diverge overhow best to engage the region. Fordecades since the abortive Franco-BritishSuez adventure of 1956, the area from theSuez to the Persian Gulf has effectivelybeen an American protectorate.Gradually, the protector shifted from apro-Arab to a pro-Israeli preference whilesuccessfully eliminating any significantEuropean and, later, Soviet political influ-ence from the region. The decisive mili-tary victories in the 1991 and the 2003campaigns against Iraq firmly establishedthe United States as the sole externalarbiter in the area.

After the September 11 attacks, the

more conservative elements in theAmerican political establishment, particu-larly those with strong sympathies for theLikud side of Israel’s political spectrum,have become tempted by the vision of analtogether new order imposed by theUnited States on the Middle East as aresponse to the new challenge of terror-ism plus proliferation. The pursuit of thatvision has already involved the forcibletermination of Saddam Hussein’s dicta-torship in Iraq, and it could portendaction against the Ba‘athi regime in Syriaor the Iranian theocracy. In the name ofdemocracy, there have also been calls forthe United States to distance itself fromthe current rulers of Saudi Arabia andEgypt and to press for internal democrati-zation, even at cost to America’s interestsin the region.

It is already evident that theEuropean Union, as it begins to identifyits own foreign policy interests, will notremain merely a passive observer or com-

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4According to numerous public opinion polls, thisissue gives rise to the most intense anti-American emotions. Reputable journalisticreports reinforce that conclusion. In the earlyfall of 2002, Jane Perlez reported in some detailthat “Anger at the United States, embedded inthe belief that the Bush administration lendsunstinting support to Israel at the expense of thePalestinians, is at an unparalleled high acrossthe Arab world.” See “Anger at U.S. Said to Beat New High”, New York Times, September 11,2002. She was echoed by Karen DeYoung, whoreported that Arab dislike of America “focusedlargely on what they saw as a general unfairnesstoward and lack of understanding of the region,and a particular bias toward Israel in the Israeli-Arab conflict.” See “Poll Finds Arabs DislikeU.S. Based on Policies It Pursues”, WashingtonPost, October 7, 2002. Arabs have also tended tointerpret U.S. hostility toward SaddamHussein’s Iraq as driven by one-sided U.S. sup-port for Israel, according to Zogby Internationalpolls conducted in mid-March 2003 in severalArab countries.

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pliant supporter of whatever theAmerican policy is in the Middle East. Infact, it is precisely with regard to theMiddle East that the European Union isbeginning not only to shape its first trulyjoint and comprehensive strategy but alsoto challenge America’s monopoly inregional arbitration. In the SevilleDeclaration of June 22, 2002, the EU tookthe important step of formulating a con-cept of a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was significantlyat variance with America’s.5 IntensifyingU.S.-EU disagreements over the after-math of the war against Iraq and possiblepolitical change in Iran may furtherencourage European assertiveness.

In the short run, America has thepower and the will to disregard Europe’sviews. It can prevail by using its militarymight and temporarily prompt reluctantEuropean accommodation. But theEuropean Union has the economicresources and financial means to make thecritical difference to the region’s long-runstability. Thus, no truly viable solution inthe area will be possible unless the UnitedStates and the EU increasingly act in com-mon. The Middle East is at least as vitalfor Europe as Mexico is for America, andthe EU—as it slowly defines itself—willincreasingly attempt to assert its position.Indeed, it is in the Middle East thatEuropean foreign policy, for the first timesince the Suez debacle of 1956, couldexplicitly define itself against America.

Nevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic com-munity’s emerging cleavage over theMiddle East is reversible. There isremarkable international consensusregarding the substance of an eventualIsraeli-Palestinian peace treaty. There areeven drafts of the likely peace treaty thatgo considerably beyond the vague“roadmap” that the Bush Administrationreluctantly endorsed in the spring of2003. The real issue, how to get theIsraelis and the Palestinians to cross the t’sand dot the i’s, will be a challenge despite

the actual support for a compromisepeace among the Israeli and Palestinianpeoples. Left to themselves, they haveproven unable to bridge their lingeringdifferences or transcend their embitteredsuspicions.

Only the United States and theEuropean Union together can decisivelyaccelerate the process. To do so, they willincreasingly have to spell out in sub-stance, and not just in procedural terms,the outlines of an Israeli-Palestinianpeace. Broadly speaking, there is interna-tional consensus that its basic frameworkwill include two states, territoriallydefined by the 1967 lines but with recip-rocal adjustments to permit incorpora-tion into Israel of the suburban settle-ments of Jerusalem; two capitals inJerusalem itself; only a nominal or sym-bolic right of return for the Palestinianrefugees, with the bulk of returnees set-tling in Palestine, perhaps in vacatedIsraeli settlements; a demilitarizedPalestine, perhaps with NATO or otherinternational peacekeepers; and a com-prehensive, unequivocal recognition ofIsrael by its Arab neighbors.

