19th Japan EU Conference

September 23, 2016, Brussels

1

Yosuke NAOI Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)

Said ABOUSAHL EC/JRC

Starting with nuclear materials safeguards research and development in 1990 after concluding the agreement between JAERI (former organization of JAEA) and EURATOM

After the first nuclear security summit in 2010, collaboration topics enlarged to nuclear security, such as R&D on nuclear material detection, nuclear forensics, capacity building

2010 May, EU Started CBRN-COE initiative

2010 December, JAEA established Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)

2011 May : #20 EU-Japan Summit Joint Statement (Excerption) ◦ The EU and Japan will strengthen cooperation on mitigation of

radiological, nuclear other risks in other countries. This include exchanging information on the implementation of respective programmes, in particular the EU regional CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative and Japan’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security.

Nuclear safeguards, non-proliferation and security R&D ◦ Detection techniques

Detection techniques using neutron interrogation and the other methods

◦ Nuclear Forensics

Capacity building, training, technical support, in the areas of safeguards, security and non-proliferation ◦ Nuclear safeguards/security training

Curriculum development

Exchange of lectures

Co-sponsor training

◦ Coordination of technical support to third countries

Challenge for particle like melted fuel by active neutron

EC/JRC - IRMM : neutron facilities JRC-IRMM major provider in Europe of ND for nuclear energy applications

GELINA

NRD: Neutron Resonance Densitometry

Joint EURATOM / JAEA workshop

4 – 5 March 2015

JRC-IRMM, Geel, Belgium

50 participants • Extensive delegation from Japan

(JAEA, Univ. Kyoto & Nagoya)

• DG-ENER, JRC • EU Member states • Participants from IAEA, US (DOE, LANL,

LLNL, ORNL)

JAEA and JRC successfully demonstrated an innovative technique to characterize complex nuclear material

Demonstration Experiments at GELINA in March 2015

Au, W, Rh, Cu, Co, Mn samples (plates) with different thicknesses were prepared .

Unknown samples (plates) were placed in the box. Then measurement were performed.

For NRTA unknown number of samples were placed in the box then sealed.

→By NRTA unknown samples were identified and quantities of elements were measured with difference less than 2%.

For NRCA/PGA unknown number of samples were placed in the box then sealed.

→By NRCA/PGA unknown samples were identified 9

Demonstration Experiments at GELINA in March 2015

Awarded JRC and JAEA received the 2016 "Award for Distinguished

Technology Development", which is one of the most important Atomic Energy Society of Japan awards

A Picture of a Practical NRD System

12

48

27 34

51

72 76 68 72

104

160

184

280

237

177 168

177

155

190 191

151 155

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Nu

mb

er

of

Stat

e P

arti

es(

TOTA

L)

Nu

mb

er

of

inci

de

nts

Year

Number of incidents

Number of State Parties(TOTAL)

Total 2,777 cases of nuclear security events reported to IAEA Illicit (Incident) Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) between 1993 and December 31, 2015

Data Source : Mr. Jose GARCIA SAINZ, Nuclear Security Information Officer, Information Management Section, Division of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, International Atomic Energy Agency

Nuclear Forensics(1)

Nuclear forensics supports the prevention of and response to a nuclear security event ◦ May identify deficiencies in nuclear security systems (facility

or a pathway) that can then be improved, aiding in the prevention of future nuclear security events

◦ Serves as a deterrent to illegal acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material

◦ Enhances the response to a nuclear security event

◦ May be combined with traditional forensics to support criminal investigations

Nuclear Forensics(2) Aim of the EC/JRC and JAEA collaboration is to improve

the capabilities for developing the nuclear forensics technologies through information exchange, workshop and training.

CMX-4 data review meeting, hosted at JRC-ITU in Karlsruhe, 17-19 March 2015

Institute for Trans-uranium Elements(ITU), EC/JRC and JAEA have participated in 4th Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX-4) organized by International Technical Working Group on Nuclear forensics.

Capacity Building Support(1)

Exchange of lecturers ◦ 8 times from EU for JAEA hosted training/seminar in Japan,

Malaysia, Lithuania, Ukraine and US for last 5 years

◦ 7 times from Japan for EURATOM hosted training/seminar in Italy, Malaysia and Thailand for last five years

Newly developed synchronized training courses on safeguards from 2015 ◦ Firstly joined JAEA’s two weeks safeguards/SSAC training

◦ Then secondly some selected participants joined EC/Joint Research Center’s NDA training in ITU-ISPRA, Italy

Co-sponsor training

Coordination of technical support to third countries

Good Practice on Capacity Building

Workshop on Nuclear Security ~ for the enhanced nuclear security across the borders~ in Lithuania (2013) Co-hosted by: Lithuania Nuclear Security Centre of

Excellence (NSCOE) , EC Joint Research Centre (EC/JRC) and JAEA

Cooperated by: US Department of Energy/ National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)

Topics: Border security monitoring, exercises

Coordination of Technical Support to Third Countries

Picture: Signature of the agreement amendment in May 2016 by Mr Mochiji, Director of Japan's Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and Mr Šucha, Director General of the European Commission Joint Research Centre.

In May 2016, the two parties decided to amend the JAEA/EURATOM R&D agreement to extend its duration for additional 5 years and to include cooperation in the field of information exchange on characterization techniques required for decommissioning of reactors, spent fuel, and radioactive waste; containments and surveillance; process monitoring; and coordination of technical support to third countries.

Renewed the agreement

Thank you for your attention