wwii 3rd army maneuvers report

8/9/2019 WWII 3rd Army Maneuvers Report

1/61

'fi-!

B t

- -^ '> V.'

PO REGI*Tf?

FINAL REPORTB

THIRD 4RMY

MANEUVERS

MAY-1540s

HQ.HCORPS

\u25a0(


2/61

jrJ J

X

POia

AAjVHTrJIRD

jVjAjNUV KS

MAY J940


3/61

FINAL REPORT THIRD ARMY"MANEUVERS

MAY 1940

3ABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION TITLE

I ORGANIZATION OF lORPSHE IV CORPS

I I JINEONCENTRATION IN THE SABINE AREAREA

111 THIRD ARMY EXERCISES

IV EQUIPMENT

V COMMUNICATIONS

V I SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

V I I ADMINISTRATION

V I I I TACTICS

TV1 a CORPS AND COUPS TROOPS

X CORPS HEADQUARTERSAND STAFFTAFF

X I FACTUAL DATA

X I I COMISNTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PAGES

1

2-4

5-13

14-17

18-20

21-28

29-32

33-39

40-43

44-46

47-50

51-57


4/61

ANNEXA

TO

FINAL REPORT

THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS

MAY 1940

NO. CONTENTS

1 . TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS.

2. STATION LIST NO. 2 IV CORPS

3. STATION LIST HO. 3 IV CORPS.

4. ROSTER OF OFFICERS IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS

5. PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS, MOVEMENT TO SABIITE AREA.

6. FIELD ORDER 13 IV CORPS, MOVEMENT TO SADINE AREA.

7. SKETCH-ROUTES AND BIVOUACS, MOVEMENT TO SABINE ARM.

-8. MAP BASE CALIFS IN SABINE AREA.9. RECORD OF MOTOR MOVEMENT TO SABINE AREA.

-10 . MARCH ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS DIVISION.

11 . ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAIN.

12. FIRST PHASE ) EACH CONTAINING:) SELECTED CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS & MESSAGES,

13. SECOND PEASE) THIRD ARMY) ALL FIELD ORDERS IV CORPS WITH OPERATIONS

14. THIRD PHASE ) MAPS AND ANNEXA.) SPECIAL MILITARY MAPS SHOWING SITUATION

15 . FOURTH PHASE) AT END OF EXERCISE.

16 . POSTAL PL/ill, CIRCULAR NO. 4 , IV CORPS

17 . ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 11, IV CORPS.

18 . ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 12, 17 CORPS,

19 . STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE IV CORPS.

20. STANDING OQMIAND POST PROCEDURE IV CORPS,

21. TYPICAL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE DIVISION.

22. REMARKS OF COMMANDING GENERAL IV CORPS AT CRITIQUE.


5/61

FINAL REPORT

THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS

KAYÎSÔ

ORGMiZATION OF TKE IV CÔgFS

1 ORGANIZATION O_P__THEORPS.

For the movement to , and concentration of the Corps in theSabine Area of Louisiana and the subsequent imnouvers therein,the basic organization of the Corps remained unchanged. CertainThird Army organizations vrere attached to the Corps fo r the move

ment from Fort Benning, Georgia to th o Sabine Area and for the concentration phase, as prescribed in Control Instructions N o, 6-Blue Headquarters Third Army, 1940 (ANNEX NO. l). Further details ofattachment and detachment of Third Army units for th e four phasesof the maneuvers are included in Section 111 of this report .

2. STRENGTH OF THE CORPS.

Strength of the Corps at the beginning and near the close ofth e exorcises in the Sabine Area are shown on Station Lists Nos.2 and 3, ANHEXA NO3. 2 and 3.

3 ,ROSTER OF OFFICERS, HQ IV CORPS.See ANNEX-NO. 4 ,

1


6/61

SECTION I I

CONCENTRATION IN TEE SABINE AREA

i

4. DIRECTIVES.

a. Administrative instructions fo r the movement of the Corpsand~"att ached units'* from base camps a t Fort Beniiing, Georgia, andconcentration in bivouacs in the Sabine Area wore contained la r-gely in Letters of Instructions, Nos. 3 an d 9, li e adquar tors,Fourth Corps Area, 194 C.

b . Tactics 1 instructions fo r the movenent and concentration ofthe~~Corps were contained large]. y in Control Instructions, Head--quarters, Third Army, 19 10 . Control Instructions No. 2 Blue, Headquarters Third Army announcing detaiLed decisions of the CommandingGeneral, Third Army for planning purposes fo r the cone or.tr fit io n ofthe IV Corps in the Camp Beauregard Area, is included in ANNEX NO. 5 .Mission of the Corps, routes of march, advance security units , andgeneral order of inarch wo.ro prescribed therein.

5. PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE AED PLANNING

Preliminary reconnaissances of the two prescribed routes, ofstaging areas, and of base camps in the Sabine Area were made by C 3and the Corps Engineer. A plan for the movement and concentration ofthe Corps based on this reconnaissance was submitted to Third Army-and approval announced in Control Instructions No. 4 Blue, Head-quarters Third Army, 1940. The sth Division then made all f inalreconnaissances and secured ell leases of march bivouac areas on thesouthern route. One officer from the Ist Div i s ion , one from the6th Division and one fron Corps troops made similar reconnaissances,and, acting fo r the Rents an d Claims Board, Fourth Corps Area, securedleases fo r all march bivouac areas on the northern route. Sketchesof all areas wore prepared and distributed.

6. ORDERS FOR THE MOVEMENT

-Control Instructions No. 11 Blue, Headquarters Third Army,1940 gave f inal instructions fo r the movenent of the corps. I tstated that information indicated that Rod forces would bo concen-trated in oast Texas, supposedly for maneuvers, b u t that they mightcross the border into Bluo terr i tory without warning. I t providedfo r augmentation of the Bluo frontier garrison at Camp Beaurcgard byArmy troops, to protect the concentration and detrainment of thecorps advance elements (6th Cavalry and 6th Division). I t providedthat Third Army vrould furnish an aircraft warning service, pursuitprotection throughout the movement, 'and antiaircraft defense of bridgesa t Vicksburg, Mississippi, and a t New Orleans, Moriroo, Columbia,Jonesville and Alexandria, Louisiana. I t required that the concen-tration of th e corps in the Sabine Area be completed by dark May 11 .A rail and motor movement table fo r IV Corps and Third Army Troopsfrom Fort Banning, Georgia to the Sabine Area was furnished by Third

Army. Pursuant to these orders, Field Order No. 13, Headquarters IVCorps with its accompanying rail movement and motor movement tableswas issued, and gives the details for the movement of the corps.I t is included in ANNEX NO. 6.

4

\


7/61

(Section 11 , Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

6. (Cont'd)

A sketch showing the two routes traversed, bivouac areas, dates ofarr ival of bivouacs, mileage fo r each stage, and accumulated mile-age from Fort Banning, Georgia is included in ANNEX NO. 7. Mapshowing initial base camps in the Sabine Area Is included in ANNEXNO. 8.

7. THE MOVEMENTa. Hail

Rail movements of heavy baggage and part of th e personnel ofcertain units proceeded as prescribed in Field Order Ho. 13, Head-quarters IV Corps, (ANNEX NO. 6). Advance detachments preceded th e6th Cavalry to unload its animals, which were moved by rail. Advanceunloading detachments of other units having rail movements, accompanied the leading march group of the Corps.

b . March Bivouac Areas, Motor Movement.

;:.roGeneral locations of bivouac areas shown on sketch, ANNEXNO. 7. Detailed location sketches wore prepared and distributed bythe advance reconnaissance officers (Paragraph 4 _b, above). I t shouldbe noted that , on the northern route, bivouacs areas were occupied

by successive march groups. In general, bivouac areas were satis-factory as to size, but lacked cover against aerial observation. Forthe entire length of the two march routes, good cover was availableonly in low areas, the use of which "c.s prevented "oy the lack ofsatisfactory standings fo r vehicles.

c . Billet ing Officers and Billeting, Detachments.

(l) The three officers who made the f ina l reconnaissance ofthe northern route and secured the leases fo r march bivouac areas onthis route, were detailed as Bil le t ing Officers at Montgomery, Alabama, Meridian ana Vieksburg, Mississippi, The sth Division, en thesouthern route, was responsible fo r the preparation of its own bivouacareas .

(2 ) Two companies, loth Engineers (c), each with water pur i -fication plant attached, l e f t Fort Bonning on Hay 4. One companyproceeded to Montgomery, Alabama, an a one to lloridian, Mississippi,as bi l le t ing detachment;-; . Under th e supervision of the bi l le t ingofficers (subparagraph (j), above), these companies assigned and marked areas fo r subordinate units of the successive march groups scheduled to occupy that bivouac, prepared entrances an d turn arounds,

reinforcedbridges,

establishedwater distributing points an d guided

successive march group unite into their assigned areas. Those tyroengineer companies remained at Montgomery and Meridian unt i l thelast clement of the Corps had c l e a r e d , They then repaired all damagesand the Bil le t ing Officer adjusted all claims. As a resul t of thissystem, damages and claims wore negligible. At Vicksburg, Mississippi

no engineer bi l le t ing detachment was necessary as the bivouac areawas in Vicksburg National Mili tary Park and Park officials and a groupof local reserve officers who voluntcrred, did excellent service inguiding successive march group units to their areas. Units using themarch bivouac area in Chi okas aw State Park, Domopolis, Alabama arranged

for their own advance bi l le t ing detachments.

3


8/61

- -- -

(Section 11 , L?ina l Report, Third Army l.lanouvers)

7.

(o) The 21st Engineers (GS) under Army control proceededfrom Fort Bcnning, Georgia to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana on "May1 . Division and Corps Troop base camps in the Sabino Area (A!ININO. 8) were prepared and marked in advance by this regiment, andguides provided fo r each incoming uni t .

d. Motor Movement.

