wwii naval battle – the cape

8/9/2019 WWII Naval Battle The Cape

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Kanook October 7th, 2009

During the month of December in the North Atlantic a classic, if not screwed

up naval battle took place between the Allied navies and the German Kriegsmaine

(Navy), whereas the Germans were intent on attacking a convoyJW55B, which had

departed from Loch Ewe, Scotland on Dec 20th headed for the Russian Lola inlet, a

total of 19 merchant ships from America, Britain and one Panamanian escort oiler

named the Norlys. Their escort consisted of four Corvettes, five Minesweepers,

twenty-two Destroyers, five Cruisers and the battle ship Duke of York, all not at the

scene at one-time but on and off from Dec 20 th, to the 27th.

On Wednesday the 22nd the convoy

was spotted by a JU-88 weather plane,

relaying the information back to the base

nearby the Luftwaffe shadowed the convoy

north

into

deteriorating weather while back in the

Norwegian harbor of Narvik from his office

on the Aviso Grille, Hitlers yacht, Kapitan-

zun Rudolf Peters mobilized the operationalU-boats of the wolf-pack named

Eisenbart. Operation Ostfront had

begun. When the course and speed of

the 19 merchantmen had been

confirmed on Christmas Day, there

were eight submarines heading to a

patrol line 135 NMs to the southwest of

Bear Island.

As it turned out the Eisenbart

submarine group played a minor role in

the battle, but they did provide data

that affected its outcome. Analysis of

the data shows that as time progressed

in the North Sea, faulty navigation and

poor communications contributed significantly to the Germans failure to determine

an accurate position of the convoy and the ultimate conclusion that resulted in the

sinking of the famous German battle cruiser the Scharnhorst.


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On Christmas Eve Kapitan-zun Rudolf Peters wrote in his diary, The boats will

be in a position to get to grips with the convoy tomorrow morning. Some hours

later Otto Hansen a 25-year old Oberleutnant zur See on board the submerged U-

601, picked up sounds of propellers and valves and pumps working. Waiting until

he believed he was in a safe area, surfaced and at 0952 Christmas morning fired off

a communication, Run over by convoy in AB6720. Enemy steering 60 degrees.Hansen.

On Christmas Day, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz signaled Scharnhorst: The

enemy is attempting to aggravate the difficulties of our eastern land forces in their

heroic struggle by sending an important convoy of provisions and arms to the

Russians. We must help.

The U-601s signal created feverish activity at the German command-post at

Kaafiord, Narvik and Kiel, whereas the Scharnhorstand several destroyers, under

the command of Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) Erich Bay, put to sea at 1900 hours

(7 PM) on Christmas Day from Altenfjord to intercept and attack the convoy. The

weather around Bear Island during their preparation for sea continued to

deteriorate, turning into a violent storm originating in the south-west with heavy

rain and showers of wind-blown snow, this causing the line of U-boats to toss and

pitch wildly in the heavy seas, and operating with reduced visibility.

Scharnhorst 38,900 Tons, 773 ft by 99 ft, cruise speed 33 knots (38 mph)

Unfortunately their communications having been intercepted and decoded by

British code-breakers resulted in the Admiralty to direct naval forces to intercept.

Hansen in U-601 fought to maintain contact with the convoy wrote in his

diary, The weather worsens from hour to hour. Periodically he would glimpse

ships in the darkness, twice having to crash dive to avoid detection by theconvoys escort vessels.

A few miles from Hansens position another young skipper of a the newly

commissioned U-716,


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25-year old Hans Dunkelbert after 5-hours of surface steaming spotted a destroyer

about 9,800 feet from is submarine, he swung U-716 around and fired a T5 Gnat

torpedo at the distant shadow as it turned out the opening shot of the Battle of

the North Cape. The only shot as far as any additional submarine action he wrote

in his diary, Am being run over by destroyer, because of the rough seas a miss was

only to be expected. Now the throb of engines and turbines are audible at varying

distances. The sounds are all fading away to the east.

Approximately at the same time a third submarine experienced a near

disaster. The U-636 under the command of Kapitanleutnant Hans Hildebrandt, who

had just had his 33rd birthday on Christmas Eve, picked up the Otto Hansens

homing signal and made ready to turn about when a succession of huge waves

broke over the conning-tower and filled the U-636 with over 15-tons of ice-cold

seawater. His diesel engine sputtered and died and the chlorine gas from his

battery banks began to accumulate, battling his problem he sent off a message,

Because of the presence of a lot of chlorine gas am only just able to dive. Am

breaking off. Hammerfest!

