WRITING A PROTEST LETTER ON THE IRREGULAR APPOINTMENT OF A CLERK OF COURT IS TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND INSUBORDINATION?

BY JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, LLM, DCL

Judge “A” was charged with Disrespect and Disregard of Authority tantamount to Grave Misconduct and Insubordination by an administrative office of the Supreme Court as the complainant for allegedly accusing in the protest letter against the Selection, Nomination and Promotion Board (Board) of certain irregularities committed by nominating court employee “B” who has a pending case involving grave offenses and court employee “C” who did not comply with the basic requirements for application as Clerk of Court such as favorable recommendation of a Judge and Position Description Form (PDF) even going to the extent of branding the appointment of court employee “C” as "void ab initio” and a “big joke," to name a few, thereby casting doubts on the integrity of selection, nomination and promotion board; that even Judge “A” casts aspersion on board by saying "Board is funny, and it made me laugh. I rather laugh than be angry, than feel helpless, than look powerless in this awful and mean situation" ; that Judge “A”s act of ascribing ill motives to the Board degrades the integrity and confidence reposed by the public in it and her language used in expressing her displeasure is hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate; and considering that the main function of the Board is merely to screen, evaluate and assess the competence and qualifications of a candidate for the appointment to a vacant position, the authority to appoint is still vested on the Chief Justice and the two (2) Senior Associate Justices; that Judge “A”s impugning the appointments of court employees “B” and “C” is a denigration of the actions of the Chief Justice and the two (2) Senior Associate Justices. Complainant prayed for a show cause order why Judge “A” will not be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and Insubordination.

Did Judge “A” commit Disrespect and Disregard of Authority tantamount to Grave Misconduct and Insubordination in writing a protest letter on the irregularly appointed Clerk of Court? The answer is in the negative.

Judge “A” did not commit a misconduct and insubordination in writing a protest letter that is a mere exercise of one’s cherished freedom of speech, a constitutional right. In US vs. Bustos 37 PHIL 731, our Supreme Court said, "The people not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, by only in a despotism. Even if the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of

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privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged by a balm of a clear conscience. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts."

Judge “A” has exercised the statutory right of a Judge to question the appointment of an applicant for a branch clerk of court who did not comply with the basic requirements under the laws thus it can be considered as an irregular appointment. The lack of ill motive of Judge “A” in questioning the appointment can be gleaned from the various letters pertaining to the questioned appointment filed before the Supreme Court.

Judge “A” lamented in one of the letters submitted to the Supreme Court that it is only in the Philippines that an applicant for branch clerk of court, who was rejected personally and in writing several times, and who previously has withdrawn her application, signed a petition for transfer with prayer for the dismissal of Judge “A”, more or less a month prior to her appointment, then criminally charge Judge “A” more or less prior to her oath-taking before the Office of the Executive Judge that can be considered as a Grave Misconduct committed by court employee “C”. Likewise, there is nothing on record that Judge “A” committed insubordination in writing the questioned letter and subsequent letters thereto because a right to protest an appointment that is perceived to be irregular is inherent in every court.

Judge “A”s letters to the administrative office of the Supreme Court, just like other persons' typical correspondences are susceptible to different interpretations so it is quite unfair that bad motive will be ascribed in writing them. Because of the varying interpretations of the letters, there is uncertainty whether the words constitute as a misconduct and an insubordination. To conclude misconduct and insubordination on Judge “A”s part, there must be certainly on the interpretation of the exact import of the words in the correspondences that is impossible to happen in this case.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior(Camus, Jr. v. Alegre, A.M. No. P-06-2182, August 12, 2008). It is any unlawful behavior by public officers in relation to the duties of their offices, willful in character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act (Joaquin

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vs. Dela Cruz, A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009). It is “a transgression of someestablished and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful

behavior or gross negligence by a public officer” (Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004). Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers [Castelo v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 581 (2003)]. In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167726, July 20, 2006) and established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct (Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005). Thus, a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave (Santos v. Rosalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8, 2007). Section 52(B)(2), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable with a corresponding penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense.

Writing a complaint letter and a protest letter on the irregular appointments of court employees “B” and “C” cannot be considered as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. It is a legitimate action of a Judge to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding their appointments as provided under The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, CANON 2, SECTION 3. – Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular appointments of court employees “B” and “C” are privileged communications that are not actionable when made in good faith. The complainant failed to adduce any proof that Judge “A” was impelled with disreputable motive and bad faith in writing them the protest letters.

In Sison vs. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28, 1961: The terms "absolute privilege" and "qualified privilege" have established technical meanings, in connection with civil actions for libel and slander. In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum: For the sake of clearness of application privileged communications are often divided into two classes: Absolute privilege; and conditional or qualified privilege, the second sometimes being called 'quasi privilege.' In cases of absolutely privileged communications, the occasion is an absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of conditionally or qualifiedly

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privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former class the freedom from liability is said to be absolute or without condition, regardless of the existence of express malice, as contrasted with such freedom in the latter class where it is said to be conditioned on the want or absence of express malice (53 C.J.S., 141- 142).

An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by reason of the occasion on which it is made, no remedy is provided for the damages in a civil action for slander or libel. It is well settled that the law recognizes this class of communications which is so absolutely privileged that even the existence of express malice does not destroy the privilege although there are some dicta denying the rule, and some eminent judges, in dealing with particular applications of the rule, have doubted or questioned the rationale or principle of absolutely privileged communications. As to absolutely privileged communications, a civil action for libel or slander is absolutely barred (53 C.J.S., p. 142).

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Qualified privilege exists in a larger number of cases than does absolute privilege. It relates more particularly to private interests, and comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter in which the author of the communication has an interest, or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private, either legal, judicial, political, moral, or social, made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Briefly stated, a qualifiedly privileged communication is a defamatory communication made on what is called an occasion of privilege without actual malice, and as to such communications there is no civil liability, regardless of whether or not the communication is libelous per se or libelous per quod (53 C.J.S., pp. 143-144). In the case of communications qualifiedly privileged, there must be both an occasion of privilege and the use of that occasion in good faith (53 C.J.S., p. 145).

