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X Annual Estonian Philosophy Conference

“Disagreements”

25.-27.09.2014 University of Tartu,

Department of Philosophy

Abstracts

Contents Christopher Gauker, Open Texture and Schematicity as Arguments for Non-referential Semantics,

(University of Salzburg) ........................................................................................................................... 3

Esa Diaz Leon, Issues in Conceptual Ethics: The Case of ‘Woman’, (University of Manitoba/University

of Barcelona) ........................................................................................................................................... 3

Dan Zeman, Disagreement in Semantics: On Two Contextualist Answers to the Challenge from

Disagreement, (University of Basque Country) ...................................................................................... 4

Riin Kõiv, Scrutinizing and deflating the role of ‘shared milieu’ in Haslanger’s account of ‘genuine

critique’, (University of Tartu) ................................................................................................................. 6

Riin Sirkel, Üksmeel Platoni ja Aristotelese vahel, (Vermonti Ülikool) ................................................... 9

Leo Luks, Lahkarvamuste staatus tõe-tus maailmas, (Eesti Maaülikool) ............................................... 9

Michiru Nagatsu, Scientific Progress in Economics and Psychology: Or How I stopped worrying and

learned to love interdisciplinary disagreements, (University of Helsinki/Tallinn University of

Technology) ........................................................................................................................................... 12

Margit Sutrop, Mida teha lahkarvamustega, mis ei ole näilikult ratsionaalselt lahendatavad?, (Tartu

Ülikool) .................................................................................................................................................. 13

Jaana Eigi, Two disagreements about political proposals in philosophy of science, (University of

Tartu) ..................................................................................................................................................... 16

Juhan Hellerma, Kas minevik on möödas?, (Tartu Ülikool) .................................................................. 17

Lauris Kaplinski, Miks lahkarvamusi ei saa analüütiliselt lahendada ehk miks on keeles, mõtlemises ja

filosoofias vastuolud, (Tartu Ülikool) ................................................................................................... 18

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Anne Kokkov, Värvide intentsionaalsus maalikunstiteoses, lähtudes Roman Ingardeni käsitlusest,

(Tartu Ülikool) ....................................................................................................................................... 20

Iuliia Krisheminska, Why European Experiment has failed in Ukraine?, (University of Tartu) ............. 22

Riin Kõiv, Individuating the vehicles of genetic representation, (University of Tartu) ......................... 23

Oliver Laas, Disagreements over Analogies: A Study of the “Problem of Virtual Communities”,

(University of Tallinn) ............................................................................................................................ 26

Andres Luure, Mittejäigad nimed, (Tallinna Ülikool) ............................................................................ 27

Ülo Matjus, Tõest ja õig(s)usest – ainult arvamisi, (Tartu Ülikool) ....................................................... 29

Katrin Laas-Mikko, Privaatsuse väärtuse kaalutlemine tehnoloogiate puhul ja konteksti roll, (Tartu

Ülikool) .................................................................................................................................................. 31

Amirouche Moktefi, Technology-assisted refereeing as a philosophical problem, (Tallinn University of

Technology) ........................................................................................................................................... 33

Jesús Enrique Moreno, Disagreement, The Phenomenology of Disagreement, and Enquiry, (Simon

Fraser University) .................................................................................................................................. 35

Peeter Müürsepp, The Problem of Verisimilitude – Maxwell vs Miller, (Tallinn University of

Technology) ........................................................................................................................................... 36

Margus Ott, Kokkukäiv lahkheli, (Tallinna Ülikool) ............................................................................... 37

Tamás Paár, Ethical Intuitionism and the Weight of Disagreements, Central European University/

Pázmány Péter Catholic University ....................................................................................................... 39

Karel Pajus, Moral constructivism and moral realism in Kantian ethics, (University of Tartu) ............ 41

Eduard Parhomenko, Vene Heidegger ja Eesti iseseisvus: filosoofia algus kui geopoliitiline küsimus,

(Tartu Ülikool) ....................................................................................................................................... 41

Vasil Penchev, Language in terms of disagreements, conflicts, contradictions, and messes, Bulgarian

Academy of Sciences ............................................................................................................................. 44

David Bordonaba Plou, A felicitious disagreement, (University of Granada) ....................................... 45

Fabien Schang, International disagreements, (National Research University, Higher School of

Economics) ............................................................................................................................................ 47

Philip Shadd, Reasonable Pluralism: Fact or Fall?, (LCC International University) ............................... 49

Kadri Simm, Humanitarianism and/or global justice?, (University of Tartu) ........................................ 51

Henrik Sova, Falling into Silence: the Burden of Proof Problem in disputes over Putnam’s Paradox

and the Brain-in-a-Vat Hypotheses, (University of Tartu) .................................................................... 52

Uku Tooming, The Commitments of Folk Psychology, (University of Tartu) ....................................... 54

Inga Vermeulen, Verbal Disputes and Failing to Disagree, (University of Hamburg) .......................... 55

Mats Volberg, Paternalismist ja vastutuse veeretamisest: Vastuseks Jonathan Quong’ile, (Yorki

Ülikool) .................................................................................................................................................. 57

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Invited Keynote Presentations

Christopher Gauker, Open Texture and Schematicity as Arguments for

Non-referential Semantics, (University of Salzburg)

Many of the terms of our language, such as “jar”, are open-textured in the sense that their applicability to novel objects is not entirely determined by their past usage. Many others, such as the verbs “use” and “have”, are schematic in the sense that they have only a very general meaning although on any particular occasion of use they denote some more particular relation. The phenomena of open texture and schematicity constitute a sharp challenge to referential semantics, which assumes that every non-logical term has a definite extension. A different, non-referential approach to formal semantics defines truth as relative to a context and defines contexts as built up from exclusively linguistic entities. For any given utterance of a sentence, there will be one of these contexts that pertains to it. In this framework, open texture and schematicity can be understood as consequences of the complex nature of the pertaining relation between contexts and utterances.

Esa Diaz Leon, Issues in Conceptual Ethics: The Case of ‘Woman’,

(University of Manitoba/University of Barcelona)

What is conceptual analysis about? According to the mainstream view in analytic philosophy, conceptual analysis is mostly concerned with the descriptive project of finding out what our ordinary concepts actually are, as opposed to the so--‐called ameliorative project of finding out what concepts we should use, for different purposes. However, recently many philosophers have started to pay more attention to ameliorative projects in different areas. Burgess & Plunkett have coined a new label, ‘conceptual ethics’, to refer to the project of finding out how we should think and talk in a certain area, and in particular what terms and concepts we should use, given certain normative and evaluative considerations. In this talk I will spell out the motivation for this project, and I will argue, first, that conceptual analysis in the traditional sense has already paid attention to normative and evaluative considerations, and second, that in any case, conceptual analysis should pay attention to normative and evaluative considerations of different sorts, including theoretical, moral and political values. In the second part of the talk I will focus on one case study, namely, the debate about the meaning of ‘woman’, and I will argue, first, that a contextualist proposal about the meaning of ‘woman’ can solve some recent problems, and second, that this is a clear case where moral and political considerations are relevant not only regarding the ameliorative question of what the term should mean, but also regarding the descriptive question of what the term actually means.

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Contributed Plenary Talks

Dan Zeman, Disagreement in Semantics: On Two Contextualist

Answers to the Challenge from Disagreement, (University of Basque

Country)

This paper focuses on the role played by disagreement in one contemporary debate about the semantic content of utterances – that between contextualism and relativism. Using predicates of personal taste for illustration, one major argument for relativism has been claimed to be contextualism’s inability to account for disagreement in ordinary dialogues like the following: DIALOGUE Anne: Avocado is tasty. Bob: No, it’s not tasty. The problem for (simple) contextualism can be seen if we compare the way the two views render DIALOGUE (where underlined material represents the content of utterances): DIALOGUE (C) Anne: Avocado is tasty for Anne. Bob: Avocado is not tasty for Bob. DIALOGUE (R) Anne: Avocado is tasty. Bob: Avocado is not tasty. While relativism can account for disagreement in DIALOGUE, contextualism cannot – at least if we conceive disagreement as involving contradictory contents. This notion of disagreement (tailored for the case of conversations like DIALOGUE) is defined in Conversational Disagreement (CD): Two interlocutors disagree if they assert contradictory contents in the same conversation. Several strategies have been employed by contextualists to respond to this challenge. Here I will tackle two of them. The first is that there are certain ways to use predicates of personal taste that would allow the contextualist to account for disagreement understood as (CD). Thus, consider what has been called “exocentric” uses of predicates of personal taste; the contextualist rendering of DIALOGUE-EXO Anne (speaking egocentrically): Avocado is tasty. Bob: (speaking exocentrically, from Anne’s point of view): No, it’s not tasty.

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is DIALOGUE-EXO (C1) Anne: Avocado is tasty for Anne. Bob: Avocado is not tasty for Anne. The contents of Anne and Bob’s utterances are contradictory, hence the contextualist can account for disagreement understood as (CD). However, this first contextualist strategy is incomplete in that it overlooks what is (or should be) the crucial case for the relativist, namely DIALOGUE-EGO: Anne (speaking egocentrically): Avocado is tasty. Bob (speaking egocentrically): No, it’s not tasty. This is a case in which the contextualist cannot account for disagreement understood as (CD). The second strategy consists in understanding the disagreement in DIALOGUE as involving opposite non-doxastic attitudes. However, since the contextualist is no expressivist, the contents those attitudes are towards need to be propositional; moreover, in order to be compatible with a contextualist semantics, those contents need to be different. This notion of disagreement (again, tailored for the case of conversations) is defined in Contextualist Attitudinal Disagreement (CAD): Two interlocutors disagree if they have opposed non-doxastic attitudes towards different contents in the same conversation, in contrast with a notion closely related to (CD), namely Relativist Attitudinal Disagreement (RAD): Two interlocutors disagree if they have opposed attitudes towards the same content in the same conversation. However, this second contextualist strategy is flawed. I show i) that adopting (CAD) as a view of disagreement yields unintuitive results; ii) that we need (RAD) to distinguish between cases of disagreement and mere misunderstandings; iii) that the contextualist argument for understanding disagreement in DIALOGUE-EGO as (CAD) fails. Regarding i and ii), it is a reasonable requirement that any theory of disagreement yields verdicts that conform to what we would intuitively take disagreement to be. Consider first how the second strategy contextualist will render DIALOGUE-EXO (where PRO and CON signify a positive and a negative attitude towards some content, respectively): DIALOGUE-EXO (C2): Anne: PRO (Avocado is tasty for Anne.) Bob: CON (Avocado is tasty for Anne.) and compare that with the rendering of DIALOGUE-EXO* Anne (speaking egocentrically): Avocado is tasty.

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Bob: (speaking exocentrically, from Claire’s point of view): No, it’s not tasty, which is DIALOGUE-EXO* (C2) Anne: PRO (Avocado is tasty for Anne.) Bob: CON (Avocado is tasty for Claire.) Intuitively, while DIALOGUE-EXO is case of genuine disagreement, DIALOGUE-EXO* is a blatant case of misunderstanding; yet, by the lights of the second strategy contextualist both cases count as disagreement. Secondly, if we compare the renderings of DIALOGUE-EXO and DIALOGUE-EXO*, we see that the only difference between the two is that in the first the opposite attitudes are towards the same content, while in the second they are not. We are thus lead to conclude that same content plays a crucial role in explaining disagreement in DIALOGUE-EXO; (RAD) is thus vindicated. Regarding iii), the most widespread contextualist argument for accounting for the disagreement in DIALOGUE-EGO by appeal to (CAD) is one based on similarity between cases. Contextualists have brought to the fore cases in which disagreement arises without same content, such as DIALOGUE-OILY Anne: I like avocado. Bob: I disagree, it’s too oily for me. The relevant question that needs to be asked is what the measure of similarity that the contextualist employs here is. Taking the mere existence of disagreement as the relevant similarity is no good, since it only works if we assume that there is only one way of disagreeing. The relativist, however, has no reason to commit to such a claim. An alternative answer to the question is to maintain that the required similarity is surface-deep: ceteris paribus, different wording requires different semantic treatment. But, if so, and if (RAD) is needed in the case of DIALOGUE-EXO, it should be needed in the case of DIALOGE-EGO too, since by the similarity measure accepted the two dialogues are identical.

Riin Kõiv, Scrutinizing and deflating the role of ‘shared milieu’ in

Haslanger’s account of ‘genuine critique’, (University of Tartu)

Assuming social constructivism it is difficult to account for ideology critique: Social construction: 1. The social fact CUTE is constituted by sufficiently many people believing ’CUTE’1. 2. Sufficiently many people believe ’CUTE’. 3. Given (1,2), CUTE is a fact. 4. Given (3), ’CUTE’ is true. 5. Given (4), one should believe ’CUTE’.

1 In Haslanger originally ’crop-tops are cue’

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Ideology critique: 6. CUTE should not be the case. 7. Believing ’CUTE’ makes CUTE the case 8. Given (6,7) one shouldn’t believe ’CUTE’. The problem: If truth is the constitutive norm of belief, and if (4), on what grounds is ideology critic (IC) justified in claiming that some subject S shouldn’t believe ’CUTE’? Haslanger offers a solution by employing MacFarlane’s (2007) account of context-relative truth and defining the conditions for ’genuine critique’ through ’truth relative to shared milieu’ requirement. She isn’t explicit however, by virtue of what does the latter legitimize critique. I will consider different options and demonstrate that ‘shared milieu’-condition cannot (i) provide necessary nor sufficient condition for justified critique, (ii) is indepted to strategies that Haslanger rejects in the paper. Haslanger’s argument The task is to account for ’CUTE’ being true while IC still being right in criticizing ‘– CUTE’. First subtask: How can ’CUTE’ and ’– CUTE’ be both true? Haslanger first rejects an intuitive… (A) moralist strategy: ‘should’ in 5 is epistemic, but in 8 moral. There is no conflict. because:

Moral reasons don’t bear upon belief forming. If merely a moral accusation, critique is futile.

Intuition that IC accuses S of misrepresentation (epistemic reasons). (B) Haslanger’s relativist solution: relativize the truth-value of ’CUTE’ to „milieus“ – social contexts operative for an agent. Which proposition ’CUTE’ expresses is fixed relative to S’s milieu (social construction), while truth-value of the proposition depends on which milieu it is assessed from. ’CUTE’ is true relative to S’s milieu, ’– CUTE’ is true relative to IC’s milieu. Second subtask: If both true, on what grounds is IC justified to criticize ‘CUTE’? Haslanger rejects… (C) objectivist strategy: appeal to objective (epstemic, moral) standards to privilege IC’s milieu over S’s milieu (hence the respective truths) dismissal: difficult to account for milieu-universal objectivity of such criteria (D) Haslanger’s „shared milieu“ solution: critique is justified (genuine) if true relative to some milieu that S and IC conciously share. But why, in what sense and how should being shared make a milieu and its respective truths privileged? Haslanger doesn’t elaborate. I will.

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Shared milieu as epistemic warrant? (E) An obvious option is to assume a version of intersubjectivity criteria of truth and objectivity – a claim is the more true/objective, the more people share the milieu relative to which it is true. My dismissal:

appeals to objective epistemic standards, is therefore an instance of (C), dismissed by Haslanger

conflicts with ideology critique’s aims: it often wants to criticize exactly what most people believe.

Shared milieu as pragmatic warrant? Haslanger (2012b)2 defines ideology critique as a political project with two adequacy criteria: i) truth ii) ability to make practical difference. Does shared milieu legitimize critique via (ii)? The argument might go3: iii) Critique is genuine if it changes social reality. iv) Social reality consists in the behavior of social agents v) Behavior is determined by beliefs vi) To change social reality one has to change what agents believe vii) To change what agents believe, critique has to be rationally endorsable viii) Pointing out a shared milieu relative to which critique is true makes the critique rationally endorsable ix) Pointing out shared milieu relative to which critique is true makes critique practically successful. Crealy rational endorsability (hence appeal to shared milieu) contributes to (ii). But is it either sufficient or necessary? - so as to provide a genuine alternative to the dismissed strategies? No:

As Haslanger allows, S can consciously operate in different milieus. Assume that in some ’CUTE’ is true, in orthers ’–CUTE’ is true. Truth being a cognitive norm, it is rational for S to hold ‘CUTE’ and ‘–CUTE’ simultaneously. Yet nothing suggests that accepting ‘–CUTE’, S should drop ’CUTE’. One now can appeal to (A) or (C) (dismissed by Haslanger) or ‘shared milieu’ requirement, under the pragmatic reading, is not sufficient for critique to be genuine.

If critique is genuine if efficient (ii – ix), then if means besides rational endorsement (manipulation, medical intervention, interference with material reality...) also guarantee (ii), those too suffice to make critique genuine. – either ‘Shared milieu’ is not necessary for genuine critique or extra (moral, epistemic) reasons should be provided that it is and (D) reduces to (A) or (C).

2 relying on Anderson (1995) 3 abbreviated version of the argument

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Conclusion: Haslanger’s notion of genuine critique cannot replace various other strategies to account for legitimate critique. References Anderson, Elizabeth S. 1995. Knowledge, human interests, and objectivity in feminist epistemology. Philosophical Topics 23(2), 27–58. Haslanger, S. 2012a. But Mom, Crop-Tops are Cute! In Resisting Reality. Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Haslanger, S. 2012b. Introduction. In Resisting Reality. Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford University Press: Oxford. MacFarlane, J. 2007. Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132, 17-31.

Riin Sirkel, Üksmeel Platoni ja Aristotelese vahel, (Vermonti Ülikool)

Tavaliselt nähakse Platonis ja Aristoteleses eri koolkondade või isegi maailmavaadete esindajaid ja eeldatakse, et kesksetes filosoofilistes küsimustes on nad põhimõttelisel lahkarvamusel. See pole alati nii olnud. Hilisantiigis (3-6 sajand) tegutsenud filosoofid lähtusid eeldusest, et Aristotelese filosoofia on harmoonias (sumphônia) Platoni filosoofiaga (‘harmoonia tees’). Neid filosoofe, kes filosofeerisid kirjutades kommentaare Platoni ja eriti Aristotelese teostele, nimetatakse sageli Kreeka Kommentaatoriteks ja nende filosoofia on oluline ühenduslüli antiik- ja keskaja vahel. Kuigi praeguseks on väljaspool kahtlust, et Kreeka Kommentaatorid võtsid omaks harmoonia teesi, pole sugugi selge, mida see endast kujutab. See on minu ettekande teema ning ma pakun välja, et ‘harmoonia’ all tuleks kõige üldisemalt mõista üksmeelt, s.t. lahkarvamuse puudumist. Oma ettekandes peatun ma kahel küsimusel. Esiteks käsitlen ma põgusalt harmoonia teesi kujunemise võimalikke filosoofilisi ja ajaloolisi põhjuseid. Teiseks uurin ma, kuidas Kommentaatorid antud teesi arendasid ja kaitsesid ühe vahest kõige huvitavama tolleaegse filosoofi, Philoponose näitel. Kommentaatorite filosoofilised vaidlused keskendusid Aristotelese “Kategooriatele”, kus esitatud väiteid oli ehk kõige raskem lepitada platonismiga. Näiteks väidab Aristoteles, et tõeliselt või esmaselt olevad (“esmased substantsid”) on meeleliselt tajutavad üksikud asjad, mis paistab olevat radikaalselt erinev Platoni seisukohast, et esmaselt olevad on meeltele kättesaamatud, mõistusega haaratavad ideed. Ma keskendun Philoponose “Kategooriate” kommentaarile, näidates, milliseid filosoofilisi käike ja eeldusi (nt. “Kategooriate” iseloomu ja tegelikkuse struktuuri kohta) harmoonia teesi kaitsmine temalt nõudis.

Leo Luks, Lahkarvamuste staatus tõe-tus maailmas,

(Eesti Maaülikool)

Lääne demokraatlikes ühiskondades tavatsetakse väärtustada lahkarvamuste olemasolu positiivselt. Samuti rõhutatakse, et filosoofia kujutab endast olemuslikult 2500 aasta pikkust

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lakkamatud vaidlust, lahkarvamusi. Oma ettekandes üritan võtta selle nö. viisakuspluralismi kriitilise vaatluse alla. Küsin:

1. Kas lääne filosoofias ja laiemalt kultuuris ollakse valmis lahkarvamusi jäägitult tunnistama, väärtustama neid nö. iseväärtusena, mitte tõeni liikumise vahendina?

2. Millised võimalused jäävad lahkarvamuste käsitamiseks olukorras, kus puudub igasugune tõde (või mõni teine tõe-laadne ühine alus)? Millised võimalikud tagajärjed on lahkarvamustel sellises olukorras?

3. Kas on üldse võimalik omada arvamust ilma selle arvamuse tõeväärtusse uskumata? Teisisõnu: kas on võimalik mõtelda seespool täielikku nihilismi? Mis saab hüpoteetilise lahkarvamuste vabamängu korral subjektist?