After restarting the diesel and airing out his boat, he set a course for FdU,

Norways most forward base. Moored at the base was the 5,000 ton combinedpassenger and cargo ship the Black Watch, and a torpedo and supply carrier, the

Admiral Carl Hering, of Hammerfast. His slow and ponderous partly submerged

passage towards U-stutzpunkt Hammerfast he came across the convoy.

Hildebrandt sent off a message, At 1800-192 in AB6496 run over by eight

cargo vessels and three escorts. Easterly course, 70 rpm. No contact. Poor

listening conditions. Visibility 800 meters (2,600 feet). He made his report at 22

hours (10 PM) that evening, however being careful he did not repeat his signal,

which never reached FdU, Peters in Narvik monitored the situation with increases

anxiety.

The Scharnhorstand her five escorts had been sailing for three hours heading

into the building storm and the Arctic darkness, and Peters knew from what little

reports his U-boats had reported that the already difficult situation was getting

worse, with no indication it was going to get any better appealed to his superiors in

Kiel and Berlin to cancel the attack. Unfortunately Grand Admiral Donitz had

promised Hitler a victory and would not back off, whereas at midnight the message

from the Grand Admiral was short and sweet, I have confidence in your will to fight.


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Heil Hitler! The 1st Battle Group went forward. They really wanted the 200,000

tons of material on its way to the Red Army, at the bottom of the Barents Sea.

After a hard stormy night, battling the wind and heavy seas, the Scharnhorst

and her destroyer escort reached the expected battleground some 50-miles to the

south of Bear Island in the wee hours of the 26 th of December, and based on last

observation of the convoy headed west searching. Apparently the last position wasbased on the sighting made by Hans Dunkelberg on the U-716 at 01:30;

AB6642 forced to dive by escort. South 7. Sea 6-7, visibility 1500 meters

(4,900 feet), when the telegram was given to the highly experience commander of

the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, Kapitan-zur-see Rolf Johannesson on board Z-29, he noted

in the ships log According to this signal the enemy is about 30 nautical miles

further west than assumed. The convoys course is confirmed. Because we are

delayed this is very welcome news.

Research over time fails to find any mention of this signal in any U-boat log,

whereas the U-716 was heading east at full speed, searching for the convoy. There

is no mention in its war diary of any dive to avoid an escort at 01:30, nor any

mention of a signal broadcast. The signal was not received by any other U-boat in

the pack, nor was it received at FdU Norwegen in Narvik. Some surmise that the

mysterious signal could have been a clever deception, although confirmation was

not found in any relevant British sources.

When the apparent U-716 sighting was received on-board the Z-29 (note: the

Scharnhorsts war diary sunk with the ship, and couldnt verify the message being

received), the convoy had already executed an emergency turn to the North

consequently the result of the apparent false signal was that the destroyers

searched in the wrong direction, lost contact with the Scharnhorstand never found

the convoy.

Eight hours later another submarine of the Eisenbart wolf pack, U-277 cameacross some ships in the dark, the skipper Kapitanleutnant Robert Lubsen sent off a

message, Convoy burning lights. Estimated course 90 degrees. This message

followed by another short message at 10:02, Convoy AB6365.

As it turned out, it was another unfortunate signal that fateful day in the cold

and stormy Arctic, whereas Lubsen had seen the ships while on his way towards

Bear Island to update his navigation. Despite knowing that he was 40-50 nautical

miles off course, some surmise, he included a fixed reference in his signal the fact

of his being lost, was supported by his next message at 10:25 hours; Have

encountered convoy. Convoy burning lights. Position uncertain.

He then added to the confusion by transmitting a 3rd

signal at 11:45 hours;Four shadows. Four destroyers. Assume course, forced away, following.

Peters, who was eagerly awaiting news from the Barents Sea, it appeared as

if U-277 remained in contact, he therefore repeatedly urged him to transmit homing

signals, but Lubsen noted in his war diary As I have lost contact, am transmitting

no further fixes. He remained silent till around 21:00 hours the same day when he

transmitted a final signal; In short signal 09:45 AM read AC4421.


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The young skipper thereby admitted that his previous position has been some

50-nautical miles wrong, but by then it was too late. Both the Scharnhorstand the

destroyers had searched for the convoy without success, their search based on

Lubsens report.