To the same effect is the American Jurisprudence, from which we quote: On the ground of public policy, the law recognizes certain communications as privileged and, as such, not within the rules imposing liability for defamation. A privileged communication or statement, in the law of libel and slander, is one which, except for the occasion on which or the circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory and actionable.

Privileged communications are divided into two general classes, namely: (1) those which are absolutely privileged; and (2) those which are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged, as defined in subsequent sections (33 Am. Jur., p. 123). An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which

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or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby, and even though it may have been made maliciously (33 Am.. Jur., pp. 123-124). A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where circumstances exist, or are 'reasonably believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on him the duty of making a communication to a certain other person to whom he makes such communication in the performance of such duty, or where the person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests the person of society that he should tell third persons certain facts, which he in good faith proceeds to do. This general idea has been otherwise expressed as follows: A communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable, and although the duty is not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation. The essential elements of conditionally privileged communication may accordingly be enumerated as a good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only (33 Am. Jur., pp. 124-125).

Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following language:

Absolute Privilege — In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even of it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice (Section 350, pp. 387388).

In the less important matters, however, the interests and welfare of the public do not demand that the speaker should be freed from all responsibility, but merely require that he should be protected so far as he is speaking honestly for the common good. In these cases the privilege is said not to be absolute but qualified; and a party defamed may recover damages notwithstanding the privilege if he can prove that the words were not used in good faith, but that the party availed himself of the occasion wilfully and knowingly for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff (Section 389, p. 415).

Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it is made, what distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication from one which is only qualifiedly privileged is, therefore, that the latter is actionable upon proof of "actual malice", whereas its existence does not affect the exemption attached to the former, provided that, in the case of judicial proceedings, the derogatory statements in question are

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pertinent, relevant or related to or connected with the subject matter of the communication involved. Under peculiar situations, a few decisions have required probable cause for the enjoyment of the absolute privilege, but such decisions not only do not reflect the view of the clear weight of authority, but, also, have acknowledged the wisdom of such view, although its non-application was sought to be justified by the special conditions obtaining in each case (See Harshaw vs. Harshaw, 136 ALR, 1411, 1413).

The reason underlying the general rule on absolutely privileged communications is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows: "The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow and is practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state, including, it is said, communications made in the discharge of a duty under express authority of law, by or to heads of executive departments of the state, and matters involving military affairs. The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages" (33 Am. Jur., 123-124). It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged (Newel on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp. 388, 391¬392, 407; 53 C.J.S. 165, 167, 173; 33 Am Jur., 142-143, 144-145, 147; Tupas vs. Parreno, L-12545 [April 30, 19591). As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has put it: "For reasons of public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, it appears to be the prevailing rule in the United States that statements made in a pleading in a civil action are absolutely privileged and no action for libel may be founded thereon when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false and malicious such statements may be (33 Am. Jur. 144, 145, Libel and Slander 149; 16 ALR 746, supplemented in 42 ALR 878 and 134 ALR 483." (Hayslip vs. Weliford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42 ALR 2d 820). Hence, the "Petition for bond" of defendant herein is absolutely privileged, and no civil action for libel or slander may arise therefrom, unless the contents of the petition are irrelevant to the subject matter thereof.

The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular appointments of court employees “B” and “C” are protected by Judge “A”s right against self-incrimination enshrined and guaranteed by Article III, Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution , to wit: “ No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”

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In Pascual Jr. vs. Board of Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969: We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us in Cabal v. Kapunan 6 SCRA 1059 (1962). In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation. The argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character (Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511, 1967). In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 378 US 52 (1964), is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." Why it should be thus is not difficult to

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discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens" (Criswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

There is no proof offered by complainant that the protest letter is intended to threaten the Board of being filed with formal charges. A Judge cannot issue threats to the officials of the Supreme Court because they can make a report and a recommendation adversely, with or without any basis against him or her. They can abuse their authority and misuse their powers including the prerogatives of their office against a Judge whom they perceive to be antagonistic to their liking, opinions and policies.

There is no proof offered by complainant that the protest letter is intended to denigrate the actions of Chief Justice and the two (2) Senior Associate Justices constituting disrespect and disregard of authority tantamount to Grave Misconduct and Insubordination.

There is no proof offered by complainant that the protest letter is intended to ascribe ill motives to the Board that degrades the integrity and confidence reposed by the public in it.

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It is not true that the language used in expressing the displeasure against the Board is hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate rather the language used is a reasonable expression of grievances of an oppressed and harassed first level court Judge. The use of the words “void ab initio” and a “big joke” are allowed under our Constitution, there is no proof that these words cast doubts on the integrity of the Board. There is no proof that the words, “"Board is funny, and it made me laugh. I rather laugh than be angry, than feel helpless, than look powerless in this awful and mean situation" cast aspersion on the Board. In fact, one of the members of Board was smiling (who appeared to try to contain her laughter of the contents of my letter questioning the irregular appointment of Clerk of Court) while reading the subject protest letter in front of Judge “A”, proof she was not offended at all of what Judge “A” wrote.

Moreover, the language Judge “A” employed in the questioned protest letters are vague and ambiguous, and this lack of certainty as to their true import and meaning, should be reason that the complaint must be dismissed for failure to meet the quantum of proof required to sanction a Judge, that is, the proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the true semantics of the words in the protest letters of Judge “A” that can be interpreted differently by people coming from all walks in life. The words “void ab initio” and “big joke’ describe the frustration experienced by Judge “A” on the irregular appointment of court employee “C” whose application as Clerk of Court was repeatedly rejected orally and in writing.

With respect to the show cause order requested by complainant against Judge “A”, it was held in Marantan vs. Diokno et al., G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014: For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice (People v. Castelo, 114 Phil. 892, 900 (1962); citing People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265, 1939). . What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case (People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265, 271 1939). The specific rationale for the sub-judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies (Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 403; citing Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez, 238 Phil. 543, 1987). The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid

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in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161, 1957). The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 161, 162, 1957). The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either. "A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the court is, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice" (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 162, 1957). By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents. Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 162, 1957). The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice (Austria v. Masaquel, 127 Phil. 677, 691, 1967). In the present case, such necessity is wanting.” The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

In Heck vs. Gamotin Jr., A.C. No. 5329, March 18, 2014: Secondly, we cannot sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Heck’s unexpected tirade in his presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person, but to Heck’s disrespectful remark against Philippine authorities in general. Any self-respecting government official like the respondent should feel justly affronted by any expression or show of disrespect in his presence, including harsh words like those uttered by Heck.