Motor movements of units of the Corps proceeded as proscribod in Field Order No. 13, Headquarter ,b IV Corps (ANIiEX 30. 6).Tho Corps moved by the tw o prescribed routes. .Che 6th Cavalry v;i thattachments preceded the Corps on the northern route with the missions of secur ing the br idges over tho Red River at Bovcc and A l-

exandria, count err econnai s t ance , and covering the concentrationof th e corps pending arr ival of the 6th Division. The 6th Division,as the corps advance guard, followed the Cavalry on the northern routewith tho missions of relieving tho Cavalry west of Alexandria securing tho bridges at Boycc and Alexandria and covering the concentration of the corps. Tho main body of the Corps ( Is t and sthDivisions) began its movement two days later than tho 3th Division,the Ist Division by the northern route, the sth Division by thesouthern routo. One day later tho Corps Troops began their movement.Record of Motor Movement showing fo r each narch group its i t ineraryfor tho ent i re movement is included in AKNIIK.i"0. 9.

j3. Aircrcf t Wcrning Sor vice

Ail aircraft -warning service, employing chiefly civi l ianobservers, was opera ted by Third Army during the motor movementperiod. Warning messages o f th e approach of enemy f l ights in for-mation of two or noro pianos were broadcast to troops concernedby radio telegraph, telephone, teletype and friendly planes.The system operated satisfactorily an d was particularly goodfo r the march as far as the Mississippi R i v e r , liarch groups wereusually able to plo t the movements of f l ights promptly and accurately. In few instances the time element be t ire en receipt of warning andar r iva l of enemy f l ights over march columns was no t sufficient fortroops to take appropriate coun te rac t ion , h'otheds of gett ing warningof approaching hostile aircraft to subdivisions of march groups were,in general unsatisfactory. They varied with each group and wore pre-dicated on the communications equipment organically available to thecomponent units of the column. Radio if available, was satisfactoryonly to the l imi t of its range, and was frequently interrupted whilepassing near high tension l ines. Reports indicate the need of apowerful vehicular set with each serial fo r proper an d timely warning.

Ground visual methods or methods involving sound (such as sirens)are unreliable. Warning by friendly plane, when available, was sati s factory. Usual procedure against a ir attack o f columns was fo rcolumns to stop in convoy formation without closing up, and fo r allavailable weapons to go into action at once. Personnel unloaded andscattered. The Corps Cavalry moved a t extended distances betweenvehicles so as not to present a profitable target to hostile aviation.Instructions of a division of the corps as to antiaircraft defensemeasures are included in AJtfKEX NO. 10 . Hostile a ir attacks were re -ported b y : -

sth Division between Elba and Staploton, Ala Hay 87 rains, do l ay.

6th Division near Monroe, La.. Hay 8 45 mins. delay.Prov. Tank Brig, at Vicksburg, Kiss., Hay 10 no delay,

troops in bivouac.

4


9/61

SECTION 111

THIRD ARMY EXERCISES

8 . PURPOSE.

a. The announced general purpose of the Third Arm;-- Maneuverswas*~to train the new type corps, composed of triangular divisions,in concentrations over long distances against a mobile enemy, andin maneuver under combat conditions, both alone and coupled withcombat aviation and mechanized forces. Only large scale operationswere intended, combat .training of snr.ll units havtixg already booncompleted.

b. The series of separate and distinct exercises announced inthe~*s chedul c were staged to develop the operations l is tod below:

( l ) The operation of an a ir warning net covering severalstatos.

(2 ) The uso of various types of movement fo r large units srail and motor.

(3) The functioning of the army and corps organization incommand, administration, supply and maintenance during sustainedaction and a determination of the needs in army and corps troopsand in reinforcing elements, i f any.

(4) The operations, during periods of rapid movement,of the "motor transport provided and the handling of large motormasses.

(5) The use of combat aviation in Ihe preliminary stages ofan advance and against enemy concentrations.

(6) The combined action of combat aviation and mechanizedforces.

(7) The operations of cavalry in combination with and againstmechanized and motorized forces.

9 . TERRAIN.

a. The Sabine Area covers the portion of Louisiana and Texasbetween the general l ine of the Rod River on the oast and theHeches River on the west.

b . The maneuver area proper la y generally between the SabineRiver and the Red River in Louisiana. I t had the followingboundaries :

North: U.S. Route 84, inclusive.-South: State Route 7 -U.S. Route 190, inclusive.-East: U.S. Route 165 U.S. Route 71 State

Route 26, inclusive.West: Sabine River.

c . Tactical movements beyond the north and south boundariesof The maneuver area were not permitted.

d. An estimate of the terrainis

included in ANNEX NO. 11 .

5


10/61

- -

(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

10. FIRST PHA.SE.

a. Opposing Forces.

Blue: IV Corps (less sth Div and march attachments; Ist Divinitially and Corps Troops)

2 Bns 68th In f (LT)1 Bn 67th In f (MT) (less 2 Cos).

Red: IX Corps.Approximate relative total strength:

May 9 May 10 May 11

Blue 11542 11542 22694Red 17274 17274 17274

-b . Situation See AItfNEX NO. 12 which includes

-Control Instructions No. 14 Blue, Headquarters Third Array,Field Order Ho. 14, IV Corps with operations map, and SpecialMili tary Map, showing situation at close of exorcise.

c . Conduct of the Exercise.

In accordance with FO 13, 30 April 1940 (AMEX NO. 6) theIV Corps moved by ro.il and motor fron Fort Bohning, Georgia, tothe general vicinity of Alexandria, Louisiana. The movement beganon 5 liny r.nd was completed late 11 Hay.

The Third Amy provided antiaircraft protection fo r allv i t a l bridges over the Mississippi during the concentration period.I t also provided initial protection fo r the concentration area withthe 29th In f (less 1 bn.).

The 6th Cavalry, with attachments, and lees elements shippedby rail arrived in the Alexandria area lloon 8 Hay and immediately-proceeded to the l ino FLATWOODS GLEMiORA to cover the concentrationof the Corps, pending the ar r iva l of the 6th Div later in the day.

By 6:00 PM 8 May the 6th Div arrived in its area and immediately dispatched CT-1 to organize and hold tactical localities along thel ine FIATWOODS GLENMOEA and along DEVILS CREEK CALCASIEU RIVER.These dispositions were in accordance with Control Instructions No.-14 31uo. The remaining two Combat Teams were held in reserve,pending the developments of enemy action.

The 6th Cavalry moved rapidly forward c.t daylight 9 Mayto gain contact with, report the strength, composition and movements of enemy forces encountered, and delay enemy columns. TheIst Sq (less Tr C) after being relieved by elements of the 6thDiv, moved to a reserve position on the north flank in the vicinityof FIATWOODS.

Contact was gained with the Rod Forces early in the day bythe 29th In f in vic in i ty of NATCHITOCHSS and by the 2d Sq. 6th Ca yin front of the 6th Div. I t was apparent that the Red Force was endeavoring the break through the. north flank with elements of the 2dHod Div. In the afternoon the situation warranted reinforcing ofthe 29th Inf, and the 6th Div was ordered to dispatch CT-20, and2 companies of the 18th Engrs, and the Tank Brigade to dispatch CoF, 67th In f (LT), with rifles,, This caused Red tc withdraw and per-mitted recalling CT-20 to re jo in the 6th Div.

6


11/61

- -

(Section 111, Final Report, Third Amy Maneuvers)

10.c. (Cont'd)

On 10 May the Ist Div, approaching the concentration areafron the north, was ordered to change direction, cross the REDRIVER at COUSHATTA and CLARENCE and strike the hostile l e f t andrear. The crossing was made late in the afternocn--CT-26 at COUSHATTA, CT-16 at CLARENCE, and CT-18 over the ponton bridge at MONTGOMERY, which had jus t been completed by the 18th Engrs.

The Commanding General, Third Amy, released the 7th CavalryBrigade, (Hecz) to the IV Corps at midnight 10-11 May, This unit wasordered to cross the RED RIVER at daylight 11 Hay at COUSHATTA to a t-tack to the south, on the west flank of the Ist Div, to extendthe envelopnont and to destroy the enemy. The count ercf f ens iv e wasordered for daylight 11 May, the 6th and Ist Divs and 7th CavalryBrig (Mecz) to participate. FO 14 was issued at 9:15 PM 10 Mayto coordinate the attack.

Early 11 May the attack on the front of the Ist Div progressed rapidly despite the fact that the 7th Ca y Brig (Mecz) washeld up by umpires u n t i l 11:00 AM, south of MiNSFIELD. The enemybegan a general withdrawal on the entire front south of HINESTONas a result of Ist Div

pressure. A t 9:00 AM,11

May, the 6thCavalry was ordered to HINESTOK to attack in the direction UNIONHILL, the 6th Div to organize a Combat Team pursuit force and the7th Ca y Brig (Mecz) to advance rapidly on LEESVILLE when re -leased by umpires.

At 11:00 All 11 May, the exercise was terminated. (Situationat this time is shown in ANNEX NO. 12), The Blue forces were order-ed into bivouac east of the l ine COUSHATT:. RED RIVER NATCHITOCHES-STATE HW Y 20 STATE WIY 265 DEVILS CREEK CALCASIEU RIVER. The7th Cavalry Brig (Mecz) was released to army control.

The sth Div and Corps Troops closed into bivouac the after-noon of 11 May, completing the concentration of IV Corps,

1 1 , SECOND PHASE.

a . Opposing; forces.

Blue: IV CorpsProv Tank BrigCo. "C", 2d Chemical Regt.29th Infantry

Red: IX Corps7th Cay Brig Mocz,

Approximate relative total strength:Blue: 35,570 ; Red: 20,773.

is Situation. See ANNEX NO. 13 which includes:

Maneuver Instructions from Third Army 9:15 AM, 12 May,

Field Orders Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18, with operations maps,and Special M ili ta ry Map, showin^. dispositions and situationat end of exorcise.

