world bank documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/...document of the world bank report no:...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002185

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-39760 IDA-H1220)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 45.970 MILLION (US$67.60 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND AN

IDA GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 27.201 MILLION (US$40.00 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

FOR THE

THE ROAD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, PHASE III

May 17, 2012

Transport Unit

Country Department AFCE1

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 31, 2011)

Currency Unit = Uganda Shillings (UGX)

SDR1.00 = US$1.59

US$1.00 = 2,585 UGX

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank

APL Adaptable Program Loan

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

CPA Contract Price Adjustment

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency

DCA Development Credit Agreement

DFA Development Finance Agreement

DLP Defect Liability Period

DPs Development Partners

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

DUCARIP District, Urban, and Community Access Roads Investment Plan

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return

EMP Environmental Management Plan

EOT Extension of Time

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

EU European Union

FM Financial Management

FY Financial Year

GoU Government of Uganda

HDM Highway Design and Maintenance Model

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency

Syndrome

ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report

IDA International Development Association

IPR Independent Procurement Review

IRI International Roughness Index

ISR Implementation Status Report

KM Kilometer

LVR Low Volume Roads

M&E Monitoring & Evaluation

MOFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development

MOWHC Ministry of Works, Housing, and Communication (July 1, 1998 to

June 30, 2006)

MOWT Ministry of Works and Transport

MTEF Medium Expenditure Framework

MTR Mid Term Review

NEMA National Environmental Management Authority

NDF Nordic Development Fund

NGOs Non Governmental Organizations

NPV Net Present Value

NRSAP National Road Safety Action Plan

NTMP National Transport Master Plan

OPRC Output and Performance Based Road Contracting

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PDO Project Development Objectives

PIP Project Implementation Plan

PRSC Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit

QAG Quality Assurance Group

RAFU Road Agency Formation Unit

RAP Resettlement Action Plan

RDP Road Development Project

RDPP1 Road Development Program Phase I

RDPP2 Road Development Program Phase II

RDPP3 Road Development Program Phase III

RED Roads Economic Decision

RF Road Fund

RSDP Road Sector Development Program

RSISTAP Road Sector Institutional Support Technical Assistance Project

SDR Special Drawing Rights

SIA Social Impact Assessment

SIL Specific Investment Loan

STDs Sexually Transmitted Diseases

TOR Terms of Reference

TSDP Transport Sector Development Project

TSIREP Transport Sector Investment Recurrent Expenditure Program

TYDRIP Ten Year District Road Investment Program

UNRA Uganda National Roads Authority

UWA Uganda Wildlife Authority

VOC Vehicle Operating Cost

WB World Bank

Vice President:

Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Philippe Dongier

Sector Manager:

Project Team Leader:

Supee Teravaninthorn

Labite Victorio Ocaya

ICR Primary Author: Zemedkun Girma

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

ROAD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, PHASE III

Contents

Data Sheet ........................................................................................................................... i

A. Basic Information .......................................................................................................... i

B. Key Dates ....................................................................................................................... i

C. Ratings Summary .......................................................................................................... i

D. Sector and Theme Codes ............................................................................................. ii

E. Bank Staff...................................................................................................................... ii

F. Results Framework Analysis ....................................................................................... ii

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................... vi

H. Restructuring ............................................................................................................. vii

I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................... vii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................. 1

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................. 6

3. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 14

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 19

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .................................................... 19

6. Lessons Learned ......................................................................................................... 22

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 23

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 24

Annex 2. Outputs by Component .................................................................................. 25

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis .................................................................. 32

Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ................. 43

Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents ....................................................................... 57

i

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information

Country: Uganda Project Name:

ROAD

DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM, PHASE 3

Project ID: P074079 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-39760,IDA-H1220

ICR Date: 05/17/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: Adaptable Program

Loan (APL) Borrower:

THE REPUBLIC OF

UGANDA

Original Total

Commitment: XDR 73.17M Disbursed Amount: XDR 72.84M

Revised Amount: XDR 73.17M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: RAFU/UNRA

Co financiers and Other External Partners: None

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 11/27/2002 Effectiveness: 09/30/2004 06/23/2005

Appraisal: 02/06/2004 Restructuring(s):

09/23/2009

04/25/2007

11/11/2009

01/12/2011

Approval: 09/02/2004 Mid-term Review: 04/28/2008 05/05/2008

Closing: 12/31/2009 10/31/2011

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

ii

Overall Bank

Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential problem project

at any time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem project at any

time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): Moderately Satisfactory

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as percent of total Bank financing)

Roads and highways 100 100

Theme Code (as percent of total Bank financing)

Administrative and civil service reform 20 10

Infrastructure services for private sector development 20 20

Other urban development 20 20

Rural services and infrastructure 40 20

Trade facilitation - 30

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President Makhtar Diop Callisto E. Madavo

Country Director Philippe Dongier Judy M. O’Connor

Sector Manager Supee Teravaninton Sanjivi Rajasingham

Project Team Leader Labite Victorio Ocaya Stephen Brushett

ICR Primary Author Zemedkun Girma

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (PDO) The development objective of the Road Development Program, Phase 3 (RDPP3) project

is to improve access to rural and economically productive areas and to progressively

iii

continue to build up sustainable road sector planning, design, and program management

capability, including road safety management.

The project comprises: (i) upgrading and strengthening of three high priority national

roads: Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi; Soroti-Dokolo-Lira; and Busega-Mityana;

(ii) designing the upgrade of about 300 km of district roads reclassified as national roads,

which therefore are required to meet the National Road Standard; (iii) studying, through

the use of consultancies, the feasibility of upgrading to bitumen standard about 600 km of

priority national roads (iv) rehabilitation/re- graveling of the Atiak-Moyo road; (v)

constructing a proposed Road Authority headquarters building; (vi) developing

institutional support for the establishment of the Road Authority, and (vii) provisioning

of external auditing services.

These project objectives complement the objectives of the Adaptable Program Loan

(APL) Phase I and II projects in meeting the overall objectives of the Road Development

Program.

Revised Project Development Objectives

Although some project sub-components were dropped, following the mid-term review,

and the scope of some components were revised, the project development objectives

remain unchanged. Due to the high bids received on the first three civil works contracts,

the target for upgrading of gravel roads was revised from 178 km to 152 km. Similarly,

the target for rehabilitation of paved roads was revised from 72 km to 15 km, with the

GoU agreeing to finance the rehabilitation of the other 57 km of the Busega-Mityana road.

At the request of the GoU the Atiak-Moyo road was left to be financed by the

government, with the understanding that the road would be upgraded to paved standard.

GoU has now financed seven bridges on this road and ferry landings where the Atiak-

Moyo crosses the river Nile. The actual achieved achievement, including the GoU funded

roads, were the upgrading of 152 km of gravel roads and the rehabilitation of 72 km of

paved roads.

At appraisal, baselines for the PDO indicators had not been established. Accordingly, the

PDO baseline indicators were established in May 2005, with these targets being used

during the entire credit period.

A: PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1: Average travel time (typical mode of transport is the bus) on selected

national road: Soroti-Lira Road (123 km)

Value: (quantitative or

qualitative)

140 minutes

travel time

without project

100 minutes travel

time with project at

IRI 2

N/A

100 minutes

travel time with

project at IRI 2

iv

at international

roughness index

(IRI) 12

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009 10/31/2010

Comments: (including

percentage of

achievement)

Target value achieved 100 percent.

Indicator 2: Vehicle operating cost (VOC) for 15-year design period on Soroti-Lira

road (USD/vehicle km)(Number)


qualitative) 0.464 0.224 N/A 0.22

Date achieved 06/22/2005 12/31/2009 10/31/2010


percentage of

achievement)

Achieved 53 percent reduction in vehicle operating cost compared to

baseline and two percent compared to target value.

Indicator 3: Traffic on selected national road: Soroti-Lira Road (vpd)(Number)


qualitative) 346 380 N/A 894

Date achieved 06/22/2005 12/31/2009 10/31/2010


percentage of

achievement)

Achieved 258 percent of baseline and 235 percent of target value.

With the return of peace in northern Uganda and South Sudan, economic

activities and subsequently the traffic increased two and half times.

B: Intermediate Outcome Indicators(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1:

178 km of existing national gravel roads upgraded to paved (bitumen) to

meet national road Class II standard of width 6.0 meter and 1.5 meter

shoulders (pedestrian walkways).

Value: (quantitative

or Qualitative)

178 km of

national gravel

roads: Soroti-Lira

road [125 km] and

Gayaza-Zirobwe-

Wobulenzi road

[54 km]

178 km of national

gravel roads: Soroti-

Lira road [125

km[ and Gayaza-

Zirobwe-Wobulenzi

road [54 km[

154 km of

national gravel

roads: Soroti-

Lira road [125

km] and Gayaza-

Zirobwe road [29

km]

152 km of

national gravel

roads: Soroti-

Lira road [123

km] and

Gayaza-

Zirobwe road

[29 km]

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009 11/29/2009 07/21/2011


Achieved 85 percent of target value and 90 percent of formally revised

target.

v

percentage of

achievement)

Indicator 2: 72 km of damaged paved roads reconstructed and widened to Class I

(national roads standard)


or qualitative)

Busega-Mityana

road [57 km] and

Kampala-Gayaza

road [15km]

72 km 15 km 15 km

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009 11/29/2009 07/21/2011


percentage of

achievement)

Due to high bids received on the first three civil works contracts, the

Busega-Mityana road (57 km) was dropped from IDA financing and was

picked up under GoU financing.

Indicator 2 : 91 km of gravel roads improved


or qualitative)

Atiak-Moyo road

[91 km]: gravel

road with poor

riding quality (IRI

13) and poor ferry

landings at the

Nile river

crossing

91 km of gravel

roads improved

Design for

upgrading Atiak-

Moyo road to

Sudan border

[104 km]

Design for

upgrading

Atiak-Moyo

road to Sudan

border [104 km]

completed

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009 01/03/2006 10/31/2011


percentage of

achievement)

At the request of GoU, re- graveling of Atiak-Moyo road was dropped.

Instead, the design has been updated so that the road could be sealed.

Indicator 3

Design for upgrading of 300 km district roads to be upgraded and

reclassified to a Class III national paved bitumen standard road (width

5.6m and 1.2m sealed shoulders)


or qualitative)

The 300 km of

roads are in the

classification of

district roads

(average width:

4.5m)

300 km of district

roads designed for

upgrading and

reclassification to a

Class III national

paved bitumen

standard road (width

5.6m and 1.2m

sealed shoulders)

311.5 km of

district roads

designed for

upgrading and

reclassification

to a Class III

national paved

bitumen

standard road

(width 5.6m and

1.2m sealed

shoulders)

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009

10/31/2011


percentage of

achievement)

104 percent achieved

vi

Indicator 4 Feasibility studies and detailed design for upgrading of about 600 km of

national roads to paved bitumen standard


or qualitative)

Long list of 755

km of gravel

roads prepared.

Average daily

traffic recorded

on the most

heavily trafficked

roads ranged from

200 to 400 vpd

Feasibility studies

and detailed design

for upgrading of

about 600 km of

national roads to

paved bitumen

standard completed

Short list of

about 200 km of

key priority

roads prepared

and a Request for

Expression of

Interest issued

for consultant’s

services for

detailed design

Detailed design

and tender

documents

prepared for the

two high

priority roads,

totaling 222 km

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009 05/15/2007 10/31/2011


percentage of

Only two high priority roads totaling about 200 km qualified for the

detailed design.

Indicator 5 Road Authority legally established and operationally functional


or qualitative)

The Roads

Agency

Formation Unit

(RAFU),

predecessor to the

Roads Authority

operational

Road Authority

legally established

and operationally

functional

Road Authority

legally

established and

became fully

operationally

functional on

July 1, 2008

Date achieved 05/05/2005 12/31/2009

07/01/2008


percentage of

achievement)

100 percent complete.

The Uganda National Roads Authority Bill was approved by Parliament

on May 24, 2006, Board of Directors appointed on January 22, 2007,

Executive Director appointed on October 31, 2007 and key positions filled

by June 30, 2008.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 09/09/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00







8 12/12/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 6.62

9 06/04/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately 21.92

vii

Unsatisfactory

10 12/20/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 44.35

11 03/19/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 59.96





H. Restructuring

The project was restructured on April 25, 2007, November 11, 2009 and on January 12, 2011.

The April 2007 restructuring was to amend the Credit to 100 percent financing by IDA.

During the restructuring of November 2009, some of the components were dropped,

primarily due to the high bids received on the civil works contracts. The restructuring

involved dropping of some of the components of the project, the reallocation of credit

proceeds and extension of the closing date. The restructured project dropped the civil works

for: (i) the upgrading of the Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road (23 km); (ii) the re-graveling of the

Atiak-Moyo road (91 km); (iii) the reconstruction and upgrading of the Busega-Mityana road

(57 km); and (iv) construction of the UNRA/MOWT Headquarter building. The funds

allocated to these dropped activities were reallocated to meet the shortfall of funds for the

upgrading of the Soroti-Lira road (125 km) and Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road (44 km) of

the project. The Credit was then amended to allow for 20 percent of GoU financing of the

civil works. The January 2011 restructuring was to allocate the unallocated funds to

Categories 1 and 2 (works and services).

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. In 2000, The World Bank’s (WB) Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Uganda

had the primary objective of reduction of poverty through a medium-term strategy

focused on private-investment-led growth and export diversification. Lowering transport

costs and improving reliability of access to infrastructure were considered in the CAS as

key elements to facilitate business development and to support poverty reduction.

Regionally targeted public investment—mainly in northern Uganda, which has lagged

behind due to two decades of insurgency—was also considered as a key element of the

CAS.

2. At project appraisal in 2004, the transport infrastructure in Uganda was comprised

of: (i) a road network of about 34,000 km, out of which 10,000 km were national roads,

21,000 km district roads, and 3,000 km urban roads; (ii) a railway system of about 1,350

km; (iii) wagon ferry services on Lake Victoria; and (iv) air transport facilities including

one international airport and eleven domestic air fields. Road transport was by far the

most dominant mode of transport and played a pivotal role in supporting the economic

and social development programs. The roads carried over 90 percent of the country’s

passenger and freight transport and provided the only form of access to most rural

communities. The classified roads, which make up only 30 percent of the network,

carried 80 percent of the total road traffic. Uganda's road network has also served as a

transit corridor linking the landlocked neighboring countries of Rwanda, Burundi, parts

of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and southern Sudan to the sea.

3. Centrally located in the East African region, the road network is of national and

regional strategic importance, as it helps Uganda play a crucial role in the region's

economy and regional cooperation. Prior to 1974, Uganda had one of the best road

networks in sub-Saharan Africa. The whole road network deteriorated sharply between

1974-1985 due to neglect, mismanagement, and lack of adequate maintenance: a

consequence of civil strife and disruption of civil administration. The neglect of road

maintenance resulted in increased transport costs, reduced transport fleets, and an

approximate 75 percent loss in road network investment due to deterioration. During that

period, Uganda registered negative economic growth, and declining agricultural and

industrial production, while population growth continued to increase at over three percent

per annum.

4. Since 1986, government policy has focused on improved transport and

communication infrastructure for accelerated development and to revamp the economy,

as well as to consolidate national unity and regional cooperation. The 1986-1995

rehabilitation and maintenance efforts improved the condition of the road network from

less than 10 percent in a good state of repair in 1986 to approximately 70 percent of main

roads and about 40 percent of district feeder roads by 1995. This duly impacted the

development of the national economy, such that Uganda registered average annual

growth rates of six percent in the 10 years from 1985 to 1995, with the economy 70

percent larger than it was in 1985.

2

5. The World Bank’s Adaptable Program Loan (APL) was an International

Development Association (IDA) contribution to the Government of Uganda’s (GoU)

Road Sector Development Program (RSDP); which was developed in 1995 and endorsed

by the participating development partners at a Donor’s Conference held in Paris on

November 30, 1996. The primary purpose of the RSDP was to improve access to rural

and economically productive areas by removing major constraints to transport services on

the country's road network. The RSDP also aimed to support actions related to further

strengthening of the road sector management.

6. The projected total expenditure under the RSDP, over the first ten years, was

estimated at about US$1.5 billion in constant prices at the end of 1998. The initial RSDP

was updated to a rolling RSDP and was endorsed by stakeholders, including Donor

Partners, at a road conference held in Kampala in April 2002. The RSDP originally

focused on the national road network, but the review of 2002 took on board the district,

urban and community access roads (DUCAR). The projected expenditure for the updated

RSDP for the 10 years from 2001/02 to 2010/11 was estimated at US$2.28 billion and

had three major components: (i) the national road sub-sector (69.5 percent), the DUCAR

sub-sector (25.3 percent) and road sector institutional development and capacity building

(5.2 percent) of the program cost.