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Whether or not Heck was justified in making the utterance is of no relevance to us. Lawyers may be expected to maintain their composure and decorum at all times, but they are still human, and their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in unexpected situations that can crack their veneer of self-control. That is how we now view the actuation of the respondent in reacting to Heck’s utterance. The Court will not permit the respondent’s good record to be tarnished by his having promptly reacted to Heck’s remark. Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the respondent’s actuations to be arrogant and overbearing, but it is not fair for us to take the respondent to task in the context of the events and occasions in which the actuations occurred in the absence of a credible showing that his actuations had been impelled by any bad motive, or had amounted to any breach of any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics.

The complainant, showing double standards of justice, did not conduct an investigation and submit a report, evaluation and recommendation on the bad or mean opinion allegedly expressed by members of the Supreme Court against a fellow SC Justice or against the SC itself, stating in its report:

1. Ascribing ill motives to other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s) that degrade the integrity and confidence reposed by the public in it.

4. The language used in expressing the displeasure against the other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s) is hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate.

5. Accusations against other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s) to name a few thereby casting doubts on the integrity of the judiciary as an institution.

6. The other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s) cast aspersion on the judiciary as an institution.

Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Arturo Brion: xxx Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without basis and out of our sense of delicadeza (which we should have), the Court should at least hear and consider both sides before making a ruling that would favor the son of a Member of the Court. xxx If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE ADMINISTERING JUSTICE in the way described in the speeches of many a Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind of hasty and imprudent action that it did in this case. The proper course of action, if the Court indeed honestly wants to achieve this objective in

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the present case, is to require the COMELEC to COMMENT on the petition and to decide matters from that point.

Regina Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013 Dissenting Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio: The Court's ruling today is a double flip-flop: (1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine that upon proclamation of a winning congressional candidate, the HRET acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest relating to the "election, returns and qualifications" of House Members; and (2) it also reverses the well-settled doctrine that any question on the validity of such proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the HRET.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, April 12, 2011, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales: Saying that Cojuangco was not a subordinate or close associate of the Marcoses is "the biggest joke to hit the century" especially with Cojuangco's own personal admission that he left the Philippines with Marcos and family on February 25, 1986 on the Marcoses' way to their exile in the United States following the first EDSA people power revolt. "Clearly, the intimate relationship between Cojuangco and Marcos equates or exceeds that of a family member or cabinet member, since not all of Marcos's relatives or high government ministers went with him in exile on that fateful date. If this will not prove the more than close association between Cojuangco and Marcos, the Court does not know what will."

League of the Cities of the Phils. vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, April 12, 2011, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio: This Court has made history with its repeated flip-flopping in this case.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC – IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO, October 15, 2010, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno: The unfortunate ruling of the majority Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its failure to distinguish between the determination of the objective, factual existence of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the determination of the liability that results from a finding of plagiarism. Specifically, it made “malicious intent”, which heretofore had not been relevant to a finding of plagiarism, an essential element. The majority Decision will thus stand against the overwhelming conventions on what constitutes plagiarism. In doing so, the Decision has created unimaginable problems for Philippine academia, which will from now on have to find a disciplinary response to plagiarism committed by students and researchers on the justification of the majority Decision. It has also undermined the protection of copyrighted work by making available to plagiarists “lack of malicious

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intent” as a defense to a charge of violation of copy or economic rights of the copyright owner committed through lack of attribution. Under Section 184 of R.A. 8293 (“An Act Describing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes”), or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, there is no infringement of copyright in the use of another's work in: (b) the making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and only to the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries: Provided that the source and the name of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned. Because the majority Decision has excused the lack of attribution to the complaining authors in the Vinuya decision to editorial errors and lack of malicious intent to appropriate ─ and that therefore there was no plagiarism ─ lack of intent to infringe copyright in the case of lack of attribution may now also become a defense, rendering the above legal provision meaningless.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, February 8, 2011: Justice Sereno castigates the majority in the Court for lowering the standards for judicial scholarship, negating the educative and moral directional value in the writing and publishing of decisions, bending over backwards to deny the objective existence of gross plagiarism, and condoning dishonesty in the exercise of a function central to the role of the courts. But our courts are in the business, not of “judicial scholarship,” but of deciding fairly and honestly the disputes before them, using precedents and legal literature that, according to American scholars, belong to the public domain. If this is not honest work for a judge, I do not know what is. And Justice Sereno has no right to preach at the expense of the majority about “educative and moral directional value” in writing published articles. For one thing, her standards are obviously for work done in the academe, not for the judge plodding at his desk to perform government work. For another, I note that on occasions she has breached those very standards, lifting from works of others without proper attribution. xxx The ideas were from GATT but the presentation was original Sereno. Down the line, however, without introduction or preamble, she copied verbatim into her work portions from Understanding on Dispute Settlement, without citing this specific source. More, she did not use quotation marks to identify the copied portions. She thus made ordinary readers like me believe that she also crafted those portions. To borrow a word from the civil code, she “co-mingled” the work of others with hers, erasing the identity of the lifted work. Justice Sereno’s explanation is that, since she was drawing from the rules embodied in GATT’s Understanding on Dispute Settlement, she did not have to make attributions to those rules at each turn of her writing. She may be correct if she in fact properly cited those rules the first time she copied from it and, further, indicated a clear intent to do further copying down the line. But she did not. xxx Further, she did not identify the portions she copied verbatim in order to set them apart from her own writing.

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Under the rule that she foists on Justice Del Castillo, quotation marks must be used whenever verbatim quotes are made. This requirement is all the more important since, unlike domestic rules, the rules of GATT are unfamiliar terrain to most readers. xxx Using the severe standards she sets for Justice Del Castillo in Vinuya, i.e., “objective existence of plagiarism,” I am afraid that any explanation of good faith or lack of malicious intent on Justice Sereno’s part in copying without proper attribution from the work of Judge Posner would not be acceptable. Still I can concede that Justice Sereno may not have intended to plagiarize the work of others even if she copied verbatim from them without proper attribution or quotation marks. Her above articles were, taken as whole, essentially hers. I regret, however, that since she wrote them as an academician bound by the high standards that she and the University of the Philippines where she taught espouse, she may have failed, borrowing her own phrase, to set the correct “educative and moral directional value” for the young.

Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006: he Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country. No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people’s sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people. Incantations of “people’s voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or “let the people decide” cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people’s fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises.

‘Midas touch’ not working on SC justiceBy Jerome AningPhilippine Daily Inquirer3:42 am | Sunday, November 20th, 2011

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While the Supreme Court upheld on Friday its temporary restraining order (TRO) on the government’s inclusion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel “Mike” Arroyo in the immigration watch list, the TRO was not really effective yet because one of its conditions was not met. This was the contention advanced by Associate Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno in her dissenting opinion, in which she chided Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez for incorrectly interpreting the high court’s resolution. Marquez is also the acting chief of the tribunal’s Public Information Office (PIO). In her nine-page dissent, copies of which were made available late Friday afternoon, Sereno contended that the TRO issued on Nov. 15 remained ineffective because the Arroyo couple had failed to comply with Condition No. 2—that “the petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common to both of them who will receive subpoena, orders, and other legal processes on their behalf during their absence.” In a press conference on Friday, Marquez announced the high court’s rejection of the executive branch’s appeal to reconsider the issuance of the TRO and said it “remained in full force and effect.”

Sereno, however, disagreed, saying: “Contrary to this interpretation, as stated, it was the understanding of a majority that the TRO is ‘suspended pending compliance’ with our earlier resolution. The operational ineffectivity of the TRO is implied—for it is a basic principle that the failure of petitioners to comply with one of the conditions in the resolution dated Nov. 15, 2011 is a jurisdictional defect that suspends, at the least, the effectivity of the TRO. Therefore, the TRO, until faithful compliance with the terms thereof, is legally ineffective.”

Clerical error

The former first couple were given five days to submit the name of their legal representative. They did so on the same day, Nov. 15, in separate documents granting special power of attorney to Ferdinand Topacio, Mike Arroyo’s lawyer. The couple’s designations were later certified by the Supreme Court’s clerk of court. The certification was done shortly after the copy of the TRO was issued and a few hours before the couple’s scheduled flight to Singapore that immigration officials, on the instruction of Justice Secretary Leila de Lima, thwarted. The couple had also posted a P2-million cash bond, another condition in the TRO. But in her dissenting opinion, Sereno noted a clerical error in the document submitted by Arroyo, where she said she was designating Topacio “to produce summons or receive documentary evidence.” (The same error was also in Mike Arroyo’s submission, but Sereno did not cite this in her dissent). The justice said the clerk made a mistake, “considering the way the TRO was rushed,” in issuing the certification despite noncompliance by the Arroyos with one of the strict conditions imposed by the Court. “Nevertheless, good faith and all, the legal effect of such noncompliance is the same—petitioners cannot make use thereof for failure to comply faithfully with a condition imposed by this Court for its issuance,” she said.

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Voted 6 times

Sereno recalled that the justices voted six times to deliberate on the various petitions on the table during their special session on Friday morning. The first vote was on whether the Nov. 15 resolution granting the TRO would be reconsidered or not. The Nov. 15 vote was upheld 8-5. The issue for the second vote, proposed by one of the justices, was on whether the TRO issued by the clerk of court should be recalled for failure to comply with Condition No. 2. On this matter, Sereno said, the vote was 7–6, finding that there was no compliance with the second condition of the TRO. The seven were Justices Sereno, Antonio Carpio, Roberto Abad, Martin Villarama Jr., Jose Mendoza, Bienvenido Reyes, and Estela Perlas Bernabe. Villarama and Abad were among the eight justices who voted to issue the TRO on Nov. 15 and who again voted to uphold it on Friday. The third vote proceeded from the result of the second vote—whether, considering that the high court found that there was failure to comply with a condition imposed by the earlier resolution, it should explicitly state that the TRO was thereby suspended pending compliance with Condition No. 2. The justices, voting 7-6, decided there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on the TRO of the noncompliance by petitioners with Condition No. 2, Sereno recalled. She explained: “The majority argued that such a clarification is unnecessary, because it is clear that the TRO is conditional, and cannot be made use of until compliance has been done. It was therefore the sense of the majority that, as an offshoot of the winning vote that there was failure by petitioners to comply with Condition No. 2, the TRO is implicitly deemed suspended until there is compliance with such condition. Everyone believed that it would be clear to all that a conditional TRO is what it is, conditional.” The fourth vote was on whether the high court would direct the public respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO and to comply with it. The vote was unanimous. The fifth vote was on whether Justice Secretary Leila de Lima should be ordered to also show cause why she should not be held in contempt for showing disrespect for the tribunal. The vote on this was 9-4. The sixth vote was on whether to reset the Nov. 22 schedule of the oral arguments. This was unanimously denied. In Friday’s resolution by the majority upholding the TRO, the Arroyos were told to “commit to the Court that [they] shall instruct [their] legal representative to amend [their document giving Topacio special power of attorney]: ‘to receive summons or documentary evidence’ and forthwith submit this compliance with the Court.”

‘Be careful’

Thus, Sereno said, Marquez erred when he told reporters that the TRO remained in effect. She admonished Marquez: “The Court Administrator cum Acting Chief of the PIO is hereby advised to be careful not to go beyond his role in such offices, and that he has no authority to interpret any of our judicial issuances, including the present resolution, a function he never had from the beginning.” She also told the clerk of court to be more careful in certifying compliance with the high court’s conditions: “[I]t is hereby clarified

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that it is mandatory for the clerk of court to ensure that there is faithful compliance with all the conditions imposed in our Nov. 15, 2011 resolution, including our second condition, before issuing any certification that the compliance with the TRO has been made, and only then can the TRO become effective.” Contacted for comment, Marquez stood by his pronouncement that the TRO, as agreed by the majority, remained in full force and effect. “Yes,” he replied via text message in answer to the question of whether he stood by what he said despite Sereno’s citation of a clerical error. “As much as we should all respect the dissenting opinion of the good Justice, I announced the majority opinion which prevails and should be complied with. I also appreciate the advice for me to be careful in announcing Court orders and decisions,” he added.