7


12/61


11.c . Conduct of tho Exercise,

On 13 May IV Corps units were directed to move by infil-t rat ion, during daylight hours, to assembly positions shown onOpn Map to FO 15. An Army Truck Co. was secured fo r the 6th Divand one fo r the sth Div. FO 15 was issued 4:00 PM, 12 May, subsequent to receipt of the Corps mission from the Commanding General,Third Army. I t was obvious that Red would attempt to defend his est-ablished bridgehead east of the SABINE RIVER against superior BlueForces. Since the dispositions of the enemy were unknown, the CorpsCommander decided to attack the predominant terrain, rather thanwait to determine the enomys MLR. The IV Corps attack contemplatedenvelopment

of the enemy l e f t (north) flankto capture the ridge

running north and south through L2ESVTLLE, thus forcing Red to with-draw wost of the r ive r. I t wiil bo noted that the Prov Mocz Brigorganized to operate on the corps r i gh t (north) flank consisted ofl i g h t and medium tanks, the mccz elemonts of the 6th Cay, the 29thIn f (mtz), one ( l ) 3n 75mm guns from the sth Div, a company ofEngrs, and AT guns. The ability of this uni t to advance rapidlyand secure areas captured, was amply demonstrated throughout theexercise. The Ist Sq 6th C ay (horse) was attached to the 6th Divto assist in protecting the left (south) flank of the Corps. The'Corps Reserve consisted of the 11th In f (sth Div), 66th In f (LT),and 4th AT Bn (less 2 cos).

The IV Corps jumped o ff at 4:30 AM, 14 May, quickly contacting tho enemy on the front of the sth Div 8 mi south-west of FIATWOODS, on the front of the Is t Div near ROBELINE, and on the frontof the 6th Div 7 mi south-west of HINESTON. The Rod MLR was'even-tually developed along the l ine SLAGLE KURTHIYOOD PBASON. Theadvance was rapid on all fronts. However, all major units werefrequently held up due to enemy destruction of bridges over thenumerous small streams of the maneuver area. At 8:50 AM the sthDiv was ordered to change its direction of attack after capturing

-SIMPSON, to tho direction SLAGLE LEESVILLE. A t 9:35 AM the 2 Bns66th In f (LT) in Corps Reserve wore moved to the vic in i ty of CYPRESS to be available to the Ist or sth Divs on call . One of those TankBns was released to the sth Div to assist in tho capture of SIMPSON,which was accomplished late in the afternoon. With the enemy fullydeveloped i t was apparent' that he would make a determined defencealong the LEESVILLE RIDGE. Consequently, the Corps Commander decidedto make a coordinated attack against this position early 15 May. FO16 was issued at 6:30 H I 14 May directing a double envelopment ofthe enemy f lanks

A t daylight 15 Apr the coordinated attack of the oorpswas launched with the Prov Mecz Brig on the west f lank, assist-ing the Ist Div in the capture of LEESVILLE. The sth Div on theleft of the l s tDiv directed its efforts to the capture of SLAGLE,then LEESVILLE. The 6th Div assisted by the 11th Inf, Ist Bn 66thIn f (LT), 1 bn 17th FA, Ist Sq 6th Cay, and 1 AT Co, made theenvelopment of the south flank and assisted in the capture ofLEESVILLE. The attack proceeded satisfactorily on all fronts. The

'Prov Mecz Brig quickly secured HORNBECK and proceeded to LSESVILLE,surprising and capturing in toto the headquarters of the Red Ist Ca yDiv. The Ist Div by 10:00 AH had passed KURTHV/OOD, the s th Div hadsecured SLAGLE, and in the 6th Div, CT-20 had advanced to LEESVILLEwhere i t was se t back by control ruling.

8


13/61

- -


11.c. (Cont f d)

A Red Mecz Regt that had broken through on the front of the6th Div in the vicini ty of LA CAMP was successfully prevented fromadvancing north across the CALCASIEU RIVER , by road blocks whichwere quickly established by elements of the 6th and sth Divs. ThisRed unit although surrounded was permitted by the umpires to withdraw. By 11: 30 "All elements of all major units of the Corps werenear LEESVILLE.

AT 2:00 PM , 15 May PO 17 was issued fo r the pursuit of theenemy. Tho 6th Div was to organize an encircling force consistingof a'roinforced combat toam, to move across the SABINE RIVER at "MERRY.VILLE to seize tho NEWTON BURKEVILLE WIERGATE aroa in Texas. 'TheProv Mecz Brig on the north-west flank was to push strong reconnaissance elements across the r iver at FERRY and connect with the6th Div. The balance of the Corps was to continue present miss*ions to clear up the situation in the vicinity of LEESVILLE.However B Red resistance continued longer than expected and the 6th Divencircling force was somewhat delayed due to the gassing of vehiclesand collection of reinforcing units , thus preventing its startingbefore 5:10 PM. The congestion of Red and Blue forces around LEESVILLE late in the afternoon necessitated control prohibiting tact-

ical" actionin

that town u n t i l Red forces could withdraw to thewest.

AT 7:15 PM , 15 Hay, FO 18 was issued to insure nightprotection of front and flanks against mechanized raids; i t alsodirected resumption of the pursui t at daylight 16 May.

At 8:30 PM , 'l5 May, a teletype message was received from theCommanding General, Third Army announcing completion of the 2dphase of tho maneuvers. For situation at this time see ANNEX NO, 13.A ll units were directed to bivouac in tho vicinity of their present

locations. Later in the evening instructions wore received to noveunits of I V Corps to bivouac areas, to be designated by the Command-ing General, IV Corps, east of the l ino DERRY DEVILS CREEKHINESTON. Two army truck companies were allotted to assist in tho .move.

At 1:00 AM , 16 May Corps instructions fo r movement of unitsto selected bivouac areas were issued. At daylight return movementbegan, all attachments being released to parent organizations. TheProv Tank Brig (less 2 Bns 66th In f (LT) and 1 Bn 67th In f (MT) )plus the 29th In f were turned over to the Red IX Corps. The 3dRadio Intell igence Co was transferred to the Blue IV Corps, All unitsclosed in base bivouacs by late afternoon 16 May.

12 . THIRD PEASE.

a . Opposin" forces.

Blue: IV CorpsCo. "C", 2d Chemical Regiment3d Radio Intelligence Co,

Red: IX Corps.29th I n f . (less 1 Co,)7th Cay Brig Mecz with 6th In f atchd.Prov Tank Brig (loss 2 Bns 68th In f (LT) and

1 Bn 67th In f LIT)Approximate relative total strength

Blue: 30,830 ; Red: 23,489.

9


14/61

- -


12.b. Situation. See ANNEX NO. 14, which includes

Maneuver Instructions from Commanding General Third Armjrdated May 19, 1940, as changed by message 5:30 PM May 19, 1940,Field Order s' No s . 19, 20 and 21, with operations maps, SpecialMilitary map, showing dispositions and the , situation a t end ofexercise 3:00 PM 21 May.

c . Conduct of the Exercise,

The Third Army directive (ANNEXNO. 14) assigned the IVCorns the mission of advancing, from march bivouacs west of theRED*

RIVER and east of l ino DERRY DEVILS CREEK HINESTON, early20 Ifey, to seize the high ground 20 miles to the west in the vicinity-of LEESVILLE HORNBECK, to block the enemy advance to the northwest. This mission was subsequently changed (See army message 5:30PM , 19 May), upon advice that the enemy advance had ceased and a defensive position, generally north east of LEESVILLE, was being organized. The new mission directed the IV Corps to advance at daylight20 May, as planned and develop that position preparatory to ageneral attack. FO 19, which had been issued at 11:00 AH 19 May,had to bo revoked and FO 20, issued at 12:05 AM 20 May whichcoordinated the attack of the Corps against the cnemys organizeddefensive position.

The Corps plan as contained in FO 19 provided fo r a penetration by the Ist and sth Divisions on 21st May, to be fo l -lowed by a night attack on the night of 21-22 May, i f necessary.This plan was the only on e considored feasible, by the CorpsCommander, in a situation whore the enemy had superior mechanizedunits to smash any attempted flanking maneuver, Tho Third Armydirected the elimination of contemplated plans fo r a night attack,and after considering verbal objections of the Corps Commander,issued the message of 5:30 PM 19 May,

changingthe mission as out

lined above, in order to obviate the necessity fo r a night attack.

Strong reconnaissance - units were moved to the limiting re --connaissance l ine (DERRY GORIJM LA CAMP) after dark 19 May. At4:05 AM 20 May, these units crossed the l ine and major units begantruGk infil tration from their bivouacs to attack positions ass ignedby FO 20.

The Third Army furnished protection fo r all crossings overthe RED RIVER, The 21st Engineers and AT units were employed in

establishing and maintaining road blocks on the north and southflanks. The Corps was disposed with the Ist Div on the north'flank,the 6th Div on the south flank and the sth Div in the center.

The reconnaissance elements pushed forward vigorously afterearly contact with Red reconnaissance elements. Each division wasdirected to employ only one battalion Inf, 'one battalion 75 *s andone battalion of 155 mm howitzers in i t ia l ly, from but two of theircombat teams. Later in the day when tho locations of major enemyunits had boen determined, the divisions were authorized to employall means at their disposal to develop fully the main defensiveposition before dark. After overcoming stubborn resistance throughout the day,- the IV Corps went into bivouac fo r the night along the-general l ine BELLWOOD -*KURTIWOOD SLAGLE'- CRAVENS, approximately15 miles west of tho morning jump off l ino.

