yemen: fighting al qaeda in a failing state the security and economic situation and considerations...

Yemen: Fighting al Qaeda in a Failing State

The Security and Economic Situation and Considerations for the Way Forward

Presented by Frederick W. Kagan and Christopher Harnisch of the American Enterprise

Institute’s Critical Threats Project

Slides Prepared by Christopher Harnisch and Katherine Zimmerman

1Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12,

2010 Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]

Topics To Be Covered:

1) The Security and Economic Situation-Al Houthi conflict, southern secessionists, resource depletion, other factors contributing to the weak economy

2) Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-Bin Laden’s view on Yemen, location of AQAP strongholds, history, leaders, group dynamics, attacks, ideology and rhetoric

3) U.S. Strategy -Recent U.S. strategy, U.S. cooperation with and support for Yemen, Yemen’s current strategy for combating AQAP, U.S. considerations for the way forward



Yemen Basics

• Area: 203,796 square miles – roughly twice the size of Wyoming

• Climate: Mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east

• Terrain: Ranges from coastal plains to flat-topped hills and rugged mountains

• Elevation extremes: from sea level to Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb at 12,030 ft

• Religious composition: 60% Sunni; 30-40% Zaydi Shiite (concentrated primarily in the northwest)

Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010 Contact CTP Manager:

[email protected]

Terrain of Yemen



Yemen: From Arabia to Africa

• Yemen’s position in the Gulf of Aden makes it an ideal location from which to stage attacks, especially on energy and shipping targets

• Eritrea has reportedly served as a staging ground for weapons-smuggling into Yemen

• Somalia’s al Shabaab have pledged support for AQAP

• More than 160,000 Somali refugees reportedly in Yemen

• U.S. military base in DjiboutiImage courtesy of National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

5Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January

12, 2010 Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]

Yemen: Basic History and Politics

• Republic of Yemen formed from the unification of the northern Yemen Arab Republic and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990– Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1990)

• Became independent imamate in 1918 upon collapse of Ottoman Empire ruled by Haashemite Imam

• North Yemen Civil War (1962-1970): Gamal abd al Nasser (Egypt) established the Yemen Arab Republic, sparking a proxy war when Saudi Arabia supported the deposed ruler, Imam al Badr

– People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1967-1990):• Former British colony, known as the Aden Protectorate, that gained

independence in 1967 as the People’s Republic of South Yemen• 1969 Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) came to power, changed name in

1970 to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen• South is characterized by its Marxist roots and is the site of most oil

reserves6


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Yemen: Basic History and Politics (cont.)

• President Ali Abdullah Saleh– President of YAR since 1978, only president of the Republic of Yemen– Last re-elected in 2006 with 77% of the vote for a term of seven years

(outside observers deemed the election relatively free and fair)– Zaydi Shi’a (but not Haashemite), member of the General People’s

Congress party• Yemen’s Political Parties:

– General People’s Congress: northern-based party from YAR, ruling political party that controls most of the parliamentary seats

– Joint Meeting Parties (JMP): six-party opposition coalition formed 11/2005, supported Faysal bin Shamlan in 2006 presidential elections

– Al Islah Party: Islamist party whose members formerly were generally members of the GPC, now member of the Joint Meeting Parties coalition

– Yemeni Socialist Party: southern-based party from the PDRY that constitutes the main opposition party in Yemen, member of the Joint Meeting Parties coalition 7


[email protected]

Al Houthi Insurgency(northern provinces)

• President Saleh launched OPERATION SCORCHED EARTH on August 11, 2009 to eradicate the al Houthi rebels– Operation believed to include anywhere from one-third to one-

half of Yemen’s total military• The current operation is the sixth round of fighting between the

rebels and the government; the current conflict began in 2004• November 4, 2009: Saudi Arabia openly began airstrikes and

ground assaults on rebel targets on the Saudi side of the border; rebels have accused Riyadh of operating on the Yemeni side of the border and killing civilians– On Dec. 26, Saudi said all rebels driven from Saudi territory,

but strikes continue• Yemen and Riyadh accuse al Houthis of receiving Iranian support• Numerous previous ceasefires and unilateral Yemeni withdraws

have failed • The conflict has generated over 175,000 IDPs



Roots of the al Houthi Conflict

• Al Houthi family belongs to Zaydi sect of Shiite Islam and the Haashimite line (i.e. traces bloodline to the Prophet)– President Saleh is Zaydi, but not Haashimite– Haashimite Zaydis ruled northern Yemen from 893-1962– Saleh is a secularist, but fears that Haashimite claims to the Imamate

could damage his legitimacy within the Zaydi community that dominates the government and armed forces

