yim nuclear nonproliferation and future expansion of np final to inta 10-12-05

To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 1

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Future Expansion of Nuclear Power

Man-Sung Yim Department of Nuclear Engineering

North Carolina State University

ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationships between the future expansion of nuclear power and the prospect for world nuclear nonproliferation. For this purpose, recent changes and developments in international political environment, nonproliferation regimes, business practices surrounding civilian nuclear power industry, and technological advancements were examined. Based on these examinations, the paper attempts to answer the question, “What should be done for future nuclear power development not to result in further increase in proliferation risk?”. I. Introduction With the world’s continuing concern over global warming, nuclear energy is receiving renewed interest. Nuclear energy is one of the few economically viable base load electricity generation technologies with no direct greenhouse gas emissions. Presently, about 440 nuclear power plants are in operation in 34 countries around the world providing about 16% of world electricity1. Nuclear power avoids the production of about 8% of the present level of CO2 emissions in the energy sector2. The nuclear power industry in the U.S. has struggled for the last quarter century3. No new nuclear power plant has been built since 1970s. The public’s attitude toward nuclear technology has been mixed with interest in times of fuel or power shortages, fear of accidents and concern over nuclear waste management. The nuclear industry, backed by performance improvements and reduction in operating/production cost, is currently engaged with various activities that are very much futuristic. There is a consortium of nuclear vendors and utilities under the support of U.S. Department of Energy preparing for the construction of a new nuclear power plant by 20104. New reactor designs, including the development of new generation reactors5, have actively been researched. Most of the newly proposed reactor designs are based on inherent/passive safety concepts with improved economy6. Within the nuclear industry, these developments are considered a presage of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. Expectation among the U.S. nuclear industry is that these new development will lead into world expansion of civilian nuclear power program.

1 The TOPS Task Force of the NERAC, Technological Opportunities To Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS), p.5, January 2001. 2 V. M. Mourogov, “Role of nuclear Energy for Sustainable Development,” Progress in Nuclear Energy, 37, 1-4, 19-24, 2000; In terms of world primary energy sources, nuclear power contributes to about 6% of the total. 3 Capital intensiveness, licensing uncertainty, and unfavorable political climate discouraged investments in nuclear option in liberalized markets. 4 Near Term Deployment Group, “A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010,” Volume I Summary Report, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science and Technology, 2001. 5 US DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, GIF-002-00, December 2002. 6 Safety of a nuclear reactor is guaranteed even in the event of a severe accident without requiring operator interventions. With these new reactors, the target accident frequency (i.e., core damage frequency) is about two orders of magnitude lower than that of the current reactor fleet. Efforts have been expended to reduce the capital cost of a nuclear plant construction project by employing modular design concepts and reducing construction time.


Over the last 50 years of nuclear technology development, many changes have occurred, in particular in the U.S. Civilian nuclear power technology, which was a spin-off from nuclear weapon development, has matured into a huge commercial enterprise. The public’s attitude toward nuclear power has gone through various changes7. Development of the technology, which was initially carried out by the U.S. government or the companies heavily subsidized by the government, is now managed and controlled by multinational business corporations. The market for civilian nuclear power technology, which was created by government policy, has become very much liberalized. Commercial interests have become a much stronger driving force behind the use of nuclear technology. The developing world, once mostly isolated from the technology, is becoming a more important player for the future. Energy demand is expected to rise sharply in the developing world as many countries aspire for better quality of life. The developers/vendors, by becoming a multinational entity through various mergers, have become much less constrained by the U.S. government policy. Concern over proliferation, which was addressed by establishing a clear boundary between civilian and military applications, has been renewed through recent incidents in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Although the vast majority of States have committed to forgo the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the recent incidents are showing that the current nonproliferation regime has defects in preventing clandestine development of nuclear weapons. More significantly, these incidents confirm the possibility of nuclear proliferation under the cover of civilian nuclear power development. The international political environment, in particular over the last decade, has become very complex and unpredictable. During the cold war, many states, under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. and Soviet Union, did not feel the need for nuclear weapons. Most states did not pursue nuclear weapons due to the perceived cost, difficulty, and in some cases the taboo associated with it8. However, this view may be changing. There is only one dominant state in the international system. Smaller and weaker states feel more responsible for their own security. A new sense of allies or enemies may be developing9. There are several regions in the world where serious security conflicts are still on-going. Some states may reconsider nuclear weapons to meet their security needs under the changing international political dynamics. To some states, a key motivation for nuclear weapon development is to deter intervention by the U.S. Possible dispersion of nuclear weapons by some states to sub-national terrorist groups adds another dimension to the world’s nuclear proliferation concern10. Current developments within the U.S. nuclear power industry which may be aiming at world nuclear power expansion remind us the dilemma that the nuclear industry faced during the early days of civilian nuclear technology development: “Can a peaceful use of nuclear power be expanded without affecting the world’s nuclear proliferation?” At the same time, the surrounding conditions for civilian nuclear power development have changed from those in the 1950s. These conditions include the international political environment, business practices, advancement in nuclear power technology, and the world nuclear nonproliferation regimes. This paper is an attempt to answer the question considering these changes. In this regard, the following questions are asked and examined in the paper as necessary steps: 1) What is the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation?; 2) What has been done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with the development of nuclear energy?; 3) Is the expansion of nuclear power realistic?;

7 Public attitude toward nuclear power started with interest, hope and changed to concern, fear, anxiety and later maybe indifference. Presently, public attitude is more or less neutral. 8 S. J. Diehl and J. C. Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, ABC-CLIO, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA, 2002. 9 L. Scheinman, “Reflections on Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime, Proceedings of 44th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 2003. 10 After the 9-11 event, terrorist group’s ambition to acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is well known.


4) How do the recent developments in the civilian nuclear power industry affect world nuclear nonproliferation?; 5) What should be done for future nuclear power expansion not to result in further increase in proliferation risk? This paper is not intended to address all aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. The focus of the paper is on the relationship between civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear proliferation. The threat under consideration is a nation, like Iran, that may contemplate possible nuclear weapon development through the establishment of a civilian nuclear power program. An underlying premise in this discussion is that spreading of nuclear weapons is detrimental to world peace and international security. II. What is the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation? Nuclear weapons can be built only if enough weapon-usable nuclear material is available. The weapon-usable nuclear materials include all isotopes capable of being assembled into a fast critical mass which then undergoes explosive prompt fission reactions11. These include all isotopes of plutonium, uranium-233,235, neptunium-237, proactium-231, americium-241,243, curium-244,245,246, berkelium-247, and californium-251. The nuclei that are readily able to undergo fission and sustain a chain reaction, such as uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-239, and plutonium-241, are called fissile12 nuclei. Plutonium-239, uranium-235, and uranium-233 are most commonly used as nuclear weapon materials. Uranium-235 or uranium-233 can be implemented into a gun-type design, for which the assembly is rather simplistic and weapon testing is not a requirement for efficacy verification. Use of plutonium-239 requires an implosion-type design which demands sophistication in the skills and knowledge of the bomb designer and testing for verification. The other nuclides (e.g., neptunium-237) can be assembled into a bomb although advanced skills and knowledge in bomb design are required. Acquiring nuclear weapon-usable material can be pursued in three different routes13: (a) Enrichment of uranium-235 to weapons grade concentrations through isotope separation; (b) Chemical reprocessing of spent fuel from reactors to extract plutonium-239, uranium-233, or other weapon-usable fissile materials; (c) Diversion, theft, seizure, purchase, or receipt of fissile nuclear materials. A civilian nuclear power program can potentially be linked to all of these routes if uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing is involved. It has been shown that reactor-grade plutonium from civilian nuclear reactors is a potentially explosive material and that the difficulties of developing an effective design of the most straightforward types (e.g., Fat Man-type) are not appreciably greater with reactor-grade plutonium than those that have to be met for the use of weapons-grade plutonium14. Thus it is possible to build an entirely credible national weapons capability with use of only reactor-grade material15. Proliferation takes place when the fissile materials from the civilian nuclear power program are diverted and know-how from the civilian nuclear programs is used for military purposes. Training and education of people to support nuclear power program is linked to nuclear proliferation as many of the skills and capabilities of nuclear scientists and engineers are common between civilian and military program. 11 “International Workshop on Technology Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Nuclear Power Systems,” March 29-30, 2000, Washington, DC. 12 R. F. Mozley, The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation, University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA, 1998; Fissile refers to nuclei that leads to fission following the absorption of a zero-energy neutron. Nuclei such as uranium-238, which do not fission unless struck by an energetic neutron, are said to be fissionable but nonfissile. Those that can be converted into fissile nuclei by the absorption of a neutron, such as uranium-238 and thorium-232, are called fertile nuclei. 13 H. Feiveson, “Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Fuel Cycles,” Annual Review of Energy, 3: 357-394, 1978. 14 J. C. Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Security, 4, 111-128, 1993. 15 See Feiveson (Note 13).