10


15/61

- -


12.o, (Cont'd)

The enemy position being suff ic ient ly developed fo r a coordinated" attack the following morning, FO 21, was issued a t 11:00 PM20 Hay. To assist in the attack the Third Army had released tothe IV Corps the Ist and 2d Bns 68th In f (LT) and 2d Bn 67th In f (MI).The Light Tank Battalions wore attached to the 6th and sth Divs,respectively and the Medium Battalion was retained in Corps Reserve,because of the refusal of Army to release them early enough to perm it their use on the south flank at daylight. The Corps schemeof maneuver was to p e n e t r a t e the hostile defensive position bet-ween LBESVILLE and HORNBBCK to drive him west of the SABINE RIVER,

The Ist Div was to capture the high ground south east of PEASONand HORNBECK, the sth Div to capture~ANACOCO,and the 6th Divisionto capture L3ESVILLE. The preponderence of tanks on the Red side,about 274 to Blues 108, precluded the possibility of successfulenvelopment of the enemys flanks. Reliable information indicatedthat the weight of enemy mechanization would bo on the south flank.Consequently, the 6th Cavalry (less 1 troop) was moved during thenight from the north flank to the south flank whore i t had beenplanned to form a Prov Mecz Brig under the 6th Division to assistthat uni t in the capture of LEESVILLE. However, the Army did notrelease the tank battalions u n t i l 3:00 AM, at SILTSON, a time andplace which prevented the carrying out of this plan.

The attack on the Red defensive position jumped off at 4:00AM 21 May after a twenty minute art i l lery preparation. St i ff res-istance was encountered all along the front. However the Ist Div-is ion had early success in securing PEA SON and the high ground southeast thereof, then shifted its attack to the south-west against

KORNBECK.The sth Division succoded in capturing SLAGLE and pushingabout 4 miles beyond. The 6th Division *ad the 6th Cay attached TwoCT f s of this division successfully resisted the Red 7th Cay Brig

(Mccz), and f ina l ly captured CRAVENS. The Ist CT was making adetermined drive toward LESSVILLE with the assistance of CorpsArtillery when the Commanding General, Third Army announced ' theend of "the Third Phase at 3:00 PM 21 May. See situation map, ANNEXNO. 14 , The IV Corps was directed to hold the important road net

- -'

just gained in the KORTRWOOD SLAGLE SIMPSON area to facilitateBlue operations in the next phase. In accordance with Army instructionsthe Corps went into bivouac east of the l ino KISATCHIE KURTHWOODSIAGLE and immediately began preparations of plans fo r organisationand defense of the area hold, against Red "reinforcements reportedapproaching from west of the SABINE RIVER.

13. FOURTH PHASE.

a. Opposing forces.

Blue: IV Corps (less 18th Engineers)3d"Radib In te l l igence Co."Co. "C", 2d Chemical Regt.

Red: IX Corps.7th Ca y Brig (Mecz) with 6th In f atchd.

29th In f34th In fProv Tank BrigadeCombat Aviation

Approximate relative total strength:Blue: 30,148 ; Red: 25,344.

11


16/61

- -

(Section 111, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers )

13 .b. Situation. See ANNEX NO. 15 fo r

Three messages fron C.G. Third Amy outlining now enemysituation and defensive mission for IV Corps; FO 22, and operationnap issued 5:00 PM 21 May; Messago from Commanding Gonoral ThirdArmy, and accompanying sketch, prescribing details of positionsfo r divisions and OPLR and MLR l inos, (Received IV Corps 5:10 PM);Letter Commanding Goneral IV Corps to Commanding General Third Armydated May 21, 1940, protesting Army direction of positions;Message from Commanding Goneral Third Amy to Commanding General IVCorps 9:25 AM 22 May, permitting defensive procedure' rooocnondodby Commanding Gonoral IV Corps; Special Military Map; showing dis-positions and situation at end of exercise, 11:00 AM, 24 May.

c . Conduct of the Exorcise.

The Blue IV Corps secured the ground held at the close ofthe Third Phase on 21 May, in order to protect the advance of thebalance of the Third Army which was assembling in tho BeaurogardArea. The mission given the Corps was to prevent the enemy" fromadvancing east of tho l ine , KISA2CEIE KURTIWOOD SLA.GLE.

FO 22, 5:00 PM , 21 May was prepared to coordinate tho defenseof the area. In general the defensive plan assigned tho Ist Divisionto the 'north flank which included tho high ground in vic in i ty ofPEASON, tho center and most vulnerable area of KURTHI7OOD to the sthDivision, and the loss vulnerable area on the south to the 6thDivision. In this situation the IV Corps' was opposed to a Red forcewhich had been given all available tanks, some 382, and what wasreported to be 400 combat planes, leaving none to tho Blue side.To combat this powerful mechanized force, the Commanding GeneralIV Corps decided to dolay on tho first posit ion with two battalionsof Infantry, a battalion of 75 *s and a battalion of 155 f s from each

division. The action between the first and second positions wasto bo road blocking and barrage to destroy a part of the mechanizedforce, to break up h is formation, to give an opportunity to det-ermine h is principal effor t , and to move forces to meet it . Theplan involved fighting a-delaying -action back- to the 2d JHfIBBBposition along tho IHHK HUTTON SIMPSON HINESTON l ino , ratherthan a withdrawal. This l ino was more suited fo r defense than anyother in the area. Here the flanks were protected by streams thatwere serious obstacles, which converged toward the center, thuscanalizing the attack -long a-6 mile fronts in the center of the-KISATCHIE KURTHWOOD MINK HUTTON area. On this front , almostperfect fields of f i r e existed, and the innumerable stumps wouldslow down any tank attack. Subsequent to the preparation of FO22, 5:00 PM , 21 May, a message was received at Corps Headquarters(TEMPLESPUR) at 5:10 PM prescribing that only two divisons be usedin defense of a l ine , shown on an attached sketch, and one divisionto be held in reserve (ANNEXNO. 15), The Commanding General IVCorps immediately protested, in wri t ing , the Army's action indesignating a defensive l ino which would loavo the Corps flankswide open against the enemy's mechanized forces, and prevent theoxecution of the dofonsivo maneuver outlined above. The request of

tho Corps Commander was approved as indicated by Army message 9:25AM, 22 May and the defensive scheme contained in FO 22 was adoptedfo r the opera t ion .

12


17/61

(Section 111, Final Import, Third Army Maneuvers)

13.c, (Cont'd)

FO 22 was augmented by special instructions contained in acorps memorandum issued at 11:00 AM 22 May (ANNFX110. 15). Thememorandum outlined in detai l "what was to be don in organizationof the ground, coordination of f i res , camouflage and cover, withdrawal plans, and restriction of use of transporation except fo rsupply and reserves.

The attack of the Red forces was launched early 24 May.I t was evident that the heavy rain during the night had material lyslowed up the speed of the initial blow. However, by 8:00 AM i twas obvious that the bulk of the Rod horse and mechanized forces-were concentrated in front of the sth Division in the SLAG-LElOJRTHWOOD area. The 10th Infantry strongly resisted in the SLAGLEsector and, with the help of a 35 minute heavy smoke screen, sloweddown the attack. Act iv i ty on the fronts of the Ist and 6th Divisionswas less marked, these units being able to hold their positions withtheir reinforced battalions fo r several hours. By 11:00 AM thepenetration on' the sth Division front had reached a point 4

mis.eswest of SLAGLE, Plans fo r a" possible counterattack were formulated;tho Corps Reserve rcir.cnts 16th Infantry and Ist Infantry, wex*emoved to positions north-east and south-east of HUTTON, respectively^The Ist Division was directed to prepare plans fo r a counterattackin the sth Division Zone with CT-18 and the aid of the Corps Reserve and Corps Art i l l o ry. However, the Red threat never "becamesufficiently acute to warrant the execution of this plan. That'afternoon the sth Division was able to hold out during the day,and by nightfall all elements had withdrawn to tho 2d posit ion.Likewise on the north flank tho Ist Division pulled back to the2d posit ion. However, on the south flank the 6th Division was stillholding the major portion of its MLR.

On the morning of 24 May i t was known that the enemywas concentrating his 382 tanks and forces fo r a major- supportingpush through the KISATCHIB HUTTON line. Instructions which hadbeen given the Ist Division fo r counterattack in the sth Divisionarea were still in effect to meet this threat. In addition to thepotential force of 4 Infantry Regiments (less 1 bn 2d In f ) plans hadbeen formulated to bring the full effect of Corps Art i l le ry and

*

most of the ar t i l le ry of the Ist and sth Divs on this area. Also,120 Antitank weapons (54-37mm and 66- , 50 cal MG) were made readyto meet the heavy mochanizod attack which would be canalized, as-expected, between HUTTON MINK, The positions of the 19th FA weresuch that i t would have direct f i re on tanks penetrating the secondposi t ion.

By 9:00 AM the Rod attack was launched in earnest, preceded'by combat av ia t ion , Howovcr, by 11:00 AM, when the 4th phase ended,the penetration had only reached tho second position where the fullplay of the Blue defensivo weapons were beginning to take effect.Only 11 tanks penetrated the posit ion. Tho exercise was ended beforethe Blue counterattack could be put into effect (ANNEXNO. 15).

A t 11:00 AM a ll IV Corps units began movomont to basecamps designated by the Commanding General Third Army,

13


18/61

SECTION IV

EQUIPMENT

14. GENERAL.

Every possible pr ior i ty and expedition has been exertedby the War Department to provide new equipment fo r the IV Corps.The new equipment has in general proved highly satisfactory, andhas contributed greatly to the value cf the maneuvers. Field testshave developed some minor" deficiencies, most of which would appearto be readily correctable.

TRANSPORTATION,15 .

a . Trailers.

Further consideration should be given to th e full useof tht t r a i l e r, which is unquestionably the most economical meansof transportation that can be produced. I f necessary fo r cargo capacity fo r any given unit, every motor vehicle that is no t essent ia l ly a prime mover fo r weapons should bo provided with a trailer,thus i n c r e a s i n g its car go -moving capacity appreciably, and adding

but 5 yards to its road spaco. The t rai ler has one other largoadvantage-: if its cargo is not needed the trai ler can be unhitchedand parked, thus freeing the truck and obviating unnecessary loading and unloading.

10 * SQmi-trailor vans ,(Command Posi)

A considerable amount of time and control may be lostwhen a command post of a Corps o r Division changes location, largelydue to the necessary disruption of staff and c orrraand facilities.Semi-trailer vans should be provided, with bui l t - in faci l i t iessuch as desks, bunks, nap boards, communications hook-ups, and thel i ke . Changes of command post locations could then be accomplishedby a simple movement of the van, with a minimum of los t tine and amaximum of comfort and faci l i t ies fo r command and staff personnel.These CP vans should be provided as follows:

4 per Corps Hcadouarters2 per Divisional Headquarters1 per Combat Team,

c,Passonrcr Sedans.