• Al Houthis are now led by Abdul Malik al Houthi, the younger brother of the group’s founder and first leader, Husayn Badr al Din al Houthi

• Zaydis have accused Yemeni gov’t of marginalization for decades, and in the mid-90’s Zaydis founded a political and paramilitary Zaydi revivalist youth group called “Believing Youth” to counter gov’t

• Followers of the Believing Youth – led by Husayn Badr al Din al Houthi – held anti-gov’t and anti-American protests after Saleh aligned himself with U.S. following 9/11

• Gov’t responded by attempting to arrest Husayn Badr al Din al Houthi and his followers in June 2004 and killing him in Sept. 2004

• Fighting has continued on and off ever since10


[email protected]

Grievances and Accusations of al Houthi Conflict

• Gov’t says that al Houthis plan to reinstate imamate (al Houthis deny this)

• Gov’t claims that al Houthis are supported by Iran and has attempted to claim an al Qaeda connection

• Al Houthis blame gov’t for economic and social neglect, corruption, aligning with U.S. and Saudi, and too much Wahhabi influence

• By Aug. 2009, al Houthis had taken control of much of Sa’ada province, blocked roads, raided and blockaded military installations, arrested soldiers, kidnapped teachers and foreigners, taken control of 63 schools, attacked mosques and gov’t buildings



Al Houthi – Al Qaeda Connection?

• NO evidence supports this claim• Ideologically, the only common denominator between the groups

is that they both oppose the central government - Al Houthis have used anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric to

garner popular support• AQAP commander in November called on Sunnis to fight al Houthi

rebels • Two AQAP members were found dead in northern Yemen in late

September, but likely not involved in the al Houthi conflict



Al Houthi – Al Qaeda Connection?

• NO evidence supports this claim• Ideologically, the only common denominator

between the groups is that they both oppose the central government - Al Houthis have used anti-American and anti-Israeli

rhetoric to garner popular support

• AQAP commander in November called on Sunnis to fight al Houthi rebels

• Two AQAP members were found dead in northern Yemen in late September, but likely not involved in the al Houthi conflict



Southern Movement (southern provinces)

• Umbrella group for southern-based secessionist movement• Leaders include southern elites and former government figures

such as Tariq al Fadhli and Ali Salim al Beidh (in exile)– Al Fadhli joined the movement in April, calling for secession– Al Beidh’s speeches are broadcast from abroad at southern

rallies• Characterized by mass anti-government demonstrations in major

southern cities such as Aden, Zinjibar, and Dhaleh• Militant factions of the movement have targeted government

personnel and buildings in the south• Yemeni gov’t has accused the Southern Movement of colluding

with al Qaeda



Roots of the Southern Movement

• Secessionist strongholds are located in the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)

• The PDRY merged with the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in May 1990 with Sana’a as the capital– Power-sharing agreement gave presidency to former YAR president, Ali

Abdullah Saleh, and the vice-presidency to former PDRY president, Ali Salim al Beidh

– 1993 parliamentary elections changed the power dynamics when the southern-based Yemeni Socialist Party won only 69 of 301 seats

• Civil war broke out May 4, 1994 after negotiations collapsed– July 7, 1994 marked the end of the war, when northern forces entered

the former PDRY capital, Aden, and southern leaders fled• In 2007, southern military officers demonstrated against the government,

demanding the reinstatement of their pensions– Other southerners joined in the demonstrations to voice concerns over

economic and politic exclusion



Grievances and Accusations of the Southern Movement

• Grievances stem from perceived marginalization by the northern-dominated government after 1990 unification and include:– Economic and political marginalization– Illegal land seizures following 1994 civil war– Forced retirements from civil and military positions– Withholding of military pensions from officers

• Gov’t has used increasingly repressive tactics against demonstrators, resulting in several deaths during rallies

• Gov’t closed down several media outlets for inciting sedition over the summer of 2009 and arrested over 500 southern elites