SC justice to court spokesman: Don't misinform public SOPHIA M. DEDACE, GMA News March 9, 2011 4:56pm

It's the Supreme Court spokesman's word against the first-hand accounts of two magistrates. Another Supreme Court justice has accused spokesman Jose Midas Marquez of misinforming the public by saying that the magistrates received copies of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez's petition before voting to suspend a congressional panel's impeachment proceedings against her last September.

In a two-page, strongly-worded press statement, Associate Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno said Marquez's account was not based on first-hand knowledge and that it was only Marquez who contradicted her account and that of Associate Justice Antonio Carpio. Sereno and Carpio had revealed that in the SC's en banc (full court) session last September 14, their colleagues — without having read Gutierrez's petition filed a day earlier — voted to issue a status quo ante order to prevent the House of Representatives' justice panel from hearing the two impeachment complaints against Gutierrez.

The stay order was lifted in February this year.

But Marquez, citing information given to him by Clerk of Court Enriquetta Vidal, said that the justices received copies of the petition before they ruled on it during the Sept. 14 en banc session. Sereno said the "problem" created by Marquez's contradiction of her and Carpio's narration of facts prompted her to issue a press statement. Independent news organization Newsbreak had the first crack on Sereno's statement. "When a Supreme Court official who has nothing to do with the distribution of case documents contradicts... narrations of facts based on personal knowledge made by two sitting justices in their judicial opinions, there is a serious problem. This statement has been necessitated precisely because of that problem. The public must not be misinformed,' said Sereno. Marquez, however, declined to comment on Sereno's statement. "With all due respect and in deference to Justice Sereno, may I be excused from further

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reacting? After all, I have already said everything there is to say regarding the issue," Marquez said in a text message to GMA News Online.

Velasco's synopsis

Sereno also said that even if a one-page synopsis of Gutierrez's petition was provided by Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr. on the morning of Sept. 14 , the Supreme Court justices should have still been given ample time to study Gutierrez's 60-page petition. "The basis of the objection of the justices was that the justices had the right and duty to read the petition in the context of what the petition was purportedly asking for—the issuance of a restraining order against the House of Representatives in the exercise of its power of impeachment," said Sereno. Velasco was supposedly assigned to handle Gutierrez's petition, but he later inhibited himself from the court proceedings because his son, Marinduque Rep. Lord Allan Velasco, is part of the House justice committee.

No undue haste, no cover-up

Last week, Newsbreak reported the alleged haste of SC justices in voting for the issuance of the stay order suspending the House justice panel's impeachment proceedings against the besieged Ombudsman. An SC delivery receipt furnished to Newsbreak would show that five justices received their copies of Gutierrez's petition only on Sept. 15, a day after the en banc session when the status quo ante order was issued. If based on the delivery receipt, it can be concluded that three of the five justices — Associate Justices Presbitero Velasco Jr., Lucas Bersamin, and Jose Perez — voted to issue the stay order without having read the petition. But Marquez had earlier questioned the reliability of the delivery receipt. “It was indicated there that Justice Velasco received a copy of the petition on September 15. But when the petition was filed on September 13, it was immediately raffled and was assigned to Justice Velasco, who was even able to write his synopsis of the petition," said Marquez. — RSJ, GMA News

Corona asks 2 justices to inhibit from impeach case Thursday, February 9, 2012

CHIEF Justice Renato Corona asked Wednesday his estranged friend Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and an alleged Malacañang-friendly magistrate to step aside in the hearing of a petition to stop his impeachment trial at the Senate. Through his lawyers, Corona said Carpio and Associate Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno should not

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join in the deliberations on Thursday afternoon since they have been critical of the Chief Justice. "More importantly, Justices Carpio and Sereno are openly touted as the likely replacements, in the event that CJ Corona is removed from office," the motion for inhibit stated. President Benigno Aquino III, who openly campaigned for Corona’s prosecution, admitted in an interview last December that he is now asking his legal advisers to come up with a list of possible replacements to Corona should he be found guilty of graft and corruption, among other impeachable offenses. Carpio has been on the inside track since he is the most senior member of the 15-man tribunal. Carpio, who was Corona’s fiercest rival to the post as Chief Justice nearly two years ago, was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in October 2001. Sereno, meanwhile, is Aquino’s first appointee in the High Court since assuming power in the middle of 2010. However, Corona said Sereno’s arrival to the High Court "signaled a new period of difficulty and embarrassment" for him because the lady justice "has openly defied and challenged" his authority.

The motion failed to elaborate.

"In this case, the animosity of Justices Carpio and Sereno against CJ Corona has become public knowledge, casting doubt on their ability to render impartial justice,” the motion stated.

Corona dares Aquino: Show banks, psychological records By Tetch TorresINQUIRER.net5:26 pm | Friday, February 17th, 2012

MANILA, Philippines – Chief Justice Renato Corona on Friday challenged President Benigno Aquino III to make public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN), bank and psychological records. “Mayroon po tayong obligasyon na ipakita sa taong bayan na maayos ang ating pag-iisip [We have an obligation to the people to show our state of mind],” Corona said in a statement to media, a day after Aquino raised anew doubts on Corona’s credibility as Chief Justice. Corona said that for the sake of transparency, he has released his own SALN and was prepared to explain the details about his property. “I have disclosed my SALN. I have not hidden it. Its non-publication is based on a two-decades-old ruling in the Supreme Court when I still wasn’t a justice. I will explain my SALN at the proper time, and according to the process of the impeachment proceedings,” Corona said in Filipino. “Perhaps, it would be much better, Mr. President, if you disclose your SALN and explain it to the people. Maybe you should include your bank accounts and psychological records that have been a nagging issue,” Corona said. Aquino’s psychological state came out during the 2010 presidential elections when a document allegedly from the Ateneo De Manila University showed that Aquino underwent psychiatric evaluation in 1996. The document was supposedly signed by Father Carmelo Caluag who assessed that he was suffering from a “major

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depressive disorder due to work-related issues”. Aquino himself denounced the report as a hoax.

