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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00002364

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

ON A CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 26.5 MILLION

(US$40.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND AN ADDITIONAL CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 9.0 MILLION (US$13.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

Republic of Niger

FOR A

NIGER AGRO-PASTORAL EXPORT AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P095210 )

April 24, 2018

Agriculture Global Practice

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective January 28, 2018)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc

CFAF 528 = US$1

US$ 1.44 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30 ]

Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Soukeyna Kane

Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele

Practice Manager: Marianne Grosclaude

Task Team Leader(s): Amadou Ba

ICR Main Contributor: Jean Claude Balcet

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional Financing

AGEX Agence d’Exécution (Implementing Agency)

BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States)

BE Bureau d’Etudes (Consultancy Firm)

BEC Bon d’enlèvement et de commercialization (Transport and Marketing Certificate)

BEEEI BOA

Bureau d’Evaluations Environnementales et d’Etudes d’Impact (Office of Environmental Assessment and Impact Studies) Bank of Africa

CNSEE CPF

Centre National de Suivi Économique et Environnemental (National Center for Economic and Environmental Monitoring) Country Partnership Framework

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

ERR Economic Rate of Return

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework

ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan

FM Financial Management

FY Fiscal Year

GoN Government of Niger

GSC Groupement de Services Conseils (Advisory Services Group)

HIMO Haute Intensité de Main d’œuvre (High Labor Intensity)

IDA International Development Association

ILO International Labor Organization

INRAN Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique du Niger (The Niger National Institute of Agronomic Research for Niger)

IP Inter-profession

IRR Internal Rate of Return

ME Micro-Enterprise

MAE Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock)

MG Matching Grant

NPV Net Present Value

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OP/BP Operational Policy/Bank Procedure

ORAF Operational Risk Assessment Framework

PANGIRE Plan d’Actions National de la Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau (National Action Plan for the Integrated Management of Water Resources) (2014)

PASEC Projet d’Appui à l’Agriculture Sensible aux Risques Climatiques (Climate Smart Agriculture Support Project) (IDA)

PTBA Programme de Travail et Budget Annuel (Annual Work Program and Budget)

PIMELAN Project Intégré de Modernisation de l’Elevage et de l’Agriculture au Niger (Integrated Project for the Modernization of Livestock and Agriculture in Niger)

PIP2 Projet de Promotion de l’Irrigation Privée (Phase 2) (Project for the Promotion of Private Irrigation) (IDA)

PPEAP Projet de Promotion des Exportations Agro-Pastorales (Project for the Promotion of Agro-Pastoral Exports) (IDA)

PDO Project Development Objective

PIM Project Implementation Manual

PO Producer Organization

PPP Public-Private Partnership

PRODEX Projet de Développement des Exportations et des Marchés Agro-Sylvo Pastoraux (Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Exports And Markets Development Project)

RAP SAHFI- SA

Resettlement Policy Framework Société Sahélienne de Financement (Sahelian Financing Society)

SME Small and Medium Enterprise

TA Technical Assistance

TFPCU Technical and Fiduciary Project Coordinating Unit

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 1

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................1

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................5

II. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 6

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ..............................................................................................................6

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ........................................................................................7

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 10

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 11

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ......................................................................................... 12

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 13

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 13

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 14

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 16

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 16

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 17

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 17

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 18

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 19

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 21

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 32

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 34

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 35

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 38

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 39

The World Bank Niger Agro-Pastoral Export and Market Development Project ( P095210 )

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P095210 Niger Agro-Pastoral Export and Market Development

Project

Country Financing Instrument

Niger Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship Project Approval Product Line

Additional Financing P148681-Niger Additional Financing to the Agro-sylvo-pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project

05-Aug-2014 IBRD/IDA

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Ministere d'Etat, Ministre du Plan, Ministere de

l'Administration Territoriale et du Developpement C Unite Technique et Financiere de Coordination du Projet

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

The project development objective is to increase the value of selected products marketed by project-supported producers.


