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WP7 Final Draft Report

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WP 7

DELIVERABLES NR 7.1a / 7.1b

CONFIDENTIAL

Contract nr HPSE-CT-2002-00121

Acronym PSYCONES

Title:

WP7: Exploring national and sector differences and similarities

Final Draft

Project coordinator: Isaksson, Kerstin, National Institute for Working Life, Sweden

Reference period: From (T22 to T26)

Date of issue of this report:

Partners responsible: The Netherlands (Tilburg University)

Belgium (Gent University)

Partners involved: Sweden (National Institute of Working Life)

Belgium (Leuven University) Spain (University of Valencia)

Israel (Bar Ilan University) UK (King’s College)

Germany (University of Leipzig)


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction................................................................................................................ 3

2. Country and sector background............................................................................... 4

2.1 Country level ............................................................................................................ 4

2.2 Sector level............................................................................................................... 8

2.3 Summary.................................................................................................................. 9

3. Employer level explorations (7.1a) ..........................................................................10

3.1 Variance explained by levels ...................................................................................11

3.2 Similarities and differences across countries ...........................................................14

3.3 Similarities and differences across sectors ..............................................................18

3.4 Interaction terms......................................................................................................21

3.5 Summary.................................................................................................................29

4. Employee level explorations (7.1b) .........................................................................30

4.1 Variance explained by the levels .............................................................................31

4.2 Similarities and differences across countries ...........................................................35

4.3 Similarities and differences across sectors ..............................................................38

4.4 Interaction terms......................................................................................................41

4.5 Summary.................................................................................................................54

References........................................................................................................................55

APPENDIX 1.....................................................................................................................56

APPENDIX 2.....................................................................................................................57

APPENDIX 3.....................................................................................................................59


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1. Introduction After the analysis of the single-level data in WP5 and WP6, the current WP7 is designed to analyse cross-level relations. In the PSYCONES project, data is gathered on three levels; the employee, the organization, and the country (figure 1). WP1 pointed to varying percentages of temporary employment across Europe. WP4 and explorations such as Rousseau and Schalk (2000), Thomas, Au and Ravlin (2003) stressed the relevance of a cross-country approach. Little is known about the effect of the organizational level. The general aim of WP7 is to explore the influence of the country and sector level on the employer and employee data. This report has three specific objectives:

1. Provide a summary description of macro-level differences between PSYCONES countries for tentative interpretation of similarities and differences found in deliverable 7.1a and 7.1b.

2. Analysis of similarities and differences between countries and sectors with respect to

the relationship between the psychological contract and organisational outcome variables. Deliverable 7:1a is based on the employer data.

3. Analysis of similarities and differences between countries and sectors with respect to

the relationship between the formal contract, the psychological contract and other mediating variables, and outcome variables. Deliverable 7:1b is based on the employee data.

The first objective is reached by short descriptions on the legal, economic, social, cultural, and labour market situations of countries and sectors based on WP1 and WP4. The second and third objective are reached by statistical analysis of empirical employer and employee data, including all intervening and dependent variables.

Country/sector level

Organisation level

Employee level

Figure 1 The levels in the PSYCONES project


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2. Country and sector background

2.1 Country level As background for the exploration and interpretation of similarities and differences concerning the psychological contract between the PSYCONES countries, we describe the country contexts for the period during which the data-collection took place (2003-2004). Descriptive information about the samples taken in the PSYCONES countries we refer to the WP5/6 reports. In an earlier phase of the project, we identified six core societal dimensions that might affect the psychological contract and provided quantitative indicators for each dimension (PSYCONES, 2004). Identification was done through literature study and structured interviews with experts. Quantification was done through consultation of international census databases and of earlier empirical research findings as well as through web-based experts’ surveys. Indicators for the societal dimensions were updated to reference years as close as possible to the data-collection. Appendix 1 provides the six identified societal dimensions and their indicators with source and reference year. The identified societal dimensions arise from a historical/cultural background (such as colonisation, evolution of production system, religious diversity) and probably operate interdependently. “Laws and regulations” include legal facilitators and constraints that shape the conditions for both the formal employment contract and the psychological contract. Firstly, laws and regulations define the zone of negotiability, the bargaining space for employer and employee. A narrow zone of negotiability may constrain the width of the psychological contract’s content. Secondly, sanctions for violation incorporated in laws and regulations may relate to fulfilment or breach of the psychological contract. Logically, numerous sanctions for violations may inhibit breach. Thirdly, laws and regulations concern the balance between social well-being in a welfare economy and self-help in a market economy. Box plots of the four indicators reveal that the UK is an outlier with a very wide zone of negotiability and very few sanctions for violations, while Israel is an outlier with a very low score for welfare state. “Industrial relations system (IRS)” is “the system by which workplace activities are regulated, the arrangement by which the owners, managers and staff of organizations come together to engage in productive activity. It concerns setting standards and promoting consensus. It is also about the management of conflict” (Pettinger, 2000, p.1). Since the IRS constructs employer-employee exchanges on various levels (societal, industry, organizational, and workplace), it may affect the psychological contract on the individual level as well. The power of the unions in the IRS is reflected by trade union density. The collective bargaining coverage determines bargaining boundaries in the psychological contract. Box plots of the two indicators show no outliers. However, when the countries are projected in a two-dimensional space by their trade union density and collective bargaining coverage (see Figure 1), the positions of the UK, Spain, Sweden and Belgium are in different ways, distinctive.


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Figure 2 The relation between collective bargaining coverage and trade union density

Collective bargaining

110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30

Trad

e un

ion

dens

ity

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

UK

Sweden

Spain

Netherlands

Israel

Germany

Belgium

“Labour market and economic system” refers to the exchange of labour supply and demand within the broader economic system. The degree of welfare in a society, as an outcome of the economic system, may influence the psychological contract in its content, its fulfilment or breach, and its state. The current and anticipated labour market bears heavily on employment contracts and may affect the promises made and kept in the psychological contract. Plots of the five indicators only show outliers for part-time employment, namely the Netherlands has a very high rate while Spain has a very low rate.

“Educational system” is defined as the provision of education, development and training of children, youths and adults in society. The relationship of the educational system and the psychological contract is threefold. Firstly, the educational system constrains or facilitates the firms’ ability to obtain employees with the skills they need. Perhaps promises are better kept for employees that are scarce. Secondly, the educational system constrains the individual’s market power and as such his/her power in negotiating the content of psychological contract. Thirdly, the educational system establishes school-to-work pipelines and prepares for new employment and opportunities to engage in psychological contracts. Plots show one outlier, Israel, with very high percentage of educational expenditure. “Family orientation” refers to family structure and family ties. It includes a special focus on gender issues such as female employment and societal attitude towards working mothers. Where there are close family ties, reflected for example in a large family, single-parent household, and dual-earners household, employees may seek to negotiate psychological contracts that satisfy the family needs. Although we assume collective responsibility of society, employers, unions, and families for family-responsive initiatives, it is clear that individual informal arrangement between employee and employer (such as the psychological contract) can prevent and/or reduce work-family conflicts. Depending on the societal attitude towards their working, mothers may be under varying degrees of pressure to bargain their psychological contracts. Box plots of six indicators reveal several outliers.(i.e., fertility rate,


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divorces, family ties, and attitude towards working mothers). The fertility rate is very high in Israel, while Spain is an outlier with a very low fertility rate. According to MOCHO (2003, p.149) “the decline in fertility and the growth in women’s labour market participation in most OECD countries, has been one of the most important economic and demographic events of the last decades”. The correlation between fertility and female participation became positive and weaker over the years. In PSYCONES this correlation is .63 (p=.13) (see Figure 2). Figure 3 Relation between fertility rate and female employment rate

Female employment rate

80 70 60 50 40

Fert

ility

rate

2,8

2,6

2,4

2,2

2,0

1,8

1,6

1,4

1,2

UK Sweden

Spain

Netherlands

Israel

Germany

Belgium

MOCHO (2003, p.165) concluded “the negative correlation between co-residence and fertility suggests that the stronger the traditional family ties, the lower the fertility rate”. The PSYCONES web based experts’ judgement survey provides data on the strength of family ties. The correlation between the indicators “fertility rate” and “strength of family ties” is indeed negative (r=-.23, p=.63, N=7). Especially, Spain has the lowest fertility rate and the strongest family ties (both outliers). Spain is also an outlier with very low divorce rate. The UK has a very low score on strength of family ties. Finally, Sweden is an outlier with a very positive attitude towards working mothers. According to Schwartz (1999, p. 25) “cultural values” are “implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society”. In relation to the psychological contract, cultural values can constrain one’s ability to enter into agreements in the first place (Rousseau & Schalk, 2000c, Schalk & Rousseau, 2001). Secondly, since culture is likely to shape perceptions of obligations, cultural values can influence the kinds of exchanges that are negotiable in the content of the psychological contract. Thirdly, since culture is likely to shape what constitutes breach, cultural values regarding the meaning of “promises kept” can affect the fulfilment or breach of the psychological contract. Fourthly, the state of the psychological contract can be determined by cultural values such as fairness and trust. Box plots of the seven indicators show that Israel is an outlier for three cultural values (low on Harmony, high on Embeddedness, and low on Egalitarianism) and Spain is an outlier


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for Egalitarianism with a high score. When looking at Schwartz’ cultural map of the world (Schwartz, 1994a), Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden are in the “West Europe” region of values with high importance of egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy. “These are cultures in which individuals are viewed as autonomous but subject to legitimate expectations to concern themselves voluntarily with the welfare of their fellow citizens” (Schwartz, 1994b, p. 111). In these countries, values such as curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity, equality, freedom, helpfulness, honesty, loyalty, responsibility, and social justice, are important (Schwartz, 1994b, 1999). Israel and the United Kingdom are in the “English-speaking” region of values with high importance regarding affective autonomy and mastery. “These are entrepreneurial cultures in which mastering and controlling the environment are central goals” (Schwartz, 1994b, p. 111). In these countries, values such as pleasure, enjoying and exciting life, varied life, ambition, choosing own goals, competence, daring, independence and success, are important (Schwartz, 1994b, 1999). All PSYCONES countries fall in these two adjacent regions of values and are thus rather similar in their scores on the seven cultural values dimensions.


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2.2 Sector level In the PSYCONES study, three sectors were selected for their variance in skill level: manufacturing (low skilled), Retail or service (medium skilled), and Education (high skilled). The rationale behind the choice for these levels relates to possible differences regarding employee well-being issues and regarding the expectations workers have towards the (hiring) organisation. Table 1 displays the number of organisations per sector (between brackets) followed by the number of respondents across these organisations.

Table 1 Samples according to sectors

Sweden Germany Netherlands Belgium UK Spain Israel Manufacturing (7) 259 (9) 215 (14) 246 (6) 211 (4) 389 (15) 385 (7) 382 Retail or Service (11) 179 (8) 187 (12) 267 (8) 217 (6) 140 (9) 264 (9) 229 Education (9) 292 (11) 226 (12) 290 (8) 211 (7) 114 (20) 293 (10) 349

Below is the standardization of each sector as used in the PSYCONES sampling procedures:

1. Manufacturing: For the manufacturing sector, the main focus was directed towards

manufacturing companies producing products for the consumer markets. Business-to-business manufacturers were not acquired. Hence, the focus was on organisations such as food manufacturers, computer manufacturers, etc. This sector was included to sample for lower-skilled workers.

2. Retail or Service: This sector includes organisations in the retail sector such as shops

as well as organisations giving service to customers (e.g., insurance companies). The key criterion was that these organisations should sell products to consumers. This sector was included to sample medium-skilled workers, such as salesmen, but also back-office workers.

3. Education: The educational sector was used to sample for high-skilled workers. This

sample includes primarily teachers or lecturers from several types of educational institutions. Grammar schools and High schools were included, but also colleges and universities.


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2.3 Summary There are differences between the PSYCONES countries for 12 of the 27 societal indicators across the six dimensions. No outliers are found for the dimension IRS. Tentative interpretation of differences concerning the psychological contract resulting from statistical analysis at the organizational and individual level in terms of societal indicators, suggests that:

1. Belgium and Germany are very similar to the other PSYCONES countries, since no outliers appear for these two countries.

2. Most distinctive is Israel with six outliers across four dimensions. This is an interesting

finding because Israel was included especially to compare with EU countries. Israel has exceptionally scores on welfare state (low), educational expenditure (high), fertility rate (high), harmony (low), embeddedness (high), and egalitarianism (low).

3. Compared to other PSYCONES countries, the Netherlands had a high percentage of

part-time work.

4. Spain has exceptional scores on part-time work (low), fertility rate (low), divorces (low), strength of family ties (high), and egalitarianism (high).

5. In comparison with the other PSYCONES countries, Sweden has a very favourable

attitude towards working mothers.

6. The UK had exceptional scores for the zone of negotiability (large), sanctions for violations (low), and family ties (low).

For more explicit data on these differences we refer to the WP4 report. Additional information regarding temporary employment in the PSYCONES countries can be found in the WP1 report.


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3. Employer level explorations (7.1a) In reporting a summary of similarities and differences between countries and sectors based on the employer data, we undertake the following steps:

a) An overview of the similarities and differences between countries/sectors on the intervening/dependent variables in the employer-model to estimate the explained variance by the levels in the PSYCONES model (organization, sector, and country). We address the direct influence of country and sector on the intervening/dependent variables, and compare the adjusted means between countries and sectors.

b) Control for effects of individual factors, independent variables, and intervening variables. An analysis of the similarities and differences between countries/sectors on the dependent variables in the employer-model. We use the SPSS module Mixed-models. The independent or intervening variable is used as a covariate, while country/sector is used as a factor. Main effects are calculated, as well as combined effects between the factor and the covariates. The latter are explored using product terms, incorporating the interaction effects between country/sector variables and the intervening/independent variables.

c) An exploration of the similarities and differences between countries/sectors, and looking for reasons why certain countries/sectors are different from others. The input from WP4 outlined in the previous section will be used as far as countries are concerned.