The Lucky Scharnhorst was considered by more than a few involved in

Naval warfare as the most gracious every built, along with her sister-ship the

Gneisenau, together they were referred to as the Ugly Sisters because they

usually sailed the Atlantic wrought havoc on Allied shipping.

The Scharnhorstwas launched on October 3rd, 1936 and commissioned on

January 7th, 1939, whereas after her initials service was modified in mid-1939 with a

new mainmast located further aft and her straight bow replaced with an Atlantic

Bow to improve her seaworthiness. Her relatively low-freeboard ensured that she

was always wet in heavy seas, a fault that caused her some problems flooding

during a brief battle with the HMS Renoun on April 9th, 1940, receiving three hits

which one caused some serious flooding in the A turret.

Her armor was equal to that of a battleship, and if it had not been for her

relatively small-caliber guns she would have been classified as a battleship by the

British, but the German navy always classified Scharnhorst and her sister-ship as

battleships (Schlachtschiffe). She had nine each 238 mm (11.1) main guns, thathad a long range and good armor-penetration capabilities because of their high

muzzle velocity, however they were no match for the larger caliber guns of most of

the battleships of her day, the small main-guns and various other technical

problems she experienced from time-to-time put her at a serious disadvantage

whereas her speed 38 MPH allowed her to run from engagements which was her

saving grace.


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A proposal to upgrade the main armament to 15-inch guns in three twin

turrets was never implemented, if so, she would have been a formidable opponent,

being faster than any British capital ship and nearly as well armored and a

tremendous cruising range.

Naval historians have put together a scenario that makes it appear that her

final sailing was a carefully planned trap, in my opinion a British historians view of aserious of mistakes, heavy weather and luck, as for serious lets set a trap!, I

doubt it as records reveal no such superior planning, but then again the recording of

history always belongs to the victor.

Her last sailing was under the flag command of

Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) Erich Bey with the ships

Kapitan z. S. Fritz Hintze with a crew of 1,840 officers and

sailors. She headed north to find convoy JW55B on Christmas

Day at 1900 hours, never to return to port.

The Norwegian Resistance had notified the British

Command that she had sailed with her five destroyer escorts,

a message that was confirmed by Bletchley Park who had

intercepted the German message of sailing. On the 26th the

British warships were told, Admiralty appreciate Scharnhorst is probably at sea!

Force 1 (Allies) were shadowing the westbound convoy, returning from Russia, and

soon became the anvil for the attack was made up of the Belfast, Norfolk, and

Sheffield, what was to become the hammer of the attack Force 2 was the Duke of

York, the cruiser Jamaica, and four destroyers, of which one was the Royal

Norwegian Navy destroyer Stord.

Force 2 on learning of the possible attack on JW55B, after just completing

previous escort duty, made a high-speed run from the Kola Peninsula heading for

Akureyri, Iceland to refuel having finished refueling the flotilla left Akureyri at22:00 hours GMT on December 23rd racing to catch up with the convoy. On

December 24th the fleet commenced an exercise with the Scorpion and Jamaica,

acting as the Scharnhorst flotilla to double check the radars. At the time of the

exercise they were heading into a Force 8 gale of 46 MPH headwinds and seas of 25

feet at a speed of 17 knots. The Admiral of the Fleet, Bruce Austin Fraser noted in

his war diary, There was an unpleasant sea. Conditions in Duke of Yorkwere most

uncomfortable, few people obtaining any sleep. Later a seaman on one of the

destroyers wrote about his statement, I consider this to be a gross

understatement! The Duke of York was 42,000 tons, she could slice through a storm

quite easily, while conditions on the Scorpion, a ship of 2,000 tons (365 x 38) wereappalling, with heavy seas sweeping over the ship, making it extremely dangerous

to go on deck, one of my shipmates said, Youd think we are serving on a bloody

submarine. For the 1st time in my service at sea, seawater was coming through the

ventilation shafts, with 2 of water sloshing back and forth on the mess deck, we

were wet through and through as we pitched and rolled our way north.


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HMS Scorpion

In the meantime convoy JW55B was making its way north to Bear Island, a

mountain top that sticks out of the sea half-way between the northern tip of Norway

and Spitzbergen. This mountain top was considered a choke point as ships going to

Russia and those returning would usually meet at this location, and was the area

where the Royal Navy concentrated its naval forces to protect the ships.