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FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IDA-45520

40,000,000 39,851,001 40,445,106

IDA-55320

13,800,000 13,800,000 12,500,263

Total 53,800,000 53,651,001 52,945,369

Non-World Bank Financing

Borrower 0 0 0

Total 0 0 0

Total Project Cost 53,800,000 53,651,001 52,945,369

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

26-Mar-2009 17-Dec-2009 18-May-2012 30-Apr-2014 31-Oct-2017

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

25-Mar-2014 37.22

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 18-Jun-2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory .53

02 24-Nov-2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory .60


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03 09-Jun-2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.38

04 28-Apr-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 4.62

05 24-Dec-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.16

06 16-Jul-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.56

07 19-Jan-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 24.70

08 03-Oct-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 37.22

09 18-May-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 37.22

10 05-Jan-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.98

11 16-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.26

12 16-Dec-2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 45.35

13 20-Jun-2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 48.96

14 23-Dec-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.98

15 30-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 52.75

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 40

Irrigation and Drainage 23

Public Administration - Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 17

Financial Sector 10

Other Non-bank Financial Institutions 10

Transportation 9

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 9


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Industry, Trade and Services 41

Agricultural markets, commercialization and agri-business

41

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Finance 7

Finance for Development 7

Agriculture Finance 7

Urban and Rural Development 94

Rural Development 94

Rural Markets 31

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 63

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Madani M. Tall Soukeyna Kane

Senior Global Practice Director: Jamal Saghir Juergen Voegele

Practice Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Marianne Grosclaude

Task Team Leader(s): El Hadj Adama Toure Yeyande Kasse Sangho

ICR Contributing Author: Jean-Claude Balcet


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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. Niger is a large (1.267 million square kilometers), landlocked country in the arid Sahel-Saharan region with a population of about 20.67 million people (2016) who are primarily engaged in semi-subsistence agriculture. Niger’s population is young (median age 15 years) and growing at about 3.9 percent per year. Most of the population is concentrated in the areas around the Niger River in the southwestern corner of the country and along its long southern border with Nigeria. Niger’s economic activity is concentrated on traditional activities, primarily agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery, but also informal trade and production. From the employment perspective, this concentration is even more striking, with about 80 percent of Niger’s population employed in the rural sector and only a small share of the population in formal employment. Niger ranked last in the UN Human Development Index in 2000 and has been last or next to last in each of the years since 2010.

2. Since independence in 1960, Niger has experienced seven republics and four military coups including the latest in 2010 when military officers overthrew the incumbent president. Civilian rule was restored in 2011 with the election of President Issoufou, who was re-elected in 2016. Niger also has experience of internal violence perpetrated by political militias and internal conflict linked to rebellions, especially in the Northern part of the country. Since 2011, regional instability has taken on a new dimension, due to the Libyan and Malian crises and the deteriorating situation in Northern Nigeria. The state of emergency and restrictive security measures in the border regions have in turn stifled economic activity and deprived many Nigeriens of their sources of livelihoods and income. Today, Niger is exposed to multiple conflict and fragility risks which stem from a combination of deep-rooted structural causes and short-term drivers.

3. Niger’s economic growth has accelerated from an annual average of 4.4 percent during the period 2002-2007 to 5.5 percent during the period 2007-2012. This was achieved despite profound political disturbances, two severe droughts in 2009 and 2011, and an increasingly adverse external environment. GDP growth averaged over six percent between 2010 and 2016; but this translated into an annual increase in per capita GDP of just 2.5 percent on account of the demographic increase. After declining to 4.0 percent in 2015, Niger’s economic growth is estimated to have reached 5.0

percent (1.1 percent in per capita terms) in 2016 thanks to a buoyant season in agriculture supported by favourable weather conditions and an expansion of crop irrigation. Poor growth performance in 2015 reflected the impact of multiple shocks including security challenges with growing social and humanitarian pressures, the economic downturn in Nigeria, unfavourable weather conditions and the depressed level of commodity prices. Inflation has been below three percent in most years since 2000, due to both the impact of more efficient food safety nets and the lack of purchasing power of vulnerable households. Average inflation was almost flat (0.2 percent) in 2016 and only 0.6 percent in July 2017, well below the WAEMU target of three percent. This reflected a regional monetary policy that was tight in Niger’s economic context, a good crop season (and hence low crop prices) and public food subsidies.