The internationally sponsored adop-tion of a viable formula for the coexis-tence of Israel and Palestine would notresolve the wider region’s manifold con-flicts, but it would have a triple benefit: itwould somewhat reduce the focus ofMiddle Eastern terrorists on America; itwould disarm the most likely trigger for aregional explosion; and it would permit a

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5The Seville Declaration was much more explicit informulating the specific parameters of a peaceagreement between Israel and Palestine—notably on such matters as the sharing ofJerusalem, the 1967 frontiers and the right ofthe Palestinians to choose their own leaders,including Arafat—than the corresponding U.S.formulations at the time, which made concretedemands of the Palestinian side while notaddressing the more contentious immediateissues.

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more concerted effort by the UnitedStates and the European Union to addressthe region’s security problems withoutseeming to embark on an anti-Islamiccrusade. The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would also facilitateAmerican efforts to promote the progres-sive democratization of the adjoiningArab states without appearing, in Arabeyes, to exploit the democratization issueas yet another pretext for delaying a com-prehensive Israeli-Palestinian accommo-dation.

Given America’s new prominence inthe political life of the Arab Middle Eastin the aftermath of its occupation of Iraq,it is essential that U.S. policymakers notbe seduced by doctrinaire advocates of anexternally imposed and impatient democ-ratization—a democratization “fromabove”, so to speak. Sloganeering to thateffect in some cases may reflect contemptfor Islamic traditions. For others it maybe tactical, rooted in the hope that thefocus on democratization will provide adiversion from efforts to press both theIsraelis and the Arabs to accept the com-promises necessary for peace. Whateverthe motivation, the fact is that genuineand enduring democracy is nurtured bestin conditions that gradually foster sponta-neous change and do not combine com-pulsion with haste. The former approachcan indeed transform a political culture;the latter can only coerce a political cor-rectness that is inherently unlikely toendure.

Similarly, creating a stable Iraq afterthe 2003 military intervention is a formi-dable and prolonged task that can only bemade easier by U.S.-EU collaboration.The fall of the Iraqi regime could reopenlatent border issues with Iran, Syria andTurkey. These could be dynamically com-plicated by the Kurdish issue, while theinternal animus between Iraqi Sunni andShi‘a believers could unleash protractedand increasingly violent instability.Moreover, Iraq’s 25 million people, gen-

erally considered the most nationalistical-ly self-conscious of all the Arab peoples,may prove less pliant to external domina-tion than expected. A long, costly and dif-ficult recovery program will have to bemanaged in a volatile and potentially hos-tile environment.

More broadly, American-Europeancooperation in promoting a stable anddemocratic Iraq and in advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace—in effect, a “regionalroadmap”—would create more favorablepolitical preconditions for addressing theunsatisfactory strategic equation that pre-vails in the oil- and natural-gas-producingareas of the Persian Gulf, Iran and theCaspian Basin. Unlike energy-rich Russia,the states of this zone—from Kazakhstanand Azerbaijan all the way down to SaudiArabia—are almost entirely exporters, butnot major consumers, of the energy that isextracted from their ground. They haveby far the world’s largest reserves of oiland natural gas. Since reliable access toreasonably priced energy is vitally impor-tant to the world’s three economicallymost dynamic regions—North America,Europe and East Asia—strategic domina-tion over the area, even if cloaked bycooperative arrangements, would be aglobally decisive hegemonic asset.

From the standpoint of Americaninterests, the current geopolitical state ofaffairs in the world’s principal energy-richzone leaves much to be desired. Several ofthe key exporting states—notably SaudiArabia and the United Arab Emirates—are weak and politically debilitated. Iraqfaces a prolonged period of stabilization,reconstruction and rehabilitation. Anothermajor energy producer, Iran, has a regimehostile to the United States and opposesU.S. efforts on behalf of a Middle Easternpeace. It may be seeking WMD and is sus-pected of terrorist links. The UnitedStates has sought to isolate Iran interna-tionally, but with limited success.