• Increased presence of gov’t troops, generally northerners, fuels feeling of occupation in the south by the north



Violence in the South,But Not Yet a Civil War

• Outbreaks of violence and targeted strikes by militant elements of the Southern Movement has required an increased troop presence in South

• March and April 2008: Demonstrations turn violent (fire set to police and army targets)

• July 23, 2009: “Zinjibar Massacre” – at least 16 die when police try to break-up demonstration

• July 28, 2009: Secessionist militants ambush military convoy killing 4 soldiers, and bomb headquarters of ruling political party

• Sep. 28 – Oct. 5, 2009: Demonstration turns violent leading to days of clashes resulting in dozens of injuries, a few deaths, and arrests

• Nov. 25, 2009: 5 die when police clash with protestors • Nov. 27, 2009: Militant secessionists shout down Sana’a-Aden road• Dec. 4, 2009: 1 dies as demonstration turns violent• Dec. 21, 2009: Yemen demands extradition of former South Yemen

presidents• Dec. 29, 2009: 1 dies as demonstration turns violent • Jan. 11, 2009: Secessionists call for labor strikes in Dhale and Lahij

provinces



Southern Movement –Al Qaeda Connection?

• No clear connection, but a potential connection exists, especially if U.S. becomes involved militarily

• Tariq al Fadhli, a recognized leader within the movement was a mujahid in Afghanistan from 1987-1989– In April 2009, al Fadhli defected from the government, which he

supported in the 1994 civil war, to call for secession– Al Fadhli has been accused of permitting al Qaeda to establish training

camps in Abyan governorate• In May 2009, al Wahayshi called for support for the south’s secession from

the north, and the establishment of an Islamic state• Overlap of strongholds could lead to coordination between Southern

Movement and al Qaeda, especially if the government continues to exact civilian casualties in its pursuit of terrorism

• Some tribes that align with the secessionists also provide shelter to al Qaeda



Yemen’s Natural Resource Depletion

• Oil accounts for approximately two thirds of public revenue and about 90% of income from exports– Weak oil economy has substantially affected Yemen’s oil revenues– The World Bank predicts that oil resources will run out by 2017– Natural gas facility opened in October 2009

• Water is scarce and resources are strained by a fast-growing population and the increased growth of qat– World Bank estimates 125 cubic meters per capita available per year

(world avg. is 2,500) – Recent reports indicate that Sana’a’s wells will be dry by 2015– Illegal well-drilling, leaky and rusted pipes, contribute to water waste– Yemeni-Saudi firm began $31 million desalination plant in Hodeidah

province– Qat, considered a narcotic in the U.S. but legal in Yemen, uses about

40% of the available water in Sana’a and land is increasingly dedicated to growing the plant



Other Socio-Economic Considerations

• Demographics: population has tripled since 1975 – expected to reach 40M by 2030; 66% of Yemenis under age 24; less than 1/3 of population lives in urban areas

• Poverty: annual income per capita: $871; almost 50% of Yemenis earn less than $2 per day

• Unemployment: 35% (conservative estimate)• Education: national illiteracy - 46%, female illiteracy – 70%; religious

conservatives influential in school system; Saudis fund much of religious education; anti-American tone pervades in text books

• Corruption: widespread corruption, nepotism, and tribal preferences; Yemen’s audit agency estimates 30% of gov’t revenue never makes it to gov’t accounts

• At least 160,000 Somali refugees in the country



The Perfect Storm

The combination of Yemen’s numerous security

and socio-economic challenges has allowed al

Qaeda to establish a safe-haven in Yemen and

take advantage of a vulnerable population.



Bin Laden on Yemen:

• 1997: Reportedly sends an envoy to Yemen to assess if it could be used as a base if the Taliban expelled him

• 1998: “In Yemen we have strong and old links…besides the fact that my roots and my father’s roots go back there.”

• 2000: Married a Yemeni woman in Afghanistan

• 2000: Appeared in a recruitment video wearing the traditional Yemeni jambiya sword

• 2003: “Areas most in need of liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen.”

• 2003: “Youth of Islam…especially in the neighboring countries and Yemen: You must roll up your sleeves [and] prepare for jihad.”

• 2006: “Abdullah Saleh…is an obedient American agent.”