4. Agricultural risks, primarily droughts in Niger, have severe economic consequences with wide repercussions. Drought reduces crop production and increases livestock morbidity and mortality; it aggravates conflicts, and accentuates price spikes of food commodities. This results in a decrease in farming household incomes, reduced consumption, higher food insecurity, and lower agricultural revenues, and, consequently a lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate. The security situation in many parts of the country is fragile. Conditions of insecurity persist in the northern and western portions of the country, particularly along the porous border with Mali, as well as eastern parts along the border with Nigeria around Diffa. This is likely to be a long-term and recurrent risk which can only be mitigated with the implementation of a strong economic development program. Recognizing the adverse impact of agricultural risks, increased attention is being paid to building the resilience of agricultural systems, and new means are being identified t help support Niger’s High Commission for the 3N Initiative to implement risk management action plans.


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Theory of Change (Results Chain)

5. The project sought to address the critical constraints that hindered the competitiveness of commercial agriculture among small and medium scale target beneficiaries, i.e.: (i) weather vagaries, climate changes and low agricultural productivity that increased agricultural risks; (ii) inadequate research and extension services and a lack of vocational training which curbed the dissemination and adoption of new technologies; (iii) fragile and scarce water resources, with limited government and donor funding which constrained the development of irrigation; (iv) poor marketing conditions within the country and across borders, including but not limited to poor transportation services, lack of adequate storage and market infrastructure and related services, excessive police and customs checkpoints, and an absence of regional markets regulation enforcement; and (v) poor access to financial services which constrained the modernization of production and marketing systems.

6. Project interventions would result in increased yield, production and sales on the domestic and regional markets among project participants for selected value chains for which Niger has a comparative advantage, i.e., primarily onions, cowpeas and livestock products, and, as a second priority on a demand driven basis, sesame, tiger nuts (souchet), Arabic gum and horticulture. These constraints included: inefficient organization of value chains, poor coordination between professional organizations and public services, weak market information, lack of leaders in the export sector, lack of capital and limited access to financing, and lack of commercial and marketing infrastructure. Added to this, was the lack of control of water in some high-potential production areas, the lack of hygiene in the processing units, the high cost of transactions linked to a defective conservation and marketing infrastructure, and road harassment for regional trade. All above constraints combined to reinforce the high-risk perception associated with the agricultural sector. Under these conditions, value chain actors were struggling to access financial services to modernize their operations and improve the quality of their products.

7. Table 1 below shows the graphic presentation of the theory of change underpinning project design: the flow from activities, to outputs and outcomes, and the principal assumptions at each stage. For all targeted value chains (VCs): (i) professional organizations and public-private partnerships would be strengthened to promote coordination among the principal links in the selected VCs, (ii) matching grants would be provided and collaboration with financial institutions would be facilitated in order to increase the availability of financing for producers and other value chain participants; the participating financial institutions would receive technical assistance to develop financial products directed towards the selected VCs; the critical assumptions included sustained sales and the existence of a demand for the promoted products; it was assumed also that producers would establish sustainable relationships with traders and input suppliers, and have access to adequate market information for effective planning and engagement with buyers; for energy-dependent transformation and preservation processes, a critical assumption was the availability of energy; and (iii) the potential for irrigated onion production would mobilized and selected production sites would be connected to the market; in order to increase market access, not only to allow for a steady inflow of critical inputs, but to help increase output sales in high potential areas with particularly bad transportation network, the project would finance the construction or rehabilitation of critical portions of the rural road network in the project area where connectivity was the binding constraint; the critical

assumption for sustained road access was the continued maintenance of the constructed/ rehabilitated road network.