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3.1 Variance explained by levels

Our study is a multilevel study, encompassing the individual and organizational level, as well as the sector level, and country level. We start our analyses with an overview of the variance that can be explained by the different levels. That gives a first idea about the relative importance of the different levels. It provides an indication of whether well-being and health of employees are mainly determined by individual differences, or characteristics of organizations, sectors, or countries. The results of the statistical analyses that will be reported are based on analyses of residuals. The SPSS procedure ‘mixed models’ was used. For each dependent variable the total uncontrolled residual can be calculated. This is the total residual variance (column 1). When the control variables were entered (those that were used in WP5 an WP6 as control variables on the individual and organizational level), the residual value is lower because the control variables explain (some) variance in the dependent variable. The residual value controlling for control variables can be found in column 2. This residual value after controlling for the control variables is used as a standard to evaluate the relative contribution of the individual, organizational, sector and country level, which add up to 100%. Column 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the following tables represent the residual values of respectively the individual, organization, sector, and country level, and the percentage of variance explained on that level. Note that the figures only refer to variance explained by levels, and not to variance explained by specific variables on that level. If the figure for, for example, the organizational level is 5%, this means that a maximum 5% of the variance can be explained by organizational characteristics. The technical procedure we used for the calculations is the following: In SPSS ‘mixed models’ we calculated

a) the residual for a dependent variable (column 1) b) included organizational characteristics that were used in WP5 or WP6 as covariates

and calculated the residual value (set as standard for evaluating the contributions of the different levels to 100%). Covariates used are: number of employees, number of permanent employees, organizational form (public/private), organizational form (independency), number of employees past three years, number of non-permanents past three years, prospects concerning workforce, influence on employment contracts, influence on HR practices, influence on working conditions, and vacancies (column 2)

c) included ORGANIZATION as a random factor. d) included respectively SECTOR, and SECTOR and COUNTRY as fixed-factors, and

calculated the residuals of the main effects of all the factors and covariates. The percentage of explained variance of each level is calculated by looking at the residual of the controlled (column 2) model. When SECTOR is included, it explains some of the variance in the dependent variable. When both SECTOR and COUNTRY are included these levels explain variance. The percentages in the tables are calculated by dividing the residual of a certain level by the total residual of the model that was tested. In the following tables, the first column (no control) shows the residual of the empty model. The second column (controlled) displays what is left of the residual after controlling for the control variables. The percentage in the column indicate how much variance is NOT explained by the control variables. The columns ‘organization’, ‘sector’, and ‘country’ include the variances explained by these levels, compared to the column two data.


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Table 2 Variances explained in employer level variables

N No

control Controlled

(100%) Organization Sector Country

Percentage temporary 194 0,067 92% 0,062 0,055 90% 0,003 6% 0,003 5%

Prospect concerning workforce 193 0,487 84% 0,408 0,360 88% 0,007 2% 0,041 10%

Vacancies 191 0,706 92% 0,652 0,595 91% 0,009 1% 0,048 7%

Percentage Union members 147 1078,69 69% 740,43 375,12 51% 36,78 5% 328,52 44%

Union influence: contracts 191 1,249 96% 1,201 1,050 87% 0,086 7% 0,065 5%

Union influence: Hr Practices 191 1,150 89% 1,026 0,752 73% 0,039 4% 0,236 23%

Union influences: Working con. 191 1,171 94% 1,099 0,893 81% 0,064 6% 0,142 13%

Content Employers Obl. perm 188 11,335 87% 9,834 8,767 89% 0,139 1% 0,927 9%

Content Employers Obl non-perm 186 13,432 83% 11,176 9,673 87% 0,190 2% 1,314 12%

Delivery Deal Employers Perm 187 0,302 80% 0,241 0,211 88% 0,004 2% 0,026 11%

Delivery Deal Employers non-perm 184 0,292 78% 0,227 0,200 88% 0,002 1% 0,025 11%

Content Employees Obl. Perm 202 27,146 59% 15,960 13,497 85% 0,118 1% 2,345 15%

Content Employees Obl. Non-Perm 202 29,856 64% 18,986 15,900 84% 0,056 0% 3,030 16%

Delivery Deal Employees Perm 183 0,319 83% 0,266 0,228 86% 0,002 1% 0,036 14%

Delivery Deal Employees Non-Perm 180 0,338 79% 0,268 0,231 86% 0,005 2% 0,032 12%

HR-Practices Permanents 202 0,941 100% 0,938 0,834 89% 0,050 5% 0,055 6%

HR-Practices all employees 202 1,886 76% 1,436 1,375 96% 0,023 2% 0,038 3%

HR-Practices non-permanents 202 4,042 93% 3,759 3,510 93% 0,106 3% 0,143 4%

Equal treatment 194 0,470 92% 0,434 0,402 93% 0,005 1% 0,026 6%

Training permanents 178 1074,90 94% 1014,60 841,92 83% 0,128 0% 172,54 17%

Training non-permanents 168 1381,49 94% 1301,61 1018,57 78% 15,84 1% 267,19 21%

Feedback Permanent 190 1648,87 79% 1302,82 1074,85 83% 136,69 10% 91,27 7%

Feedback non-permanents 185 1902,71 87% 1647,54 1467,46 89% 86,05 5% 94,02 6%

Benefits Permanents 192 1511,47 91% 1375,60 1189,46 86% 120,60 9% 65,52 5%

Benefits non-permanents 187 1224,85 95% 1159,09 1058,90 91% 19,14 2% 81,05 7%

Satisfaction non-permanents 188 0,809 93% 0,753 0,664 88% 0,028 4% 0,061 8%

Satisfaction permanents 189 0,847 91% 0,774 0,729 94% 0,031 4% 0,013 2%

Quit permanent 158 149,337 80% 120,181 88,616 74% 6,809 6% 24,756 21%

Quit non-permanent 154 540,05 86% 464,15 347,07 75% 5,670 1% 111,41 24%

Dismissal permanent 158 21,886 83% 18,141 15,779 87% 1,000 6% 1,362 8%

Dismissal non-permanent 193 2530,19 89% 2241,43 2179,67 97% 19,87 1% 41,88 2%

Sick leave permanent 139 71,314 94% 66,798 58,280 87% 0,278 0% 8,241 12%

Sick leave non-permanent 121 98,799 97% 95,905 89,121 93% 0,453 0% 6,330 7%

Accidents permanent 154 381,313 70% 267,863 194,087 72% 24,791 9% 48,985 18%

Accidents non-permanent 151 18,081 85% 15,335 12,308 80% 0,452 3% 2,575 17%


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The results show that, when the total explained variance is put to 100%, a considerable part of the variance is explained by the ORGANIZATION (ranging from 51% through 97%), some part by the COUNTRY level (up to 44%), and a minor part by SECTOR (maximum 10% for feedback to permanent workers). Most country dependent are the percentage of union members, the influence of unions on HR practices and quit non-permanent. Finally, the effect of country on HR practices and performance indicators should be interpreted with care, as there are a lot of missing values.

Table 3 Explained variances of types of non-permanent workers

N No

control Controlled


Fixed term 189 2,802 96% 2,684 1,996 74% 0,142 5% 0,547 20%

Temporary Agency 184 0,619 71% 0,441 0,346 79% 0,035 8% 0,059 13%

Daily/ on call 181 0,957 98% 0,940 0,764 81% 0,005 1% 0,171 18%

Probation 181 1,198 79% 0,947 0,770 81% 0,045 5% 0,132 14%

Training 183 0,751 87% 0,656 0,527 80% 0,028 4% 0,101 15%

Seasonal employment 172 0,819 68% 0,553 0,488 88% 0,002 0% 0,064 11%

Job creation scheme 179 0,442 100% 0,443 0,442 100% 0,001 0% 0,000 0%

Subcontractor 181 0,325 81% 0,262 0,243 93% 0,005 2% 0,015 6%

Consultant 180 0,214 78% 0,167 0,142 85% 0,009 5% 0,017 10%

Other 189 1,018 107% 1,091 0,888 81% 0,026 2% 0,176 16%

The types of non-permanent workers hired by organizations are also dependent on country (up to 20%), except for hiring non-permanents on job-creation schemes (0%).

Table 4 Explained variances motives for hiring non-permanents

N No

control Controlled


Peaks in production 185 1,908 85% 1,629 1,417 87% 0,152 9% 0,060 4%

Replace due to short absence 188 1,562 92% 1,434 1,347 94% 0,003 0% 0,084 6%

Replace due to long absence 187 1,640 88% 1,444 1,217 84% 0,052 4% 0,175 12%

Unfilled vacancies 182 1,695 97% 1,652 1,258 76% 0,070 4% 0,325 20%

Specialized skills 184 1,359 93% 1,270 1,154 91% 0,060 5% 0,056 4%

Limiting core workers 183 1,808 90% 1,621 1,340 83% 0,046 3% 0,235 14%

Improving performance 182 1,062 94% 0,998 0,957 96% 0,020 2% 0,021 2%

Testing new employees 185 2,494 93% 2,309 1,939 84% 0,043 2% 0,326 14%

Working unusual hours 185 1,231 91% 1,126 1,001 89% 0,035 3% 0,090 8%

Saving salary costs 184 1,172 93% 1,095 1,023 93% 0,006 1% 0,065 6%

Saving training costs 185 0,265 66% 0,174 0,161 92% 0,006 4% 0,007 4%

Saving benefit costs 184 1,065 95% 1,016 0,916 90% 0,004 0% 0,096 9%

Motives such as replacement due to long absence, unfilled vacancies, limiting core workers, and testing new employees are partially determined by the country (up to 20%). On the level of the sectors, the motive ‘to cope with peaks in production’ is somewhat dependent on sector (9%).


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3.2 Similarities and differences across countries Here we discuss the similarities and differences between countries on the intervening and dependent variables of the PSYCONES model. There are differences between the characteristics of the samples of organizations in each country. With respect to, for example, organization size and organization form the samples are not identical across countries. Therefore a number of control variables is taken into account as covariates in the statistical analyses. In this way, we are able to assess country differences, controlling for the effect of specific sample characteristics. We used the SPSS procedure mixed models including the control variables as covariates1. The variables ‘Responsibility on HR policies’ and ‘Union percentage’ are not taken into account as control variables because of the large number of missing values. COUNTRY is included as a fixed factor. Only main effects are included. The F-score in the tables indicates the effect of COUNTRY controlled for organizational characteristics on the dependent variables in the PSYCONES-model. In order to assess differences between the countries involved, post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons are performed on the modified population marginal means. Only the comparisons that are significant are signalled. When a country scores significantly different (minimum of p < .05) compared to four countries, the difference is signalled using bold fonts.

1 number of employees, number of permanent employees, organizational form (public/private), organizational form (independency), number of employees past three years, number of non-permanents past three years, prospects concerning workforce, influence on employment contracts, influence on HR practices, influence on working conditions, and vacancies.


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Table 5 Post-hoc analyses on organizational and dependent variables

N F Swe Ger Net Bel UK Spa Isr Number of employees 3 yrs 194 ,74 1,74 1,72 1,61 1,80 2,04 1,65 1,92

Number of non-perm 3 yrs 193 2,57* 2,29 1,75 2,21 2,01 1,55 2,17 1,61

Percentage temporary 194 1,95 ,377 ,311 ,235 ,305 ,414 ,217 ,366

Prosp. conc. Workforce 193 3,20** 1,99 2,09 1,96 1,69 1,33 1,62 1,69

Vacancies 191 2,39* 2,45 2,78 2,78 3,28 2,89 2,57 2,56

Percentage Union members 147 16,36*** 49,84 31,53 15,52 46,70 20,34 38,49 83,37

Union influence: contracts 191 1,72 2,30 2,07 2,67 2,14 2,04 1,99 1,84

Union influence: HR practices 191 8,82*** 3,42 2,10 2,91 2,22 2,11 1,98 2,23

Union influence: Working con 191 4,41*** 3,60 2,85 3,10 2,65 2,14 2,49 2,65

Content employers obl. perm 188 2,93* 12,53 11,32 11,12 9,15 12,57 12,57 12,32

Content employers non-perm 186 3,71** 11,81 10,03 9,43 8,96 10,68 12,29 11,09

Delivery deal employers perm 187 3,32** 3,89 4,23 4,10 4,13 3,97 3,75 3,97

Delivery employers non-perm 184 3,45** 3,80 4,31 4,05 4,02 3,98 3,82 3,93

Content employees perm 202 4,90*** 14,24 12,81 13,34 10,76 15,04 15,77 16,23

Content employees non-perm 202 5,37*** 13,70 11,82 12,25 10,61 14,74 15,79 15,85

Delivery employees perm 183 4,29*** 3,50 3,98 3,65 3,75 3,96 3,40 3,58

Delivery employees non-perm 180 3,70** 3,60 4,11 3,57 3,66 3,56 3,53 3,66

HR practices permanents 202 1,86 ,46 ,49 ,79 ,32 ,66 1,08 ,68

HR practices all employees 202 ,77 3,46 3,46 3,61 3,78 3,19 3,21 3,10

HR practices non-permanents 202 1,15 3,00 2,98 2,82 3,47 2,53 2,13 2,43

Equal treatment 194 1,84 1,74 1,42 1,86 1,71 1,30 1,43 1,63

Training permanents 178 5,29*** 68,73 39,88 44,26 75,49 85,35 65,92 69,28

Training non-permanents 168 6,43*** 60,85 26,54 30,27 66,07 88,67 56,19 43,43

Feedback permanent 190 2,34* 83,97 61,66 62,37 62,49 85,41 55,08 76,14

Feedback non-permanents 185 1,72 53,21 48,33 57,51 76,31 73,03 43,09 61,99

Benefits permanents 192 1,53 30,37 21,64 19,04 11,67 29,21 32,10 43,37

Benefits non-permanents 187 2,08 23,81 17,64 10,56 7,85 15,19 13,67 44,06

Satisfaction permanents 188 ,50 5,40 5,26 5,47 5,18 5,34 5,18 5,05

Satisfaction non-permanents 189 2,54* 5,24 5,72 5,38 5,41 4,50 5,17 5,32

Quit permanent 158 6,66*** 10,80 5,11 6,26 ,41 24,04 2,94 7,45

Quit non-permanent 154 7,44*** 8,07 8,73 2,71 12,39 51,43 1,53 16,43

Dismissal permanent 158 2,06 ,79 1,68 3,13 1,90 3,52 1,06 4,98

Dismissal non-permanent 193 ,53 54,56 52,30 43,30 47,95 19,84 43,75 42,48

Sick leave permanent 139 2,88* 8,10 8,04 6,01 -,087 5,18 6,76 14,76

Sick leave non-permanent 121 1,25 10,77 5,68 5,28 -1,66 1,98 7,27 5,92

Accidents permanent 154 5,76*** 7,95 11,02 -2,50 12,48 32,21 7,30 7,44

Accidents non-permanent 151 4,71*** ,97 2,09 -,65 5,92 2,07 3,24 2,30

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001


16

With respect to the percentage of union members there are large differences. The percentage is highest in Israel, and lowest in the Netherlands. We have to remark that it concerns the percentage of union members as estimated by the HR manager of the company. Comparing these means with the societal indicators of union density (see Figure 2) reveals some discrepancies. The estimations of percentage of union members, however, are based on different frames. While the HR managers estimate the union strength in their organizations in a specific sector, the societal indicator applies to the whole of a country across sectors and organizations. Swedish unions are perceived to have a relative big influence on HR practices. The results of the employer-reported psychological contract variables are quite interesting. In general, Belgian organizations report the lowest number of employer obligations for both permanent and non-permanent employees compared to most other countries. Spain reports the highest number of obligations and expectations for non-permanent employees. Also interesting are the results with respect to HR practices for both temporary and permanent workers. There are only few differences between countries. With respect to training, UK organizations offer more opportunities for both permanents and non-permanents compared to other countries. German organizations report the lowest percentage of training facilities to both non-permanents and permanents. Finally, the performance indicators show that on quits among permanents and non-permanents, and on accidents involving permanent workers, the UK scores much higher compared to the other countries. The results should be interpreted with care, however, because of the large number of missing values.

