10/16/2017

The Warsaw Institute Foundation

lessons learned

ZAPAD-2017

The course of the joint Russian-Belarussian strategic exercises Zapad 2017 confirmed the forecasts of the Warsaw Institute analysts presented in the report of September 13. The Russians did not use the drills to attack any of the neighboring countries, nor did they take the opportunity to start the occupation of Belarus or to deploy any significant forces there. In spite of many concerns, there were no instances of border violations, especially of neigbours belonging to NATO. As expected, Moscow practiced a regular armed conflict against the West with the use of nuclear weapons. The true scale of the maneuvers in terms of the number of troops and the geographical scope, went beyond the officially designated framework. According to the Russians, the drills appeared to be very successful. They managed to show that the army modernisation is advancing at a fairly high rate and, in order to achieve so, Russia uses its military experience gained in Syria and Ukraine. In comparison to the previous exercises, a level of command has been increased; also coordination between army and local authorities has been improved and new types of weaponry have been tested. As for the political aspect of the exercises, some new accents in the Russian policy towards Belarus may be distinguished and they can be potentially dangerous, especially for the latter.

LESSONS LEARNED

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ZAPAD-2017 LESSONS LEARNED

Borisov (Belarus), 09.20.2017. Belarussian combat helicopters Ka-52 in action during the joint Russia-Belarus strategic military exercises Zapad 2017.

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• Accordingtosomeofficialdata,theZapad2017militaryexercisesendedonSeptember20.AsitwasinformedbyRussia'sMinistryofDefence,thelasttransportofRussiansoldiersleftBelarusonSeptember28.However,Ukrainedoesnotseemtobelieveinsuchastatement.OnSeptember29,theChiefoftheGeneralStaffViktorMuzhenko

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announcedthatRussiahadwithdrawnfromBelarusonlyapartofitsmilitaryunits.OnSeptember30,Muzhenko'sstatementwascommentedbytheRussianDefenceMinistryspokesman,whosaidthatallRussiantroopsinvolvedintheBelarusianpartofZapad2017drillshadalreadyreturnedtotheirregularplacesofdislocation.OnOctober6,alsotheDefenceMinister,SergeiShoygu,confirmedthatallsoldiershadgonebacktotheirmilitarybases.Atthisstage,it isextremelydifficulttoevaluatethecurrentsituation.EvenifRussiaactuallywithdrewall troopswhoofficiallyparticipatedintheBelarusianpartofZapad,itdoesnotmeanthatallRussiansoldierslefttheterritoryofBelarus.ItmustbetakenintoaccountthatinBelarustherewerealsosomeRussianunitswhichwerenotreportedtoparticipateinthedrills.AsforKaliningradOblast,thereisnodoubtthatadditionaltroopsandweaponshavebeenplacedthereandtheyhavenotbeenwithdrawn,atleastsofar.

• SomeconcernsabouttheRussianpresenceinBelarusderivetosomeextentfromanothercontroversyontheactualsizegotheforcesparticipatingintheexercises.Accordingtosomeofficialinformation,therewere12,700soldiers.TheChairmanof theNATOMilitaryCommittee,PetrPavel,has argued thatbetween70,000and100,000 couldhavetakenpartinthedrills.On26,Lithuania'sDefenceMinistryinformedthatupto100,000troopsmayhavebeenengagedintheexercises.However,accordingtothecommandinggeneraloftheUnitedStatesArmyEurope,BenHodges,morethan40,000soldiersmighthavebeenengagedinZapad2017.LieutenantGeneralHodgescriticisedRussiaandBelarusfordividingZapad"intoallthoselittleexercises",but"theywereallconnected,becauseZapadconstitutedacomprehensiveproject".