Table 1: Project Results Chain

Constraints Activities Outputs Assumptions Outcomes PDO

Component A - Improvement of VC coordination and marketing conditions

Inadequate VC Assessment of VC competitiveness VC apex entities Competitive


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organization, limited capacity of VC operators and poor marketing arrangements

(a) Support to VC coordination

completed and related information disseminated

established ness of targeted export-oriented agro-pastoral chains has improved

Increase of the

value of traded

products of

selected VCs

Public-private partnerships promoted

Commercial information disseminated

(b) Assistance to high-potential economic operators

VC operators identified and diagnosed Adequate institutional and regulatory framework in place

Formal business relationships developed

Business drivers/ leaders have emerged

(c) Support for marketing and competitiveness

Knowledge and capacity amongst key VC players, and development of business friendly regulatory framework

MOUs between government and key players implemented

Component B – Development of financing instruments

Poor access to capital markets and financing, and insufficient credit instruments

(a) Provision of Matching Grants (MGs)

MGs targeting production, primary marketing and other relevant services provided, including income generating activities and market infrastructure (livestock markets, onion conditioning, storing and transshipment platforms)

Reviews and design of sub-projects addressing weak links of VCs completed

Access to financial services in targeted VCs is enhanced

(b) Facilitating access to credit

Supply side credit and related instruments for participants in the targeted VCs (input/ inventory credit - warrantage, contract financing, leasing, etc.) developed

Time bound cost sharing support from PFIs agreed

(c) Sustainable financing instruments

Establishment of ag. guarantee/ investment funds and dedicated lines of credit facilitated

PFI interest and capability for ag. funding

Component C – Securing irrigation potential

Limited water resources, poor connectivity and fragile environmental conditions

(a) Irrigation and site development/protection

Community-based infrastructure for 2,000 ha of onion-based irrigation constructed/rehabilitated

Beneficiaries implement and bear O&M costs

Irrigation potential in project targeted areas is secured

(b) Feeder roads Feeder roads (105 km) to link irrigated areas to markets rehabilitated

Communes responsible for O&M

(c) Environmental monitoring

Soils and water resources in sensitive areas monitored

Participatory monitoring


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Project Development Objective (PDO)

8. The project development objective (PDO)1 was to “increase the value of selected products marketed by project-supported producers.”

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

• The key expected outcomes and outcome Indicators were as follows:2

• PDO: Project-supported producers increase by 25 percent the value of marketed products of selected supply chains

• Intermediate Outcome 1 indicators:

• - Marketed volumes by project beneficiaries of selected supply chains increase by 15 percent

• - Operational annual plan for at least three targeted supply chains are implemented on a regular basis

• Intermediate Outcome 2 indicators: o - At least 2,300 sub-projects are successfully implemented under the Matching Grant Mechanism o - The percentage of funded sub-projects successfully implemented is 80%

• Intermediate Outcome 3 indicators: o - At least 2,000 ha of irrigated areas are established or rehabilitated

- At least 105 km of feeder roads built or rehabilitated

Components

• The Project consisted of the following four components:

• Component A - Improvement of Supply Chain Coordination and Marketing Conditions ($10.0 million). This component aimed to build public-private partnerships to structure and invigorate coordination among the principal links in the selected supply chains (livestock products, onion, cowpeas, sesame, souchet, and Arabic gum). This was to be achieved through the following set of activities: (i) support to supply chain coordination through capacity building and strengthening coordination among the principal links in the selected supply chains ($3.0 million); (ii) assistance to high potential economic operators through the strengthening of existing producer organizations, and support to the emergence of new ones, so that together they could compete effectively in national and international markets ($5.0 million); and (iii) support to marketing and competitiveness, through a comprehensive value-chain approach to increase the quality of Niger’s products and their competitiveness in domestic and international markets ($2.0 million);

• Component B - Development of Financing Instruments ($17.0 million). This component aimed to address the needs of players active in the selected supply chains for business expansion and access to sustainable financial services, through the following activities: (i) provision of Matching Grants for investment sub-projects regarding production, primary collection, and marketing. ($13.0 million); and (ii)) facilitating access to credit by providing technical assistance to financial institutions to develop financial products directed towards agricultural sector development ($3.5 million); and (iii) ensuring sustainable financing instruments through facilitating the establishment of the Fonds des Filières (Supply Chains Investment Fund) ($0.5 million); 3