As of 2004, the world has accumulated 1450 metric tons of plutonium as global stockpiles16. Among this, 250 metric tons of plutonium were produced at weapons facilities. The rest were produced through civilian activities. 195 metric tons of plutonium have been separated from spent nuclear fuel from the civilian reactors. Continued accumulations of plutonium in spent fuel and of separated plutonium resulting from reprocessing can be perceived as increasing the proliferation risk associated with the global expansion of nuclear energy17. It may be true that, if a country wants nuclear weapons, it would prefer a dedicated route to material production over the diversion of material from a civilian nuclear power program. The dedicated route would be cheaper, less time consuming and possibly yield higher quality weapons material. However, examination of nuclear proliferation history indicates that using a dedicated route has not been practiced among potential proliferators. Except for the early nuclear weapons states such as the U.S., Soviet Union, U.K. and China where weapons programs predated civil applications, most of the states with nuclear ambition have used civilian nuclear power programs as cover for any on-going weapons work. The list of these countries includes France, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, India, and Israel18 19. Pursuing a dedicated route would be very difficult under the current world nonproliferation regimes. Due to its capital cost intensive nature and requirement for a large manpower support, establishing a civilian nuclear program requires a long-term financial and political commitment. Additionally, pursuing detonation capability and delivery capability requires a significant amount of investment for an extended period of time. According to Erickson20, it would be difficult for any state with a gross national product 16 G. Perkovich, J. Cirincione, R. Gottemoeller, J. B. Wolfstahl, J. T. Matthews, Universal Compliance, A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Draft, June 2004. 17 Hassberger, J., T. Isaacs, and R. N. Schock, “A Strategic Framework for Proliferation Resistance: A Systematic Approach for the Identification and Evaluation of Technology Opportunities to Enhance the Proliferation Resistance of Civilian Nuclear Energy Systems,” UCRL-JC-142356, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2001. 18 In France, nuclear weapon development was closely interconnected with the civilian program; France provided a plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant to Israel for civilian purpose under the cover of substantial secrecy. No safeguards requirements were in place; In India, from the inception, military and civilian nuclear energy programs were closely interconnected; Also in Pakistan, military and civilian nuclear energy programs were substantially integrated; enrichment technology was commercially obtained from Urenco; In South Africa, a nuclear energy program began initially as civilian. Foreign assistance was used to build up an indigenous technical base for its weapons program; Civilian nuclear technologies acquired from abroad were used as a basis for the nuclear weapons program in Iraq; In Iran, the nuclear program was initially civilian. Technologies relevant to a nuclear weapons program were obtained through China, Russia, and Pakistan. The civilian program provided a cover for weapon work; Under the cover of a civilian nuclear energy program, a covert nuclear weapons program was pursued in Taiwan; In South Korea, a secret nuclear weapons program was begun simultaneously with the construction of its first civilian nuclear power plant. Under U.S. pressure, Seoul pledged not to establish either enrichment or reprocessing capabilities; Argentina’s civilian nuclear program was the oldest and most successful in South America, which also served as a cloak for what appears to have been a nuclear weapons effort. The weapons program was abandoned in the 1980s as the military government regime changed to a civilian one; In Brazil, the military ran an unsafeguarded “parallel program” which was cancelled later under a civilian government; Sweden originally had an integrated program for both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons; Yugoslavia pursued a secret nuclear weapons program terminated in 1987, and still retains a base of expertise and nearly 50 kilograms of fresh 80% enriched HEU fuel; In North Korea, a secret extensive nuclear weapons program has been underway under the cover of civilian applications for over 30 years. 19 Bunn, M., “Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record,” International Topical Workshop on Proliferation-Resistance in Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycle, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Como, Italy, July 2-6, 2001. 20 S. A. Erickson, “Economics and Technological Trends Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 40-54, Summer 2001.


(GNP) significantly less than that of about ~$100 billion to devote enough annual governmental funding to a nuclear weapon program to actually achieve positive results within a reasonable time frame (i.e., 10 years). But once a country possesses an established civilian nuclear power program, it can change the dynamics of proliferation. Presence of trained nuclear scientists and engineers within the state will make a difference in the cost of a nuclear weapon program. An established civilian nuclear program creates a bureaucracy that can then affect the politics and decision making within that state surrounding the decisions on nuclear weapons21. Once complicated nuclear plants and supporting infrastructure are formed in these states, they can influence state policy that wants to take advantage of their expensive nuclear establishment for prominence, pride, and security. Therefore, a state’s bureaucracy and politics surrounding its nuclear establishment plays a larger role in defining the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. Establishing commercial nuclear program can become both a conduit and mask to a weapons program that a government might not otherwise be willing to undertake22. Nuclear proliferation is not a matter solely determined by a mastery of technical details. Overcoming financial constraints does not necessarily dictate the course of a proliferation attempt. Technology or finance is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for nuclear proliferation. There are over 20 countries in the continents of North and South America, Africa, and Asia with $50 billion or over GNP in 2002 that have not developed nuclear weapons. There are over 35 countries in the world that possess the civilian nuclear capability. But other than the first nuclear club countries (i.e., U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China), only 4 or 5 countries (e.g., Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) currently are known to possess nuclear weapons. Regardless of how a country acquires civilian nuclear technical capability (so called “latent capacity”23), the most important step in the process of nuclear proliferation is the acquisition of functional nuclear weapons. This could come about only from an explicit proliferation decision by a government to transform a latent capacity into an operational capacity24. At the most fundamental level, the proliferation decision by a state is controlled by the political motivation25. Those countries that were at least once involved in activities toward nuclear proliferation had political motivations to become a nuclear weapon state. These motivational factors can be international political power/prestige incentives, military/security incentives, and domestic political incentives26. The international political power/prestige incentive is related to a country’s desire to obtain regional or global power status/pretensions due to the belief that nuclear weapons somehow magnify a nation’s image. This incentive may not be a common desire in today’s world but was behind the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and India27. When a state perceives that nuclear weapons are necessary for its national security to provide deterrence against larger states and groups of states, military/security incentives exist. The potential proliferant country may perceive some likelihood of future security disputes with a country owning nuclear weapons (e.g., India vis-à-vis the Peoples Republic of China28, Pakistan vis-à-vis India) or an adversary country with overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. Future attempts for nuclear proliferation are likely to be dominated by this incentive among the current non-NWS. Domestic

21 G. Perkovich, “Nuclear Power in India, Pakistan, and Iran,” Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2002. 22 See Feiveson (note 13). 23 S. M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1984. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 A former Indian Air Force chief of staff stated in the 70s that India was not taken seriously by other states. In his view, becoming a nuclear weapons state would rectify that and perhaps eventually lead to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, which he felt India deserves on all counts – T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India’s Challenge to Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, 6 pp. 1-11, Fall 1998. 28 See Erickson (note 20).


political incentives exist when national decision makers perceive nuclear weapon development as a way to divert domestic energies away from domestic problems, or as a way of economic gain29. A proliferation decision by a government is clearly a political act that depends on a complex balance of both incentives and disincentives and bureaucracies within the country30. For most countries whether they own civilian nuclear power programs or not, political issues surrounding their security would dominate the decision to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapon development. Their decision will also be affected by the degree to which the nuclear-weapon states are willing to apply security assurance or, conversely, diplomatic pressure. Their decision will also be strongly affected by the time and degree of illicit activity required to obtain nuclear weapons materials. The longer it takes to obtain the weapons material, and the more stringent the safeguards agreements are that have to be broken, the greater the challenges to these countries will be. This is where the technological advancement in proliferation resistance makes a difference. This is where the interactions between civilian and military program become most salient with regards to nuclear proliferation. Most countries owning nuclear power technology have drawn clear physical boundaries between military and civilian nuclear programs. Developing civilian nuclear capability does not bear direct relationship with nuclear weapon development. But civilian nuclear capability can provide a cover for clandestine weapon development work. As long as political ambition for nuclear ambition exists, driven by security concerns, a civilian nuclear power establishment provides necessary tools for nuclear proliferation. III. What has been done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with commercial development of nuclear energy? Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with the development and utilization of civilian nuclear technology was a major concern at the beginning of commercial atomic age. People involved with nuclear technology development were well aware of the devastating destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons which were confirmed at the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Since then, with the evolving changes in the international environment surrounding nuclear power development, U.S. efforts for nonproliferation have gone through five different stages31. These stages include: 1) “Nuclear Monopoly” (1945-1953); 2) “Atoms for Peace, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)” (1954-1974); 3) “Tighten export control and restrict plutonium economy” (1974-1991); 4) “Strengthen NPT” (1991-2001); and 5) the current post 9-11 era (2001-present) which is yet to be defined. The first stage is the period of “Nuclear Monopoly” which is characterized by U.S. efforts to promote international control over atomic energy32. Maintaining secrecy of the Manhattan project was crucial during World War II to prevent the enemy from acquiring any information about nuclear bomb making. World uranium resources were thoroughly controlled by the U.S. and its allies. After the war, the victorious powers agreed to establish a UN Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to bring nuclear energy 29 There may also be economic incentives for a country with an established civilian nuclear power industry to pursue proliferation. It could be to improve their economic situation by either selling the weapons or technology developed or by using the weapons or technology as a political bargaining chip to coerce economic aid from the U.S. or other countries. 30 See Feiveson (note 13). 31 Foran, V. I., A. Herpel, ; et al., “U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991,” The National Security Archive, 2003; Sanders, B., “A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 62, December 1998, Nuclear Energy Agency. 32 H. Muller, D. Fischer, and W. Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1994; W. C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Oelgerschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Inc., Cambridge, MA, 1982.


and the spread of nuclear weapons under international control. Through the new UNAEC in 1946, the US proposed a bold comprehensive effort, called Baruch Plan, to address the dilemma of how to utilize peaceful benefits of nuclear energy while avoiding the danger of nuclear proliferation33. The Plan called for destruction of all nuclear weapons, once such a control system had been established. However, the Soviet Union, which was secretly engaged in nuclear weapon development, was against the Plan. They asked for destruction of existing weapons first before the international control of nuclear materials. The two states’ approach could not come to an agreement. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act of the U.S. puts an effective end to all nuclear collaboration. The U.S. tried to maintain the monopoly over the nuclear information through secrecy even with its closest allies. This period ends with President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in December 1953. “Atoms for Peace” (AFP) was a movement made by the U.S. government after realizing that the use of nuclear technology could no longer be contained within the existing circle. There were emerging possibilities of nuclear export efforts by the USSR, French and British governments. The U.S. saw the need for taking a lead in the upcoming commercial race which was materialized through the Atoms for Peace Initiative (AFPI). Thus AFP was largely driven by U.S. commercial interest34. The original U.S. AFPI proposed assisting other nations to develop peaceful uses for nuclear technology in return for a pledge not to use the knowledge and materials to produce nuclear weapons. The AFPI’s assumption that any nation could be permitted to deploy a complete fuel cycle, however, remains very much controversial. In particular, the promise of the access to enrichment and reprocessing technology has been the source of contention. The AFP period is characterized by nearly unrestricted development of nuclear energy by other nations. Many nations joined the bandwagon to gain access to the “privileged” technology, although they were not economically or politically ready. There was an assumption that a nuclear weapons capability could not be obtained solely through a civilian nuclear power program. In his Atoms for Peace speech, President Eisenhower proposed that the governments principally involved in nuclear research and development make joint contributions to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Statute of the IAEA was approved in October 1954 and entered into force in July 1957. The IAEA began to safeguard nuclear operations in 1959 (on a very modest scale). Non-proliferation gradually gained interest with the concern over radioactive fallouts and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) passed in 1963 and the first nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was established in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in 1967. In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was finalized by the UN and went into effect on March 5, 1970. Within the NPT framework, countries were divided into two groups: the five states that had already tested nuclear weapons (the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China – so called Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)), and the rest of the world that had not yet deployed these weapons. The non-weapon states were given security guarantees against nuclear attack. NWS committed themselves into eventual nuclear disarmament. The period ends abruptly with India’s atomic explosion in May 1974. The third stage (“Tightening export control and restrict plutonium economy”) is characterized by the competition between export control policy and honoring the NPT promise for unrestricted access to civilian nuclear power technology. India’s explosion in 1974 reminded the world of the potential global spread of nuclear weapons. Up until 1974, the primary organization restricting international exports of