Küsimuste käsitlemise ulatus ja detailsus sõltuvad ettekandeks eraldatud ajalimiidist. Väidan: 1. Nii filosoofias kui laiemalt kultuuris aktsepteeritakse lahkarvamusi üksnes piiratud määral. Samuti ei väärtustata lahkarvamusi iseeneses, vaid üksnes tõe poole liikumise vahendina (vaidlustes selgub tõde jms). Iga kogukond, kultuur vajab püsimiseks kindlat hulka tuumseid ühisarvamusi. Ei piisa sellest, et ühisarvamusi peetaks kunatisteks kokkulepeteks või sattumuslikuks kultuuripärandiks; tuumsed alususkumused vajavad veenvuseks, praktikaid kujundavaks väeks kindla tõesuse tiitlit. Kultuuri hoiab koos uskumus, et maailmas valitseb korrapära, mida õige õpetus, logos, peegeldab ning tuletab sellest õiged käitumisnormid. Üks kaunis hiline lähenemisviis, mis on tänaseks saanud lääne kultuuris valdavaks ideoloogiaks, väidab, et just ainelise looduse hoolikas läbivaatus teaduslike meetoditega viib meid kindla tõeni. Üldiselt läbib lääne onto-teoloogilist mõtlemist põhiprobleemina see, et olulisimad tõed maailma kohta on peidus, nendeni jõudmine vajab erilisi meetodeid ja ehk ka vaimuandeid (Herakleitos: loodus/loomus armastab varjuda; sama mõtteliini jätkab veel ka Heidegger, üritades artikuleerida end loomuldasa varjavat olemist). Filosoofia peavoolud seletavad eriarvamuste olemasolu just sellega, et teadmise saavutamine on ülimalt keeruline. Mõtteviis, et maailma olemuseks on kaos, mida pole võimalik teadmisesse koondada, jääb lääne filosoofias väga marginaalseks. Tõsi küll: ajapikku on tõesuse nõue kultuuris mõnevõrra lõdvenenud. Võidakse nõustuda, et teatud valdkonnas käibivad sellised arvamused, millel puudub põhimõtteliseltki objektiivne tõealus (nt. maitseotsustuste puhul). Samuti võidakse nõustuda, et mõningates küsimustes pole võimalik filosoofiliste ega teaduslike meetoditega tõeni jõuda (nt. küsimused: milline on inimsoo õitsenguni viiv poliitiline programm; kas Jumal on olemas). Kuid kultuuris saab sääraseid lõdvendusi sallida üksnes juhul, kui kusagil mujal on nö baasuskumused, mida peetakse tõesteks. Näiteks lääne poliitilist diskursust kannab usk universaalsete inimõiguste vaieldamatusse kehtivusse — iga vähegi populaarset lahkarvamust nimetatakse radikalismiks ning välistatakse mitmel viisil. 2. Kuigi suusoojaks kõneldakse kõigi arvamuste relatiivsusest, postmodernistlikust olukorrast jne, ei ole selle olukorra (mida võiks Nietzsche sõnadega nimetada nihilismiks) tõsiduse üle veel laiemalt järele mõeldud. Nihilismi kui ajaloolise olukorra kese seisneb selles, et kadunud on nö. transtsendentne instants (Jumal, tõeline ilm vms) tõe ja vale, õige

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ja väära eristamiseks. Selle olukorra vahetuks järelmiks on mistahes arvamuste leviku põhimõtteline võimalikkus. Antud tees ei kirjelda mitte üksnes seda, et võimalikud on erinevad maailma kirjeldavad paradigmad (mis peaksid siiski olema sisemiselt koherentsed). Vastupidi: nihilismi ajastul ei nõua keegi loogilisust ja mõistuspärasust, levivad ka kõige pöörasemad doktriinid ja uitmõtted (mõeldagu näiteks, millist segadust suutsid 20. sajandi ajaloos külvata intellektuaalselt lihtsakoelised ideoloogiad). Probleem ei ole pelgalt intellektuaalne, arvamused kujundavad välja veendumusi, veendumused käitumist, tegusid. Vilets lohutus on viidata seejuures teaduse vaieldamatule autoriteedile: isegi kui jätta arvesse võtmata teadusliku teadmise piiratus (praktiliselt olulistes küsimustes, nagu nt. inimtegevuse mõju määr keskkonnale, ei lakka faktivaidlused kunagi), valitseb suurim tühimik just õigesti elamise küsimuses. Dostojevski sõnadega: kui Jumalat ei ole, siis on kõik lubatud. Nagu nähtub sotsioloogilistest uuringutest, ei tee see totaalne vabadus keskmist lääne inimest eriti õnnelikuks. Sestap levivad nii kõikvõimalikud esoteerilised eluabi õpetused kui ka kramplik klammerdumine nö. üldinimlike püsiväärtuste külge. Olgu mainitud, et paljud viimase sajandi filosoofid üritavad nihilistlikku tõe-tuse olukorda mõtestada, enamasti otsides olukorrast väljapääsu. Seejuures panustatakse nii inimese olemuslikule ratsionaalsusele (nt Habermas) kui ka empaatilistele emotsioonidele (nt. Levinas). Ettekande maht ei võimalda neid alternatiive eritlema asuda. 3. Ettekande lõpetuseks vaatlen intellektuaalselt huvitavat ettepanekut, milles seisneb mõne tõlgendaja (nt. Vattimo) arvates Nietzsche nihilismiga toimetulemise strateegia. Kas on võimalik omada arvamusi-veendumusi ning nendest lähtudes toimida, ilma et seejuures omistataks noile arvamustele tõeväärtust? Filosoofilises plaanis on seisukoht, et iga arvamus on pelgalt kokku luuletatud fiktsioon, küllaltki arusaadav (kui jätta kõrvale hambutu puhtformaalne relativismi paradoks). Kuid mis motiveerib sel juhul kedagi luiskelugu arvamusena omaks võtma? Üks lahendus oleks hoopis skeptitsismile omane: (olulistes küsimustes) igasugustest arvamustest loobumine. Nietzsche jaoks on selline variant dekadentlik (vt viimse inimese kujundit). Nietzsche ise tundub panustavat vitaalsusele: (teadvuses) pulseeriv puhas jõud (võimu tahe) formuleerib arvamusi ja paneb tegutsema. Kuid kas sel puhul pole jälle sisse hiilinud üks tõesusele pretendeeriv kõrgema taseme teooria (nõnda loeb Nietzschet nt Heidegger)? Tundub olevat selge, et inimene vajab siiski psühholoogilises plaanis tõesust maailmapilti korrastava funktsioonina. Väidan, et elamine tõe-tus luiskelugude maailmas, kaosmoses, nõuab teistsugust subjektiivsuse režiimi kui seda on kartesiaanlik enesega kooskõlas olev subjekt. Terviklik mina peab muutuma skisoidseks lahkarvamuste tandriks, mis ei vaja enda püsimiseks nö. alusnarratiivi. Arvan, et Nietzsche üleinimese mõiste säärane tõlgendus on küllaltki õnnestunud; olulise sammu säärase hargneva subjektiivsuse poole teostavad ka Deleuze ja Guattari.

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Michiru Nagatsu, Scientific Progress in Economics and Psychology:

Or How I stopped worrying and learned to love interdisciplinary

disagreements, (University of Helsinki/Tallinn University of

Technology)

Recent popular books accuse economists of being totally misguided about human decision making with the notorious postulation of homo economicus. In fact, however, economists are quite frank about the unrealistic nature of the assumptions of their models in general, and of individual decision making in particular. Although Milton Friedman’s (1953) instrumentalism---the methodological doctrine that the truth of the assumptions of economic models doesn’t matter as long as those models successfully predict real world economic phenomena---is losing popularity even among economists, better alternative defenses, such as models as Galilean idealizations (McMullin 1985; Cartwright 1999), isolations and surrogate systems (Mäki 1992), or credible worlds (Sugden 2000) for reliable causal inferences, have been proposed by philosophers and methodologists. Lively discussions continue as to which of these accounts of scientific modelling is better, but the bottom line is that successful causal inferences can be made from models with clearly false assumptions, such as expected utility maximization. If this is the case, the disagreement between economists and psychologists cannot be about the methodology of using false assumptions in their models: in fact both use the very same methodology in different ways (e.g. economists idealize about psychology; psychologists idealize about neurology), with a varying degree of success. Instead, their disagreement must be substantial rather than methodological in nature. I turn to three candidates of domains of such substantial disagreements ((1) risk preference; (2) time preference, and (3) social preference), and conclude that none of them genuinely constitute domains of serious empirical disagreement. That is, the available evidence on individual decision making is more or less taken into account in both economic and psychological models, though in somewhat different ways. I then argue that remaining genuine disagreement is practical. That is, as policy advisors, economists recommend that the government promote national wealth by, based on the best relevant economic models, intervening on incentives to which economic agents respond, such as interest rates and taxes. In contrast, some psychologists who are keen on economic issues believe that the government should intervene on decision making processes so that individuals make less choices that are bad to themselves, e.g., bad bets such as gambles, impatient decisions such as under-saving, or selfish behaviour such as non-provision of public goods. The disagreement is practical in the sense that the explicit disagreement is at the level of practical recommendation, while it is not clear whether both camps disagree with each other on propositions such as: (1) “The best way for G to achieve W in C is to intervene on I.” (2) “The best way for G to achieve W in C is to intervene on P.” (3) “The best way for G to achieve W in C is to intervene on X.” etc. Although the practical disagreement is serious because both camps most likely disagree on these propositions (after all the rationality of their occupational choice seems to depend on the truth of such propositions as (1) and (2)), I argue that this disagreement can be domesticated, as it were, without being elevated as a matter of belief, as some

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disagreements in religion. This can be done by undermining the dichotomy between (1), (2), (3) … by demonstrating that “G can better achieve W in C by intervening on I with the knowledge about P, or vice versa, than on I or P alone”. I give two examples of this kind, one from economics of risky choice and the other from behavioral economics of information. I end up with a response to the sceptic who says that serious disagreement remains since both examples do not resolve the tension between those who subscribe to (1) and those who subscribe to (2). My response is that this is fine because the goal of science as a whole is not to resolve the tension of this kind. Rather, the point of scientific progress is to increase our practical knowledge (of e.g. how to achieve W in C) by domesticating and exploiting such epistemic tensions. Philosophers should worry about whether the latter is achieved, instead of worrying about the former issue in isolation. This conclusion generalizes Hasok Chang’s (2012) active normative pluralism as a philosophy of interdisciplinarity.

Margit Sutrop, Mida teha lahkarvamustega, mis ei ole näilikult

ratsionaalselt lahendatavad?, (Tartu Ülikool)

Moraali, poliitika ja religiooni küsimuste üle toimuvates arutlustes näivad mõned lahkarvamused olevat olemuslikult lahendamatud. Näib, et siin ei aita tavapärane retsept - võtta rohkem aega arutlemiseks, kontrollida, et arutluskäigus pole tehtud vigu ning kontrollida üle faktid, millel arvamused põhinevad. Nii filosoofias kui ka igapäevases arutlevas demokraatias on ikka ja jälle tõdetud, et kõik see ei pruugi aidata vastandlikke pooli leppimisele lähemale. Tõdemus, et on küsimusi, kus lahkarvamusi ei saagi lahendada, tekitab ühelt poolt küsimuse moraali objektiivusest ning teisalt praktilise küsimuse, mismoodi korraldada kooselu nendega, kelle arvamustega me ei nõustu (Mason 1993, Gowans 2000, McMahon 2009). Lahendust on nähtud sallivuses (McKinnon 2006) või koguni pandud ette nõustumist, et ei nõustuta (Holm 2010). Paljudel juhtudel hakatakse enne otsima praktilisi lahendusi, kui on lähemalt uuritud, mis sorti lahkarvamustega on üldse tegu, mistõttu on võimalik, et hinnates valesti ründeobjekti, võetakse kasutusele valed relvad. Hiljuti on mitmed sotsiaalteadlased (Haidt 2012, Bartels 2008) arvanud, et moraali ja poliitika küsimustes on tegemist mitte-ratsionaalsete lahkarvamustega, mis põhinevad emotsioonidel ja intuitsioonidel, mistõttu nad ei allu ratsionaalsetele argumentidele. Samas ei pea emotsioonidel põhinevad lahkarvamused olema tingimata mitte-ratsionaalsed. Kõik oleneb sellest, kuidas me emotsioonide olemust mõistame. Kui emotsioone mõista kui afektiivselt laetud hinnangulisi otsustusi (affect-laden axiological judgments) (Broad 1971, Lyons 1980), siis saab ka emotsioonide puhul rääkida nende ratsionaalsusest ning küsida, kui sobivad või mittesobivad nad antud olukorras on. Sageli arvatakse, et emotsioonidele keskendumine tähendab loobumist objektiivsuse taotlusest või üldse eetilisest arutlusest. Need kahtlused on ümber lükanud Martha Nussbaum (2001). Ka Patricia Greenspan (1988, 2011) on veenvalt näidanud, et emotsioonidel on eriline roll ratsionaalsuses ja emotsioonid võivad tugevdada moraalseid aluseid või koguni ise toimida moraalsete alustena (moral reasons). Põhjus, miks siiski pole lahkarvamuste debattides emotsioone tõsiselt võetud, seisneb ilmselt selles, et neid on

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peetud otsustuste “pimedateks” põhjustajateks. Kui ratsionaalsust ja praktilist arutlemist mõista aga avaramalt, saab ilmsiks, kuidas emotsioonidel on praktilises arutlemises oma väärikas koht. Kuidas siis lahendada lahkarvamusi, mis ei ole tingitud sellest, et ühel osapoolel on valedel faktidel põhinev uskumus või et arutlemises tehakse loogika viga? Arvan, et kui selgub, et mõnes moraali, poliitika või religiooni küsimuses lähevad inimeste arvamused lahku sellepärast, et neil on erinevad väärtused, soovid või emotsioonid, siis tuleks mõelda sellele, kas ja kuidas väärtuskonfliktid on lahendatavad või kas emotsioonid ning soovid on muudetavad. Käesolevas ettekandes huvitavad mind eelkõige emotsioonidel põhinevad lahkarvamused. Oma ettekandes tahaksin avada emotsioonidel põhinevate lahkarvamuste olemuse ning pakkuda välja võimalikke teid selliste lahkarvamuste lahendamiseks. Selleks on vaja arutada lahti emotsioonide, kujutlusvõime, soovide ja väärtusotsustuste seos, milles kavatsen toetuda nii klassikutele (Hume, 1748, Smith 1759) kui ka kaasaegsetele autoritele (Helm 2001). Seejuures kavatsen rõhutada, et lahkarvamuste lahendamisel on oluline roll täita kujutlusvõimel (imagination). Plaanin näitena analüüsida paari kõigile tuntud lahkarvamust, nt Taani pilapildi skandaali, Eesti ühiskonnas kulgevat vaidlust kooseluseaduse üle ja sakslaste ning hollandlaste erinevat suhtumist eutanaasia moraalse lubatavuse küsimusse. Püüan näidata, kuidas kõigi nende puhul ei ole üksmeele saavutamine mitte selle taga, et üks pool eksib faktides või et argumendid ei veena, vaid et moraalsete hinnangute aluseks on erinevad emotsioonid, mis võivad olla rohkem või vähem sobivad. Emotsioonidest põhjustatud lahkarvamuste puhul ei saa loota vaid sellele, et vaadatakse üle, kas lähtutakse tõestest faktidest ja esitatakse üksikasjalik tõestusmaterjal oma seisukohtade kasuks, kuna see ei mõjuta teise emotsiooni. Pigem tuleb vaadata, millisest perspektiivist vaidlusküsimust vaadatakse ning mis emotsionaalne reaktsioon on antud olukorras sobiv (erapooletu vaatleja seisukohast). Näitan, et teise inimese emotsiooni mõistmiseta ei ole võimalik jõuda isegi lahkarvamuse tuumani. Toetudes Adam Smithi käsitlusele erapooletust vaatlejast, kes aitab korrigeerida emotsioone, väidan, et lahkarvamuste puhul tuleb võtta appi kujutlusvõime, mis aitab kujutada ette, kuidas teine olukorda näeb ja mis emotsioon tema arvamust kannab. Tüli lahendamiseks ei piisa muidugi vaid teise inimese mõistmisest. Tuleb jõuda selgusele selles, mida tunneks antud olukorras erapooletu vaatleja ja siis püüda muuta kas enda või teise emotsiooni. Siin saab jälle loota vaid sellele, et kannustatakse vastaspoole kujutlusvõimet (avardades konteksti, kus vaidlusküsimust vaadatakse), pannakse vastaspoolt vaatama vaidlusobjektile hoopis uuest vaatekohast, lootusega kutsuda esile teistsugune emotsioon, mis annaks võimaluse jõuda koosmeelele. Kui küsida, mis peaks inimest motiveerima oma emotsiooni muuta, siis saab jällegi vastata Adam Smithi (1759) sõnadega, et inimest kannustab soov emotsioonide tasakaalu järele, mistõttu olukord, kus teised (sh erapooletu vaatleja) ei jaga emotsioone, on ebameeldiv ja seetõttu püüeldakse emotsioonide harmoonia poole.

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Kirjandus Bartels, D., Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgement and decision making. Cognition, 2008, 108: 381-417. Broad, C. D. Emotion and sentiment. In Critical Essays in Moral Theory. London: Allen & Unwin, 1971/1954. Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Pantheon. Helm, B. W. Emotional Reason. Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Holm, S. “Euthanasia: agreeing to disagree?”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2010, 13, 399-402. Hume, D. Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963/1748. Lyons, W. Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Mason, A. Explaining political disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. McKinnon, C. Toleration. A Critical Introduction. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. McMahon, C. Reasonable Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Greenspan, P. Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. New York: Routledge, 1988. Greenspan, P. “Craving the Right”, in Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Nussbaum, M. C. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Roberts, R. C. Emotions in the Moral Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Smith, A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie. Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 1982/ 1759.

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Contributed parallel talks

Jaana Eigi, Two disagreements about political proposals in

philosophy of science, (University of Tartu)

A number of recent accounts in philosophy of science propose certain changes in the way science is organised. The aim of my presentation is to discuss two strategies for justifying such a proposal. One of them explicitly involves non-epistemic values; the other explicitly denies their relevance. In the first part of the presentation, I argue that the disagreement between these strategies is superficial: the argument that denies the relevance of values fails to justify this claim. I suggest that the real disagreement is between arguments that see a place for political proposals in philosophy of science and arguments that deny it. In the second part, I begin to address this issue, suggesting that philosophical analysis and political proposals may be closely connected but the practical realisation of the latter remains an open question. Janet Kourany (2003) defends the notion of socially responsible philosophy of science that focuses on the social consequences of research and evaluates it in light of the “egalitarian ideal of human flourishing” (Kourany 2003, 6). Epistemic values, hypotheses and research projects to be preferred are those that can contribute to the achievement of this ideal. Kourany’s proposal for changes in scientific practices and organisation is thus explicitly connected to her preferred social values. This approach can be contrasted with James Brown’s (2008). After summarising a number of epistemic problems in medical research that he attributes to the current funding and patenting regime, Brown argues that the discovery of its negative influence should lead to the introduction of a new regime: socialised research. He acknowledges that the proposed form of organisation may appeal to one’s moral sense but denies that moral values are relevant for discussing the epistemic proposal. Brown’s argument presupposes that once the epistemic rationale for a form of social organisation of science is given, it is immune to criticism in terms of values that its implementation is likely to promote. I discuss three possibilities for defending this position. The first is to argue that the form of organisation preferable for epistemic reasons should not be appraised from the perspective of its practical consequences, as pure research is not subject to such an appraisal. Another possibility to block the discussion of values associated with the proposal is to argue that the advancement of epistemic aims of science overrides any other values: as long as the proposal is epistemically beneficial, consequences for other values do not matter. Finally, it is possible to use the “thesis of neutrality” (Lacey 1999, 74–82) and to argue that the epistemically desirable form of organisation does not benefit any value system in particular and thus one cannot criticise it for advancing particular values. All these positions have known problems and need defence before being able to support the argument; Brown does not provide it. Moreover, I show that some aspects of Brown’s

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argument undermine the possibility to defend any of them. In the argument, he recognises that a certain form of organisation of science does have practical consequences that are better compatible with some values than others. Accordingly, I conclude that Brown’s attempt to present his argument as immune to discussion in terms of social values fails and cannot provide a value-free alternative to Kourany’s approach. Kourany’s and Brown’s proposals can be together contrasted with the position that denies the legitimacy of political proposals in philosophy of science, such as Ronald Giere’s (2003) argument that the political project of Kourany’s socially responsible philosophy, unlike her naturalistic and critical projects, does not belong to philosophy of science. Addressing this real disagreement, I suggest that the borders between the projects may be less definite. As long as naturalistic philosophy is interested in the question of reliability of science, discovering that some aspects of the social organisation of science undermine it constitutes an important result. As Brown points out, improving the situation identified may require political action. The discussion of such action then seems a natural extension of philosophical analysis. However, Giere is right when pointing that acting for political change is not currently a part of professional philosophy. Accordingly, an important question for philosophy of science is the practical status of political proposals made within it. References Brown, James R. (2008). “The Community of Science®”. In: Carrier, Martin, Don Howard and Janet A. Kourany (eds.) The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 189–216. Giere, Ronald N. (2003). “A New Program for Philosophy of Science?”. Philosophy of Science 70(1): 15–21. Kourany, Janet A. (2003). “A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century”. Philosophy of Science 70(1): 1–14. Lacey, Hugh (1999). Is Science Value-Free? Values and Scientific Understanding. London and New York: Routledge.