After leaving Altenfjord Rear Admiral Bey, because of the storm, realized his

destroyers could not keep up with him and ordered them to string out at 5-mile

intervals and sweep the sea looking for the convoy as the Scharnhorstsailed on in

the darkness un-escorted.

At 08:00 hours Scharnhorst received the message from U-277 and altered its

course, at that time the Royal Navy was closely covering the convoy with the HMS

Belfast, HMS Norfolk and the HMS Sheffield (Force 1), at 08:30 hours the HMS

Norfolk showed up the Scharnhorst on its radar screen at 33,000 yards distance

(18.75 Smiles), at 09:29 hours the Belfastfired a star shell, after the HMS Sheffield

had reported a visual sighting at 09:21 hours, that burst above the Scharnhorst

illuminating here like a great silver ghost on a darkened sea the Scharnhorstwas

caught with her pants down, the running gun battle of North Cape had commenced.

As Rear Admiral Bey had no idea where the British capital ships were, that is not

until that Star Shell illuminated his bridge.

At 0929 hours, following the star shell the order to engage was give, howeverall ships having flashless cordite except the Norfolkwhich made it the primary

target for the Scharnhorst. At 09:40 a shell from Norfolkdamaged the main radar

(Seetakt radar, destroying the port HA director and wounding 4 of her crew) on the

Scharnhorst that was retreating at over 30 knots (34.5 MPH), radar contact by the

Norfolkwas lost. Scharnhorst worked its way around the convoy to attack from a

different direction but at 12:20 hours ran into the three cruisers again, whereas the

HMS Belfastand made a correct assumption after they lost the Scharnhorstthe first

time, now they were approaching head-on.

Once again it was the Sheffieldwho announced "enemy in sight" and, at 1220

hrs, Force 1 was ordered to "Open Fire!" For the second time, Scharnhorst wastaken completely by surprise. However, when she did reply, her shooting was quite

accurate. Norfolkagain bore the brunt of her replies. One 11 inch shell hit X Turret,

putting it out of action. Another hit Norfolkon the starboard side, amidships, killing

8 men near the secondary damage control headquarters.

Chief Engine Room Artificer Cardey later wrote: "I was standing in the middleof the compartment by the dials when there was a vivid flash and bits of metalrained down. One hit an engine room rating, who was just beside me, in the leg.


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Another piece of metal tore off the tops of two fingers of a man who had his handon a lever; he did not know it had happened until a quarter of an hour later. Waterbegan to pour down through the engine room hatches. Some fuel oil came with it,and I saw one fellow looking like a polished ebony statue because he had beencovered from head to foot with the black oil. He was carrying on as if nothing hadhappened. I went across to the dials and found that the pressure was not affected.

Some of the lights had gone out and there was a good deal of smoke, and we knewby the smell that the fire was raging somewhere. They were too busy to come andtell us what happened. Every man in the engine room had his work to do so we justcarried on and only heard odd bits of information when they brought thesandwiches down and so on. We kept the engines going at full speed for six hoursafter the ship was hit. There was about three feet of water swishing about in thebilges below the engine room and the lower plates were covered."

And CERA Davies wrote of the "Hostilities Only" men: "As an old RN man I cantell you they were something to be proud of. Not one faltered, and I suppose we allwere, at the back of our minds, expecting something to happen any minute"."Hostilities Only" men were sailors who had signed up "for the duration" and would

leave the Royal Navy at the outbreak of peace. The destroyers were buzzing round Scharnhorst like angry wasps.

"Musketeer" got close enough to observe the hits from her guns landing.Scharnhorst increased speed again and began to pull away from Force 1. Burnett,on Belfast, resolved to shadow her until Force 2 was in a position to intercept her.

The whole engagement had lasted 20 minutes. Force 1 had taken up position portside of the battle-cruiser, about 7 1/2 miles, just outside visible range. At 1300 hrs,Admiral Bey turned Scharnhorst onto a course of 155 degrees which would takenher home.

Scharnhorst then left the convoy and steamed south by south-east for the

next 3-hours, unfortunately on a course that was leading him directly toward Force

2. The three cruisers of Force 1 that were shadowing the speeding Scharnhorst

were reporting its position to the advancing Force 2, at 15:25 hours Admiral Fraseron the Duke of Yorksignaled his destroyers that Scharnhorst was 56-miles away and

converging. All ships went into extreme battle stations, sealing their ships uptight.