33 Ibid (see Potter): The Baruch Plan was based on internal government report directed by undersecretary of state Dean Acheson and TVA Chairman David Lilienthal, with the majority of the input coming from Robert Oppenheimer. Under the Baruch Plan, the ownership and control of all sensitive material/facilities by a so-called International Atomic Development Agency was called for. 34 T. E. Perry, “The Origins and Implementation of the 1992 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Agreement,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 2002.


nuclear technology was the NPT Exporters Committee (known as the Zangger Committee, named after its first chairman, established in 1971). The Committee had developed a so-called trigger list of sensitive exports. States receiving these technologies were to accept safeguards and periodic inspections of these technologies. Inspection of other related national nuclear facilities was not explicitly required. Alarmed by the Indian explosion and with the expected growth in nuclear facilities worldwide, reappraisal of the adequacy of export controls led to the establishment in 1975 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG, or London Club)35. A common set of voluntary standards for international nuclear transfers to non-nuclear weapon states was established in 1977 by the NSG36. “Restraint” in the export of sensitive technology such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants was put into practice as part of the standards. On April 16, 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established to limit the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction37. In 1976, the U.S. developed a new safeguards export policy that significantly changed the practice of the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. Serious discussions about the U.S. civilian nuclear fuel cycle were made during this period, from which a strategic decision not to pursue a closed nuclear fuel cycle and to abandon spent nuclear fuel reprocessing came. Following that decision, the U.S. government has since closed all research activities on fast breeders. The Carter Executive Order stated38 that the U.S. will not reprocess spent fuel nor export enrichment/reprocessing technology. Going beyond the order, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) was enacted in 197839. The Act was an end to nuclear trade with non-nuclear weapons state whose nuclear facilities were not subject to full-scope safeguards. The Act required U.S. permission for the reprocessing, enrichment or re-export of nuclear materials received from the U.S. This unilateral attempt has been unpopular abroad. France, U.K. and Germany nonetheless continued the commercial development of reprocessing technology. The U.S., at the same time, began a dialogue called the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) by engaging U.S. partners and developing nations on the technical aspects of nuclear proliferation40. A very extensive report was produced from this exercise41. However, the report failed to vindicate the Carter philosophy. Rather than delegitimizing plutonium recycling, the report provided some credibility to supporters of plutonium recycling by concluding that there was no single fuel cycle superior to all others with regard to its proliferation resistance. A companion U.S. effort called NASAP (Nonproliferation Alternatives System Assessment Program)42 concluded slightly differently as: (1) All nuclear fuel cycles entail some proliferation risk; there is no technical fix, (2) There are substantial differences in proliferation resistance among fuel cycles if they are deployed in non-nuclear-weapon states, (3) Technical and institutional proliferation resistance features can help, and (4) The vulnerability to threats by sub-national groups varies among fuel cycles. These

35 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Nonproliferation, Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes,” GAO-03-43, Report to Congressional Committees, October 2002: The NSG’s part 1 guidelines provide an annexed list of 89 items of nuclear materials and equipment (similar to the trigger list of Zangger Committee). NSG part 2 guidelines include 67 items consisting of exports of nuclear-related, dual-use equipment, materials, and related technology (e.g., machine tools, beryllium, lasers, laser amplifiers, oscillators, and flash x-ray equipment). 36 G. T. Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1994. 37 A. F. Wolf, “Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: A Listing of Events,” in Arms Control and Nonproliferation, L. T. Carter (ed.), Nova Science Publishers, Huntington, NY, 2000. 38 “Remarks by President Carter on Nuclear Power Policy,” April 7, 1977, reprinted in Nuclear Proliferation Factbook (1977), pp. 112-119. 39 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) - Public Law 95-242, US Statues, Vol. 92, p.120 (March 10, 1978). 40 See Muller, et al. (note 32). 41 Report from the Commission to the Council: International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Document COM (80) 316 Final (11 June 1980). 42 DOE, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program, United States Department of Energy, Washington DC (June 1980).


conclusions still remain valid. Discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in 1991 ended the third stage. The fourth stage is characterized by revising and strengthening NPT. It began with the reexamination of the export control regime, motivated by the Iraqi event. The 1990-91 Gulf War revealed a very extensive nuclear weapon program in Iraq, despite its being a member of NPT. The incident showed that the current NPT regime could not prevent the danger of proliferation through clandestine development. In 1992, the NSG established additional guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology. Subsequent efforts to better address the nonproliferation issue led to IAEA Director General Hans Blix’s request43: In order to detect clandestine activities three fundamental requirements must be met: (1) the IAEA must have the unequivocal right to inspect suspect locations at short notice; (2) member states must provide the IAEA with intelligence data so that it would know where to look; and (3) the IAEA must have the full backing of the Security Council to enforce its rights of inspection. These were implemented into a strengthened IAEA safeguards system by mid-1992. Shortly after, through the testing of the newly implemented system, North Korea’s nuclear ambition was disclosed. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and a Strengthened Safeguards program was fully approved. The Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/540) was approved in 1997. Provisions made in the Additional Protocol include: Information about, and inspector access to, fuel cycle-related research and development; information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies and inspector’s access to manufacturing and import locations; the collection of environmental samples beyond the declared locations when deemed necessary by the IAEA, and administrative arrangements that improve the process of designating inspectors; and the issuance of multi-entry visas and IAEA access to modern means of communications. Overall, NPT has assisted in developing a global political environment that prevents nuclear proliferation44. Although India, Israel, and Pakistan remain outside, states that signed the treaty have in principle not only placed all of their nuclear activities under international monitoring, but have also agreed to create a nonproliferation culture. There is a large popular antipathy toward nuclear weapons present in many states. During this period, extensive clandestine nuclear weapons development programs in Iran and North Korea were discovered, raising serious concern over the NPT’s effectiveness. The NPT relies on willing signers and voluntary compliance while current verification provisions are insufficient. Under the current NPT arrangements, countries can acquire the technology for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation without explicitly violating the treaty. Then they can leave the treaty without penalty. Cleary, IAEA has been very much limited in determining whether states are pursuing undeclared nuclear weapons program. IAEA is not entitled to have any enforcing power either. The Clinton administration’s statement in 1993 reaffirmed the U.S. policy on abstaining from commercial reprocessing. Pakistan tested and declared nuclear status in 1998 along with India’s serial testing. During this period, the Wassenaar Arrangement was established in July 1996 as a multilateral export control regime. The Wassenaar Agreement was to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (COCOM), which controlled exports to Soviet-bloc countries during the Cold War45. The Agreement’s main goal is “to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting

43 These requests were made at a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in July 1991. Nucleonics Week, 8 Aug. 1991, p.9; Nucleonics Week, 19 Sep. 1991, pp.12-13. 44 See Erickson (note 20). 45 See Wolf (note 37).


transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations.”46. The current fifth stage, post 9-11 era, is yet to be defined. International relations and security dynamics have become more complex, less predictable, and more decentralized than before. The nature and source of threat has become more diverse47. National interest is being defined more narrowly. After the Afghan and Iraqi war, countries which could potentially face the U.S. as an enemy state may seek nuclear weapons as a way of deterring military invasion by the U.S. The current Bush administration’s policy to support regime change (even through an unilateral war) against “rogue” states is considered a serious security threat to some states (e.g., North Korea). This provides further incentive for nuclear weapon development48. At the same time, efforts in futuristic nuclear power development are well underway. The Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group49, May 2001, recommends: 1) expansion of nuclear energy in the United States, 2) Development of advanced nuclear fuel cycles and next generation technologies, and 3) Development of advanced reprocessing and fuel treatment technologies. The third recommendation represents a request for a major shift in current U.S. policy on nuclear fuel cycle. Recent developments in Iran and North Korea raise a concern of making the fissile materials available to the nuclear black market or the hands of terrorist groups. With terrorism on the rise, and the evolution of dictatorial and unstable states like Pakistan and North Korea into nuclear powers, the threshold for first nuclear use may be on decline. The fact that Pakistan, India, and Israel50 possess nuclear weapons and they are outside the NPT regime leaves the world uneasy and undermines the world’s nonproliferation efforts51. The current international nonproliferation regime lacks clear guidance on what happens when a state violates its nonproliferation undertakings52. Taking punitive actions (e.g., sanctions or military action) against violators is increasingly difficult. The Iraq war by the U.S. and its allies has proven itself very costly. Under the current world political climate, with no clear shared vision, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the U.N. Security Council to take swift and effective action. The IAEA is an inspection agency with no enforcement powers and is rather technically focused and very under-funded. Given the current developments in North Korea and Iran, policy decisions in the next few years will shape the course of world nuclear proliferation in the future. The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative53 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 154054 are important steps toward international collaboration. The Proliferation Security Initiative, with eleven nations

46 M. Beck, C. Craft, S. Gahlaut, and S. Jones, “Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls,” Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, September 2002: The Wassenaar Agreeement is an informal agreement of 33 states thus each national government regulates its own exports. It has no list of target countries or restricted entities, although it does (since December 2001) target “terrorist groups and organizations, as well as individual terrorists.”. 47 See Scheinman (note 9). 48 This may be true with North Korea. 49 National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, Washington, DC, May 2001. 50 Israel has maintained a policy of opacity on nuclear weapons – Israel has never advertised or even admitted its nuclear status up to now even though the country developed nuclear weapons in the 1960s. 51 For example, terrorist organizations and radical fundamentalist groups are active and operating in Pakistan. 52 See Perkovich, et al. (note 16). 53 The Proliferation Security Initiative was announced by President Bush in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003 to undertake effective measures for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery system, and related materials. PSI core group includes Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, U.K., and U.S. 54United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540, Adopted at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004.


