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Page 1: XENOPHON AND THE ART OF COMMAND - gbv.de · XENOPHON AND THE ART OF COMMAND Secrecy, Spies, non-combative Deception and Intelligence 67 Intelligence requirements and shortcomings

A 335435

XENOPHONAND THE

ART OF COMMAND

Godfrey Hutchinson

Greenhill Books, London

Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania

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CONTENTS

The Principles of War 2List of Illustrations 11Acknowledgements 12Preface 13Brief Biography of Xenophon 14

Introduct ion 18

The Historical Context 21 Greek Armies at the Mid-Point of thePeloponnesian War 26 Some Points on Persia 32 Battles 33The Main Text 35 Main Sources and Abbreviations 38 Glossary 39

Part One. Xenophon as Commander 41

Piety 45The 'sneeze' 45 Dreams 46 Sacrifices 46 Purification rites 49The battle dead 49 More on sacrifices 50 Pledges 50

Morale, Training and Discipline 51Xenophon's views other than in the Anabasis 51 Care of men 52Problems of provisioning 56 Some indiscipline 57 Methods ofacquiring provisions 57 Leadership by example 60 Temporarybreak-up of army 61 Use of corporal punishment 62 A moving citystate? 62

On the March and in Camp 63Decisions to be taken 63 Initial problems 63 Special forces 64Tactical night movement of Greeks and Persians 64 Van andrear to be in contact 65 Secure camp in enemy territory 65 Picketsand fires 65 Order of march by day and by night 66

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XENOPHON AND THE ART OF COMMAND

Secrecy, Spies, non-combative Deception and Intelligence 67Intelligence requirements and shortcomings 67 Choice of route 68Non-aggression pact and subsequent problems 68 Evidence of basicintelligence structure 70 Methods of acquiring information 70 Somedeceptions 71 The later value of Xenophon's experience 73

Tactics 73Few but effective cavalry 73 Successful attack of Mithridates 74Analysis of needs 74 The failed second attack of the Persians 75Actions in mountainous areas 75 Use of special forces 76Protection of flanks from high positions 77 Weaknesses indiscipline 78 Tissaphernes' tactics for harassment 78 Questions ofterrain 79 The enigma of the Chalybians 80 Drilai fortifications 80Mysterious spearmen 81 Problems from an over precipitateadvance 81 Analysis points to lesser of two evils 82 Disciplinedattack and withdrawal 82 Insubordination turned to advantage 83Attack uphill with covering fire 84 Evaluation of enemy leads to lightinfantry success 84 Adaptive tactics 84 Changing battle lines forchanging conditions 85 Problems for unbalanced forces 88 Use ofreserves 89 Crossing a ravine 90 The battle against Spithridates andRathines 90 A drop in high standards 91

Postlude 92Need for a balanced force 92 Cavalry 93 Failure of Greeks tocapitalise on the experience of the Anabasis 94 Archery 94 Wickershields 94 Insubordination 94

End Notes 95

Part Two. Commanders in Practice 411-362 BC 100

Training of Militias 100 New thinking 101 Command position 101

Cavalry 101Physical limitations 102 Uses 103 New roles 103 Agesilaos raises acavalry force 104 Battle of Sardis 104 Agesilaos' tactics in Thessaly104 Cavalry prior to Leuktra 105 Economics and politics 105Manoeuvres at Leuktra 106 Poor support at Lechaion 106 Syracusan

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CONTENTS

cavalry 107 Formations and tactics at Second Mantineia 108Phleiasians 109 Action at Olynthos 109 A long pursuit 110

Piety 111Responsibility for the dead 111 Sacrilege 112 Changes in attitude112 Sparta's decline in manpower 121 Duties of the Priest King atSparta and Archons at Athens 122—123 Rites 124 Responses toportents 124 Confirmation by sacrifice 125 Holy truce 127 Signsfrom heaven 127 Battlefield sacrifice 128 Gross impiety 129 Moralcause of Leuktra 130

Morale, Training and Discipline 130Agesilaos'example 131 Iphikrates'training methods 132 Sustainingmorale 132 Confidence in leadership 133 Lysander's death 134Lysander's faults 134 Trust and respect 134 Degrees of discipline135 Indecision and lack of control 136 Dangers of a lack of trust 137

On the March and in Camp 137Spartan organisation 138 A Theban practice 139 Effecting a safewithdrawal 139 Speed of march 139 Marching in battle order 140Disregard for safety 140 A river as flank protection 140 Making aforce seem larger 141 The anastrophe 142 Timing 142 Overnightmarch 142