A ll now passenger sedans purchased should bo equipped withsleeping accommodations for at least two persons. One such sedanis now sold in the commercial market. In mobile opera/tions such acar would contribute tremendously to the physical well-being andefficiency of staff personnel.

Camouflage of Transport,

Camouflage cf motor vehicles has become a serious problem,with the large numbers of vehicles now provided. Natural coverfortunately has. boon plent i fu l , but many less fortunate situationsw i l l bo encountered. The provision of light weight nets to becarried with each vehicle is suggested.

14


19/61

(Section IV , Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

15 .o . Command-Reconnaissance Cars.

While those vehicles have proved very useful, th e s i l -

houette is fa r too high, and insufficient protection, both armorand armament, is available fo r personnel.

f. Motorcycles.The provision of a raoro serviceable vehicle to replace

the commercial type of motorcycle now in use is recommended. Thepresent type functions satisfactorily on paved roads at reasonablyhigh rates of speed, but in convoy at low rates, or on unpavedroads, breakdowns from a variety of causes are enormous.

16. EQUIPMENT_USED BY ALL A R M S AND SERVICES.

a . New Gas Ranee, M1937.

This item of equipment has proved most satisfactory. Dueto its design, however, the use of white p;as is essential, orhabitual clogging of gas food lines and f i l te rs w i l l resul t . Aswhite gas is d i ff i cu l t to procure in the f i e ld , i t is believedthat lines and f i l te rs should bo redesigned to pernit the use ofleaded gasoline.

The now food containers proved satisfactory and greatlyfacili tated the dispensing of hot food to troop elements separatedfrom their mess.

b. Tent a go .

Consideration should be riven to reducing the visibil i tyof tentago, the use of a darker color (possibly black), and withimpregnation to permit the use of l ights without being observed byenemy aircraft , being suggested as basis fo r further study. The

painting of tents in irregular designs in the normal camouflagecolors is also worthy of investigation.

c * 2jZlJL Sic epiftj^ Equipment ._

The present officers bedding roll is too heavy and bulky.The adoption of a simple lightweight sleeping bag, with a ir mat-tress, should be investigated.

17. NSW ARMS AND AI^KAMENT.

a. The Gar rand Rif le .

This rifle, with its f;roat rapidi ty of f ire and absence ofr e c o i l , is excellent fo r combat.

b . The 37mm Antitank Gun.

This is an admirable weapon. The only criticism possibleis that i t is toe l imited in numbers. The substitution of six ad-di t ional antitank guns fo r tho .50 caliber machine guns in. the in -fantry regiment

would greatlystrengthen

antitank defense.The

corps antitank battalion should be provided with 64-37mn runsinstead of 36, as covered fu l ly in Section IX of this repor t .

15


20/61


17.c . The 37m Antiaircraft Gun.

The 37mm antiaircraft gun has been present only to theextent of one battery, but its replacement of the cal . .50 machine gun is expected in the near future. To bo able tc perform ant itank missions in addition to antiaircraft tasks, carriages of thoseweapons should be modified so that guns can be depressed fo r firingwith a -negative an^le of site. The ammunition of those batteriesshould include a proportion of armor piercing shell.

d. The 105nr.i Howitzer.

Ono lone example of the now 105 mm howitzer was present withthe Corps Art i l l e ry,

c . The New 15 Sum Gun M-l .

The Corps Art i l le ry Brigade had only ti-o of these newweapons during the maneuvers . With their effective range of26,000 yards they have proven invaluable, especially fo r intordiction f i res . Their mobility going into or out of position issurprising. The speed of their prime movers on the read is,however, only about nine miles per hour. I f the Corps is tobe a homogeneous uni t , its component parts roust have

approximatelythe same speed. Hence either an increase in the speed of thoseprime movers or a dc - crease in the caliber of this weapon seems indicated.

f. The 81mn Mortar.The 81mm mortars have been supplied to all organisations

and arc highly efficient weapons when ammunition can be supplied.The ammunition requirements fo r these mortars demands the development of a low profi le motor carrier that can actually be used on

the field of bat t le . The necessity fo r such a carrier for machinej_,uns end ammunition has boon apparent ever since the World War, butthe development of the 81mm mortar has greatly accentuated this need.To the maximum use of these mortars, proper telephonic equipment should be provided.

ja* Antitank Mines ,j,

A supply of this munition should be carried at all timesby Divisional and Corps Engineer units , so as tc be readily available fo r road-blocking ?nissicns and antitank operations. Theuse of trailers to transport the mines is recommended.

18. SPECIFIC ITEMS.

a . Water Equipment*

Water 1 purification plants issued to Corps and DivisionalEngineer units have proved invaluable. Whenever a small stream, ofwater is available-, the question of safe potable water is completelysolved by those plants. Consumption has' varied from 3/4 to l|rgallons per man jper day*

I t is recommended that water purification plants beorganically assigned as fellows:

Per Division: Four of the 900 gallon per hour sets.Per Corps: Four of the 900 gallon per hour sets.

16


21/61


18 .a, (Cont'd)

This arrangement would pemi t the employment of a plantfo r oach conbat team of a division, plus one fo r divisional specialtroops, (or all ether divisional troops n o t a ]:>art of the cor.ibatteams). The arrangement for Corps Troops would pcrr.iit the simultaneous operation of several water DP's with possibly one set inreserve fo r replacement purposes.

The snail units should be mounted complete on a t rai ler ofthe 3/4 to n type.

"k # Shower Bath Equipment^,

I t

is understood that motorized hot water shower units arenow under procurement by the Corps of Engineers. However, inaddition, i t is believed that immediate consideration should begiven to the design and production of simple shower attachments tobe operated in conjunction v-rith each water puri f icat ion unit .

c . Top ogrnphi c C onpariy

Further study should bo riven to the transportation andtechnical equipment to be furnished the newly activated 64th Eng'ineor Company, Topographical, I t is now too cumbersome.

d. Balloons.

The vulnerabil i ty of the present C-6 type balloon, an d itsreplacement cost , could bo materially lessoned by the developmentcf a smaller, non-mo t o r i zed, one-nan balloon. This balloon wouldhave to be capable of rapid f ield inf la t ion , and each squadronshould be equipped with several. Experiments should be conductedin developing a covering material fo r the separate balloon gas com-*partments with 0. self-sealing feature for bul le t holes or punctures.A satisfactory system of this nature has already been adopted fo rairplane gasoline tanks. The' motorized feature of the balloon isof doubtful value. If there is serious doubt as to relative valueof balloons versus hcavier-than-air-craft such as autogyros, extensive tests should be made without delay to arrive at a solution,in order that production of the selected means could be initiated.

19 . DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS.

Detailed recommendations as to quantities and type of equipment, and modifications thereof, are being reported, through channels,

to Chiefs of Branches by the various Arms and Services.

17


22/61

SECTION V

COMMUNICATIONS

20 , GENERAL.

a. The maneuvers conclusively demonstrated that presentmethods , types of equipment, and organization of signal unitsemployed in the signal system are in need of radical changes.The rapidity of troop movements and the greater distances in -volved as a result of motorization requires a signal communi-cation system of far greater size and speed than heretoforecontemplated.

b. I t was again found essential that engineer units an dordnance ammunition control points be provided with additionalsignal communication equipment and personnel. The faci l i t iesexisting at present are not adequate.

c . Autogyros fo r use of a ir messengers should be providedat Corps Headquarters. Their value has boen successfullydemonstrated fo r this purpose.

21. IiESSAGE CENTERS.Message center personnel for the Corps Signal Battalion

should bo increased to include a messenger section as an organicpar t , with tho necessary transportation.

22. RADIO COIMJNICATION.

a. Distances between units were often so great that rangeof sots wore inadequate. In operations such as those just com-pleted, vehicular radio sets with ranges of 200 milos andpositive communication fo r 100 miles, should be furnished corpsand divisions; in lower units , vohiculor sets with ranges of 40miles. Tho rapid shif t ing of units from one point on tho frontto another requires constant radio communication. Too much val-uable time is los t in loading, unloading and setting up presentportable types of radio equipment. Coding of radio messages isstill too slow and cumbersome, even with well trained code clerks.Prearranged codes with special meanings wore found to be of someassistance in reducing time. A short simple' code for use betwoenstaff officers should be doviscd. A f ield mochanical cipher deviceis needed to speed up coding and decoding. The use of radioteletype or facsimile radio equipment should bo investigated asa possible means of improving communication and increasing speodin transmission.

b. Tho value of radio intercept and goniomotric service hasagain boon demonstrated. There appears to bo a need for furtherdevelopment in direction finding equipment.

18


23/61

(Section V, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

22.c . A battle reconnaissance radio intelligence uni t should be

a par t of the Corps Signal Battalion. A signal officer trainedin crypt oanalysis and to ac t as evaluating officer on radio intelligence matters fo r the Asst. Chief of Staff G-2 seems desirable.

d . A special radio set, belonging to the A ir Corps, was usedat the Corps CP fo r the exclusive use of aviation. I t is believedthat this necessary additional radio sot should be included inthe equipment of the Corps Signal Battalion. Seldom were telephone communications available and frequently an airplane had tobe called for, and operations conducted, over the same radio n o tthat was carrying the command load for that uni t . The satis

factory functioning of the corps aviation is absolutely dependentupon rapid i-jid positive communications, -which arc possible onlyi f alternate means are provided.