Table 6 Post-hoc analyses on temporary workforce composition

N F Swe Ger Net Bel UK Spa Isr Fixed-term 189 6,90*** 2,94 2,00 2,28 3,64 2,26 1,69 ,62

Temporary Agency 184 4,78*** ,06 ,19 ,51 ,64 ,59 ,32 1,02

Daily/on call 181 6,00*** ,42 ,53 1,33 ,06 -,131 ,39 ,34

Probation 181 4,94*** 1,07 ,47 ,39 ,15 ,88 ,26 1,59

Training 183 5,14*** ,78 1,07 ,15 ,16 ,58 ,26 ,47

Seasonal employment 172 3,31** ,24 ,26 ,82 -,02 ,76 ,29 ,60

Job creation Scheme 179 1,20 ,50 ,11 ,10 ,41 ,02 ,18 ,32

Subcontractor 181 1,67 ,46 ,24 ,08 ,09 ,16 ,23 ,41

Consultant 180 2,60* ,11 ,17 ,16 ,25 ,28 ,21 ,63

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 Table 5 reports the composition of the temporary workforce as reported by organizations in the PSYCONES-countries. A clear difference between countries is the low percentage of fixed-term workers in Israel compared to most countries, while they have a relatively high number of temporary agency workers. Dutch organizations in the sample make relatively more use of daily/on-call workers, while Israel makes more use of probation employees. Israel also makes more frequent use of consultants in our sample.


17

Table 7 Post-hoc analyses on motives for hiring temporary workers

N F Swe Ger Net Bel UK Spa Isr

Peaks in production 185 1,19 2,91 3,52 3,12 2,80 3,49 3,15 3,73

Replace due to short absence 188 1,65 2,77 2,62 2,70 3,25 3,72 2,73 2,44

Replace due to long absence 187 3,91** 3,73 2,94 3,36 3,95 3,22 3,37 2,18

Unfilled vacancies 182 7,40*** 1,56 1,47 2,00 2,31 2,38 3,28 1,71

Specialized skills 184 1,58 1,82 1,64 2,31 1,73 2,10 2,35 2,07

Limiting core workers 183 4,74*** 1,31 1,68 2,60 2,14 1,11 2,14 2,50

Improving performance 182 ,62 1,93 1,88 1,87 1,81 1,96 1,51 1,99

Testing new employees 185 4,62 4,30 2,35 3,25 2,25 2,79 3,00 3,85

Working unusual hours 185 2,62* 2,46 1,31 1,54 1,73 1,65 1,54 1,76

Saving salary costs 184 1,63 1,34 1,97 1,88 1,53 1,15 1,90 1,91

Saving training costs 185 1,24 1,11 1,07 1,22 1,04 1,17 1,24 1,34

Saving benefit costs 184 2,90* ,97 1,64 1,51 1,04 1,44 1,70 2,16

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 With respect to the motives for hiring temporary workers, some differences between countries can be found. Israeli organizations make relatively low use of temporaries to replace permanent workers on long absences such as sickness and pregnancy. Spanish organizations in our sample make relatively more use of temporary workers to fill vacancies. Third, Swedish organizations report ‘working unusual hours’ as an important motive for hiring non-permanents.


18

3.3 Similarities and differences across sectors Table 1 showed that the percentage of variance explained by sector is low. This should be taken into account in the discussion of the differences between sectors on the intervening and dependent variables in the PSYCONES model on the employer level. We used the same statistical procedure that was used for the COUNTRY differences. The F-score in the tables represent the controlled effect of SECTOR on the variables in the PSYCONES-model. To measure differences between sectors, post hoc tests compare the modified population marginal means. Bonferroni correction is applied for multiple comparisons. Only the comparisons that are significant are signalled, unless stated otherwise in the tables. When a sector is significantly different from the two other sectors, bold fonts signal the significance.

Table 8 Post-hoc analyses on organizational and dependent variables

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Change number of employees 194 1,23 1,86 1,64 1,71

Change number of non-perm 193 ,17 1,96 2,01 2,07

Percentage temporary 194 4,82** ,255 ,391 ,26

Prosp. conc. Workforce 193 ,85 1,72 1,80 1,90

Vacancies 191 1,12 2,57 2,81 2,76

Percentage Union members (M>R) 147 9,23*** 50,83 30,62 41,11

Union influence: contracts 191 6,97** 2,69 2,02 1,94

Union influence: HR practices 191 4,06* 2,79 2,49 2,20

Union influence: Working con 191 6,25** 3,29 2,81 2,55

Content employers obl. perm 188 1,12 11,95 12,03 11,05

Content employers non-perm 186 1,52 10,44 11,41 10,28

Delivery deal employers perm 187 1,12 3,93 3,96 4,09

Delivery employers non-perm 184 ,62 3,94 3,96 4,06

Content employees perm 202 ,66 14,03 14,58 13,61

Content employees non-perm 202 ,27 13,46 13,91 13,26

Delivery employees perm 183 ,46 3,60 3,63 3,71

Delivery employees non-perm 180 1,33 3,60 3,63 3,78

HR practices permanents 202 4,13* 1,03 ,55 ,48

HR practices all employees 202 1,28 3,31 3,64 3,29

HR practices non-permanents 202 2,10 2,28 3,10 2,81

Equal treatment 194 1,15 1,73 1,57 1,51

Training permanents 178 ,01 60,20 61,20 60,65

Training non-permanents 168 ,99 46,53 44,84 56,69

Feedback permanent (R>M) 190 9,27*** 51,48 82,62 67,80

Feedback non-permanents 185 4,40* 40,58 62,90 64,16

Benefits permanents 192 8,26*** 23,35 43,25 12,81

Benefits non-permanents 187 1,27 20,86 22,31 10,80


19

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Satisfaction permanents (R<E) 188 3,12* 5,18 5,09 b 5,58

Satisfaction non-permanents 189 2,91 5,10 5,24 5,57

Quit permanent (R>E) 158 3,87* 6,29 10,84 3,27

Quit non-permanent 154 ,77 11,18 12,04 5,56

Dismissal permanent (R>E) 158 4,08* 2,75 3,35 ,55

Dismissal non-permanent 193 ,66 41,03 43,33 53,02

Sick leave permanent 139 ,29 6,68 6,73 8,19

Sick leave non-permanent 121 ,24 4,97 6,10 6,99

Accidents permanent 154 6,89** 15,79 5,81 2,24

Accidents non-permanent 151 1,62 2,81 1,94 1,03

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 Organizations in the retail & services sector have the highest percentage of temporary workers. With respect to union influence, the manufacturing sector shows the highest score on employment contracts and influence on working conditions. The similarities on the PC variables should be noted. With respect to HR practices, organizations in the manufacturing sector offer permanent workers more HR practices in comparison to temporary workers. With respect to feedback to non-permanents, the manufacturing sector has the lowest percentage. Organizations in the retail & services sector provide more benefits to permanents compared to the other sectors. Finally, an expected result is the relatively high number of accidents reported by organizations in manufacturing.

Table 9 Post-hoc analyses on composition of the temporary workforce

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Fixed-term 189 4,71* 1,92 1,76 2,77

Temporary Agency 184 6,58** ,59 ,57 ,13

Daily / on-call 181 ,47 ,58 ,42 ,60

Probation (R>E) 181 3,99* ,69 ,92 ,31

Training 183 4,13* ,62 ,70 ,22

Seasonal employment 172 ,17 ,49 ,40 ,39

Job Creation scheme 179 ,27 ,28 ,26 ,17

Subcontractor 181 1,41 ,25 ,33 ,14

Consultant (M>R) 180 3,86* ,36 ,13 ,20

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 Looking at the composition of the temporary workforce in three sectors, three results are worth mentioning. First, the educational sector makes more use of fixed-term workers compared to the other two sectors. On the other hand, they make less use of temporary agency workers and training arrangements.


20

Table 10 Post-hoc analyses on motives for hiring temporary workers

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Peaks in production 185 8,19* 3,71 3,45 2,96

Replace due to short absence 188 ,19 2,81 2,72 2,87

Replace due to long absence 187 2,76 2,94 3,28 3,59

Unfilled vacancies 182 4,64* 1,84 1,90 2,60

Specialized skills (E>R) 184 4,16* 2,01 1,67 2,37

Limiting core workers 183 2,19 2,22 1,69 2,05

Improving performance 182 1,80 2,03 1,87 1,60

Testing new employees 185 1,57 3,30 3,39 2,82

Working unusual hours 185 2,76 1,81 1,92 1,39

Saving salary costs 184 ,45 1,77 1,82 1,61

Saving training costs 185 2,81 1,29 1,18 1,06

Saving benefit costs 184 ,22 1,51 1,41 1,54

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 The table above shows the motives for temporary workers in three sectors. The educational organizations report a lower use of temporary workers to cope with peaks in production. This is very logical because what kind of production would there be in education? However, they report a higher score on hiring temps to occupy unfilled vacancies.


21

3.4 Interaction terms

This paragraph describes the influence of country and sector on the relationship between the psychological contract variables and outcome variables. The influence of country and sector on these relationships can be assessed by analysing the effect of the interaction terms between psychological contract variables and country/sector on the outcome variables. These interaction terms are added to the regressions performed for working packages 5 and 6. In the analyses, all psychological contract variables are included, since there is no theoretical reason to include or exclude variables. The interaction product variables are calculated from dummy-codings for countries and sectors. As in WP5 and 6, for the countries Israel is used as the comparison country, and for the sectors Retail is the comparison sector. When interaction product variables are included in a regression when the main effects are also included, multicollinearity should be controlled (Fisher, 1988), therefore, we checked the correlations between the one-way product terms and the individual variables and there were no problems with high intercorrelations. The results of the analyses are presented in Tables 11 through 14. Table 11 presents the regression on the employer level including country interactions for permanent workers; Table 11 for non permanent employees. Table 12 presents regressions on the employer level including sector interactions for permanents; Table 14 for non permanent employees. There are not many significant interaction effects. The chances of obtaining a significant result that is only (statistical) coincidence is for p <.05 1 in 20. Since we included many interaction terms in the regression equation, we will only discuss the interaction effects in the text with a significance level < .01. We will further analyse and discuss these interaction effects by presenting Figures with graphs that depict the interaction effects Because the psychological contract variables are assessed by the employers for their permanent and temporary employees separately, our analyses are performed for permanents and temporaries separately.

Table 11 Regressions including country interactions for permanents

Satisfaction Permanents

Quit Permanents

Dismissal Permanents

Sick Leave Permanents

Accidents Permanents

Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta

Number of employees ,013 -,077 -,005 ,081 ,571*** Percentage of Permanent workers ,001 -,158** -,049 ,096 -,011 Organizational form -,132 -,087 ,043 -,216 ,049 Number of employees past three years -,082 -,083 ,053 -,051 -,017 Number of non-permanents over past three years ,093 ,110** ,054 ,108 -,044 Manufacturing dummy -,023 -,010* -,019 ,057 ,244** Education dummy ,128 -.290** -,144 ,150 ,068 Content Employers Obligations for Permanents ,224 ,108 -,010 -,007 -,013 Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations for Permanents -,035 -,267 ,129 ,014 -,073 Content Employees Obligations for Permanents 1,421 ,072 ,010 ,130 ,058 Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations for Permanents ,311 -,108 ,018 -,071 ,083 Sweden dummy 3,773 ,212 -,236 ,097 ,064 Germany dummy 2,957 -,113 ,047 ,095 1,447 Netherlands dummy 2,094 -,187 -,044 ,081 -1,161 Belgium dummy 2,102 -,117 ,013 -,227 ,689 Spain dummy ,004 -,054 ,065* -,069 5,408** UK dummy 3,332 ,103 -,326 ,062 ,003


22


Quit Permanents




Adjusted R2 ,16 ,31 ,07 ,01 ,44

F-value for R2 change 1,31 5,68*** 2,17 1,91 4,50*** N = 145 125 125 103 118

Interaction terms Sweden x Content Employers Obligations for Perm. -1,386 -,099 -,213 ,063 ,114 Germany x Content Employers Obligations for Perm. ,536 ,117 -,048 -,223* -,115 Netherlands x Content Employers Obligations for Perm. ,450 ,024 -,138 -,224 ,187 Belgium x Content Employers Obligations for Perm. -,089 ,111 -,056 -,388 ,025 Spain x Content Employers Obligations for Perm. -1,860 -,068* -,281 -,323 -4,808*** UK x Content Employers Obligations for Perm. -,487 ,395 -,120 -,306 -,095 Sweden x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations Perm. -,463 -,073 ,067 -,388 ,256 Germany x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations Perm. ,221 ,110 -,143 -,550 -,034 Netherlands x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations Perm. 1,907 ,083 -,054 ,068 1,047 Belgium x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations Perm. ,114 -,271 ,122 -,076 ,255 Spain x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations Perm. ,800 ,115 ,054 ,057 -1,619* UK x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations Perm. ,239 -,074 ,013 -,062 ,001 Sweden x Content Employees Obligations for Perm. -2,831 ,387 -3,913 ,100 ,013 Germany x Content Employees Obligations for Perm. -2,981 -,549 -3,223 -3,088 ,234 Netherlands x Content Employees Obligations for Perm. -2,924 ,213 -3,484 -1,446 -,217 Belgium x Content Employees Obligations for Perm. -1,828 -,119 -2,331 -,586 -,360 Spain x Content Employees Obligations for Perm. -,773 -4,119 -5,843 -,307 5,643** UK x Content Employees Obligations for Perm. -3,103 ,146 -3,922 -1,785 ,390 Sweden x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Perm. 1,280 ,164 -,918 ,562 -,402 Germany x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Perm. -,313 ,512 -,802 2,034 -1,429 Netherlands x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Perm. -,836 -,330 -,433 ,813 -,006 Belgium x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Perm. ,129 1,080 -1,443 -,032 -,537 Spain x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Perm. 2,097 -2,483* -2,012 ,682 -4,449*** UK x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Perm. ,305 ,157 -1,163 2,097 -,323

Adjusted R2 ,166 ,377 -,02 -,04 ,61 F-value for R2 change 1,06 1,57 ,58 ,78 3,04***

N = 121 101 101 79 94

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 With respect to the accidents of permanent workers, the interaction between Spain and the psychological contract variables is in some cases strongly significant. The model including these interaction effects explains significantly more of the variance compared to the model without interaction effects. Figure 4 shows the interactions in graphs.


23

Figure 4 The relationship between employers obligations and accidents for permanent workers in Spain and Israel

0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00

Content Employers Obligations for Permanents

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anen

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Spain Israel

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Content Employers Obligations for Permanents

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Content Employees Obligations for Permanents

0

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dent

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Spain Israel

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24

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Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations for Permanents

0

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50

75

100ac

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Spain Israel

2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations for Permanents

The pattern of interactions is difficult to interpret, because the range of scores on accidents is much lower in Israel as compared to Spain. The results seem to indicate that, compared to Israel, in Spain the content and delivery of obligations the correlation with few or many accidents is low, whereas the correlation between content and delivery of permanent employees with a medium/high level of accidents is high.