• TheexercisesconductedintheterritoryofBelaruswereonlyasmallpartofthehugeprojectoftheRussianArmedForces.Duringthefirstday,theRussiansredeployedthreeairbornedivisions(intotal24,000soldiers)toitswesternfrontiersinthevicinityofEstoniaandLatvia.Theydidnotevenhidethatsuchamaneuverwasrelatedtothedrills.AllsortsoftrainingprojectshadgonefarbeyondtheWesternMilitaryDistrict.ExercisesandoperationalreadinessevaluationinalmostallcountryweresupposedtogivetheGeneralStaffanoverallimageofthecapabilitiesoftheRussianArmedForces.Therefore,theBelarusianpartoftheexerciseshadforMoscowminimumimportance.Instead,itsaimwastodistractattentionfrommaineventsintheRussianterritory,wheremilitaryunitstrainedapotentialconflictwiththeWest.And,iftheBelarusianpartoftheZapad2017wargameshadadefensivecharacter,theRussiantrainedoffensiveelements.Inthiscase,theenemieswerenotanysaboteursorterroristsbutregulararmiesofothercountries.Inordertofightagainstloosemilitaryformations("littlegreenmen"),nobodyresortstomassiveairstrikes(bytheuseofaviationandmissiles)andhundredsoftanks.AsstatedbytheLithuanianDefenceMinister,RussiasimulatedinfactanattackontheBalticstates,mostlyby"raids"bytheLithuanianborderandlandinginthevicinityofLatvianandEstonianones.GeneralPetrPavelstatedthattheZapad-2017maneuverscouldbeperceivedintermsof"seriouspreparationforagreatwar".

• There isnodoubt in this regard,especiallyafter theanalysisof the lastdayof themaneuvers.OnSeptember20,thegreatest intensificationoftheRussiansoldiers'activitiescouldbeobservedonthe"widestbattlefieldpossible"stretchingfromtheBarentsSeatotheBlackSea.ItcouldpossiblybeasimulationofafullarmedconflictbetweenRussiaandNATO,especiallyifMoscowtrainedanuclearattackwiththeuseofalltheelements(so-callednucleartriad).AtthePlesetskprovingground,aRussianarmedintercontinentalballisticmissileRS-24Yearswaslaunchedand two strategic bombers Tu-22M3 flew over the Baltic Sea and the Norwegian Sea; in addition, the RussiansubmarineDmitriyDonskoimadeanelectroniclaunchofaninternationalballisticmissilefromthesealevel.

• Duringthefirststageofthemaneuvers,theRussianspractisedtherepellingbackofmassiveairattackwiththeuseofconventionalmeans,whichconfirmsthefactthattheir"opponent"wasnotadiversionarygroupofseparatistsbutNATO.ThekeyrolewasplayedbytheRussianaviationandtheairdefenceofthe6thArmyofAirandAirDefenceForcesintheWesternMilitaryDistrict.ItsunitsemployedtheA2/AD(anti-access/area-denial)methodbymovingairdefencesystemstotheWest.Atthesametime,theRussianslaunchedaseacomponentofA2/AD,theBalticFleetunitinKaliningradOblast.Themissiletestswereconductedsimultaneouslyinnorthernpartofthecountryaswellas in theLaptevSeaand theBarentsSea.Theywereattendedby theBastionandRubezhcoastaldefencemissile

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systemsaswellasthevesselsoftheNorthFleet.WhileusingtheA2/D2systems,itwasimportanttomobilisethetacticalballisticmissilelaunchersIskander-M.Themissiletestshouldworrytheinternationalcommunity,especiallythatitcouldpossiblybequalifiedasaviolationsoftheprovisionsoftheTreatyonIntermediate-rangeNuclearForces(INFTreaty).Russia'sDefenceMinistryhasinformedaboutasuccessfultestofweaponsofincreasedrangefortheIskander-Mlaunchers.ThemissilewasliftedofffromKapustinYartestrange(AstrakhanOblast),ittravelled480kilometresandhit the target locatedon theprovingground inMakat,Kazakhstan. In fact, it concernedacruisemissilesystemIskander-K,whichmayhavearangeofmorethan2,000kilometres.

Borisov (Belarus), 09.20.2017. Belrussian and Russian tanks fire during the joint Russia-Belarus strategic military exercises Zapad 2017.