Juhan Hellerma, Kas minevik on möödas?, (Tartu Ülikool)

Viimasel paarikümnel aastal on hakatud problematiseerima ja ümber mõtestama traditsioonilist ettekujutust aja põhikategooriate ehk mineviku, oleviku ja tuleviku vahekorrast. Põletavaimaks teemaks on seejuures mineviku ja oleviku suhe. Varem laialdaselt aktsepteeritud eeldus, et minevik ja olevik on üksteisest lahus, on asendunud ideega minevikust, mis on mingil viisil olevikus kohal, püsib selles, mõjutab ja määretleb seda. Rõhuasetuse nihkumist minevikult kui iseseisvast ja autonoomsest uurimisobjektist minevikuks, mis on olevikuline ja presentne, on üldistanud prantsuse ajaloolane ja mõtleja François Hartog, nimetades seda muutuseks „ajaloolisuse režiimis“. Sellega seoses räägitakse uuest, nn presentistlikust ajajärgust, mis erinevalt progressiusul põhinevast ning tulevikule orienteeritud mõtlemisviisist keskendub olevikule ning iseäranis oleviku vahekorrale minevikuga. Presentism ei tähenda seega oleviku eraldamist minevikust, vaid vastupidi, see haarab mineviku ja oleviku kokku ja vaatleb minevikku niivõrd, kuivõrd see ei

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lähe mööda, ei saa õieti minevikuks, vaid on alati presentne, püsiv ja möödumatu. Arutelu mineviku ja oleviku uuenenud vahekorra üle leiab aset interdistsiplinaarsel väljal, milles osalevad teiste seas ajaloolased, ajaloofilosoofid, antropoloogid ja arheoloogid. Minu ettekande eesmärk on anda ülevaade, kuidas muutus ajaloolisuse mõistmisel on toimunud, mida selle all täpsemalt mõeldakse ning kuidas toimunud nihet põhjendatakse. Samuti uurin, millised teemad ja uurimissuunad on sellega seoses esile kerkinud. Lähtudes eeldusest, et presentism on tõepoolest meie ajale midagi olemuslikku, kerkib küsimus, kuidas see paigutub laiemale skaalale – millised on olnud eelnenud ajastute temporaalsed dominandid ning kuhu tõmmata piir, millal üks ajajärk asendub teisega. Edasi küsin, kuidas mõista käimasoleva diskussiooni põhilist väidet mineviku ja oleviku läbipõimituse kohta. Mida ikkagi tähendab, et minevik on olevikuline? Sellele küsimuse vastamisel räägivad eri autorid näiteks traumast, kultuurist, pärandist, identiteedist ja mälust. Ettekandes visandan põhilisi strateegiaid ja argumente, mille abil mineviku kohaolu analüüsitakse. Teise seas osutan Jan Assmani rajatud mäluajaloole ning David Carri fenomenoloogilisele ajaloofilosoofiale.

Lauris Kaplinski, Miks lahkarvamusi ei saa analüütiliselt lahendada

ehk miks on keeles, mõtlemises ja filosoofias vastuolud,

(Tartu Ülikool)

Kui maailm ja selle kirjeldus oleksid sisemiselt kooskõlalised ja iga asja kohta oleks oleks olemas üks parim (kõige tõesem või kõige õigem) seisukoht võiks loota, et piisavalt põhjaliku analüüsi tulemusena võib selleni ka jõuda. Aga ei jõuta. Lähtudes (näivalt) tõsikindlatest eeldustest võime loogilise pedantsusega ehitada üles süsteemid mis mingites fundamentaalsetes väidetes tunduvad täielikult mitteühilduvad. Eeldustes vigu ei näi olevat aga järeldused on vastuolulised. Sellest näib järelduvat, et kas maailm ise või vähemalt keel, milles me seda kirjeldame sisaldab mingeid sisemisi vasturääkivusi (ja vasturääkivatest eeldustest võib loogiliselt tuletada ükskõik mida). Aga ükskõik mida me siiski ei näi saavat tuletada. Analüütikud ütleks nüüd muidugi, et me kasutame kusagil mõisteid, millel ei tähenda-tähista midagi. Ja Wittgenstein ütleks, et me kasutame keelt valesti, rääkides asjust millest rääkimiseks keel pole mõeldud. Aga millegipärast ei suudeta siis ka luua keelt, milles saaks neist asjadest kõnelda samal viisil nagu füüsikud suudavad rääkida tavakeelt ja matemaatikat sünteesides asjust, millest rääkimiseks tavakeel ka täiesti ilmselt pole mõeldud. Või vähemalt pole selline keel kontekstides, kus me filosoofilist mõtlemist tahame pruukida intuitiivselt vastuvõetav. Võib-olla on põhjus, miks analüütiline filosoofia pole suutnud siin rohkem selgust luua on see, et ta viskas liiga kergekäeliselt (kuigi mõistetavatel ajaloolistel põhjustel) kõrvale metafüüsika. Ei saa rääkida keelest rääkimata maailmast ja vastupidi.

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Ma arvan, et selle keele-maailma vastuolulisuse taga on nähtus, mille saab kokku võtta kahe väitena:

1. Iga propositsioon on definitsioon. 2. Sõltumatute võimalikkuste hulk maailmas on lõlik ja väiksem kui väidete (nähtuste,

asjade, tõsiasjade, mõistete, kategooriate) hulk Millele lisandub tegelikult aksioom (mida tuleb siis lihtsalt uskuda):

3. Maailm on olemas ühel viisil (ei sisalda vastuolusid ja tema täielik kirjeldus on võimalik)

Tõestust selle kohta muidugi ei ole (ja kas tõestus on üldse võimalik?) aga on mõned vihjed mis sinna suunas viitavad. Filosoofia sisutühjus. Kui me võtame ükskõik millise sisuka või mittesisuka metafüüsilise hüpoteesi ja arendame selle loogiliselt täielikult välja taandub see lõpuks tautoloogiaks. Ja kui me seda tautoloogiat veidi uurime saame aru, et see pole lahendanud ühtegi vastuolu vaid on lihtsalt defineerinud kõik mõisted ümber oma süsteemi nii, et kõik oleks kooskõlaline (kõik tautoloogiad olevatki tegelikult üks ja sama A=A). Kontrafaktuaalid ja modaalsused. Laused ilmselt saavad omada mingit sisu, mis on seotud nende tõeväärtusega aga ei ole nende tõeväärtus. Implikatsioonid. Laused on seotud omavahel (kui A siis B). Lausete sõltuvus keelest. Üksik lause võib tähendada ükskõik mida, tähenduse omandab ta ainult seotult suure hulga (võib-olla kõigi, võib-olla ainult osade) teiste lausetega. Binaarne (tõene/väär) mudel ei suuda ilmselt kirjeldada kõiki väidete seoseid. Ma pakun välja järgmise tähendusmudeli (ma illustreerin seda geomeetriliselt, teda ilmselt saab matemaatiliselt paremini formaliseerida aga see pole siinkohal eesmärk):

1. Maailm on väga suure (aga mitte lõpmatu) dimensioonide arvuga (eukleidiline) ruum.

2. Tegelik olukord on üks (ja ainult üks) vektor selles ruumis. 3. Iga propositsioon tähendab/tähistab ühte vektorit sellessamas ruumis. 4. See tähendus ei ole iseenesest fikseeritud ja võib olla ükskõik milline. 5. Iga kahele vastukäivale väitele vastavad vektorid peavad olema risti üksteisega. 6. Propositsiooni väitmine ja propositsiooni tõesus on erinevad asjad. 7. Propositsiooni väitmine on tema tähendusvektori paigutamine ühtima maailma

olekuga. 8. Propositsiooni tõesus tähendab, et tema tähendusvektor ei ole vastuoluline maailma

olekuga. 9. Keele loogiline struktuur tekib implikatsioonidest (kui... siis...). 10. Implikatsioon seob ühe propositsiooni väitmise teise propositsiooni tõeväärtusega.

Ehk väites: "kui A siis B" me nõuame keelelt, et kui propositsioon A ühtiks maailma olekuga, siis propositsioon B ei tohi olla vastuolus maailma olekuga (ja propositsiooni B eitus peab olema vastuolus). Aga me ei nõua, et propositsioon B ühtiks maailma olekuga (sest siis oleks A ja B üks ja seesama propositsioon).

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Seega tähendab implikatsioon, et A ja B ei ole vastuolulised aga A ja mitte-B on. Sellega me oleme piiranud A ja B (ning mitte-A ja mitte-B) tähendusvektorite võimalikku paiknemise (üksiku propositsiooni tähendusvektoril pole paiknemise piiranguid v.a. tema tõesus). Ärgem unustagem, et maailma dimensioonide arv on piiratud. Kui sõltumatute implikatsioonide arv kasvab, siis väheneb "vabade" dimensioonide arv, kuhu propositsioonide eitusi "paigutada". Ühel hetkel on kõik "vabad" dimensioonid ära kasutatud ning uusi vektoreid ei saa enam teistest sõltumatult paigutada. Ehk iga uue implikatsiooni lisamisel tekib "soovimatu" kaasnähtusena implikatsioon ka kusagil mujal. Me saame endiselt teha uusi ning korrata vanu implikatsioone. Lihtsalt me peame nüüd leppima sellega, et propositsioonid kusagil peavad olema vastuolulised. See millised väited nimelt, pole määratud (tähendusvektorite paikemine pole fikseeritud). Ma olen veendunud, et see fenomen eksisteerib palju üldisemalt kui ainult keeles ning kirjeldab igasugust maailma piiritlemist (näiteks objektideks jagamist) aga selle lähem uurimine jääb edasiseks.

Anne Kokkov, Värvide intentsionaalsus maalikunstiteoses, lähtudes

Roman Ingardeni käsitlusest, (Tartu Ülikool)

Ettekande aluseks on mu artikkel Intentionality of Colours in Konrad Mägi Paintings: Based on Roman Ingarden’s Ontology, mis lähtub Ingardeni esseest Pilt teosest Uurimus kunstiteose ontoloogiast: muusikateos, pilt, arhitektuur, film (1962). Ingarden kirjeldab “tegelike” materiaalsete “asjade” erisust “asjade” teadvuslike intentsionaalsete korrelaatide suhtes. Vastavalt eristab ta (1) ‘maali’ kui tegelikku asja, mis on meile antud lihtsas esmases nägemistajus, ja (2) kunstiteosena ‘intentsionaalset pilti’, mis ilmub keerukas intentsionaalsete pildi-teadvuslike aktide ahelas. Ingarden keskendub essees pildi kihilisele struktuurile, eristades ’vaadete’ ja ’esemelisuse’ kihte. Küsimus, kuidas me värvipastade alusel tajume esemeid, jääb Ingardenil süvitsi arendamata. Nimelt see ongi mu uurimise teema. Kuigi impressionistide kunsti iseloomustades kirjeldab Ingarden värvi-pasta pinnal valguse murdumisel tekkivaid värvi-kvaliteete, ei esine füüsikalise nähtava ’valgus-värvi’ mõistet ta käsitluses. Ingarden mõistab ’värve’ kui värvilaike maali pinnal; need on füüsikaliste ja keemiliste omadustega ega kuulu pilti. ‘Maali’ – ‘pildi’ dihhotoomia kõrval ei erista Ingarden (1) ‘värvi’ kui materjali ja (2) nähtavat ‘värvust’, nagu teeb värvi-teooria. Intentsionaalsest pildist kõneldes arutleme õieti värvuste üle. Pildilise valguse nägemist kirjeldades jätab Ingarden lahendamata küsimuse, kuidas määratleda värvus-kvaliteetide staatust pildis. Erinevalt Ingardenist olen veendunud, et pildi värvus-suhetes ilmub nähtusi, mida ei saa taandada värvilaikude materiaalsele tasandile. Pildi esemelisuse värvust näeme intentsionaalselt; pildi-teadvuses kogeme ühtlasi pildi esemelist “valgust”. Nimetatud

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nähtused ei ole „tegelikud“ materiaalses mõttes. Kuna pildi intentsionaalsete esemete koloriit ilmub fenomenaalselt, peaks esemelisi värvusi käsitlema intentsionaalsetena. Ingardeni väitel vastavad värvilaigud lõuendil algsetele nägemismeele andmetele reaalsuses kogetavatest esemetest. Värvilaigud toovad tunnetuses esile „päris“ esemetele analoogiliste esemete kvaasi-taju; pildis esitatus kogeme nii moodi “keha” enda koloriiti. „Keha“ värvide staatus jääbki Ingardeni tekstis ebaselgeks. Fenomenaalsetena kannavad värvus-suhted omadusi, mida värvainetel ei ole: pildi esemete värvus-kvaliteedid ja pildiline valgus. Nende üle arutledes läheme objektiivselt antud materiaalselt tasandilt (maalist) pildi-teadvuslike intentsionaalsete nähtuste juurde. Sõna otseses mõttes võetuna on Konrad Mägi Naise portree jämedas pintslitöös teostatud värvikihiga kaetud lõuend. Välises valguses näeme tumesiniste, pruunide, kahvatu roheliste jt värvide laike. Mõistame, et kujutis esitab naise poolfiguuri, sest värvilaikude struktuur toob tajusse naise kuju. Kui taevas on Naise portrees intentsionaalne ese, on ühtlasi taeva värvus-kvaliteedid intentsionaalsed, sest sinine värvilaik ei võrdu taeva-sinaga. Tegelikul füüsikalisel valgusel on objektiivsed füüsikalised omadused. Pildis näeme intentsionaalselt ilmuvat fenomenaalset valgust, mis on ainult pildi-sisene ning määrab ühtlasi pildiliste esemete koloriidi. Pildilises valguses nähtavate „asjade“ („kehade“) värv moodustub “keha pinna” värvi ja pildilise üld-valguse summast, sest valgus mõjutab ka esemete värvi. Üldiselt tajume värvus-kvaliteete sarnasel moel. See võimaldab lähtuvalt teose koloriidist mõista pildi esemeid intersubjektiivselt ühte moodi. Gestalt-psühholoogia loeb värvi-pertsepte meie algsete kaasasündinud pertseptide hulka. Ka kuju-pertseptid kuuluvad meie algsete loomulike tajude hulka. Ingarden ei viita Gestalt-teooriale, kuid taust on neil sarnane: nende õpetajatel oli ühine õpetaja (Carl Stumpf). Ingardeni käsitlus meenutab Rudolf Arnheimi arutlust: mõlemad peavad pildiliste esemete tajumise aluseks tegeliku maailma-taju esemetes kogetavaid põhilisi tüüpe. Värvilaigud on nii struktureeritud, et tajus moodustub tegelikkuse esemete struktuuri analoogia; pildi kujutis esitab õieti tegelikkuses tajutava eseme struktuuri-skeemi ekvivalentsust tasapinnal. Tegelikke esemeid tajume struktuuri-skeemi kõrval veel värvus-suhetes; sama toimub pildis. Tajume intuitiivselt teose värvus-suhteid ekvivalentsetena tegelikkuses kogetavate värvus-suhetega. Tegelike esemete värvus sõltub ümbritsevast valgusest; see muutub, kui muutub ümbritsev valgus. Pildis loob värvus-suhete valik mitte ainult „ümbritseva valguse“, vaid ka külma- ja sooja-tunde. Nii võib rääkida värvus-temperatuurist – soojadest ja külmadest värvidest pildis. Kuigi palaval suvepäeval ei pruugi me tajuda kollast, jätavad just domineerivad kollased teostes mulje kuumast suvepäevast. Värvivalik loob pildis ruumilise sügavuse, temperatuuri, meeleolud ja dünaamika. Värvivalik vahendab pertsepte, mida pildis pole võimalik teisiti väljendada. Värvused käituvad aga pildis erinevalt kui tegelikkuses, sest pildi-väli on miniatuurne võrreldes esemete ja nende värvusega. Tegelikkuses on aga esemed miniatuursed, võrreldes ümbritseva väljaga. Vastavalt on esemetel ja värvus-suhetel pildis teistsugune väärtus kui tegelikkuses.

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Värv ja ese lahutamatult seotud nii reaalsuses kui pildis, sest esemed ilmuvad värvilisena ja värvused ei esine kunagi üksi, vaid ikka esemetel. Esemed ilmuvad alati värvustes, kuid eseme ja värvuste suhe pole esemete tajumisel vältimatu, sest esemed võivad olla erinevat värvi (punane maja, roheline maja). Tavaliselt ilmuvad värvused segatuna, kuid Arnheimi järgi on värvuste tajumise aluseks primaar-värvused (kollane, sinine, punane). Pilti tajume tervikuna; esemed saavad vormi kogu pildi-ruumi koloriidis ja struktuuris. Tajume pildilisi esemeid struktuuri ekvivalentsuse ning värvuste ja valguse ekvivalentsuse kaudu tegelikkuses tuntud esemetega. Värvuste ekvivalentsus tähendab, et pildilised esemed ilmuvad värvus-suhetes, mis toovad esile tegelikkuse põhilistele värvi-pertseptidele vastavaid pertsepte. Valguse ekvivalentsust pildis vahendavad pildi värvused nii, et tulemuseks on meie loomuliku valguse tajuga sarnane kogemus. Kuna me kogeme maailma tajude kaudu, kogeme pildilisi esemeid, pildilist valgust ja värvusi tegelikele tajudele vastava ekvivalentsuse kaudu. Ingarden määratleb värv-ainete staatuse – need on materiaalsed ja meeleliselt tajutavad. Samal ajal ei määratle ta ilmuvate pildiliste esemete värvi staatust. Värvilaigud pildis ei võrdu pildiliste esemete värvus-kvaliteetidega; viimased ilmuvad fenomenaalselt. Pildi värvus-kvaliteedid kannavad sisu, mida ei ole värvipastadel. Ingarden ei anna intentsionaalsete esemete värvi-kvaliteetidele intentsionaalsuse omadust. Nii jääb tema filosoofias pildiliste esemete värvuse küsimus ebaselgeks. Pilt on intentsionaalne ehitis; vastavalt on intentsionaalsed kõik pilti kuuluvad nähtused. Roman Ingarden. The Picture. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst: Musikwerk, Bild, Architektur, Film (1962). Used here The Ontology of the Work of Art: the Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film; transl by Raymond Meyer with John Goldthwait, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989. 137-254. Print Ingarden. Streit um die Existenz der Welt, Formalontologie I, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1965. Print Rudolf Arnheim. Art and Visual Perception, A Psychology of the Creative Eye. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. London. 1967. Print Arnheim. Visual Thinking. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1997. Print

Iuliia Krisheminska, Why European Experiment has failed in

Ukraine?, (University of Tartu)

The idea of human rights traced back to philosophical works of Suarez, Locke and Kant. Since Congress of Vienna in 1814 its subcategory, minority rights, had risen in the consciousness of the international community, so that rational thought cannot avoid it. Nowadays one of the leading experts in this field is Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka. In 2007, he dedicated a whole chapter of his book 'Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity' to the so-called 'European Experiment': try to spread liberal and democratic model of diversity among post-communist

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countries for preventing ethnic conflict that can provoke refugee movements in Western Europe. The philosopher analyzed three strategies that have been employed by European organizations and what difficulties occurred during their implementations. Since Kymlicka's publication, seven years has passed but disagreements upon minority rights are currently central and hotly-debated throughout the world. Crimea and Donbass cases in Ukraine are the newest examples of how ethnic conflict can endanger peace and stability of the state and European community. In this talk, I will highlight reasons of launching European experiment and present three approaches, surveyed by Kymlicka: publicizing best practices; formulating legal norms; case-specific interventions. My general aim is to show how situation changed during last years and how mental disagreements led to the failure of this experiment in Ukraine and even escalated into sharper ethnic conflict.

Riin Kõiv, Individuating the vehicles of genetic representation,

(University of Tartu)

Nicholas Shea (2007a, 2011) defends a teleosemantic account of genetic representation. I will argue that: (1) the account is committed to a non-semantic individuating criteria for the vehicles of genetic representations, (2) Shea does not provide a good one, (3) initially plausible vehicle candidates are problematic. In Shea’s framework, to be a representation is to play a specific role in a system solving some environmental task that is describable by ‘the basic representationalist model’ (BRM). BRM divides a system into subsystems characterised by a specific role: (i) producer, (ii) intermediaries, (iii) consumer, where:

(iv) consumer system takes the intermediaries as input and systematically produces different outputs in response to different intermediaries.

(v) for each output, specific environmental contitions have to hold if the system is to solve its task successfully.

(vi) the system is successful if each intermediary systematically co-varies with specific environmental success conditions.

To be a representation is to function as one of the intermediaries. Contents of these intermediaries are fixed by their function in the system to differntially covary with consumer outputs and output-specific success conditions. Arguably, BRM applies to genetic inheritance system whose task is to produce adaptive organisms:

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producer Intermediaries (representations)

consumer System’s success condition (content)

Natural selection

genes

development

- development of adaptations - presence of environmental conditions in which the adaptations are adaptive

Selects particular genes for causing particular adaptive phenotypes in specific environmental conditions.

Evolutionary function to: - correlate differentially with environmental conditions causally responsible for the gene’s selection - cause selected phenotypes, adaptive in those conditions

Produces different adapted phenotypes (output) in response to different selected genes (input).