7. Out of the RSDP cost, around US$1.4 billion had been secured in 2004, leaving a

funding gap of about US$0.88 billion. The Bank provided funding to the RSDP through

an APL instrument in the total amount of US$289.35 million. The APL 1 and 2 were in

the amount of US$90.98 million and US$64.52 million respectively. The Road

Development Program Phase III (RDPP3), the third phase of a four-phased APL

program, provided US$107.6 million.

Table 1: Financing Summary for APL Phases

APL Phases Financing and Implementation

Period at Appraisal

Actual Financing and Implementation

Period at Closing

Difference of actual from appraisal

Amount

(US$m)

Start Date Completion

Date

Amount

(US$ m)*

Effectiveness

Date

Completion

Date

Amount

(US$ m)*

Start to

Effective

ness - No.

of days

Start to

Completion

No. of Days

Phase I 90.98 Nov. 1999 June 2004 92.33 Feb 1, 2000 June 30, 2008 1.35 +60 +1460

Phase II 64.52 July 2001 June 2006 76.12 April 11, 2002 June 30, 2008 11.6 +250 +730

Phase III 107.60 Oct. 2002 June 2007 112.54 June 23, 2005 Oct 31, 2011 4.94 +945 +1580

Phase IV 26.25 June 2003 Dec. 2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Total 289.35 280.99

* The difference appears due to exchange rate between SDR and US$.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

8. The development objective of the Road Development Program, Phase 3 project

was to improve access to rural and economically productive areas and to progressively

continue to build up sustainable road sector planning, design and program management

capability including road safety management. The project components are: (i) upgrading

and strengthening three high priority national roads: Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-

3

Wobulenzi; Soroti- Dokolo-Lira; and Busega-Mityana roads; (ii) designing the upgrade

of about 300 km of district roads reclassified as national roads, which therefore are

required to meet the National Road Standard; (iii) studying, through the use of

consultancies the feasibility of upgrading to bitumen standard of about 600 km of priority

national roads; (iv) rehabilitation/re-graveling of the Atiak-Moyo road (91 km); (v)

constructing a proposed Road Authority headquarters building; and (vi) developing

institutional support for the establishment of the Road Authority; and provisioning of

external auditing services. These project objectives complement the objectives of the

Phase I and II projects in meeting the overall objectives of the Roads Development

Program. The core indicators, included: (i) increase in the share of rural population with

all-season access; (ii) increase in the proportion of the road network in good condition;

and (iii) direct project beneficiaries (number), of which the percentage of female.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators

9. Following the mid-term review, the Credit was restructured and the scope of work

revised for some components. The project development objective remained unchanged as

agreement was reached with GoU that they would finance the components that were

dropped. As a result, it was not necessary to make any changes in the key indicators.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

10. The primary target group or main beneficiaries of the project were the road users,

who were to gain from travel time savings and vehicle operating cost (VOC) reduction as

a result of improvements on the main roads. The roads under the program serve areas of

good agricultural potential in central, eastern, and northern Uganda and the road

investments benefited agricultural producers and consumers as demonstrated by the

increase in traffic. Furthermore, the privately provided commercial bus services were

capable of competitively extending coverage and improving service frequencies to more

remote and less developed areas of the project after responding to the road improvements.

To this extent, VOC savings also benefited low-income road users leading to

improvements in their accessibility to markets and social services.

11. The communities living along the roads benefited from growth in trade, economic

activities, and the introduction of awareness creation of cross cutting issues of road safety

matters such as speed controls, sealed verges, road signs etc. In addition, the project also

benefitted the Ministry of Works and Transport (MOWT), the former Road Agency

Formation Unit (RAFU), now the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA), and local

governments. RDPP3 also contributed support of the preparation and launching of the

National Transport Master Plan (NTMP). The NTMP is being used as a guiding principle

for making decisions relating to planning and development of transport projects in the

country and in the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area. As the improved road projects

were part of a comprehensive countrywide road investment strategy, the overall RDPP3

project contributed a great deal to fostering economic growth and poverty alleviation

through improvement in accessibility and market integration. RDPP3 is succeeded by the

on-going Transport Sector Development Program (TSDP); which is a three years Specific

Investment Loan (SIL).

4

1.5 Original Components

12. The original project was comprised of the following parts:

Component 1: Civil works for upgrading, rehabilitation and reconstruction of national

roads including: (i) upgrading of about 125 km of the Soroti-Lira road to paved (bitumen)

standards; (ii) upgrading of about 68 km of the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi

road; (iii) rehabilitation and re-graveling of about 91 km on Atiak-Moyo road; and (iv)

reconstruction and upgrading of the 57 km Busega-Mityana road.

Component 2: Civil works for construction of headquarters building for MOWT and the

Road Authority

Component 3: Roads construction supervision services for construction of roads referred

to in Component.1

Component 4: Review and update of detailed engineering design and preparation of

tender documents, verification of economic feasibility for reconstruction of the paved

roads and completion of environmental and social assessments for Busega-Mityana road,

all through the provision of technical advisory services.

Component 5: Roads feasibility and detailed engineering design for: (i) upgrading of

about 300 km of district gravel roads to national roads at paved (bitumen) standard; and

(ii) upgrading of about 600 km of national roads from gravel to paved (bitumen) standard

and detailed design of selected roads thereof, all through the provision of technical

advisory services.

Component 6: Institutional support and establishment of the Road Authority, comprising:

(i) provision of training and technical advisory services to consolidate the institutional

reform process, including establishment and commencing operations of the Road

Authority; (ii) strengthening institutional support for implementation of Components 1

through 5 of the project; and (iii) provision of external audit services.

1.6 Revised Components

13. The scope of the revised project components include:

Component 1:

i) Upgrading from gravel to paved (bitumen) standard of the Kampala-Gayaza-

Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road dropped the Zirobwe-Wobulenzi (23km) section of

the road.

ii) The reconstruction of the Busega-Mityana road (57km) dropped from the

credit, but funded by the Government.

iii) The rehabilitation and re-graveling of Atiak-Moyo road (91km) scope of work

reduced only to design works for upgrading the road to paved (bitumen)

standard and the Government agreed to finance the civil works part.

Component 2: Civil works for construction of UNRA headquarter building dropped.

5

Component 3: The supervision works of the components under Component 1 dropped

and Government financed the corresponding consultant’s services. The GoU agreed to

undertake the project financing.

Component 4: Detailed designs on total length of roads slightly increased to 312km

from the planned 300km.

Component 5: Feasibility studies and engineering designs reduced to 300km from

600km of high traffic national roads only to include: Gulu-Atiak-Bibia-Nimule (104km);

Vurra-Arua-Koboko-Oraba (92km); Atiak-Moyo-Sudan border (104km).

Other significant changes

14. The project was restructured on April 25, 2007 to allow for 100 percent financing

by IDA because of a lack of counterpart funding from GoU. The amended Development

Financing Agreement (DFA) provided for the Credit to pay for taxes levied by, or in the

territory of the Borrower, on the goods or services to be financed under the Financing, or

on their importation, manufacture, procurement, or supply.

15. A second restructuring on November 11, 2009 was prompted by a shortfall

resulting from higher than anticipated bids received on three works contracts tendered,

out of the seven contracts originally planned for implementation under the Credit. Thus,

the DFA was amended to: (i) drop the components that could not be financed under the

Credit; (ii) reallocate the amounts in Category 1(b) of SDR 16.53 million to meet the

shortfall in Category 1(a); to allow for 20 percent GoU financing of civil works under

Category 1 of the Credit; (iv) extend the closing date by 22 months from December 31,

2009 to October 31, 2011; and (v) change the name of the implementing agency from

RAFU to UNRA.

16. A third and final restructuring was carried out on January 12, 2011 to reallocate the

amounts in Category 3 (unallocated) of SDR 5.451 million to Categories 1 and 2 so as to

complete the remaining civil works contract for upgrading Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe

road and the related supervision consultancy services; and to drop the requirement for

completion of environmental and social assessment of the Busega-Mityana road that was

dropped from Component 3 of the project.

17. Project Design, Scope and Scale: When the RDPP3 project faced large cost

overruns it was intended for a while that the RDPP4 would be reshaped to finance such

overruns. However, during a bi-lateral meeting between MOWT and the IDA in October

2008, it was decided that the cost overruns, which could not be financed by the RDPP3

project, could be financed by GoU from its increased road sector allocation. Accordingly,

the Busega-Mityana road and bridges on the Atiak-Moyo road were financed by the GoU.

Apart from the amendments mentioned above, no other changes were made to the project

design scope and scale.

18. Implementation Schedule: The original project closing date was December 31, 2009.

On June 19, 2009, the government requested IDA to amend the DFA and extend the

6

closing date by two years. On November 11, 2009, IDA issued a letter to GoU to amend

the Development Finance Agreement (DFA) and extended the closing date by 22 months

from December 31, 2009 to October 31, 2011.

19. Funding Reallocation: The final project cost at completion is US$239.34 million

(US$116.40 million IDA credit/grant; US$122.94 million government contribution)

against the commitment of US$133 million. This indicates that there was an overall

increase of 80 percent at completion as compared to the original commitment of US$133

at appraisal. As a result, the GoU contribution increased from 20 percent to 51 percent at

completion, inclusive of the dropped project components.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

20. The Four Phased Roads APL was envisaged in the Bank Group's CAS discussed

by the Executive Directors on November 16, 2000. The APL was an appropriate choice

of lending instrument for the long-term development of Uganda's road sector. The

program was simple in design, limiting itself to civil works for national roads and some

district roads, plus institutional support for creating an autonomous road authority and a

road fund. Suitable measures were included to transform the Road Agency Formation

Unit (RAFU) to a full-fledged autonomous Uganda National Road Authority (UNRA)

and to allow for continued dialogue with the borrower on the establishment of a Road

Fund. The borrower fully participated in the preparation of the project and remained

committed to the project objectives, in particular the road upgrading. On the institutional

front there was strong ownership, as evidenced by the creation of UNRA and a Road

Fund.

21. The project supported the government’s RSDP which is a critical element of its

overarching strategy for poverty reduction. The RSDP nonetheless required regular and

substantial infusions of capital support for infrastructure improvement and maintenance.

The RDPP3 project was designed to provide a blend of grant and credit to ensure that the

government’s financing requirements would be met, commensurate with its borrowing

capacity and with acceptable progress towards debt sustainability. At the introduction of

IDA grants in September 2002, the RDPP3 project was selected to receive IDA grant

financing in view of the complementarily of the RSDP goals with those of the Poverty

Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC) and the specific contribution of infrastructure

improvements targeted to increased mobility and access to services and markets of the

rural poor.

22. The project design was relevant, appropriate and responsive to the client’s needs as

it was part and parcel of the Road Development Program, in line with the GoU National

Development Plan (NDP) and the RSDP. The Bank also shared knowledge and

experience gained from the Road Maintenance Initiative (RMI) in Africa to help support

the GoU and donor community efforts in the preparation of the RSDP. In addition, a

series of information-sharing and consultation meetings took place with the donor

community during project preparation about the RDPP3 project. As a result, the overall

risk at project appraisal was assessed as “moderate.” The project had inbuilt price and

7

physical contingencies as well as the unallocated amounts to cater for any cost overruns.

However, due to the long period of time that elapsed from appraisal to implementation,

the contingencies were found to be inadequate to respond to the cost overruns and

changing circumstances at project implementation.

23. Quality of Procurement in Project Design: At project appraisal, procurement

aspects at design were straight-forward since this project was the third phase of the APL.

All procurement arrangements, including a procurement plan, a project implementation

plan, and procurement methods consistent with the World Bank guidelines, were

discussed and agreed upon. The project primarily included procurement of large civil

works contracts, requiring pre-qualification, for upgrading/strengthening of major roads.

Other contracts were for consulting services for the supervision of the civil works

contracts, carrying out design and feasibility studies on reclassified national and district

roads, and data collection on the national roads network. RAFU was responsible for

managing mainly donor-funded projects. Many donors were involved and appropriate

coordination and control mechanisms were put in place. As such, Phases 1 and 2 of the

program were implemented with some comfort with respect to GAC and no specific

provisions were included in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD). However, during the

implementation of the project, governance issues were noted and appropriate measures

were taken to address them. This included the carrying out of independent procurement

and technical audits and the overall restructuring of the procurement functions of UNRA.

24. Value for Money Assessment of the Procurement of the Civil Works Contracts: The

procurement of each of the three civil works contracts were assessed by the Operations

and Procurement Review Committee to determine that each one returned good value for

money. The prequalification documents and confidential cost estimates were prepared in

2004 and revised estimates were prepared in 2006 prior to the invitation of bids to give an

indication of the possible changes in price escalation. The bids opened between

December 2006 and March 2007, were on average 36 per cent above the updated

Engineer’s estimates. A value for money cost analysis was carried out based on: (i) the

local market cost analysis for fluctuation in prices of petroleum products, power, and

materials from quarries which came out in the bids as high cost items; (ii) road

construction unit costs for similar projects in the region which seemed to be on the rise;

(iii) the effect of insecurity, specifically for the Soroti-Lira road which was affected by

insurgency at the time of bidding; (iv) pre-financing cost of guarantees, insurance

premiums, delayed payments to contractors in previous contracts, and the implications on

the prices of bids received. The conclusion was that the engineer’s estimates did not

adequately address these issues. The analysis, based on sample contracts from elsewhere

confirmed that the region had experienced massive price escalations in the cost of road

construction contracts within the two years preceding the time of preparation and

submission of the bids. A highway design and maintenance model (HDM) was re-run,

with the lowest evaluated bid price, showed that the projects were still viable, with an

economic internal rate of return (EIRR) above 15 percent for each road project.

25. Quality of Financial Management Aspects in Project Design: There was a

dedicated Finance and Administration Division, in RAFU/UNRA, that was responsible

for all aspects of financial management. A well-documented Financial Management

8

Manual was developed. The manual outlines internal control procedures as well as

financial reporting arrangements for the funding received from the GoU budget, IDA, and

other donors. Prior to appraisal, the accounting system was fully computerized based on a

double entry accounting system. The financial management (FM) system was well

established with experienced and knowledgeable staff, modified financial manual, and

appropriate technology requirement to support the FM system. At appraisal, the FM

system was performing satisfactorily. However, the project was subject to statutory audit

regulations through which the internal audit function was provided by the Ministry of

Works and Transport. This service was limited to the pre-audit inspection of the project’s

transactions. The project envisaged a transition from RAFU to UNRA, which would have

an internal audit function in accordance with the UNRA Act.

26. Quality of Environmental Aspects in Project Design: The project was classified as

a Category B project with no potential impact on wildlife or national parks.

Environmental aspects were integrated into project design to a large extent. Key

stakeholders included in the project were: the National Environmental Management

Authority (NEMA), the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), the RAFU, the Ministry of

Works and Transport (MOWT), concerned groups, NGOs, and local communities who

were to participate through public consultations, field visits, and surveys for the project.

The steps undertaken for environmental assessment and the environmental management

plan (EMP) preparation included the following: determination of the scope of the

environmental impact assessment (EIA); preparation of the terms of reference (TOR) for

the EIA that captured the importance of preparing and implementing a comprehensive

EMP; review of the coverage of the TOR; approval of the TOR by NEMA; information

retrieval and consultation with the affected people and local non-governmental

organizations (NGOs); comparison of alternatives; assessment of impacts; and proposal

of mitigation and monitoring measures.

27. The EIA was carried out for each road project as part of the detailed feasibility

studies for the following purposes: (i) to prepare a comprehensive investigation

delineating any environmental impacts of the proposed road works; (ii) to describe and

quantify these impacts; (iii) to draw up feasible mitigation measures for minimizing,

eliminating or offsetting any adverse effects; and (iv) to recommend the most appropriate

mitigation and/or enhancement measures. Mitigation measures were incorporated in the

final road designs and contract documentation, and those with appropriate expertise were

included in the supervision consultants’ staff to carry out such measures. An

environmental and social monitoring plan was developed for each project road outlining

the nature, location, and methodology of monitoring that should take place during the

construction of each road.

28. Quality of Social Safeguards in Project Design: The social agenda was adequately

outlined in the original project documentation. The key issues that were identified as

relevant to the project objectives included: the likely impacts on road safety due to an

increase in the number of accidents; impacts on public health resulting from dust and the

spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and Human Immunodeficiency

Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS); and degradation of air and

water quality caused by dust, soil erosion, and siltation of water bodies/sources. Road

9

safety audits out under the Roads Sector Institutional Support Technical Assistance

project (RSISTAP) provided the basis for safety considerations in road design,

construction and maintenance. Each of the physical components included in the Phase III

Project included provisions for qualified on-site clinic screening and counseling for

HIV/AIDS and STD, and awareness and training programs for workers and local people,

with associated costs included in the construction contracts. A social impact assessment

(SIA) for the physical components was conducted prior to appraisal in conjunction with

EIA for the roads selected for upgrading and strengthening. For each road project, the

Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) team included a social scientist.

Socioeconomic data were collected and analyzed from each of the areas where the road

improvements were planned. The ESIA included analysis of the temporary and localized

social and microeconomic impacts resulting from construction activities. Further separate

site specific resettlement action plans (RAP) for the roads were undertaken to determine

the need for land take, prepare compensation for assets that would be lost and

rehabilitation of the facilities for the project-affected persons.