• Component C - Securing Irrigation Potential ($9.2 million). This component was to secure the potential for onion-based irrigation systems and to connect selected production sites to the market. The activities to be carried out were: (i) construction, or rehabilitation, and site protection of 2000 irrigated ha in onion-based production areas ($4.7 million);

1 As spelled out in Schedule 1 of the project Financing Agreement dated April 24, 2009 2 As indicated in Table 3.1 of Annex 1 of the PAD dated March 2, 2009. 3 At appraisal a contribution was envisaged to the Fonds des Filières; however, no disbursement was made against that cost item.


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(ii) construction or rehabilitation of 105 km of feeder roads to improve connection of irrigated areas to markets ($3.0 million); and (iii) environmental monitoring of soils and water resources (fragile ground and surface water) in sensitive project areas ($1.5 million); and

Component D - Project Coordination, Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation ($3.8 million): (i) Project coordination

and management: support for incremental costs associated with the operation of the Project Coordinating Unit including

national staff and regional focal points, equipment, and operating costs ($2.8 million); and Monitoring and Evaluation

(M&E) ($1.0 million).

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

9. The granting of Additional Financing (AF) credit was the major change during implementation. The AF phase was to build on the successes of the original project phase to ensure further development of inter-professional organizations, consolidation and scaling-up of sub-projects, diversification into new value-adding segments/ links (storage, processing, marketing), and stronger linkages with the commercial banking sector. The scaling-up of sub-projects and development of profitable SMEs, together with stronger linkage with commercial banks, as well as the focus on women’s activities, were

the major thrusts of the AF phase.4 The closing date of the AF phase was extended to October 31, 2017. The main reason for the extension was the completion of the six on-going livestock markets contracts and initiation of work on contracts that had yet to be signed at that stage – roads, seed house, two commercialization centers, and three livestock markets. The associated restructuring included a reallocation of funds to the Matching Grants category.

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

10. The PDO remained the same during the project implementation period. The targets for the indicators for the AF phase were revised as follows5: (i) the PDO indicator regarding the value of production was disaggregated to show targets for the three main VCs (onions, cowpeas, one-hood animals); the number of beneficiaries and the percentage of women to be reached (35 percent) were formally added; (ii) the indicator for Intermediate Outcome 1 regarding production volumes was disaggregated per VCs like the PDO indicator; (ii) an additional indicator was added for Intermediate Outcome 2 to take into account the support to SMEs (40 regular SMEs and 10 larger SMEs); and (iii) two intermediate indicators were formally added to measure Intermediate Outcome 4.

Revised PDO Indicators

11. The listing below summarizes the above:

• PDO performance indicator o Increase in the value of the marketed production of targeted value chains by project-supported producers: 65

percent for onions, 70 percent for cowpeas and 50 percent for on-hood animals o Additional project beneficiaries (of which % women): 34,221 (35%) (NB: no number of beneficiaries was formally

indicated in the RS for the original phase)

• Outcome 1 Intermediate Indicators o Increase in marketed volumes by project beneficiaries: 25% for onions, 35% for cowpeas and 20% for on-hoof

animals

• Outcome 2 intermediate indicators o 1197 sub-projects (800 first-generation and 397 additional ones) supported under the matching grand

mechanism, of which 40 with high potential upgraded to agricultural SMEs, and 10 larger SMEs showing investment needs greater than CFAF 50 million

4 It is to be noted that the project funding helped prepare the new follow-on project of Climate Smart Agriculture and Risk Mitigation (PASEC). 5 Para 29 to 34 of PAD for Additional Financing dated July 11, 2014


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• Outcome 3 intermediate indicators o At least 1904 ha of irrigated areas received protection by weirs and catchment construction o At least 30 km of feeder roads built or rehabilitated

• Outcome 4 intermediate indicators (these indicators were new) o 8 periodically produced implementation reports o 2 annual audit reports submitted on time with no major qualifications