Content of an individual gene (qua representation) is specified by the gene’s evolutionary function and is hence a selectional property of the gene. As Shea (e.g. 2007b, 2013; also Godfrey-Smith 2006, 2007) argues, applying BRM to a system is legitimate if distinct entities correspond to each subcomponent of BRM, including each intermediary. What makes an entity? In case of representation in cognitive systems, the criterion has been: non-semantic individuation. It is common to distinguish representational contents and the vehicles having these contents. A condition for representations to be real entities is that the vehicles can be individuated as separate „items“ independently of content attribution (Shea 2006, 2007b). A test for whether some items, non-semantically described, are suitable as candidate vehicles is to see if some separate mechanism systematically produces different outputs in response to these different items – as in (iv) (Shea 2006). Absent such individuation criteria, it has been claimed – e.g. as regards connectionist theories of cognition – to suggest absence of representation (Shea 2007b). I argue that Shea’s account itself is in trouble with vehicle individuation. He says it is individual genes that carry content. However, ‘gene’ is ambiguous.4 I consider two common approaches to ‘gene’ and assess if under either construal genes are befitting as representation vehicles: Do they pass the systematicity test? Can they have selectional properties? Is their individuation non-semantic? 1. Shea specifies: contents are selectional properties of molecular genes, “(stretches of) DNA... transcribed as a single unit.” (2007a: 319). A gene has a selectional property if selected for some phenotype. This implies that during selection the gene was cross-contextually robust causal difference-maker with regard to the phenotype. But it is

4 see Stotz et al. (2004) for an overview of different gene concepts in biological research.

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empirically unlikely that in most cases any one molecular gene has such robust relation to a selected phenotype. (Griffiths&Sterelny 1999: 83-88; Griffiths &Stotz 2006) Molecular genes therefore cannot have content-properties as ascribed. 2. Functional gene is defined through phenotypic effect as: the difference-maker of a phenotypic difference (of interest) that shows Mendelian inheritance pattern (e.g. Waters 1994). This specification is indeterminate as to the material substance referred to; genes, functionally individuated, do not map onto a pre-existing physical type. (Griffiths&Sterelny 1999, Moss 2008) However, they do have the required robust relation to selected phenotypes, therefore can have selectional properties – functional gene just is the causal correlate of whichever heritable phenotypic difference. Functional genes also pass the systematicity test. In Shea’s account, consumer’s outputs are different selected phenotypes. Since functional genes are individuated by phenotypic effects, correlation between genes (input) and phenotypes (output) is guaranteed by definition. Nevertheless, treating functional genes as vehicles is problematic:

Materially undefined and often instrumentally specified, genes might not qualify as entities proper.

That the systematicity test is passed by virtue of definition deprives it of verifying power and empirical content.

Phenotypic effect partly constitutes the content of genetic representations. Individuating vehicles as functional genes – itself individuated through phenotypic effects – seems to rely on semantic description after all.

Conclusion:

Shea’s account is yet due a specification of ‘gene’ as content vehicle

There are principled reasons why genes as entities might not qualify as content vehicles. Given BRM application criteria, this threatens to undermine the account.

References: Griffiths, P.E (2001), ’Genetic Information: A metaphor in search of a theory’. Philosophy of Science 68(3), 394-412. Griffiths, P. E. & Sterelny, K. (1999). Sex and Death. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press Griffiths, P. E. & K. Stotz (2006), ‘Genes in the Postgenomic Era’. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (6), 499-521. Godfrey-Smith, P (2007) Innateness and Genetic Information. In P. Carruthers, S, Lawrence, and S. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 3: Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press, 55-68. Godfrey-Smith, P (2006) ‘Mental Representation, Naturalism, and Teleosemantics,’ in G. MacDonald and D. Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42-68. Moss, L. (2008), The Meanings of the Gene and the Future of the Phenotype, Genomics, Society and Policy, 4, 38-54 Shea, N. (2013), 'Naturalising representational content', Philosophy Compass, 8(5), 496-509 Shea, N. (2011), 'Inherited Representations are Read in Development', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(1), 1-31 Shea, N. (2007a), ‘Representation in the genome and in other inheritance systems’ Biology and Philosophy, 22, 313-331

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Shea, N. (2007b), ‘Content and Its Vehicles in Connectionist Systems’, Mind & Language, 22(3), 246-269 Shea, N. (2006), ‘Millikan’s Contribution to Materialist Philosophy of Mind’ (in French translation) Matière Première, 1, 2006, 127-156 Stotz, K, P. E. Griffiths, R. Knight (2004), ’How biologists conceptualize genes: an empirical study.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 35, 647–673.

Oliver Laas, Disagreements over Analogies: A Study of the “Problem

of Virtual Communities”, (University of Tallinn)

Disagreements are an increasingly prominent topic in semantics, metaphysics, ethics and other branches of philosophy. But they are also relevant for metaphilosophy. Many disagreements are rooted in aporetic clusters, viz. a set of philosophically relevant propositions such that:

(1) they are all independently plausible in light of the known evidence; (2) but they are mutually incompatible when taken together, thereby making the entire

set inconsistent. The evidential data for such clusters is drawn from everyday life, commonsense intuitions, and various kinds of scientific results. Because there are numerous prima facie equally valid ways for dissolving the inconsistency involved, disagreements over a cluster often lead to as well as involve disparate metaphysical commitments. Over time such disagreements bog down to little more than pitting conflicting intuitions against each other. Yet to characterize these disagreements as merely verbal does not entail that they are insubstantial. I will argue that sometimes it might be beneficial to recast such disagreements as disputes over analogies instead of treating them as differences over essential ontological commitments. I believe that this is justified because a lot of philosophical argumentation rests on analogical as well as other kinds of similarity-based reasoning. To argue my point I will demonstrate how a disagreement in information ethics over the moral impact of virtual communities—the so called “problem of virtual community”—can be recast as a disagreement over analogies. The disagreement is rooted in differing metaphysical intuitions about communities as well as the properties of virtual communities qua virtual. To reframe the argument I will:

Show that they rest on different semantic interpretations of the adjective ‘virtual’, which is treated either as a modal term in the metaphysical sense or as a property ascribing or sortal predicate. These ontological differences can be diffused if ‘virtual’ is interpreted as a linguistic hedge that modifies the truth values of contextually evaluated predicates and propositions.

Review relevant types of crisp and fuzzy analogies as well as forms of analogical reasoning involved in the debate.

Show that if the analogical reasoning involved is explicated, then the disagreements boil down to: (a) controversies over the relative weight of the positive and negative analogies (similarities and differences between the source and target domains); (b) disagreements over the adopted source domain, i.e. the standard of comparison. An

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important but so far largely neglected disagreement should involve (c) differences over the validity of the analogical arguments involved.

The benefit of such reconstruction and explication is that it can break us out of the deadlock of trading conflicting intuitions by instead focusing our attention on the validity of the arguments involved. While this does not necessarily eliminate any of the mutually incompatible propositions in a given aporetic cluster, it can, at least temporarily, put some of the propositions out of play because of the analogies they rest on, or the analogical arguments advanced on their behalf, are rejected. Since recent years have seen an upsurge in work on analogical reasoning, another benefit of the approach argued for here is that we would have at least some rudimentary guidelines for evaluating the validity of the analogies that the disputants’ positions rest on. While this procedure might not be applicable or particularly enlightening in all philosophical controversies, it could advance debates in some of them in virtue of providing a new point of view on the disagreement in question. Furthermore, using this procedure does not depend on the possibility of taking a nominalist approach to key terms within a given domain of discourse as was done in the case of ‘virtual’. In light of all this, it would be beneficial for philosophers to pay more attention to the analogies they employ, and to further develop normative theories of analogical and other kinds of similarity-based reasoning.

Andres Luure, Mittejäigad nimed, (Tallinna Ülikool)

Max Black (1952) räägib universumist, mis sisaldab ainult kaks täpselt ühesugust täiuslikult sümmeetrilist raudkera, mille keskmed asetsevad teineteisest kahe miili kaugusel. Nende nimed on Castor ja Pollux. Kumb on Castor, kumb on Pollux? Noh, me ütleme: „Olgu ühe nimi Castor ja teise nimi Pollux.“ Meil ei ole ühtki sõltumatut kriteeriumi, et Castori ja Polluxi vahel vahet teha. Vahet teha saame ainult nimede järgi. Nimed hoiavad neid kindlalt lahus. Näiteks kui me ütleme: „Castor ei ole Pollux,“ siis me kindlasti ei ütle sellega kummagi kohta, et ta ei ole tema ise. Me räägime siin nimedest, sest „Castor“ ja „Pollux“ näevad välja nagu nimed, aga kas ei jää siin midagi olulist puudu? Oletame, et keegi on selles universumis ekspeditsioonil ning paneb ühele taevakehale nimeks Castor ja teisele Pollux. Siis muidugi on see universum ise ka juba teine (nagu Black'ki märgib), ta pole enam see sümmeetriline universum, mis meid nõutuks tegi. Selline nimeandmine mahub väga hästi Kripke (1972) skeemi: taevakehad on ristinud see, kes nendega kokku puutus, ja nüüd kasutatakse nende nimesid kavatsusega, et need osutaksid samale taevakehale, millele need osutasid mõnel varasemal tarvitusjuhul. Aga isegi kui meile on jutustatud lugu sellest universumist, mis on küll asümmeetriline, kuid on ikkagi pelgalt kujutluslik ega saa seetõttu avaldada meie universumile põhjuslikku toimet (jätan kõrvale võimaliku põhjusliku toime, mida avaldab fantaasia objekt fantaseerijale), siis jääb meil ikkagi küsimus, kumb on Castor, kumb on Pollux, nii et tekib tunne, et pole selge, millele osutatakse. Pole sobivat põhjuslikku ahelat, mis ulatuks Castori ja Polluxi ristimisest meieni, rääkimata sellest, et stipuleerimine „Olgu ühe nimi...“ sellist ahelat tekitaks. Kas ehk raskus selliste nimede osutamise mõistmisel tuleb sellest, et objektid, millele osutada tahetakse, on kujutluslikud? Aga analoogne olukord võib tekkida ka abstraktsetele objektidele ja reaalse maailma konkreetsetele objektidele osutamisel. Näiteks kui me ütleme: „Olgu meil kaks erinevat [või ka: mitte tingimata erinevat] naturaalarvu, a ja b,“ (sellele analoogiale vihjab ka Max Black) siis ei saa öelda,

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millistele arvudele „a“ ja „b“ osutavad. Ja võib-olla osutamist polegi (samamoodi võib arvata Castori ja Polluxi näites). Leian, et mõlemal juhul on siiski tegu indiviidile osutamise teatud viisiga, ja see on mõlemal juhul sama tüüpi. Mõlemal juhul jäetakse määramata, millisele indiviidile osutatakse. Castori ja Polluxi puhul ei ole määrava kirjelduse abil osutamiseks tunnuseid, mis neid teineteisest eristaks, nime abil Kripke skeemi järgi Castorile ja Polluxile osutada ei saa me aga sellepärast, et me ei saa neid ristida. Teises näites aga on asi selles, et meil on tarvis rääkida üldjuhust. Siin võiks vastu väita et sümboleid „a“ ja „b“ kasutatakse mingiks muuks otstarbeks, mitte osutamiseks (näiteks et tegu on üldisuskvantifikatsiooniga, kus „a“ ja „b“ ei ole osutavad väljendid, vaid muutujad; pole aga selge, et muutujadki pole osutavad väljendid). Ent ka määravat kirjeldust võidakse kasutada ka siis, kui konkreetsele indiviidile osutamine pole oluline (omistav (attributive) tarvitus Donnellani (1966) järgi; muide, Donnellani järgi polegi omistava kasutuse puhul tegu osutamisega, vaid ainult denoteerimisega, siin on aga arvatud ka see osutamise alla, sest traditsioonilises lähenemises on eeldatud, et määrava kirjelduse kui osutava väljendi normaalne tarvitus on omistav). Eelnevat arvestades ei tohiks olla liiga imelik rääkida niisugusest osutamisest, mille korral lastakse osutusel kujuneda suvaliselt. Vaadeldud kahes näites see nii ongi. Osutavad väljendid toimivad sel juhul samamoodi nagu nimed Kripke järgi, ainult et viis, kuidas osutus osutava väljendiga seotakse, erineb ristimisest. See võiks õigustada nende osutavate väljendite nimetamist nimedeks. Ent need nimed ei saa olla jäigad tähistajad juba sellepärast, et osutuse „fikseerimist“ Kripke mõttes ei toimu. Seega oleks siis tegu mittejäikade nimedega. Seega on jutt niisugusest osutamisest, mille puhul tahetakse osutatada suvalisele objektile (mingit laadi objektide seast) ja objekte, millele osutatakse, ei eristata konkreetselt kuidagi teisiti kui nende „nimede“ erinevuse kaudu. Leian, et ilma sellise osutamise osaluseta ei ole üldse võimalik osutada abstraktsetele objektidele. Tõepoolest, abstraktsetel objektidel ei ole meeleliselt tajutavaid omadusi, ja seetõttu on nad iseenesest eristamatud. Kui jätta kõrvale relatsionaalsed ja funktsionaalsed omadused, mis abstraktsele objektile omistatakse, siis osutatakse sellele kui suvalisele objektile eristamatute objektide seas. Näiteks naturaalarve võiks kujutleda kui mittefüüsilisi ühesuguseid klotse, millele on number peale kirjutatud; kusjuures numbrimaalingut võidakse alati vahetada (see pole klotsi olemuslik omadus). Osutamine naturaalarvudele on niisuguste vahetuste suhtes mittejäik. Kirjandus Black, Max (1952). The identity of indiscernibles. ‒ Mind, kd 61, lk 153‒164. Donnellan, Keith S. (1966). Reference and definite descriptions. ‒ The Philosophical Review, kd 75, lk 281‒304. Kripke, Saul (1972). Naming and Necessity. – Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman (toim). Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel, lk 253–355, 763–769. Ümbertrükk: Saul Kripke. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1980. Eesti keeles: Nimetamine ja paratamatus, Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus 2001, tlk Anto Unt.

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Ülo Matjus, Tõest ja õig(s)usest – ainult arvamisi, (Tartu Ülikool)

Arvamuse all mõistetakse harilikult ütlust, mis ei pretendeeri tõele ega peaks kedagi häirima. Igaühel on õigus oma arvamusele ja õigus seda vabalt avaldada. Ma ei lasku siin arvamuse kui säärase lähemasse eritlusse, mis iseendast oleks täielikult tematiseeritav käesolevagi konverentsi piires. Edasi – kui ühes ja sellessamas asjas kohtuvad erinevad ehk lahknevad arvamused, siis on tegemist lahkarvamustega. Kuid selles ühes ja sellessamas asjas on sageli tarvis jõuda ühele ja sellelesamale arvamusele, s.t. kõrvaldada või ületada lahkarvamused. Ilmselt sattutakse sel puhul kõigepealt seisundisse, mida nimetaksin riiuks (tüli, vaidlus, polemos). Kui selle riiu käigus ei saavutata eesmärki – üht ja sedasama arvamust – täieliku konsensuse teel, siis tarvitatakse enamasti demokraatlikku hääletust, mis tähendab enamuse konsensust. – Seejuures võib tähele panna, et arvamuste riiu käigus tõuseb suuremast või vähemast varjatusest hoolimata ometi tuntavalt esile olemuslik riid „tõeste” arvamuste vahel, s. t. riid „tõese” arvamuse pärast. Riieldakse justkui tõe pärast. Seepärast käsitlengi lähemalt lahkarvamuste sügavamat põhja ehk põhjust, mille esiletoomine ja omaksvõtt osutaks võimalusele mõista, et nn. lahkarvamuste riid ei ole vähemasti mitte alati riid tõe pärast. Ometi sõltub see t õ e resp. t õ e ( s u ) s e käsitlusest, olles sellega tihedasti seotud. Enamik eestlasi on vaidlusega tõe ja õiguse üle, mis minu arutelus üheks keskseks, tuttav A. H. Tammsaare epopöa „Tõde ja õigus” kaudu. Millest epopöa kõneleb, seisab suurelt ja selgesti pealkirjas – t õ d e ja õ i g u s . Oleme sellega harjunud ega jää pealkirja juurde pidama – vähemalt lihtsa lugejana. Ometi ei ole pealkiri sugugi mitte üheselt tõlgitsetav ega ka ... tõlgitav. Seda võib tähele panna juba eestigi keeli, kuid kui pöördume romaani (pealkirja) võõrkeelsete tõlgete poole, siis näeme, et oma sisuliste lahenduslike vastete poolest on nad üpriski erinevad. – Teadaolevalt on „Tõde ja õigust” tõlgitud ositi või tervenisti 12 võõrkeelde – arvestamata jäävad siin arusaadavalt ühe ja sellesama tõlke eri väljaanded ja kordustrükid. Keeled ise on järgmised: hollandi, inglise, leedu, läti, poola, prantsuse, saksa, slovaki, soome, tšehhi, ungari, vene. Olles pealkirjade tõlkeid võrrelnud, võib e s i t e k s täheldada seda, et tõlkimisel on eri köidetele sageli antud omalt poolt eri pealkirju, jättes epopöa pealkirja nii eesti kui ka võõrkeeli üldse esitamata-tõlkimata. Või kui epopöa pealkiri on isegi esitatud võõrkeeli, siis on tiitleis esikohale seatud siiski see oma pealkiri. Lätlased on kogunisti terve epopöa varustanud uue tiitliga „Zeme un mīlestība” („Maa ja armastus”). See kõik vihjab t e i s e k s raskustele A. H. Tammsaare epopöa pealkirja tõlkimise ehk selle tõlgitsetavusega. Sugulaskeelis ei tekki erilisi raskusi – vt. nt. soome „Totuus ja oikeus” –, kuid eriti ilmekalt avaldub see nt. vene keeli, milles võib kohata algul pealkirja „Правда и право” („Tõde ja õigus”), kuid edaspidi valdavalt hoopis teisiti tõlgitsevat tiitlit „Правда и справедливость” („Tõde ja õiglus”). Lahkarvamuste riiu sügavamaks põhjaks ehk põhjuseks paistab olevat tõe käsitlemine õigsusena, mis tänapäeval on väidetavasti üldine. Ja kuulub meie „maailmapildi aega”. M. Heideggeri järgi on tõde „algselt” mõteldud kui aletheia`t, s.t. kui varjamatust ehk oleva ise-endalt lähtuvat esilepaistmist. Platoniga algab üleminek tõe metafüüsilisele määratlusele

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õigsusena – adaequatio intellectus et rei. Sealtpeale nivelleerub see tõekäsitus õigsusena „iseendastmõistetavaks”. Lühidalt üteldes muutub tõe koht, asupaik. Pilkusaamise õigsusena iseloomustab ta inimese suhet olevaga, see on inimese „omadus”. „Tõde tähendab täna ja ammustaega tunnetuse kooskõla asjaga. /.../ Need kriitilised tõemõisted, mis Descartes´ist alates lähtuvad tõest kui tõsikindlusest [Gewissheit], need on ainult t õ e k u i õ i g s u s e määratluse teisendid.” (M. Heidegger, Kunstiteose algupära. – Lk. 50. – Minu sõrendus. Ü. M.) Kui tõde on pelgalt õigsus, siis on igaühel kui subjektil tõesti õigus õienduda objektile, seda õigesti „mõõta” ning õige otsus langetada. Siis võibki „erineda” ning riieldagi, ehkki see on mõttetu ... Probleem selles, et oma tulemust esitatakse tahes-tahtmata tõe(se)na, tõena, kätkevana tõele omistatavaid tunnusjooni – subjekti-„välisust”, „objektiivsust”, sõltumatust, iseseisvust, üldist kehtivust, üldisust, absoluutsust etc., mida ei peaks nõudma ega saagi nõuda subjekti „subjektiivsuselt”. – Isegi E. Husserli teadvuse käsituse järgi „transtsendentaalse subjektiivsusena” on tõde mõistetav transtsendentsuselt, ehkki fenomenoloogiliselt, kuid see on omaette teema. – Lahkarvamusi, mida püütakse kõrvaldada ehk ületada iga hinna eest mingisuguse konsensuse teel kui eba- või mittetõeseid, kui vääri, ei tekkiks, kui mõista ja tunnistada seda, et tõe(suse) või tõese all mõistetakse tegelikult õigsust või õiget. See tähendab. et arvamus on alati õige, kuid mitte siis tõene, mis lähtub täiesti teistsugusest tõekäsitusest aletheia`na, millele eespool ka vihjati. Nõnda seisab küsimus selles, kas meie, inimesed, omast arust tõde taotledes alati ikka tõepoolest tõe ka saavutame, – selles, kas me taotleme tõde või hoopis õigsust ja koos sellega tammsaarelikult koguni õigust või õiglust. Ses mõttes on ka täielik või osaline (enamuslik) konsensus kõigest õige, kuid mitte tõene. M. Heideggeri tõe(suse) pähe kultiveeritava õigsuse kriitilist käsitust toetab üpris korralikult ka eesti sõna õige etümoloogiline käsitlus. See läänemeresoome-saami või läänemeresoome-volga tüvi tähendavat tarvituslikult: „tõele, tegelikkusele vastav, veatu; tõeline; aus; sirge”. Siin on selgesti nähtaval subjekti ~ objekti suhe, mida valitseb subjekt, kelle pildile, ettekujutusele, arvamusele vastab või peab vastama objekt, olgu selleks (subjekti-„väline”) tõde või tegelikkus. õige tähendab ka sirget parima suhte või seose mõttes. Kõige parem on olla õigel teel, käia õiget teed. Tegusõna õiendama, mida olen ise tahtmatult ohtrasti tarvitanud, tähendab kõigepealt sirgu ajama, sirutama. Ja sõnad õigus, õiglus, õigsus on õige eritähenduslikud derivaadid. (Vt. Eesti etümoloogiasõnaraamat. – Tallinn, 2012. – Lk. 625.) Küsigem viimaks, mida siis tegid meie kontekstis eurooplased A. H. Tammsaare ja M. Heidegger, kes elasid pikalt, üle 50 aasta ühel ja samal ajal (1889-1940). A. H. Tammsaare astus oma ühelt poolt siduva ja teiselt poolt eristava (vastandava) pealkirjaga e s i m e s e sammu – eristas selgesti tõe õigusest ja kõigest sellest, mis ohustab tõde. Ainult eristas ja vastandas – ei enamat. Ei ole muidugi selge, mida ta tõeks pidas – see tarvitseb teist arutelu –, kuid arusaadavalt ei pidanud ta selleks varjamatust aletheia mõttes, sidudes tõe ja selle saavutamise võimaluse kõigepealt siiski maise inimesega, millele vihjab ka mitmeti tõlgitsetav pealkirjasõna õigus. M. Heidegger astub selles talle aimamatus vastanduses t e i s e sammu, minnes kaugeimale – tõde ei ole mitte mingisugune „tunnetuse kooskõla asjaga” ehk õigsus, vaid varjamatus, o l e m i s e v a r j a m a t u s , mis – tõsi – „tarvitseb” inimest. – Ent kui riieldakse arvamuste „tõesuse” pärast, siis ei ole õigupoolest mõtet riielda, sest arvamus, ka lahkarvamus, ei kuulu tõe või tõesuse alasse – arvamused on kõigest „õiged” ... Õigsuse sfääris on igal arvajal midagi arvates õigus. – Ja lõppeks võib ka seda

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käsitlust pidada üksnes üheks arvamuseks tõe ja õiguse resp. õigsuse kohta teiste arvamuste kõrval, mille võib rahulikult kõrvale lükata. Nõnda harilikult tehaksegi.