Table 12 Regressions including country interactions for non-permanents

Satisfaction Non-

Permanents Quit Non-

Permanents

Dismissal Non-

Permanents

Sick Leave Non-

Permanents

Accidents Non-

Permanents Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Number of employees ,126 ,178* ,420*** ,064 ,354*** Percentage of Permanent workers ,035 ,152 ,043 ,049 -,056 Organizational form -,057 -,076 -,085 ,146 ,085 Number of employees past three years -,111 -,141 -,038 -,097 -,102 Number of non-permanents over past three years ,079 ,037 -,003 -,024 -,158 Manufacturing dummy -,113 ,031 -,038 -,005 ,395*** Education dummy ,120 -,096 ,122 ,111 -,068 Content Employers Obligations for Non-Permanents ,685* -,213 ,115 -,157 ,362 Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations for Non-Permanents -,038 ,126 ,074 ,135 -,312 Content Employees Obligations for Non-Permanents ,000 ,047 ,014 ,708 -,494 Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations for Non-Permanents ,323 -,506 -,202 -,203 ,150 Sweden dummy -1,865 -1,358 -1,423 -,623 -1,773 Germany dummy -,490 -1,410 -1,347 ,099 ,612 Netherlands dummy ,472 -,928 -1,256 -,420 -1,496 Belgium dummy 2,668 -1,206 -,354 ,854 1,569 Spain dummy ,740 2,122 ,274 ,159 -1,306 UK dummy 1,187 -1,187 -,504 2,295 -1,542

Adjusted R2 ,16 ,31 ,06 -,11 ,33 F-value for R2 change 1,58 7,18*** ,55 ,58 3,17**

N = 142 119 142 85 113


25

Satisfaction Non-


Permanents

Dismissal Non-

Permanents

Sick Leave Non-

Permanents

Accidents Non-

Permanents Sweden x Content Employers Obligations Non-perm. -1,239 ,519 ,703 1,280 ,058 Germany x Content Employers Obligations Non-perm. -,522 ,210 ,097 -,324 -,381 Netherlands x Content Employers Obligations Nonperm -,605 ,239 ,136 ,409 -,227 Belgium x Content Employers Obligations Non-perm. -,527 ,623* ,374 ,007 -,341 Spain x Content Employers Obligations Non-perm. -,065 ,517 -,732 -,028 ,285 UK x Content Employers Obligations Non-perm. -1,184* ,208 ,191 ,401 -,912 Sweden x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. -,076 -,394 ,545 ,576 1,031 Germany x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. ,960 -,086 -,312 -,506 -,392 Netherlands x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. 1,015 -,994 ,276 ,713 1,392 Belgium x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. -,740 ,529 ,895 -,180 ,903 Spain x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. ,643 -2,025* -1,103 -,321 UK x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. -,186 -,619 ,518 -1,313 ,823 Sweden x Content Employees Obligations Non-perm. 1,639 ,035 ,247 -,511 ,758 Germany x Content Employees Obligations Non-perm. -,277 ,102 -,187 -,510 1,183 Netherlands x Content Employees Oblig Non-perm. -,240 ,016 ,038 -1,418 ,678 Belgium x Content Employees Obligations Non-perm. -,227 -,299 -,739 -,863 -,114 Spain x Content Employees Obligations Non-perm. -,393 -2,314* ,381 -,739 1,488 UK x Content Employees Obligations Non-perm. ,122 ,035 ,067 -2,146 2,160 Sweden x Delivery Deal Employees Non-perm. 1,376 1,214 ,027 -,559 -,306 Germany x Delivery Deal Employees Non-perm. ,432 1,200 1,861 1,426 -1,214 Netherlands x Delivery Deal Employees Non-perm. -,611 1,429 ,775 ,792 -,810 Belgium x Delivery Deal Employees Non-perm. -1,142 ,337 -,123 -,006 -1,997* Spain x Delivery Deal Employees Non-perm. -1,113 1,982* 1,034 ,513 -,210 UK x Delivery Deal Employees Obligations Non-perm. -,086 1,329 -,316 ,698 -,653

Adjusted R2 ,30 ,36 ,05 -,31 ,36

F-value for R2 change 2,15** 1,45 ,95 ,45 1,23 N = 118 95 118 62 89

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 There are only few significant interaction effects for the outcome variables measuring performance of non-permanents. In addition, these results should be interpreted with care, as some models are based on a small population. For example, the model predicting sick leave of non-permanents is based on only 62 cases (organizations). Therefore we will not discuss these interaction effects here further in depth.


26

Table 13 Regressions including sector interactions for permanents


Quit Permanents




Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Number of employees -,017 ,122 ,002 -,096 ,584*** Percentage of permanent workers ,123 -,224** -,095 ,055 ,100 Organizational form -,153 ,113 ,052 ,112 ,034 Number of employees past three years -,129 -,104 ,145 -,148 ,049 Number of non-permanents over past three years ,064 ,207* -,004 ,137 -,011 Content Employers Obligations for Permanents ,163 -,352 -,168 ,094 ,033 Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations for Permanents ,157 -,154 -,285 ,423 -,171 Content Employees Obligations for Permanents -,076 ,220 ,282 -,270 -,132 Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations for Permanents ,277 -,135 ,098 -,252 ,190 Sweden dummy ,168 ,075 -,344* -,400* ,055 Germany dummy -,025 ,029 -,211 -,281 ,110 Netherlands dummy ,182 ,096 -,064 -,513** -,155 Belgium dummy -,048 -,096 -,132 -,449** ,112 Spain dummy ,032 ,406*** -,038 -,367** ,243** UK dummy ,110 -,095 -,294* -,563** -,043 Manufacturing dummy ,573 -,369 ,543 ,118 ,879 Education dummy -,214 -1,146 -1,355 1,205 -,677

Adjusted R2 ,16 ,31 ,07 ,01 ,44 F-value for R2 change 1,24 4,65*** 2,70** 1,53 4,94***

N = 145 125 125 103 118 Manufacturing x Content Employers Obligations perm. ,152 ,770 ,901 -1,297 -,370 Education x Content Employers Obligations for perm. -,248 ,575 ,392 -,522 -,163 Manufacturing x Delivery Deal Employers Oblig perm. -,357 -,342 ,400 -3,606** ,037 Education x Delivery Deal Employers Obligations perm. -,582 ,783 1,432 -1,653 ,819 Manufacturing x Content Employees Obligations perm. -,068 -,560 -1,612 2,359 ,536 Education x Content Employees Obligations for perm. ,505 -,397 -,598 ,043 ,543 Manufacturing x Delivery Deal Employees Oblig perm. -,336 ,392 -,219 2,521* -,926 Education x Delivery Deal Employees Oblig perm. ,624 -,003 -,094 ,928 -,603

Adjusted R2 ,13 ,28 ,05 ,11 ,43 F-value for R2 change ,35 ,46 ,74 2,41* ,81

N = 137 117 117 95 110

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 Figure 5 shows the interaction effect of Manufacturing and the Delivery of the Deal of Employers Obligations of the permanent workers and sick leave. In manufacturing there is no clear linear relationship between sick leave and the delivery of the deal, whereas in retail, organisations that report high levels of employee sick leave also report higher delivery of the deal regarding employers obligations.


27

Figure 5 The relationship between the delivery of the deal by employers and sick leave for permanent employees in Manufacturing and Retail

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leav

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ent

Manufacturing Retail

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Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations for Permanents

Table 14 Regressions including sector interactions for non-permanents

Satisfaction Non-


Permanents

Dismissal Non-

Permanents

Sick Leave Non-

Permanents

Accidents Non-

Permanents Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Number of employees ,141 ,274** ,357** -,040 ,284** Percentage of permanent workers -,010 ,162* ,021 ,077 -,121 Organizational form -,116 -,122 -,007 ,183 ,157 Number of employees past three years -,047 -,111 ,039 -,076 -,054 Number of non-permanents over past three years ,031 ,054 -,099 -,052 -,056 Content Employers Obligations for Non-Permanents ,275 ,330 ,257 -,026 -,222 Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations for Non-Permanents ,237 -,127 ,286 ,358 -,183 Content Employees Obligations for Non-Permanents -,082 -,341 ,208 -,103 ,132 Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations for Non-Permanents ,173 ,094 -,243 -,176 -,287 Sweden dummy -,003 -,043 ,057 ,037 -,206 Germany dummy ,080 -,124 ,004 -,074 ,076 Netherlands dummy ,032 -,206 -,068 -,115 -,256* Belgium dummy ,026 -,034 ,032 -,223 ,096 Spain dummy -,214* ,321** -,097 -,139 -,061 UK dummy ,009 -,317* -,018 -,144 -,017 Manufacturing dummy -,206 -,506 ,939 1,175 -,669 Education dummy ,444 -,181 ,875 ,668 -1,512

Adjusted R2 ,16 ,31 ,06 -,11 ,33 F-value for R2 change 1,80 5,67*** ,67 ,53 5,07***

N = 142 119 142 85 113


28

Satisfaction Non-


Permanents

Dismissal Non-

Permanents

Sick Leave Non-

Permanents

Accidents Non-

Permanents Manufacturing x Content Employers Oblig Non-perm. -,330 -,354 -,102 ,114 ,641 Education x Content Employers Oblig for Non-perm. -,581 -,593 -,194 -,059 ,671 Manufacturing x Delivery Deal Employers Non-perm. -,020 ,131 -,559 -1,857 -,055 Education x Delivery Deal Employers Oblig Non-perm. -,994 ,630 -,942 -1,507 ,750 Manufacturing x Content Employees Oblig Non-perm. ,211 ,740 -,812 ,142 ,028 Education x Content Employees Oblig for Non-perm. ,678 ,833 -,719 ,234 -,467 Manufacturing x Delivery Deal Employees Non-perm. ,280 -,021 ,520 ,375 ,416 Education x Delivery Deal Employees Oblig Non-perm. ,600 -,849 1,126 ,726 ,569

Adjusted R2 ,14 ,29 ,04 -,19 ,34 F-value for R2 change ,70 ,87 ,75 ,32 1,22

N = 134 111 134 77 105

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 In line with the country effects with respect to outcome variables for non-permanents, there are no interaction effects between sector and the psychological contract variables on outcomes for non-permanents. In addition, the model statistics are not significant.


29

3.5 Summary Only taken into account clear significant results on variables not suffering from too many missing values, the conclusions with respect to the employer level variables are the following:

1. The major part of not individual variance is explained by the organization level. Country has some effect and sector has only a minor effect.

2. In general there are more similarities between countries than differences.

3. The country differences are:

a) Sweden reports the highest influence of unions on HR practices. From the

societal data we recall that Sweden has the strongest union density. b) Within the HR practices, Germany reports the lowest training to both

permanent and non-permanent employees. However, looking at the types of non-permanent workforce, Germany reports “training” as the highest.

c) Belgium reports the most narrow content of the psychological contract for both permanent and non-permanent employees. We recall from the societal data that Belgium has high collective bargaining coverage. Furthermore, Belgium reports a high percentage of fixed term within the types of non-permanent workforce.

d) Within the HR practices, the UK reports the highest training to non-permanent employees.

e) Spain reports the broadest content of the psychological contract for non-permanent employees.

f) Israel is exceptional in the types of non-permanent workforce with low percentage of fixed term and high percentages of temporary agency, probation, and consultants.

4. In general there are more similarities between sectors than differences. 5. The few sector differences seem logical and include: percentage of temporary and

type of non-permanent workforce, union influence, HR practices, accidents.

6. There are only few interactions with country or sector. The significant interactions are hard to interpret.


30

4. Employee level explorations (7.1b) This section presents similarities and differences between countries and sectors based on quantitative data gathered through questionnaires from employees. We discuss the following:

a) First we provide an overview of the explained variance by the levels in the PSYCONES-model: individual, organization, sector, and country. Next we present differences and similarities between countries/sectors on the intervening and dependent variables. These findings represent the direct influence of country and sector. We compare the adjusted means (adjusted for differences in characteristics of the sample in each country on the control variables).

b) To examine the influence of country and sector on the relationships between type of

contract and the dependent variables, and the relationships between the psychological contract variables and the dependent variables we included interactions with country and sector in the analyses. We used the SPSS module Mixed-models. The independent/ intervening variables are included covariates. Country/sector is a factor. Organizational characteristics are included as fixed-factors. “Organization” is included as a random factor.

c) We summarize the similarities and differences between countries and sectors, and

look for reasons why certain countries/sectors are different from others.


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4.1 Variance explained by the levels Our study is a multilevel study, encompassing the individual and organizational level, as well as the sector level, and country level. We start our analyses with an overview of the variance that can be explained by the different levels. That gives a first idea about the relative importance of the different levels. It provides an indication of whether well-being and health of employees are mainly determined by individual differences, or characteristics of organizations, sectors, or countries. The results of the statistical analyses that will be reported are based on analyses of residuals. The SPSS procedure ‘mixed models’ was used. For each dependent variable the total uncontrolled residual can be calculated. This is the total residual variance (column 1). When the control variables were entered (those that were used in WP5 and WP6 as control variables on the individual and organizational level), the residual value is lower because the control variables explain (some) variance in the dependent variable. The residual value controlling for control variables can be found in column 2. This residual value after controlling for the control variables is used as a standard to evaluate the relative contribution of the individual, organizational, sector and country level, which add up to 100%. Column 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the following tables represent the residual values of respectively the individual, organization, sector, and country level, and the percentage of variance explained on that level. Note that the figures only refer to variance explained by levels, and not to variance explained by specific variables on that level. If the figure for, for example, the organizational level is 5%, this means that a maximum 5% of the variance can be explained by organizational characteristics. The technical procedure we used for the calculations is the following: In SPSS ‘mixed models’ we calculated

a) the residual for a dependent variable (column 1) b) included individual characteristics that were used in WP5 or WP6 as covariates and

calculated the residual value (set as standard for evaluating the contributions of the different levels to 100%). Covariates used are: age, sex, educational level, living condition, household contribution, dependency on household-income, homework responsibilities, tenure in months, hours/week, union membership, supervision, additional job(s), night shifts, core HR-practices, position, and type of contract (column 2).

c) included ORGANIZATION as a random factor. d) included respectively SECTOR, and SECTOR and COUNTRY as fixed-factors, and

calculated the residuals of the main effects of all the factors and covariates. The percentage of explained variance of each level is calculated by looking at the residual of the controlled (column 2) model. When SECTOR is included, it explains some of the variance in the dependent variable. When both SECTOR and COUNTRY are included these levels explain variance. The percentages in the tables are calculated by dividing the residual of a certain level by the total residual of the model that was tested. In the following tables, the first column (no control) shows the residual of the empty model. The second column (controlled) displays what is left of the residual after controlling for the control variables. The percentage in the column indicate how much variance is NOT explained by the control variables. The columns ‘individual’, ‘organization’, ‘sector’, and ‘country’ include the variances explained by these levels, compared to the column two data.