29. Risk Assessment: A risk analysis was carried out and mitigation measures were

identified. The identified key risks include: (i) total annual development and recurrent

budget estimates are not made available in accordance with projections; (ii) GoU

counterpart funds are neither budgeted nor released on time; (iii) annual road network

maintenance program is not implemented as scheduled; (iv) government does not prepare

legislation and support proclamation for the establishment of a Road Authority by end of

2005 and subsequently no transfer of agreed management functions for national roads

from MOWT to the road authority; (v) an adequate social plan for redundant MOWT

staff is neither developed nor funded; (vi) security problems in some project areas inhibit

surveys, detailed engineering, and construction; (vii) detailed studies of individual roads

do not conform to the economic viability of selected roads and do not address social and

environmental aspects; and (viii) internal audits limited to pre-audit of expenditures with

no review of internal control system.

30. The risk mitigation measures mainly relied on the experiences from the outcomes

and the prevailing conditions of the parallel and ongoing APL components of RDPP1 and

RDPP2. These comprised: (i) a rolling three-year Transport Sector Investment Recurrent

Expenditure Program (TSIREP) produced every year in consultation with the Bank and in

consistency with the Medium Expenditure Framework (MTEF); (ii) funding targets for

the life of the program confirmed in letter of development policy; (iii) a maintenance

program updated in line with the updating of the TSIREP by March 31, each year; (iv)

Cabinet approval sought before end 2004 so that legislation for establishment of a roads

authority can be tabled in Parliament in a timely fashion; (v) creation of the legal

framework for the establishment of a roads authority to provide for a properly constituted

internal audit function; and (vi) transfer of maintenance function to the roads authority,

when established.

31. The risk due to the unforeseen procurement delay that led to costs escalations was

not adequately addressed by the price/physical contingencies and the unallocated amount

in the financing agreement. Overall the project risk mitigation measure rating was

assessed as “Modest.”

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32. The project was not subjected to a Quality Assurance Group (QAG) review at

entry.

2.2 Implementation

33. The Bank approved the project on September 2, 2004, the DFA was signed on

February 23, 2005, and the credit became effective on June 23, 2005 after a delay of five

months. At the request of government, the financing agreement was amended on April 25,

2007 to allow for 100 percent IDA financing of consultancy services and civil works. A

mid-term review (MTR) took place in May 2008 and identified the need to drop the

components that could not be financed as a result of high bids received on the first three

civil works contracts and to extend the closing date of the credit due to delays

experienced in procuring the civil works contracts. It was therefore recommended that the

credit be amended to: (i) drop some of the project sub-components; (ii) extend the closing

date by 22 months; and (iii) change the name of the implementing agency from RAFU to

UNRA which was to become effective on July 1, 2008. Accordingly, on November 11,

2009, the DFA was amended to drop the components that could not be financed. Further,

due to initial delays in procurement of the civil works contracts, the Closing Date was

extended by 22 months from December 31, 2009 to October 31, 2011. On January 12,

2011 a final amendment to the DFA was effected to reallocate the “unallocated” amount

on the credit to enable completion of the remaining civil works contract for upgrading

Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road and the related supervision consultancy services. Overall,

there was a further increase in costs of the three civil works contracts due to: (i)

additional works that were not envisaged at the design stage, and (ii) price escalation for

which the provision in the price contingencies was not adequate.

2.2.1 Major Factors Affecting Implementation

Factors outside the Control of the GoU or Implementing Agencies

34. Limited Construction Sector Capacity: It was evident that there was a low

construction industry capacity in Uganda, with very few contractors who had the capacity

to handle ICB projects at the time of appraisal. Further, there were contractors with

limited financial and technical capacities, leading to limited competition and lengthy

verification processes on the performance of previous projects.

35. Insecurity: Some of the project roads fell in areas that were experiencing

insurgency at the time of appraisal and commencement of the works. As a result, the

response to the invitation for bids was poor.

36. Shortage in the Supply of Fuel: The temporary closure of the refinery at Mombasa,

followed by an intermittent break down of operations of the oil pipeline from Mombasa

to Eldoret, as well as the political crisis in Kenya at the of end 2007 to early 2008 created

a fuel supply shortage. This contributed to the overall slow project progress and affected

the civil works contracts both in completion delays and cost overruns.

37. Global Economic Crisis: The global economic situation affected the prices of

inputs. This is a fact that was acknowledged by the QAG Report of November 2008. For

11

example, while the price of a barrel of oil was US$43.03 at appraisal in August 2004, the

registered price in November 2006, 28 days prior to opening of bids was US$58.48, a 26

percent increase from the cost at appraisal. During the implementation of the civil works

contracts, the price of a barrel of oil continued to fluctuate, generally with an upward

trend and with a peak of US$133.90 in July 2008. The average price during the execution

of the civil works contracts was US$77.35, which is 32.3 percent above the price 28 days

prior to bid opening or 80 percent above the price at appraisal. In terms of contracts

management, this resulted in higher than expected values of price adjustment for which a

price contingency of five percent was provided in the project. In real terms, price

adjustments followed the percentage increase of the price of a barrel of oil as the

production and transportation of all other inputs were affected by the price of oil.

Factors Generally Subject to Government Control

38. Counterpart Funding: The project was designed to provide for 20 percent

counterpart funding on the civil works component and 10 percent on the consultants’

services. At the request of government, the Credit was amended to provide for 100

percent financing of the civil works and consultants’ services. However, when bids were

opened for the first three civil works contracts, the total sum of the contracts was 43

percent over and above the available funds for this category of expenditure on the

Credit/Grant. Hence, the GoU had to commit additional financing to meet the shortfall

for the three contracts that were signed. Accordingly, the DFA was amended to provide

for 20 percent financing of the civil works by government, leaving the consultants’

services to be financed 100 percent by IDA. However, at closure, there were still

outstanding payments on completed works, including retention, which the government

committed to finance as the Credit is fully disbursed. Generally, the government has

demonstrated a good performance by meeting the financing shortfall, over and above the

planned 20 percent borrower commitment of counterpart funding for the creation of the

Uganda National Roads Authority and a Road Fund.

Factors Generally Subject to the Implementing Agency’s Control

39. The Transition from RAFU to UNRA: RAFU has been the executing agency for

Phase I and II of the program. While not always showing an outstanding performance, its

managerial and technical skills were adequate. RAFU was the agency responsible for

implementing the first half of Phase III of the program, but starting July 1, 2008, the

newly created autonomous Road Authority (UNRA) became the responsible entity. With

the transfer of responsibilities from RAFU to UNRA, some of the mechanisms and

fiduciary controls were temporarily affected due to delays in transition to UNRA from

RAFU and the resultant weakness reflected on transitional accountability.

40. Lack of Comprehensive Progress Reporting: RAFU/UNRA prepared progress

reports on individual project activities, but paid little attention to the production of more

comprehensive and consolidated progress reports on implementation of the project.

However, with time, UNRA improved on their method of reporting.

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2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

41. M&E Design and Implementation: At project appraisal, the key performance

indicators were: (i) reduction in travel time compared to baseline, (ii) reduction in vehicle

operating costs on national roads compared to baseline; and (iii) industrial and

agricultural product flows. The last one is reflected by growth in traffic. Due to lack of

information on the entire national roads network, given that the previous phases of the

program did not include data collection on the national roads network, it was not possible

to get baseline data for these indicators. Instead, the RDPP3 project provided for full data

collection on the entire national roads network. During project implementation, the

performance indicators were not modified to take into account the project restructuring

and extension.

42. A QAG review carried out on October 8, 2008 acknowledged that in terms of the

institutional framework for the project, the transition from RAFU to UNRA was the main

policy element in the project, and reasonable measures were put in place to achieve this during

RDPP3 project. The QAG noted that the good progress on the institutional setup was in the

right direction for achievement of the development objectives. Further, they noted that the

pace of project implementation and disbursement had started to pick up as an indication that

the remaining project elements would be implemented successfully. The report also pointed

out some of the strengths and weaknesses, which, as captured in Section 6 – Lessons

Learned, were to be addressed under the project and follow-on projects. The overall QAG

assessment of the likelihood to achieve the development objectives was “Moderately

Likely.”

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

43. Procurement: The procurement process remained the primary factor delaying the

project implementation, and required putting in place a realistic procurement plan in

order to avoid such delays. The organization structure of UNRA placed the functions of

procurement at a very low level in the directorate of Finance and Administration. At

commissioning, UNRA did not have a qualified Procurement Specialist. After a long

dialogue the Directorate of Procurement was created and the procurement functions were

split into: (i) works and services and (ii) goods. Other weaknesses were noted in the area

of contracts management and specifically on the application of contract price adjustment

(CPA) formulae. Because of the absence of a proper procurement function, several

complaints were registered, including an allegation of improper contract management

against UNRA for some of the roads financed by the project.

44. An independent procurement review (IPR) on the project was conducted in

October and November 2010. The consultants reviewed the procurement, contract

management, internal control mechanisms, and implementation processes, as well as the

timeliness and appropriateness of no-objections issued by the Bank to confirm their

consistency with the Legal Agreements and associated documents. Major factors, subject

to the control of the implementing agency UNRA, indicated in the IPR summary include:

(i) UNRA has insufficient skills in the evaluation and application of CPA

13

(ii) UNRA does not have adequate procurement and technical staff leading to

long procurement cycles of up to 32 and 42 months between prequalification

and contract signature, and inadequate attention to contract management.

(iii) UNRA did not handle, in a timely manner, cases of delayed compensation

of project-affected persons, leading to delayed site handover, which resulted

in delays in completion of the civil works contracts.

45. Because of the above factors, the IPR gave the recommendations: (i) build the

capacity of UNRA by establishing a quality assurance system to help reduce the long

procurement cycle; (ii) train UNRA staff in the application of the CPA formula; (iii)

review the current organization structure and increase the number of staff in the

procurement and technical departments; (iv) prepare a customized procurement manual

and ensure procurement based on updated designs/bidding documents and invite bids

after the design reviews; and (v) enhance contract management and administration. It

concluded that the benefits of investing in adequate staffing would, in the long run,

outstrip the cost of the extra staff.

46. In order to enhance the skill of UNRA and their consultants, the Bank organized a

special training, in Kampala in July 2011, on the application of CPA formulae. With the

support of the governance team and financing from the Governance Partnership Facility

Window 1 project, the bank engaged an independent consultant to review the

procurement processes in UNRA and to recommend ways of combating corruption. The

consultant recommended the establishment of an independent and parallel bid evaluation

for large contracts and a random sample of smaller contracts to benchmark the results of

UNRA’s bid/proposal evaluation reports. These actions are now undertaken by the DFID

financed project part of the ongoing follow-up actions of the Transport Sector

Development Project (TSDP).

47. Financial Management: The quality of the financial management reports was

generally acceptable. Satisfactory audit reports were received on a timely basis, which

were reviewed by the Bank and the comments sent to the borrower. The project was first

implemented by RAFU, which did not have an internal audit unit within its structure as it

was not a statutory body but an organ of the MOWT. An internal audit unit was

established as part of the UNRA structure. Consistent with the DFA, the following

financial covenants were complied with: (i) carrying out audits of the special account in

accordance with appropriate auditing principles by independent auditors; (ii)

implementing a time-bound action plan for strengthening financial management system;

and (iii) furnishing quarterly project management reports. Given that the project closed

on October 31, 2011, the Credit is not able to finance the audit for the period from July 1,

2011 to closure of the accounts on February 29, 2012. The government has pledged to

finance the audit and the report will be provided at the end of FY12/13.

48. Environment: At project implementation, the supervising consultants responsible

for construction-related mitigation as part of the routine inspection of contractor's work

provided information on environmental mitigation measures in the monthly progress

reports. A full time environmentalist within RAFU/UNRA continued to monitor the

14

activities on the road projects in liaison with NEMA. No adverse environmental

degradation matters were reported and the performance was rated “Satisfactory.”

49. Social Assessment: During the project implementation, RAFU/UNRA had a

sociologist and two land acquisition officers who were instrumental in monitoring the

implementation of the RAPs, and the HIV/AIDS mitigation programs. Treatment of the

STD cases was also provided by the on-site clinics, with the HIV/AIDS treatment

coordinated through the national program. UNRA have provided the RAP

Implementation Completion Reports for all the upgraded roads and the reports are

satisfactory. However, reporting on the progress of RAPs implementation was a

challenge. This challenge was addressed through the training of UNRA staff and their

consultants in management of land acquisition and through on-the-spot guidance during

supervision missions to enhance their skills. The performance was rated “Moderately

Satisfactory.”

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

50. Originally it was planned to continue the Roads Development Program with a

fourth phase (RDPP4). RDPP4 was intended to finance the rehabilitation of district roads

identified by the Ten Year District Road Investment Program (TYDRIP) with a credit

amount of US$26 million. However, in the course of the implementation of the APL

program, it was decided that the financing of district roads should be mainstreamed in the

government’s recurrent and development budgets, and that development programs (DPs)

should rather focus on capacity building (including capacity for the management of local

roads) and on large investments on the national roads network.

51. The next lending program was chosen to be a SIL. This instrument was chosen

rather than continuation with the APL for RDPP4 because the reforms that were

promoted under the three phases of the previous APL (RDPP) had largely been achieved,

although with some delays. It was therefore agreed that the proposed RDPP4 would be

dropped and that IDA would support a new proposed series of projects named the

Transport Sector Development Project (TSDP) that would, jointly with other DPs,

support government’s implementation of its National Transport Master Plan (NTMP).

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

52. The project objectives were clear, relevant, and important to improve sector policy

and strengthening road management. The program components had a good linkage with

the project objectives. The project also contributed to the Bank’s CAS strategic outcomes

of improving reliability of access to infrastructure services and poverty reduction through

medium-term strategy focused on private-investment-led growth. The project objectives

were also in line with the country’s 2000 CAS objectives of facilitating the efficient and

reliable provision of transport services, increasing agricultural production, stimulating

economic growth, promoting security in the country, and enhancing linkages with

neighboring countries.

15

53. The RDPP3 was the third phase of the APL, follow-on project from the RDP

Phases I & II (RDPP1 & RDPP2). Originally it was planned to continue the Roads

Development Program with a fourth phase (RDPP4) which was intended to finance the

rehabilitation of district roads identified by the Ten Year District Road Investment

Program (TYDRIP) with a credit amount of US$26 million. In the course of

implementing the APL program, it was decided that the financing of district roads should

be “mainstreamed” in the government’s recurrent and development budgets, and that

Development Partners should rather focus on capacity building (including capacity for

the management of local roads) and on large investments on the national road network.

54. Further, since the RDPP3 was a phased APL program, for continuity of the APL,

the PDO relied on RDPP1 and RDPP2 objectives, and implemented them as a rolling

program with overlaps in the different phases of the program. The combined output of the

APL has substantially contributed to achieving the objective of the RDP as a total of 935

km of roads were upgraded/rehabilitated.

55. In terms of linkage to the PDO, the project components of the RDPP3 project

focused on the national roads network. Project areas are rural part of the country with

high yield of agricultural productivity. Thus, the anticipated benefit lay with reducing

high transport costs that form a large portion of the cost of agricultural produce and

therefore make it uncompetitive in the market. However, due to the fact that some of the

projects components were dropped, the outcome achievements were not at desired level

as anticipated at appraisal. Overall, since the GoU agreed to finance the components that

were dropped, there was no requirement to consider the review of the PDO and outcome

indicators in line with project restructuring and new developments in the sector.

56. Given the long time period elapsed at initial stages—the time of preparation, and

the unprecedented procurement delays on actual implementation—it would have been

better to consider a review of the PDO indicators, so as to realistically reflect the changes

and new developments. In addition, dropping of some components while keeping the

original PDO indicators intact, lead to gross reductions in project benefits. A lack of

detailed information makes quantifying the foregone benefits a difficult and complex

exercise, rendering measured values nearly impossible. However, it can be noted that

delay caused lost benefits that would have been generated from savings on transport costs

and travel time.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

57. The project’s overriding objective of improving accesses to rural and economically

productive areas through upgrading of selected priority road links and further

strengthening road sector management was substantially achieved through the following

accomplishments: (i) the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road (44 km) was

strengthened/upgraded from gravel to paved (bituminous) standard; (ii) the Soroti-

Dokolo-Lira road (123 km) was upgraded from gravel to paved (bituminous) standard;

(iii) a detailed design for upgrading of 300 km of district roads reclassified to national

(bitumen) standard was prepared; (iv) data collection on 10,000 km of national roads was

completed; (v) a feasibility study and detailed design for upgrading of 300 km of national

gravel roads to paved (bituminous) standard was completed; (vi) provision was made for

16

training and technical advisory services to consolidate the institutional reform process,

including establishment and commencing operations of the Road Authority, through,

inter alia, developing a performance agreement and a business plan, (vii) a financial

management system and internal audit function was established, including the restructure

of internal office organization and staffing, and development of management information

systems; and (viii) provision was made for external audit services. As noted above it was

the Busega-Mityana road and bridges on the Atiak-Moyo road that were financed by the

government. As a result, the outcomes of the project were achieved with this financing of

the Government that supported key pillars of the CAS.