Katrin Laas-Mikko, Privaatsuse väärtuse kaalutlemine tehnoloogiate

puhul ja konteksti roll, (Tartu Ülikool)

Jälgimisele orienteeritud turvatehnoloogiate puhul, nagu näiteks sensoritega kaamerasüsteemid, kehaskännerid, biomeetrilised passid jne, tõusetub kahe eetilise väärtuse, privaatsuse ja turvalisuse konflikt. Jälgimisele orienteeritud tehnoloogiate eesmärgiks on turvalisuse tõstmine ühiskonnas. Kuid turvalisuse taseme tõstmise nimel tuleb inimestel ohverdada osa oma privaatsusest. Privaatsust käsitletakse tihtipeale “õigusena”, mis laseb arvata, et tegu on absoluutse väärtusega, mida ei tohiks vahetada teiste väärtuste vastu. Käesolevas uurimuses võtan aluseks informatsioonilise privaatsuse kontseptsiooni, mille kohaselt tähendab privaatsus isiku õigust otsustada, kes ja mil määral saavad teised isikud juurdepääsu ja kasutada teda puudutavat informatsiooni (Sutrop ja Laas-Mikko 2010). Oma käsitluses toetun ma Valeria Steeves’i (2009) teooriale, mille kohaselt on privaatsuse otsimine sotsiaalne praktika, mis võimaldab sotsiaalsetel toimijatel tõmmata piiri enda ja teiste vahel, olles suletud või avatud sotsiaalseks suhtlemiseks. Selle teooria kohaselt on sotsiaalsed toimijad võimelised valima, mis on neile olulisim; seega on see nii individuaalne kui ka ühine väärtus toimijatele niivõrd, kuivõrd teised isikud jagavad seda. See käsitlus eeldab, et väärtuskonfliktid on meie elu loomulikuks osaks pluralistlikus ühiskonnas, ja privaatsus peab olema kaalutav teiste meile oluliste ja mõnikord võrreldamatute väärtustega. Info- ja kommunikatsiooni (edaspidi IKT) eetika väärtuste kaalutlemise käsitlused on olnud eelkõige kaasuspõhised. Viimastel aastatel on arendatud praktilisi privaatsuse hindamise ja tehnoloogiate eetilise hindamise raamistikke ning teooriaid (nt Palm ja Hansson 2006, Stahl et al 2010, Wright 2011). Enamike tehnoloogiate hindamise metodoloogiate keskseks osaks on analüüs selle kohta, kas ja milliseid väärtusi tehnoloogia rakendamine ohustab või milliseid väärtusi edendab. Mitmed IKT eetika autorid (Nissebaum 2010, Stahl et al 2010) viitavad sellele, et tehnoloogiaga seonduvaid eetilisi küsimusi ja väärtuskonflikte ei ole mõtekas muud moodi analüüsida, kui kontekstis või nö kontekstuaalselt. Oma ettekandes keskendun küsimusele, mida need autorid võiksid konteksti või kontekstuaalsusega silmas pidada ja kuidas võiks kontekst väärtuskonflikti lahendada aidata. Konteksti võib kasutada minu arvates tehnoloogiate hindamisel kaheti:

(1) määratlemise ja spetsifitseerimise eesmärgil, st. konkreetses situatsioonis määratletakse tehnoloogia kasutuseesmärk, tehniline konfiguratsioon, võimalikud rakendamise eetilised või sotsiaalsed tagajärjed, kuid ka tehnoloogia sidusgrupid ning nende hoiakud väärtuste suhtes, samuti idenfitiseeritakse kontekstiga seotud väärtused ja väärtuskonfliktid;

(2) moraali allikana, mis tähendab, et eetilised printsiibid väärtuskonflikti lahendamiseks tuletatakse kontekstist endast.

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Enamik IKT eetika käsitlusi peavad konteksti mainimisega silmas minu arvates esimest eesmärki. Sellega taotletakse, et eetiline arutelu ei oleks liiga abstraktne, vaid praktilise situatsiooniga haakuv ning tooks ka mingeid praktilisi lahendusi. Samuti on sellise lähenemise eeliseks see, et võimaldab kaardistada erinevaid tehnoloogia rakendamise riske ja hüvesid väärtustega seonduvalt sõltumata eetilistest normatiivsetest teooriatest, eelkõige väärtusmonistlikest teooriatest. Seega see lähenemine võtab lähtepunktiks väärtuste paljususe idee. Näitan, et riskide analüüs aitab üsna keerukate tehnoloogiate puhul praktiliselt kaardistada, millised väärtused on kontekstiga seotud ja millised väärtuskonfliktid võivad tekkida. Kontekstiga peetakse neis teooriates silmas peamiselt eluvaldkonda (nt julgeolek), kus tehnoloogiat rakendatakse või tehnoloogia konkreetset kasutuseesmärki (nt biomeetrilisi passe kasutatakse isikusamasuse paremaks tuvastamiseks). Kuid sama tehnoloogia erinevate rakendustega (ja vastavate kasutuseesmärkidega) võivad seonduda erinevad riskid ja väärtused. Seetõttu on minu arvates oluline määratleda kontekst tehnoloogia kasutuseesmärgi kaudu. Hiljutised empiirilised uuringud tehnoloogia ja privaatsuse kohta näitavad, et ka inimeste hoiakud võivad rakenduseesmärgist tulenevalt olla sama tehnoloogia juures väga erinevad (Tiits et al 2014). Konteksti määratlemine võimalike väärtuskonfliktide ja seisukohtade väljatoomise ning joondamise mõttes on oluline eeldus väärtuste kaalutlemiseks, kuid samal ajal siiski piiratud üritus ebatäieliku ja assümeetrilise informatsiooni tõttu privaatusega seotud kontekstidest, riskidest, tehnoloogia eetilistest ning sotsiaalsetest mõjudest, võimaliku kompromissi tulemite ning osalejate vasturääkivate otsuste tõttu (emotsioonide jms faktorite tõttu). Konteksti määratlemisel võib selguda, et privaatsuse ja turvalisuse väärtused ei ole alati üksteist välistavad või ühildamatud. Kuid samas ka ei pruugi konteksti määratlemisega väärtuste konflikti vältida ja seega vajame me normatiivset teooriat väärtuste kaalutlemise kohta pluralistlikus väärtuste süsteemis, mida IKT tehnoloogia hindamise raamistikud ei ole suutnud pakkuda. Kirjandus Nissenbaum, H. (2010). Privacy in Context. Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life. Stanford University Press: Stanford, California. Palm, E., Hansson, S. O. (2006). The case for ethical technology assessment (eTA). - Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 73: 543-558. Sutrop, M., Laas-Mikko, K. (2012). From Identity Verification to Behavior Prediction: Ethical Implications of Second Generation Biometrics. – Review of Policy Research, 29: 1, 21-36. Stahl B. C., Heersmink R., Goujon P., Flick C., Hoven van den J., Wakunuma K. J., Ikonen V., Rader M. (2010). Identifying the Ethics of Emerging Information and Communication Technologies: An Essay on Issues, Concepts and Method. – International Journal of Technoethics, 1: 4, 20-38. Steeves, V. (2009). Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy. - Privacy, Identity and Anonymity in a Network World: Lessons from the Identity Trail. Eds. Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves and Carole Lucock. New York: Oxford University Press, 191–208. Wright, D. (2011). A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information technology. - Ethics of Information Technology 13: 199-226. Tiits, M., Kalvet, T., Laas-Mikko, K. (ilmumas 2014). Social Acceptance of ePassports. - IEEE Conference Proceedings.

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Amirouche Moktefi, Technology-assisted refereeing as a

philosophical problem, (Tallinn University of Technology)

The football world cup tournament that recently took place in Brazil has brought its share of joy, surprise and controversy. All around the world, people argued, agreed and disagreed. No philosopher could explain how Germany defeated Brazil 7 to 1 in semi-finals. However, philosophy might help to understand the spirit of the game and its cultural impact [Richards 2010]. A permanent object of disagreement is the fairness and objectivity of refereeing. High claims have been made for technology as an aid to improve refereeing and prevent errors. The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary philosophical discussion of the disputes on technology-assisted refereeing. There is a wide range of positions on technology-assisted refereeing but a survey of the arguments displayed provides the following picture: let’s postulate some ideal refereeing by an omniscient and objective referee. There seems to be a general agreement that such an ideal is impossible, that human refereeing is fallible and that technology-assisted refereeing is somewhere in between. So, the disagreement does not really concern the quality of the latter but rather the opportunity of appealing to it.

Opponents highlight the impossibility of filling the gap between technology-assisted and ideal refereeing while supporters insist on the possibility of moving from human to technology-assisted and shortening the distance to ideal refereeing. There is a theoretical hope for reconciliation by defining some “good use” of technology in refereeing. An agreement seems to already exist on the restriction of technology-aid to “significant decisions” with a team challenging the referee. Technology is viewed as a mean to eliminate the disagreement and reach consensus in litigious situations. As such, the enhancement of refereeing by technology-aid proceeds by ‘objectivation’. Two referees who disagree at first might agree after watching a replay. The process might be extended by transforming viewers into witnesses [Collins 2010]. Objectivation establishes the “fact” by removing its dependence to the perception of the referee alone. This “nothing-to-lose” strategy aims at limiting interpretation in order to reach consensus. A “good refereeing” makes the teams agree and leads to no dispute. It is not optimal however. Indeed, it dismisses errors that might similarly occur when teams do agree. This ‘good use’ of technology makes settling disagreements the business of refereeing. It establishes the referee in the position between opposite teams, a place where it is common to find him on the field when disputes occur. This observation would be misleading however. Indeed, the decisions of the referee are not the least concerned with the disagreement of the teams. FIFA states that “each match is controlled by a referee who has full authority to enforce the

‘Human’

refereeing

‘Technology-assisted’

refereeing

‘Ideal’

refereeing

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laws of the Game in connection with the match to which he has been appointed” [FIFA 2014, 24]. The referee stands between the game and its laws. He might very well make decisions against the will of both teams as long as those decisions are made in accordance with the rules of the game. This switch might be exhibited by applying Hintikka’s distinction between definitory and strategic rules. Definitory rules “tell us what is and what is not admissible in a game. Following them […] assures that you are playing the game correctly […] Strategic rules [are] rules which give insight into how to play a game successfully and well” [Hintikka & Bachman 1991, 32-33]. Referees are concerned with definitory rules. They assure that players play accurately, independently of how good they play and how consensual are decisions. This rule-formalism might be disputed on the ground that referees face situations where rules are not that clear as to what to do [McFee 2011]. For some ‘minor infringements’, referees might even decide against rules and privilege the ‘spirit’ over the ‘letter’ of the rules [Colwell 2000]. However, games usually are part of broader competitions. Consequently, ‘permissive’ refereeing in a game would harm to other teams. One might make explicit guidelines for the whole competition but that would shift ‘permissiveness’ from the spirt to the letter. Refereeing errors still occur and might allow a team to be successful by violating definitory rules. That’s what makes refereeing look unfair. However, the possibility of referees making errors is involved in definitory rules themselves. This admission in the game simply introduces an element of chance. This should not be confused with unfairness which applies on games where skills alone hold. This element of chance is essential to the very idea of football in present state. This internalization of chance disqualifies the idea of technology as a solution because it denies the existence of a problem at all. As such, technology-assisted refereeing does not improve the game. It rather changes it. This conclusion does not reject the appeal to technology for refereeing purposes. It merely affirms that technology-assisted refereeing is a wish, not a need. References Harry Collins, “The philosophy of umpiring and the introduction of decision-aid technology”, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 37, 2010, 135-146 Sharon Colwell, “The ‘letter’ and the ‘spirit’: football laws and refereeing in the twenty-first century”, Soccer & Society, 1 (1), 2000, 201-214 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), The Laws of the Game 2014/2015, Zurich: FIFA, 2014 Jaakko Hintikka & James Bachman, What If…? Toward Excellence in Reasoning, Mountain view, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1991 Graham McFee, “Fairness, epistemology, and rules: a prolegomenon to a philosophy of officiating”, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 38 (2), 229-253 Ted Richards (ed.), Soccer and Philosophy, Chicago & La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 2010

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Jesús Enrique Moreno, Disagreement, The Phenomenology of

Disagreement, and Enquiry, (Simon Fraser University)

There are two phenomena that need to be distinguished if we are to understand our practice of enquiry: disagreement and conflict. Not only are they not the same, but our phenomenology in each is indicative of the reasons why they differ. I will argue that the phenomenological features of thinking that we are disagreeing with someone indicate the constitutive role of disagreement in our practice of enquiry—indeed, we cannot see ourselves as enquires without it. If our self-image as enquirers is as important to ourselves as I will argue it is, then any account of the world that tries to dismiss disagreement fails to provide us with a satisfactory story of what it is like to be the kind of beings that we are. Conflict, which I shall characterize as incompatibility of preferences, will be shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient for disagreement. I will link the difference between conflict and disagreement to Plato’s distinction between eristics and dialectics: whereas eristics is the practice of those interested in persuasion, dialectics is the method of those interested in truth—namely, of the philosopher. An example of such distinction is found in Republic V 454a, where Plato presents those whose carelessness in discussion leads to practice antilogic (“ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης”) as practicing eristics (“ἔριδι”) rather than dialectics (“διαλέκτῳ”). Eristics is the practice taught by the sophist, albeit it can also spring from a misapplication of techniques learned in the study of philosophy (e.g., see Republic 539b-c). Eristics is all about conflicting goals: each contender wishes to lead either their opponent or the spectators of the disputation into accepting whatever she is claiming; each contender seeks assent for victory’s sake. Only those enquiring can disagree, for disagreement requires more than the apparent absence of agreement: there is no agreement when two contenders try to seduce an audience, yet there is nothing about which they find themselves disagreeing in their exchange. Disagreement requires the intention to secure one’s beliefs on the way the world may be regardless of one’s own preferences. I will argue that the difference between eristics and philosophy is the difference between acting with words onto others and carrying out enquiry. I will employ the quartet “Non ti fidar, o misera” from act one of Mozart’s Il dissoluto punito ossia il Don Giovanni as a central example throughout the essay. If all instances of discourse were to be different in degree but not in kind to the exchange between Donna Elvira and Don Giovanni in the aforementioned quartet then we could hardly be in a more comfortable position than if we were not to presuppose that the world is intelligible. There is a sense in which we can read Descartes’ Evil Daemon precisely along these lines: if all our investigations were carried out under the threat of complete purposeful deception by an agent, then we could hardly think enquiry possible—we would always be facing eristics. I will also appeal to David Enoch’s distinction between instrumental indispensability and intrinsic indispensability in order to emphasize the importance I argue should be attached to the phenomenology of disagreement in relation to enquiry.5 Something is instrumentally indispensable for a project if it cannot be dismissed without therefore defeating our reasons to engage in that project (Enoch 2006, 32). A project is intrinsically indispensable if we have no option but to engage in it (Enoch 2006, 34). If my analysis is correct then we can conclude that the possibility of

5 Enoch, David. “An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism” Edited by Dean. W. Zimmerman. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Oxford University Press) 2:21-50.

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seeing ourselves as disagreeing with someone on normative matters is instrumentally indispensable to the practice of enquiry. If, upon consideration, we cannot fail to think of ourselves as enquirers, that is if enquiry is intrinsically indispensable to us, then the experience of thinking we are disagreeing is instrumentally indispensable to the project of understanding what it is like to be the kind of beings that we are. We cannot understand what it would be like to portray every discussion on ‘shoulds’ as eristics—for we would see such scenarios as conflict, and a characterization of this kind would ignore the phenomenology of those involved. I will conclude that if we cannot but think of ourselves as enquirers, if a world without enquirers is indeed a non-human world, then we cannot easily dismiss the phenomenology of disagreement.

Peeter Müürsepp, The Problem of Verisimilitude – Maxwell vs

Miller, (Tallinn University of Technology)

Karl Popper believed that physics usually proceeds from one false theory to another. At the same time, science was supposed to make progress. This is the basis of the problem of verisimilitude. In 1963 Popper himself tried to solve the problem within the framework of his own methodology of falsificationism. After the critiques by David Miller and Pavel Tichy appeared in 1974 it has been generally believed that Popper’s formally logical solution does not work. In 2007 Nicholas Maxwell presented a different kind of solution. Maxwell’s solution presupposes the exchange of the so-called standard empiricism for aim-oriented empiricism. According to Maxwell, regular practice of science today can be called standard empiricism. This means that in contemporary science the choice of a theory is governed by evidence alone. In Popper’s words, experience alone can decide upon the truth or falsity of scientific statements. There is a problem for Maxwell here. He has been advocating the need for a revolution in the academia for several decades. This revolution would involve introducing aim-oriented empiricism in the place of standard empiricism. Aim-oriented empiricism would build on falsificationism. Popper introduced the need to improve the articulation of the problems to be solved and critically assess the possible solutions. Aim-oriented empiricism adds the requirement of interconnecting basic and specialized problem-solving so that each may guide the other. Therefore, not just the theories have to be constantly assessed and adjusted but the aims of research as well. According to Maxwell, the latter is crucial for the solution of the problem of verisimilitude. Maxwell presents the solution in several steps. First, as aim-oriented empiricism requires, we have to presume some general metaphysical conception about the universe to hold, i.e. that the theory-of-everything exists. If so, the successive theories of physics should get successively closer to that general theory. For this to take place, every theory has to be approximately derivable from the next one in the sequence but not vice versa. The term of “approximate derivation” can be explained by the example of the “approximate derivation” of Kepler’s law that planets move in ellipses around the sun from Newtonian theory. A detailed account of this derivation can be given. In general, Maxwell’s solution to the problem of verisimilitude works if the universe is such that a true theory-of- everything exists and has yet to be discovered and current theoretical knowledge can be approximately derived from that theory. David Miller has come forward with a severe criticism of aim-oriented empiricism. Miller declares that the decisive point of disagreement between Maxwell and critical

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rationalists or falsificationists is whether there exists any substantial metaphysical doctrine that science does presuppose or is even obliged to presuppose. It is true that Maxwell denies that theories are assessed impartially on the basis of evidence alone, no permanent assumption being made about the nature of the universe independent of evidence. Miller sees this as a justificationalist thesis. If Miller’s criticism is valid then one can hardly claim that Maxwell has solved the problem of verisimilitude. Thus, we need to assess Maxwell’s counterarguments to the criticism of Miller. In his criticism, Miller suggests that disunified theories are like ’God hypotheses’ that are simply excluded from science. Thus, all metaphysical hypotheses are simply excluded from science and there is no ’standard empiricism’ problem that Maxwell is so keen about. But, as a matter of fact, many disunified theories do receive serious consideration in science. This is rightly pointed out by Maxwell. For instance, there is a disunified rival to Newtonian theory put forward by Maurice Levy. Actually, orthodox quantum theory falls under the same category. There is a second, and more serious, way in which Miller fails to do justice to the argument for aim-oriented empiricism. Miller fails to notice that the disunified rival theories considered by the argument are sometimes empirically more successful than the accepted unified theory. Any accepted physical theory, Newtonian theory, classical electrodynamics, quantum theory, general relativity and so on – runs into some empirical difficulties and is, ostensibly empirically refuted. Miller contradicts himself by accepting that metaphysics plays a role in the practice of science, that there is a clear sense in which scientific theories do sometimes make metaphysical assumptions. This looks somewhat similar to Maxwell’s claim that there are necessary metaphysical assumptions in science itself as part and parcel of it. Aim-oriented empiricism does not require metaphysics outside of science but as its integral component. This is a crucial point that Miller has overlooked or misunderstood. In the case of agreement over the role of metaphysical assumptions in science, Miller could agree with Maxwell’s solution of the problem of verisimilitude. But first, Miller has to give credit to aim-oriented empiricism as presented by Maxwell and not limit himself with criticising a simplified version.