participating as core group (China and Russia are not in the core group), is a multinational effort to enhance and expand the efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery system, and related materials to and from countries of proliferation concern, following the Interdiction Principles55. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously on April 28, 2004, calls for all states to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation and adopt national legislative measures to that effect56. It also provides international authorization for seizure of illegal material transfers by making them subject to Chapter VII of the UN Charter which permits the Security Council to use sanctions or military force in response to international security threats57. Many parts of the world are currently covered by Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ), such as Treaties of Tlatelolco (Latin America), Rarotonga (South Pacific), Bangkok (Southeast Asia), and Pelindaba (Africa). At the same time, the most controversial hot spot areas in the world, i.e., Northeast Asia with Japan, South Korea and North Korea, the Middle East, and the old SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics), have not been included in any of the NWFZ. The current multilateral export control regimes are not prepared for future proliferation challenges58. In the absence of binding and consistent interpretations of the guidelines, countries can adjust their export policies to meet their economic or policy goals that may be in conflict with the intent of the multilateral export control regimes. Without high-level political support, the goal of export control can be easily defeated by the economic interests of companies backed by political leaders59. Because the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement work by consensus, effective implementation of any new resolutions for export control of nuclear and dual-use technologies and equipment is difficult60. IV. Is nuclear power expansion realistic? Civilian nuclear power technology development in the U.S. parallels the development of high technology and environmental awareness of the public. In the early days of the environmental awakening era in the U.S., environmental activists played a critical role. To them, nuclear energy was "a surrogate issue for more fundamental criticism of U.S. institutions"61. Nuclear technology was considered a symbol of commitment to growth, consumption, and high technology among the environmental activists in the 70s62. 55 Fact Sheet, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, January 11, 2005: The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP) was agreed among the founding PSI countries on September 4, 2003. The Principles include: adopting streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information, work to strengthen the relevant national legal authorities to accomplish the objectives and work to strengthen international law and frameworks, and not transport or assist in the transport of any cargoes of WMD. 56 See Perkovich, et al. (note 16). 57 Ibid: “To facilitate compliance with the laws criminalizing proliferation behavior, the Security Council or relevant specialized institutions such as the IAEA need to develop a declaration system that will help distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate trade across state borders.” 58 See Perkovich, et al. (note 16): The regimes emerged out of a network of a small number of like-minded countries where informal consultative arrangements worked. Now the outgrown regime membership is very diverse with different security outlooks and interests. The growth was not supported by corresponding development in formality and institutionalization of the regime. 59 See Beck, et al. (note 46). 60 Member states lack transparency in their export control systems and decision making and are inefficient at information sharing. Members are failing to deal effectively with increased dual-use trade and technology transfers. The systems are hampered by the voluntary nature and lack of enforcement and penalization measures. Current system only calls for states to share decisions to deny export requests between member states. 61 S. Rothman and S. R. Lichter, “Elite Ideology and Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy,” American Political Science Review, 81, 81, 1987 62 R. E. Kasperson, G. Berk, D. Pijawka, A. B. Sharaf, J. Wood, “Public Opposition to Nuclear Energy: Retrospect and Prospect,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, 5, 31, 11-23, 1980.


A network of environmental groups provided the leadership to anti-nuclear organizations at state and local levels. Concerns on the safety of reactor operation, nuclear waste disposal, and possible diversion of nuclear material capable of use in weapons manufacture, sometimes in the form of horror stories, were the more visible counts in these opposition movements involving the public. Exploiting the wave of distrust in institutions which had been heightened by the Vietnam war and Watergate tragedies along with the timely occurrence of the Three Mile Island accident, the anti-nuclear movement was extremely successful. Lately, with emergence of global warming issue and nuclear power’s contribution to abate greenhouse gas emissions, the anti-nuclear sentiment has become lessened. More recent surveys of public attitude toward nuclear power show the turnaround trend for nuclear energy. The 2003 NEI study63 showed that 7 out of 10 Americans believe nuclear energy should play a role in our energy future. And 57 percent would find it acceptable to add a new reactor next to the nearest existing nuclear power plant if a new source of electricity supply were needed. Support for new nuclear plants jumped 18 percentage points to 58 percent in the Northeast and 11 percentage points in the Midwest, where 66 percent said it would be acceptable to build a new reactor at the site of the nearest nuclear plant. This increase in support may be related to the blackout in the Northeast and Midwest during the month of August in 2003. The energy crisis in California during 2001 might also have contributed to this swing. More recently, high oil and gasoline prices and their effect on the economy may have also had a impact on American attitudes toward nuclear power. These recent developments work in favor of the nuclear power industry, providing support for futuristic development. The nuclear industry has reached a critical turning point with the passage of site approval of the Yucca Mountain repository along with the renewed interest in nuclear energy in the country. Many of the current members of the public have never experienced the anti-nuclear movements nor the nuclear risks personally. This is an opportune time for the nuclear industry to gain trust and credibility from the public. Gaining trust and credibility requires repetitive demonstrations of a transparent corporate behavior respecting the views of vulnerable parties and empathizing with the interests of the public64. They need to maintain consistent levels of successful operational performance. Recent performance of the nuclear power plant fleet in the U.S. tops near-record level 90% capacity factor. Many of the U.S. utilities are vying for life-time extension through re-licensing and purchasing old units. So far the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has renewed the licenses for 23 reactors nationwide. Following these trends, the U.S. Department of Energy has started several initiatives such as Generation IV reactor development and Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiatives (AFCI). Generation IV represents truly advanced systems and its design goals include not only safety/reliability enhancement but also minimum waste impact, proliferation resistance and physical protection, and economics. Generation IV is an international undertaking with potentially multiple deployment scenarios and locations. Eight other countries (including U.K., Switzerland, South Korea, South Africa, Japan, France, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina) are collaborating under the Generation IV International Forum. AFCI represents the government’s recognition of nuclear waste problems. Given the expected difficulty in securing high-level radioactive disposal capacity, the U.S. DOE is investigating, under AFCI, the possibility of nuclear waste recycling and transmutation to minimize the impact on waste disposal. Another activity of significance that affects the future of development of nuclear power is the “Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative”. Hydrogen offers significant promises as a future energy technology, in particular in the transportation sector. A large scale use of hydrogen in the U.S. transportation sector will significantly

63 “Public Support for Building Nuclear Power Plants Increases Following August Electricity Blackouts,” Perspective on Public Opinion, NEI, November 2003. 64 La Porte, T. R. and D. S. Metlay, “Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit of Trust,” Public Administration Review, 56, 4, 341-347, 1996.


reduce dependence on foreign oil import, thus improving energy security65. But, hydrogen as an energy source is not naturally available and has to be manufactured by breaking up molecules such as water, methane, or sugar. Currently a commercial large-scale method of hydrogen production involves the conversion of methane into hydrogen through a steam reforming process. This process is efficient but has the environmental drawback of producing large quantities of carbon dioxide as a by-product. Nuclear energy has the potential to play a major role in this. Nuclear heat supplied through an intermediate heat exchanger to a hydrogen-producing thermochemical plant promises high efficiency and avoids the use of carbon-based fuels. The goal of the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative is to demonstrate the commercial-scale, economically feasible production of hydrogen using advanced high-temperature nuclear reactors by the year 2017. These activities have provided a boost for the morale of the nuclear professionals. There is a high hope for a larger contribution of nuclear power in the future in the U.S. and in the world. In terms of domestic development in the future, several issues are at stake and will affect the course of future development. First of all, U.S. electricity generation is so much market driven and the federal government has such a weak impact on influencing the domestic energy mix picture. If the generating cost of nuclear power remains competitive as projected for a while, revival of nuclear energy in the U.S. is very much likely. The longer- term commercial deployment of new advanced nuclear reactors will primarily depend on the cost reduction provided by the new designs. Current U.S. policy on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle does not allow reprocessing and related fast reactor applications since the 1976 Carter executive order66. According to the projections made in a recent fuel cycle economics study67, there is no viable economy around the use of plutonium in the U.S. For the nuclear option to be a source of energy for sustainable development, breeder reactors need to be a part of the fuel cycle. With lack of government leadership and public support, commercial development in the U.S. of fast reactors and related commercial plutonium market or related closed fuel cycle development is unlikely in a near future. That may force the technology to remain with an open (once-though) nuclear fuel cycle for a while. For domestic expansion of nuclear power to become a reality, the nuclear power industry needs to resolve the spent fuel disposition challenge. If the nuclear fuel cycle remains open/once-through in the U.S., the issue of long-term uranium supply should also be examined. Current abundance in uranium supply and its low price68 is due to optimistic demand growth projection and availability of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from weapons stockpiles. Based on the Reasonably Assured Resources in the Redbook69, it can be predicted that world resources would last only about 35 years at the current consumption rate of 64,000 tonnes of natural uranium per year. However, as discovery of new resources continues along with improvements in mining technology, the cost of previously high-cost deposits is being lowered. By including less well-proven, speculative and higher cost resources (<130 $ /kgU), the current uranium resources base increases to 11 million tonnes70.

65 Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Energy, March 2003. 66 Clinton administration reaffirmed this commitment in 1993. The administration Fact Sheet states that “the U.S. does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes.” The U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is still nominally guided by this statement. 67 M. Bunn, S. Fetter, J. P. Holdren, and B. van der Zwaan, “The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 2003. 68 The spot price of uranium has considerably decreased since the end of the 1970s. In 1992, uranium cost about US$18 per kilogram (US$8 per pound) of U3O8; in 1979, the spot price was over US$88 per kilogram (US$40 per pound) of U3O8. 69 “Uranium Resources, Production and Demand,” the OECD NEA and the IAEA, 1999. 70 Ibid.