58. The PDO relates the project roads to classified national roads, which are considered

to be important instruments for the improvement of the linkage of rural economic activity

to the market. The PDO reflects the importance of the project components with regards to

their contribution to rural access improvement and increase in agricultural productivity as

a result of the expected reductions in transport cost. However, use of crude traffic growth

measures as a proxy indicator for agricultural productivity cannot adequately or fully

reflect the project zone of influence on agriculture productivity growth and economic

activity. Detailed data on the project area freight traffic generation by traffic mode and

commodity type were not availed either as baseline or for the project at completion. This

limits the assessment capacity on the sub-indicator elements of the project. However,

from the appraisal and reappraisal reports, an overall economic assessment is provided on

Annex 3 of the report, summarizing the economic parameters and traffic information for

the two road projects.

3.3 Efficiency

59. At project appraisal, an economic analysis for investment on each of the project

roads was carried out using the HDM. The consolidated EIRR was observed to be above

12 percent. The project also carried out a sensitivity analysis based on economic costs

(+20 percent) and average daily traffic (-20 percent). At project completion, the net

present value (NPV) and the EIRR were re-evaluated for the two roads that were

upgraded—the Soroti-Lira and Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe roads. The NPV and EIRR for

the two roads at completion are much higher than at appraisal. Details of the economic

and financial analysis, economic indicators and assessment on the reappraisal report are

shown in Annex 3 with input parameters in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and traffic count for the two

roads in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.

60. Results of traffic studies on Soroti Lira road revealed an increase in traffic from

appraisal forecast. The number of heavy goods vehicles more than doubled in volume,

the number of cars increased by 200 percent while passenger buses did not grow as

forecasted. The economic indicators for the completed road (Soroti-Dokolo) showed

positive NPV of US$30.6 million, which is about 50 percent more than that obtained at

appraisal, and an EIRR of 15.6 percent despite the increase in cost from US$47.0 million

at appraisal to US$115.0 million at completion (more than double). It must be noted that

the scope of work of the completed project was substantially different from the scope at

appraisal. Specifically for the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road, additions to the original

scope of work included dualization of the carriageway, relocations of utilities, and

17

provision of pedestrian walkway. These additions were, however, necessary since the

completion of the northern by-pass, which was designed after completion of the design of

this road, attracted a high volume of traffic, calling for improvement of the capacity and

road safety features on the first 1.3 km of the road that now feeds traffic from the central

business district to the by-pass. Results of the current study show that some of the

predictions made at appraisal were achieved soon after completion of the project.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

61. The development objective of the project was to improve access to rural and

economically productive areas and to progressively continue to build up road sector

planning, design, and program management capability including road safety management.

However, the road safety aspect was not properly addressed as part of the indicators nor

captured as one component of the project. The outcome indicators relate to reduction in

average travel time, vehicle operating costs, and traffic growth as a proxy measure to

agricultural productivity and increase in economic activity on the project roads. As

discussed in paragraph 54, the corresponding baseline values for each indicator were not

properly developed during preparation. In addition, the inadequacy and absence of

detailed data and information on agricultural productivity and economic activity makes

the justification on the overall rating difficult.

62. However, there are tangible results attained from the other indicators defined

during the implementation process. The project achieved the targets of upgrading and

rehabilitating a total of 152 km of roads, and rehabilitating 15 km of an existing paved

road. In addition, the GoU financed the rehabilitation of another 57 km of road that was

dropped when the project was restructured. The change in average roughness on these

roads brings about benefits to all groups of road users resulting from reduction in vehicle

operating costs and travel time.

63. Considering the time lose on actual implementation, and zero disbursement levels

over the project period from 09/09/2004 (1st ISR date) to 06/28/2007 (6

th ISR date), the

ISR “Satisfactory” ratings were too generous. The project in 2007/08 was one of the

flagged problem projects and the ISR rating was downgraded to “Moderately

Unsatisfactory.” From 2008 onward, with the advent of UNRA and proactive measures

on project management, the project started to progress very well and started to pick up

“Satisfactory” ratings and continued thusly up to end of the project. Based on an

assessment of the overall performance, considering the above mentioned factors and

weaknesses as an impetus for rating, the ICR assessed the overall performance outcome

rating to be “Moderately Satisfactory,” differing from the ISR “Satisfactory” inclined

ratings as indicated in Section G of the Data sheet.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

(i) Poverty Impact: The project influence area in which the roads were improved are

known for agriculture production, dairy and poultry farming, fish production, and tourism

18

for the provision of easy access to national parks. The development of all these activities

enhanced the local economy and reduced rural poverty through creating job opportunities,

increasing agricultural production and promoting tourism.

(ii) Gender Impacts: The policy and strategy of the roads sector provided overall equal

opportunities of employment for male and female workers on road rehabilitation works.

(iii) Social Development: The project provided improved access to schools, health centers,

village markets, social services, and facilitated business development activities. Since the

roads were improved on existing alignments, the project did not have any negative impact

on human settlements.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

64. During the implementation phase the following institutional changes were made:

(i) RAFU, which was a nucleus for the establishment of UNRA, was phased out and the

UNRA,(created by an act of Parliament in May 2006) took over on its effective

operational date of July 1, 2008. RAFU was instrumental under the MOWT for effective

development of the RDP from concept level to implementation of the RDPP1 and RDPP2

phases. It also commenced the implementation of the RDPP3 up to the time UNRA

became effective. The experience gained from the works of RAFU was the basis for the

newly formed institution to start its business from firm ground as an independent and

autonomous body. This is demonstrated by the fact that RAFU/UNRA’s capacity to

deliver increased from US$120 million per annum at appraisal to about US$400 million

per annum at closure of the project.

(ii) In April 2001, with financing provided under the RSISTAP, an environmental

management/liaison unit was established within the MOWT. Its objective was to provide

the needed capacity to coordinate environmental and social policies under the RSDP and

to facilitate coordination between all affected stakeholders —RAFU/UNRA, MOWT,

NEMA, the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), the engineer, the contractor, local

administrations, and members of the local communities—on the implementation and

monitoring of the mitigation measures.

(iii) Parliament passed the UNRA Bill in May 2006. UNRA Board was appointed in

January 2007. UNRA was formally established on November 1, 2007 and it became fully

operational on July 1, 2008 after a lengthy process to appoint its Chief Executive Officer

and senior managers.

(iv) A Road Fund Act was passed by Parliament on June 19, 2008, gazetted on October

15, 2008 and the Road Fund (RF) became operational on July 1, 2009 after appointment

of the Board members, its Chief Executive Officer and senior managers.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

N/A

19

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

65. Every year, a joint transport sector review meeting was held in Kampala to review

the performance of the sector. The assessment reports included a paragraph or two on the

project and were provided to both development partners and the political leadership of

the country.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

66. Given that UNRA and the Road Fund are now fully operational; the risks to the

development outcomes are considered moderate. UNRA has taken over the maintenance

function on national roads from MOWT and the well-tested management systems of

RAFU. Even though, as has been experienced in many other countries, policy reversals

are possible, UNRA and the RF have continued to build their capacities. However,

UNRA has not been able to retain high quality staff as many of them have joined large

organizations (Regional Economic Communities, African Development Bank (AfDB),

European Union (EU), and others). UNRA has not yet adopted new ways of managing

road networks based on the principles of life cycle costs, for example output based

approaches. The RF has yet to implement the principles of the second generation Road

Fund. However, this has been hampered by the fact that Uganda Revenue Authority Act

does not provide for direct transfer of funds to the Road Fund. Instead, the funds are

channeled through the consolidated fund of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and

Economic Development (MoFPED) and passed to the Road Fund through the budget

cycle. The end result is that the funds received are insufficient to meet the maintenance

requirements of approximately 60,000 km of national, district and urban roads and are

unable to arrest the buildup of backlog maintenance. In order to address the situation, it

has been agreed with the rest of the Development Partners to handle backlog maintenance

through the use of Output and Performance Based Road Contracting (OPRC) approach.

In this regard, there is ongoing dialogue with government to ensure sustainable funding

for road maintenance.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


67. The project design was relevant, appropriate, and responsive to the client’s needs

as it supported the government’s 10-year (1997-2006) RSDP and the updated RSDP

(2001- 2012). The key triggers for preparation of the third phase of the Road

Development program were: (i) RAFU strategy for recruitment of technical staff

implemented; (ii) PIP prepared; (iii) detailed design and bidding documents accepted;

and (iv) pre-qualification of contractors commenced. During project preparation,

information sharing and consultation took place with the donor community; the Bank

20

provided experience gained from application of principles of the Road Maintenance

Initiative (RMI) in Africa. The GoU and donor community acknowledged the Bank's

leadership role during preparation of the RSDP.

68. The overall risk at project appraisal was assessed to be Moderate as mitigation

measures were adequate at entry. However, it is noted that a comprehensive risk

mitigation plan to be followed during project implementation was not designed and

discussed with the borrower at entry. The capacity built under the RSISTAP, apart from

contributing a lot for implementation of the previous projects (RDPP1 and RDPP2), laid

the base foundation to help reduce the quality-at-entry risk for project implementation.

The team proactively addressed the project risks and problems faced and came up with

mitigation measures agreed with the GoU.

(b) Quality of Supervision


69. A Project Implementation Plan (PIP) was prepared, which provided a good basis

for the project supervision. The skills mix of the Bank supervision team was well

balanced. The team maintained a strategic vision not only on institutional development,

but provided a good advice on other cross cutting issues such as road safety, HIV/AIDS

awareness and mitigation measures and governance. There was significant involvement

of the Bank’s team to resolve day-to-day problems. The quality of the financial

management reviews was found to be satisfactory and consistent with the Bank

guidelines. The supervision aide-memoires for the implementation phase provided

highlights on the key issues thus providing prompt information to the client and Bank

management.

70. The contracts were substantially delayed due to procurement delays. As such, the

project implementation was rated Unsatisfactory and Moderately Unsatisfactory in the

ISR No 8, dated December 12, 2007 and ISR No. 9, dated June 24, 2008, respectively.

From a strategic standpoint, the Bank was responsive in recognizing the problems that

arose and in providing space and time for their resolution. The actions taken by the Bank

to resolve implementation bottlenecks were adequate. With enhanced supervision and

independent technical audits carried out by consultants outsourced under the project,

implementation and subsequent ratings of the project improved. Under the RDPP3, in

2005, the Bank provided training for a critical mass of RAFU staff in the application of

road planning tools, specifically the Roads Economic Decision (RED) model and the

HDM4, to enable the staff to analyze data and use it for planning. Software licenses were

also provided for the HDM4.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


21

71. Taking into account the role that was played by the Bank at entry and at

supervision, the overall rating for Bank’s performance is assessed as “Moderately

Satisfactory.”

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


72. The government showed commitment in implementing institutional reforms;

UNRA became fully operational in July 2008 though it took ten years. As recommended

by the sector financing and management study and after a consistent dialogue with the

Bank, the government finally decided to set up a Road Fund to enhance financial

sustainability of road maintenance. The Road Fund Bill was passed by the Cabinet on

May 17, 2007 and was approved by the Parliament on June 19, 2008 and the RF became

operational on July 1, 2009. When high bids were received for the first three civil works

contracts, the total sum of the contracts was 43 percent over and above the available funds

for this category of expenditure on the credit/grant. The GoU came in promptly to meet

the shortfall. At closure, there were still outstanding payments resulting from variations

in the scope of work that were needed to address changes not envisaged at the design

stage. Based on the commitments, and because the ultimate goal of the second generation

Road Fund have not been met, the government’s performance is rated as “Moderately

Satisfactory.”

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


73. RAFU was the executing agency for Phase I and II of the program. While not

always showing a stellar performance, its managerial and technical skills were adequate.

RAFU was also the agency responsible for implementing the first half of Phase III of the

program, but starting July 1, 2008, the newly created autonomous Road Authority

(UNRA) is the responsible entity. With the transfer of responsibilities from RAFU to

UNRA, some of the accountability mechanisms and fiduciary controls may have been

temporarily impaired.

74. Due to pre-qualification issues, the project has suffered a delay of about two years.

On the institutional side, there was a weakness in UNRA’s procurement capacity.

However, at closure of the project, UNRA had made most of the required improvements.

It has also responded well to calls for training to improve the skills of its staff. Based on

the above, UNRA’s performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


75. The government’s overall performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

22

6. Lessons Learned

76. APL Instrument: The APL instrument cut down on the demand for rigorous project

preparations for every SIL. It also cut down on the approval processes from the

government’s side as evidenced by the fact that each phase was able to start and run for

some time in parallel with the previous phase.

77. Policy and Institutional Reforms: Institutional reform conducted parallel to project

implementation causes delays in program implementation. An important lesson learned is

that establishment of new institutions require longer time than anticipated for transition,

which may impact on project progress, and needs policy consultations and commitment

as part of the preparatory work.

78. Human Resource Capacity Development: Restructuring an agency at the same time

as implementing a project is challenging and may cause project implementation delays.

The development of human capital to an acceptable and stable stage is a continuous

process. It is therefore essential to continue providing support to build UNRA’s capacity

to enable them to establish sustainable management systems to help reduce the turn-

around time for implementing of projects. It is also essential to keep in mind the

dynamics of human resource development, including of recruiting and training staff in

various disciplines. For sustainability on the provision of policy and institutional reform

and technical assistance, the process needs continuation and pick up by the follow-on

TSDP.

79. Counterpart Funding: Due to delays caused by the long procurement process that

resulted in cost overruns, the project was restructured and DFA amended to drop

components that could not be financed. However, the GoU committed to finance the cost

overruns and works that, as a consequence of these overruns, could not be financed by

RDPP3 with its increased road sector allocation.

80. Sustainability of the Road Network: With the establishment of the Road Fund, it

was anticipated that the important aspect of sustainable financing of maintenance would

be addressed. However, Government has yet to implement the RF on the principles of the

second generation Road Fund, without which the sustainability of road management will

be doubtful.

81. Escalation of Costs: Cost of the civil works component both at appraisal and

feasibility/detailed design varied substantially due to the sudden sharp rise of the cost of

fuel, construction materials and other inputs at the time of bidding. The eventual bid

prices could therefore not enable the project to be implemented as appraised and

consequently some components had to be dropped. In future, design reviews and updates

of the cost estimates will be necessary just before calling for bids.

82. Land Acquisition and Right-of-way: Payment of compensation for properties has

continued to cause project implementation problems thus should be resolved before the

works contracts commence. All efforts should be made to ensure that contractors always

receive encumbrance free sites.

23

83. Procurement Delays: Cost of the civil works component at the time of bidding

varied substantially from that at the feasibility and detailed design stage due to delays in

the procurement process of about four years. The eventual bid prices could therefore not

enable the project to be implemented as appraised and consequently some components

had to be dropped. In future, design reviews and updates of the cost estimates will be

necessary just before calling for bids. It would also be advisable to avoid a long

prequalification period. It is also worthwhile to explore the possibility of commencing

procurement prior to credit effectiveness in order to provide for procurement lead-time.

84. Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators of the Projects: At appraisal, the baseline

data for the outcome indicators were not provided. These were provided in the ISR4 in

August 2005. As a proxy for increased industrial and agricultural activity, the traffic

increase on the project roads was used to reflect the agricultural productivity benefits to

the rural population. The lesson learned is that baseline data should be provided at the

appraisal stage for appropriate reading of the PDO indicators.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies: None

(b) Co financiers: No co-financier

(c) Other partners and stakeholders: None

24

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

Financial Status

1. The financial status presented in the Table below shows that there was a final total

commitment of US$239.34 million against the appraisal estimate amount of US$133

million. As this by far exceeded the available funds on the credit, the GoU agreed to

finance the shortfall. The GoU also financed one road that was dropped from the Credit

along with bridges on the Atiak-Moyo road that were re-designed for upgrading. The

bridges are commensurate with the Class II bitumen standard road. The Table 1.1 shows

costs including dropped projects financed by the GoU.