23. WIRE COIMUBICATIOH.

a. The vdrc now issued provides for telephone communicationfo r only nine miles, or fifteen to eighteen miles when loadedwith coi l s . This wire should guarantee communication from twenty-f ive to thir ty miles and y^t be l i gh t enough fo r rapid laying.Field wire allowance in a corps signal battalion should be increased from 80 miles to 150 miles. A more rapid method of laying wire should be developed.pod. uss &-"-"iliir , _hehe e_jk~-air - ?\u25a0>"[ajag s 1G'"f'.lj^ f or^thoemergency laying of f i l djyrfjifi^iiTTlmTEetr^treru^nr^ further study. Loading of f ie ld wirelines by using loading coils to increase their transmission rangewas found to be of groat value. More loading coils or otherequipment that would increase the transmission range of f ieldwire lines should bo provided. The exploitation of the commercialwire net to a much greater degree than heretofore contemplatedwas decidedly indicated.

b . Tola type service was found to be most satisfactory endshould be a principal means of communication between divisionsand corps, between corps forward and rear echelons, and betweencorps and airdrome. Teletype equipment f o r communication unitsof divisions and corps ahould be standardized. Field teletypeswere operated over a distance of eighteen road miles withoutd i ff i cu l ty, ut i l iz ing f ield wire l ines.

j3. The arrangement of telephone toll credit cards issued tocertain staff officers proved satisfactory and should be adopted

in future operations. A rapid' procedure fo r making arrangementsfo r commercial telephone service, such as connections and leasedci rcui t s , was adopted. This greatly facili tated the use ofcommercial communication linos in the mili tary system.

19


24/61


25/61

SECTION V I

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

25. QUARTERMASTER.

a Organization,

remainedThethe

organization of the Corps Quartermastersame during the march from Fort Benning

Serviceto the

beenSabine Area and during the Third Army exercises as i t hadfo r the IV Corps exercises at Fort Benning.

b. Class I upplies.

(l) March From Fort Benning to Sabine Area.

(a) Railheads were established and stocked at Mont-gomery, Alabama, and Meridian and Vicksburg, Mississippi, justprior to the start of the march. The three overnight halts of thenorth column were in the immediate v ic in i ty of these ci t ies .Fresh meats, fresh vegetables and perishable dairy products werestocked. Articles were shipped from Fort Benning by rail and

stored in refrigerator cars , A detachment consisting of oneofficer and four enlisted men f operated each railhead and had thesubsistence stores ready fo r issue to each march group upon itsar r iva l in the overnight bivouac a r e a , .Railhead distribution wasmade promptly to all units. The strength of each component ofeach march group had been furnished the railhead officer prior tothe start of the march and a breakdown of rations for each reg-iment or similar organization was made by the railhead detachmentp r i o r to the ar r iva l of the march groups^

(b ) Railheads were established at New Orleans and S t.Martinsvi l le , Louisiana, for the sth Division, marching on thesouth route. This division subsisted on a nonporishable rationfor the first two days of its march and was provided with freshcomponents .for the remainder of the march.

(c) The method of subsisting troops on the marchwas most satisfactory and provided normal rations without d i ff -iculty, delay or confusion. Upon ar r iva l in the Sabine concen-tration area all troops were subsisted from the Third Army Quar-termaster Base in A l e x a n d r i a , L o u i s i a n a ,

(d) Elements of Corps troops were attached to eachmarch group and i t was necessary fo r the Corps Quartermaster todivide his service company into a rear and forward echelon. Therear echelon distributed rations to Corps Troops u n t i l tho lastelements departed from Fort Benning and then marched with thelast march group. The forward echelon moved with the first marchgroup and was pr pared to distribute rations to each element ofCorps troops upon arr ival in the Sabino A r e a ,

(2) Third Army Exercises,

(a) For the period May 11th to 16th rations wereforwarded by rail from the Third Army Quartermaster Base torailheads which were operated by personnel from, the Corps anddivision Quartermaster service units. There are two railroadsrunning north from Alexandria, one on each sido of the Red River,

21


26/61

(Section V I, Final Report, Third Army Maneuvers)

25.

b . (2), (a) (Cont'd)

Movement of supplies by rail was very satisfactory. FromMay 17th, delivery of Class I upplies was by Army motor trainsto division and Corps Troops distributing points. The la t termethod of delivery is considered more f lexible, provided a goodroad not is available, as delivery points and time of deliverycan bo quickly changed in accordance with changes in the tacticalsituation. Both methods are subject to unexpected delays. Theuse of rail faci l i t ies usually has the advantage of providinggood unloading and distributing platforms. Perishable subsistenceand ic e can bo left in refrigerator cars u n t i l loaded onto uni t

trucks . (b) Groat di ff icu l ty was exporioncod in obtainingdai ly strength returns in time to consolidate into a dai ly telegram,due to overtaxed communications and wide dispersion of units .I t became necessary fo r the Subsistence Officer to o.bandon ent i re ly an attempt to submit a telegram on the basis of a twoday l ag , and resort to a throe day lag* A small mobile reserve,which at no time exceeded five hundred rations of non-perishablenature, was so t up in Corps Troops and in each divis ion. Thisreserve proved invaluable in meeting emergencies caused by inf luxof prisoners, tagged casualties and discrepancies duo to the threeday time la g between submission of daily strength report and theactual consumption of the ration

(c) The greatest single di ff icu l ty experienced in getin g subsistence to troops was due to sudden attachment or detachment of small units to other tactical organizations, which in afew cases le d to the duplication or omission of rations fo r thedetached uni t . In exercises of this character i t is believed tobe necessary to establish a policy, clearly understood throughout the entire command, that anyj^n](itH&ist continue to besubsisted through the agency of its own regiment or other parentorganization. No other system appears to be feasible whore theissue of rations is on the basis of one ration per man and wherepeace time accountability is superimposod on simulated campaignconditions.

(d) The "Type "C" Field Ration" was issued to thedivisions for consumption on May 20 and 21. Information obtainedthus fa r seems to indicate that this is a highly desirable formof reserve ration but that i t should bo packed in rectangulartins of about ten to twelve ounce capacity fo r the meat component. As issued, the cans were too heavy, too bullqy, and containedmore food than could bo consumed by an individual at one time.I t also appears that troops must be educated in the use of this _^"""concentrated form of food to prevent indigestion and i l lness, asthere was noted a tendency to over-eat while over-heated and exhausted as a result of strenuous physical exertion.

(c) Truckhead or railhead delivery of rations wasused throughout the exercise fo r Corps Troops. Unit delivery

of rations was occasionally resorted to in the divisions.Sometimes railhead delivery was used for units operating inclose proximity to the railhead while uni t delivery was madeto the more distant units. I t appears that this combinationof the two standard methods of distribution often may bo advantageous when units are widely scattered. T-Thcn units arefa i r ly closely grouped around th


27/61

(Section V I, Final Report, Third Army Maneuver s )

25.c. Class 111 Supplies (Gasoline and Oil).

( 1 ) March From Fort Bonning to Sabine Area*

(a) Duo to the large quantities of gasoline requiredby the march groups at each bivouac area, advance preparationswere started in March to acquaint the contractors with the re -quirements. Marches were staged so thdt no refueling was necessary between nightly bivouac areas. Excellent cooperation washad from the o il companies involved* namely the Standard O il Company of Kentucky, Standard O il Company of Louisiana, Homo Oi lCompany, The Texas Company, and the .'Sinclair O il Company. Thecontractors wore furnished with an estimate of gasoline require-

ments and the exact dato and point of delivery. Each dealer movedin sufficient additional equipment to assure a steady floxv ofgasoline by tank trucks from h is bulk distributing plant to themarch group distributing points. Multiple distributing outlets,improvised at Fort Bonning, were installed in each bivouac areato transfer gasoline from the commercial tank trucks to the standardton gallon drums. Motor vehicles wero r of uo lad from the drums a tthe rate of about six hundred vehicles per hour or about as fastas they closed into the bivouac areas. No undue delays or diff icul t ies'were experienced. - .^\u0084,^.,._,...._ ^asfe,^^

(b) The following table shows gasoline consumption ofeach march group along the north route:

-6th Division -Ist Division Corps Troops- \ i

Vehicles 1600 1575 1666 t

g^VVfWAd-'

GASOLINE DISTANCEi

Montgomery 23720 18350 19400 108 -Kilos

"Meridian 25044 26812 22801 171"

Vicksburg 23390 22377 19659 150

TOTALOTAL 72154 -h 67539 _y 61860 409 .Miles^(c) The following data was secured by the sth \ f'

Division on its march along the south route via Now Orleans:

. . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ : No. : Vehicle : Gasoline : Miles/Gallon:tin Div. : Miles .; Consumption : Gasoline t

Cars, Commend : 134 ; 127572 ; 8811 t 14.47 ;

Trucks ,|wT Pickup ; 243 : 195456 ; 13527 ; 14.3 :Trucks, l^-T (4x4) T : : \ T

Cargo ; 420 ; 321223 : 37184 ; 8.63 : Trucks, 2J-T (4x4) : : : : :

Cargo : 11 t 8304 : 1111 : 7.46 :Trucks, lgh-T (4x4) I \ 1 1 T

Dump : 31 : 22474 t * ; 7.9847 :Trucks, 4*T {6x6) : : . : . : :

Prime Movers ; 20 : 15063 : 5482 ; 4.3 :

Average number of miles of unimproved road traveled: 97.4" " " " "1 improved 692.8" "*"/


28/61


25.

c .(2 ) Third Army Exerc i ses ,

(a) Gasoline and oil were supplied from commer-cial tank trucks to Corps and Division distributing pointsin the same manner as during the IV Corps Exorcises at FortBenning. The Provisional Corps Gasoline Supply Company withits reserve of twelve hundred drums (ten gallon capacity)proved to be an extremely valuable organization capable ofrapidly reinforcing a division or other uni t with a mobilereserve of gasoline or of operating as many as four widelyseparated distributing points. During the second exercise asection of this company moved behind a provisional mechanized

brigade from the vic in i ty of Dry Prong to Natchitoches andafterward south to Leesvillo, operating gasoline supply pointsimmediately in the roar of this brigade. At no time was anyorganization beyond the reach of gasoline. I t is believed thata gasoline and oil supply platoon should be constituted in eachdivision and provided with a reserve supply of about throehundred drums (ton gallon capacity) to function in the samemanner in tho division as the provisional company did fo r CorpsTroops.