Just to the north, in the southernCaucasus and Central Asia, the newly

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independent energy-exporting states arestill in the early stages of political consoli-dation. Their systems are fragile, theirpolitical processes arbitrary and theirstatehood vulnerable. They are also semi-isolated from the world energy markets,with American legislation blocking theuse of Iranian territory for pipelines lead-ing to the Persian Gulf and with Russiaaggressively seeking to monopolize inter-national access to Turkmen and Kazakhenergy resources. Only with the comple-tion, several years from now, of the U.S.-sponsored Baku-Çeyhan pipeline willAzerbaijan and its trans-Caspian neigh-bors gain an independent link to the glob-al economy. Until then, the area will bevulnerable to Russian or Iranian mischief.

For the time being, the powerful andexclusive U.S. military presence in thePersian Gulf region and the effective U.S.monopoly of significant long-range war-fare capabilities give America a very con-siderable margin for unilateral policymak-ing. If it should become necessary to cutthe potential nexus between the prolifera-tion of WMD and conspiratorial terrorism,the United States has the means to act onits own, as it proved in bringing down therecent Iraqi regime. The problembecomes more complex, however, and thechances of a solitary American successmore ephemeral, when the longer-rangeconsequences of a violent strategicupheaval are taken into account.

It is difficult to envisage how theUnited States alone could force Iran intoa basic reorientation. Outright militaryintimidation might work initially, giventhe gaping disparity of power between thetwo states, but it would be a gross error tounderestimate the nationalist and reli-gious fervor that such an approach wouldlikely ignite among the 70 millionIranians. Iran is a nation with an impres-sive imperial history and with a sense ofits own national worth. While the reli-gious zeal that brought the theocratic dic-tatorship to power seems to be gradually

fading, an outright collision with Americawould almost certainly re-ignite popularpassions, fusing fanaticism with chauvin-ism.

While Russia has not stood in the wayof any decisive U.S. military efforts toalter the strategic realities of the region,the current geopolitical earthquake in thePersian Gulf could jeopardize America’sefforts to consolidate the independence ofthe Caspian Basin states. American preoc-cupation with the mess in Iraq, not tomention the cleavage between Americaand Europe as well as the increasedAmerican-Iranian tensions, has alreadytempted Moscow to resume its earlierpressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan toabandon their aspirations for inclusion inthe Euro-Atlantic community and to stepup its efforts to undermine any enduringU.S. political and military presence inCentral Asia. That would make it moredifficult for the United States to engagethe Central Asian states in a largerregional effort to combat Islamic funda-mentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Aresurgence of Muslim extremism of theTaliban variety could then even acquire aregional scope.

These risks could be lessened by clos-er U.S.-EU strategic collaboration withregard to Iraq and Iran. That may not beeasy to achieve, given divergent Americanand European perspectives, but the bene-fits of cooperation outweigh the costs ofany compromise. For the United States, ajoint approach would mean less freedomof unilateral action; for the EuropeanUnion, it would mean less opportunityfor self-serving inaction. But actingtogether—with the threat of U.S. militarypower reinforced by the EU’s political,financial and (to some degree) militarysupport—the Euro-Atlantic communitycould foster a genuinely stable and possi-bly even democratic post-Saddam regime.

Together, the United States andEuropean Union would also be betterpositioned to deal with the broader

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regional consequences of the upheaval inIraq. Significant progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would reducethe Arab concern that U.S. actions direct-ed at Iraq’s regime were inspired byIsrael’s desire to weaken all neighboringArab states while perpetuating its controlover the Palestinians. Moreover, strategiccollaboration between the United Statesand the EU would make it easier forTurkey to avoid a painful choice betweenits loyalty as a U.S. ally and its hopes forEU membership.

Active strategic partnership betweenthe United States and the EuropeanUnion would also make it more likely thatIran could eventually be transformedfrom a regional ogre into a regional stabi-lizer. Currently, Iran has a cooperativerelationship with Russia, but otherwiseeither wary or hostile relations with all ofits neighbors. It has maintained a relative-ly normal relationship with Europe, butits antagonistic posture toward America—reciprocated by restrictive U.S. trade leg-islation—has made it difficult forEuropean-Iranian and Iranian-Japaneseeconomic relations to truly prosper. Itsinternal development has suffered accord-ingly, while its socioeconomic dilemmashave been made more acute by a demo-graphic explosion that has increased itspopulation to 70-odd million.