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Table 15 Explained variances of the outcome variables

N No

Control Controlled

(100%) Individual Organization Sector Country Work Involvement 5315 0,769 91% 0,700 0,609 87% 0,020 3% 0,002 0% 0,063 9%

Job Satisfaction 5331 0,729 85% 0,620 0,554 89% 0,037 6% 0,002 0% 0,023 4%

Sick Leave 5268 1,044 92% 0,955 0,894 94% 0,045 5% 0,004 0% 0,017 2%

Sick Presence 5249 1,653 93% 1,542 1,440 93% 0,017 1% 0,007 0% 0,085 5%

Accidents 5264 0,287 85% 0,244 0,237 97% 0,005 2% 0,000 0% 0,002 1%

Incidents 5252 0,514 93% 0,480 0,465 97% 0,012 2% 0,002 0% 0,002 0%

WRM: Anxiety-Contentm. 5295 0,547 94% 0,516 0,482 93% 0,012 2% 0,001 0% 0,023 5%

WRM: Depression-Enth. 5278 0,524 92% 0,484 0,448 93% 0,019 2% 0,001 0% 0,019 4%

Irritation2 5309 1,473 90% 1,332 1,262 95% 0,019 1% 0,014 1% 0,043 3%

Positive Work-home interf. 5288 0,830 93% 0,770 0,709 92% 0,018 2% 0,002 0% 0,040 5%

Occ. self-efficacy 5306 0,412 91% 0,376 0,341 91% 0,004 1% 0,001 0% 0,029 8%

Life Satisfaction 5293 1,139 92% 1,044 0,988 95% 0,020 2% 0,005 0% 0,030 3%

General Health 5293 0,520 97% 0,502 0,486 97% 0,007 1% 0,001 0% 0,008 2%

Organizational Comm. 5304 0,527 88% 0,466 0,405 87% 0,035 8% 0,006 1% 0,021 5%

Intention to quit 5330 0,824 93% 0,770 0,668 87% 0,037 5% 0,001 0% 0,065 8%

Perceived Performance 5319 0,272 90% 0,245 0,228 93% 0,010 4% 0,001 0% 0,005 2%

The outcome variables in the employee model are largely dependent on individual factors (explained variance ranging from 87% through 97%). On the higher levels, including organization, sector, and country, none of the variables is considerably dependent on each of these levels. Especially sector hardly has any influence (explained variance 0% and 1%). The organizational level explains some variation (up to 8%) attitudes with respect to the organization and the job, such as organizational commitment and job satisfaction. Health indicators are not dependent on organizational factors. Country does have some influence on these variables (up to 9%).

2 Note that Work-related Mood: Anxiety-Contentment, Work-related Mood: Depression-Enthusiasm, and Irritation are negative. A high score on one of these variables represents a high levels of Irritation, and mental strains.


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Table 16 Explained variances of the intervening variables

N No

Control Controlled

(100%) Individual Organization Sector Country Content employers obligations 5271 20,904 92% 19,212 17,519 91% 1,125 6% 0,212 1% 0,483 3%

Content employees obligations 5284 17,540 96% 16,808 14,787 88% 1,002 6% 0,345 2% 0,884 5%

Delivery deal Employers obl. 4999 0,701 91% 0,640 0,586 92% 0,037 6% 0,000 0% 0,020 3%

Delivery deal Employees obl. 5188 0,257 91% 0,235 0,216 92% 0,007 3% 0,000 0% 0,011 5%

Trust 5285 1,013 93% 0,941 0,839 89% 0,066 7% 0,002 0% 0,035 4%

Fairness 5294 0,868 92% 0,799 0,714 89% 0,048 6% 0,004 0% 0,037 5%

Trust/fairness combined (state) 5297 0,818 92% 0,753 0,666 88% 0,051 7% 0,003 0% 0,035 5%

Violation of PC 5183 0,745 91% 0,678 0,614 90% 0,044 7% 0,002 0% 0,024 4%

Core HR Practices 5118 4,019 94% 3,788 3,425 90% 0,396 10% 0,127 3% 0,113 3%

Employability 5310 1,118 88% 0,984 0,861 88% 0,040 4% 0,000 0% 0,087 9%

Job Insecurity 5311 0,973 83% 0,810 0,687 85% 0,088 11% 0,007 1% 0,036 4%

Volition 5254 1,673 60% 1,004 0,955 95% 0,037 4% 0,002 0% 0,014 1%

Job of Choice 5264 1,286 87% 1,113 1,028 92% 0,043 4% 0,007 1% 0,039 3%

Profession of Choice 5174 1,510 80% 1,212 1,113 92% 0,046 4% 0,019 2% 0,041 3%

Work of Choice (interaction Item) 5161 56,082 82% 45,718 41,563 91% 1,951 4% 0,855 2% 1,679 4%

Role Clarity Single Item 5267 0,684 93% 0,634 0,584 92% 0,027 4% 0,003 1% 0,021 3%

Role Clarity 2-items 5312 0,391 91% 0,357 0,330 92% 0,016 5% 0,002 0% 0,011 3%

Autonomy 5291 0,807 74% 0,596 0,519 87% 0,050 8% 0,014 2% 0,016 3%

Skill Utilization 5296 0,890 69% 0,613 0,532 87% 0,048 8% 0,034 6% 0,007 1%

Workload 5322 0,785 82% 0,647 0,547 85% 0,075 12% 0,006 1% 0,036 6%

Social support supervisor 5309 1,042 78% 0,812 0,745 92% 0,040 5% 0,005 1% 0,026 3%

POS 5324 0,793 94% 0,748 0,675 90% 0,067 9% 0,002 0% 0,007 1%

With respect to the intervening variables, more or less the same order of importance of levels appears. The individual level explains 85% through 95% of the variance, the organizational level 3% through 12%, the sector level 0% through 6% for skill utilization, and the country level 1% through 9% for employability.

Table 17 Explained variables for the non-permanent specific questions

N No

Control Controlled

(100%) Individual Organization Sector Country Contract Expectations 1854 1,241 94% 1,160 0,931 80% 0,165 14% 0,014 1% 0,036 3%

Expecting perm. Con. 1 item 1773 1,870 94% 1,754 1,505 86% 0,152 9% 0,006 0% 0,108 6%

Difficult finding permanent 1765 2,211 91% 2,022 1,723 85% 0,242 12% 0,015 1% 0,036 2%

Suits better 1755 2,487 86% 2,147 1,757 82% 0,197 9% 0,031 1% 0,195 9%

Gives me higher salary 1749 1,405 90% 1,257 1,071 85% 0,124 10% 0,023 2% 0,059 5%

Gives me more freedom 1762 1,894 90% 1,706 1,529 90% 0,063 4% 0,009 1% 0,121 7%

Hope to get permanent 1783 2,295 93% 2,140 1,758 82% 0,263 12% 0,004 0% 0,113 5%

Provides me extra income 1750 1,988 77% 1,536 1,383 90% 0,113 7% 0,013 1% 0,050 3%

To gain experience 1762 2,217 92% 2,040 1,872 92% 0,119 6% 0,010 1% 0,051 3%

Came with the job 1778 2,295 88% 2,015 1,806 90% 0,167 8% 0,006 0% 0,046 2%

Only contract I could get 1698 2,350 97% 2,285 2,070 91% 0,084 4% 0,043 2% 0,105 5%


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With respect to the motives of non-permanent workers to accept a temporary job, more or less the same order of importance of levels appears. The individual level explains 80% through 91% of the variance, the organizational level 4% through 12%, the sector level 0% through 2%, and the country level 2% through 7%.


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4.2 Similarities and differences across countries In this section we will discuss the differences between countries in the intervening and dependent variables in the PSYCONES model. By using mixed models, the control variables (individual, work related, and organizational)3 are taken into account as covariates. In addition, COMPANY is included as a random factor, because the data is nested into the organizations. Therefore, the actual influence should take into account the organization in which the respondents are employed. COUNTRY is included as a fixed factor. Covariates and fixed factors are included as main effects. The F-score in the tables represent the controlled effect of COUNTRY on the variables in the PSYCONES-model. The means in the following tables are the modified population marginal means.

To measure differences between countries, post hoc tests (Bonferroni) are used. When a country scores significantly different (maximum of p < .05) compared to four countries, the difference is signalled using bold fonts.

Table 18 Post-hoc analyses on dependent variables


Work Involvement 5315 41,08*** 2,54 3,01 2,54 2,64 2,34 2,72 3,18

Job Satisfaction 5331 11,46*** 3,75 4,16 4,16 4,10 3,71 4,00 4,02

Sick leave 5268 6,15*** 2,10 1,84 1,95 1,80 2,19 1,79 2,03

Sick presence 5249 29,75*** 2,54 2,52 2,09 2,31 2,61 2,78 3,01

Accidents 5264 3,65** 1,25 1,13 1,12 1,14 1,21 1,20 1,17

Incidents 5252 1,88 1,27 1,19 1,23 1,22 1,34 1,19 1,20

Work-Related Mood: Anxiety- Contentment

5295 19,60*** 2,26 2,62 2,24 2,45 2,63 2,56 2,51

Work-Related Mood: Depression-Enthusiasm 5278 16,86*** 2,06 2,27 1,84 2,00 2,26 2,01 2,11

Irritation 5309 16,71*** 2,79 2,76 2,57 2,99 2,90 3,01 3,27

Positive work-home interference

5288 23,58*** 2,62 2,61 3,00 3,09 2,81 3,04 3,14

Occ. Self-efficacy (low alpha!) 5306 46,63*** 3,90 3,68 3,94 3,81 4,07 3,96 4,30

Life satisfaction 5293 15,91*** 4,96 5,02 5,51 5,24 5,02 5,33 5,28

General health - SF-36 5293 8,62*** 4,01 3,88 3,98 3,83 3,85 4,02 4,10

Perceived Performance 5304 7,70*** 4,00 4,08 4,04 4,04 3,97 3,92 4,17

Organizational Commitment 5330 12,51*** 3,67 3,92 3,93 3,92 3,92 4,10 4,18

Intention to quit 5319 29,40*** 2,27 1,43 1,76 1,73 2,21 1,66 1,85

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Looking at work involvement, the UK scores significantly lower compared to the other countries, while Germany and Israel score significantly higher. The UK also scores lower on job satisfaction, together with Sweden. On the health-related variables, there are many differences between countries. Sick presence is interesting; Israel scores higher compared to all countries but Spain. Sweden and the Netherlands report low scores on Work-Related Mood: Anxiety-Contentment. The

3 Individual: age, gender, education, living condition, financial contribution, dependents, homework; Work related: position (occupation) tenure, working hours, union membership, supervision, main job vs other paid job, night shifts; Core hr practices, type of contract.


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Dutch employees also score low on the other psychological factor, work-related mood: Depression-Enthusiasm, while Germany and the UK report high levels of this variable. With respect to irritation, again, Dutch employees report a low mean, and Israel reports high levels of irritation. Germany and Sweden have a low mean with regard to positive work-home interference, and German employees also report low occupational self-efficacy. With respect to life satisfaction, Dutch employees report high levels of satisfaction, while Swedish employees are relatively less satisfied (although they still report a high level of life satisfaction). Belgian employees report the lowest general health. With respect to the organizational attitudes, Israel again takes an interesting position. They score (significantly) highest on perceived performance and organizational commitment. With regard to the latter, Sweden scores significantly lower compared to other countries. This could affect intention to quit, on which Sweden scores high, together with the UK. The German data on the other hand show a low intention to quit.

Table 19 Post-hoc analyses on intervening variables


Content employers obligations 5271 17,24*** 8,16 8,12 8,94 8,52 10,34 9,47 7,76

Content employees obligations 5284 9,42*** 12,35 13,61 12,01 13,49 14,77 14,59 13,10

Delivery of the deal, employers obligations

4999 9,06*** 3,50 4,01 3,72 3,77 3,73 3,68 3,62

Delivery of the deal employees obligations

5188 20,11*** 4,17 4,46 4,20 4,24 4,34 4,35 4,45

Trust 5285 9,84*** 2,93 3,41 3,40 3,40 3,05 3,26 3,00

Fairness 5294 14,11*** 2,71 3,44 3,42 3,39 3,09 3,23 2,92

Trust & Fairness Combined 5297 13,30*** 2,95 3,43 3,41 3,40 3,08 3,35 2,95

Violation of Psychological Contract

5183 10,23*** 2,40 2,13 2,18 2,08 2,36 2,13 2,55

HR practices 5118 6,72*** 3,35 3,55 4,22 3,77 4,19 3,33 3,70

Employability 5310 32,76*** 3,23 2,54 3,10 2,95 3,52 3,34 3,42

Job insecurity 5311 9,74** 2,18 2,54 2,36 2,29 2,52 2,12 1,93

Volition 5254 5,44*** 3,31 3,44 3,47 3,58 3,35 3,25 3,20

Job of choice 5264 12,72*** 3,28 3,85 3,66 3,90 3,55 3,77 3,88

Profession of choice 5174 13,46*** 3,20 3,76 3,54 3,73 3,58 3,81 3,90

Work of choice (interaction term) 5161 13,23*** 11,50 14,91 13,93 15,00 13,90 15,31 16,01

Role Clarity - 1-item 5267 11,37*** 4,20 4,54 4,27 4,35 4,18 4,13 4,48

Role Clarity - 2-items 5312 9,61*** 4,34 4,53 4,36 4,42 4,36 4,27 4,56

Autonomy 5291 6,54*** 3,45 3,28 3,41 3,36 3,40 3,31 3,70

Skill Utilization 5296 3,32** 3,56 3,67 3,55 3,50 3,36 3,55 3,68

Workload 5322 11,52*** 3,33 3,09 2,82 2,86 3,12 2,90 3,32

Perceived Organisational Support 5309 2,29* 3,28 3,19 3,29 3,42 3,12 3,31 3,39

Social Support (Supervisor) 5324 10,57*** 3,25 3,65 3,55 3,39 3,61 3,73 3,73

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 With respect to the psychological contract, the sample shows that employees in the UK expect more from their organizations in comparison to employees in the other countries. Together with Spain, UK workers also promise significantly more compared to other


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countries, while Dutch employees in the sample promise less compared to their colleagues from other countries. The data also show that fulfilment of the employer’s obligations is highest in Germany. Swedish and Dutch workers generally fulfil their promises less compared to the other countries. With respect to the variables measuring the state of the PC, Swedish workers score low, together with Israel. However, Israel also report a low violation of the PC.

Looking at job expectations, German employees score lowest on employability. On job insecurity however, Israel scores significantly lower compared to most countries. On the choice-variables, Sweden shows low scores. On job of choice, profession of choice, and the interaction term of work of choice, Sweden scores significantly lower compared to the other countries, except for the UK. With respect to the job characteristics, three results stand out; Israel scores high on the role clarity variables, while the UK scores lowest on skill utilization. Dutch workers report a low workload. With respect to social support from the supervisor Sweden has the lowest mean.

Table 20 Post-hoc analyses on temporary specific variables


Contract expectations 1854 3,39** 3,64 3,41 3,40 3,77 3,24 3,76 3,76

Expecting permanent contract - single item

1773 8,95*** 1,83 1,34 2,11 2,20 1,62 2,32 2,24

Difficult finding permanent 1765 2,36* 2,51 2,61 2,25 2,27 2,01 2,56 2,08

Suits better 1755 9,17*** 2,66 2,45 1,94 2,04 3,32 2,28 2,82

Gives me higher salary 1749 6,52*** 2,07 1,65 1,42 1,71 2,30 1,94 1,93

Gives me more freedom 1762 12,64*** 2,39 1,71 1,91 1,97 3,01 2,33 2,41

Hope to get permanent 1783 5,71*** 2,89 3,59 3,52 3,76 2,94 3,84 3,18

Provides me extra income 1750 3,77** 2,39 1,84 1,92 2,01 2,37 1,97 1,75

To gain experience 1762 4,44*** 2,84 2,90 2,70 2,82 3,23 3,40 2,72

Came with the job 1778 3,32** 3,52 3,08 3,32 3,46 3,33 3,47 3,91

Only contract I could get 1698 8,38*** 3,18 4,00 3,52 3,13 2,68 3,33 3,34

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 The table above shows the results for the temporary-specific variables. The expectation of a permanent contract among temporary workers is lowest in Germany and highest in Spain. Looking at the motives for temporary work, the Dutch employees in our sample show the lowest score on voluntary motives for accepting temporary work. Temps from the UK show the highest score on voluntary motives.