Corona: Carpio wants me outBy Shielo Mendoza | Yahoo! Southeast Asia Newsroom – Wed, Mar 7, 2012

Chief Justice Renato Corona on Wednesday accused Associate Justice Antonio Carpio of being part of a plot to oust him so he could take over his position. “Hindi mo maaalis sakin na magduda kasi matagal na niya (Carpio) gusto maging chief justice. Ang alam ko mga partner sa law office niya, sila ang gumagalaw,” Corona said in an interview in GMA7’s "Unang Hirit." Carpio is a founding member of the Villaraza, Cruz Marcelo & Angangco law office, popularly known as the "The Firm." The firm once provided legal services to Arroyo and her family but they later had a falling out. Like Corona, Carpio was appointed to the Supreme Court by former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Corona said he suspects that his impeachment is a part of a “professional demolition job” against him. Amid the trial, the embattled chief justice admitted that he is offended by insults thrown against him and his family. “Sa mga iba’t ibang insulto at panlalait na ibinabato sa amin, kami’y nasasaktan rin. Alam namin na ito’y walang basehan at puro kasinungalingan lamang,” he said. Corona said he just looks at the brighter side of things, noting that if wins the case, it will make the judiciary stronger. “Kapag ako’y naabswelto, mas titibay at mas tatatag ang hudikatura. Hindi madali itong pinagdadaanan namin pero sabi ko, if this is the price I have to pay to fight for the institution I represent and for the country that I love, gagawin ko,” he added. “Papatunayan ko na lahat iyan ay kasinungalingan. (I will win this case), no doubt about it. Wala akong kasalanan,” Corona said.

Corona: Ana Basa’s claims big lies, part of Carpio plotBy Cynthia D. Balana, Marlon Ramos Philippine Daily Inquirer12:47 am I Thursday, March 8th, 2012

Impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona on Wednesday came out firing at his critics, claiming the accusations leveled against him and his family by his wife’s cousin, Ana Basa, were “big lies.” In his first media interview since his impeachment trial in the Senate began on January 16, Corona said the lies were part of a “professional hatchet job” being carried out by the law firm of Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio. The prosecution said it might consider presenting Ana Basa and her aunt, Sister Flory (one of the five original BGEI stockholders), if necessary, in its rebuttal to the defense of

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Corona when the Senate impeachment court resumes trial on March 12. Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas Jr. said the two-part Q & A interview with Ana Basa which detailed how Corona and his wife oppressed other members of the Basa clan, “strikes at the very character of Chief Justice Corona.” (The interview appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 6 and March 7.) Corona said he was just dragged into the ownership dispute over Basa-Guidote Enterprises Inc. (BGEI), a company owned by the family of his wife Cristina, since he was an in-law and his wife’s former lawyer.

Dark side

Tupas said the interview presented the dark side of the Chief Justice that the public did not know—his lack of integrity—as alleged in the impeachment complaint. “It clearly shows Corona’s lack of integrity. It will also shed light on the Basa-Guidote issue. The prosecution will discuss if we will include Ana’s testimony as well as Sister Flory’s in rebuttal if necessary,” Tupas said. In the two-part Q & A, Ana Basa said Cristina seized control of the rental income from a company property in Manila and of the P34-million proceeds from the sale of the property to the city government although she was only entitled to a 10-percent share of BGEI.

Armed men

Ana also claimed that the Corona couple sent armed men to harass her parents at home and make phone calls in the middle of the night after her father, Jose Ma. Basa III, filed a criminal case against Cristina for allegedly misappropriating rentals due BGEI. Corona allegedly put a gun to the head of the family caretaker and threatened to kill the latter, she said. Ana, who is in casino business in Las Vegas, Nevada, is in the country to visit her aunt Flory, who just turned 90.

Hacienda Luisita

The Chief Justice also insisted that the impeachment complaint filed against him by the President’s allies in the House of Representatives was linked to the high court’s decision to dismantle the 4,915-hectare hacienda. He disclosed that the Cojuangco-owned HLI wanted a P10-billion compensation from the government before the agricultural estate could be distributed to the 6,296 registered farmworker-beneficiaries. “I was the one who blocked that and for them to get that amount, they would have to ... remove me. That’s the truth. That’s the root cause of this impeachment,” he said.

“If you will ask me now why they want me out, I think it’s because I blocked that demand for a P10-billion compensation for Hacienda Luisita.” “I owe it to the people to explain that this is a big lie,” Corona said in an interview with Arnold Clavio, host of the GMA 7 morning show “Unang Hirit.” “I’m not directly involved in this problem. This feud among the members of my wife’s family started a long time ago. It’s about 30 years in the running,” he said in a mix of English and Filipino. “That Ana Basa and (her parents)

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were not stockholders of the corporation. But they are still insisting that they [still] are (even if) they already got their share,” the Chief Justice said. Corona vehemently denied that he put a gun to the head of a BGEI watchman and threatened to kill him, saying he was not known to be a hot-headed person. [The caretaker, Pedro Aguilon, had issued an affidavit about the gun-poking incident that took place on Jan. 2, 1997.] “That incident did not happen. Those who know me personally for years would tell you that I’m not that kind of person,” Corona said in a separate radio interview with dzBB anchor Mike Enriquez.

‘Media hopping’

After keeping mum on the issues raised against him by the prosecution panel in his impeachment trial, Corona said he decided to speak with the media after meeting with his defense lawyers on Tuesday. As a member of the Corona camp said the Chief Justice’s visit to GMA 7 on Wednesday was a start of his “media hopping” to “friendly” media companies. “You cannot blame the Chief Justice because he had been wanting to speak up since Day One. He’s just trying to defend himself and his family,” the source, who asked not to be named, told the Inquirer. Reiterating his claim of innocence, Corona said he was ready to explain his wealth and counter the allegations that he had amassed ill-gotten wealth. “I will give an adequate explanation for each centavo that came in and went out,” he said. Corona also took exception to what he described as “black propaganda” intended to portray him as a crooked public official who used his position to enrich himself and his family. The Chief Justice insisted that he was able to acquire some of his properties from the money he earned as “a top executive in the private sector.” “Those who are out to destroy me had been spreading those stories. But that’s one thing that I wanted to explain since the beginning,” he said. “They are trying to picture me as if I had nothing when I entered government. That’s not true because I was a top executive in the private sector for half of my entire career. So, I was able to save. And just like my wife, I also didn’t come from an ordinary family.”