Revised Components

12. The AF made no substantial change to the development hypothesis. It expanded some activities and incorporated limited adjustments such as a twofold change in the definition of project components: (i) the addition of strategic diversification-oriented sub-projects, and (ii) the graduation of some sub-projects to Type 1 SMEs (those that needed <50 million CFAF) and Type 2 SMEs (those that needed >50 million CFAF). The AF financing arrangement provided a 20 percent grant for Type 1 SMEs, and no project grant for Type 2 SMEs which were to be linked up with formal financial institutions to secure commercial loans. This was in contrast with the 80 percent project grant offered to original and standard matching grant sub-projects. The total cost of the project after the AF financing was US$61.8 million.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

13. Rationale for changes and their implication on the original theory of change. The changes undertaken at AF stage were entirely consonant with the original theory of change. The AF would focus on (i) supporting further operational strengthening of established inter-professional (IPs) organizations for onions, cowpeas and livestock products; these Ips were expected to play a leading role in increasing VC competitiveness through further capacity building and market development activities; (ii) ensuring the consolidation and expansion of funding under the Matching Grant Mechanism (particularly sub-projects supporting women and youth), promoting value-adding linkages (storage, processing and marketing), ensuring efficient access to commercial credit, through sustainable business models and/or structured transactions (e.g., contract farming, aggregation of marketed production); increased attention was to be given to building alliances between producers and traders to facilitate commercialization goals, transforming sub-projects into sustainable enterprises and supporting high potential and efficient SMEs; and (iii) providing greater integration of women and acknowledge the need to enhance efforts to reach out to this target group which played an important role in targeted VCs.

14. The revised RF for the AF phase was appropriate since it was more realistic vis-à-vis project achievements at RF stage; it also permitted to ‘unpack’ outcomes, particularly (i) get a disaggregated measure of the project impact across the three major VCs; (ii) formally assess gender outcomes; and (iii) measure the performance of Component 4. The project baseline used to establish the AF reference situation was appropriately revised with more accurate data made available during project implementation (see greater details in Section III).

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

Rating of Relevance: High

15. PRODEX has been fully relevant in the three-pronged context of the Bank priorities for Niger, the Government’s strategic orientations for the country and the real needs of beneficiaries as they face their own development constraints. This accounts for the High rating given the PDO relevance.

16. The project has been consonant with the Bank Country Partnership Framework and Strategy (CPF/CPS for the last period 2013-2016 and for the current period 2017-2021). The project has provided clear evidence of alignment of its


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PDO and intermediate outcomes with the CPF/CPS objectives, and it has contributed directly to the CPF/CPS outcomes. Indeed, accelerating the growth of market-oriented agriculture amongst small- and medium-scale producers in Niger is central to the CPF/CPS. The project has conformed to the type of Bank support to the Government’s agenda envisaged in the CPS, in the sense that its thrust has been to contribute to improved productivity and increased market access, two areas that have hindered agriculture-led growth and poverty reduction among small- and medium-scale farming communities.

17. The project has also been fully aligned with the 3N Initiative (‘Nigeriens feed Nigeriens’) which constitutes the development blueprint for Niger since 2012; this initiative focuses on promoting sustainable growth and welfare enhancement. The project has supported the 3N main strategic orientations, i.e.: (i) creating a sufficient number of jobs to address the protracted problems of unemployment, especially amongst youth, and long-term poverty; (ii) laying the foundation for a robust and inclusive growth of the Niger economy, including a focus on promoting women’s agenda; and (iii) improving and sustaining the well-being of all Nigeriens regardless of their personal circumstances and location. The project has contributed specifically to Strategic Orientation No. 2, i.e., the regular supply of rural and urban markets with agricultural and agro-alimentary products. PRODEX is also aligned with the national plan of action for management of water resources (PANGIRE) prepared in 2014. Finally, on another plane, PRODEX has been quite pertinent to the extent that he has responded to the real needs of targeted beneficiaries (producers, processors, transporters, traders, etc.) regarding the constraints they are facing in improving their productive activities.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