Table 1.1 Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) including dropped

projects financed by GoU

Components

Appraisal

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi,

Civil Works 31.18 57.72 185%

Atiak-Moyo, Civil Works 10.88 8.92 82%

Soroti-Dokolo-Lira, Civil Works 47.00 103.51 220%

Busega-Mityana, Civil Works 24.30 53.94 222%

Road Authority Headquarters, Civil

Works 7.50 0 0%

Supervision consultancy services for

roads (Kampala, Atiak, Soroti and

Busega) 5.44 9.52 175%

Detailed Design of 300 km of District

Roads from gravel to National paved

(bitumen) standards. 1.60 1.02 64%

Feasibility & Design for upgrading 600

km of national roads to paved (bitumen)

standards. 2.00 2.51 126%

Consultancy services, institutional

support to RAFU/Road Authority 3.10 2.20 71%

TOTAL 133.00 239.34 180%

Table 1.2 Financing inclusive of dropped projects financed by GoU

Source of Funds Type of Co-

financing

Appraisal

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 25.40 122.94 484%

IDA 107.60 116.40 108%

Total 133.00 239.34 180%

25

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. The credit had six components: (i) upgrading and strengthening of three high priority

national roads; (ii) designing the upgrade of about 300 km of district roads as national roads,

which therefore are required to meet the National Road Standard; (iii) studying, through the

use of consultancies, the feasibility of upgrading to bitumen standard about 600 km of

priority national roads; (iv) rehabilitation/re-graveling of the Atiak-Moyo road (91 km); (v)

constructing a proposed Road Authority headquarters building; and (vi) developing

institutional support for the establishment of the National Road Authority, and (vii)

provisioning of external auditing services.

2. The outcome indicator related to the civil works for upgrading, rehabilitation and

reconstruction component is “reduction in average travel time on national roads compared to

baseline” and “reduction in vehicle operating costs on national roads compared to baseline.”

At closure of the RDPP3, the three APLs together upgraded and rehabilitated a total of 877

kilometers of roads, close to the original target of 886 kilometers appraised for upgrading

rehabilitation and re-graveling under the program. This has resulted in reduction of travel

time and vehicle operating costs from Kampala-Gayaza and Soroti-Lira to far off towns, as

well as cross-border traffic as high as 40 percent. With completion of the projects, travel time

and vehicle operating costs from the Kenya border for traffic originating from Mombasa to

northeastern DRC and southern Sudan were reduced by equivalent amounts.

3. Further, under institutional support to the sector, creation of a roads authority, transfer

of maintenance functions from the Ministry of Works to UNRA and the creation of a road

fund are major milestones. With the above background, it can be concluded that the outcome

indicator related to the civil works for upgrading and rehabilitation/reconstruction under the

program was achieved. However, it has to be noted that sub-components dropped from the

original plan during the restructuring of the program would have brought additional output

gains. The three civil works dropped are: (i) upgrading Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road (23 km); (ii)

rehabilitation of the paved Busega-Mityana road (57 km) and re-graveling of Atiak-Moyo

road (91 km), and the building contract for the proposed UNRA and MOWT offices, all of

which the government embarked on financing.

4. RDPP3 was originally planned to finance the paving and reconstruction of 249

kilometers of national roads and to re-gravel 91 kilometers of (national) gravel roads.

However, due to higher than anticipated bids, the paving and reconstruction of 57 kilometers

of roads out of the 82 kilometers appraised could not be financed by the project. GoU

committed itself to avail financing for the balance of dropped projects from its own budget.

The project was also supposed to finance the re-graveling of a 91 km road that was planned

to be financed by the IDA-supported Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project (1994-1996).

but was abandoned due to insurgency in the area. While the road was appraised for re-

graveling, the government decided that with the increased traffic, it would be best to upgrade

the design to enable upgrading to a paved (bituminous) standard road. In that light, the

US$8.7 million allocated for the road was about 10 percent of the engineer’s estimate for

upgrading the road. Hence, the government’s proposal was to finance it at a later stage

through other means.

26

Table 2.1: Comparison of Performance Indicators at Project Appraisal and Project

Completion

Hierarchy of Objectives

Planned Outputs at

Appraisal and/or

as amended

Achieved Outputs

at Project

Completion

(October 2011)

Remarks Percent

Achieved

Project Development Objectives

To improve access to rural areas and economically productive areas, and to continue to build up sustainable road sector planning,

design and program management capabilities, including road safety.

i) Upgrading of three priority

national roads, i.e. Kampala-

Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi;

Soroti-Dokolo-Lira; and

Busega-Mityana;

154 km of National

Roads upgraded

from gravel to

bitumen standard;

72 km of bitumen

standard roads

reconstructed.

152 km of National

Roads upgraded to

bitumen roads;

15 km of bitumen

standard roads

reconstructed.

Upgrading of 23 km of

Zirobwe-Wobulenzi were

cancelled due to insufficient

funds;

First 1.3 km of Kampala-

Gayaza built to dual

carriageway standard.

57 km of Busega-Mityana

was fully financed by the

GoU

92%

21%

i) Detailed design for upgrading

about 300 km of District Roads

reclassified to the National

Road Standard;

Detailed designs for

300 km completed.

Designs completed

for 311.5 km

Satisfactorily completed. 104%

ii) Consultancies for feasibility

studies of upgrading about 600

km of priority national roads;

Feasibility studies

for 600 km

completed.

Detailed designs

and preparation of

bidding documents

completed for

upgrading 202 km

The Government conducted a

further prioritization based on

traffic levels and only Gulu-

Atiak-Nimule and Vura-

Arua-Koboko-Oraba were

authorized for detailed design

preparation of biddings

documents.

34%

iii) Rehabilitation/re-graveling of

the Atiak-Moyo road;

91 km of gravel

roads improved.

Detailed designs

and preparation of

bidding documents

for upgrading to

bitumen standards.

Following design review, the

need for widening of bridges

and upgrading to Class II

bitumen standards was

established and scope of

services was extended

accordingly. Detailed designs

were completed and bidding

documents were prepared.

100%

iv) Construction of the proposed

Road Authority headquarters

building;

Road Authority HQ

design completed

end 2005; occupied

and functioning by

end of 2008.

Designs and

preparation of

bidding documents

completed in 2008.

Designs Satisfactorily

completed.

Construction of HQ building

cancelled due to shortage of

funding.

100%

0%

v) Institutional support for the

establishment of the Road

Authority, including provision

of external auditing services.

Road authority

staffing is

completed and

operational and

developmental

budget provided for

by end 2005.

Road authority staff

recruited and

authority became

operational on July

1, 2008.

Satisfactorily completed. 100%

27

Table 2.2: Comparison of Activities Proposed at Appraisal and Outputs Achieved at Project

Completion

Com-

ponent

Name of

Component

Activities Agreed at

Appraisal/through

Amendments

Output Achieved at Project

Completion

Percent Remarks

A. Civil Works

for Upgrading,

Rehabilitation

and

Reconstruction

i) Soroti-Dokolo Road (62.6 km)

i) Soroti-Dokolo Road (62.6 km) 100%

ii) Dokolo-Lira Road (60.4 km)

ii) Dokolo-Lira Road (60.4 km)

100%

i) Reconstruction of

Kampala-Gayaza Road (15 km)

i) Reconstruction of

Kampala-Gayaza Road (15 km) 100%

ii) Upgrading of Gayaza-

Kiwenda Road (11 km)

ii) Upgrading of Gayaza-

Kiwenda Road (11 km) 100%

iii) Upgrading of Kiwenda-Zirobwe Road (19 km)

iii) Upgrading of Kiwenda-Zirobwe Road (19 km) 100%

iv) Upgrading of Zirobwe-

Wobulenzi Road (23

km)

iv) Not achieved

0%

Upgrading of road section cancelled

due to insufficient funds in the DFA.

v) Rehabilitation and Re-

graveling of Atiak-Moyo Road (91 km)

v) Achieved with GoU financing

100%

vi) Reconstruction and

Upgrading of Busega-Mityana Road (57 km)

vi) Achieved with GoU

financing 100%

B Civil Works

for

Construction

of Buildings

Construction of headquarters

building for MOWT and the

Road Authority

Not achieved

0%

Project cancelled due to increased

costs of road components and

insufficient funds in the DFA.

C Road

Construction

Services

i) Soroti-Dokolo Road

(62.6 km): Design

Review & Supervision

of construction.

i) Soroti-Dokolo Road (62.6

km): Design Review &

Supervision of

construction. 97%

Issuance of final certificate and final

accounts outstanding.

ii) Dokolo-Lira Road (60.4


Supervision of

construction.

ii) Dokolo-Lira Road (60.4


Supervision of

construction. 97%

Issuance of final certificate and final

accounts outstanding.

28

Com-

ponent

Name of

Component


Appraisal/through

Amendments


Completion

Percent Remarks

iii) Kampala-Gayaza-

Kiwenda-Zirobwe Road

(45 km)

iii) Kampala-Gayaza-

Kiwenda-Zirobwe Road

(45 km) 90%

Substantial Completion was achieved

on July, 2011. Services under Defects

Liability Period (DLP) after closure

of the Credit will be financed by the

GoU.

iv) Zirobwe-Wobulenzi Road (45 km) Not achieved.

0% Road project cancelled due to

insufficient funds in the DFA.

v) Rehabilitation and Re-

graveling of Atiak-Moyo Road (91 km)

DED services awarded.

Services were later amended

through Addendum 1 to cover

design for upgrading the road

from gravel to paved

(bituminous) standard.

100%

Following design review, design to

upgrading to Class II Standards was

adopted, including

reconstruction/widening of bridges to

double carriageway. Detailed design

was completed and bidding

documents prepared.

vi) Reconstruction and

Upgrading of Busega-Mityana Road (57 km)

Not achieved

0%

Upgrading of road section was

cancelled due to insufficient funds in

the DFA.

D

Roads

Feasibility and

Design

Detailed engineering design

for upgrading of 300 km of

District Roads from gravel

to paved standards.

i) Lot A Roads:

Katine-Ochero (69.2 km)

Nebbi-Golli (14.4 km)

Ochoko-Inde (32.8 km) 100%

Detailed design, EIA and Bidding

documents prepared.

ii) Lot B Roads:

Luwero-Wakyato (34.2

km)

Luwero-Zirobwe (36.7

km)

Mityana-Kanoni (37.2

km)

Kyegegwa-Kazo (87.0

km) (replacing Muzizi-

Rwemiyaga)

100%

Detailed design, EIA and Bidding

documents prepared.

Feasibility studies for

upgrading 600 km of

national roads to paved

standards, and detailed

design of selected few

(Kotido–Moroto–Muyembe

Road (290 km); Mpigi–

Maddu–Sembabule Road

(135 km);

Kyenjojo–Hoima–Masindi–

Kigumba Road (238 km);

Arua–Koboko–Oraba Road

(78 km); Gulu-Atiak-Bibia

Road (104 km).

i) Feasibility study and

detailed design of Gulu-

Atiak-Bibia/Nimule (104

km).

100%

Because of low traffic on the four

roads, the original scope was reduced

to two roads: namely; Arua–Koboko–

Oraba Road (78 km) and Gulu-Atiak-

Bibia Road (104 km).

Design of Gulu-Atiak-Bibia-Nimule

road was completed and bidding

documents prepared for two contract

packages: Gulu-Atiak (64 km) and

Atiak-Nimule (40 km).

29

Com-

ponent

Name of

Component


Appraisal/through

Amendments


Completion

Percent Remarks

ii) Feasibility study and

detailed of Vura-Arua-

Koboko-Oraba (98 km). 100%

Design of Vura-Arua-Koboko-Oraba

road was completed and bidding

documents prepared for one contract

package: Gulu-Atiak (64 km) and

Atiak-Nimule (40 km).

E Institutional

Support and

Establishment

of the Road

Authority

Provision of training and TA

services, including

establishment of the Road

Authority

i) TA services engaged to

support establishment of

Road Authority. 100%

TA services acquired during

transition.

ii) Training of Road

Authority staff. 100%

Training program of the Road

Authority supported.

iii) Road Authority

Established. 100%

Processes for establishment of the

Road Authority supported.

Institutional Support for

Parts A thru E, including

external audit services.

Institutional support provided. 100%

External Audits carried out.

100%

30

Table 2.3: Comparison of Cost & Duration of Civil Works Contract at Project Start and

Completion

No

.

Project Length

(KM)

Original

Contract

Price US$

Millions

Revised

Contract

Price With

Price

Adjustment

US$

Millions

Cost

Increase

%

Start Date Original

completion

date

Actual

completion

date

Delay Remark

1 Soroti-

Dokolo

62.6 38.68 53.58 38.52% 1-Nov-07 30-Apr-10 18-Mar-10 0 Contract was

completed ahead

of schedule.

2 Dokolo-

Lira

60.4 44.7 62.25 38.26% 1-Jun-08 30-Nov-10 24-Sept-10 0 Contract was

completed ahead

of schedule.

3 Kampala-

Gayaza-

Zirobwe

45 39.2 54.59 39.26% 30-Mar-08 30-Nov-09 21-Jul-11 19.6

months

EOT was

granted for

additional

works, including

dualing of km 0

~ km 1.3.

4 Busega-

Mityana

road

57 47.19 53.94 14.30% 24-Jan,-09 8-Jan-11 31-Jan,-12 Financed by the

GoU

5 Atiak-

Moyo

road

bridges

and ferry

landings

7

Bridges

and 2

Ferry

landings

8.92 8.92 0.00% 31-Dec-10 30 Dec-11 20-Jan-12 Financed by the

GoU

TOTAL 178.69 230.74 30.55%

31

Table 2.4: Comparison of Cost of Consultancy Services Contract at Project Start and

Completion

No. Project Length

(km)

Original

Contract

Price US$

Million

Revised

Contract

Price US$

Million

Percent

of Cost

Increase

1 Supervision of Soroti-Dokolo 62.5 1.2 1.2 0%

2 Supervision of Dokolo-Lira 45.55 1.5 1.5 0%

3 Supervision of Kampala-

Gayaza-Zirobwe

68 1.1 2.93 166.36%

4 Supervision of Busega-Mityana

road

57 1.87 3.32 178%

Supervision of bridges on

Atiak-Moyo road

7 No 0.46 0.46 0

4 Design for Gulu-Atiak-Nimule 104 0.79 0.79 0%

5 Design for Vurra-Arua-Oraba 92 0.90 0.90 0%

6 Feasibility/Design of Atiak-

Moyo road

104 0.82 0.82 0%

7 Design for district roads – Lot A 116 0.45 0.45 0%

8 Design for district roads – Lot B 203 0.57 0.57 0%

9 National Roads Data Collection

Study

10,000 2.0 2.37 18.50%

10 Capacity Building LS0 1.0 1.0 0%

TOTAL 12.66 16.31

28.83%

32

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe Road

1. The Economic reappraisal report was prepared to update the appraisal report that

was conducted long before the commencement of civil work contracts. The reappraisal

provided updates on results, and verified and validated the previous economic appraisal

of the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe Road Upgrading Project at completion. There was a

significant project cost escalation that could have changed the indicators of the study. It is

noted that, mainly due to additional scope of work, the overall project cost at completion

increased significantly to the projected final cost of UGX 96.05 billion (US$40.261

million at an exchange rate of UGX 2,385.79 as at 29 April, 2011), including a Contract

Price Adjustment (CPA) and additional improvement works. The Engineer’s cost

estimate at appraisal was UGX 38.46 billion while the tender price was UGX 67.80

billion.

2. As part of the assessment, the consultant carried out classified traffic counts and

origin and destination surveys at designated locations. Three alternative assumptions

were considered for the economic and sensitivity analysis of the completed road. The

alternatives scenarios considered were:

Alternative 1: to consider only normal traffic and no maintenance after

improvement.

Alternative 2: to include generated traffic with no maintenance after completion.

Alternative 3: to include both generated traffic and maintenance after

improvement.

3. A summary of the results obtained in the appraisal and reappraisal reports are shown

in the Table 3.1 for the economic indicators based on actual work completed.

Table 3.1: Summary of Results of the Appraisal and Reappraisal Reports

Appraisal

Reappraisal results by Alternative Remark

Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3

EIRR % 27.5 55.1 57.2 55.4 Alternative 3 higher at reappraisal

NPV US Millions 18.09 26.47 26.34 30.13 Alternative 3 higher at reappraisal

B/C 1.58 3.33 3.47 3.57 Alternative 3 higher at reappraisal

Cost/km 496,215 744,208 744,208 744,208 Unit Cost at reappraisal increasing by

50% from reappraisal

4. Overall, the scenario option of Alternative 3 recorded better results for the economic

indicators. With regards to traffic, the base year traffic ranged from 200 to 600 vehicles a

day with higher traffic volumes found towards the Kampala end of the road. At

completion the traffic on all sections ranged from 584 to 16,176 vehicles per day. The

highest traffic count was recorded for the Kampala-Mpererwe section, and overall

measured annual daily traffic (ADT) at reappraisal far exceeded the projected traffic at

appraisal. The average traffic growth rate estimate is 8.16 percent for the reappraisal and

the projected traffic growth rate was 5.5 percent at appraisal. The long project delays

33

between project appraisal and project implementation can invalidate the estimates and

may have an effect on the results of the project benefit.

5. The NPV for the completed project was higher than that obtained when the road was

appraised though costs have increased by about 50 percent from original levels. Hence,

the positive results of the reappraised road can be attributed to increases in benefits due to

increased traffic on the completed road. Baseline for economic analysis and input

parameters for economic analysis and traffic volume are shown in Tables 3.3. Results of

the traffic analysis revealed that there is an overall increase in traffic compared to

appraisal forecasts. For some categories of vehicles such as heavy trucks, vehicle traffic,

which was not expected to increase, more than doubled in volume. On the contrary, some

passenger vehicles, for which traffic was expected to grow, did not perform well;

specifically small bus traffic grew negatively while car traffic increased by over 200

percent.

