world bank washington, dc, june 6, 2013

25
Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America Nora Lustig Tulane University Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

Upload: chas

Post on 23-Feb-2016

29 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America Nora Lustig Tulane University Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD. World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013. Commitment to Equity Assessments (CEQ) for Latin America. Comprehensive standard fiscal analysis of current systems - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America

Nora Lustig Tulane University

Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD

World BankWashington, DC, June 6, 2013

Page 2: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

2

Commitment to Equity Assessments (CEQ) for Latin America

• Comprehensive standard fiscal analysis of current systems

• No behavior and no general equilibrium effects• Harmonizes definitions and methodological

approaches to facilitate cross-country comparisons• Uses income per capita as the welfare indicator• Allocators vary => full transparency in the method

used for each category, tax shifting assumptions, etc.• Mainly average incidence; a few cases with marginal

incidence

Page 3: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

3

www.commitmentoequity.org

Page 4: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

4

Page 5: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

5

• Government transfer or market income?– No agreement in literature for pay as you go

systems• CEQ Benchmark– Contributory pensions are part of market income– Contributions to pensions are not subtracted

• CEQ Sensitivity Analysis– Contributory pensions are a government transfer– Contributions to pensions are subtracted like tax

Contributory Pensions

Page 6: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

6

Market Income

• In addition to the uncontroversial wages and salaries, income from capital and private transfers (e.g., remittances), it includes:– Auto-consumption (with some exceptions)– Imputed rent for owner’s occupied housing– Contributory pensions from individualized accounts– Benchmark: Contributory pensions from social

security

Page 7: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

7

Net Market Income• Start with market income• Subtract direct taxes– individual income taxes– corporate taxes (when possible); NOT IN CURRENT VERSIONS– property and other direct taxes (when possible)

• Subtract contributions to social security– Benchmark: contributions going to pensions are NOT

subtracted; all the other contributions are– Sensitivity Analysis: all contributions to social security are

subtracted• If survey reports after tax and cash transfers income, go

backwards to construct net market and market income

Page 8: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

8

Disposable, Post-fiscal, Final Income

• Disposable income– Add direct transfers– Includes cash transfers and food transfers– Sensitivity analysis: pensions are a direct transfer

• Post-fiscal income– Add indirect subsidies– Subtract indirect taxes

• Final income– Add in-kind transfers from free or subsidized public services in

education, health, housing– Currently, government cost method is used to value these

services

Page 9: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

9

Scaling Up

• Household surveys understate “true” income–Underreporting– Lack of adequate questions– Society’s richest not captured by survey

• HOWEVER, No scaling up for poverty measures (no corrections for under-reporting)

• Scaling up for inequality and distributional measures to avoid overstating impact of in-kind transfers

Page 10: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

10

Tax Shifting and Tax Evasion Assumptions

• Burden of direct personal income taxes is borne by the recipient of income

• Burden of payroll and social security taxes falls entirely on workers

• Consumption taxes are assumed to be shifted forward to consumers

• Individuals who do not participate in the contributory social security system assumed not to pay income or payroll taxes

• Depending on the country, purchases in informal sector establishments or in rural areas assumed not to pay consumption taxes

Page 11: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

11

Valuation of Public Services: Education and Health

• Valuation of public spending on education and health followed is the so-called ‘government cost’ approach.

• Uses per beneficiary input costs obtained from administrative data as the measure of marginal benefits.

• This approach—also known as ‘classic’ or ‘nonbehavioral approach’—amounts to asking the following question: how much would the income of a household have to be increased if it had to pay for the free or subsidized public service at full cost?

Page 12: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

12

Indicators

• Inequality and poverty• Incidence• Concentration shares and concentration

coefficients• Coverage and leakages of programs• Fiscal mobility National; Rural/urban; By race/ethnic group; and, working on by gender

Page 13: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

13

Gini Before and After Taxes, Transfers, Subsidies and Free Government Services

Page 14: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

14

Headcount: Before and After Cash Transfers

Page 15: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

Headcount Ratio Before and After Indirect Taxes

Page 16: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

16

Incidence of Taxes and Cash TransfersNet Change in Income after Direct and Indirect Taxes and Transfers by Decile

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

BoliviaBrazilMexicoPeruUruguay

Page 17: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

17

Page 18: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

18

ProgressivityKakwani Index for Taxes: Red= regressive

Page 19: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

19

ProgressivityConcentration Coefficients for Transfers

Green= progressive in abs terms

Page 20: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

20

Coverage of Direct Cash Transfers

Bolivia Brazil Peru0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

87.7%93.3%

57.7%

83.2%

73.1%

41.9%

67.8%

29.2%

15.5%

Poor<2.5 2.5<=Poor<4

Non poor

Page 21: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

21

Distribution of Direct Cash Transfers(Percent going to poor and nonpoor)

Bolivia Brazil Peru0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

25.2%16.8%

46.9%

12.8%

9.7%

24.0%

62.0%

73.5%

29.1%

Non poor2.5<=Poor<4Poor<2.5

Page 22: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

22

ImpoverishmentFiscal Mobility Matrix for Brazil

Page 23: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

23

Mexico: Conc. Coeff. By Item

Page 24: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

24

Page 25: World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013

25

THANK YOU