Roots of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

•AQAP officially formed in January 2009 with the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi al Qaeda franchises

•At time of merger, the Saudi al Qaeda leaders pledged allegiance to the al Qaeda in Yemen leader, Nassir al Wahayshi

•The merger was necessary from the perspective of Saudi al Qaeda leaders because the Kingdom has effectively denied al Qaeda a haven in Saudi Arabia since 2004



AQAP’s Presence in Yemen

24

Before the Merger: al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia

• Saudi had been a place of sentimental and strategic importance for AQ since before 9/11: bin Laden envisioned it as the seat of a Caliphate, and it received considerable recruits and funding from within Saudi

• In mid-2003, AQ’s leadership debated the merits of attacking targets within Saudi: preserve a safe-haven or destabilize the regime?

• Al Qaeda in Saudi launched a string of deadly attacks from May 2003-December 2004 sparking a crackdown by Saudi authorities

• Group’s most effective leader, Abdul Aziz al Muqrin killed in June 2004

• In mid-2005, a Riyadh daily declared al Qaeda in Saudi eliminated

• Last major attack attempt in Saudi: suicide bombing foiled at Abqaiq oil facility in February 2006



Before the Merger: Al Qaeda in Yemen

• Al Qaeda active in Yemen from 2000-2002: failed USS The Sullivans attack, successful USS Cole and French Limburg attacks

• Al Qaeda in Yemen leader and five operatives killed by U.S. drone in November 2002

• No major attacks from 2003-2005

• Al Qaeda in Yemen begins to regroup following February 2006 Sana’a prison break

– Among the escapees were Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi (currently the AQAP leader and a deputy, respectively)



Before the Merger: Al Qaeda in Yemen (cont.)

• Nov. 7, 2006: al Qaeda in Yemen takes credit for suicide car bombings at American and Canadian oil facilities in eastern Yemen

• June 20, 2007: al Raymi releases audio tape announcing al Qaeda in Yemen will continue attacks on Peninsula and identifies al Wahayshi as its leader

• In 2007 and 2008, al Qaeda in Yemen launched a string of small-scale attacks

– Targets included: energy sector, tourists, gov’t buildings, army checkpoints, and the U.S. embassy (twice)



Nasser al Wahayshi (Leader)

Said al Shiri (Deputy AQAP leader, former Guantanamo detainee)

Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki (Influential spiritual figure within AQAP)

Qasim al Raymi (Deputy AQAP leader, Arhab cell leader)

Mohammed Saleh al Kazimi (Deceased, Abyan cell leader)

Mohamed Atiq Awayd al Harbi(Turned self into Saudis, former Guantanamo detainee)

AQAP Deputies

Hizam Mujali (AQAP commander)

AQAP Cell Commanders

Former Senior AQAP Members

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Organization Chart

Potential other unknown cell commanders



AQAP Group Dynamics

• Estimates of operatives range from a low of 50 to a high of several thousand

• The number of sympathizers and supporters is much higher: estimates place the number of veterans of previous “jihads” in Yemen at 20,000

– AQAP relies on tribal support for shelter; recently has adopted the strategy of marrying into tribes to earn the loyalty of tribes

• Operatives work in cells around the country

• AQAP portrays itself as the protector of the people to win popular support

• AQAP members come from multiple countries – high concentrations from Yemen, Saudi, Egypt, Pakistan and Somalia

• AQAP appears to have operational links – transferring of weapons and fighters – with al Shabaab in Somalia, and maybe al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)



2009 AQAP Attacks

• March 14: Suicide bombing, executed by Abu Obedia al Jarrah, hit a group of South Korean tourists in Hadramawt

• March 18: Second suicide attack by AQAP on South Korean diplomatic convoy to Sana’a executed by Shamel al Sana’ani

• August 27: Abdullah al Asiri detonated suicide bomb targeting Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef

• November 3: AQAP ambushes and kills seven Yemeni security officials near the Saudi border, including three senior officials

• November 26: AQAP released video showing interrogation and execution of Bassam Tarbush, head of security in Ma’rib

• December 25: AQAP claims responsibility for Christmas Day attack on Detroit-bound Flight 253



Conservative Estimate of al Qaeda Attack Casualties in Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Prior to AQAP

* Non-Western casualties tended to be foreign workers, but were not targeted by al Qaeda