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• Duringthemaneuvers,theRussianshadattheirdisposalallsortsofthemissileandartilleryassetssuchasTunguskaanti-aircraftsystem,PantryS-1system,Tochka-Umissilesystem,MultipleLaunchRocketSystem(MLRS)andBM-21Grad,self-propelledhowitzers(MstaandAkatsiya)aswellasself-propelledartillery(Pion).Asfortheaviation,itwasrepresentedbytheSu-24bombersandvarioustypesofattackhelicopters,namelyMi-24,Mi-28andKa-52.Themaneuversconstitutedanopportunitytopresentandtestnewtypesofweaponry.Moreover,theRussiantookadvantageoftestingT-72B3tanksonsuchamassivescale.InFebruarythisyear,thefirstbatchoftwentyupgradedtankswasintroducedwithintheWesternMilitaryDistrict.TheproductionofthemostrecentversionofT-72tanksstarted last year.Also such typesof tanks asT-90MandT80BWMaswell asBMPTarmouredfightingvehiclesappearedintheRussianarmy.AsfortheBelarusians,theycouldboastoftheV1lightarmouredvehicle,CaimanarmouredvehicleandanupgradedT-72BM3tank.

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• Theyalsotestedasystembasedonreservistsofso-called"territorialdefenceforces".Alsosuddencall-uptoserviceforthedurationoftheexerciseappearedtobeabsolutelytopsecret.ItisknownthatittookplaceinKaliningradOblastandPskovOblast.InAprilthisyear,VladimirPutinsignedadecreeoncall-upofreservists.

• Inspiteofmanyconcerns,therewerenomajorinstancesofborderviolation,withtheexceptionofbriefincursioninto theLithuanianairspacedoneby twoIl-76 transportairliftersonSeptember16.The incidentoccurredwhentheRussianaircraftsflewfromRussiatoKaliningradOblast.Asaresult,Lithuania'sForeignMinistrysentanoteofcomplainttotheRussianEmbassy.However,Moscowexplainedthattheaircraftssoughttoavoidthestorm.Therewerenootherprovocations,neitherdirectedintothemembersofNATOnorintoUkraine.Nevertheless,duetotheZapaddrills,thelatterintensifiedaerialpatrolsonitsnorthernborder.

• FortheKremlin,theRussianarmy'scombatreadinessanditspotentialisnotimportant;itismorerelevanttofillWesterncountrieswithfear.ThatiswhytheZapad2017drillsreliedmostlyontheinformation.Russia'swillingnesstoimpresstheWestwasgreaterthanthenumberofsoldiersandthetypeofweaponry.Inthiscontext,theUkraine'salmosthystericalallegationsappearedpositiveforRussia.SincethefalloftheSovietUnion,Moscow'smainweaponisnotthestrengthofitsarmy,butthefearofothercountries.Suchafearisoftenexaggeratedorevenunmotivated.Itisoneoftwomainreasons(asforthesecondone,itisthedesiretokeepsomemilitaryissuestopsecret)behindRussia'sunclearattitudeduringthemaneuvers.Thecountryacceptedforeignobserversonitsterritoryonlyonce;on18September,VladimirPutin,SergeiShoygu,theRussiangenerals,manyforeignjournalistsand95militaryattachésappearedat theLuzhskyprovingground located inLeningradOblast.Due to the terribleweather, theyprobablydidn'tseea lot.Forforeignobservers, itwasmucheasiertomonitorthemaneuverstakingplaceontheterritoryofBelarus.OnSeptember17, fourteenonlookers fromsevencountrieshadanopportunity to inspectonly somemaneuversattheRuzhanskyprovinggroundinBrestOblast.Formanyyears,Russiahadledsomeunclearactivities,notonlythemilitaryones(inthiscase,Russia'sdecisiononsuspensionofTreatyonConventionalArmedForcesinEuropeseemedextremelyimportant).Inthisrespect,theZapad2017drillswereexceptional,notonlywithregardtoRussia'spolicytowardsNATOandUkrainebutalsotoBelarus.

• Themaneuvers'aimwasnottoshowtheallies'unity.Onthecontrary,MoscowtriedtodiscreditBelarus,mostlyduetosomeofitsprovocations.Forexample,RussiainformedthatadditionalarmouredforceshadbeentransportedontheterritoryofBelarus,whichappearedtroublesomeforMinsk.AnotherproblematicissuewasacarconvoywithRussiannationalistsdrivingthroughtheBelarusiancapital.Itneedstobeaddedthattheeventhadnotbeenarrangedwithlocalauthorities.GoodrelationsbetweenBelarusandUkrainehavebeenrecentlydeterioratedrightbeforethestartofZapad2017astheRussianFSBkidnappedsonofaUkrainianmilitary.TheincidenttookplaceintheterritoryofBelarus.