The entire energy-exporting regionwould be more stable if Iran, the region’sgeographic center, were reintegrated intothe global community and its societyresumed its march to modernization.That will not happen as long as theUnited States seeks to isolate Iran and isinsensitive to Iran’s security concerns,especially given the presence in Iran’simmediate neighborhood of three overtand one covert nuclear powers. Moreeffective would be an approach in whichthe Iranian social elite sees the country’sisolation as self-imposed and thus coun-terproductive, instead of somethingenforced by America. Europe has long

urged the United States to adopt thatapproach. On this issue, American strate-gic interests would be better served ifAmerica were to follow Europe’s lead.

A promising start in this regard hasbeen made by the European initiativeon the complex issue of the Iraniannuclear program, an issue that shouldnot be addressed in a manner reminis-cent of the earlier U.S. exaggerations ofthe alleged Iraqi WMD threat. In thelonger run, contrary to the image pro-jected by its ruling mullahs—that of areligiously fanatical society—Iran standsthe best chance, of all the countries inthe region, of embarking on the pathtraced earlier by Turkey. It has a highliteracy rate (72 percent), an establishedtradition of significant female participa-tion in the professions and political life,a genuinely sophisticated intellectualclass and a social awareness of its dis-tinctive historical identity. Once thedogmatic rule imposed by AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini wears thin and theIranian secular elites sense that theWest sees a regionally constructive rolefor Iran, that country could be on theway toward successful modernizationand democratization.

Such a progressive alteration of theregion’s prevailing strategic equationwould permit implementation of theCaucasus Stability Pact proposed byTurkey in 2000, providing for variousforms of region-wide cooperation.6 To

Hegemonic Quicksand 15

6In January 2000, President Suleyman Demirel ofTurkey proposed a “Caucasus Stability Pact”,based on the successful experience of the“Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”founded in June 1999. The latter—with strongU.S. and EU backing and under their securityumbrella—was subsequently able to raise sub-stantial amounts of money to promote therecovery of the Balkans. A similar initiative forthe Caucasian region, involving its three newlyindependent states, as well as the UnitedStates, the EU, Russia and Turkey (at some

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make it effective, not only Turkey’s andRussia’s involvement would be needed,but also Iran’s. Iran’s reorientation wouldalso permit wider economic access to theenergy resources of Central Asia. In time,pipelines through Iran to the Persian Gulfcould also be matched by parallelpipelines from Central Asia throughAfghanistan and Pakistan to the IndianOcean, branching out also to India. Theresult would be of major economic (andpotentially political) benefit not only tosouth-central Asia but to the increasinglyenergy-ravenous Far East.

Progress along these lines, in turn,would help advance the third strategicpriority for this region, the need to con-tain both the proliferation of WMD andthe terrorist epidemic. Neither issue issusceptible to a quick resolution. But tan-gible movement on the first two priori-ties—Israeli-Palestinian peace and theremaking of the region’s strategic land-scape—would undercut some of the pop-ular support for anti-Western, and espe-cially anti-American, terrorism. It couldalso make it easier to concentrate on thestruggle against Middle Eastern terroristswhile reducing the risks of a more com-prehensive religious and cultural clashbetween the West and Islam.

Moreover, an effective halt to furthernuclear proliferation in this conflict-rid-den region will ultimately have to bebased on a regional arrangement. If Iranis to forsake the acquisition of nuclear

weapons, it must have alternative sourcesof security: either a binding alliance witha nuclear-armed ally or a credible interna-tional guarantee. A region-wide agree-ment banning nuclear weapons—on themodel of the convention adopted someyears ago by South American states—would be the preferable outcome. But inthe absence of regional consensus, theonly effective alternative is for the UnitedStates, or perhaps the permanent mem-bers of the UN Security Council, to pro-vide a guarantee of protection againstnuclear attack to any state in the regionthat abjures nuclear weapons.

THE EFFORT to stabilize theGlobal Balkans will last sev-eral decades. At best, progress

will be incremental, inconsistent, and vul-nerable to major reversals. It will be sus-tained only if the two most successful sec-tors of the globe—the politically mobi-lized America and the economically unify-ing Europe—treat it increasingly as ashared responsibility in the face of a com-mon security threat. One should not for-get that struggling alone makes the quick-sand only more dangerous. ■■

The National Interest—Winter 2003/0416

point also Iran) could become an importantvehicle for multilateral efforts to stabilize thevolatile Caucasian region, to help resolve itsvarious ethnic conflicts and to facilitate apeaceful solution to such tragic conflicts as theRussian war in Chechnya.

“I remember how shocked I was when he said he congrat-ulated the victors—and that he pitied them deeply, for theconquered see what they are up against and what needs tobe done, while the conquerors can hardly suspect what isin store for them.”

—Ivo Andric, Letter from 1920

The Compassion of the Conquered

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