Coronas hurting

While maintaining a fighting stance, Corona acknowledged that he and his family were hurt by the allegations hurled against them. “We’re just humans. We’ve been receiving all kinds of insults. There were also name-calling. We’re all hurt by these attacks. Who wouldn’t be? These are all baseless and lies,” he said. Corona said the attacks were part of a demolition job. “It’s very obvious that a professional group has been doing this to us.” When Clavio asked him about his relationship with Carpio, Corona said it was “OK” and that he would occasionally speak with him during the deliberations of the Supreme Court en banc. But when the host asked him if he thought Carpio could be responsible for the purported demolition job against him, Corona smiled and said: “What do you want to hear? We cannot ignore that because he had also been aspiring to be a

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Chief Justice.” “What I know is that his partners in his law office are the ones making the moves.” Asked if Carpio’s law partners were behind the attacks against him, Corona said: “Siguro (Maybe).”

Justices Carpio, Corona snub each other at new lawyers' oath-takingBy: InterAksyon.com March 21, 2012 5:37 PM

MANILA, Philippines – No, the airconditioning at the PICC was not switched to super cold. The chill at Wednesday’s oath-taking of new lawyers was palpable in that space between two justices of the Supreme Court, who have publicly been feuding since the historic trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona started. Corona and his nemesis, Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, were literally not seeing eye to eye. They obviously avoided any eye contact, or even making the slightest body language that might put one in the other’s line of sight, even though they stood beside each other. As they witnessed the oath-taking of new lawyers led by Raoul Angelo Atadero and Luz Danielle Bolong of Ateneo, Justices Corona and Carpio - accused by the former of intriguing against him because he is impatient to get the post of CJ - remained grim-faced in their black robes. In those same moments, just a few kilometers away, lawyers for Chief Justice Corona were defending him before senator-judges at his impeachment trial, in a case he openly accuses Carpio of either helping hatch or benefiting from. Appropriately enough, the guest speaker for the PICC oath-taking, Supreme Court Associate Justice Arturo Brion, delivered a message challenging the new lawyers to always be faithful to the Rule of Law.

Carpio declines Sereno post offerBy Edu Punay (The Philippine Star) | Updated October 28, 2012 - 12:00am

MANILA, Philippines - Is there still animosity between Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno and her colleagues in the Supreme Court (SC)? A highly placed source thinks so, citing as proof Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio’s turning down Sereno’s offer for him to head the high court’s computerization program. And it was not just a simple rejection, the insider told The STAR. Sereno, whose appointment meant a second and probably final bypass to Carpio’s bid to become SC chief, made the offer in a personal note thanking the latter for substituting for her in an event. In his reply note, Carpio advised the Chief Justice to offer the post to “the junior justices so they can work their way up.” “It’s not even a subtle attack. It was very obvious,” the source said.

SC justice De Castro questions Sereno order reopening RCAO By Tetch Torres

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INQUIRER.net5:29 pm | Wednesday, December 5th, 2012

MANILA, Philippines—The November 27 resolution allowing the reopening of the Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) issued by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno does not reflect the objections raised by the high court justices and should be recalled or amended, a senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court said in a memorandum addressed to Sereno. “I regret that I have to write this Memorandum in connection with Resolution in A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC supposedly adopted by the Court en banc on Nov. 27, 2012...With due respect to the Chief Justice, to my recollection, the Resolution does not reflect the Court’s deliberation and the consensus of the Justices opposing the reopening of RCAO-7,” Senior Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo de Castro said. In her three-page memorandum dated Dec. 3, 2012, De Castro took note of the objections raised by the high court justices, which include:• The Chief Justice has no authority to create the Judiciary Decentralized Office which, under the Administrative Order, shall take full responsibility over the RCAO in Region 7, which was reopened without court en banc approval on Nov. 27, 2012;

• The AO of the Chief Justice cannot deprive the high court of its constitutional duty to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of its statutory duty under

Presidential Decree 828 to assist the Supreme Court in the exercise of said power of administrative supervision;

• An official outside OCA was designated to take charge of RCAO answerable only the Chief Justice without any guideline set by the Court en banc;

• The RCAO cannot be reopened without a pilot study. The court took note that when it was launched in 2008, it resulted in protest among judges and court personnel;

• There has to be a study showing the scope of powers of the OCA, which will be transferred to RCAO;

• The head of the Project Management Office (Judge Geraldine Faith Econg) cannot be in charge of RCAO since it is not part of her duty. At best, the high court justices said she can participate in a study to determine whether to reopen RCAO or not;

• The high court is constitutionally vested with administrative supervision of all courts and has the authority to decide whether to reopen RCAO or not;

“The resolution dated Nov. 27, 2012, ratifying the action of the Chief Justice reviving RCAO...and appointing the PMO head as officer-in-charge must be recalled or amended to faithfully reflect the deliberation of the Court en banc, particularly the objections raised against said AO,” De Castro said. The high court was supposed to discuss the Nov. 27 resolution on Dec. 4 during its full court deliberation but Sereno called in sick and designated Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio as acting chief

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justice to act on her stead until she got back to work. Sereno, in a separate letter to the high court, through her Judicial Staff head lawyer Ma. Teresa B. Sibulo assured that she will attend next week’s deliberation to discuss the Nov. 27 resolution before she flies to the US Tuesday evening. Through Administrative Order No. 16-2008, RCAO was formally organized in 2008 by designating the key officials to run the pilot RCAO in the 7th Judicial Region (Bohol, Cebu, and Negros Oriental). The RCAO project aims to decentralize the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator to facilitate judicial operations in major regions of the country. The pilot testing failed and the plan was eventually shelved. Dec. 11 will be the last full court session of the Supreme Court.