(b) I t is apparent from a study of the War Department Table of Organization fo r the Gasoline Supply Company thati t was intended that i t operate from a r e f i l l i ng point such asrailroad tank cars or an Army bulk storage point . This was notthe case during the maneuvers jus t completed since the methodof supply was by civi l ian contractor delivery to distributingpoints. While such a procedure might be satisfactory fo r peacetime maneuvers, i t seems unsound in principle to place dependence during national emergency on a c iv i l ian agency fo r adequatesupply. In other words, eithor the Corps or Army echelon mustbe equipped with tank trucks of approximately 1500 gallon capacitydivided into

twocompartments which employ

apower pump discharg

in g gasoline to the ten (10) gallon drums from either four (4)or eight (8) outlots. Those tank trucks would then either operatebetween r e f i l l i ng points and tho various distributing points orbe used to maintain an adequate ro l l ing reserve with tho combattroops. Assuming, that six (6) of these tank trucks are providedas organic' equipment of the Gasoline Supply Company i t is possibleto furnish in tabularproper operation undertable of equipment shown

form the remaining equipmentcombat conditions. In this

below:

requiredconnection

fo rsee

Equipment

Item QuantityDrums, 10-gallon capacity, each 600Nozzles, flexible fo r cans 100Funnels, largo size, (12-inch) 24Electric Lanterns, Portable Battery Typo 6Trucks, 2-j-ton (6x6) 16Cars, Command or Sedan 2Trucks, -| ton (4x4), Pick-up 4Trailers,

truck 3Hand Pumping Apparatus, 4-nozzle 4Fire Extinguishers, Foamito 12Tank Trucks, 1500 gallon, 2-compartment 6

24


29/61


25.d. Motor Maintenance.

(1)(1 ) March From Fort Banning to Sabino Area.

(a) Regional maintenance was organized and operatedby Third Army maintenance units under supervision of the IV Corps.A platoon of a l ight maintenance company was placed in each biv-ouac area along the north route, moving into position with thefirst march group and remaining there u n t i l the last troopscleared through the area. By fixing such a uni t in each bivouacarea more time was gained fo r repair work and salvaging of con-demned vehicles. This also permitted the organic maintenance unitsin each division and in Corps Troops to remain mobile. Vehiclesthat could not be repaired by organic maintenance units due to

the nature of the repair, unavailabil i ty of parts or lack of timewere turned over to the regional unit . This method of maintainingand repairing motor vehicles on a long march was highly successfuland is strongly recommended fo r future use.

("k) Third Army Exercises.

Motor maintenance was conducted in the samemanner as in the IV Corps Exercises, except that on occasionsthe maintenance company vrith Corps Troops operated as two platoonsseparated by about f i f ty miles. This was necessitated by the widedispersion of Corps Troop units . The only di ff icu l ty encounteredby either platoon was due to lack of parts and this was partiallyovercome by placing the majority of the parts normally carriedin the company vrith the platoon operating at the greatest distancefrom the supply base.

( c ) Transportation.

(l) Increased mobili ty implies wide sweepingmovements with consequent dispersion of tactical units . The

corollary is increased mobili ty of supply. The natural inferenceis that all Quartermaster Service Units should be fu l ly motor-ized with the necessary command and control vehicles, organiccargo transportation and personnel carriers.

.*>'

(2) A minimum of three truck companies (2-g- T)should be organically a par t of the Corps Quartermaster Service.These trucks would form a reserve fo r emergency use by tho CorpsCommander fo r transportation of personnel and would be- availableto facilitate supply under adverse conditions such as a temporarybreakdown of tho supply flow from Army, by transporting adequatero l l i ng reserves and to accomplish uni t distribution to tho moredistant combat units . A further use arises, in that tacticalsituations may dictate the sudden removal of railhead or truckhoadrosorves of rations, gasoline and oil to prevent' their destructionor falling into the hands of tho enemy. Tho exigencies of campaignw i l l in addition, dictate many replacements of general suppliesfo r which truck transportation must necessarily bo provided.

(3) The type Corps of three divisions shouldhave within i t sufficient organic transportation to completelymotorize at least two combat teams fo r Corps

Roserves.I t should

also have immediately available sufficient transportation to re in-force two of the three divisions with ono 2-J- ton Quartermaster truckcompany each. Normally two divisions w i l l have missions making i thighly desirable to give thorn additional transportation to reduceshutt l ing. I t has been found that by proper loading, a divisionso reinforced can move most of its tactical elements without shutt l ing.

25


30/61


25.d.., (1), (c), (3) Cont'd.

Such mobili ty should bo afforded two of the divisions to permit

rapid displacement and shif t ing of units to meet the tacticalsituation. The Army is often quito far removed from the front ,and quick communication therewith is frequently lacking or un-certain. Three Quartermaster truck companies, organically apar t of the Corps, would provide a pool of transportation tohandle the administrative needs of the corps and mako quicklyavailable to the Corps Commander sufficient transportation tomotorize a powerful s t r iking force of from one to two divisions.

(4) During thoso exercises no truck companieswere available to the Corps. Delays and uncertainties wore ex-perienced in obtaining transportation from the Army. Lack oftelephone or other rapid moans of communication in a ccmbat zonew i l l aggravate this condition. I t is believed the three truckcompanies mentioned above represent the minimum organic transportation essential to the operation of the Corps and that this amountshould suffice under normal conditions.

26. WATER.

Water was supplied to all units by mobile water puri f icat ionplants

in adequatequantities

without d i ff i cu l ty. These pur i -y .

fication plants functioned in a very satisfactory manner. Numer- ,yous small streams wore available in the maneuver area, and i t S,,never became necessary to haul water any great distance.

27. ORDNANCE./'

_a. Organization*

There was no change in the organization of the CorpsOrdnance troops . They functioned in the same manner as in the IVCorps Exercises at Fort Benning except that each company operatedas a shop under the supervision of a battalion maintenance officer.This method proved fa r superior to the method of grouping sectionsas was done at Fort Benning.

b. Maint enanc e. *Tho Ordnance Battalion (less the ammunition company)

operated a repair center fo r Ordnance material during the entireperiod of the four exercises in tho Sabino Area. In these ex-ercises the locations fo r the shop wore selected at points con-vonient to the troops and well in the roar of tho Corps. Severalchanges in the tactical situation did not cause tho shop to move,and because of this a maximum of repair service could be rendered.In the Fort Benning Area the shop was kept so closely in contactwith the rear echelon of the Corps that frequent changes werenecessary. Tho Ordnance Shop should remain stable fo r as long aperiod as possible, even when distances to f ront l ine units areas great as fo r ty to fifty miles, as such distances representonly two or three hours travel by repair crews or tovdng vehicles.On the other hand, when the shop moves, a full day may bo los t by

all elements of the shop.

26


31/61


27.c . Ammunition Suppl;

( l ) There was no change from the plan usod in the IV CorpsExercises at Fort Bonning,

(2) I t is rocommendod that tho ammunition supply planentitled "Tho Administrative Handling of Ammunition in the Field"be adopted in principlo as the standard procoduro fo r the supplyof ammunition in ' the f i e ld ; but that tho term ammunition controlpoint be dropped, and a name more descriptive of tho functions ofthe Munitions Officers of the Division be used to dosignate h isoff ice I t is suggested that tho. simplo torn "Ordnance Office"be employed.

(3) I t is also recommended that the Ordnance Office belocated habitually near the forward echelon of Division Head-quarters, and that all references to combat trains being requiredto pass by or near the ammunition control point or Ordnance Officebe eliminated.

(4 ) Sufficient blank ammunition should be provided fo rexercises of this nature to provide a one to one ratio betweenblanks actually fired and the service ammunition represented. Notrue picture of the difficulties incident to ammunition supply can

be had otherwise. The expense involved in providing such asupply of blank ammunition would be more thon justified, A highrat io of represented service ammunition to blank ammunition actu-al ly stocked, moved and fired, often loads to faulty and erroneousconclusions on the par t of subordinate units .

28. MEDICAL CARS AND EVACUATION.

Bonning, March from Fort to Sabine Area.

( l ) Casualties on the march were evacuated by ambulancesof tho medical battalions and medical regiment to Corps HospitalStations which were established at Montgomery, Alabama, on May sth,7th, and Bth; at Meridian, Mississippi, on May 6th, Bth, and 9th,and at Vicksburg, Mississippi on May 7th, 9th, and 10 th , Casualtiesrequiring emergency hospital ization were evacuated as far as possibleto Government Hospitals. Whon this was impracticable they wereevacuated to hospitals specified by Letter of Instructions No. 3,Headquarters Fourth Corps Area. A total of eight (8) casualtieswere evacuated from civi l ian hospitals to Government hospitals.At the conclusion of tho march a total of thirteen (13) patients

remained in civi l ian hospitals. In addition one ( l ) casualty wasevacuated to Station Hospital , Fort Bonning, Georgia; and four (4)to Station Hospital, Maxwell Field, Alabama; remainder of patientstreated by the Corps Medical Regiment during the march was eighty-eight (88). The types of patients treated by the Corps MedicalRegiment were Z7% in jur ies , 29% rospiratory, 17$ intestinal upsets,and 17% infection*.

27


32/61

(Section V I, Final Report, Third Array Maneuvers)

28.a . (Cont'd)

(2) During the march period May 4th to 11th inclusivethere was no prevalence of communicable disoaso and only eight(8) voncr&l cases, all gonorrhea, wore reported, Thore was atotal of 138 patients admitted to all hospitals as follows:

Civi l ian Hospital 21Ist Evacuation Hospital. . , ,108IV Corps Clearing Station.. . 9

(Immobilized Hospital)Total 138

Mean strength during the march,, 37,457'Tho

rato perthousand per annum,. 176,64

b . Third Army Exorcise Fer iod ,

( l ) There was no essential difference in the employmentof the Corps Medical Regiment in Third Army Exercises from thatemployed in the IV Corps E x e r c i s e s , The companies of the re in-forcing battalion wore attached to the divisions making the mainoffor t in each exercise, tho remainder of the regiment operatingtho Corps Clearing Station.