If the inventories of depleted uranium stored at enrichment plants are included in the estimate, the uranium resources base further increases. The 1.2 million tones of uranium currently stored at enrichment plants could supplant a few hundred thousand tones of natural uranium if demand required71. Presence of uranium in sea water also presents a well-quantifiable amount of uranium resource (~4 billion tones). Although the recovery of uranium from seawater is highly speculative, it provides the resource that can be tapped into if the recovery cost becomes realistic72. Given these observations, uranium supply may not be a limiting factor for the future of nuclear industry even if the nuclear fuel cycle remains once-through. Demands for nuclear power appear to be increasing as interests from the developing countries grow. Many of the developing countries don’t have an appropriate infrastructure for energy production to support the desired industrial development. They may not also have access to abundant natural resources for energy production. The International Atomic Energy Agency forecasts that electricity demands outside the U.S. will grow at an annual rate of less than three percent through 201573. By 2020, worldwide growth in electricity demand will be highest in the developing world, particularly among the expanding economics of Asia74. Worldwide electric capacity additions are projected to approach 3,503 gigawatts electric (GWe) from about 1500 GWe at present. Various projections indicate global electricity consumption growth to reach between 4000 and 6500 GWe by 205075. The choice of resources for some of this new capacity is limited. Differing estimates are available as to how much of this electricity demand would be provide by nuclear power. For example, six different scenarios are available from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy Council with the projected increase in nuclear electricity generation ranging from 10 to 485% by 2050. These estimates depend upon differing assumptions about economic growth and other electricity sources. Availability, maturity, and cost of alternative renewable technologies76, such as solar and wind power77,

71 Generation-IV Roadmap, Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, March 18, 2001 (http://www.ne.goe.gov/reports/GeNIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf). 72 See Note 71: The sea water uranium provides an upper limit on the cost of uranium for futuristic fuel cycle analysis. Estimates of recovery costs have been in the neighborhood of $200/kgU to $1000/kgU. At these high uranium prices, economics of spent fuel recycling could become reasonable with the increasing value of plutonium to secure further supply of nuclear fuels and leading into sustainable development. As fuel cycle contributes only about 20% to the overall cost of electricity with nuclear option, wide range of fuel cycle approaches could be explored with relatively weak influence on economics to minimize uranium consumption. This view would be different in Europe (U.K., Germany, France), Canada, or Asia (China, Japan) where spent fuel recycling is currently practiced and the value of plutonium would be higher (especially in France). Nuclear industry is primarily a government enterprise in these countries. Long-term energy policy, rather than market, controls the future direction of nuclear program in these countries. 73 G. Marcus, “Considering the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants,” Progress in Nuclear Energy, 37, 1-4, 5-10, 2000. 74 Two-thirds of any forecasted increase is projected to be in the developing world: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy Council, “Global Energy Perspectives,” Vienna, 1998. 75 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy Council, “Global Energy Perspectives,” Vienna, 1998; Electric Power Research Institute, “Electricity Technology Roadmap: Powering Progress,” Palo Alto, CA, 1999. 76 Based on the World Nuclear Association (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.htm accessed on October 9, 2004) estimation, US electricity generation cost (fuel, maintenance and capital cost combined) would be 3.73 c/kWh for nuclear, 3.27 c/kWh for coal and 5.87 c/kWh for gas on the basis of 2001 dollar, assuming that capital costs in USA are 55% of total for nuclear, 45% of total for coal and 16% of total for gas. The most recent OECD comparative study [OECD/ IEA NEA 1998, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity] shows that at a 5% discount rate, in 7 of 13 countries considering nuclear energy, it would be the preferred choice for new base-load capacity commissioned by 2010. At a 10% discount rate the advantage over coal would be maintained in only France, Russia and China. A new report from the University of Chicago [University of Chicago, August 2004, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power], funded by the US Department of Energy, compares the levelised power costs of future


are an importance factor in this regard. Competing options for electricity generation that could become more attractive in the future include clean coal technology, wind power, and photovoltaic power78. Coal is abundant and still reasonably cheap – although there is a sign of coal price increase79. Coal is expected to remain a major player for a while. The primary challenge facing renewables is relatively high unit costs. Significant progress of cost reduction and technology improvement have been made over the last three decades, especially with wind turbines. Much progress is expected, to the extent that renewables could become major contributors to the U.S. and global energy needs over the next several decades. The Shell International, for example, projects80 that by 2020 renewable energy sources supply a fifth of electricity in many OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) markets and nearly a tenth of global primary energy. However, electric utilities in OECD countries have indicated that up to 10 to 15% of electricity generation from dispersed, intermittent sources could be managed easily, but generation beyond that share could affect system reliability (e.g. Denmark experience)81. For renewable sources to play a major role in electricity generation, they should become capable of covering base-load demand. For renewable sources to be a base-load option, they require a reliable and cost-effective backup or energy storage facility without unduly increasing environmental emissions. Whether the renewable sources such as wind power would replace a significant portion of current generating capacity is yet to be seen. Depending upon what type of option is used for backup82, renewables and nuclear power can be competitive or complementary to each other. Having nuclear power can provide an immediate boost for the needed infrastructure development. This is evidenced in the examples of energy resource deficient countries such as France, Japan, and South Korea. For the last three decades, uranium supply has been abundant. To many countries, nuclear energy appears a guarantee of energy independence. Nuclear power provides a good alternative to diversify their energy mix, especially to reduce greenhouse gas emission under the Kyoto Protocol. Nuclear power also comes with a side benefit of improving self-esteem with nuclear scientific and technological development. To support the development of nuclear power capability, a mature legal and regulatory system is needed backed by financial commitment. Given this reality, not many countries in the developing world would opt to pursue nuclear technology at least in the near term. Several countries in the developed world (e.g., Netherlands, Norway, Australia) could start a new civilian power program if the necessary political support is provided. Several large developing countries that are well below the industrialized country HDI nuclear, coal, and gas-fired power generation in the USA. Various nuclear options are covered, and for ABWR or AP1000 they range from 4.3 to 5.0 c/kWh on the basis of overnight capital costs of $1200 to $1500/kW, 60 year plant life, 5 year construction and 90% capacity. Coal gives 3.5 - 4.1 c/kWh and gas (CCGT) 3.5 - 4.5 c/kWh, depending greatly on fuel price. 77 “The Cost of Generating Electricity,” The Royal Academy of Engineering, London, UK, March 2004; The study looked at electricity generation costs from new plant in the UK, using "a robust approach to compare directly the costs of intermittent generation with more dependable sources of generation". Accordingly the cost of standby capacity for wind, as well as carbon values up to £30 per tonne CO2 (£110/tC) were added for coal and gas. Wind power was shown to be more than twice as expensive as nuclear power. Without the carbon increment, coal, nuclear and gas CCGT ranged 2.2-2.6 p/kWh and coal gasification IGCC was 3.2 p/kWh - all base-load plant. Adding the carbon value (up to 2.5 p) took coal close to onshore wind (with back-up) at 5.4 p/kWh - offshore wind is 7.2 p/kWh, while nuclear remained at 2.3 p/kWh. Nuclear figures were based on a conservative £1150/kW (US$ 2100/kW) plant cost (include. decommissioning). 78 The price of natural gas has been volatile and is expected to result in lower demand for its use. 79 “Trends in U.S. Domestic Coal Markets Are Higher Prices and Higher Price Volatility Here to Stay?,” PINCOCK Perspectives, Issue No. 58, September 2004.. 80 “Energy Needs, Choices, and Possibilities, Scenario to 2050,” Global Business Environment, Shell International Limited, London, UK, 2001. 81 Renewable Energy: Market and Policy Trend in IEA Countries, OECD/IEA, 2004. 82 Competitive if renewables are used as base-load with gas turbines/combined cycle/hydro as backup or electric storage; Complementary if renewables provide base-load capacity with nuclear as backup.


(human development index) and aspire to advance by rapid economic growth (such as China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia) may engage in an aggressive nuclear development83. Most of these countries currently own civilian nuclear power technology (except Indonesia). Several of the large advanced developing countries (such as Mexico, Brazil, and Iran, that already own civilian nuclear technology) are expected to engage with nuclear capacity expansion. Several of the developing eastern European countries, such as Ukraine, Slovenia, and Kazakhstan, are strongly interested in nuclear development: Some of them (e.g., Ukraine and Kazakhstan) own the technology as an inheritance from the USSR era. Other developing countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Venezuela, may be interested in the nuclear option as economic and political progress is made in the country84. Many large developing countries, with particular concentration in Africa, are not likely to be candidates for nuclear power for some time due to limitations in financial and technology resources. According the scenarios in a MIT study85, there would be 28 to 32 countries in 2050, with a total of 115-224 GWe of nuclear capacity, which today do not have any commercial nuclear reactors. Of these, 17 (94-181 GWe) would be in developing countries. Whether these scenarios will be realized or not is highly dependent on political development and the level of trust toward the government in each respective country. Turkey and Philippines were pursuing civilian nuclear technology but both countries’ efforts are on hold at the moment. In Turkey, issues such as earthquake risk at the proposed site, proliferation concerns, and high cost led to the cancellation of the Akkuyu project in 2000 after 8 years of extensive effort86. In Philippines, the effort to build civilian nuclear power plant began in 1971. However, concerns over safety, economic viability, and corruption charges against the contractors and suppliers of the plant’s equipments and against the Marcos Administration led to public opposition and Aquino Administration’s decision to decommission the nuclear power plant. In 1997, the Philippine Government decided to convert the completed Bataan nuclear power plant into a combined gas cycle plant. The potential for world expansion of nuclear power exists. But more immediate expansion of nuclear power is likely to continue among the current owners of nuclear technology. China, India, South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina are likely to be in this category. In this case, nuclear proliferation concern mainly lies within the current circle of civilian nuclear power owners. If the time horizon is 30-40 years or so from now, perhaps many developing countries could be very interested in large-scale nuclear power as their economies expand and the demand for increased energy supply continues. But the challenges and difficulties in establishing a civilian nuclear power program in a developing world should not be overlooked. V. How do the recent developments in the civilian nuclear power industry affect world nuclear nonproliferation? One of the notable changes surrounding the nuclear power industry is appearance of multinational business corporations. In 1970s, world’s commercial nuclear system vendors represented each respective country, including U.S. corporations such as Westinghouse, General Electric (GE), Babcox and Wilcox (B&W), and Combustion Engineering. Other countries such as U.K., France, and West Germany each had a government owned or controlled company, i.e., BNFL (UK), Framatome (France), and Siemens/KWU (West Germany). Today, the list is quite different. Of the vendors operating in the U.S., B&W is owned by Framatome (France), and Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering are owned by BNFL (UK). The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is a product of a cooperative venture