6. The economic indicators for the completed road recorded positive NPV of US$30.13

million, which is 65 percent more than that obtained at appraisal. An EIRR of 55.4

percent was recorded despite the fact that there was an over 100 percent increase in costs;

against EIRR appraisal values of 27 percent for Alternative 3. However, it must be noted

that the scope of work of the completed project was substantially different from the scope

work at appraisal. Among others, factors resulting from dualizations of the carriageway,

relocations of utilities, and provision of pedestrian walkways are some of the additions to

the original scope of work. In general, results of the current study show that some of the

predictions made at appraisal were achieved soon after completion of the project.

7. With regards to costs, the Kampala Gayaza Zirobwe Wobulenzi civil works cost at

appraisal was estimated at US$31.38 million, which was only US$458,529 per km. This

is for the appraised project segment including the dropped Zirobwe-Woblonzi (23km)

segment of the road. At completion of the credit, after dropping the Zirobwe-Woblonzi

road segment, for the remaining 53 km of the Kampala Gayaza Zirobwe the actual cost

was US$54.61 million. The corresponding unit cost sharply increased to US$1,030,377

from US$458,529 per km. The increment from the appraisal cost is by about 75 percent

and by-unit cost is 125 percent. Assuming a delay of five years, and other factors being

constant, the unit cost increment per year on average was 25 percent. This reduced the

high level of expected benefit that was expected to be gained by road users over the time

period.

8. The unit cost per KM increment varied from the project cost increment as the project

road length reduced from 68 km to 53 km at completion (see Table 3.2). It can be argued

that the anticipated benefits are partial due to segment dropping from the original

appraised project. The comparative analysis on increments of the Kampala Gayaza and

the Soroti Lira indicating the estimates at appraisal are devalued due to long delays over

the project time period. At appraisal, an incremental project cost provision of US$15.82

million was given, for an increment of 55 km over Soroti Lira compared to Kampala

Gayaza. The actual comparative increment at completion ended up at US$60.59 million.

34

Table 3.2: Comparison of Unit Cost per Km Against Project Cost at Appraisal and

Completion

Component Distance

Project Cost US$

million at

Unit cost (US$)

per km at

Percentage

increment

completion cost

from appraisal

by

Remark

Appraisal Completion Appraisal Completion Project

cost

Unit

cost

Kampala-

Gayaza-

Zirobwe-

Wobulenzi

68 31.18 54.61 458,529 1,030,377 75% 125%

Zirobwe

Woblenzi

(23) km

dropped

Soroti-

Dokolo-Lira,

Civil Works 123 47 115.2 382,114 936,585 145% 145%

Increments of

Soroti Lira to

Kampala

Gayaza

55 15.82 60.59 287,636 1,101,636 283% 283%

9. It should be noted that traffic counts were not conducted just before the

commencement of construction and soon after completion of the project. In addition, the

long project delays between project appraisal and project implementation have an effect

on project benefit. In general, it is noted that planning, monitoring, and evaluation of

projects during the appraisal stage, and re-evaluating projects in situations where there is

a long delay, did not adequately take in to account the long term effect resulting from

delays. It is important to read the results in light of the actual time gap between appraisal

and commencement of construction to ascertain the validity of results obtained at

appraisal. For a realistic comparative assessment, the traffic counts should also be

conducted just before the commencement of construction and soon after completion of a

project life cycle.

35

Table 3.3: Input Parameters for Economic Analysis Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe

Road Length 67.28 km

Works Commencement 2007

Project Duration 3 years

Completion Cost

(Based on Lowest Bidder)

Financial Cost (US$/km) Economic Cost (US$/km) Total Financial Costs (US$)

Kampala -Nsooba 1,480,923 1,406,877 1,828,940

Nsooba -Mpererwe 1,162,584 1,104,455 3,644,701

Mpererwe -Gayaza 730,448 693,926 6,960,074

Gayaza -Kiwenda 709,135 673,678 7,188,147

Kiwenda -Zirobwe 686,342 652,025 12,388,473

Zirobwe -Wobulenzi 686,342 652,025 14,983,532

Total 46,993,866.74

Annual Cost Stream Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

30% 30% 40%

Start Year 2007

Analysis Period 25 yrs

Discount Rate 12%

Salvage value 10%

Base Option: Do Minimum Maintain Gravel Road

Re-graveling when gravel thickness less than equal 50mm

Grading every 365 days

Routine maintenance

Maintain Paved Road

Patching once a year, 100% potholes

Crack sealing once a year, 100% transverse thermal cracks

Routine Maintenance

Alternative Option Upgrading of Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi Road to bitumen standard in 2007; and

Strengthening/rehabilitation of Kampala-Gayaza road in 2007; and

Maintain Paved Road from 2011 onwards

Traffic growth after 2007 5 % - Light vehicles As forecast in economic evaluation report

Motorized Traffic in 2006 (weighted

average ADT) Motorized Traffic (ADT) Non Motorized Traffic (ADT)

Kampala -Nsooba 17920 3,947

Nsooba-Mpererwe 11487 1,610

Mpererwe-Gayaza 6163 944

Gayaza-Kiwenda 1723 375

Kiwenda-Zirobwe 591 564

Zirobwe-Wobulenzi 783 1,493

Generated Traffic Assumptions used in the feasibility have been applied as follows:

Generated traffic at 5% of normal traffic;

Diverted traffic of 20 vpd for Kampala-Gayaza-Kiwenda road and 59 vpd for

Kiwenda-Wobulenzi road (Not applied);

Sensitivity analysis carried out at 10% and 20% reduction in normal traffic as well as

10% and 20% increase in construction/rehabilitation costs.

36

10. The traffic composition in percentage terms derived from the March 2007 traffic

counts that were used in this analysis are as indicated in the table below:

Table 3.4: Increase in Traffic Volume Kampala-Gayaza-Woublonzi

Vehicle Composition (%) Kampala-Gayaza Gayaza-Wobulenzi

1 2 3 4 5 6

Cars Special Hire Taxis 22.54 23.20 15.34 6.97 1.51 1.91

Pickups / Vans / 4WD 15.93 14.18 13.27 10.78 4.15 3.76

Minibuses 31.50 26.96 25.14 9.86 6.24 1.34

Medium Buses / Coasters 0.27 0.29 0.60 0.73 0.15 0.01

Buses 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.08

Single Unit Truck (Dynas / Tractors) 6.59 1.95 6.89 3.94 2.47 2.14

Single Unit Truck (Medium) 1.58 1.56 1.81 1.48 1.28 0.18

Single Unit Truck (Fusos / Lorries) 1.99 0.99 1.73 1.37 1.36 0.41

Truck Trailers and Semi Trailers 0.11 0.13 0.37 0.1 0.00 0.03

Motorcycles 19.47 30.67 34.8 64.67 82.83 90.12

Soroti-Dokolo-Lira Road

11. The Economic reappraisal report updated the appraisal report conducted by the

consultant in 2002, which was conducted long before the commencement of civil works.

The reappraisal study provided updates on indicators, and verified and validated the

economic appraisal of results the Soroti-Dokolo-Lira Road Upgrading Project at

completion. The overall project cost at completion had increased, mainly due to

additional scope of work. The actual cost is UGX 116,466,319,888 as against the

projected contract cost of UGX 82,068,227,664, including Contract Price Adjustment

(CPA) and additional improvement works.

12. As part of the assessment, the consultant carried out classified traffic counts and

origin and destination surveys at designated locations. Three alternative assumptions

were considered for the economic analysis of the completed road. The alternatives

scenarios considered were:

Alternative 1: to consider only normal traffic and no maintenance after

improvement.

Alternative 2: to include generated traffic with no maintenance after completion.

Alternative 3: to include both generated traffic and maintenance after

improvement.

13. A summary of the results obtained in the appraisal and reappraisal reports are shown

in Table 3.5 for the economic indicators based on actual work completed.

37

Table 3.5: Summary of Results on the Appraisal and Reappraisal

Appraisal

Reappraisal results by Alternative Remark

Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3

EIRR % 21.3 7.8 14.70 15.6 Alternative 3 high at reappraisal

NPV US Millions 18.09 -23.04 20.11 30.6 Alternative 3 high at reappraisal

B/C 1.79 0.38 1.53 1.78 Alternative 3 high at reappraisal

Cost/km 381,779 744,208 744,208 744,208 Appraisal Unit Cost doubled by

increasing by about 95%

14. Overall, the scenario option of Alternative 3 recorded better results for the economic

indicators. With regards to traffic, the base year traffic in 2003 ranged from 219 to 644

for the four sections of the project road, whereas the 2010 traffic count ranges from 584

to 1505. The traffic increment level for the four segments of the Dokolo-Lira road is

shown in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: Summary of Traffic Count

Lira-Agwata Agwata- Dokolo Dokolo-Katine Katine –Soroti

Year 2003 2010 2003 2010 2003 2010 2003 2010

ADT 623 1505 219 644 245 584 380 991

% of ADT (2010 to 2003) 142% 194% 138% 161%

Overall total traffic growth (%) 10.71 16.66 13.21 158

Overall generated traffic growth (%) 5.71 11.66 8.21 9.68

15. Measured ADT at reappraisal exceeded the projected traffic forecast of the appraisal.

The average traffic growth for overall annual traffic for the four sections of the road

ranged from 11 percent to 16 percent and for the generated and diverted traffic between

five percent and 11 percent against a projected growth rate of 5.5 percent at appraisal.

Despite the unit cost increases on the project, the NPV values for the completed project

remain higher than the results obtained when the designed road was appraised. The

positive results achieved on the reappraised road can, therefore, be attributed to increases

in benefits due to increased traffic on the completed road.

16. Upon reappraisal, results of traffic analysis revealed an overall growth of traffic

above the appraised forecast levels. For some categories of vehicles such as heavy trucks,

vehicle traffic, which was not expected to increase, more than doubled in volume. On the

contrary, some passenger vehicles, for which traffic was expected to grow, did not

perform well; specifically small bus traffic grew negatively while car traffic increased by

over 200 percent. The economic indicators for the completed road showed positive NPV

of US$30.6 million, which is about 50 percent more than that obtained at appraisal, and

an EIRR of 15.6 percent despite the over 100 percent increase in costs. The EIRR at

appraisal was about five percent more than of the re-appraisal. The reappraisal showed

that some of the predictions made at appraisal were achieved soon after completion of the

project.

38

17. The Soroti Dokolo Lira civil works construction estimated cost was US$47 million;

which is only about US$382,000 per km for the whole project segment at appraisal. At

project completion the actual construction cost was US$115.2 million and the

corresponding unit cost sharply increasing to US$936,585 from US$382,000 per km. The

increment in cost, in terms of both project cost and unit costs, from appraisal to

completion is 145 percent. This is so significant that on taking a delay of five years, and

other factors being constant, the unit cost increment per year was 29 percent. This

indicates that the huge level of benefit missed which could otherwise was supposed to be

gained over the time period.

18. The comparative analysis on increments of the Kampala Gayaza and the Soroti Lira

indicates that the estimates at appraisal are devalued due to delays over the time period

(see Table 3.2). At appraisal, an incremental project cost provision of US$15.82 million

provided on the estimates for the increment of 55 km of Soroti Lira from Kampala

Gayaza. Whereas the actual comparative increment at completion ended up to be

US$60.59 million. The variance is justified from the point of variances in the

competitively offered tender prices for the two projects and dropping of segments of the

project. It is noted that the completion cost for the increment at completion is four fold

higher than the project cost estimates at appraisal.

19. It should be noted that traffic counts were not conducted just before the

commencement of construction and soon after completion of the project. In addition, the

long project delays between project appraisal and project implementation have an effect

on project benefit. In general, it is noted that planning, monitoring, and evaluation of

projects during the appraisal stage, and re-evaluating projects in situations where there is

a long delay, did not adequately take in to account the long-term effect resulting from

delays. It is important to read the results in light of the actual time gap between appraisal

and commencement of construction to ascertain the validity of results obtained at

appraisal. For a realistic comparative assessment, the traffic counts should also be

conducted just before the commencement of construction and soon after completion of a

project life cycle

39

Table 3.7: Input Parameters for Economic Analysis Soroti-Dokolo-Lira

Road Length 123.0 km

Road Sections Soroti – Dokolo 62.6 km

Dokolo – Lira 60.4 km

Works Commencement 2007

Project Duration 3 years

Completion Cost (Based on Lowest bidder) Financial Cost (US$/km) Economic Cost (US$/km) Total Financial Costs (mn

US$)

Soroti – Dokolo 640,701 608,666 40.04

Dokolo – Lira 745,109 707,854 45.00

Annual Cost Stream Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

30% 35% 35%

Start Year 2007

Analysis Period 25 yrs

Discount Rate 12%

Salvage value 10%

Base Option: Do Minimum Maintain Gravel Road:

Re- graveling every 10 years

Grading every 550 days

Spot re- graveling with 30m3/km/yr

Routine maintenance

Alternative Option Upgrade Road in 2007 (DBST with 150mm Base)

Maintain Paved Road from 2011 onwards

Last rehabilitation 2004 (assumed)

Traffic growth after 2007 3.4 % - Light vehicles As forecast in economic evaluation

report 2.0% - Commercial vehicles

Motorized Traffic - 2006(weighted average ADT) Soroti-Dokolo Dokolo-Lira

Motorized 320 vpd 374 vpd

Non-Motorized 1392 vpd 1203 vpd

Motorized Traffic- 2004 (weighted average ADT) Soroti-Dokolo Dokolo-Lira

Motorized 321 421

Non-Motorized 2051 1428

Generated Traffic Assumptions used in the feasibility have been applied as follows:

20% of normal traffic (for PSVs, light vehicles and motorcycles;

10% of normal traffic (for light and medium trucks;

0% of normal traffic (for heavy trucks and buses).

Exogenous benefits (producer surplus based on

assumptions made in previous studies)

Net benefit increment of agricultural income US$ 18,338 per year

Soroti – Dokolo Dokolo - Lira

Cars Special Hire Taxis 14 15

Pickups / Vans / 4WD 6 8

Minibuses 28 26

Medium Buses / Coasters 10 11

Buses 1 1

Single Unit Truck (Dynas / Tractors) 3 3

Single Unit Truck (Fusos / Lorries) 12 15

Truck Trailers and Semi Trailers 13 10

Motorcycles 13 11

40

Table 3.8: Increase in Traffic Volume Soroti - Lira

Name of

Roads

Traffic Volume at

Appraisal (2004)

Traffic Volume at Project

Completion (2010/11)

Percent increase

Car Bus Others Car Bus Others Car Bus Others

Lira-Agwata 68 53 404 301 30 578 343 -43 43

Agwata-Dokolo 9 31 166 164 30 321 1722 -3% 93

Dokolo-Katine 17 25 111 86 14 379 406 -44 241

Katine-Soroti 20 51 268 123 21 652 515 -59 143

41

Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Process

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending

Supervision/ICR

Mustapha Benmaamar Sr. Transport. Spec. EASIS

Anil S. Bhandari Consultant AFTEG

Mary C.K. Bitekerezo Senior Social Development Spec. AFTCS

Nina Chee Senior Environmental Specialist MIGEP

Jocelyne O. Do Sacramento Operations Analyst AFTTR

Olav E. Ellevset Sr. Transport. Spec. AFTTR

Martin Fodor Senior Environmental Specialist AFTEN

Jonas Per Hermanson Transport. Spec. AFTTR

Yitzhak A. Kamhi Consultant AFTTR

Paul Kato Kamuchwezi Financial Management Specialist AFTFM

Agnes Kaye Program Assistant AFMUG

Rosemary Kyabukooli Program Assistant AFMUG

Negede Lewi Sr. Highway Engineer AFTTR

Mary Consolate Muduuli Operations Officer AFMUG

Grace Nakuya Musoke

Munanura Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC

Harriet Nannyonjo Senior Education Specialist LCSHE

Elizabeth Ninan Human Development Specialist AFTED

Labite Victorio Ocaya Sr. Highway Engineer AFTTR

Peter Okwero Senior Health Specialist AFTHE

Richard Olowo Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC

C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Sector Manager AFTTR

Stephen Brushett Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR

Dieter E. Schelling Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR

Kristine Schwebach Operations Analyst AFTCS

Subhash C. Seth Consultant LCSUW

Patrick Piker Umah Tete Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTFM

Zemedkun Girma Senior Transport Specialist AFTTR

Hege Hope Wade Senior Operations Officer AFMUG

42

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks

USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY02

FY03 4.53 31.05

FY04 10.98 62.61

FY05 23.70 128.19

Sub-Total: 39.21 221.86

Supervision/ICR

-

FY06 20.84 94.51

FY07 15.72 57.93

FY08 17.17 57.22

FY09 23.78 87.26

FY10 25.65 114.35

FY11 26.53 86.60

FY12 33.27 98.96

Sub-Total : 162.96 1,734.17

TOTAL 202.17 1,956.03

43

Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

5.3 Introduction

1. A key element in the implementation of the Government’s Roads Sector strategy is the Road

Sector Development Program (RSDP), which was endorsed at the Donor’s Conference held

in Paris on November 10, 1996. The primary objectives of the RSDP were: (i) to provide an

efficient, safe and sustainable road network in support of market integration and poverty

alleviation; (ii) to improve the managerial and operational efficiency of road administration;

and (iii) to develop the domestic construction industry. The projected total expenditure level

under the RSDP was estimated at US$1.5 billion for the national roads network for the period

1996 to 2007 and US$380 million for the district roads over the same period.