AQAP’s Ideology and Objectives (Historical Perspective)

• Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia sought to drive U.S. personnel out of Saudi, destabilize the Saudi regime, and set up a Caliphate

• Al Qaeda in Yemen sought to drive “Crusaders” off the Peninsula, end Yemen’s cooperation with the U.S., hurt U.S. economy because of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and set up Caliphate



AQAP’s Ideology and Objectives

• Seeks to establish an Islamic state on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP leaders appear in front of the Islamic State of Iraq flag upon founding)

• Defeat the “Crusader” occupation and invasion of ALL Islamic lands, especially in the Arabian Peninsula

• Weaken and overthrow the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia

• Enemies: America, Jews, polytheists, Shiites, any gov’t that cooperates with the U.S. and any Muslim that works with or protects non-Muslims on the Peninsula

• Strong emphasis put on the need to support Palestinians and liberate Jerusalem



“….Also, fighting in the Cause of Allah and the oppressed is a necessary condition to spread the principles of Islam, establish the State of Islam, and preserve the structure of the Islamic Ummah from outside encroachment….” “…. the main supporters of the occupation of Palestine are America and Europe, so we must destroy them and the Crusader interests that are spread over the Arabian Peninsula, including Yemen. They must be struck to support Palestine….” “….[Prophet Muhammad said]: ‘Expel the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula….There cannot be two religions in the Arabian Peninsula….’” “….whoever thinks that Palestine will be liberated without breaking the siege of the traitors around it is delusional and blowing into ashes. Salahuddin…began by liberating the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt from the traitors and agents, and the worship of the polytheistic infidels. After he liberated the internal front, he then went directly to liberate [Jerusalem]….” “….The Crusader campaign against our people…utilizes the Arabian Peninsula as an area for their bases. The American, British, and French fleets and bases in the Arabian Peninsula are only protection for the jews….The rulers of the Arabian Peninsula are [complicit], for the ruler of Yemen....he is a true supporter. Ali Abdullah Saleh supports the Crusader campaign with all forms of logistical and military support to combat our brothers in Palestine.”

“….More than five-thousand soldiers and others were killed at the hands of the [Shi'ites] in Sa'da, not including inhabitants there!....Others say that we are infidel-branding renegades! They themselves to do not dare to speak of the truth of the [Shi’ites], and their role in destroying Islam throughout history….”



Quotations Reflecting AQAP’s Ideology(Wahayshi, January 2009)

Shift in AQAP Rhetoric Towards Targeting the U.S.

• Late Oct., Wahayshi calls on followers to attack airports and trains in West using homemade bombs

• Early Nov., Saudi Commander of AQAP identified “Crusaders, among them America and NATO” as the first enemy

• Late Nov., AQAP executes Yemeni spy after forcing him to confess that Saleh is an agent of America

• Following 12/17 and 12/24 airstrikes on AQAP strongholds, AQAP increased its rhetoric toward U.S.

• AQAP warned of more attacks against U.S. in statement taking credit for Christmas Day attack



Notable U.S. Visits to Yemen in 2009

• March 16, 2009: Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan visited to discuss counterterrorism cooperation

• July 26, 2009: General Petraeus met with President Saleh to discuss bilateral relations

• August 16, 2009: Delegation of senators, including Senators Joseph Lieberman, Susan Collins, and Lindsey Graham, led by Senator John McCain, met with President Saleh to discuss counterterrorism cooperation

• October 4, 2009: Vice Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander of U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, met with President Saleh to discuss U.S.-Yemeni cooperation against AQAP

• November 10, 2009: Representatives from the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Staff, led by Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Smith, met with Yemeni counterparts to discuss security cooperation

• January 2, 2010: General Petraeus met with President Saleh to discuss U.S.-Yemeni relations, especially regarding counterterrorism efforts



2009 U.S.-Yemen Cooperation

• Yemen is a recipient of Department of Defense Section 1206 funds for building partnership capacity

– Primary recipients are: Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF), Yemeni Army 11th Brigade, Central Repair Base

– Funds have gone towards cross-border security and counterterrorism efforts, YSOF development, helicopters with night vision, Coast Guard patrol boats, and counter-IED training and equipment