Secrecy, Spies, non-combative Deception and Intelligence 143Alkibiades and Lysander 143 Kyros the Younger 144 Intelligenceafter Kounaxa 145 The capture of Thebes 147 Liberation ofThebes 147 Sphodrias 148 Tactical deception by Agesilaos149 Epameinondas' deception prior to Mantineia 150

Tactics 150Pre-fourth century manoeuvres 150 Mercenaries 151 Teleutias atsea 151 Praxitas at Corinth 151 Disadvantage of leadership bycommittee 152 Laxity and unpreparedness prior to Kounaxa 152Persian strategy 154 Koroneia 155 Desperate men 155 Repulse forthe Sacred Band 157 Intersupportive actions 157 Agesilaos retainsinitiative 158 Poor leadership by Gylis 159 Economic warfare 160Encirclement of Sparta 161 Continuity of command 161 Tegyra 161

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XENOPHON AND THE ART OF COMMAND

Command positions 162 Prelude to Second Mantineia 162The battle 165 Prelude to Leuktra 166 Psychology 168 The battle(Indecisive orders 169 Cavalry positions 169 Timing 170)Epameinondas' tactical developments 171 The thinkingcommander 173

End Notes 173

Part Three. The Ideal Commander 180

Expectations and problems 180 Greek attitudes to cavalry182 Hunting as training 182

Cavalry 183Establishment 183 Its growth 184 Armour and armament 184Uses 185 Camels 187 Necessary attributes of a commander 187

Piety 187Sacrifices 188 A catch all ceremony 188 Magi or army chaplains188 Involvement of all 189

Morale, Training and Discipline 189How to sustain morale 189 Care 189 Health, food, equipment,exercise and competition 190 Fostering comradeship 190 Acommander's accessibility 190 An enemy's morale 191 Rewards 192

On the March and in Camp 192Safety in transit 192 Order of march 193 Passing of orders 193Night advances 194 Preparations for march prior to Thymbrara 194The march itself 195 The two Babylon marches 195 Camp positions196 Large shields 197 Fires 197

Secrecy, Spies, non-combative Deception and Intelligence 198Gathering intelligence 198 Checking its veracity 198 The Armenianruse 199 Indian envoys 199 Using rumour 199 A planted spy in theenemy camp 200

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CONTENTS

Tactics 200Need for good defence 200 Close quarter engagement 201Digression — Theban cavalry at Leuktra 201 Where and when toattack 201 The safe retreat 201 Concealing the size of forces 202Psychology 202 Creativity in command 203 Infantry withcavalry 204 Appropriate size of forces 204 Foraging 204 Forwardpositions 205 Capturing fortified positions 205 Babylon 206Anastrophe 207 Siege operations 207 Treatment of civilians 208Culminating point and operational pause 209 Chariots and moveabletowers 210 Evaluation of numbers to engage 211 Tensions incommand 211

The Final Battle 212Planning the battle line 212 The master plan 212 Openingmoves 213 The battle 214 Signals 215

End Notes 218

Concluding Comments 224

Cavalry 224Topography 224 Uses and importance 225 Formations 226

Piety 227Practices 227

Morale, Training and Discipline 227Rites and Commissariat 228 Insubordination 228 Training andsecurity 228

On the March and in Camp 229Fires, topography and formations for marches 229 Speed of march230 Concealment of strength, timing of orders 230

Mercenaries 231Economics 231 Former uses of mercenaries 231 Availability afterPeloponnesian War 231

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XENOPHON AND THE ART OF COMMAND

Secrecy, Spies, non-combative Deception and Intelligence 232Evaluation and sources 232 Disguising strength and intention 233

Tactics 234Spartan lead to the right 234 Depth of the Theban phalanx 234Leuktra 234 Second Mantineia 235 Increasing professionalism 235Adaptations in armament 235 Interdependence of arms 236 Uses ofancillary forces 236 Reserves 236 Discursus on the phalanx and itsdepth 237 An extrapolation for Leuktra 237 Second Mantineia 239Xenophon's view of depth 239

After Xenophon 240The problems of hegemony 240 Phillip II 240 Developing trends240 Cavalry and commanders 240 Hannibal's debt? 241

Appendix 1: Jason of Pherae 242

Achievements 242 Involvement after Leuktra 242 Last action andpossible aim 242

Appendix 2: Siege Warfare and fortifications 244

Deception preferred 244 Problems for hoplites 244 Fortifications244 Syracuse 244 Plataea 245 Mantineia 245

Appendix 3: Economic Warfare 246

Agricultural methods and depredation 246 Agesilaos 247Epameinondas' great achievement 248

Main Characters 249

Chronology 253

Select Bibliography 268

Index 271

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