(2) Camouflage: I t is practically impossible to concealthe hospital ward tents because of their large size. As conceal-ment is necessary i t is f e l t that saallor tents similar to largowall or storage tents should bo used.

29. MILITARY POLICE ACTIVITIES.

a. Standing Operating Procedure was established and publishedduring IV Corps Exorcises at Fort Benning. Changes wero made toprovide fo r a l ino of demarcation between division and corps con-t r o l of routes of movement and fo r the establishment of stragglerl ines, and prisoner of war enclosures.

_b. lSaintona.no o of order among military personnel in civi l iancommunities near bivouacs and base camps was the responsibilityof the uni t Provost Marshal.

jc. Traffic Control fo r tho movement to Sabine Area wasarranged in advance with the Director of Public Safety of eachstate traverscdi In every case full and excellent cooperation wasobtained. In the Sabine Area tho cooperation of the Louisiana

State Police was under control of Third Army.

28


33/61

SECTION V II

ADMINISTRATION

30. ROUTINE

During the movement of the Corps from Fort Benning, Georgia,to the Sabine Area, administrative matters were held to a minimum.In a few exceptional cases, matters of urgent importance were transmitted to the Rear Echelon of Corps Headquarters, where the f i lesand records were maintained. The Rear Echelon was two (2) days be

hind the Forward Echelon in the movement to the Sabine Area. I f anextensive movement from one point to another is made as a Corps movement, i t is recommended that the Adjutant General's Section be divid-ed into two self sustaining echelons, and that the rear echelon notmove from the old station u n t i l the forward echelon is actually setup and functioning at the new station.

In the Sabine Area the Administrative Section of Corps Head-quarters was located at Dry Prong, La. Administrative and pe>vo_?.nelaffairs wore handled from that place. When the Forward Eohai'-ti ofCorps Headquarters moved from Dry Prong, La., to variovu:post locations in accordance with tactical situations .tive matters were sent back to the Roar Echelon at Dry Prong, La.,by special messenger service fo r necessary action. Tho operation ofthe tactical communications system was never burdened with administra^tive^business ; tactical t raff ic was accorded pr ior i ty a t all times.This, of course, involved some delay in the completion of administrat ive affairs .

31. PERSONNEL.

sx

. coAdministrative Instructions Nos. 11 & 12,

AMEXA NOS. 17 k 18.

_b. Discharges and Re enlistments.

A casual center was established at Fort Benning, Georgiato handle the discharge of those enlisted men of the IV Corps duofo r discharge during the period May 4th to 11th inclusive, whosignified their intention not to roonl is t .

Enlisted men duo fo r discharge during tho movement of tho

IV Corps to tho Sabine Area, who stated their intention to reonlist ,accompanied their organizations and were discharged and reonlistcdenrouto. Thcso enlisted men were paid f ina l statements by theirDivision Finance Officers. In the case of enlisted men who woremembers of Corps Troop organizations, arrangements wero made fo rthoir payment by the nearest Division Finance Officer.

In the Sabino Area f ina l statements of the Divisions andall attached units wero paid by the Division Finance Officers concerned. Final statements of enlisted men of Corps Troops were paidby the nearost Division Finance Officer.

29


34/61

(Section V II Final Report Third Army Maneuvers)

Injured.c . Sick and

Thoso onlistod men of tho IV Corps who woro patients inthe Station Hospital, Fort Banning, Georgia, at tho time of de-parture of units fo r tho Sabino Area woro divided into four classes.

(1 ) Thoso who woro ready fo r full duty in a short time.(2) Those who woro ready fo r duty during the period

of maneuvers in the Sabin Aroa.(3) Thoso no longor requiring hospitalization and

who were ready fo r ordinary garrison duty, but who were not yet fitfo r active f ield duty.

(4) Thoso who required prolonged hospital ization, ortransfer to a general hospital .

Those in groups (1) and (2) were returned to dutywith their organizations in tho Sabine Area by tho Commanding General,Fort Bonning, upon completion of hospitalization. Those in group (3)wore returned to their home stations on orders issued by Headquarters,4th Corps Area. Those in group (4 ) were reported to Headquarters, 4thCorps Aroa fo r disposition.

Enroute to the Sabine Aroa, personnel requiringhospital ization wore, as fa r as possible, evacuated to GovernmentHospitals.

Disposition of M ilitary Offenders.

A l iberal policy was established in the administration ofmili tary justice to the end. that miner infractors of mili tary discip-l ine were not deprived of full participation in tactical training.In most cases organization commanders obtained the parole of membeisof their organizations serving garrison sentences and took them onall tactical exercises. In many instances the unexecuted portions ofconfinement were remitted and prisoners restored to duty. Ful l advan-tage was taken \vhonover possible of the provisions of the 104 th Articleof War.

32. ATTACHMENT OF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS.

National Guard Division staffs trained with units as indicatedbelow:

Ist Division: -38th Division May 13, 14, 15. 10 officers.sth Division: -31st Division May 14, 15, 16. 10 officers.6th Division: -33rd Division May 9, 10, 11. 10 officers.

A total of 1267 Reserve officers took par t in the training ofthe IV Corps in the Sabine Area.

30


35/61


33. POSTAL SERVICE

a. D u r i n g movement to the Sabine Area.

Postal service, which was l imited to the dolivcry of f i r s t -class mail, was furnished troops onroute from Fort Benning to theSabino Area by moans of a woll-plannod and well-executed system' off lying the mail by Army airplane to each march group at one pointon its route. Sec ANNEX NO. 18. On the northern route mail wasflown and delivered to the 6th Cavalry at Jackson Municipal Airpor t , Jackson, Mississippi, and to the 6th Division, Ist Division,and Corps Troops march groups at the Key Municipal Airpor t , Meridian,Mississippi. On the southern route delivery was made to the sth Division march group at the Now Orleans State Airport, New Orleans, La./in average of 1200 pounds of mail was carried on each of the f ive

f l ights .

b . While in tho Sabine Area*

(l) Postal service during tho period the Corps operated in the Sabine Area (ANNEX NO. 17) was based upon the plan usedat Fort Benning, Georgia (ANNEX NO. 16). The four Army Poet Offices,one fo r Corps Troops and one each fo r the Ist, sth and 6th Divio'.ons,continued their operations. Tho point of contact between the .in-iyPost Offices and the United States Post Office service was at Alexandria, La. A ll normal services of a civi l ian Post Office, exceptspecial delivery, were handled by civilian and mil i tary personnel.

(2) Statistics covering the handling of mail by theseveral Army Post Offices follow:

INCOMING OUTGOINGNo. Piecos No. Pounds No Piocos No. Pounds

Ordinary mail 27,500 1,140 30,000 932Official mail 8,936 654Registered mail 48 2 44 2Special Delivery 70 4 108 5Insured mail 92 322 29 1082d & 3d class mail

and Parcel Post 2,100 1,150 340 450TOTALS: 29,810 2,618 39,457 2,151

(Figures shown are dai ly average)j'm. average of 135 sacks of mail was received per day

by the several APOs. About 30 money orders were issued per day by thoAPOs. This is less than half the dai ly average at Fort Benning butthis is because there was no pay-day during tho period in the SabineArea.

The unclaimed and undelivered mail averaged about

100 pieces per day, which is about 3/lO of \% of all mail handled.c . Comments and Recommendations.

(1) The success of tho system of f lying mail totroops making a long motor movement of several stages, warrants i t sbeing adopted as normal procedure therefor. I t is believed thatdai ly service should be so provided at each march bivouac.

31


36/61


c . Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd)

(2) A t concentration areas near an army post such asFort Bonning, the system of having United States Post Office personnelsort the mail to the various Amy Post Offices operates successfully,duo to the familiarity of the United States Post Office personnel withthe designation of army units and with am y administrative methods.Whero such famil iar i ty with army methods does not exist , i t is re -commended that the largest army unit concentrated in that area operatea central post office, and bo responsible fo r the sorting of mail tovarious subordinate Army Post Offices.

(3) The system of requiring locator cards to bo furnish-Ed the central and subordinate post office is the only satisfactorymethod of insuring prompt, efficient delivery of mail. During thosemaneuvers this locator card f i le was found to bo invaluable, not only

fo r postal use, but as a. locator system fo r use by tho various uni tAdjutant General Sections.

(4) Duo to the fact that tho personnel of the Army PostOffices arc required to maintain 24 hours service,' Army Post Officesshould bo established in the vicini ty of Corps end Division CPs soas to be provided with electric l igh t ing .

32


37/61

SECTION V I I I

TACTICS

34. TEAM TACTICS

a . In f an t ry-Ar t i l l ry .The combination of an infantry regiment and a battalion of

l i g h t ar t i l le ry as the basic elements of a combat team has becomestandard throughout the divisions of the corps. I t is the practiceto have them march, bivouac and ini t iate conbat together. As soonas the tactical situation warranted, the ar t i l le ry of combat teamswas brought under centralized control. This procedure has provedto be entirely sound and desirable.

In many situations i t would be highly desirable to have abattery of 155-mm Howitzers included in the combat team* Its inclusion would to some extent obviate the long delay which generallyoccurred in getting medium ar t i l le ry into action, caused by the factthat" the medium ar t i l le ry regiment marches with division troopsin rear of the combat teams. I t is further believed that the

medium art i l lery regiment of the division,if

both l i g h t and mediumart i l lery are retained, should comprise two battalions, each ofthree f i r i ng batteries instead of two. Such a composition wouldpermit placing the batteries of on e battalion in combat teams onthe march, and in the initial stages of combat, and of keepingtho other battalion under divisional control.

t>. Infantry- A i r.

Effor t ytq.s made to extend the team idea to include tho Infantry-Air f ield by automatically alloting to the using troops,a ir units which would be at the disposition of those units habitually. To do th is , Standing Procedure proscribed that airplanesof tho Observation Aviation Group would be habitually a t t

wwii 3rd army maneuvers report

Documents