Margus Ott, Kokkukäiv lahkheli, (Tallinna Ülikool)

Demokraatliku riigi kodanikele on küllap hästi arusaadav, kuidas lahkarvamused ühiskonnas kasuks tulevad: nende kaudu saab probleeme mitmekülgsemalt välja valgustada ning ühtlasi praktikas tasakaalustatumalt toimida. Samas on olemas ka “liiga suuri” lahkarvamusi, mida me ei talu: näiteks kui keegi leiab, et teatud nahavärvi, kultuuri või soo-orientatsiooniga inimeste peal võib tarvitada vägivalda. Siin tundub, et lahkarvamus hakkab ühiskonda ennast lõhki rebima. Teisisõnu: lahkarvamus on konstruktiivne ja kasulik seni, kuni säilib ühiskonna sidusus, lõiming, mis on vajalik lahkarvamuse positiivsete tulemuste salvestamiseks. Samas kasutatakse omakorda seda asjaolu poliitilises võitluses vastaste (s.t nende, kes on minu suhtes lahkarvamusel) tasalülitamiseks, kuna viimaste lahkarvamus olevat destruktiivne ja õõnestavat kogukonna sidusust ning et nad seetõttu ei tohiks oma arvamust avaldada. See näitab, et lõimingu ja eristumiste (lahkarvamuste) proportsioon ise on küsimuse all ja lahkarvamuse objektiks. Üleüldiselt öeldes puudutab see lõimingut ja eristumist kui kogukonna kaht olulist mõõdet: lõiminguta kogukond laguneb ja pihustub, eristumiseta ta tardub ja mandub. On vajalik nii ühtekuuluvus kui ka lahkarvamused.

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Kui me aga hakkaksime otsima alust, millele ühtekuuluvus toetada, siis me jääksime omadega jänni. Muidugi on kogukonnal alati mingi hulk ühiseid tunnuseid ja samastumisobjekte, kuid neist mõne väljavalimine ja vaieldamatuks kuulutamine on alati meelevaldne ja kunstlik. Kui identiteedi aluseks on mingisugune olev asi (sümbol, kujutis, narratiiv või mis iganes), siis sellega see seatakse “kolmandaks” kogukonna liikmete vahele või kujundlikult pigem nende “kohale”, nende “üle”: see saab kõrguvaks ideeks, mille kaudu mina ja sina suhestume. Selle kaudu on võimalik “üleneda”, luua endast kõrgemale: meie kogukonna sidusust kehastav sümbol või jutt võib panna mind ennast kokku võtma, ennast ületama. Kogukonnaks ühendatud inimesed suudavad üldiselt rohkem kui selle liikmed eraldivõetuna. Alati säilivad muidugi erimeelsused, aga “teatud piires”, nii et pühana ülestõstetut küsimuse alla ei seata. Sellisel identiteedil oleva asja kaudu aga on ka puudused. Esiteks saab see oma välja- ja esiletõstetuse kaudu lahutatuks kulgemisest, ajalisusest, muutumisest ning jääb vältimatult “ajale jalgu” ega võta arvesse kogukonnas toimunud muundusi. Teiseks on sellised identiteedid kas algusest peale sõnastatud antagonistlikult kellegi/millegi välise suhtes, või kergesti selleks muudetavad. Suletud ühiskond (vt “Moraali ja religiooni kaks allikat”) on endeemselt sõjakas. Olev asi samastumisobjektina on nagu lahter või kast, mis samastab enda seesolijad ja vastandab neid väljasolijatele, kellel on teised samastumisobjektid. Füüsiline sõda on alati ka sõda sümbolite ja narratiivide vahel. Nüüd võiks aga selle asemel mõelda kogukonnast, mille ühtsus ei tugineks mingil oleval asjal (ega isegi ülimal oleval), vaid olemisel enesel ehk väel, kus eristumine ongi juba lõimiv ja lõiming käib üle eristumiste. See oleks Bergsoni “müstikute” kogukond või Bataille’ “nende ühisus, kellel pole midagi ühist”. See ühine mitteühine oleks olemine või vägi ise, ja ühisus käiks selle mitte-asja läbi. Sellisel juhul oleksid ka endiselt muidugi mingid ühised asjad, aga need pole tõstetud “kolmandaks” minu ja sinu kohale või üle, vaid need on mõistetud eristumise ja lõimimise punktidena, millest vägi läbi tuleb. Nad oleksid kulgemise ehk kestmisega kooskõlas, nad võivad muutuda või vahetuda koos ajaga, kui vägi võtab teisi vorme. See tähendab ühisuse asetamist ajalisse perspektiivi, kontakti väega, mis ühisust toodab, ja sihtidega, kuhu ta liigub. Kogukonda loov vägi loob ühtlasi isendi; vägi jõuab alati juba kätte kahel suunal: kogukonna ja isendina. Minu kujunemine isendina toimub alati ja pidevalt läbikäimises ümbrusega, esmajoones teiste inimestega. Muidugi see, kuidas keegi väliseid impulsse vastu võtab, neid töötleb, neile reageerib, on igaühel üksjagu erinev (ja siit lahkarvamused). Teisipidi aga on ühiskond tema liikmete kogum ning igaüks oma eripäras panustab sellesse ja teisendab seda mingil määral. Muidugi, me juba sünnime ühiskonda ja näime enamiku asju lihtsalt üle võtvat (keele, kombed, materiaalse kultuuri) ning inimeste läbikäimisest võrsuvad ka sünkroonselt mustrid, tavad jne, millega me kohaneme, mugandume. See “resonantsiühtsus” kahandab meie erinevusi, “silub nurki”, kasvatab sidusust, üksmeelt, ühisust, lõimitust. Seda tähtsam on aga tähele panna divergentseid, lahknevaid, eristuvaid liikumisi nii isendite vahel kui isendite sees. Ühiskonna käekäigule on nüüd äärmiselt oluline, kui hästi või halvasti suudetakse neid divergentse arvesse võtta ja üldist resonantsi muuta, tekitades sellesse peenemaid rütmierinevusi, tehes sellest rikkalikuma koosluse. Kas kohandatakse isendi võnkumised ühiskonna omaga või kohandatakse jõudumööda ühiskonna võnkumisi isendite järgi. Esimesel juhul jääb tõesti mulje, justkui individuatsiooni

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ja ühiskonna küsimused oleksid kaks täiesti erinevat asja, teisel juhul on nad tihedalt läbi põimunud. On hea, kui ühiskondlikud eristumised ja lõimimised toimivad võimalikult vabalt, jõuliselt, mitmekesistuvalt, et tuleksid välja, puhkeksid ja areneksid isendlikud eripärad, ning vastastikku üksteist võimendaksid. Nüüd aga võib küsida, kuidas on homogeniseerimisprotsessidega ühiskonnas. Näiteks sellega, mis on demokraatlikes ühiskondades üks tuumsemaid – valimistel hääletamine. Seal ei loe mitte mingisugused minu eripärad, vaid ma olen täpselt võrdne ja ühetaoline kõigi teiste hääleõiguslike kodanikega. Puuduvad igasugused kvalitatiivsed vahed, järgi jääb üksnes kvantitatiivne. Teisest küljest on aga äärmiselt oluline silmas pidada, et sellel kvantitatiivsel erinevusel on tähendus ja mõte üksnes siis, kui on olemas reaalne kvalitatiivne paljusus (mitu parteid, erinevate seisukohtadega poliitikud). Seda kvalitatiivset paljust aga me hoiame ja loome kogu aeg: kodanikualgatustena, arvamusavaldustega ajakirjanduses ja internetis, teistega seltsides ja ühiskondlikke sidemeid luues jne. Selles mõttes on hääletamine toimivas demokraatias paradoksaalsel kombel suhteliselt kõrvaline asi, sest sellega lihtsalt pitseeritakse, kinnitatakse seda paljusst ja heterogeensust, mida on juba toodetud ja jätkuvalt toodetakse oma ühiskondlikus toimimises. Ilma selleta, nagu me teame, pole ka hääletamisel mingit tähendust ega mõtet. Demokraatia ei püsi demokraatliku vormi najal, vaid demokraatliku “sisu” ehk “kultuuri” najal, mida see vorm aitab küll lahku hoida ja toetada, aga mida ta ei suuda (mehaaniliselt, väliselt, iseenesest) tekitada.

Tamás Paár, Ethical Intuitionism and the Weight of Disagreements,

Central European University/ Pázmány Péter Catholic University

In my paper I investigate whether intuitionist moral epistemology could be defended from two important challenges that have been put forward during recent years and which build on the phenomenon of pervasive moral disagreement. I start by defining intuitionism as the position according to which some of our moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. According to intuitionists these non-inferentially justified beliefs could also be justified inferentially and be further justified by establishing coherence among our moral and non-moral beliefs. As an explanation of how intuitions are justified I introduce the principle of Phenomenal Conservativism, a self-evident rule, according to which we are justified in believing that things are so as they appear. I explain that the so-called Moorean arguments have their basis in this principle, and these arguments that look question-begging actually turn on the relative apparent obviousness of their premise compared to the symmetric counterargument’s premise. I also show how the Jamesian idea of justification by faith could be used by intuitionists, in cases where we believe without being able to prove or to convince others. I compare this position to convictionism, which position I illustrate with the thoughts of Thomas Nagel and Ronald Dworkin, who appear to think that our theory-independent convictions should be the justificatory grounds of our theories.

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Intuitionists accommodated moral disagreement in their theories partly by noting that intuitions can be colored by biases and partiality. Yet this very strategy seems to bear problems for intuitionism. How could it be the case that we are justified in believing something if we must be aware that it could be a mere appearance caused by, for example biases? The fact of disagreements call our attention to this possibility, as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues. He suggests that we should not believe that our intuitions are justified non-inferentially. I reply to his criticism in three stages. First of all I show that his concept of intuitionism is at least partly misguided. He did not take it into account that even after defeating the possible defeaters named by him (coming from possible biases, disagreements, partiality, emotions, etc.) our beliefs could be justified both inferentially and non-inferentially at the same time (this would be a case of epistemic overdetermination). Nevertheless I grant that defeating these defeaters might be very difficult, if not impossible, when we are aware of the expert disagreement about moral issues, or more specifically, the disagreeing philosophers in all kinds of moral questions. Secondly, I note that using the epistemological theories of intuitionists the challenge can be answered. According to Robert Audi, who thinks that conscientiously reflecting again on our judgment and checking our epistemic position as well as the other’s epistemic parity (which is a very difficult task) we can gain even more justification if we retain our previous belief. I also note the role of Phenomenal Conservatism and Moorean arguments, which, by creating a kind of stand-offs, shed light on the need of an integrated epistemology that gives at least equal weight to our convictions, including many people’s strong moral convictions. Lastly, I show that the challenge can be answered even without relying on intuitionist epistemology. I argue in connection with Sinnott-Armstrong’s principle concerning disagreement that it does not seem to be able to stand its own test and if we take it seriously it leads to skepticism about philosophy in general. After the discussion of Sinnott-Armstrong’s view of intuitionism, I turn to Roger Crisp’s challenge. He argues that in case of peer disagreement, the only non-erroneous reaction is to suspend our belief. I show that this reaction might be just as irrational or faulty as keeping our belief, since by doing so we could follow our conscience and practice moral understanding by responding to the proper moral reasons and that is impossible if we suspend our belief. I also point to William James’s argument, according to which the suspension of judgment is not genuinely rational in many cases, and our options in these situations depend on our character. I conclude that even if serious disagreements are important data in constructing our moral theories, so are our intuitions – and the former cannot undermine the truth of intuitionism. The arguments from disagreement that aim to defeat intuitionism seem to imply a questionable bias towards agreement that should be counterbalanced by noticing the benefits of disagreements such as the possibility to understand each other and to develop our own positions.

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Karel Pajus, Moral constructivism and moral realism in Kantian

ethics, (University of Tartu)

The question about Immanuel Kant's meta-ethical position has become one of the central issues in recent Kantian research. According to Kant moral claims are truth apt and at least some moral claims are true. Kant's deeper meta-ethical commitments are however difficult to decipher and various contradicting interpretations have in recent years emerged. The currently dominant position holds that Kant is a moral constructivist. Constructivism in the Kantian context means that moral judgments and ends spring from our ideal rational agency. Moral judgments and ends are constructed by the procedures and fundamental principles of pure practical reason. The other popular interpretation can be called moral realism, which in the Kantian context means that ends and moral claims are true insofar as they reflect some non-natural and mind independent moral order. These competing meta-ethical interpretations compete, among other things, as grounds of Kant's concept of human dignity, which denotes the intrinsic value of a rational creature. Realists find that dignity is a mind independent property, while constructivists support the view that dignity is a value constructed by our autonomous rationality. It is argued that moral constructivism is in a better position than moral realism to account for the fundamental value and justification of human dignity in the Kantian ethical framework.

Eduard Parhomenko, Vene Heidegger ja Eesti iseseisvus: filosoofia

algus kui geopoliitiline küsimus, (Tartu Ülikool)

“Vene filosoofia – see on säärane hüpoteetiline tervik, mis pole meile antud ei tervikuna ega mitte ka mitme osana. See on tervenesti kujuteldav maailm, mis ometigi on ehitatud üles täiesti konkreetsele ja fenomenoloogiliselt vaieldamatule vene Alge, venesuse, vene maailma, vene omapära, vene kultuuri alusele. Venelik on fenomenoloogiliselt tõepärane. Kes seda eitab, nendega jutt on lühike: need on lihtsalt vaenlased, aga vaenlastega on kõigil aegadel toimitud ühtmoodi.”

Aleksandr Dugin. “Martin Heidegger: vene filosoofia võimalikkus” (2011) “VP: Kas te suudaksite maha lasta inimest? AD: Vaenlast? VP: Inimest. AD: Vaenlast – jah!”

Aleksandr Dugin vestluses Vladimir Pozneriga saates “Pozner” telekanalil Pervõi Kanal 21. aprillil 2014

Ettekanne analüüsib Martin Heideggeri mõtlemise retseptsiooni vene uusparempoolses ideoloogias Aleksandr Dugini Heideggeri-tõlgenduse näitel. Analüüsi fookuses on küsimus filosoofia ja geopoliitilise mõtlemise seosest. Täpsemalt küsimus selle kohta, kuidas Aleksandr Dugin püüab Heideggeri käsitusega mõtlemise teisasest algusest (der andere Anfang des Denkens) anda filosoofilist sügavust ja alust nüüdisaegse Venemaa

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geopoliitilisele ambitsioonile. Probleem pole aga pelgalt selles, kas Aleksandr Dugini arusaamine Heideggerist on tõsiselt võetav filosoofiliselt. Muret teeb nägemus “vene maailmast”, avaramalt geopoliitilisest maailmakorraldusest, mida filosoofiliselt sätestada tahetakse ja sõjaliselt kehtestada kavatsetakse, Heideggerile osutades seejuures. Nii ei pääse me vaagimast küsimust, mil määral on Heideggeri käsitus olemisest (tema olemisajalooline mõtlemine (seinsgeschichtliches Denken)) üldse ühitatav Eesti iseolemise ontoloogiaga. Milline võiks olla vastus sellele küsimusele lähtuvalt Heideggeri-retseptsiooni eripärast Eestis (Tõnu Luik, Ülo Matjus)? Aleksandr Dugin (sünd. 1962) on üks silmapaistvamaid vene uusparempoolse äärmusliku rahvusluse ideolooge nüüdisajal. Teda on vene fašistiks nimetatud. Avaldanud üle neljakümne monograafia ja õpiku geopoliitika, sotsioloogia, filosoofia ja esoteerika teemadel. Oma ettekandes keskendun monograafiatele “Мартин Хайдеггер: философия другого Началa” / “Martin Heidegger: teisase Alguse filosoofia” (2010) ja “Мартин Хайдеггер: возможность русской философии” / “Martin Heidegger: vene filosoofia võimalikkus” (2011), kus Dugin üritab rekonstrueerida Heideggeri olemisajaloolist mõtlemist omalaadse õpetusena filosoofia uutest metafüüsikajärgsetest alguste võimalikkusest kui alternatiivist lääne filosoofilisele traditsioonile. Ühe säärase uue algusena käib Dugin omaltpoolt välja algupärase vene filosoofia võimalikkuse. Oma õpetust algupärase ratsionaalsuse ehk logose paljususest, millest võrsub eri tsivilisatsioonide (sh vene) puhas ja taandamatu eripära, arendab Dugin edasi monograafiates “В поисках тёмного Логоса” / “Hämara logose otsinguil” (2013) ja “Ноомахия: войны ума. Три Логоса: Аполлон, Дионис, Кибела” / “Noomachia: mõistuse sõjad. Kolm logost: Apollon, Dionysos, Kybele” (2014). Aleksandr Dugini radikaalses rahvusluses tuleks näha maailmavaatelist reaktsiooni Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemisele. Silmnähtavalt väljendub see tema geopoliitilises õpetuses, mis taotleb USA ehk siis liberaalse demokraatia ülemvõimu murdmist maailmas multipolaarse maailmakorralduse kehtestamise läbi. Dugini nägemuses peab selle võitluse etteotsa asuma Euraasia mandril impeeriumina taastatud Venemaa. Dugin nimetab oma geopoliitilist õpetust “uuseuraasluseks”, sidudes seda euraasluse filosoofilise suundumusega 1920. ja 1930. aastate vene emigratsioonis. See klassikaline euraaslus tunnustas bolševikke Vene impeeriumi taastamise eest Nõukogude Liiduna. Duginit silmas pidades tuleks ühtlasi välja tuua juba klassikalise euraasluse ideoloogiline lähedus ja paralleelsus kahe maailmasõja vahelise saksa konservatiivide ja parempoolsetega (nn konservatiivne revolutsioon Saksamaal). Dugini vaadete (eeskätt tema geopoliitilise kontseptsiooni) kujunemise seisukohalt tuleks rõhutada, et Dugini Heideggeri-uurimustele eelnes pikaajaline tegelemine nii saksa konservatiivsete mõtlejate (Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger) kui ka euraaslaste ning traditsionalistidega (René Guénon, Julius Evola). Dugini geopoliitika käsitlused on mõjusad nii vene poliitikute kui ka juhtivate sõjaväelaste ringkonnis: “Основы геополитики. Геополитическое будущее России” / “Geopoliitika alused. Venemaa geopoliitiline tulevik” (1997), “Геополитика Постмодерна” / “Postmoderni geopoliitika” (2007), “Теория многополярного мира” / “Mitmepolaarse maailma teooria” (2012). Martin Heideggeri mõtlemises on geopoliitiline mõõde algselt olemas, iseäranis tema 1930. aastate teostes. See kasvab välja mõtlemise olemisajaloolise alguse kui teisase algupärasema alguse võimalikkuse küsimusest. Nii kõneleb Heidegger loengukursuses “Einführung in die