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4.3 Similarities and differences across sectors In this section we will discuss the differences between sectors in the intervening and dependent variables of the PSYCONES model. We have to take into account that the amount of explained variance by the sector level is very low. By using mixed models, the control variables (individual, work related, and organizational)4 are taken into account as covariates. In addition, COMPANY is included as a random factor, because the data is nested into the organizations. Therefore, the actual influence should take into account the organization in which the respondents are employed. SECTOR is included as a fixed factor. The F-score in the tables represent the controlled effect of SECTOR on the variables in the PSYCONES-model. We assume that these sectors are the same in all countries, and therefore, we do not control for COUNTRY effects. The means in the following tables are the modified population marginal means. To measure differences between sectors, post hoc tests (Bonferroni) are used. In the following tables, only the differences that are significant are signalled, unless stated otherwise in the tables. When a sector is significantly different form the two other sectors, bold fonts signal the significance.

Table 21 Post-hoc analyses on dependent variables

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Work Involvement 5315 3,68* 2,68 2,78 2,67

Job Satisfaction 5331 2,55 3,92 4,01 4,03

Sick leave 5268 3,33* 1,90 1,92 2,05

Sick presence 5249 8,29*** 2,40 2,60 2,65

Accidents 5264 3,34* 1,13 1,19 1,19

Incidents 5252 7,62** 1,17 1,22 1,32

Work-Related Mood: Anxiety- Contentm. (n) 5295 2,20 2,44 2,45 2,52

Work-Related Mood: Depression-Enthus. (n) 5278 0,82 2,08 2,05 2,10

Irritation (n) 5309 18,13*** 2,78 2,80 3,11

Positive work-home interference 5288 2,86 2,88 2,96 2,86

Occupational Self-efficacy (R>M) 5306 4,57* 3,92 4,00 3,94

Life satisfaction (M>E) 5293 5,93** 5,29 5,19 5,10

General health - SF-36 5293 5,54** 3,99 3,99 3,88

Perceived Performance 5304 1,31 4,02 4,06 4,02

Organizational Commitment 5330 8,24*** 3,99 4,01 3,84

Intention to quit 5319 1,59 1,80 1,84 1,90

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 The division between sectors generates still fewer differences compared to the countries. Looking at the significance of SECTOR with respect to the dependent variables, some have an influence on the dependent variables. Employees in the manufacturing sector report a lower sick presence. Workers in the educational sector report relatively more incidents (though the number is very low). The data also show a high level of irritation among employees in the educational sector, and a lower self-reported general health. Finally, sector

4 Individual: age, gender, education, living condition, financial contribution, dependents, homework; Work related: position (occupation) tenure, working hours, union membership, supervision, main job vs other paid job, night shifts; Core hr practices, type of contract.


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influences organizational commitment, with education scoring lower compared to manufacturing and retail & sales.

Table 22 Post-hoc analyses on intervening variables

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Content employers obligations 5271 8,44*** 8,64 9,33 8,25

Content employees obligations 5284 19,92*** 12,15 14,29 12,81


4999 0,04 3,71 3,71 3,73


5188 2,77 4,32 4,34 4,28

Trust 5285 1,78 3,22 3,26 3,14

Fairness 5294 3,26* 3,25 3,25 3,12

Trust & Fairness Combined 5297 2,75 3,24 3,25 3,13

Violation of Psychological Contract 5183 2,01 2,23 2,23 2,32

HR Practices 5118 6,70** 3,64 4,01 3,53

Employability 5310 1,54 3,10 3,16 3,20

Job insecurity 5311 6,30** 2,42 2,21 2,21

Volition 5254 1,36 3,37 3,42 3,33

Job of choice 5264 9,40*** 3,68 3,58 3,84

Profession of choice 5174 22,76*** 3,55 3,49 3,89

Work of choice (interaction term) 5161 24,20*** 13,87 13,30 15,93

Role Clarity - 1-item (E>R) 5267 6,63** 4,31 4,39 4,22

Role Clarity - 2-items (E>R) 5312 5,43** 4,41 4,46 4,35

Autonomy 5291 20,19*** 3,30 3,33 3,61

Skill Utilization 5296 48,02*** 3,39 3,42 3,85

Workload (E>M) 5322 4,55* 2,97 3,07 3,15

Perceived Organisational Support 5309 2,01 3,27 3,35 3,24

Social Support (Supervisor) (M>E) 5324 5,35** 3,57 3,64 3,47

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 Looking at the variables measuring the psychological contract, the effect of sector is weak. Only the content of the obligations from both employers and employees is significant; workers in the manufacturing sector report higher expectations from both the employer and themselves. In addition, workers in the Retail and Sales sector experience to have significantly more HR practices compared to the other two sectors. Workers in the manufacturing sector report a higher level of job insecurity.

The variables measuring choice (except volition) do have a significant relationship with sector. In addition, employees in the educational sector report a higher job, profession, and work of choice compared to the other sectors. Sector also influences job characteristics; with respect to autonomy and skill utilization, educational workers score higher compared to manufacturing and retail and sales. Finally, none of the sectors is different from the other sectors on variables measuring the relationship with the organization/supervisor.


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Table 23 Post-hoc analyses on temporary specific variables

N F Man Ret & S Edu

Contract expectations 1854 3,98* 3,61 3,70 3,40

Expecting permanent contract - single item

1773 0,16 1,96 1,99 1,92

Difficult finding permanent (M>R) 1765 3,21* 2,52 2,15 2,37

Suits better (R>E) 1755 6,39** 2,45 2,73 2,16

Gives me higher salary 1749 6,78** 1,96 1,97 1,56

Gives me more freedom 1762 1,88 2,23 2,29 2,04

Hope to get permanent 1783 ,60 3,56 3,38 3,43

Provides me extra income 1750 6,01** 2,16 2,14 1,75

To gain experience 1762 ,92 3,05 2,94 2,83

Came with the job (E>R) 1778 5,27** 3,34 3,22 3,67

Only contract I could get 1698 8,56*** 3,22 3,11 3,69

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 The last table in this section shows the influence and the comparison of sectors on variables specific for temporary workers. In our sample, temps working in the educational sector show low scores on voluntary motives such as ‘It gives me a higher salary’, and ‘provides me extra income’. They also show the lowest score on the involuntary motive ‘Only contract I could get’.


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4.4 Interaction terms This paragraph describes the influence of country and sector on the relationship between:

a. the type of contract on the outcome variables; b. the psychological contract variables and outcome variables.

The influence of country and sector on these relationships can be assessed by analysing the effect of the interaction terms between psychological contract variables and country/sector on the outcome variables. These interaction terms are added to the regressions performed for working packages 5 and 6. In the analyses, all psychological contract variables are included, since there is no theoretical reason to include or exclude variables. The interaction product variables are calculated from dummy-codings for countries and sectors. As in WP5 and 6, for the countries Israel is used as the comparison country, and for the sectors Retail is the comparison sector. When interaction product variables are included in a regression when the main effects are also included, multicollinearity should be controlled (Fisher, 1988), therefore, we checked the correlations between the one-way product terms and the individual variables and there were no problems with high intercorrelations. The results of the analyses are presented in tables 24 through 26. There are not many significant interaction effects. The chances of obtaining a significant result that is only (statistical) coincidence is for p <.05 1 in 20. Since we included many interaction terms in the regression equation, we will only discuss the interaction effects in the text with a significance level < .01. We will further analyse and discuss these interaction effects by presenting figures with graphs that depict the interaction effects. Because the psychological contract variables are assessed by the employers for their permanent and temporary employees separately, our analyses are performed for permanents and temporaries separately.

Table 23 Regressions including country and sector interactions, part 1

Occ. Self-efficacy

Positive work-home

WRM: Anxiety-

WRM: Depression

Irritation

Adjusted R2 ,36 ,27 ,39 ,45 ,28 F-value for R2 change 46,93*** 12,25*** 49,31*** 29,57*** 31,15***

N = 3243 3236 3233 3226 3235 Sweden x Type of contract -,258** -,024 -,060 -,032 ,061 Germany x Type of contract -,087 -,183** -,057 ,022 -,022 Netherlands x Type of contract -,151* -,164* -,045 -,053 -,010 Belgium x Type of contract -,186** -,072 ,049 ,056 ,057 Spain x Type of contract -,047 -,158 -,050 ,090 ,006 UK x Type of contract -,115 -,150* ,119 ,084 ,113 Sweden x Content employers obligations ,090 ,050 ,089 ,067 ,047 Germany x Content employers obligations ,076 ,067 ,025 ,036 ,063 Netherlands x Content employers obligations ,095 -,004 ,092 ,109 ,038 Belgium x Content employers obligations ,038 -,017 ,051 ,022 ,058 Spain x Content employers obligations ,019 ,009 ,043 -,005 ,040 UK x Content employers obligations ,061 -,071 ,065 ,011 ,026 Sweden x Content employees obligations -,035 -,023 ,001 -,022 ,043 Germany x Content employees obligations ,023 -,029 ,028 ,062 -,029 Netherlands x Content employees obligations -,034 ,023 -,046 -,009 -,012 Belgium x Content employees obligations ,039 ,103 -,046 ,002 -,083 Spain x Content employees obligations -,005 ,154 -,058 -,031 -,112 UK x Content employees obligations ,083 ,216 -,039 -,004 ,021


42

Occ. Self-efficacy

Positive work-home

WRM: Anxiety-

WRM: Depression

Irritation

Sweden x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,109 ,138 ,087 ,024 ,004 Germany x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,157 -,027 ,045 ,041 ,093 Netherlands x Delivery of the Deal Employers Oblig. -,019 -,201 ,212 ,139 ,153 Belgium x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,201 ,010 ,075 ,006 ,001 Spain x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,003 -,039 -,002 ,042 ,065 UK x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,153 -,053 ,117 ,062 ,188 Sweden x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,239 -,163 ,139 ,369* ,035 Germany x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,113 ,088 ,447* ,265 -,084 Netherlands x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. -,167 -,044 -,018 ,184 -,213 Belgium x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,321 ,036 ,231 ,363* ,010 Spain x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations ,188 -,068 ,222 ,082 -,243 UK x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,100 -,077 ,398* ,345 ,065 Sweden x trust -,084 ,107 ,094 -,059 ,010 Germany x trust -,127 ,072 ,152 -,146 ,079 Netherlands x trust -,157 ,112 ,181 ,026 ,088 Belgium x trust -,021 ,053 -,036 -,174 ,039 Spain x trust -,129 ,076 ,048 -,109 ,016 UK x trust -,082 ,069 ,171 -,081 ,120 Sweden x fairness -,158 -,034 ,074 ,054 -,035 Germany x fairness -,107 ,060 -,227* -,148 -,185 Netherlands x fairness ,092 ,015 -,106 ,035 -,077 Belgium x fairness ,023 ,059 ,029 ,023 -,181 Spain x fairness -,059 ,041 -,096 -,033 -,221* UK x fairness -,172 -,019 -,144 ,061 -,155

Adjusted R2 ,37 ,27 ,40 ,46 ,28 F-value for R2 change 1,72** 1,13 1,81** 2,10*** 1,36

N = 3201 3194 3191 3184 3193 Manufacturing x Type of contract ,101 ,019 ,066 ,105 ,030 Education x Type of contract -,085 -,028 ,037 ,051 -,090 Manufacturing x Content employers obligations ,051 ,010 ,066 -,020 ,025 Education x Content employers obligations -,024 ,084 ,036 ,012 ,022 Manufacturing x Content employees obligations ,050 -,021 ,057 -,083 ,041 Education x Content employees obligations -,023 -,032 ,042 ,005 ,089 Manufacturing x Delivery of the Deal Employers Oblig. ,173 ,264* ,044 -,138 ,296** Education x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,085 ,194 ,139 ,109 ,198 Manufacturing x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. ,174 -,014 -,058 ,076 ,061 Education x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. ,054 -,074 -,217 -,132 ,004 Manufacturing x trust -,008 -,019 -,182 -,020 -,315** Education x trust ,037 -,168 -,043 ,075 ,131 Manufacturing x fairness -,143 -,283* ,248* ,244* ,224* Education x fairness -,109 -,114 ,159 ,217* -,117

Adjusted R2 ,37 ,27 ,40 ,47 ,29 F-value for R2 change 1,65 1,36 1,40 2,98*** 2,75***

N = 3187 3180 3177 3170 3179

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 These first regressions on the employee-level variables show some interesting interaction effects. Sweden and Belgium, combined with type of contract, show a significantly different effect on Occupational self-efficacy compared to Israel (Figure 6).


43

Figure 6: The relationship between occupational self-efficacy and type of contract in Sweden, Belgium, and Israel

3,80

3,90

4,00

4,10

4,20

4,30

Occ

upat

iona

l Sel

f-ef

ficac

y

3,91

3,87

Sweden Belgium

Israel

3,83

3,71

no yes

type of contract

3,80

3,90

4,00

4,10

4,20

4,30

Occ

upat

iona

l Sel

f-ef

ficac

y

4,24

4,35

In Belgium and Sweden, occupational self-efficacy is lower for permanent workers. In Israel, the relationship reversed; temporary workers have a lower occupational self-efficacy. Type of contract has a different effect on positive work-home interference in Germany, as compared to Israel (see Figure 7).


44

Figure 7: The relationship between positive work-home interference and type of contract in Germany and Israel

no yes

type of contract

2,60

2,80

3,00

3,20

Pos

itive

wor

k-ho

me

inte

rfer

ence

2,602,57

Germany Israel

no yes

type of contract

3,10

3,35

With respect to sector, there is an effect related to irritation. In the manufacturing sector the Delivery of the Deal of Employers Obligations has a u-shaped relationship with trust, whereas in the Retail sector higher irritation is related to a lower delivery of the deal by employers. These effects are shown in Figure 8. Figure 8: The relationship between the delivery of the deal and irritation in Manufacturing and Retail.