83 The Future of Nuclear Power, An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 2003 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Recently, Turkey is seriously reconsidering a civilian nuclear power option.


between Japan’s Toshiba and Hitachi and GE Nuclear Energy from the U.S. More recently, Framatome and Siemens have joined their nuclear businesses under a new company name, AREVA. In the future, Russia, China, Japan and likely South Korea will join the competition in the market. The deregulation of the utility sectors in the U.S. and in other parts of the world has resulted in numerous acquisitions and joint ventures involving international collaborations87. With liberalized markets, and with weak government control in the U.S., commercial interest is an ever-stronger driver behind current nuclear power development. Along with domestic expansion, there is a strong desire to expand the market into the new developing world. U.S. policy over nuclear development is likely to have less and less impact on world business practices. Unless there is a real economic incentive, proliferation resistance is not likely to have a major role in the future development of nuclear power. Progress has been made by the nuclear industry in developing more proliferation resistant technologies. Major examples of these recent developments88 include 1) the modular, long-lived “nuclear-battery” reactors (which removes the need for refueling), 2) employment of UREX89 or pyroprocessing for the separation and subsequent destruction of plutonium, 3) use of inert matrix fuel (IMF) which features negligible or no net production of plutonium, 4) use of a fuel form with extremely high chemical barrier characteristic (thus making it very difficult to extract fissile material from spent fuel), 5) use of thorium-based fuels with uranium denaturing (any newly bred U-233 is denatured/contaminated with U-238). Our main question regarding these developments is “Do these new developments make a drastic difference in preventing potential proliferation attempts?”. The modular, long-lived “nuclear-battery” reactor90 is designed in such a way that there is no need to open the reactor system during its lifetime, eliminating all “in-country” fuel handling and storage operations. Fresh and spent-fuel handling is limited to the actual installation and replacement of the entire reactor unit, presumably under strict international control91. The scale of skills, expertise and knowledge that can be obtained from the purchase and operation of the reactor is much more limiting than those expected from the purchase of more conventional nuclear plants. The nuclear battery reactor requires the transportation of the entire fresh core with about 20% enriched fuel in it. This implies that there is enough fissile material for weapon making if the core is stolen or diverted. Due to the fact this is a new system for which little accumulated experience is available, unexpected need for maintenance cannot be precluded92. This may mean that there could be a need to access the reactor system during operation (although not requiring fuel handling).

87 “Beginning a new era in nuclear regulation,” Remarks of Richard Meserve, Chairman of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission at the 2000 American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, June 5, 2000, San Diego, California. 88 See TOPS (note 1): Proliferation resistance is defined as those technical characteristics of a nuclear energy system that impede the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse of technology, by States (or non-state) actors, in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 89 UREX stands for uranium extraction. 90 The encapsulated nuclear heat source reactor proposed by UC Berkeley, entitled STAR (small, transportable, autonomous reactor) is a major example. This reactor concept is being developed under US DOE support by a collaboration between Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and UC Berkeley. 91 J.A. Hassberger, Application of Proliferation Resistance Barriers to Various Existing and Proposed Nuclear Fuel Cycles, UCRL-ID-147001. October 2001. 92 According to NRC experience, the most expensive systems to repair are the ones that were not intended to be replaced: E. Lyman, “The Limits of Technical Fixes,” Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2002.


The UREX process was developed for actinide separation in response to the concern over high purity plutonium production with PUREX93. In this process, the plutonium is not separated into a pure stream but always contains some neptunium, and the process could be configured such that this stream might include other higher actinides as well. Separation of uranium for disposal and transmutation94 of actinides are the main purpose of this approach to reduce the environmental impact and repository capacity needs. Presence of neptunium provides a stream signature from a daughter product of neptunium that can be used to increase real-time detection capability95. However, neptunium is still a weapon-usable material. Pyroprocessing refers to a spent fuel reprocessing based on high temperature-based melting, e.g, molten-salt based electrochemical technology. In this process, spent fuel gets dissolved in a molten salt bath with an electric current passing through it. The spent fuel constituents, i.e., uranium, plutonium and fission products, are removed from the salt through deposition on different cathodes. The plutonium removed from the salt in this manner contains some uranium, other transuranic elements and some fission product contamination. The product would not be desirable for a terrorist seeking fissile material for a bomb. It would be hard to have access to the material due to the presence of high radiation levels. But, it is in principle possible to alter the pyroprocessing technology to produce pure plutonium. It is harder to accurately measure and keep track of the fissile materials in the process. IMF is a non-fertile fuel, or fuel with no U-238 thus is incapable of producing plutonium. Diluents such as zirconium oxide or magnesium oxide make up the fuel volume instead. The approach is effective in burning plutonium in a reactor. But use of IMF requires the loading of plutonium into a non-fertile fuel rod, making the plutonium available to the user96. Use of fuel forms with very high chemical barrier characteristics has been implemented to an HTGR (High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor) whether it is PBR (Pebble Bed Reactor) design or prismatic reactor design. This approach features high proliferation resistance due to the difficulty in chemical processing required for the carbide forms, the mechanical processing, and to the dilute nature of both fresh and spent fuel, and the fact that there is no commercially demonstrated technology to date for processing the fuel97. But, in both prismatic HTGR and PBR, if the chemical barrier can be overcome, an entire core of fresh fuel, although relatively dilute in uranium, contains some 10 critical masses of U-235. In the case of PBR, the reactor features a continuous on line refueling. The individual fuel pebbles move through the reactor relatively quickly, making many passes through the reactor before being fully spent, and remain in the reactor for about 60 days. If the transit system is modified, weapon-useable materials can be obtained without accessing the core. Due to low content of plutonium, about 200,000 pebbles need to be diverted to obtain a critical mass98. Use of thorium-based fuels with denaturing of uranium, so-called the Radkowski Thorium Fuel (RTF), features a LWR (Light Water Reactor) using a heterogeneous thorium seed-blanket core99. The thorium-

93 PUREX stands for plutonium and uranium extraction. 94 Transmutation is defined as a nuclear reaction process to convert one element into another. As applied to nuclear waste, transmutation involves irradiation of wastes by neutrons to convert long-lived radionuclides into a stable or short-lived nuclide. Thus the process aids natural decay by effectively shortening half-lives. 95 “An Evaluation of the Proliferation Resistant Characteristics of Light Water Reactor Fuel with the Potential for Recycle in the United States,” Complied by A. Waltar and R. P. Omberg, Blue Ribbon Panel Final Report to the Advanced Nuclear Transformation Technology sub-committee of Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC), November 2004. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid 98 H. Feiveson, The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power, Position Statement from Federation of Atomic Scientists. 99 Ibid.


based fuel could be retrofitted into existing light water reactors. By reducing the quantities of U-238 (the fertile material that breeds plutonium) in the core, it breeds significantly less plutonium than current uranium fuel cycles100. As the fuel is burned, the thorium is converted to U-233 but is contaminated/ denatured with U-238101. The fuel mix is designed to ensure that the concentration of the mixture of U-233 and U-235 remains below the “HEU” limit (nominally 20% U235 equivalent). The higher burn-ups degrade the isotopics of plutonium in the spent fuel and reduce the overall actinides inventories. The reactor would generate about 1/5 the plutonium generated in today’s light water reactors per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced. Also the decay heat emission is much higher due to the larger concentration of Pu-238, presenting a higher radiation barrier. But, because thorium is not a fissile material, the initial enrichment of uranium must be increased, requiring the fresh uranium component of the fuel to be enriched to nearly 20%. The denatured material and reduced Pu-239 contents cannot preclude the use of the plutonium for weapons. Use of breeder reactors without separating plutonium from other actinides has also been considered. The approach reduces the proliferation vulnerability by reducing the effectiveness of the fissile materials. However, many of the minor actinides themselves are weapon-usable102. It has been noted103 that making nuclear weapons out of an increasing number of fissile isotopic compositions is possible as nuclear weapon design and engineering expertise combined with sufficient technical capability become more common. These observations imply that the latest technologies provide enhancement in proliferation resistance but cannot prevent a determined proliferator from acquiring fissile materials. The next question deserving deliberations is, “Is the proliferation resistance of new technological developments robust enough to reduce existing safeguards and security requirements with confidence?” One of the key desirable qualities for effective safeguards is timely and accurate warning, i.e., the ability to detect diversions with accuracy and sufficiently early before the diverter has acquired substantial quantities104. Do these new technologies allow this timely and accurate warning? In principle, the nuclear-battery reactor eliminates the need for “in-country” fuel handling and storage operation, except for fresh and spent-fuel handling during the actual installation and replacement of the entire reactor unit. As long as the installation and replacement of reactor unit and any necessary fuel handling is conducted under strict international control, the system features an excellent safeguardability. The UREX process when it is combined with smaller material balance zone facilitating near real-time material accounting can significantly enhance safeguards effectiveness. Pyroprocessing can be employed on-site with a nuclear reactor, thus largely eliminating the need for spent fuel transportation. But since it is hard to accurately measure and keep track of the fissile materials in the process, the system may not enhance safeguardability. The IMF design involves the existence of pure plutonium stream which implies that safeguardability is not much different from existing systems (i.e., PUREX reprocessing). The thorium-based fuel may reduce the need for on-site dry storage of spent fuel but is not expected to enhance safeguardability. The Prismatic-HTGR features a higher level of remote fuel handling which improves safeguards capability. Also the fact that nearly the entire core must be diverted to obtain roughly a critical mass of plutonium with the prismatic HTGR helps safeguards effort. Use of a pebble-bed HTGR involves continuous refueling with low detectability for spent fuel pebbles with the small

100 See Hassberger (note 91). 101 Ibid. 102 “Summary of the Workshop on Proliferation –Resistant Nuclear Power Systems,” UCRL-JC-137954, p. 14, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, June 2-4, 1999. 103 E. Lyman, “The Limits of Technical Fixes,” Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2002. 104 See Hassberger, et al. (note 17).