At 16:30 hours the Duke of Yorkopened fire on the Scharnhorst at 11-miles

distance and the Scharnhorst returned fire. One of the seamen on the Scorpion,

disobeying orders left his station in the radio room and went on deck to see the

action noting that, the flashes from the Duke of York appeared yellow in color,

while the flashes from Scharnhorstappeared more a reddish hue. He returned to

his station and dogged down the watertight door, if I had been his superior officer I

would have had him shot and thrown overboard.

Shortly after his trip to the deck the destroyers received a message from

Admiral Fraser, Take up advantageous position for firing torpedoes, but do not

attack until ordered! 60-minutes later the following message came over the air,

attack with torpedoes at first available opportunity. The order was a bit difficult to

follow, in that the Scharnhorst was a fast ship and the slower destroyers were

having a hard time tracking her.


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At this time Scorpion was asked by Duke of York, Can you report my fall ofshot?

Scorpion replied, Your last salvo 200 yards short. As the Scorpion and the

other destroyers continued to fire Star Shells, which were mainly shot down. The

same seaman noted in his diary, I again went on to the upper deck and was

surprised to see the Scharnhorst only about a mile away, she was a beautiful but

frightening sight slipping her way through the heavy sea. She had so many guns

and I felt that her secondary armament could have blasted us out of the water in an

instant. I could not help but think, My God, how are we going to get out of this

mess? A young seaman, we called Stormy Evans yelled out, Put out wires and

fenders were going alongside the bastard. I went back to my office in great haste,

not that the thin sides of a destroyer would have afforded much protection.

At 1840 hours the Scorpion managed to reduce the distance as the

destroyers Savage and Saumarezwere astern of the Scharnhorstand the Scorpion

and Stordwere on her starboard beam. Commander Mevrick of the Savage was

directing the torpedo attack, in the meantime Savage and Saumarezwere seen by

Scharnhorstwho opened fire on them, where the Saumarezwas hit pretty good and

the Savage less so as the Scharnhorst turned away from their attack she

presented Scorpion with an excellent broadside target and the Scorpion fired an 8-

spread of torpedoes with an accompanied message of Attach Complete with an

immediate follow-up message of Two hits on enemy!

After firing her torpedoes the Scorpion turned at high-speed and left the areazigzagging and laying a smokescreen as they fled, with 6 and 4 shells from the

Scharnhorstpeppering the sea around them. The crew on-board the Scorpion heard

underwater explosions, rumblings that echoed through the ship as vibrations the

crew then felt the Scharnhorstwould not escape its meeting with destiny.

The rumbling reported was the first torpedoes to hit the Scharnhorst, whereas

Savage reported Estimate one hit!, while the Saumarez was unable to fire its


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torpedoes due to damage, where she had 13 men killed and 11 wounded. Savage

later claimed three hits.

Savage reported shortly after the reported rumblings, Main target stopped,

by now the Duke ofYork had stopped firing and Admiral Fraser sent a message to

the 23rd Destroyer Flotilla, Destroyer with searchlight illuminate target. Scorpion

illuminated the Scharnhorstand they saw the graceful ship lying on its side under apall of smoke, with fires burning the exposed decking and superstructure. They saw

a lot of wreckage on the sea with men in the water and on rafts; it was pitch black,

snowing at the tail end of the storm. The crew in the water had lights on their life

jackets, and as they went up and down in the swell the lights appeared to be

twinkling within the reach of the searchlight the crew of the Scorpion could hear

the men in the water, about 200 of them, blowing whistles and shouting.

Commander Clouston allowed the

Scorpion to drift down to the survivors so they

would not be drawn under his ship; he then sent

a message to Admiral Fraser, Survivors are

from Scharnhorst. Survivors state Scharnhorst

has sunk the Scorpion was the ship nearest

to the Scharnhorst, but nobody but the

survivors saw the lady sink. A total of 55

torpedoes and 2,195 shells had been fired at

Scharnhorst.[20]

Commander Clouston crew was able to

rescue 30 men, plucked from the sea amongst a

mass of dead bodies. Admiral Fraser asked for a

confirmation on the Scharnhorst sinking which

he received and at 2035 hours the Duke of Yorkbroadcast in the clear to Scapa WT,

Scharnhorst Sunk, at 2136 hours game the

reply Grand. Well done.

You can imagine that when the German

High Command in Berlin heard that signal, senior officers shuttered and went for the

brandy.