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00


2,25

2,50

2,75

3,00

3,25

Irri

tatio

n

Manufacturing Retail or Service

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00



45


Sick Leave Sick

Presence Accidents Incidents Job

Satisfaction Adjusted R2 ,12 ,16 ,08 ,08 ,61

F-value for R2 change 2,67** 6,22*** 1,14 2,70** 93,27*** N = 3227 3226 3233 3226 3243

Sweden x Type of contract ,214* -,018 ,168 ,111 -,009 Germany x Type of contract ,043 -,149* ,033 ,107 ,008 Netherlands x Type of contract ,131 -,233* ,004 ,133 ,000 Belgium x Type of contract -,029 -,048 ,075 ,148 -,105* Spain x Type of contract ,154 -,063 ,089 ,212* -,092 UK x Type of contract ,072 -,023 ,055 ,200* -,051 Sweden x Content employers obligations ,021 ,061 -,065 -,160* ,089* Germany x Content employers obligations ,038 ,040 -,016 -,127* ,080* Netherlands x Content employers obligations ,143* ,150* ,040 -,036 ,011 Belgium x Content employers obligations ,154* ,082 -,024 -,130* ,104* Spain x Content employers obligations ,014 -,052 ,029 -,084 ,200*** UK x Content employers obligations ,046 -,020 -,046 -,142 ,086 Sweden x Content employees obligations ,145 -,017 ,027 ,165 -,141* Germany x Content employees obligations ,010 ,074 ,050 -,038 -,148* Netherlands x Content employees obligations -,030 -,008 ,026 ,017 -,101 Belgium x Content employees obligations -,040 -,110 ,091 ,066 -,093 Spain x Content employees obligations ,029 ,095 ,053 -,002 -,102 UK x Content employees obligations -,053 ,071 ,059 ,045 -,064 Sweden x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations -,089 -,167 -,268* -,194 -,078 Germany x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,073 ,261 -,072 -,170 -,024 Netherlands x Delivery of the Deal Employers Oblig. -,069 ,048 ,074 ,066 -,004 Belgium x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations -,078 ,067 -,017 -,035 -,085 Spain x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,139 -,031 -,117 ,019 -,023 UK x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,089 ,210 -,035 -,015 -,075 Sweden x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,293 -,591** -,030 ,131 -,133 Germany x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,005 -,568* ,318 ,103 -,144 Netherlands x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. ,263 -,523* -,138 -,066 -,117 Belgium x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations ,166 -,545* -,121 ,040 -,182 Spain x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,329 -,629** ,386 ,142 ,118 UK x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations ,145 -,630** -,131 ,127 ,120 Sweden x trust -,098 -,039 ,065 ,233* ,052 Germany x trust ,059 -,137 ,047 ,205 -,064 Netherlands x trust ,192 ,042 ,067 ,154 -,069 Belgium x trust -,008 -,160 ,157 -,107 -,034 Spain x trust ,107 -,002 ,128 ,114 -,086 UK x trust -,072 -,005 ,107 ,110 ,081 Sweden x fairness ,030 -,160 -,068 -,380** -,124 Germany x fairness -,052 -,267* -,114 -,161 -,016 Netherlands x fairness -,313* -,277* -,114 -,137 -,103 Belgium x fairness -,207 -,021 -,062 ,153 ,089 Spain x fairness -,166 -,156 -,249* -,258* ,068 UK x fairness ,012 -,290* -,144 -,222 -,172*

Adjusted R2 ,13 ,17 ,08 ,08 ,61 F-value for R2 change 1,86** 1,99*** 1,01 1,50* 2,49***

N = 3185 3184 3191 3184 3201 Manufacturing x Type of contract ,004 ,031 -,132 ,043 -,168** Education x Type of contract ,026 -,013 -,020 -,022 -,084 Manufacturing x Content employers obligations -,043 -,037 -,065 ,017 ,047 Education x Content employers obligations ,016 ,006 -,129* ,054 ,013 Manufacturing x Content employees obligations -,042 -,089 -,020 -,133 ,044 Education x Content employees obligations -,034 -,068 ,129 -,031 -,060 Manufacturing x Delivery of the Deal Employers Oblig. ,182 ,117 -,028 -,016 ,011 Education x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,155 ,040 ,175 -,074 -,159 Manufacturing x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. -,393* ,203 -,305 ,280 ,109 Education x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. -,259 ,106 -,152 ,248 -,088


46

Sick Leave Sick

Presence Accidents Incidents Job

Satisfaction Manufacturing x trust -,071 -,172 -,200 -,213 -,043 Education x trust ,076 -,065 -,110 -,139 -,064 Manufacturing x fairness -,026 ,161 ,234 ,241 -,059 Education x fairness -,073 ,148 ,165 ,124 -,084

Adjusted R2 ,13 ,17 ,08 ,08 ,62 F-value for R2 change ,78 ,80 1,58 ,79 3,21***

N = 3171 3170 3177 3170 3187

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 With respect to sick presence, the Delivery of the Deal of Employees obligations shows a number of significant effects related to different relationships in countries. Figure 7 shows the relationships in Sweden, Spain, and the UK. Israel shows a non linear relation, with a higher delivery for employees with low or high sick presence. In Spain, sick presence increase slightly with a higher delivery of the deal, whereas in the UK the opposite seem to be the case. The profile of Sweden is mixed, and hard to interpret. Figure 9: the relationship between the delivery of the deal and sick presence in Sweden, the UK, Spain, and Israel

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Sic

k pr

esen

ce

Sweden UK

Spain Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00


1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Sic

k pr

esen

ce

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00



47

With respect to incidents, the interaction between Sweden and Fairness is significant (see Figure 10). The graphs, however, show no real clear-cut differences. Figure 10: The relationship between fairness and incidents in Sweden and Israel.

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Inci

dent

s

Sweden Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

Two interactions are significant with respect to Accidents. In Spain the relation between the content of the employees obligations and accidents (see Figure 11), and in Manufacturing the relation between accidents and the Type of Contract (see Figure 12). Hard to explain is the relation between the content of employee obligations and accidents in Spain, which is different from the positive relationship in Israel. Figure 11: The relationship between the content of employees obligations and accidents in Spain and Israel

0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00

Content employees obligations

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Acc

iden

ts

Spain Israel

0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00

Content employees obligations


48

In manufacturing permanent employees report less accidents, while in retail permanent employees report more accidents. Figure 12: the relationship between accidents and type of contract in Manufacturing and Retail

Non-permanent Permanent

type of contract

1,16

1,20

1,24

1,28

Acc

iden

ts

1,28

1,23

Manufacturing Retail or Service


type of contract

1,15

1,22


Org. Com-

mitment Intention to

quit Perceived Perform.

General Health

Life Satisfaction

Adjusted R2 ,54 ,48 ,37 ,12 ,23 F-value for R2 change 39,59*** 46,44*** 50,23*** 9,10*** 22,88***

N = 3243 3242 3236 3238 3236 Sweden x Type of contract -,086 ,028 -,091 -,132 ,009 Germany x Type of contract -,106 -,135* -,094 -,091 ,008 Netherlands x Type of contract -,158* -,112 -,089 ,052 ,033 Belgium x Type of contract -,188** ,021 -,083 -,065 -,028 Spain x Type of contract ,008 -,052 -,199* -,070 -,030 UK x Type of contract -,050 -,060 -,190** -,065 ,030 Sweden x Content employers obligations -,039 -,010 ,080 -,006 -,010 Germany x Content employers obligations -,025 ,035 ,037 -,086 ,050 Netherlands x Content employers obligations -,027 ,074 ,104 -,089 -,019 Belgium x Content employers obligations -,012 -,025 ,024 -,086 -,011 Spain x Content employers obligations -,033 -,113 ,002 -,065 -,043 UK x Content employers obligations -,030 -,036 ,076 ,063 ,021 Sweden x Content employees obligations ,000 ,064 -,008 -,118 -,118 Germany x Content employees obligations -,071 ,059 ,016 -,015 -,203* Netherlands x Content employees obligations -,127 ,031 -,105 ,059 -,092 Belgium x Content employees obligations -,094 ,050 ,006 ,062 ,015 Spain x Content employees obligations -,107 -,010 -,119 ,191 ,085 UK x Content employees obligations -,033 ,021 -,133 -,006 -,229* Sweden x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,075 ,023 ,005 -,067 -,125 Germany x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,003 -,042 ,005 -,239 ,010 Netherlands x Delivery of the Deal Employers Oblig. -,048 -,069 -,132 -,079 ,001 Belgium x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations -,064 ,075 ,074 -,240 -,075 Spain x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations -,118 ,010 -,004 -,212 -,213 UK x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,058 ,002 ,127 ,008 -,067 Sweden x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,067 ,359* -,196 -,050 -,300 Germany x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations ,270 ,440* -,014 ,117 -,628* Netherlands x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. -,041 ,286 -,280 -,178 -,138 Belgium x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations -,093 ,376* -,347 ,059 -,115 Spain x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations ,395* ,333* ,119 ,296 ,088 UK x Delivery of the Deal Employees Obligations ,163 ,182 -,597** -,070 -,031


49

Org. Com-

mitment Intention to

quit Perceived Perform.

General Health

Life Satisfaction

Sweden x trust ,064 -,104 ,103 ,083 -,020 Germany x trust ,047 -,082 ,103 -,113 -,017 Netherlands x trust -,013 ,028 -,025 -,051 -,148 Belgium x trust ,122 -,121 ,091 -,026 -,194 Spain x trust -,096 -,007 ,144 ,013 ,027 UK x trust -,071 -,014 ,167 -,171 -,085 Sweden x fairness ,049 -,038 -,128 ,022 ,233* Germany x fairness ,042 ,172 -,280* ,333* ,326** Netherlands x fairness ,068 ,130 -,029 ,230 ,178 Belgium x fairness ,082 ,019 -,054 ,212 ,318** Spain x fairness ,213** -,122 -,283** ,086 ,193 UK x fairness ,186* ,071 -,146 ,010 ,119

Adjusted R2 ,54 ,49 ,37 ,12 ,23 F-value for R2 change 1,90*** 2,22*** 1,76** 1,23 1,29

N = 3201 3200 3194 3196 3194 Manufacturing x Type of contract -,009 ,064 -,020 -,086 ,008 Education x Type of contract ,037 ,039 -,097 -,055 -,018 Manufacturing x Content employers obligations -,024 -,061 -,044 ,029 ,018 Education x Content employers obligations ,075 -,040 -,065 -,138* ,024 Manufacturing x Content employees obligations ,018 ,056 ,198* ,042 ,118 Education x Content employees obligations -,030 ,044 ,058 ,198* -,015 Manufacturing x Delivery of the Deal Employers Oblig. -,077 -,048 ,131 -,259* ,233* Education x Delivery of the Deal Employers Obligations ,104 ,130 ,092 -,374** -,048 Manufacturing x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. ,001 -,129 ,104 ,042 -,256 Education x Delivery of the Deal Employees Oblig. -,258 ,031 -,067 ,163 -,125 Manufacturing x trust ,094 ,109 -,073 ,133 -,197 Education x trust ,025 ,019 ,038 -,116 -,210 Manufacturing x fairness -,072 ,070 ,053 -,010 -,080 Education x fairness ,021 ,034 -,042 ,276* ,168

Adjusted R2 ,54 ,49 ,37 ,12 ,24 F-value for R2 change 1,60 ,95 1,12 2,09* 1,54

N = 3187 3186 3180 3182 3180

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 In Figures 13 through 19 the significant interaction effects are graphically depicted. Some of the interactions are difficult to interpret. This is the case for the relationships in Figures 14, 16, and 19. Figure 13 shows that permanent employees show lower organizational commitment than non permanent employees in Belgium, whereas in Israel the opposite is the case.


50

Figure 13 The relationship between organizational commitment and type of contract in Belgium and Israel


type of contract

3,90

4,00

4,10

4,20

4,30

4,40

Org

aniz

atio

nal C

omm

itmen

t

3,93

3,81

Belgium Israel


type of contract

4,01

4,39

Figure 14 The relationship between fairness and organizational commitment in Spain and Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Org

aniz

atio

nal C

omm

itmen

t

Spain Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

Figure 15 shows, that in comparison to Israel, the difference in perceived performance between permanent and non permanent employees is much smaller in the UK.


51

Figure 15 The relationship between perceived performance and type of contract in the Uk and Israel


type of contract

4,10

4,20

4,30

Per

ceiv

ed P

erfo

rman

ce

4,01

4,03

UK Israel


type of contract

4,14

4,30

Figure 16 The relationship between delivery of the deal of employees and perceived performance in the UK and Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00


1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Per

ceiv

ed P

erfo

rman

ce

UK Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00


Figure 17 depicts that low perceived performance in Israel is related to a high degree of perceived fairness; in Spain, higher fairness is related to higher perceived performance.


52

Figure 17 The relationship between fairness and perceived performance in Spain and Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Per

ceiv

ed P

erfo

rman

ce

Spain Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

Figure 18 shows that bad general health in Retail is related to a low degree of delivery of the deal of employers; in Education, however, a high degree of delivery of the deal is related to low general health. Figure 18 The relationship between the delivery of the deal by employers and general health in Retail and Education

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00


1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

Gen

eral

hea

lth -

SF-

36

Retail or Service Education

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00



53

Figure 19 The relationship between fairness and life satisfaction in Germany, Belgium, and Israel

2,00

4,00

6,00

Life

sat

isfa

ctio

n

Germany Belgium

Israel

1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Fairness

2,00

4,00

6,00

Life

sat

isfa

ctio

n


54

4.5 Summary Only taken into account clear significant results on variables not suffering from too many missing, the conclusions on the employee level explorations are the following: 1. The major part of variance is explained by the individual level. Organization has some

effect (maximum 12% of explained variance) while country and sector have only a minor effects (maximum respectively 9% and 6% of explained variance). The few interactions country x sector are difficult to interpret.

2. There are largely more similarities between countries than differences. 3. The country differences are:

a) Sweden reports the poorest well-being. This coincides with low scores of choice variables and on social support. Also, the delivery of the employee deal and the state of the psychological contract are low in Sweden.

b) Germany reports poor well-being, in spit of high delivery of the employers’ deal. Also, Germany scores low on employability but high on work involvement.

c) The Netherlands have good well-being. This coincides with low work load and with narrow content and delivery of the psychological contract for employees.

d) Belgium keeps a middle position within the PSYCONES countries. But for low general health there are no exceptional scores on employee data..

e) UK reports low work involvement and low skill utilization. It reports the broadest content of the psychological contract (both for employers and employees). We recall from the societal data that the UK has a wide zone of negotiability, few sanctions for violations and low union density and coverage. As well-being is concerned, the UK reports low job satisfaction, high depression-enthusiasm, and high intention to quit.

f) Spain reports broad content of the psychological contract for employees. It has no exceptional scores on well-being.

g) Israel is exceptional in terms of high work involvement, high role clarity, high sick presence, high irritation, and low job insecurity. Concerning the psychological contract, Israel reports the lowest score on the state and the highest on violation.

4. There are largely more similarities between sectors than differences. 5. There is no consistent pattern in the results of the interactions with country and

sector. We tested many interactions, and there are not many significant results. Common error variance could be responsible for the significances that have been found. The general conclusion, therefore, is that the relationships between psychological contract variables and outcome variables are in general about the same in the countries we have examined. In comparison to Israel, all of the countries, expect for the Netherlands, show some different patterns of relationships, which are described above. There is no consistent country or sector effect.


55

References

• Fisher, G.A. (1988). Problems in the Use and Interpretation of Product Variables. In:

J.S. Long (Ed.), Common Problems/Proper Solutions. Avoiding Error in Quantitative Research (pp. 84-107). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

• MOCHO (2003). The rationale of motherhood choices: Influences of employment conditions and of public policies. Brussels: European Commission, HPSE-CT-2001-00096.