pebble size. Thus, monitoring the diversion attempt seems difficult. However, since proliferation requires a large number of pebbles to be diverted, the diversion attempt will require a very high rate of new fuel supply. This would provide a warning signal. In particular, if this diversion takes place early in a cycle to have the right plutonium content, an early warning signal could be available. Some of these new technologies are likely to allow the reduction in existing safeguards and security requirements. By providing enhanced deterrence and better opportunity for the international community to intervene, new technological developments would make any diversion attempts more difficult to pursue, both technically and politically105. Thus, proliferation resistance slows down the process of latent proliferation106. Technology does affect a potential proliferator’s balance of incentives and disincentives107. VI. What should be done for world nuclear power expansion not to result in further increase in proliferation risk? The U.S. is arguably the most motivated actor on the international scene with respect to opposing proliferation. Russia, China, and other U.S. allies may see proliferation as more of a threat to the U.S. than to themselves, as the U.S. is more of a likely target of future attack. However, it would be a mistake for other nations to consider that nonproliferation is not worthy of their commitment. There is the distinct danger of collateral damage for any global neighbors from the effects of weapons use as radioactive fallout will not stop at state borders. Refugee flows can themselves impose huge burdens on neighboring states. In the event of a successful nuclear attack made on the soil of the U.S., the pressure on the government to make a vengeful response would be very great. If the sponsor of the attack is identified, U.S. retaliation might inflict millions of casualties. If the attacker is not identified, known enemies believed to have nuclear capabilities or to have sponsored other acts of anti-U.S. terrorism might be the target of massive attack in order to deter further attacks. In that event, the possession of nuclear weapons might prove to be a fatal liability for sponsors of terrorism. Possibility of a prolonged global economic depression is another collateral consequence of nuclear terrorism. If, for instance, a terrorist group procured an atomic bomb and detonated it from within a shipping container in a U.S. port city, the result, apart from the horrendous human and economic immediate damage, would almost certainly be the complete suspension of international trade by the U.S. for an indefinite period. With the globalization of the world economy, the economic consequences would be incalculable and felt all over the world. For expansion of nuclear power to occur, there has to be better world nuclear nonproliferation regimes that strengthen and fortify the wall between civilian and military applications. Any future expansion of nuclear power should not result in increased proliferation risk. The immediate expansion of nuclear capacity is expected to occur within the current owners of civilian nuclear power. The likely new owner states, through the expansion of nuclear power to the developing world, are not expected to be involved with major regional security conflicts108. Most of these new owner states would find it difficult to justify the investment in nuclear weapons unless their national and regional security deteriorates significantly. With an effective nonproliferation regime already in place, managing the addition of new owners is not expected to be a major challenge to world nuclear nonproliferation. 105 See Feiveson (note 13). 106 Ibid: Latent proliferation is the movement of a country through development of its commercial nuclear power program toward the possession of nuclear weapons, without an explicit or visible decision actually to obtain the weapons. 107 Ibid: A country may not decide to acquire nuclear weapons if the costs, hazards, and uncertainties of success were sufficiently high. 108 They are mostly in southeastern Asia, northern Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe. These regions are not hot spots, although the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the regions cannot be precluded.


In this regard, the world’s nonproliferation efforts should be focused on those countries with existing latent capability. Effectively enforcing safeguards requirements to the existing civilian nuclear power states is essential in this regard. At the same time, every effort must be made to ensure that any new export be equipped with appropriate proliferation resistance and be carefully monitored. Given the rising role of commercial interests among the nuclear system vendors, with less constraints exerted on them by becoming multinational corporations, controlling and monitoring the export behavior of nuclear vendors is important. Currently there is no incentive for improving or enhancing proliferation resistance from a selling company’s perspectives. The company will normally be competing against companies from other nations that may not have an equal standard of proliferation resistance109. The developing nations most likely to be considered proliferation risks by the global community are not likely to be willing to pay more for a nuclear plant design with improved proliferation resistance. The incentive to promote improved proliferation resistance must be generated by the governments of the exporting nations because they have the most concern about the issue110. One possibility to explore in this regard is to develop a safeguards fee system111 for IAEA. The fee system would be based on the safeguards requirements of the importing system which would be determined based on the design features of the exporting reactor system. The fee must be incorporated into life-cycle cost analysis and be paid by the importing countries to IAEA112. Practical implementation of the system requires a quantifiable metric to represent proliferation resistance of a system with a supporting international consensus113. The U.S. DOE has undertaken an effort called the “PRPP (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection) project”114 to develop the needed “metric” with supporting consensus. To be effective, the fee system should include all existing nuclear technology owner states under NPT. IAEA’s policing capability must be strengthened. The IAEA’s budget was frozen for about fifteen years while the inspection burden increased greatly. The amount of material under safeguards increased by 57% between 1992 and 1998 alone; the IAEA’s FY04 budget for verification was $100 million which could be compared unfavorably to the $174 million as the City of Denver police department budget for the same period. With the current funding structure of IAEA, it is difficult to expect major improvements in their inspection efforts. The IAEA needs substantially increased funding if it is to play its role effectively. The safeguards fee system mentioned above can be an alternative to resolve this issue. The IAEA should focus 109 Ibid. 110 See TOPS (note 1). 111 See Erickson (note 20). 112 The higher the proliferation resistance of the sold nuclear system, the lower the safeguards fee would be to be paid to IAEA. 113 “How to define acceptable proliferation resistance” is a major related issue in this discussion. One of the metrics used to define proliferation resistance is the “spent fuel standard” as suggested by the 1994 National Academy of Science (NAS) study [National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994]. It is used to indicate the degree of inaccessibility of plutonium for weapons use in civilian spent fuel. Although the NAS study did not endorse the spent fuel standard as acceptable, the study mentions that if the spent fuel standard is accepted, then the approaches that would leave the plutonium in a form substantially more accessible for recovery and use in weapons than plutonium in commercial spent fuel can be rejected. Even if the spent fuel standard were to be accepted, a remaining question is how to compare the proliferation resistance of a new technology to that of the standard. This effort still requires a metric that can be quantified. Currently several methods have been proposed to quantify proliferation resistance including pathway-dependent PRA-based vulnerability assessment, multi-attribute utility analysis, fuzzy-logic based barrier quantification methods, etc. There is no consensus on the use of these methods to date. 114 J. Roglans, R. Bari, and P. Peterson, “Development of an Assessment Methodology for Proliferation Resistance of Generation IV Systems,” International Workshop on Methodologies for quantitative assessment of nuclear fuel cycle technological proliferation resistance, Obninsk, Russia, June 3-5, 2003.


its policing activities on states that present the most risk, and using fewer resources inspecting low-risk installations. In this regard, developing a country specific proliferation vulnerability index that captures the maturity of nonproliferation culture115 could be considered to assist allocation of IAEA budget and distribution of safeguards effort. Along with these, Additional Protocol to the existing safeguards agreement should be mandatory for all states116. The idea of establishing a system for international control of sensitive materials has been suggested by many scholars. Some believe117 that the Baruch Plan (Acheson-Lilienthal plan, i.e., international control of nuclear power and fissile material) still offers a framework for a peaceful nuclear future. Developing world consensus on finding a trustworthy guard will be a major challenge in this case. One alternative might be empowering IAEA beyond its current status. This will still be very much controversial as the scope goes beyond civilian nuclear power programs. Examination of current world use of nuclear energy indicates that there are only a few countries with a full fuel cycle capability. Most of the countries using nuclear energy are taking advantage of the fuel cycle capabilities of a few countries that are mostly nuclear weapons states118. This indicates that marketing the entire fuel cycle to potential nuclear buyers is not necessary. This was also made clear in President Bush’s speech on February 11 , 2004119. In this regard, internationalization of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle as proposed by the Director General of IAEA deserves further thoughts. The Director General of the IAEA has indicated that “sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle – the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste – would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control.”120. Under this, all uranium enrichment should be done in facilities under international control monitored by agencies such as the IAEA or the UN, with national governments working jointly121. This arrangement requires fuel guarantee to member states. Suggested options for this fuel guarantee122 include using a commercial consortium of fuel providers or empowering IAEA to act as managing agent for stocks of fuels or

115 Nonproliferation culture is reflective of the country’s socioeconomic status. The status is related to economic conditions and pay for workers and guards and the political stability of responsible governmental authorities115. Several of the qualitative measures such as gross domestic product, per capita income, cost of living, and unemployment rate, can be used to represent this socioeconomic status related culture. Consideration must also be given regarding whether the country has the political stability, maturity and motivation to commit to nonproliferation and whether the country has sufficient personnel and resources to handle this special technology in the special way it requires. Relative comparisons of the culture can be an important indicator for the importing country’s vulnerability. 116 G.W. Bush, “Address on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” Remarks at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004; “Curbing Nuclear Proliferation,” an interview with El Baradei, Arms Control Today, pp. 3-6, November, 2003; See Perkovich, et al. (note 16). 117 Rhodes, R., “Nuclear Power and Proliferation,” in Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2002; Miller, M., “Attempts to Reduce the Proliferation Risks of Nuclear Power: Past and Current Initiatives,” in Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2002. 118 Exceptions to this are Brazil, which is developing a front end capability, and Iran, which seems to be on a course for weapons development masked by a decision to develop an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. 119 See Bush (note 116): The President said that the world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. This requires fuel supply guarantees to countries that abstain from production and verify commitments not to acquire enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 120 M. ElBaradei, “Saving Ourselves from Self-Destruction,” New York Times, February 12, 2004, sec. A, p. 27. 121 IAEA, “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” IFCCIRC/640, February 2005. 122 See Perkovich, et al. (note 16).


guarantor of fuels123. Similar arrangement could be possible for spent fuel reprocessing through creation of a new international consortium for reprocessing service under the supervision of IAEA124. Current nonproliferation efforts seem to overemphasize the role of technology. Technology has promises and limitations in preventing proliferation. A determined state can overcome technical barriers should persistent infrastructure support be available. Proliferation is mainly driven by a security concern aided and affected by technical and economic resources. Developing a civilian nuclear power program is driven by a country’s economic need aided and affected by technical and economic resources. Although there is no explicit connection for the motivational factors between the two, there is an overlap for the resource requirement for the two. Once the necessary technical and economic resources are spent to establish civilian nuclear power program, the situation could affect the motivational factors. Motivational issues must be addressed to effectively control the connections between the two, As indicated in the review of proliferation history, lack of motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is a key in nonproliferation125. If security threat to a state is reduced, possible benefits of proliferation can be marginalized126. World leaders must support political reforms necessary to remove the perceived need for nuclear weapons along with demonstration of the commitment to nuclear disarmament127. In this regard, the current U.S. effort in developing nuclear earth penetrator weapons (EPWs) might be perceived as a lack of commitment to nuclear disarmament. Whether Russia or China is engaged in similar weapons development is currently unknown. Investigations on EPWs have indicated128 that nuclear earth penetrators would more likely disperse than destroy buried stockpiles of (chemical and biological) weapon materials. In the case of buried stockpiles of chemical agents, the effects of nuclear weapon explosion itself are expected to be much greater than the effects from the dispersal of buried weapon materials.