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Metaphysik” / “Sissejuhatus metafüüsikasse” (1935) olemisest kui “Õhtumaa vaimsest saatusest” ning visandab dramaatilise pildi Euroopast kui pihtide vahele haaratust – üheltpoolt Venemaa ja teiseltpoolt Ameerika, mis “metafüüsiliselt nähtuna” on “seesama”. “Me lebame pihtide vahel. Keskel seisvana kogeb meie rahvas pihtide tugevaimat survet, naabriterikkaim rahvas ning nõnda ohustatuim rahvas ning kõiges selles metafüüsiline rahvas.” Kõnekas on 1936. aastal Roomas peetud ettekanne “Europa und die deutsche Philosophie” / “Euroopa ja saksa filosoofia”, kus Heidegger osutab seosele rahvaste geopoliitilise liigenduse (Gliederung der Volksordnung) ja olemiseküsimuse (Frage nach dem Grund und Abgrund des Seyns) vahel. Samuti Heideggeri Nietzsche- kui ka Hölderlini-loengud on tõlgendatavad geopoliitilise mõtlemise võtmes. Hölderlini hümnide “Germanien”, “Der Rhein”, “Der Ister”, “Andenken” interpretatsioonides põimuvad sügavuti ühte mõtlemise mõisteline käik ja maastiku liigendumine elementideks (jõed, mäed, orud, mered), sakraalseteks paikadeks ja rahvaste saatusteks – tegemist on sõna otseses mõttes mõtlemise maastikega. Hölderlini luulendatud Euroopa suurte jõgede hoovamine vastu oma voolusuunda tagasi oma algusesse Heideggeri mõtelduna: õhtumaise metafüüsika olemisajalooline liikumine tagasi oma vanakreeka algusesse. Hölderlini-loengutes töötab Heidegger välja oma arusaamise mõtlemise esimesest ja teisasest algusest. Aleksandr Duginit tõmbab silmnähtvalt Heideggeri filosoofiliselt fundeeritud liberalismi ja demokraatia (amerikanismi) kriitika ning nihilismi-käsitus praeguseaja kriisi määratlemisel. Seejuures aga lahutab arusaamine geopoliitikast. Väidan, et kui ka Heideggerile mõtlemisele saab mitmeti omistada geopoliitilist mõõdet, siis erinevalt Aleksandr Duginist ei näe Heidegger geopoliitikas (iseäranis poliitilis-sõjalise mõtlemise ja praktika tähenduses) kriisi lahendamise vahendit. Dugin aga loodab just maailma geopoliitilise ümberkorraldamise teel leida lahendus n-ö metafüüsilisele kriisile, mis tema meelest väljendub nüüdisajal Nõukogude Liidu kokkukukkumises ning USA jätkuvates katsetes lagundada Venemaa suurriigina lõplikult, tahtes ära tõmmata Ukraina Venemaa mõjusfäärist (vrd Zbigniew Brzezinski “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives” (1997)). Dugini mõtlemist iseloomustab läbivalt poliitiline aktivism, millest Heideggeril puhul saab kõnelda ehk vaid episoodiliselt. Heidegger näeb pääseteed kriisist (inimese) olemasolemise muutuses (Wandel des Daseins). Samas konstitueerub Heideggeri arusaama kohaselt (inimest määrav) olemasolemine olemise-tõe avatusena ühtlasi seeläbi, mida siinkohal olen tõlgendanud geopoliitilise dimensioonina. Seetõttu vajab täpsemat analüüsi, kuidas lõpuks seda “olemasolemise muutust” mõista geopoliitilise suhtes. Raamatu “Martin Heidegger: vene filosoofia võimalikkus” puhul äratab aga tähelepanu tõik, et siin soovitab Dugin venelastele Heideggeri õpetust filosoofia teisasest algusest justkui esiotsa mingi vaimse praktikana vene rahvusliku olemasolu sisemiseks uuenemiseks vene oma algupärase filosoofia võimalikkuse rajamise kaudu. Küsitav aga on, et seejuures käib Dugin välja ikkagi üsna konkreetselt identifitseeritavad ehk siis lokaliseeritavad traditsioonid ja orientatsioonid (nt vene õigeusk, platonism, ida religioossed traditsioonid, esoteerilised õpetused) filosoofia uute kujuteldavate algustena, vabastamaks ja puhastamaks venesus selle ensekolonisatsioonist lääne filosoofia ja liberalismi poolt (archeo-modern). Dugini arusaamise kohaselt kujutab Heideggeri käsitus mõtlemise esimesest ja teisasest algusest algselt lääne filosoofiasse enesesse kätketud võimalust tematiseerida lääne filosoofia kui oma lõpetatuse saavutanud ajaloolist tervikut – ning väljuda sellest. Käsitus algusest lokaliseerib filosoofia geopoliitiliselt. Lääne filosoofia ühes selle universalistlike ehk globalistlike taotlustega (nt inimõigused) osutub

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lokaliseerituks oma ajaloolise paikkondliku vanakreeka alguse läbi. Ent ka teisane algus tõlgendub võimalikkusena lokaliseeritavaks ehk tematiseeritavaks filosoofia uute alternatiivsete paikkondlike algustena. Geopoliitiline mõtlemine on agonistlik. Kas siia registrisse kuulub ka 1930. aastate Heideggeri jutt polemosest ja olemise vägivaldsusest? Erinevaid tsivilisatsioone rajavate eri logoste vahel käib Aleksandr Dugini käsituses vältimatu sõda. Geopoliitilise mõtlemise kohaselt on riikide, rahvaste või siis tsivilisatsioonide vastasseisud paljuski määratletud maailma ruumilisest liigendusest. Ühtlasi teostub maailma ruumiline liigendus eri rahvaste ja riikide kultuurilise, ideoloogilise, ka filosoofilise vastasseisuna (Carl Schmitt: sõber – vaenlane). Geopoliitlises mõttes pole tegemist mitte niivõrd üksikindiviidide “lahkarvamuste”, kuivõrd rahvaste ruumilis-ajaloolise asumise ehk olemise saatuslike printsiipidega, millisena on nad üksikindiviidi suhtes transtsendentsed ja justkui juba ära otsustatud. Nii ehk saakski mõista filosoofia alguse küsimust geopoliitilise valiku küsimusena. Nagu oleks eestlasel siin midagi valida.

Vasil Penchev, Language in terms of disagreements, conflicts,

contradictions, and messes, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

The thesis is: Language is often described as a mean of the representation of reality and the meditation between human beings for actions in reality. Furthermore, the language can emancipate from that function of representing and even communicating in fictions and literature or in linguistics. Therefor one can offer another viewpoint to the language, according to which the language should maintain an optimal degree of opacity rather than transparency. Thus the main function of language is to replace reality by an image of it, which should not correspond to reality exactly but more or less approximately and even fussy and foggy. Consequently, the main function of language is to create fictions and literature rather than representations. Furthermore, a very important, but only particular and borderline case is that of representing reality. However this particular case should not serve for researching and defining the language as a whole. Main arguments “pro” the thesis: Pro.1 The hypothesis of a single reality underlies the possibility for the language to be understood as an exact representation of reality. In fact, reality is combined from many fragments more or less consistent internally and rather inconsistent to each other. The even partial agreement even of a little part of them is too complicated and redundant puzzle, the resolving of which is one task, considerably exceeding the intellectual capabilities of any human being, even of a genius. Fortunately, the language has evolved in another way, “bracketing” the question about the absolutely exact representation of reality either single or plural. Therefor it has gradually and historically grounded tools such as words, which are fussy, foggy, imprecise, but which are apt to omit all immaterial contradictions between eventual parts of reality and clearing more or less only a few essential and consensual properties. Consequently any unit of meaning outlines some area of consensus either between parts of reality or between many realities.

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Pro.2 Even if the hypothesis of one single reality is granted, any human being perceives and interprets it radically differently from anyone other. The consistency of perceptions ant interpretations might be achieved exceptionally difficultly by the scientific picture of reality. That picture is so sophisticated that no human being can understand it as a whole. Only a few genii can embrace even that tiny piece of it, which is contained in a single scientific theory or discipline. Nevertheless, the language has created tools relevant to the intellectual potential of an average human being for anyone to communicate and interact jointly and rather successfully. Those tools abandon and darken absolutely all dividing human beings including the different intellect and experience and concentrating only on a few unifying features of reality as the meaning of the corresponding linguistic item. Pro.3 The process of appearing of any meaning darkens gradually all contradictions both between different aspects of the meaning and between its interpretations by different human beings. Consequently, the sense of any meaning consists in the optimal proportion between its unclearness and exactness. Even more, the exactness of any meaning in a language is secondary. This is the little rest after removing all disagreements or contradictions both between different fragments of knowledge and between people’s interpretations. Science hides this process alleging the words in the language as imprecise in comparison to any scientific notion possessing ostensibly in advance an exact definition. In fact, the scientific definitions have many disadvantages in relation to the words in a language. The concepts in science only continue the same process in a community of scientists creating an artificial language just for this community therefore excluding the rest people and even a part of their colleagues from this newly-made language as ignoramuses. Main arguments “contra” might be: Contra.1 Science is one of the most successful areas of human activity. It is the base both of the contemporary global society and technics. The scientific notions possess exact definitions even when the used terms are the same as certain words in most languages. Any scientific notion should be as exact as possible. The logical and deductive method is fundamental for science. It requires maximally precious definitions to be applied. An essential part of the contemporary science including thoroughly physics, informatics and chemistry is mathematized. The mathematizing is impossible in any other base than that of absolutely precise definitions of all concepts. The mathematics itself is built axiomatically and deductively. The properties of all notions are rigorously fixed by axioms. The thesis should explain the way of science to be so successful after it has used a maximally exact and artificial language contra the thesis. Contra.2. All contradictions in the unified scientific picture of the world are removable. This picture has guaranteed the progress during the last centuries. What can the thesis offer to mankind?

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David Bordonaba Plou, A felicitious disagreement, (University of

Granada)

The meaning of predicates of personal taste (cfr. Lassersohn 2005) has been a very controversial theme in the recent debates in the philosophy of language. One notion that has played an important role in these debates is that of faultless disagreement. We can encounter different attitudes towards the value of this notion in the literature, some approving it (cfr. Kölbel 2008, Lassershon 2005), others rejecting it (cfr. Glanzberg 2007, Stojanovic 2007), but most of them agreeing in the idea that we have faultless disagreement when two speakers utter incompatible contents (contents that cannot be true in the same context of use) but, at the same time, we cannot say of any one of them that they are mistaken. From Austin, it is a commonplace in philosophy of language that to state a fact, either truly or falsely, is not the only function that a statement can play. We can do a lot of things with words (cfr. Austin 1956), and predicates of personal taste are not an exception. They allow us to perform different actions. When we utter, for example, that something is tasty, it is clear that we are producing some sounds and, through these sounds, we are stating that a determinate object (for example a given meal) posseses certain features. But we are expressing too that we are having a hedonic/positive experience, and sometimes, we are expressing the acceptance of a rule that sanctions positively or negatively our having that experience. The aim of this work will be twofold. On the one hand, we will show that the different positions taking part in the debate originated from 2005 Lassersohn’s work have a very specific understanding of disagreement –one that is based on the truth of the contents expressed by the utterances of the speakers–. This widespread view take these contents in isolation, leaving aside the context in which the utterances have been produced or the relevant features of the conversational score. We think that this approach is adequate neither to entertain certain features of the speech acts involving predicates of personal taste nor to explain certain pragmatic phenomema associated with cases of disagreement. Secondly, we will defend an alternative vision of disagreement, one focused in what speakers do when they disagree. Under this view, the fact that two people disagree is not viewed as the last stage of a conversation, but the first. As Austin says in How to do things with words: “If we never made mistakes how should we correct them”. In other words, disagreement makes explicit the neccessity of speakers to accomodate (cfr. Lewis 1979) certain information that can play a relevant role setting off a situation of disagreement. That is to say, the situation of disagreement triggers a coordination process between speakers that allows them to make explicit the relevant elements producing the disagreement. The core idea will be this: if disagreement is not followed by a coordination process, the speech act will be unfelicitious. In Austin’s stance, it would be a Misexecution of the type B. 2 (Austin 1956, pg. 18). The speakers carry out the speech act, but they do not do it completely. They are omitting important information. They are putting hitches that do not allow the speech act to be felicitous.

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Here is an example that illuminates the ideas displayed up until now. Consider two people speaking about oranges:

(1) A: They’re tasty. (2) B: They’re not tasty. (3) A: I thought you liked oranges. Yesterday morning you ordered an orange juice. (4) B: Yes, I love orange juice, but I don’t like raw oranges because of their texture.

If we only take (1) and (2) into account, the example does not show anything new. A and B disagree about oranges being tasty, and their respective stances are faultless because both speakers have good reasons to endow the contents associated with their utterances. That is it. But what the enquire of B in (3) triggers is a coordination process that forces B to make explicit relevant information for her position. They do not disagree about oranges being tasty or not. Rather they disagree about if raw oranges are tasty. After the coordination process, the context is richer, and their respective speech acts are not anymore unfelicitious, or at least, not so unfelicitious as if the coordination process had never taken place. Besides, the coordination process has other positive consequences: it allows us to modulate our behaviour in order to avoid unneccesary future disagreements. In the above example, speaker A will know that in a possible future occasion it is ok offering to speaker B orange juice, but it will not necessarily be ok to offer raw oranges.

Fabien Schang, International disagreements, (National Research

University, Higher School of Economics)

The so-called Theory of International Relations (or International Relations Theory: IRT) is supposed to deal rationally with political objects as equally rational agents as mere individuals. One of these rational rules concerns the relations of agreement and disagreement [1], including Fritz Heider’s theory of social balance [3]: any triadic relation is said to be “balanced” whenever the number of disagreements is even; it is “imbalanced”, otherwise. An application of this social rule to IRT is to the effect that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. To what extent does such a statement hold, and how to account for its empirical failure? The objective of my talk is to address such an issue by a formal treatment of international relations. By doing so, my talk resorts to a formal philosophy [6] whose task consists in applying formal methods to philosophical problems including political philosophy. After turning back to the roots of IRT [7], several primary issues are in order to characterize the general relation R(a,b) between arbitrary agents a,b. The first question is: what is the nature of a and b in IRT? The second one is: what is the relation R holding between these? And the third one: what are the logical properties of R, if any? Then a formal treatment of IRT is proposed to frame the whole debate, including a special focus on the previous case of enemies and friends between state-centered entities. Letting

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E and F be the relations of enmity and friendship, respectively, the point is to assess the value of the aforementioned statement:

(EEF) For every x,y,z: (E(x,y) E(y,z)) F(x,z) The formal logic I developed for semantic purposes (Opposition-Friendly Logic: OF Logic) will be advocated to make sense of both the plausibility of (EEF) and its restrictions, in terms of opposite objects endowed with specific logical values (sequences of 0-1 values, or bitstrings). Thus each state is defined within a unique referential framework (that of the hegemon) by a set of features like military, economic, social and cultural values, and each of these combined values is marked with a proper strength coefficient. The resulting set of ordered values may help to assess the political relationship between any two states and to throw some light upon their variation through time. More specifically, an abstract logic of opposition will be used to characterize the difference between friends and enemies in basic terms of compatible and incompatible sets of values. A number of statements will be defended in this formal philosophy of political relationships, both paralleling the results of [5] and developing the latter by means of logical operators:

(1) The relation of rivalry proceeds as an intermediary stage “between” friendship and enmity, corresponding to the logical relation of indifference (the same ordered values can be shared or not). (2) The strength coefficient attached to each single value depends upon the political paradigm assumed by the corresponding state (liberal, realist, Marxist, transnational, or constructivist model of political relations) and may explain why two states can share common values while changing their behavior with respect to these through their history. (3) The difference between direct and indirect relations between states also justifies the call for coefficients attached to states: the combination of physical distance and political difference (non-identity) may weaken the relation between two states x,z sharing a common enemy (or friend) y, thereby explaining the possible failure of (EEF) or its variant (EFE): “the enemy of my friend is my enemy.”

Finally, I conclude by returning to the “Great Debate” concerning the epistemological status of IRT [4]: is the latter nothing but a set of maxims based on individual caution and experienced wisdom, or a scientific system of computable rules based on logic and statistics? My plea for OF Logic does not want to overcome Dilthey’s famous distinction between natural and social sciences in this respect [2]. To the contrary, I will argue that the crucial role of paradigms does justice to the understanding of state-centered objects (unlike explaining their political decisions). References [1] Aulmann, R. J. “Agreeing to disagree”, The Annals of Statistics, Vol. 4, N°6, 1975: 1236-1239 [2] Dilthey, W. Introduction to the Human Sciences, Princeton University Press, 1991 [3] Heider, F. “Attitudes and cognitive organization”, The Journal of Psychology, Vol. 21, 1946: 107-112

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[4] Kaplan, M. “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations”, World Politics, Vol. 19, N°1, 1966: 1-20 [5] Kuperman, R. D. & Maoz, Z. & Talmud, I. & Terris, L. G.: “What is the enemy of my enemy? Causes and consequences of imbalances international relations, 1816-2001”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, N°1, 2007: 100-115 [6] Schang, F. “Abstract logic of oppositions”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, Vol. 21, 2012: 415-38 [7] Schang, F. “Making sense of history? A formal theory of international relations”, in in Globalistics and Globalization Studies (Aspects & Dimensions of Global Views), L. E. Grinin & I. V. Ilyin & A. V. Korotayev, Volgograd, 2014, 50-60

Philip Shadd, Reasonable Pluralism: Fact or Fall?, (LCC International

University)

What John Rawls called the “fact of reasonable pluralism” has become one of the dominant parameters for contemporary political theorizing. Like scarcity of resources or humans’ basic biological needs, reasonable pluralism is simply one of the empirical facts with which normative political theory must reckon. What’s more, Rawls and likeminded theorists go so far as maintaining that failure to recognize this fact, and failure to acknowledge that it has implications for fair social cooperation, renders someone unreasonable himself. In Rawls’ own words, reasonable pluralism is the fact that Under the political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable – and what’s more, reasonable – comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist….6 While the “fact of pluralism as such” is undeniable7, the operative word here is ‘reasonable’, as Rawls himself emphasizes. Disagreements over justice are not “the upshot of self- and class interest, or of peoples’ understandable tendency to view the political world from a limited standpoint”.8 Nor are disagreements over religion. In other words, what distinguishes reasonable pluralism from unreasonable or simply de facto pluralism is that the former cannot be chalked up to any moral defects possessed by the parties to a disagreement. Instead, disagreements are a result of the “burdens of judgment”. These burdens include, among other things, the complexity of empirical information, the vagueness of concepts, and the different personal backgrounds that people bring with them to the assessment of evidence.9 It is these morally innocuous factors that are the cause of reasonable disagreements, not any moral defect. Rawls’ account of the burdens of judgment, like the fact of reasonable pluralism, largely goes unchallenged by mainstream secular theorists, but seems to pose a significant challenge to anyone working within the tradition of historic Protestant Christianity. For this

6 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 36. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 37. 9 Ibid., 56–57.

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tradition would ultimately trace disagreements, at least religious disagreements, back to human sin. Sin is understood as the corruption of human nature that resulted from humanity’s rebellion against God, and is a thoroughly moral concept. Moreover, Protestants have traditionally held that sin not only distorts human hearts but also human minds. Broadly speaking, they have done so in contrast to Catholics who, in following Aquinas, have tended to understand sin’s distorting effects only in behavioral rather than also in cognitive terms. Current Protestant Christian philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, whose epistemology maintains that humans’ cognitive faculties fail to function properly apart from divine grace, continue in Calvin’s wake.10 On a traditional Protestant view, it is sin that is the root cause of disagreement in pluralistic societies, not merely Rawls’ burdens of judgment. The pluralism we see is not merely an amoral fact, but a result of the Fall. The question my paper tackles is simply this: Is recognition of reasonable pluralism compatible with the traditional Protestant belief that human cognition has been corrupted chiefly by sin? As I say, prima facie they are incompatible. One attributes disagreement to Rawls’ burdens of judgment, the other to sin; one would judge modern pluralism “reasonable”, the other foolish, immoral, idolatrous. But appearances can be misleading, and my paper probes how much Rawlsian and Protestant views of disagreement actually differ. This isn’t an idle question. Since Rawls’ account of reasonable pluralism is so widely accepted by secular theorists, one might think that this is no more than an in-house question for Protestant Christians, one of not much interest to a wider philosophical community. But the issue should also be of interest to secular theorists, for at least two reasons. First, there’s the simple fact that Protestant Christian thought is a major part of the West’s cultural heritage, and continues to have many adherents. Second, if the answer to my question comes back negative, then Rawls and likeminded theorists will have to classify all these many Protestant adherents as “unreasonable”. I think Rawls would be hesitant to do so, however, since he intends his political theorizing to address most, though not all, of the diverse citizens that constitute extant liberal democracies. If it does not address Protestant Christians deemed unreasonable, it hardly addresses the pluralism extant in contemporary Western societies. My tentative answer, though, is affirmative: Recognition of reasonable pluralism in the Rawlsian sense is, indeed, compatible with the traditional Protestant belief that human cognition has been corrupted chiefly by sin. Despite the prima facie tension between these perspectives on disagreement, in large part they are reconcilable. I, as a Protestant Christian, can by and large affirm Rawls’ account of reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgment, in particular the claim that this pluralism is ‘reasonable’. At least three thoughts push me in the direction of this affirmative answer. One is that there are different kinds of disagreement – religious, yes, but also moral, empirical, and otherwise – even though the Rawlsian idea of reasonable pluralism is often indiscriminately used to cover all these diverse kinds. A parallel mistake is for the Protestant to

10 For instance, see Plantinga, Alvin, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Plantinga, Alvin and Wolterstorff, Nicholas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

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indiscriminately assume that sin, even if it does distort cognition as well as behavior, is equally responsible for all these varied kinds of disagreement. In light of the variety of types of disagreement that exist, though, it may be that only some are attributable chiefly to the distorting effects of sin while others are chiefly due to the amoral burdens of judgment. If so, then the Rawlsian and Protestant perspectives on disagreement would not be as different as we first thought, and the Protestant may be free to affirm the Rawlsian analysis of many cases of disagreement. Second, a helpful heuristic to the Protestant thinker in assessing the Rawlsian account is to ask what, if any, types of disagreement would persist if humans were not subject to the distorting influence of sin. At least for my part, it seems that absent sin humans would still have to deal with such things as vague concepts and limited, even if improved, understanding of empirical matters. This means that disagreements, at least not all of them, aren’t traceable to sin. In other words, the Protestant need ask himself if we will ever disagree in heaven, and, if so, why. Third, from a Protestant viewpoint we might affirm the Rawlsian account if we take the burdens of judgment to simply be mediate causes of disagreement, though not the ultimate cause. On this proposal, the Protestant would maintain that sin is the ultimate cause of pluralism, though concede that Rawls’ burdens of judgment play a real albeit secondary role. In this way the Protestant might actually reconcile the Protestant and Rawlsian viewpoints concerning all types of disagreement. One question, though, would be whether Rawls’ account can fairly be interpreted in this way

