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Outline of the Evolution of
Corporate Governance in Latin America
(1997-2009)
Mike LubranoCartica Capital
January 26, 2010Santiago de Chilewww.CarticaCapital.com
Definitions of Corporate Governance
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.”
OECD Corporate Governance Principles, 2004
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The Elements of Corporate GovernanceShareholder Rights and Treatment
• For Whose Benefit is the Company Run?Boards of Directors
• Role, Composition, Organization and Quality
• Accountability and IncentivesControl Environment
• Identifying, Quantifying and Addressing Risk
• Internal and External Checks and Balances
Transparency and Disclosure• Accounting and Audit Standards
Supervision and Enforcement• Public and Private Mechanisms
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The Prequel :The 90s
The Decade Started off Pretty Well…• Privatizations after the lost decade• Pension reforms• New Issuances in domestic markets• American Depositary Receipt Boom• CTC breaks the ice in July 1990• Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
…but it Ended in Tears• Tequila Crisis (‘94 – ’95)• Asian Crisis (‘97)• Drop-off in listings / volumes
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The Prequel :The 90s
Investors’ experience left a bitter aftertaste:
• Poor equity returns on a risk-adjusted basis• e.g., IFC portfolio review
• Inequitable treatment in changes of control• “Low-ball” bids in delistings• Suspicious related-party transactions
• Mispricing of sales• Tunneling
• Rich controllers, poor companies
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The Prequel :The 90s
What did policy makers and investors learn?
• Macro measures and Market reforms/regulatory framework are not enough
• The proper functioning of the corporation cannot be assumed
• Corporate Governance failures can contribute to economic crisis (Korea ‘ 97)
• Company success does not necessarily translate into profits for minority shareholders
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Early Latin American Milestones
1997 – “Chispas” case (Enersis/Endesa España)• Treatment of minorities in Changes of Control
1999 – COSRA/IOSCO Governance Initiatives
1999 – OECD Principles
2000 – Proposals to revise Brazilian Company Law• Rights and treatment of non-voting shares
2001 – Latin America CG Roundtable
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Role of the Latin America CG Roundtable
Forum for Research, Discussion and Debate among all Participants in Corporate Governance• Regional and international• Public and Private Sector
Develop Consensus on Problems to be Tackled, Priorities and Policy Responses
• White Papers• Revision of OECD Principle
Sharing of Experience Assists Policymakers and Private Sector Agents to Adapt Solutions to Local Circumstances
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Governance Begins with Ownership / Control Structures
Stereotypical US/UK Public Co.• “The Modern Corporation and
Private Property” (1932) – Berle & Means
• Dispersed Ownership/Control in the Market
• Principal / Agent Problem• Separation of Ownership and
Control• Conflict: Managers vs.
Dispersed Shareholders• Discipline: Market for
Corporate Control / Civil Litigation
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European / Emerging Markets• Concentrated Ownership• Minority of Voting Shares in
the Market• Concentrated Business Elites• Management Selected by or
are Controlling Shareholders• Personal/Family Identification• Conflict: Controlling
Shareholders vs. Minority Shareholders
• Discipline: Minority Shareholder Rights / Regulation / Governance Discount
Typical Pathologies – US/UK vs. Europe/LA
Dispersed Ownership
• Empire building by CEOs • Excessive remuneration
(stock options; nest feathering)
• Insider trading• Defense mechanisms
(poison pills, staggered boards)
• Non-disclosure of information (manipulation of financial statements)
• Internal control problems (independence of auditor)
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Concentrated Ownership
• Ineffective Boards• Poor Capacity• Passive Approach• Low independence
• Conflicts of Interest; RPTs• Minority Shareholder
mistreatment, especially in changes of control
• Succession / Family Business Issues
• Transparency / Internal Controls / Audit Function
Typical Weaknesses of Emerging Markets
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• Director pool (independence, qualification, training, D&O insurance)
• Internal Controls• Accounting and Audit standards and
practices• Compliance culture• Regulatory oversight and enforcement• Market discipline / Informational
Infrastructure• Civil litigation
Menu of Responses
• Legislation (e.g., Chile, Sarbanes Oxley)• Voluntary Standards (Code Movement)• “Private Governance Infrastructure”
• Proxy Advisors / Information Services• Rating Agencies (Credit and
Governance)• Opt-in Regimes (Novo Mercado – Brazil)• Shareholder Activism / Relational
Investors
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Latin America Timeline
1997 – Chispas Scandal (Chile)
1999 – OECD Principles Issued
2000 – Ley de OPAS (Chile)2000 – 1st Meeting of Latin America CG
Roundtable (São Paulo)
2001 – Brazilian Legal Reform
2001 – Enron Scandal
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Latin America Timeline
2002 – Bovespa Novo Mercado / IGC Index
2002 – Peruvian Code (Conasev)
2002 – Sarbanes-Oxley2003 – Roundtable White Paper on
Corporate Governance
2004 – OECD Principles Revised
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Latin America Timeline
2005-7 – IPO Boom in Brazil
2006 – Ley de SAPIs (Mexico)
2007 – Colombia Código País
2007 – Poison Pills in Brazil2009 – Ley de Gobiernos Corporativos
(Chile)
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Brazilian Response 2000-2002
Limited Legal Reform • Limits on PN shares, but “Grandfathering”
for existing firms• Partial tag along rights• Delisting rules • Regulator’s (CVM) powers increased
Voluntary Codes• CVM –“ Comply or Explain”• IBGC – Aspirational
Opt-in System (Novo Mercado)
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2006 Revisions
Amendment Process• Closed hearing with the NM’s
companies• Not rejected by more than 1/3 listed
companies• Approval of securities regulator
Revision (main topics)• Independent director requirement
(20%)• Directors’ unified term at most 2 years • Arbitration applied for all shareholders • Definition of diffuse control
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Novo Mercado Takes Off (2006-2008)
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Listed Cos. Equity Offerings
Mkt. Cap.US$ mm
MC/GDP%
Brazil 404 43+7+8=58 1,369,711 104 Russia 328 28 1,104,974 117 Bombay 4887 86 1,819,101 155 Shanghai 833 223 3,694,348 194 Mexico 367 6 397,725 39 Turkey 319 34 286,572 44
2007 data
Chilean Response 1997-2009
1997 - Enersis / Endesa Scandal(Chispas)
2002 - Ley de OPAs• Equal Treatment of
Shareholders in Changeof Control
• Responsibility of Directors
2008 – Centro de Gobierno Corporativo y Mercados de Valores
2009 – Ley de Gobiernos Corporativo
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Thanks!
Mike LubranoManaging Director, Corporate Governance
Cartica Capitalwww.carticacapital.com
+1-202-367-3011
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