• January 21, 2009: Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI James W. McJunkin delivered thirty biometric collection systems to Yemen as part of the counterterrorism initiative

• November 3, 2009: A delegation of Yemeni military officers from the counterterrorism unit, coast guard and army special forces observed U.S. Marine Corps training at Paris Island



December 2009 Strikes on AQAP

• December 10: drone strike in North Waziristan, Pakistan– Shpalga, Pakistan: Saleh al Somali, head of al Qaeda’s external operations

and possibly responsible for transfer of militants to Yemen, killed• Dec.17: strikes in Arhab, Sana’a, and Abyan supported by U.S. missiles and

intelligence– Arhab district:

• Nawbah Operation: killed Hani al Shu’alan (#225) and two others, injured a fourth

• Al Tabbah Operation: Qasim al Raymi, Hizam Saleh Mujali and third escaped

• Bayt Mujali Operation: arrested Aref Mujali and seven others– Al Majalah, Abyan:

• Targeted house of Abdul Mun’em al Qahtani• Mohammed al Kazimi, among others, including foreigners, was killed

– Sana’a City: Fourteen arrested with ties to the Arhab cell• December 24: strike in Rafadh area of al Said, Shabwah

– Rafadh: About 30 al Qaeda suspects killed in strike targeting hide-out where Nasser al Wahayshi, Said al Shihri, and Anwar al Awlaki had been meeting



U.S. Foreign Assistance to Yemen

• Noticeable increase in foreign assistance to Yemen.– $55.5 million requested for FY 2010, nearly triple the amount

requested for FY2008 – $19.8 million• Foreign Military Financing (FMF) restored to just above FY2007 levels

after dropping considerably in FY2008 and FY2009

Source: Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, July 2009



Select U.S. Foreign Assistance to Yemen

(2000-2009)

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Database (1999-2007 data); Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, July 2009



Department of Defense 1206 Account

[Yemen] FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

USD in Millions 4.3 26 0 66.8

FY2009 Budget Breakdown:

$5.9 for aerial surveillancehelicopters with night vision

$30.1 million for Coast Guard patrol2 boats, radios

$25 million for border security360 4x4 armored pickup trucks

$5.8 million for IED mitigation

Source: Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, July 2009



Yemen’s Current Offensive

• Yemen has deployed “hundreds” of troops in eastern Yemen and has deployed “thousands” of troops to target AQAP

• December 30: Mohammed Abdu Saleh al Hawdali arrested in Hodeidah

• January 4: two al Qaeda militants killed and three injured in Arhab – Qasim al Raymi and Hizam Mujali likely among dead

• January 6: three al Qaeda suspects arrested in hospital in Amran after being treated for injuries sustained in previous clash

• January 8: eight al Qaeda members arrested in Arhab district, one in Majzar district of Ma’rib

• January 10: seven al Qaeda suspects arrested northeast of Sana’a

• January 12: reported al Qaeda cell leader in Shabwa, Abullah al Mehdhar, killed



Need for More Than Just Counterterrorism

• Focusing only on precision strikes on terrorist strongholds and leaders has failed previously

– The U.S., with Yemeni support, killed al Qaeda in Yemen leader in Nov. 2002, and al Qaeda rebuilt there four years later

– Strategy has also failed in Afghanistan and Pakistan

• U.S. helped establish and build up capacity of Yemeni Coast Guard, and it has used Special Forces to train the Yemeni security apparatus

– This did not prevent al Qaeda from settling in the country



Boots on the Ground???

• AQAP already portrays itself as the “protector of the people”; a U.S. invasion would only enhance this image

• Tribal conflict: some tribes – most which are heavily armed – would remain loyal to Saleh, others would support AQAP

• Potential alliance between AQAP and southern secessionists --- south would likely break away from Sana’a

• Iran could increase support of al Houthis

• Large naval contingency required to prevent arrival of new mujahideen and support from state actors, such as Iran

• Harsh fighting conditions: very hot (often humid), very mountainous

• Rebuilding a country plagued by corruption, weak security apparatus, and a lack of natural resources would be challenging