Kadri Simm, Humanitarianism and/or global justice?,

(University of Tartu)

The aim of the presentation is to attempt to bring together two fields of reasoning that while often dealing with the same subjects and issues, have developed separately for historical and disciplinary reasons. These are theories of humanitarianism and those of global justice. Theorizing on humanitarian rationale and purpose has expanded over the past decades, mirroring a similar expansion of actual on-the-ground humanitarian action. Humanitarianism, in the eyes of a wary supporter, has perhaps even replaced politics as usual, and humanitarianism is now seen as “the secular religion of the new millennium” (McFalls 2010). Yet, humanitarianism is by no means a coherent set of views. Firstly there is the oldest, charity- and compassion-based type of humanitarianism that has been central in responding to human suffering and needs throughout history. Yet, this approach is often seen lacking by many contemporary humanitarians who propose a human-rights based strategy to deal with the causes and the consequences of large-scale human suffering. The compassionate humanitarianism - seen as a mixture of sentimentalism, paternalism and colonialism – is thus guilty of replacing the demand for justice with the logic of compassion (Fassin 2008). Rights-based approach wants to relieve

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suffering, but it also wants to advocate, speak out, bear witness to it. Thirdly, last decades have also witnessed the rise of the humanitarian-military intervention. Within this awkward partnership humanitarian and military organisations have relied on each other for legitimation, security, logistics and many other purposes. Lauded by some as a necessary cooperation for providing efficient and professional assistance, it is also rejected by others as unethical and disastrous in the long term as trust towards the neutrality of humanitarian organisations is jeopardized. All in all, it can be descriptively argued that the rights-and justice-based approach to disasters and crisis is slowly but surely becoming more prevalent. This is very much linked up with the realization that often disasters can be either avoided, or at least minimized, and it is the duty of governments to do so. While humans are unable to prevent an earthquake or tropical storm, we are able to enforce construction zones, early warning systems and even social programmes that promote resilience of communities hit by disasters. Similarly most famines, flooding and conflicts are human-made. And therefore a question of justice and of responsibility can be raised. And yet, there is a curious lacuna between the debates in humanitarianism and those held within and between theories of global justice. For the traditional charity-based humanitarianism there can of course be no theoretical support from the theories of justice. Although utilitarianism similarly recognizes human suffering as requiring our response, it is first and foremost a justice-and not charity-based request (e.g Singer 1972). Rights are central in many justice theories although debates are ongoing as to the geographical and political limits of the corresponding duties (eg Rawls 1999). Very different responses are given to questions of responsibility for global poverty and suffering (eg Pogge 2002, Kekes 2002) and it is here that I see a potentially fruitful opportunity to link these two large discourses more systematically.

Henrik Sova, Falling into Silence: the Burden of Proof Problem in

disputes over Putnam’s Paradox and the Brain-in-a-Vat Hypotheses,

(University of Tartu)

There are philosophical disputes concerning the consequences of metaphysical realism and content externalism that have been stemmed as a reaction to certain arguments presented by Hilary Putnam. The arguments have been dubbed as the Putnam’s paradox and the brain-in-a-vat hypotheses in the literature. I argue that these are types of disagreements or disputes where stating the positive claim or arguing for whichever side of the dispute (taking the burden of proof) opens the possibility for the opponent to force the claimer to contradiction or to show that the claimer cannot coherently state the argument or necessarily falls short showing the desired outcome. The sides are not able to state or argue coherently for their claim and must therefore fall into silence. This dire situation of an unresolvable stand-off is a consequence of certain assumptions about reference: metaphysical realism and/or content externalism.

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I’ll bring forth three examples of such disputes. Firstly, Putnam’s paradox. Putnam’s model-theoretic argument purports to show that for any empirically adequate theory T that meets epistemic standards has an interpretation for the model of T – a function that maps the elements of the model with the pieces of the world. Taking the mapping to constitute a Tarski’s satisfaction relation and defining the truth via that relation, we have a result of T being true. Hence, any ideal scientific theory T comes out true. This is a problem for metaphysical realism: the claim that there is a determinate relation of reference between the terms in which T is stated and pieces of the world and there can only be one true T with correct interpretation. But since any T comes out true, metaphysical realism must be false. Answering to this problem, constraints to possible interpretations of T has been posed: causal constraints or David Lewis’s elite classes that would secure the reference at least some part of the language. We can represent the dispute situation by two scenarios. In scenario A, Putnamian skeptic’s challenge is accepted by a metaphysical realist (theorist). The challenge is: prove that causal constraints (or some Lewisian elitarianism) restrict the range of interpretations. Theorist accepts the challenge and provides a theory T, e.g causal reference theory. Next, Putnamian skeptic argues that theory T is “just more theory”: if T is stated (claiming some constraints), it can itself be subjected to the Putnam’s argument and there is no elite interpretation. Although it might be possible that T is true, the proponent of T cannot argue that the constraints restrict the interpretations. Notice that in scenario A, Putnamian skeptic didn’t show that T is false, only that T is always exposed to the Putnam’s paradox. We can conceive a scenario B, in which case the burden of proof is reversed. Theorist proposes a challenge to the Putnamian skeptic: prove that theory T doesn’t restrict the interpretations. In this case, Bas van Fraassen’s response to the Putnam’s paradox applies: Fraassen argues that in order to prove that T is false, you must be able to state T and your argument. But trying to show that T is false with Putnam’s argument, you’re not able to state T nor the argument anymore without contradicting precisely because of the Putnam’s paradox. Hence, you cannot show that T is necessarily false. Notice that Fraassen’s response applies only to the scenario B, not to A, because in A the skeptic does not state a positive claim. I’ll argue that the same framework applies to the dispute between Lewisian physicalist response to the Putnam’s paradox that science reveals objective joints in nature and the epistemological problem for the criterion of eligibility as presented in Catherine Elgin’s paper Unnatural science. In the case of scenario A, Elgin’s skeptic states the challenge to prove that science reveals the objective joints in nature. And in case of scenario B, the theorist challenges the skeptic to disprove that. And the conclusion is similar to the previous cases: for A, there are still several interpretations possible (ones that do not carve at the joints); and for B: theory is not necessarily false. And thirdly, I argue that this framework also applies to the brain-in-a-vat-dispute concerning the Putnamian argument that the utterance “I am a brain in a vat” must be false. If one takes the burden of proof showing that the utterance might be true, the opponent can show

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that this sentence is false, but nevertheless, he/she cannot show that the opposite utterance is true. The common quarrel in these disputes is a certain view about the reference: metaphysical realism with its content externalism. The preliminary conclusion that these peculiar stand-offs concerning Putnam’s arguments seem to suggest is that one cannot make an affirmative nor negative claim about content externalism.

Uku Tooming, The Commitments of Folk Psychology,

(University of Tartu)

The question of my paper is: How to establish what we are ontologically committed to when we attribute mental states? Different views of what our folk conception of the mind is committed to entail different understandings of the way in which scientific and folk psychology relate to each other. For instance, if it is true that attributers of mental states are committed to there being inner states with specific structure then folk psychology clearly needs vindication from science. However, if attributers only need to track coarse-grained functional roles or dispositions, which can be realized in multiple ways, then the folk conception is less threatened by scientific discoveries. It isn't clear, though, what the commitments of the folk actually are and how we can explicate them. Commitments involve normative implications and one needs to know which assumptions about mental states pretend to say something about the nature of those states and which don't. To find the answer to this queston I will start by considering conceptual analysis, exemplified by analytic functionalism, according to which we can infer the ontological commitments of folk psychology from the intuitive judgments of those who attribute mental states. Such judgments are supposed to constitute the folk theory of mental states. I will argue that this approach faces the difficulty of deciding which intuitions are normatively relevant. There is no clear-cut criterion for deciding which assumptions about mental states form the folk theory which is supposed to be ontologically commissive. It is unclear what kind of judgments would settle this issue. Should we really ask for the unreflective judgments (intuitions) or should we prefer the reflective judgment of philosophers? Choosing either of these possibilities will spell trouble for the investigator. If we prefer unreflective judgments, we disparage the role of reflection in our conceptual competence. If we focus on reflective judgments, we are threatened with the possibility that reflection distorts the process of evaluating the application of the concept. To make matters worse, there is probably a continuum between unreflective and reflective judgments. A second consideration against the conceptual analysis is that it is possible that the ability to make judgments about concept application isn't enabled by a theory at all. My third argument is that even if we are able to identify which folk judgments reveal the conceptual competence, it is unclear whether they should be given the authority to decide our ontological commitments. It is doubtful whether authority can be conferred on a claim only because the majority of people tend to endorse it.

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As a solution, I will recommend a pragmatic approach. We can clearly do various things by attributing mental states – we negotiate and manipulate the attitudes of the attributees, explain and predict their behaviour, criticize the attitudes, etc. I suggest that if we want to decide whether a shared assumption about mental states reveals an ontological commitment then we should ask whether folk psychological practice can still play these roles if we don’t assume the putative commitment in question. In other words, we must ask whether our practice of attributing beliefs and desires still delivers its benefits after we have given up that putative commitment. Only those assumptions of mental state attributers that really are required for the practice to play its roles have to be considered as ontologically commissive. Unlike conceptual analysis, the present approach – let's call it „pragmatic analysis“ – views our folk psychological practice from the outside. It doesn't look at what people think when they attribute mental states, but what they actually do. Because of that, it doesn't face the problem of deciding which judgments of the folk – reflective or unreflective – are relevant. The judgments by themselves are not relevant at all. It also doesn't need to assume that mental state attributions are enabled by a theory: whatever the actual attributional mechanisms are, we can still ask about the assumptions one should accept. Finally, it can handle the third objection by providing a criterion of normative relevance for ontological assumptions. A perhaps surprising consequence of adopting such an approach is that it renders folk psychology largely immune to scientific discoveries. The pragmatic approach acknowledges as ontologically commissive only those assumptions that have to be true in order for mental state attributions to deliver their benefits. Because of that, the truth of such assumptions is pretty much guaranteed, as long as the benefits are not illusory (whatever that illusoriness amounts to). Scientific psychology can certainly challenge what the folk think about mental states but it doesn't challenge what they are committed to because the commitments have to track something real in order for the folk psychological practice to be beneficial.

Inga Vermeulen, Verbal Disputes and Failing to Disagree,

(University of Hamburg)

Some disputes just do not seem to be getting anywhere. Take the following simple case. Peter and Paul, two Ph.D. students, have a chat about Ph.D. supervision when the following dispute ensues:

Paul: “Most students meet their supervisor biweekly.” (“biweekly”: fortnightly) Peter: “That would be nice. But no, it’s clearly not the case that most students meet their supervisor biweekly.” (“biweekly”: twice a week)

Let us assume that Peter and Paul, in fact, both find it plausible that most students have meetings every other week. What goes wrong is that Peter and Paul mean something else by “biweekly” and hence talk past each other. Paul means fortnightly whereas Peter means twice a week. They appear to be disagreeing when they really aren’t. Their dispute is what philosophers have come to call “merely verbal.”

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Philosophical disputes are not obviously defective in this way. In the same time, it is difficult to outright dismiss the possibility. Is the argument over whether there are tables actually getting anywhere? Are we really making progress on whether we have free will? Maybe, just maybe, these disputes are defective in something like the way the biweekly-dispute is. One variant of metaontological deflationism, which is often traced back to Rudolph Carnap (in particular 1950) claims just that: Ontological disputes like the one over whether there are tables are merely verbal (in particular Hirsch 2005; 2009; against this view argues Sider 2005, 2011). Ontological disputes are the usual suspects, but there are many other philosophical disputes that have at some point by someone been suspected of being merely verbal, for example, disputes over whether a phenomenon is semantic or pragmatic or disputes over whether scepticism is true. In each case, the worry is that the dispute is in the very least seriously defective, maybe outright pointless. Hence, we need to better understand what defects make a dispute merely verbal in order to determine what exactly is wrong with such disputes and develop ways to detect and overcome them. This paper addresses the first issue, more specifically, the question: When is a dispute over a statement S – one party claims S and the other objects not S – merely verbal? And what exactly is wrong with such a dispute? I will argue that extant answers (Balcerak Jackson 2014; Chalmers 2011; Hirsch 2005; 2009; Sider 2011) do not satisfactorily explain the lack of disagreement in verbal disputes and provide a too narrow view of the linguistic confusions that can give rise to verbal disputes. A more promising approach is to understand verbal disputes as a pragmatic phenomenon where parties use the same utterance type S with different speaker’s meaning in a roughly (as we will see very roughly) Gricean sense. This pragmatic approach suggests furthermore that there are at least three interesting phenomena in the vicinity of what has been roughly outlined as the phenomenon of a merely verbal dispute, three stages of verbalness so to speak with increasing defects. At two of these stages, the activity of having a dispute over the statement S is, indeed, pointless. Nevertheless, at both stages, there are useful deliberative activities in the vicinity. Hence, it is too quick to dismiss a dispute as merely verbal and hence pointless. At the worst, the dispute is seriously defective and a significant adjustment of deliberative activities is required. References Balcerak Jackson, Brendan. 2014. Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness. Erkenntnis 79, 31–54. Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 20–40. Chalmers, David. J. 2011. Verbal Disputes. Philosophical Review 120, 515–566. Hirsch, Eli. 2009. Ontology and Alternative Languages. In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, ed. David J. Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, 231–259. Oxford: Oxford University Press. — 2005. Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, 67–97. Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon.

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Mats Volberg, Paternalismist ja vastutuse veeretamisest: Vastuseks

Jonathan Quong’ile, (Yorki Ülikool)

Oma 2011. aasta raamatus Liberalism Without Perfection esitab Jonathan Quong versiooni Rawlsilikust poliitilisest liberalismist, mis vastandub nii perfektsionistlikule kui kõikehõlmavale liberalismile, püüdes sellega vastata poliitikafilosoofia keskseks küsimuseks tõusnud probleemile: kuidas hoolimata kõigist meie lahkarvamustest hea osas, siiski kõigile ühiseid poliitilisi institutsioone õigustada. Kuigi ma jagan tema argumentide üldist meelsust ning olen nõus, et liberalism ei tohiks olla perfektsionistlik ega kõikehõlmav, siis tahaksin oma ettekandes kritiseerida kaht seisukohta, mida Quong oma raamatus kaitseb. Esiteks tema nägemust paternalismist ning teiseks tema ettepanekut vastutuse veeretamisest indiviidile seoses tõega poliitikafilosoofias. Kuna Quong positsioneerib end perfektsionistliku liberalismi vastu ning üks peamistest argumentidest selle vastu põhineb paternalismil – perfektsionistlik liberalism on paratamatult paternalistlik ja kuna paternalism on halb, siis ei ole nende teooria hea – siis pühendab ta oma raamatu kolmanda peatüki paternalismile. Quong nimetab oma nägemust hinnanguliseks paternalismiks, selle järgi tegu on paternalistlik kui agent A püüab parandada agendi B heaolu ning on sealjuures motiveeritud negatiivsest hinnangust agendi B võimest ise oma heaolu parandada. Niisuguse arusaama järgi paternalismist on see prima facie halb, sest eitab agendi B moraalset staatust kui vaba ja võrdne isik. Eeldusel, et meil on põhjust ära hoida või takistada asju, mis on halvad, siis meil on põhjust ära hoida paternalistlikke tegusid. Sealhulgas paternalistlikke tegusid, mis on meie endi pihta suunatud, see tähendab kui meie oleme agent B, kelle suhtes tehakse negatiivne hinnang. Quongi arusaam paternalismist võimaldab seda teha, sest kui agentide A ja B vahel on eelnev kokkulepe, et A peaks sekkuma B tegudesse, siis ei ole A motiveeritud mitte negatiivsest hinnangust vaid tollest kokkuleppest. Kuid sellisel lahendusel paistab olevat väga kaugeleulatuvad ja veidrad järeldused, sest vältimaks võimalikke paternalistlikke tegusid meie suhtes, peaksime sõlmima kokkulepped nendeks sekkumisteks kõigi võimalikke paternalistlikke sekkujatega. See on aga juba absurdini kalduv järeldus, sest meil ei ole võimalik ette kujutada kõiki võimalikke tuleviku situatsioone, mille jaoks peaksime kokkuleppeid sõlmima, ega jõuda nende inimesteni, kellega peaksime neid kokku leppeid sõlmima. Või isegi kui need raskused oleks ületatavad, siis sellele järgnev kokkulepete rägastik teeks meie elu ülemäära keeruliseks, nii et kõikidest neist kokkulepetest kinnipidamine muutuks võimatuks. Seega Quongi arusaam paternalismist suudab küll lahendada kõik vastunäited, mis kehtivad teiste paternalismi arusaamade puhul, kuid sellel on äärmiselt veidrad järeldused meie käitumisele. Esitades oma positiivset programmi poliitilisest liberalismist väidab Quong, et üheks keskseks tunnuseks on see, et poliitikafilosoofias hoidutakse tõe-väidete tegemisest, sest üheks aluseelduseks on mõistlikud eriarvamused hea suhtes. Kuid Quong täpsustab, et seda ei tohiks tõlgendada absoluutselt, sest mingit tüüpi tõe-väiteid peab poliitiline liberaal siiski tegema. Selleks eristab Quong igapäevase ja metafüüsilise tõe mõiste, millest esimene on

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äärmiselt minimaalne ning oma sisult väga sarnane deflatsionistlikkule tõeteooriale, kuigi Quong on pigem agnostiline: igapäevases mõttes tõene väide ei võta mingit seisukohta selle osas, mis teeb asju metafüüsilises mõttes tõeseks. Quongi jaoks on liberalismi aluseks kaks väärtust: vabadus ja võrdsus, kuid kuna poliitiline liberalism peab hoiduma metafüüsilistest tõe-väidetest, siis ei saa teooria ise võtta mingit seisukohta nende väärtuste alustes. Teiste sõnadega poliitiline liberaal ei saa osana oma teooriast esitada põhjendusi miks me peaksime vabadusse ja väärtusesse uskuma. Aga see ei tähenda, et selliseid põhjendusi ei oleks, need on lihtsalt väljaspool poliitilist liberalismi. Seega teooria veeretab vastutuse nende väärtuste põhjenduste leidmiseks indiviidile ja seega ei pea ise tegema vastuolulisi metafüüsilisi tõe-väiteid vabaduse ja võrdsuse kohta. Ning iga indiviid saab pakkuda õigustusi vabadusse ja võrdsusesse uskumiseks oma enda hea arusaamast lähtuvalt. Minu kriitika Quong’ile on see, et sellise olukorra juures me ei saa olla kindlad tolle vastutuse edasi veeretamise tulemustes. Teiste sõnadega kui iga indiviid peab pakkuma kõigile poliitilise liberalismi printsiipidele tugeva õigustuse oma vaatenurgast lähtuvalt ning me eeldame selliste vaatenurkade mitmekesisust, siis kuidas me saame olla kindlad, et soovitud tulemused järgnevad? Kas poliitilise liberalismi teoreetikul on piisavalt alust arvata, et kõigi indiviidide vaatenurk pakub sobilikke põhjendusi? Üks võimalus on, et vabadusse ja võrdsusesse uskumiseks on mingid kindlad head põhjendused ning kuna poliitiline liberaal eeldab mõistlikku eriarvamusi hea suhtes, siis ta võib ühtlasi eeldada, et kõigi võimalikel vaatenurkadel on juurdepääs neile sobilikele põhjendustele. Kuid see ei oleks tegelikult reaalne lahendus, sest see sellisel juhul teeks meie arusaam, mis on „mõistlik“, ära kogu töö. Juba ette defineerida mõistlikeks vaatenurkadeks need, mis sisaldavad sobilikke põhjendusi vabadusele ja võrdsusele paistab olevat sohi tegemine, kuid mingite üldisemate sisuliste kriteeriumite seadmine lihtsalt lükkaks probleemi järgmisele tasemele. Teine võimalus on, et misiganes põhjendused inimesed välja pakuvad on sobilikud, sest nende peale see vastutus veeretati ning nemad ise on nende põhjendustega rahul ja seega ei ole mingit probleemi. Kuid sellise lahenduse puhul puudub igasugune reaalne kvaliteedikontroll ning inimesed võivad olla veendunud vabaduse ja võrdsuse väärtuses väga halbadel põhjustel või põhjustel, mis tegelikult nende väärtust ei näita. Samuti oleks sellise lahenduse puhul osade inimeste põhjendused paremad, mis tõttu oleks kogu poliitilise liberalismi alused ebaühtlaselt põhjendatud. Seega Quongi vastutust edasi veeretav käsitlus tõe-väidetest poliitikafilosoofias ei ole väga hea.