The survivors were able to give some details at the end of the battle-cruiser.

Beginning with the hammering fire by the Duke of York at 1901 hours, the

Scharnhorst had been pounded to pieces. C Turret had been the only gun turretto fire right to the end, when its ammunition was exhausted shells were passed

from A Turret note was than none of the Duke of Yorks salvos had penetrated

the heavily armored deck, but had wreaked havoc above, leaving only mangled

wreckage. It was also noted that none of the medical staff had survived assumingly

attending to the wounded until she slipped beneath the waves.

Gunfire did not sink the Scharnhorst; it was the torpedoes that brought about

her end. It was noted by one German sailor that at no time did was there a loss of
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_warship_Scharnhorst_(1936)#cite_note-19http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_warship_Scharnhorst_(1936)#cite_note-19


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discipline or a well of panic overcome the ship. Both Rear Admiral Bey and Capitan

Hintze survived the sinking but drown before they could be rescued, it should also

be noted that Capitan Hintze gave his life jacket to a sailor who had lost his.

Later that evening, Admiral Bruce Fraser briefed his officers on board Duke of

York: "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorsthas ended in victory for us. I hope

that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against anopponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as

Scharnhorstwas commanded today".

Out of the ships company of approximately 1,900 men, only 36 were rescued!

They were taken to the Kola Peninsula and after a brief moment of panic amongst

them when they thought the British would turn them over to the Russians, were

transferred to the Duke of Yorkand taken to the UK. They arrived at Scapa Flow on

New Years Day 1944, where the Duke of Yorkwas welcomed with cheers of all the

assembled ships companies even though the cheers and congratulations flowed in

from around the allied forces the crews of the British fleet that were involved in the

Battle of North Cape reflected with sadness the loss of almost 2000 men. An officer

on board the Sheffieldwrote: "All that is left of a 26,000 ton ship was some 36

survivors. One couldn't help feeling a little sorry for those who had perished. It was

a cold dark night, with little chance of survival in those icy waters. However, it might

just as easily have been one or indeed, all of us"

Kapitan-zun Rudolf Peters remained FdU Norwegen till he was replaced by a

young U-boat ace, Fregattenkapitan Reinhard Suhren in the spring of 1944. Rudolf

Peters was appointed commander of the 1st Battle Group, which still kept the

Tirpitz and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla in the Alta Fiord. When the Tirpitz was

bombed by 5.5 ton Tallboy bombs on Sept 15th, 1944 her bow was nearly cut off,

under her own power at 10 knots she was removed to Tromso and served as a

floating battery. During another bombing raid by Lancaster bombers from Scotlandshe capsized with a loss of 1,000 lives on Nov 12 th, 1944. Court-martials were

convened; scapegoats presented among them Luftwaffe pilots who failed to protect

her and against the planners in Berlin who had picked the anchorage but, the case

against Rudolf Peters never concluded, he was dismissed from the service to his

country on the same day that Hitler shot himself in his bunker April 30th, 1945. A

sad end to an extraordinary, but little know career of a field officer of the German

Navy.

After researching the preceding I cannot fail to believe that the weight of

blame for the inexcusable tactics of this most beautiful of ships, the Scharnhorst,must lie on the shoulders of Rear Admiral Bey. As with all "flag ships", the Admiral

on board makes the ultimate decision but the views of the ship's Captain (Hintze)

should have been taken into account. I have a gut feeling that they were not. I read

many years ago of the differences between Captain Lindemann (Bismarck) and the

Admiral, where tactical decisions of the Captain's were overruled by the Admiral

(and by Berlin). Decisions reached by the on board hierarchy left the British stunned

and surprised. The four apparent occasions that the Scharnhorst was "surprised"


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are already spoken of in this section, couple this with evidence that Scharnhorst

knew of the Duke of York's presence via her radar, yet they did not call the gun

crews to action stations and "guns were fore and aft" when sighted. The saddest

part of all this is the loss of 2000 souls. Although these were sailors at war, it was an

unnecessary death - achieving absolutely nothing! The thing that does stand out in

my mind is the bravery of all the sailors involved, on both sides. The thoughts of thevictorious British sailors were not on celebration but of their near 2000 dead

"comrades of the sea" that would not reach home ports again. I see quite clearly

that all sailors, of whatever nation, are of a unique fraternity and I salute them - all.

Most are brilliantly led, others, just led.

wwii naval battle – the cape

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