• Heavily armed population with extensive experience in guerilla warfare



The Way Forward

• Comprehensive strategy focused on enhancing security, preventing Yemen from becoming a failed state, and alleviating the conditions conducive to a terrorist safe-haven– Saleh is not an ideal partner, but he is who we have to work with; a

failed state would nearly guarantee an al Qaeda safe-haven• Must work to increase security and intelligence capabilities of Yemeni

security apparatus • Must help Saleh defeat the al Houthi rebels and address other perceived

threats– Cannot tie aid to only targeting al Qaeda

• Must work to prevent a military conflict with southern secessionists and disentangle southern tribes from AQAP

• Must enhance aid and development support to Yemen– Aid should focus on increasing economic opportunities, addressing

resource depletion (including the qat addiction), reforming and improving education, democracy and governance (including ending corruption) 45


[email protected]

Appendix to Yemen Brief

AQAP Leader Profiles and List of Major al Qaeda Attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen Prior to Formation of AQAP



AQAP Leaders and Figures:

Nasser al Wahayshi (Abu Basir)Leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

• Served in Afghanistan as bin Laden’s aid• Fled to Iran after fighting in the battle of Tora Bora in December

2001; arrested in Iran in early 2002• Extradited to Yemen in 2003, with eight others• Escaped in the February 2006 prison break• Officially recognized as al Qaeda in Yemen’s leader June 21, 2007

(although was likely serving as its head by mid-2006)• Became leader of AQAP in January 2009• Issued multiple statements calling on Muslims to rebel against

Arab regimes, especially in Saudi Arabia and Yemen• Said to have survived the 12/24 strike, unconfirmed




Said al Shihri (Abu Sufyan al Azdi)Guantanamo #372

Deputy Leader of AQAP

• Captured in Pakistan in December 2001 and later sent to Guantanamo • Transferred to Saudi Arabia’s terrorist rehabilitation facility on

November 9, 2007• Believed to have coordinated the September 2008 bombing of the U.S.

Embassy in Sana’a• January 2009 became the deputy leader of AQAP• May 27, 2009 listed by Defense Intelligence Agency as “re-engaged in

terrorism”• September 27, 2009 called for donations to AQAP• Said to have survived the 12/24 strike, unconfirmed




Mohamed Atiq Awayd al Harbi(Abu Hareth Muhammed al Awfi)

Guantanamo #333

• Captured in Pakistan in 2001– name found on document recovered from former residence of

bin Laden– member of “al Irata and mujahid” at Kandahar

• Transferred to Saudi Arabia’s terrorist rehabilitation facility on November 9, 2007

• January 2009 spoke in initial AQAP video• February 17, 2009 turned himself in to the Saudi authorities

(allegedly pressured to by female members of his family)




Qasim al Raymi (Abu Hurayrah)AQAP Arhab cell leader

• Arrested and escaped in the February 2006 prison break• Became deputy leader of al Qaeda in Yemen• His June 21, 2007 audio statement announced al Qaeda in

Yemen’s reestablishment with al Wahayshi as leader• Believed to have masterminded July 2, 2007 suicide car bomb that

killed eight Spanish tourists in Ma’rib• Appeared in January 2009 initial AQAP video • Reportedly running a training camp in Abyan• Reportedly killed in 1/4 raid in Arhab, unconfirmed




Hizam MujaliAQAP Commander

• Reportedly member of 15-man cell that launched the attack on the French tanker Limburg on October 6, 2002

• Resisted arrest in 2003 and killed a Yemeni police officer• Escaped in the February 2006 prison break• Turned himself in to authorities and struck a deal renouncing al

Qaeda in exchange for his freedom• Reportedly reconnected with Qasim al Raymi




Mohammed Saleh al KazimiAQAP Abyan cell leader

• Named as suspect in July 2, 2007 suicide car bomb that killed eight Spanish tourists in Ma’rib

• Reportedly ran a training camp in Abyan province • Killed in 12/17 strike in Abyan, confirmed




Sheikh Anwar al AwlakiInfluential figure in AQAP

• Influential American-Yemeni whose radicalized teachings are readily available online and who is accessible via his blog– Connections found to 9/11 hijackers, the Virginia 11, 7/7

bombers, Toronto 18, Fort Hood shooting, and Christmas day attack

– “44 Ways to Support Jihad,” calls on all Muslims to engage in jihad

• FBI opened inquiry into activities in 1999-2000• Investigated for connection to two 9/11 hijackers• Arrested in Yemen for al Qaeda ties in 2006, supposedly at the