• Pettinger, R. (2000). The future of industrial relations. London: Continuum. • PSYCONES (2004). Societal dimensions: context of the psychological contract.

Brussels: European Commission, HPSE-CT-2002-00121. Confidential Deliverable 4.1.

• Rousseau, D.M., & Schalk, R. (2000). Learning from cross-national perspectives on psychological contracts. In: D.M. Rousseau, & R. Schalk (Eds.), Psychological contracts in employment: Cross-national perspectives (pp. 283-304). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

• Schalk, R., & Rousseau, D.M. (2001). Psychological contracts in employment. In : N. Anderson, D.S. Ones, H.K. Sinangil, & C. Viswesvaran (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial, Work and Organizational psychology. Volume 2. Organizational Psychology (pp. 134-142). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

• Schwartz, S. H. (1994a). Cultural differences across nations: A value perspective. Paper presented at the Symposium “Values and Work – A Comparative Perspective”, WORC paper 94.11.050/6, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, November 9-12 (33p.).

• Schwartz, S. H. (1994b). Beyond individualism and collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values. In: U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagicibasi, S.C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), Individualism and collectivism: Theory, methods and application. (pp. 58-119) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

• Schwartz, S. H. (1999). A theory of cultural values and some implications for work. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 48, 23-47.

• Thomas, D. C., Au, K., & Ravlin, E. (2003). Cultural variation and the psychological contract. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, 451-471.


56

APPENDIX 1 Indicator Definition and/or Operationalisation Source + year Laws and regulations Zone of negotiability Terms and conditions of employment that society allows either the

worker or the firm to negotiate. Means on 1-7 rating scale. PSYCONES 2003

Sanctions for violation Sanctions for violating terms and conditions that were negotiated. Means on 1-7 rating scale.

PSYCONES 2003

Welfare state* Percentage of GDP spent on social protection. Eurostat 2001 Social benefits for unemployment* Percentage of GDP spent on income maintenance and support in

cash or in kind in connection with unemployment. Eurostat 2000

Industrial relations system Trade union density* Percentage of gainfully employed and salary earners (excluding

unemployed). EIRO 2000

Collective bargaining coverage* Proportion of workers that have their pay or conditions set, at least to some extent, by collective agreement.

EIRO 1998-2001

Labour market and economic system GDP per capita* GDP per head in EUR. Eurostat 2002 Net annual income* Mean/median net annual income (equivalised with EU15=13420). Eurostat 1998 Total employment rate* Percentage of civilian and armed employment and all persons aged

15-64 years who during a specified brief period were in paid employment or self-employment.

Eurostat 2002

Part-time employment* Percentage of total employment. Eurostat 2003 Unemployment rate* Percentage of labour force: without employment during the reference

week; available to start work within the next 2 weeks; actively sought employment at some time during the previous 4 weeks; had no employment and had already found a job to start later.

Eurostat 2003

Educational system Educational expenditure Percentage of GDP for public and private education, all levels. OECD 2000 School expectancy Expected years of schooling of full- and part-time scholars under

current conditions, excluding children under the age of five. OECD 2001

Exposure to computers Number of personal computers per 1000 people. World Bank 2001

Family orientation Persons per household* Household: having a shared residence and common arrangements.

A household comprises either one person living alone or persons living at the same address with common housekeeping, i.e. sharing at least one meal a day or sharing a living or sitting room. Means.

Eurostat 2002

Fertility rate Average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if current fertility rates were to continue.

Eurostat 2002a

Divorces Number of divorces per 1000 people. Eurostat 2001b Female employment* Percentage of total employment (15-64 years). Eurostat 2002 Family ties Strength of family ties. Means on 1-7 rating scale. PSYCONES

2003 Attitude towards working mothers Attitude towards working mothers. Means on 1-7 rating scale. PSYCONES

2003 Cultural values Harmony Cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously in the environment. Means

on -1 to 7 scale for student samples. Schwartz 25/02/2003

Embeddedness Cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order. Means on -1 to 7 scale for student samples.

Schwartz 25/02/2003

Hierarchy Cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power roles and resources. Means on -1 to 7 scale for student samples.

Schwartz 25/02/2003

Mastery Cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion. Means on -1 to 7 scale for student samples.

Schwartz 25/02/2003

Affective autonomy Cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience. Means on -1 to 7 scale for student samples.

Schwartz 25/02/2003

Intellectual autonomy Cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions. Means on -1 to 7 scale for student samples.

Schwartz 25/02/2003

Egalitarianism Cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favour of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others. Means on -1 to 7 scale for student samples.

Schwartz 25/02/2003

* Data provided by Israelian colleagues a For Israel: World Bank 1998 b For Israel: Central Bureau of Israel 1999


57

APPENDIX 2 Organization Sector Country Percentage temporary 0,066969 0,061914 92% 0,002964 4% 0,002091 3% Prospect concerning workforce 0,487154 0,447009 92% 0,002054 0% 0,038091 8% Vacancies 0,705628 0,641624 91% 0,007151 1% 0,056853 8% Percentage Union members 1078,694 494,4616 46% 72,5607 7% 511,6716 47% Union influence: contracts 1,249143 1,048379 84% 0,093023 7% 0,107741 9% Union influence: Hr Practices 1,149694 0,814063 71% 0,031766 3% 0,303866 26% Union influences: Working con. 1,17135 0,989449 84% 0,049216 4% 0,132685 11% Content Employers Obl. perm 11,33499 9,523717 84% 0,706194 6% 1,105082 10% Content Employers Obl non-perm 13,43233 11,33572 84% 0,515006 4% 1,581609 12% Delivery Deal Employers Perm 0,302144 0,280092 93% 0,000392 0% 0,02166 7% Delivery Deal Employers non-perm 0,291515 0,269138 92% 0,000543 0% 0,021835 7% Content Employees Obl. Perm 27,14616 23,71585 87% 0,221741 1% 3,208567 12% Content Employees Obl. Non-Perm 29,85629 25,9999 87% 0,208161 1% 3,648229 12% Delivery Deal Employees Perm 0,318523 0,278557 87% 0,000136 0% 0,03983 13% Delivery Deal Employees Non-Perm 0,337718 0,285695 85% 0,005052 1% 0,046972 14% HR-Practices Permanents 0,941109 0,832505 88% 0,06758 7% 0,041024 4% HR-Practices all employees 1,885992 1,805487 96% 0,022486 1% 0,058019 3% HR-Practices non-permanents 4,042471 3,779778 94% 0,135726 3% 0,126967 3% Equal treatment 0,470002 0,426973 91% 0,001675 0% 0,041354 9% Training permanents 1074,903 866,187 81% 8,2158 1% 200,5001 19% Training non-permanents 1381,491 1139,747 83% 45,8572 3% 195,8867 14% Feedback Permanent 1648,875 1279,196 78% 208,2453 13% 161,4342 10% Feedback non-permanents 1902,714 1670,61 88% 113,4015 6% 118,703 6% Benefits Permanents 1511,474 1189,348 79% 220,1373 15% 101,9886 7% Benefits non-permanents 1224,855 1101,736 90% 35,185 3% 87,934 7% Satisfaction non-permanents 0,809272 0,720333 89% 0,042859 5% 0,04608 6% Satisfaction permanents 0,847442 0,794797 94% 0,022039 3% 0,030606 4% Quit permanent 149,3372 111,0697 74% 10,29482 7% 27,97265 19% Quit non-permanent 540,0511 418,3899 77% 16,37583 3% 105,2854 19% Dismissal permanent 21,88637 18,39069 84% 1,489258 7% 2,006423 9% Dismissal non-permanent 2530,195 2492,41 99% 0,0152 0% 37,7695 1% Sick leave permanent 71,31412 64,93254 91% 0,466803 1% 5,914781 8% Sick leave non-permanent 98,79895 94,27201 95% 0,149908 0% 4,37703 4% Accidents permanent 381,3131 317,9523 83% 34,23417 9% 29,12664 8% Accidents non-permanent 18,08149 14,39751 80% 1,803648 10% 1,880334 10% Fixed term 2,801769 2,116582 76% 0,143184 5% 0,542003 19% Temporary Agency 0,618827 0,440518 71% 0,069668 11% 0,10864 18% Daily/ on call 0,957114 0,757881 79% 0,002741 0% 0,196492 21% Probation 1,198498 0,918028 77% 0,048615 4% 0,231855 19% Training 0,751471 0,602758 80% 0,028987 4% 0,119727 16%


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Seasonal employment 0,818551 0,708046 87% 0,033325 4% 0,077179 9% Job creation scheme 0,441684 0,40949 93% 0,008635 2% 0,02356 5% subcontractor 0,324776 0,297653 92% 0,005047 2% 0,022076 7% Consultant 0,214167 0,180654 84% 0,009671 5% 0,023841 11% Other 1,018023 0,832463 82% 0,022439 2% 0,163122 16% Peaks in production 1,908079 1,514794 79% 0,325056 17% 0,068228 4% Replace due to short absence 1,56233 1,484014 95% 0,003417 0% 0,074899 5% Replace due to long absence 1,640024 1,36354 83% 0,0236 1% 0,252884 15% Unfilled vacancies 1,695478 1,35429 80% 0,080667 5% 0,260521 15% Specialized skills 1,358696 1,205638 89% 0,051043 4% 0,102015 8% Limiting core workers 1,807997 1,57372 87% 0,030644 2% 0,203633 11% Improving performance 1,061587 1,004665 95% 0,027844 3% 0,029077 3% Testing new employees 2,493966 1,989296 80% 0,122449 5% 0,382222 15% Working unusual hours 1,231439 1,069313 87% 0,090185 7% 0,071941 6% Saving salary costs 1,172466 1,093863 93% 0,013763 1% 0,06484 6% Saving training costs 0,264836 0,233544 88% 0,003673 1% 0,027619 10% Saving benefit costs 1,064952 0,957838 90% 0,001778 0% 0,105336 10%


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APPENDIX 3 Individual Organization Sector Country OUTCOME Work Involvement 0,769 0,647 84% 0,023 3% 3,09E-05 0% 0,078 10% Job Satisfaction 0,729 0,607 83% 0,051 7% 2,87E-02 4% 0,025 3% Sick Leave 1,044 0,952 91% 0,067 6% 4,09E-04 0% 0,024 2% Sick Presence 1,653 1,530 93% 0,030 2% 1,30E-03 0% 0,090 5% Accidents 0,287 0,271 94% 0,008 3% 3,89E-03 1% 0,003 1% Incidents 0,514 0,491 96% 0,020 4% 2,79E-04 0% 0,004 1% Work Related Mood: Anxiety-Contentment 0,547 0,508 93% 0,017 3% 4,79E-04 0% 0,022 4% Work Related Mood: Depression-Enthusiasm 0,524 0,475 91% 0,019 4% 5,98E-03 1% 0,019 4% Irritation 1,473 1,353 92% 0,039 3% 3,10E-02 2% 0,054 4% Positive Work-home interference 0,830 0,745 90% 0,024 3% 4,76E-03 1% 0,049 6% Occupational self-efficacy 0,412 0,367 89% 0,005 1% 1,84E-03 0% 0,035 8% Life Satisfaction 1,139 1,074 94% 0,025 2% 1,01E-03 0% 0,036 3% General Health 0,520 0,502 97% 0,007 1% 8,36E-04 0% 0,010 2% Organizational Commitment 0,527 0,441 84% 0,054 10% 1,34E-03 0% 0,029 6% Intention to quit 0,824 0,705 86% 0,043 5% 1,62E-03 0% 0,068 8% Perceived Performance 0,272 0,248 91% 0,013 5% 6,73E-04 0% 0,010 4% INTERVENING Content employers obligations 20,904 18,578 89% 1,521 7% 1,94E-01 1% 0,761 4% Content employees obligations 17,540 15,121 86% 1,211 7% 3,52E-01 2% 0,902 5% Delivery of the deal Employers obligations 0,701 0,628 90% 0,043 6% 9,17E-03 1% 0,027 4% Delivery of the deal Employees obligations 0,257 0,237 92% 0,007 3% 1,74E-04 0% 0,013 5% Trust 1,013 0,882 87% 0,082 8% 4,33E-03 0% 0,040 4% Fairness 0,868 0,753 87% 0,067 8% 4,15E-03 0% 0,044 5% Trust and fairness combined (state) 0,818 0,703 86% 0,067 8% 4,05E-03 0% 0,042 5% Violation of Psychological Contract 0,745 0,655 88% 0,057 8% 3,02E-03 0% 0,032 4% Core HR Practices 4,019 3,445 86% 0,431 11% 4,94E-02 1% 0,129 3% Employability 1,118 0,947 85% 0,063 6% 6,66E-03 1% 0,101 9% Job Insecurity 0,973 0,816 84% 0,111 11% 8,85E-03 1% 0,040 4% Volition 1,673 1,542 92% 0,130 8% 8,89E-04 0% 0,013 1% Job of Choice 1,286 1,106 86% 0,071 6% 5,84E-02 5% 0,048 4% Profession of Choice 1,510 1,216 81% 0,092 6% 1,37E-01 9% 0,062 4% Work of Choice (interaction Item) 56,082 45,270 81% 3,394 6% 4,84E+00 9% 2,562 5% Role Clarity Single Item 0,684 0,617 90% 0,033 5% 1,43E-03 0% 0,031 5% Role Clarity 2-items 0,391 0,352 90% 0,020 5% 9,77E-04 0% 0,017 4% Autonomy 0,807 0,618 77% 0,080 10% 8,29E-02 10% 0,026 3% Skill Utilization 0,890 0,637 72% 0,092 10% 1,39E-01 16% 0,010 1% Workload 0,785 0,635 81% 0,115 15% 1,21E-02 2% 0,041 5% Social support supervisor 1,042 0,956 92% 0,044 4% 4,56E-03 0% 0,038 4% POS 0,793 0,705 89% 0,078 10% 6,15E-03 1% 0,009 1%


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NON-PERMANENT Contract Expectations 1,241 1,004 81% 0,176 14% 5,15E-03 0% 0,032 3% Expecting permanent contract 1 item 1,870 1,601 86% 0,154 8% 4,78E-03 0% 0,108 6% Difficult finding permanent 2,211 1,819 82% 0,272 12% 5,44E-02 2% 0,036 2% Suits better 2,487 1,884 76% 0,419 17% 6,78E-02 3% 0,148 6% Gives me higher salary 1,405 1,211 86% 0,109 8% 3,25E-02 2% 0,051 4% Gives me more freedom 1,894 1,634 86% 0,184 10% 5,41E-03 0% 0,093 5% Hope to get permanent 2,295 1,825 80% 0,332 14% 2,84E-02 1% 0,089 4% Provides me extra income 1,988 1,583 80% 0,354 18% 8,57E-03 0% 0,051 3% To gain experience 2,217 2,026 91% 0,126 6% 7,49E-03 0% 0,074 3% Came with the job 2,295 1,913 83% 0,181 8% 1,02E-01 4% 0,071 3% Only contract I could get 2,350 2,146 91% 0,083 4% 3,34E-02 1% 0,102 4%

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