123 See IAEA (note 121); In the case of the commercial consortium of fuel providers, fuel producing states or companies would form supply groups to commercially outcompete domestic fuel production programs. Multiple fuel providing entities could offer reinforcing contracts to prospective buyers and if one company dropped out, others would be obligated to fulfill the contract. The fuel could be sold or leased (depending on the recipient states’ ability to manage spent fuel). Such an arrangement would require a new level of cooperation and coordination between competing companies. 124 See IAEA (note 121). 125 See Erickson (note 20). 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid: A renewed commitment to nuclear weapons reductions on the part of the NWS’s is important. It may be a propitious time for all the NWS to seriously reduce their nuclear arms as the clear sense of enemy country is diminishing and the security threats are becoming more diffuse. The externalities of nuclear weapons, including the ecological damage from the facilities that make the special nuclear materials (SNM) and the risk of global nuclear war, makes them an expensive luxury or, more accurately, a liability. U.S. must take a leadership in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and restraining from further developing and testing new nuclear weapons. If the U.S. develops new nuclear weapons, it would stimulate not only states that have wanted to acquire nuclear weapons but also the states that have wanted to remain non-nuclear. Hesitation in U.S. effort in nonproliferation makes it very difficult to use moral suasion on non-nuclear weapons states to adhere to the NPT. Uncertainties about the strength of commitment to multilateral regimes and accompanying arms control strategies would be detrimental to the future of world nonproliferation. As agreed by most of the American public [S. Kull, “Survey says: Americans Back Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, pp. 22-26, June 2004] our goal should be to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons through an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating theirs too. We need to work with Russia and other countries to restore the momentum toward verifiably and irreversibly reducing the amounts of nuclear weapons and materials. 128 National Research Council, Effects of Earth Penetrator and Other Weapons, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC. 2005; R. W. Nelson, “Nuclear Bunker Busters Would More Likely Disperse Than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of Biological and Chemical Agents,” Science and Global Security, 12:62-89, 2004.


World leaders must reward the state that contributes energetically to nonproliferation129”. The salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs should be diminished. They must reassure the world neighbors that their strategic interests can be met without nuclear weapons. It needs to be understood that owning nuclear weapon capability comes with not only its own liability risk but also physical risks to the owner state130. One of the main requirements for effective control of the motivational factors is having the culture of nonproliferation. Culture of nonproliferation requires a politically mature and stable society131. Without appropriate cultural and political support, possibility of nuclear material diversion by a national or an individual action exists. Although civilian nuclear technology is not directly related to weapons work, the expertise, equipment, and facilities can be used to develop facilities for weapon development. Many of the people who deal with material, facilities, equipment, and computer models related to making nuclear weapons132 learn the skills necessary and useful for nuclear weapon making by engaging in civilian nuclear power programs. Training these people to practice highest levels of moral values in their professional activities and to refrain from any clandestine engagement for illicit weapon development must be exercised. Institutionalizing this sense of responsibility133 has been exercised within the nuclear community through development of a special canon of ethics134. But simply writing a canon of ethics does not reinforce the culture of nonproliferation. The idea must be actively communicated among the nuclear professionals. Presently there are no formal training requirements on ethical issues for nuclear professionals. Formally institutionalizing a training program (say by the IAEA) on ethical issues in the use of nuclear technology would be desirable for all nuclear professionals in all NPT member states. If the holders of the knowledge practice their own code of ethics, the barrier that technical expertise plays will be effective135. If the situation is the opposite, the technical barriers will no longer be limiting, defeating the purpose of many of the technical and technological development for proliferation resistance. VII. Concluding Remarks Use of nuclear energy has been controversial from the beginning as the technology has potential for both peaceful and destructive purposes. The potential of the technology for energy generation was first 129 Ibid: A state’s contribution to the nonproliferation regime in prospective decisions should be considered to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council. The state should be rewarded when the U.S. determines state visits, political-economic favoritism, and other forms of positive U.S. engagement. Cooperative research should be expanded with fully compliant non-nuclear weapon states to develop designs for safer and proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors. As much as possible, U.S. should provide states who are adhering to nonproliferation commitment formal security assurances through political and military commitment. 130 See Erickson (note 20): By attempting to own nuclear weapons, a nation may become a more prominent target from a larger potential adversary country. The physical risks include the possibility of nuclear accidents at weapons facilities, environmental catastrophes, and the prospect that nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials could fall into the wrong hands and be misused. 131 Politically mature and stable society is also a desirable necessary condition for civilian nuclear power establishment. As was experienced in Philippines (see section IV), premature development of civilian nuclear power program could lead into a major financial debacle. 132 See Hassberger, et al. (note 17). 133 A. M. Weinberg, “Do Nuclear Engineering Educators Have a Special Responsibility?,” Annals of Nuclear Energy, Vol. 4, p. 337, 1977. 134 Currently several Code (or Charter) of Ethics exist within the nuclear professionals’ community. , i.e., from the World Nuclear Association (http://www.world-nuclear.org/aboutwna/charter.htm), the World Council of Nuclear Workers (http://www.wonuc.org/peace/cuk-ethic01.htm), and the American Nuclear Society (http://www.ans.org/about/coe/). 135 See Hassberger, et al. (note 17).


manifested in the form of a most potent bomb during a world war. Nuclear energy was once viewed as a promise of an inexhaustible source of energy for sustained human development. As Weinberg mentioned, nuclear energy was a Faustian bargain136 in which we accept an inexhaustible and non-directly polluting energy source at the cost of potential for destructive power and long-term waste impact requiring a high degree of care and surveillance. Weinberg asserted137 that we are immoral if we do not exert every humanly possible effort to uncover, assess, and remedy whatever deficiencies we can find in nuclear energy. With the renewed interest in nuclear export to the developing world, we need to be reminded that “Atoms for Peace” encouraged a one-sided emphasis on nuclear technology138 regardless of the real needs of the less developed countries in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Without the world’s commitment to nonproliferation, continued expansion of nuclear power use into the developing world could be sowing seeds for nuclear proliferation. Although the possibility of nuclear power expansion to the developing world exists, proliferation risk/concern with civilian nuclear power expansion lies mostly with the countries currently owning nuclear power technology in unstable regions. Implementing effective safeguards system and creating political conditions to reduce the desire to acquire nuclear weapons in these nations would remain the most important tasks for nuclear nonproliferation. Recent developments in proliferation resistant technologies will make diversion of fissile material from the new commercial nuclear reactors very difficult by providing enhanced deterrence and better opportunity for the international community to intervene. Use of these technologies should be encouraged whenever possible. Given the rising role of commercial interests among the nuclear system vendors, with fewer constraints exerted on them by becoming multinational corporations, the importance of controlling and monitoring the export behavior of nuclear vendors was noted. These companies must exercise the highest degree of integrity in export sales decisions. Incentive for enhancing proliferation resistance from a selling company must be generated and provided by the governments of the exporting nations. One possibility noted was to develop a safeguards fee system for IAEA, based on the projected safeguards requirements for each system and country. Reinforcing effective safeguards requires providing adequate resources and effective distribution of them for IAEA’s policing activities. The safeguards fee system can address the resource acquisition issue. Prioritization of IAEA resource distribution for policing activities can be augmented by using an idea of developing country specific vulnerability index. Consensus needs to be achieved among the nations for these approaches to be practical. To improve the practice in nuclear export control, sharing information on actual exports granted is needed to help all states track what others are buying. To this end, a centralized database for information sharing should be pursued among participant states. It has also been noted that technological barriers cannot prevent a determined state from a proliferation attempt. An integrated approach to address human, political, institutional, and technical factors is required to avert the spread of nuclear weapons139. The people who man the enterprise must have qualities that match the demands placed on them by the nature of nuclear energy, thus requiring professionalism and

136 A. M. Weinberg, 1972, Rutherford Centennial Lecture at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 1972. 137 Ibid. 138 A. M. Weinberg, Foreign Affairs, p407, April 1971. 139 See TOPS (note 1).


dedication of those who are entrusted with the nuclear enterprise140. Within the nuclear community, culture and ethics of nonproliferation must be enhanced and fortified through active communications among the professionals. Formally institutionalizing a training program on ethical issues in the use of nuclear technology should be considered for all nuclear professionals in all NPT member states. The world’s nuclear community must demonstrate continued commitment to clear severance between the civilian and military applications. A state’s bureaucracy and politics surrounding the nuclear establishment plays a larger role in defining the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation further. World international security conflicts are not likely to subside but rather increase with potential upcoming escalation in cultural, racial, and religious conflicts. Given the competing security, economic, and political interests in national policy making surrounding the role of nuclear weapons, world nonproliferation efforts face the challenge of maintaining political commitment to nonproliferation141. To see any real progress in world’s nuclear nonproliferation, the world powers (in particular the NWS) need to work together to support political reforms to remove the perceived need for nuclear weapons. Acknowledgments This paper was written while the author was appointed as Sam Nunn International Security Fellow at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology. Continued support and encouragement from Profs. John Endicott, William Hoehn, and Sy Goodman at the Sam Nunn School and Dr. Allison McFarlane at MIT are very much appreciated. The author is very grateful for the excellent comments from the anonymous reviewers and the editor (Dr. Donald Dudziak). He would also like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. McArthur Foundation for the funding support.

140 See Weinberg (note 136). 141 See Scheinman (note 9).

yim nuclear nonproliferation and future expansion of np final to inta 10-12-05

Documents