U.S.’s behest, released 18 months later• Indications that he is a recruiter and is “operational”• Said to have survived the 12/24 strike, unconfirmed 53


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Major al Qaeda in Yemen Attacks (AQIY)Prior to 2009

• 9/17/2008: U.S. Embassy targeted by VBIED in Sana’a• 8/7/2008: Police convoy targeted in grenade attack in Hadramawt• 6/25/2008: Oil refinery hit in rocket attack in Ma'rib• 5/30/2008: Aden’s oil refineries and pipelines targeted in mortar attack• 4/30/2008: Italian embassy targeted in mortar attack in Sana’a• 4/23/2008: Police station damaged in grenade attack in Hadramawt• 4/16/2008: 3 police officers killed, 4 civilians wounded in landmine

explosion by suspected AQIY in Ma'rib• 4/12/2008: Water tank damaged in mortar attack by in Sana’a• 4/6/2008: Several houses damaged in mortar attack Sana’a• 3/18/2008: 1 police officer, 1 child killed, 22 civilians, 5 police officers

wounded in mortar attack in Sana’a• 1/18/2008: 5 civilians killed, 3 others wounded in attack in Hadramawt



Major AQIY Attacks Prior to 2009 (cont.)

• 11/5/2007: Oil pipeline damaged in IED attack in Ma'rib• 8/9/2007: Government building, police checkpoint, and power station

damaged in armed attack by suspected AQIY in Ma'rib• 7/2/2007: 10 civilians killed, 8 others wounded in VBIED attack by

suspected AQIY Ma'rib• 9/15/2006: Synchronized car VBIEDs targeting American and Canadian-

owned oil facilities attempted in al Dhaba, Hadramawt and Safir, Ma’rib • 12/4/2003: Assassination of the director intelligence of ‘Ibb province• 12/30/2002: 3 American missionary doctors killed and another wounded in

Jibla by Islamic extremist who spoke with al Qaeda members before attack• 10/6/2002: Attack on MV Limburg reminiscent of attack on USS Cole• 4/4/2002: Small explosion near U.S. embassy in Sana’a• 10/13/2000: Bomb exploded at UK embassy in Sana’a, no casualties• 10/12/2000: Attack USS Cole killed 17 American sailors• 1/3/2000: Failed attack on the USS Sullivans in Aden similar to USS Cole



Al Qaeda attacks in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Prior to 2009

• 2/24/2006: 2 security guards wounded in suicide VBIED in Abqaiq

• 6/30/2005: Security officer killed in armed attack by suspected al Qaeda near Mecca

• 12/29/2004: 4 civilians wounded in VBIED attack in Riyadh

• 12/29/2004: Civilian killed in VBIED attack in Riyadh

• 12/6/2004: 5 government employees killed, 3 others, 4 civilians, 2 soldiers wounded in armed attack and bombing in Jiddah

• 9/26/2004: contractor killed in armed attack by suspected al Qaeda in Jiddah

• 9/15/2004: UK citizen killed in Riyadh• 8/30/2004: Civilians targeted in attack by suspected al Qaeda in Jiddah• 8/3/2004: Civilian killed by suspected al Qaeda in Riyadh• 6/12/2004: Contractor kidnapped, then killed in Riyadh• 6/12/2004: Contractor killed in armed attack in Riyadh



Al Qaeda attacks in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Prior to 2009 (cont.)

• 6/8/2004: Government contractor killed in armed attack in Riyadh

• 6/6/2004: Journalist killed, another wounded in attack by suspected al Qaeda in Riyadh

• 5/30/2004: 22 civilians killed, 25 citizens wounded in armed attack and hostage attempt al Khobar

• 5/1/2004: 6 civilians killed, 19 police officers wounded in IED and armed attack in al Madinah

• 4/21/2004: 5 civilians killed, 148 wounded in suicide VBIED attack by suspected al Qaeda in Riyadh

• 4/13/2004: Militants open fire on checkpoint killing four police officers

• 11/8/2003: Suicide car bombing in Riyadh housing complex killed 17 people and wounded over 120 others

• 9/14/2003: Saudi marijuana trafficker beheaded

• 5/12/2003: Synchronized suicide car bombings at three foreign compounds killed 26 people, including 9 U.S. citizens



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