2. In order to achieve the RSDP’s intended development objectives, the Government of Uganda

(GoU) in 1999 approached the International Development Association (IDA) for funding

support. The IDA, in cooperation with other development partners, agreed to support the 10-

year program. Of the projected total financing, GoU planned to contribute US$700 million;

EU US$223 million; IDA US$356 million and bilateral donors to finance the remainder, The

IDA contribution was to include US$282 million under the Adaptable Program Lending and

the rest to be provided under the Transport Rehabilitation Project (TRP - Cr. 2587-UG), the

Roads Sector Institutional Support Technical Assistance project (RSISTAP Cr. 2987-UG),

and El Nino Emergency Project (ENERP).

3. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) for Road Development Program Phase 1

(RDPP1) in the amount of SDR 67.2 million (US$ 90.98 million equivalent) was signed on

November 22, 1999. The closing date for the credit was June 30, 2004 but was later revised to

June 30, 2008. The DCA for RDPP2 in the amount of SDR 50.9 million (US$ 6452 million

equivalent) was signed on April 11, 2002 and the scheduled closing date was June 30, 2006

but was later reviewed to June 30, 2008. The Development Financing Agreement (DFA) for

RDPP3 in the credit amount of SDR 45.970 (US$67.70 equivalent) and grant amount of SDR

27.201 (US$40.00 million equivalent) was signed on September 30, 2004. The closing date

was scheduled for December 31, 2009 but was later revised to October 31, 2011.

4. When the tenders for the key components of the RDPP3—the upgrading and strengthening of

three high priority national roads—were received the bid amounts were found to be much

higher than the funds available for the component. Coupled with the delays during the

prequalification of contractors, the lengthy evaluation process, and the long time to decide

whether the contracts should proceed, the implementation fell behind schedule by more than

two years. The credit was then extended to October 31, 2011.

5. This report is the Borrower’s contribution to the Implementation Completion and Results

Report (ICR) for the Road Development Program, Phase III (RDPP3). It provides the overall

performance of the project over the program phase and it comprises: an introduction, project

objectives, project scope and any changes during the course of implementation, project costs

and reallocations, achievements of the project, and lessons learned.

44

5.2 Project Objectives

6. The development objective of the Project was to improve access to rural areas and

economically productive areas and to progressively continue to build-up sustainable road

sector planning, design and program management capability including road safety

management. It was envisaged that the project would contribute to the following:-

i) Increased industrial and agricultural activity

ii) Increased traffic growth

iii) Reduced travel time and

iv) Reduced transport rates and vehicle operating costs over the national roads

network.

5.3 Project Components

5.3.1 Original Project Scope as approved

7. The project comprised of the following components:

Component 1. Civil works for upgrading, rehabilitation and reconstruction of priority

national roads:

i) Reconstruction / upgrading from gravel to paved (bitumen) standards of Kampala-

Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road (68km);

ii) Upgrading from gravel to paved (bitumen) standards of Soroti-Dokolo-Lira road (125

km);

iii) Reconstruction of the Busega-Mityana road (57 km); and

iv) Rehabilitation and re-graveling of Atiak-Moyo road (91km).

Component 2. Civil works for construction of buildings

This component comprised the reconstruction of the proposed new headquarters building for

the Roads Authority.

Component 3. Roads construction services – Construction supervision

This component comprised provision of consultancy services for supervision of the civil

works contracts in component 1.

Component 4. Detailed design of about 300km of upgrading of district gravel roads and

reclassifying to national road standard.

This component comprised carrying out designs for the following district roads.

Luwero-Zirobwe 36.7 km

Luwero- Wakyato 34.2 km

Mityana-Kanoni 37.2 km

Nebbi-Goli 14.4 km

Ocoko-Inde 32.8 km

Muzizi-Rwemiyaga 77.3 km

Katine-Ochero 69.2 km

Total: 302km

Component 5. Feasibility Studies and Selected Design of about 600 km for Upgrading of

Priority National Roads:

45

This component comprised carrying out feasibility studies and engineering designs of about

600km of roads. Initially, the following roads, with a length totaling to 788 km were

considered:

Muyembe-Moroto-Kotido 290 km

Mpigi-Maddu-Sembabule 135 km

Kyenjojo-Hoima-Masindi-Kigumba 285 km

Arua-Koboko-Oraba 78 km

Component 6. Institutional Support and Establishment of the Road Authority

This component comprised activities that would enable the establishment and strengthening

of an autonomous Roads Authority to improve national roads administration.

5.3.2 Changes in the Project Scope

8. Revised Project Components

Component 1

A revision and restructuring of this component was prompted by the shortfall in funds

resulting from higher than anticipated bids received on the first three works contracts out of

the seven originally planned for implementation under this credit.

The following components / subcomponents were reviewed or dropped:

iv) Upgrading from gravel to paved (bitumen) standard of the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-

Wobulenzi road had been planned to be implemented through two contracts: Kampala-

Gayaza-Zirobwe, 44 km and Zirobwe-Wobulenzi, 23 km. Due to inadequacy of funds,

procurement for the contract for the Zirobwe-Wobulenzi, 23 km section of the road was

not commenced and this part of the sub-component was dropped.

v) Reconstruction of Busega-Mityana road, 57 km. This sub component was funded by the

Government of Uganda.

vi) Rehabilitation and re-graveling of Atiak-Moyo road, 91 km. The scope of work for this

sub-component was reviewed. Drawing from previous experience where investments in

rehabilitation and re-graveling of heavily trafficked roads lasted a few months,

government adopted a policy not to contract any more future loans for this type of

investment. Instead, it was agreed with the Bank that a full design for upgrading the road

to paved (bitumen) standard be undertaken under the RDDP3. Government is now

financing the construction of bridges, box culverts, and ferry landings for crossing the

River Nile on this road.

Component 2

Civil works for construction of buildings: The sub-component for the construction of the

proposed headquarters of the Roads Authority was also dropped due to the shortfall arising

from the higher prices for contracts in Component 1.

Component 3

The road construction services - supervision of the construction works: the sub-component

for the construction supervision of Busega–Mityana road was funded by the GoU and

rehabilitation and re- graveling of Moyo–Atiak road was dropped. GoU is financing

consultant’s services for supervision of the bridges and ferry landings.

46

Component 4

Detailed designs were carried out on the roads as per Appraisal Document excepting Muzizi–

Rwemiyaga road: 77.3 km which was replaced by Kyegegwa–Kazo road: 87 km. The total

length of the roads subsequently increased slightly from the initially 300 km planned to 312

km.

Component 5

This component comprised carrying out feasibility studies and engineering designs of about

600km of national roads. It had been envisaged that the priority national roads that would be

considered under this component would be as follows.

Muyembe-Moroto-Kotido 290 km

Mpigi-Maddu-Sembabule 135 km

Kyenjojo-Hoima-Masindi-Kigumba 285 km

Vurra-Arua-Koboko –Oraba 92 km

Gulu-Atiak-Bibia-Nimule 104 km

The total length of the roads 859 km

A traffic count was carried out on various road links of the national roads network and it was

established that there were some that were carrying higher traffic volumes than some of the

above roads. Coupled with other economic considerations, the list of the roads to be studied

was reviewed and it was agreed that only the following roads totaling to 300 km in length be

designed to bitumen standard.

Gulu -Atiak-Bibia-Nimule 104 km

Vurra-Arua- Koboko-Oraba 92 km

Atiak-Moyo-Sudan border 104 km

The total length of the roads designed 300 km

Component 6

All the sub–components of this component were accomplished as appraised

5.4 PROJECT COSTS

5.4.1 Original IDA Financing Allocations

9. The Development Financing Agreement (DFA) for RDPP3 provided for allocation of the

SDR 45,970,000 (Credit) and 27,201,000 (Grant) as follows:

Category 1. (a) Civil works for parts A1, A2, A3, and B of the project: SDR 20,884,000

Credit and SDR 22,876,000 grant being 80 percent funding for the category;

(b) Civil works for part A4 of the project: SDR 16,530,000

Category 2. Consultants’ Services, including Audit Fees: SDR 3,105,000 Credit and SDR

4,325,000 grant being 90 percent funding for the category; and

Category 3. Unallocated: SDR 5,451,000.

5.4.2 Amendments and Re-allocations

47

10. Due to the changes of project scope mentioned in 5.3.2 above and other factors, there were

several amendments to the DFA. The first amendment to the DFA was made in November

2007 in response to the Government’s application to the Bank in April 2006 requesting it to

meet 100 percent of the financing for (i) civil works and (ii) consultancy services. The Bank

accepted the request and Schedule 1 of the DFA was amended to read as in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Amendment 1 to the Development Financing Agreement

Category Amount of the

Credit Allocated in

SDR Equivalent

Amount of Grant

Allocated in SDR

Equivalent

% of

Expenditure

i) Civil Works

a) For Parts A1, A2, A3, and B of

the Project 20,884,000 22,876,000 100%

b) For part A4 of the project 16,530,000

ii) Consultant’s Services,

including audit fees 3,105,000 4,325,000 100%

iii) Unallocated 5,451,000

Total 45,970,000 27,201,000

11. Schedule 7 of the DFA was also amended to allow for the proceeds of the credit to be utilized

to pay for some taxes. The second amendment was made in January 2011 following the

Government’s request to the Bank in October 2010 to reallocate the Category of the credit for

Unallocated Funds to Categories 1 and 2. The Bank accepted the request and Schedule 1 of

the DFA was amended as shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Amendment 2 to the Development Financing Agreement

Category Amount of the

Credit Allocated in

SDR Equivalent

Amount of Grant

Allocated in SDR

Equivalent

% of

Expenditure

1) Civil Works

a) For Parts A1 and A2 of

the Project

41,800,000 22,876,000 80%

2) Consultant’s Services,

Technical Assistance and

Parts B, C and D of the

Project

4,170,000 4,325,000 100%

Total 45,970,000 27,201,000

12. Further, amendments were also made to the scope and description of works to be executed

under Category i) Parts A and B of the Project. The credit closing date was also extended by

22 months from December 31, 2009 to October 31, 2011; and the name of the implementing

agency was changed from RAFU to UNRA. In component 6, it was agreed with the Bank that

the sub-component for consultancies to assist with RAFU transformation be funded by

another development partner, EU. The amendments to the original allocations are as shown in

Table 5.3.

48

Table 5.3: Amendments and Reallocations of the Credit and Grant

Component Original Allocation

SDR million

Revised Allocation

SDR million

a) All Civil works other than Busega-

Mityana road

43.760 64.676

b) Busega-Mityana road 16.530 Nil

c) Consultancy Services and Audit fees 7.430 8.495

d) Unallocated 5.451 Nil

Total 73.171 73.171

13. When bids for Soroti-Dokolo road were received, it became clear that costs for civil works

would outstrip the funds available. A decision was taken to advertise tenders for Kampala-

Gayaza-Zirobwe road and Dokolo-Lira road and hold back on tendering the Zirobwe-

Wobulenzi road for the time being. For Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road, the lowest bid was

US$ 8millon above the funds available for the road. For the Dokolo-Lira road, the lowest bid

was US$20million above the budget. It was agreed with the Bank that Government would

avail the balance of US$25 million to cover the shortfall in the two contracts before a “no–

objection” to sign the contracts would be granted. Following the undertaking, the Bank gave

its “no objection” for the contracts to be signed. There were several reallocations between the

components to cover the shortfalls in the budgets for the civil works. Allocation of the credit

and grant proceeds between the components and financial performance during the

implementation of the project are as shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Financial performance of the project components

Components

Appraisal

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi, Civil

Works 31.18 57.72 185%

Atiak-Moyo, Civil Works 10.88 8.92 82%

Soroti-Dokolo-Lira, Civil Works 47.00 103.51 220%

Busega-Mityana, Civil Works 24.30 53.94 222%

Road Authority Headquarters, Civil Works 7.50 0 0%

Supervision consultancy services for roads

(Kampala, Atiak, Soroti and Busega) 5.44 9.52 175%

Detailed Design of 300 km of District Roads from

gravel to National paved (bitumen) standards. 1.60 1.02 64%

Feasibility & Design for upgrading 600 km of

national roads to paved (bitumen) standards. 2.00 2.51 126%

Consultancy services, institutional support to

RAFU/Road Authority 3.10 2.20 71%

TOTAL 133.00 239.34 180%

5.5 Project Implementation

5.5.1 Implementation Schedule

49

14. The credit became effective on June 23, 2005 with an original project closing date of

December 31, 2009. Due to delays occasioned by the late commencement of the key

components of the project i.e. upgrading and strengthening of three priority national roads, an

extension was sought on November 2009, and the credit was extended to October 31, 2011.

Implementation of the main component of the project, the civil works, was delayed by more

than two years. Project implementation of the key activities is as shown in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Procurement Implementation Schedule of Key Activities.

Activity

Original

Actual / Revised

Credit Negotiation March 31, 2004 April 5, 2004

Credit Signature September 30, 2004 February 23, 2005

Credit Effectiveness September 30, 2004 June 23, 2005

Credit Closure December 31, 2009 October 31, 2011

Component 1: Upgrading of Priority Roads

i) Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi

Road

Selection of Consultants September 28, 2004 July 27, 2007

Selection of Contractors March 29, 2007 August 11, 2007

Commencement of works May 1, 2007 March 30, 2008

Completion of works July 26,2009 July 21, 2011

ii) Soroti-Dokolo Road

Selection of Consultants May 3, 2005 July 27, 2007

Selection of Contractors April 5, 2007 August 13,2007

Commencement of works June 1,2007 November 1, 2007

Completion of works November 17,2009 March 18, 2010

ahead of schedule

iii) Dokolo-Lira Road

Selection of Consultants May 3, 2005

Selection of Contractors April 5, 2007 February 2008

Commencement of works June 1,2007 June 1, 2008

Completion of works November 17,2009 September 24, 2010

ahead of schedule

iv) Busega – Mityana Road

Selection of Consultants June 24, 2005 May 8, 2009

Selection of Contractors October 23, 2007 May 7, 2009

Commencement of works July 9, 2009

Completion of works April 15, 2009 July 30, 2012

v) Rehabilitation and Re-graveling of Atiak-

Moyo road

Selection of Consultants September 28, 2004 February 23, 2007

(only design)

Supervision: Dec.

31, 2010

Selection of Contractors August 31, 200 October 4, 2010

Commencement of works January 24, 2009 Dec. 31, 2010

Completion of works August 21,2010 Dec. 31, 2012

Component 2: Civil works for construction

50

of Buildings

Selection of Consultants

Selection of Contractors July 19,2007 n.a

Commencement of works September 1,2007 n.a

Completion of works July 28, 2008 n.a

Component 3: Consultancy services for civil

works construction supervision

Selection of Consultants Various times Various times but

within schedule

Commencement Various times Various times but

within schedule

Completion Various times Various times but

within schedule

Component 4: Design of 300km District

Roads

Selection of Consultants June 24, 2005 September 1, 2006

& February 19, 2007

October 30, 2007


within schedule


within schedule

Component 5: Feasibility Studies and Design

of 600km of National roads

Selection of Consultants January 2005 December 29, 2008

Commencement June 24,2005 December 29,2008

Completion March 24, 2006 August 28, 2009

Component 6: Institutional Support and

establishment of Roads Authority

Selection of Consultants Various times Various times but

within schedule


within schedule


within schedule

5.5.1 Financial Performance

A summary of the financial performance of the individual components at project closure is shown

in Table 5.6. From the table the percentage utilization of the credit and grant is 108 percent. This

difference arises from the depreciation of the dollar against the SDR over the years.