• OnSeptember14,thatisduringthefirstdayoftheexercises,Russia'sDefenceMinistryannouncedonitswebsitethatsubunitsoftheWesternMilitaryDistricthadlaunchedatroopingoperationtoBelarusandthesoldiersofthe1stGuardsTankArmywhostationednearMoscowwereputonhighalertandwereevendirectedtoaloadingpoint.Aspublishedinthepressrelease,troopswouldactatunknownprovinggroundsandtankswouldbetransportedwithinaday.SuchastateofmattersappearedtobesurprisingfortheBelarusiansandsomeoppositonactivistsevenrushedtowardsthebordertoblocktheRussiantransport.Ofcourse,itdidn'thappen.InthecourseofconsultationwiththeRussians,Minskexplainedthatthepressreleasehadcontainedanerror.ItwastruethatunitsweretransportedatRussian,andnotBelarusian,provinggrounds.SuchwastheofficialversionbutitwasclearthatMoscowwantedtotesthowBelaruswouldreacttoapotentialdeploymentofRussiantroopsonitsterritory.JudgingbythereactionofMinsk,Russiahaspassedthetest.TheBelarusianauthoritiesappearedtobesurprisingandindecisivewhenthecarconvoywithRussianPeople’sLiberationMovementhaddriventhroughthecapital.

• Thanks toZapad2017,Moscowcouldnotice that thevastmajorityofBelarusianshaveeitherneutralorpositiveattitudetotheRussianarmy.Theiropponentsdidnotmanagetoorganiseanyimportantanti-Russianprotests.IfMoscowsoughttotest thedegreeofcontrolandeventheknowledgeofMinskaboutthecurrentactivitiesof the

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RussiantroopsintheBelarusianterritory,itshouldberathersatisfied.ItseemsthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofBelarusiansdonottakeseriouslyintoaccounttheRussianthreat,and,asfortheinformationwar,MoscowisabletoparalyzetheBelarusianpublicopinion.

• NotonlydidsuchinstancesofconsciousprovocationhelpMoscowtotestBelarusbuttheywerealsosupposedtomakeAlexanderLukashenkoresignfromobservingthedrillsalongwithVladimirPutin.However,Russia'spresidentdidnotwanttogotoBelarustodoso.Asaresult,leadersofbothcountriesobservedthemaneuversseparately,unlikein2009and2013.LukashenkowasalsohumilitatedbythefactthattheBorisovprovingground(wherethepresidentofBelarusinspectedthedrills)wasnotvisitedbyaforesaidSergeiShoygu.ItneedstobenotedthatMinskandMoscowseemedtospeakwithdifferentvoices.Moreover,therewasnoonecommandso,infact,BelarusiansandRussiansfoughtshouldertoshoulderbuttheydidnotacttogether.FortheKremlin,thecooperationwiththeBelarusianarmywasofminorimportanceinthecontextofZapad2017.ThisshowsthatMoscow,initscurrentmilitarydoctrine,countsmainlyonitselfandinRussiathereisnolongeranypoliticaldemandforformalallies.InMinsk,itwasfeltthatduringthedrillstheRussianstriedtopresentBelarusnotastheirallybutratherasatellite;akindofaprovinggroundthatcanbeusedtoattacktheirneighbours.Zapad2017has intensifiedBelarus'sdistrust towardsRussia.ThedrillshavealsocomplicatedtheBelarus'srelationswithneighbouringcountries.Notaccidentallyadozendaysafterthemaneuversended,theBelarusiansideunexpectedlyreturnedtooneofitsgreatestfearsexpressedearlierinconnectionwiththeexercises.AccordingtotheBelarusianForeignMinister,VladimirMakei,hiscountryhadnointentionofstartingthewaranditdidnotseektodeployanyforeignmilitarybasesinitsterritory.

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