Sereno-De Castro rift over party-list TRO continuesGMA News Online – Thu, Jun 6, 2013

After accusing Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno of omitting a recommendation she made in the case of a party-list group, Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro once again wrote Sereno this time accusing her of "inaction." De Castro, in her letter, belied Sereno's claim that she did not include a draft temporary restraining order (TRO) when she handed the case of the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens of the Philippines party-list to Sereno's office for approval. As standard practice in the Supreme Court, a member-in-charge recommending the issuance of a TRO should include a draft TRO to the Office of the Chief Justice when submitting it for approval. Sereno earlier wrote De Castro a letter explaining that she had to write her own TRO on the case because De Castro, who handles the case, failed to include a draft TRO when the case was submitted for approval. She claimed all she got from De Castro was a synopsis of the case. It was Sereno's TRO that was made public the following day by SC Public Information Chief Theodore Te, in which further party-list proclamation was being stopped. De Castro, in a response letter to Sereno, insisted that a draft TRO had been submitted to her office. "I wish to correct a misimpression in your letters... that on May 28, 2013 at 8:05 a.m. what your office received from me was only the synopsis of the above-mentioned cases," De Castro told Sereno in a two-page letter dated June 5, a copy of which was obtained by reporters. Reached for comment, Te said he was not aware of such exchanges between Sereno and De Castro.

Deleted recommendation?

De Castro had earlier contested Sereno's TRO, saying the chief magistrate omitted her recommendation to stop the disqualification of Senior Citizens party-list only and not the party-list proclamation itself. In her latest letter to Sereno, De Castro said from May 27 to 28, she wrote Sereno three different letters with attachments: a synopsis of the case, a draft of her recommended TRO, and the rollos for the case. De Castro said at 8:05 a.m. on May 27, she sent Sereno a letter about the case that included the three attachments. The next day, after learning from Clerk of Court Enriqueta Vidal that the

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party-list group had filed "extremely urgent motions to reiterate the issuance of TRO and and/or status quo ante order," De Castro sent Sereno a revised synopsis and a second version of a draft TRO. De Castro said the second draft TRO included a "Whereas" clause narrating the new urgent motions filed. She said "the substace of my recommended draft TRO remained the same." After submitting the second set of documents, De Castro was once again informed by the Office of the Clerk of Court that the Senior Citizens party-list again filed a supplemental petition to support its original petition seeking to stop its disqualification by the Commission on Elections.

Third letter

"Again, after verifying that you still had not acted on my recommendation, I sent your office at 1:30 p.m. the third version of my draft TRO this time modifying the 'Whereas' clauses to include the filing of the supplemental petition," De Castro said. De Castro stressed that the substance of her recommendation remained unchanged in the third TRO version. De Castro sent photocopies of the set of documents, all with a "Received" stamp from Sereno's office and bearing the date and time they were delivered. "I trust this will enlighten you on the real circumstances that occurred on May 28, 2013 while you were out of your office," she wrote Sereno. In a full court session on Wednesday, the magistrates ruled on the matter and decided to issue a status quo ante order against Comelec's resolution disqualifying the Senior Citizens party-list. The first time De Castro wrote Sereno a letter to complain about one of the latter's orders was in December last year, when De Castro accused the chief justice of ordering the reopening of a judicial office in the Visayas and made it appear it had the go-signal of the full court when it did not. — KBK, GMA News

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Do the above- quoted Supreme Court text of the Decisions and media news merit administrative sanctions? The answer is in the negative unless the concerned parties will file administrative or criminal charges against those who are responsible for publishing offensive opinion in the media that must be proven beyond reasonable when the charges are made against a Judge.

Citizens of a democratic country have constitutionally protected right to free speech as held by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bustos, In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.

The values served by the protection of Free Speech are:

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1. The Discovery of Truth - This value was first suggested by Milton, who first suggested that when truth and falsehood are allowed to freely grapple, truth will win out.

2. Facilitating Participation by Citizens in Political Decision-Making - It has been suggested that citizens will not make wise and informed choices in elections if candidates and proponents of certain policies are restricted in their ability to communicate positions.

3. Creating a More Adaptable and Stable Community (The "Safety Valve" Function) - It has been suggested that a society in which angry and alienated citizens are allowed to speak their mind--"vent"--will be more stable, as people will be less likely to resort to violence. It has also been pointed out that allowing the alienated and discontented to speak freely enables government to better monitor potentially dangerous groups who would otherwise act more clandestinely.

4. Assuring Individual Self-Fulfillment - Free speech enables individuals to

express themselves, create and identify--and, in the process perhaps, find kindred spirits. Freedom of speech thus becomes an aspect of human dignity.

5. Checking Abuse of Governmental Power - As Watergate, Irangate, Clintongate (and all the other "gates") demonstrate, freedom of the press enables citizens to learn about abuses of power--and then do something about the abuse at the ballot box, if they feel so moved.

6. Promoting Tolerance - It has been argued that freedom of speech, especially through our practice of extending protection to speech that we find hateful or personally upsetting, teaches us to become more tolerant in other aspects of life¬-and that a more tolerant society is a better society.

7. Creating a More Robust and Interesting Community - A community in which free speech is valued and protected is likely to be a more energized, creative society as its citizens actively fulfill themselves in many diverse and interesting ways ( Exploring Constitutional Law by Doug Linder, 2014).

Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed (BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONUNCIATIONS, 6th ed.).

The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer (Porter v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Columbia, 246 S.C. 370, 146 S.E.2d 620, 622).

Willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,

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lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge (Realda vs. Mirasol Jr., G.R. No. 192190, April 25, 2012).

The elements of Insubordination are not present in the protest letter on the irregular appointments of court employees “B” and “C”. There is no proof presented by complainant that insubordination was committed pertaining to the protest letter on the irregular appointments of court employees “B” and “C”.

Complainant should be reminded: Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence (General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010). “The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.” Considering that complainant has failed to substantiate her allegations, failing even to attest to her claims before the investigator appointed by this Court, elementary justice dictates respondent’s exoneration of the charge (Alegria vs. Judge Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, April 4, 2007). In Alcuizar vs. Judge Carpio, A.M.-RTJ-07-2068, August 7, 2007: In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on the complainant (Susa v. Pena, A.M. No. P-03-1740, September 17, 2003, 411 SCRA 182).

While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt (Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428, citing In Re Impeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212 (1922). To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 27. Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.

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