51

Table 5.6: Financial performance as at Project Closure

Component Description Appraisal Estimate

US$ million

Revised Estimate

US$ million

Actual Expenditure

US$ million

IDA GoU Total IDA GoU Total IDA GoU Total

Part A: Civil works for

Upgrading, Rehabilitation

and Reconstruction

i) Kampala -Gayaza-

Zirobwe-Wobulenzi

road

24.94 6.24 31.18 27.85 21.16 54.59 31.56 26.16 57.72

ii) Soroti-Dokolo-Lira

road

37.60 9.40 47.00 74.00 40.83 114.83 74.00 29.51 103.51

iii) Busega-Mityana road 19.44 4.86 24.30 0.00 47.19 47.19 0.00 53.94 53.940

iv) Atiak-Moyo road 8.70 2.18 10.88 0.00 8.92 8.92 0.00 8.92 8.92

Part B: Construction of

Road Authority

Headquarters

6.00 1.50 7.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Part C: Consultancy

Services for Construction

Supervision

i) Kampala-Gayaza-

Zirobwe -Wobulenzi

road

1.32 0.14 1.36 2.33 2.33 2.70 0.23 2.93)

ii) Soroti-Dokolo-Lira

road

1.84 0.20 2.04 2.70 2.70 2.47 0.34 2.81)

iii) Busega-Mityana road 0.99 0.11 1.1 1.87 1.87 3.32 3.32

iv) Atiak-Moyo road 0.85 0.09 0.94 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46

Total for Part C 5.44 0.00 5.44 5.03 0.00 5.03 5.17 0.57 5.74

Part D:

i) Design for Upgrading

300km

1.44

0.16

1.60

0.92

0.01

1.02

0.97

0.05

1.02

ii) Feasibility studies and

Detailed Design of 300

km

1.80 0.20 2.00 2.26 0.25 2.51 2.51 0.00 2.51

Part E: Institutional

Support to RAFU / Road

Authority

2.79 0.31 3.10 2.94 0.33 3.37 2.19 0.01 2.20

TOTAL PROJECT

COST

107.70 25.39 133.00 107.97 126.05 239.79 116.40 122.94 239.34

5.6 Achievements Of Project, Implementation And Financial Objectives

5.6.1 Overall Assessment

15. The overall development objective of RDPP3 was to improve access to rural and

economically productive areas and to progressively continue to build up sustainable road

sector planning, design and program management capability, as well as road safety

management. This was to be achieved by: (i) upgrading/reconstruction of three high priority

national roads; (ii) carrying out detailed design of about 300km of district roads reclassified

52

to the national roads standard; (iii) carrying out feasibility studies and detailed engineering

design for about 600km of priority national roads; (iv) rehabilitation/re-graveling of the

Atiak-Moyo road; (v) construction of the proposed new Roads Authority headquarters

building and (vi) institutional support to the establishment of the Roads Authority.

16. Implementation of the civil works commenced more than two years behind schedule. During

the Bank’s mission of October 22-November 2, 2007, the project rating had been down-

graded to “moderately unsatisfactory.” However, once the civil works contracts commenced,

performance improved significantly. The rating with respect to achievement of the project

and implementation objectives is as follows:

Component 1. Civil Works for Upgrading, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction:

Table 5.7: Component 1 – Outputs

Planned

Output Output Indicator Actual Output Remark

Priority national

roads upgraded

to paved

standard

154 km of gravel

roads upgraded by

December 2009

Upgrading of Soroti-

Dokolo section: 62.6 km

completed in March 2010,

Dokolo-Lira section: 60.4

km completed in

September 2010 and

Gayaza-Zirobwe section:

30.0 km completed in

July 2011

152 km out of the planned 154 km was achieved.

The road Section: Zirobwe -Wobulenzi: 23.0 km could

not be done due to inadequate funds.

Works were completed 2 years late; the late

completion was due to initial delays in credit

effectiveness; prequalification of contractors,

evaluation of bids and approval of commencement of

the works after bids received were much higher than

the available budget.

Priority national

roads

reconstructed

72km of existing

roads reconstructed

by December 2009

Kampala -Gayaza section

of 14.6 km was completed

in July 2011

Busega-Mityana (57km)

will be completed in June

2012

Only 14.6 km out of the planned 72km of roads was

achieved, there were two years of delay.

Busega-Mityana: 57km was financed by GoU. Due to

inadequate funds in the budget, for the component,

works will be completed by the end of June 2012.

Priority national

roads

rehabilitated/ re-

graveled.

Moyo-Atiak road

91km rehabilitated /

re-graveled by

September 2009

Feasibility study and

detailed engineering

design carried out

The GoU funded the construction of bridges and box

culverts, which will be completed by the end of

December 2012.

Rating of achievement of this objective is: SATISFACTORY

53

Component 2. Civil Works for construction of buildings:


Planned

Output Output Indicator Actual Output Remark s

Authority Head

Quarters

Building

Building

Construction works

completed by

September 2009

Construction works

not undertaken

This component was dropped due to the

restructuring of the credit

The objective of this component was not achieved.

Component 3. Consultancy Services for Civil works construction supervision


Planned

Output Output Indicator Actual Output Remark

Civil works

contracts

supervised

5 Civil works

contracts completed

by September 2007

3 Civil works

contracts completed

at various times

between March 2010

and July 2011.

Planned outputs were achieved

excepting consultancy services

contracts for components B which were

dropped and the services were not

procured


Component 4. Detailed design of about 300km of upgrading of District gravel Roads and

Reclassifying to National Roads Standard


Planned

Output Output Indicator Actual Output Remarks

Feasibility

studies and

Detailed

Engineering

Design for

about 300km

road carried out

Feasibility studies

and designs of the

roads completed by

September 2009

Feasibility studies

and Designs for 312

km of district roads

in 2 lots completed in

February 2007

All planned outputs were achieved

within the project implementation

period. However there was a

replacement of Muzizi – Rwemiyaga:

77.3 km road with Kyegegwa – Kazo:

87 km road


54

Component 5. Feasibility studies and design of about 600km for upgrading of Priority

National Roads.


Planned

Output

Output

Indicator Actual Output Remarks

Feasibility

studies and

engineering

design for

about 600km

of roads

carried out

Feasibility

studies and

designs of about

600 km of roads

completed by

September 2009

Feasibility studies

and designs of 306

km of roads

completed by

December 2009

Government reviewed its

prioritization based on traffic counts

and determined that Vurra–Arua –

Koboko–Oraba: 98 km and Gulu–

Atiak–Bibia–Nimule: 104 km were

of higher priority and be designed to

bitumen standard in addition to

Atiak – Moyo.

Rating of achievement of this Component is: SATISFACTORY

Component 6. Institutional Support and establishment of the Roads Authority


Planned Output

Output Indicator

Actual Output

Remarks i) Parliamentary Proclamation of

Road Authority

Act to establish Road

Authority passed

Achieved in 2006

ii) Consultancies to assist with

RAFU transformation procured

Consultants procured

within implementation

period

43 man-months

of TA procured

This component was

later financed by

another development

partner – EU

iii) Head Office Organization

Restructured

Organization

restructured

achieved

iv) Performance Agreement

Developed

Performance

agreement put in place

achieved

v) Internal Audit Department

Established

Internal Audit

Department

established

achieved

vi) Management Information

Systems Developed

MIS’s in place achieved

vii) Management Systems for

subsidiary activities developed

Systems for subsidiary

activities in place

achieved

viii) Human Resource and

Management Skills Developed.

Training to develop

skills undertaken

achieved

ix) Funding arrangements

established

Arrangements

established

achieved

x) Roads Authority Business Plan

Developed

Business Plan in place achieved

xi) Regional Managing Engineering

Consultants Established

Consultants procured achieved

xii) External Audit Services carried

out through the Implementation

Period

Audit services carried

out annually

achieved

Rating of achievement of this Component is: SATISFACTORY

55

5.7 Bank and Borrower Performance

5.7.1 Bank’ s Performance:

a) Project Preparation:

17. Components of the project had been identified earlier in 1999 when the RDP was being

formulated. The Bank worked very closely with the Government officials during the

implementation of Phase I and II. Phase III was as per earlier plan but some modifications to

scope and timing to take into account Government’s emerging priorities and policies at that

later time were introduced.

b) Project Appraisal:

18. The project was reviewed and appraised in August 2004. The appraisal took into

consideration the country’s RSDP review of 2001.

c) Project Monitoring:

19. The Bank’s monitoring was satisfactory. This is reflected in the regular quarterly project

implementation supervision missions, midterm review, an independent procurement review

and several other project visits all of which provided invaluable guidance for improving the

project implementation.

20. Throughout the life of the project, the Bank endeavored to ensure that the Client achieved the

project outcomes. This was particularly evident with regard to the Bank’s keen interest in

trying to resolve the issue to achieve the original project objectives despite the higher than

anticipated costs of the road projects. Regular project implementation missions were

conducted throughout the project life. In this regard, the Bank’s performance is rated as

SATISFACTORY.

5.7.2 Borrower’s Performance

a) Government:

21. Although it experienced problems in meeting its counterpart funding obligations during the

earlier stages of the project implementation, Government was later able to contribute

additional funding to enable some of the components that had been dropped from the

program due inadequate funds, e.g., the reconstruction of Busega-Mityana road. There were

long initial delays to commence the civil works contracts, but once the problems were

overcome, contract execution was smooth. The proportion of GoU’s contribution ended up

being higher than at project appraisal. In this regard, Government’s performance is rated as

SATISFACTORY.

b) Implementing Agencies

22. With the establishment of the National Roads Authority (UNRA), the borrower was able after

resolving problems that caused the initial delays, to ensure timely and smooth implementation

of the project.

56

23. The implementing agency endeavored to ensure that the contracts were completed within the

scheduled time, cost and quality. The agency was able to ensure success of most of the

project components as conceived. The agency supported the Bank missions whenever need

arose to ensure that the Bank accomplished its objectives. Overall, the Implementing

Agency’s performance is rated as SATISFACTORY.

5.8 Lessons Learned

24. The cost of the civil works component both at appraisal and feasibility/detailed design varied

substantially. This was due to the sudden sharp rise of the cost of fuel, construction materials

and other inputs at the time of bidding. The eventual bid prices could therefore not enable the

project to be implemented as appraised; consequently some components had to be dropped.

In future, it may be prudent to undertake design reviews and updates of cost estimates just

before calling for bids.

25. Land acquisition for right-of-way and payment of compensation for properties has continued

to cause project implementation problems, and thus should be resolved before the works

contracts commence. All efforts should be made to ensure that contractors should always

receive encumbrance free sites.

26. Procurement continues to be a major delaying factor for IDA and other donor funded projects.

It is vital that realistic procurement plans are put in place to avoid such delays. It is

worthwhile to explore the possibility that commencement of procurements could also be de-

linked from the credit effectiveness date in order to reduce procurement lead-time.

27. Clauses in the standard bidding document relating to variation of price, the price adjustment

formula, and indices and factors affecting prices of project inputs need to be reviewed and

streamlined. The complex implementing agency’s staff need to receive specialized training to

enable them handle this subject more confidently.

5.9 Project Benefits

28. The major benefits of the project are:-

i) The upgrading / reconstruction of 170 km of national roads;

ii) Reduction of travel times on the improved roads;

iii) Increased agricultural activities along and in the neighborhood of the improved roads;

iv) Increased values of land and properties along and in the neighborhood of the improved

roads;

v) The design and subsequent improvement of 312 km of district roads that have been

reclassified to national roads standard;

vi) The design of some 306km of national roads for upgrading from gravel to bitumen

standard; and

vii) The establishment of an autonomous Roads Authority for more effective of national

roads management.

57

Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Documents for:

i) Road Development Program, Phase I Project – June 3, 1999

ii) Road Development Program, Phase II Project – June 7, 2001

iii) Road Development Program, Phase III Project – August 9, 2004

2. Development Credit Agreements for:

i) Road Development Program Phase I Project – November 22, 1999

ii) Road Development Program, Phase II Project – August 16, 2001

iii) Road Development Program, Phase III – February 23, 2005.

3. Aides-memoire, implementation status reports and project progress reports.

4. Country Assistance Strategy

5. Project Implementation Plan

6. Executive Agency Implementation Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, March

2000

7. Uganda National Road Authority Act, June 8, 2006

8. Consultants’ Study Reports:

i) Transitional Institutional Reforms for the Establishment of Road Agency, June 1998

i) Road Agency Study, March 2002

PakwachPakwach

OlwiyoOlwiyo

AtiakAtiak

NimuleNimule

KarumaKaruma

BusunjuBusunjuGayazaGayaza

ZirobweZirobweWobulenziWobulenzi

KatunguruKatunguru

KilembeKilembe

MpondweMpondwe

BundibugyoBundibugyo

BushenyiBushenyi

IbandaIbanda

KiruhuraKiruhura

NtungamoNtungamo

HoimaHoima

IgangaIgangaBusiaBusia

SironkoSironko

BugiriBugiri

KabaleKabale

KamuliKamuliKaliroKaliro

ButalejaButaleja

BudakaBudaka

KayungaKayungaKyenjojoKyenjojo

KapchorwaKapchorwa

BukwoBukwo

KaseseKasese

KisoroKisoro

KitgumKitgum

KumiKumi

KaberamaidoKaberamaido

LiraLira

LuweroLuweroNakasekeNakaseke

NakasongolaNakasongola

MasakaMasaka

KamwengeKamwenge

KalangalaKalangala

MasindiMasindi

MbararaMbarara

KanunguKanungu

MorotoMoroto

NakapiripiritNakapiripiritKatakwiKatakwiAmuriaAmuria

MoyoMoyo

KibaleKibale

PallisaPallisa

SorotiSoroti

FortFortPortalPortal

AruaArua

JinjaJinja

BubuloBubulo

MbaleMbale

TororoTororo

GuluGulu

NebbiNebbi

ApacApac

AmolatarAmolatar

MubendeMubende

RukungiriRukungiri IsingiroIsingiro RakaiRakai

SembabuleSembabule

MpigiMpigi

MukonoMukonoMityanaMityana

WakisoWakiso

KibogaKiboga

KotidoKotido

KaabongKaabong

AdjumaniAdjumaniYumbeYumbeKobokoKoboko

KilakKilak

MarachaMaracha

OyamOyam

DokoloDokolo

BusikiBusiki

BulisaBulisa

AbimAbim

KAMPALAKAMPALA

DEM. REP.DEM . REP.OF CONGOOF CONGO

S U D A NS U D A N

K E N Y AK E N Y A

K E N Y AK E N Y A

TANZAN IATANZAN IATANZAN IATANZAN IA

RWANDARWANDA

VurraVurra

Corner AbokeCorner Aboke

CornerCorner Ayer Ayer

MalabaMalaba

KatunaKatuna

Pakwach

Vurra

OlwiyoCorner Aboke

Corner Ayer

Atiak

NimuleOraba

Karuma

Kafu

MalabaBusunjuGayaza

Nyakaita

Mutukula

Katuna

ZirobweWobulenzi

Katunguru

Kilembe

Mpondwe

Bundibugyo

Bushenyi

Ibanda

Kiruhura

Ntungamo

Hoima

IgangaBusia

Sironko

Bugiri

Kabale

KamuliKaliro

Butaleja

Budaka

KayungaKyenjojo

Kapchorwa

Bukwo

Kasese

Kisoro

Kitgum

Kumi

Kaberamaido

Lira

LuweroNakaseke

Nakasongola

Masaka

Kamwenge

Kalangala

Masindi

Mbarara

Kanungu

Moroto

NakapiripiritKatakwiAmuria

Moyo

Kibale

Pallisa

Soroti

FortPortal

Arua

Jinja

Bubulo

Mbale

Tororo

Gulu

Nebbi

Apac

Amolatar

Mubende

Rukungiri Isingiro Rakai

Sembabule

Mpigi

MukonoMityana

Wakiso

Kiboga

Kotido

Kaabong

AdjumaniYumbeKoboko

Kilak

Maracha

Oyam

Dokolo

Busiki

Bulisa

Abim

KAMPALA

DEM. REP.OF CONGO

S U D A N

K E N Y A

K E N Y A

TANZAN IATANZAN IA

RWANDA

Albe

rt

Nile

Victoria Nile

L a k e

V i c t o r i a

LakeLakeEdwardEdward

LakeEdward

Lake Albert

To Faradje

To Juba

To Lodwar

To Beni

To Bunia

To Beni

To Nyakanazi

To Kisumu

To Nakuru

To Kigali

To G

oma

30°E

4°N

2°N

0°

4°N

2°N

0°

32°E

32°E 34°E

UGANDA

0 25 50 75

0 25 50 75 Miles

100 Kilometers

IBRD 39358

JUNE 2012

Th is map was produced by the Map Des ign Uni t o f The Wor ld Bank. The boundar ies , co lo rs , denominat ions and any other in format ionshown on th is map do not imply, on the par t o f The Wor ld BankGroup, any judgment on the lega l s ta tus of any te r r i to r y, o r anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundar ies .

UGANDAROADS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PHASE 3 (RDPP3) PROJECT

MAIN CITIES

DISTRICT CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

GRAVEL ROADS

PAVED ROADS

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

ROADS UPGRADED TO BITUMEN STANDARD

ROADS DESIGNED FOR UPGRADING UNDER THE FOLLOW-ON PROJECT

ROADS UPGRADED OR RECONSTRUCTED UNDER RDPP

ROADS DROPPED BUT REHABILITATION FINANCED BY THE GoU

ROAD DROPPED FROM RDPP3

Source: Uganda National Road Authority (UNRA).