Efficacy Rating: High

18. The project fully achieved and/ or exceeded its objectives (intended outcomes) as established in the Results Framework (RF). It met and/or surpassed most of the targets for the three key RF performance indicators – namely, increase in total value production (PDO) and sales volumes (Intermediate Outcome 1), number of sub-projects (IO 2) and rehabilitation/ protection of irrigated areas and roads (IO 3) -- for project-supported producers in the targeted value chains. Project performance under the PDO and intermediate outcomes is discussed below. This is all the more commendable since the targets were revised upward at RF stage in view of the substantial results achieved, e.g., increase in total value of production from 25 to 64 percent and sales volumes from 15 percent to 39 percent (see paras 20 and 21, and RF in Annex 1).

19. This section also outlines the causal relationships between the project’s activities and achieved outcomes established based on the data collected by the M&E unit. At the outset, it can be said confidently that the project performance is primarily attributable to the activities supported by the project since there were no other national projects providing any support of importance to the targeted VCs in their main production areas during the project implementation period. To avoid bias possibly caused by non-project factors that may have affected the observed outcomes, the project team used multiple sources of information to help with ‘triangulation’ when different sources pointed to the same types of achievement (see details in Section IV. A regarding M&E). This convergence provided a richer, more robust and accurate assessment of achievement of outcomes.

20. Project Development Objective. The PDO stated as the ‘increase in the value of marketed production’6 was surpassed. At appraisal, the total value of production by project-supported producers across all targeted VCs had been projected to grow by an average of 25 percent above baseline. For the AF phase, this target was revised upward to a weighted average of 64 percent across the three main VCs (onions, cowpeas and on-hoof animals).7 At project closing,

6 ‘Marketed production’ referred to access of national production to both domestic and export markets. 7 The weighted average was computed on the basis of the number of sub-projects per VCs (with the large dominance of the onion VC


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the actual percentage increase in the value of production across all targeted value chains averaged 81 percent or 27 percent above target. It is to be noted that this result is attributable to the increase in both production volumes, as well as the prices that the production has commanded, in particular owing to a better quality of products. Intermediate Objective 1 that focused only on volumes shed more light on this question.

21. Intermediate Outcome 1. IO 1 was to be measured by two indicators: the increase in the volume of marketed production and the number of operational plans executed by IPs. The increase in the volume of production was exceeded by an even larger margin than the PDO indicator. At appraisal, the total volume of production by project-supported producers across all targeted VCs had been projected to grow by an average of 15 percent above baseline; for the AF phase, this target was revised upward to a weighted average of 25 percent across the three main VCs. At project closing, the actual percentage increase in production volumes across all targeted value chains averaged 39 percent or 56 percent above target. This means that production volumes have increased less than the total value of production (81 percent). This was anticipated, the difference being explained by the increase in prices which have contributed roughly at a par to the increase in the value of sales. IO 1 was also measured by the number of operational plans executed yearly by Inter-professional organizations (IPOs). The results are that all three IPOs for the main targeted VCs systematically prepared and executed their operational plans during the project implementation period, denoting a substantial increase in their capacity to operate.

22. Intermediate Outcome 2. The number of micro-projects (MPs) approved under the Matching Grant mechanism was exceeded by 55 percent during the initial phase; they also adhered to the targeted level of execution of 80 percent. During the AF phase, the portfolio of MPs was expanded. At project closing, the target had been exceeded by 12 percent, and the level of execution of the MPs had risen to 93 percent denoting greater efficiency in execution. These MPs typically regarded small investment size of less than US$5,000, for irrigated onion production (84 percent), the remainder being for cowpeas (4 percent), on-hoof animal fattening (7 percent) and others (5 percent). One innovative feature of the AF phase is that, in addition to small sub-projects, it supported larger ones with potential to become SMEs. This activity concerned 40 small SMEs (with investment needs under CFAF 50 million) and 10 larger ones (with investment needs over CFAF 50 million). The target for small SMEs was not achieved (18 or 45 percent) but the one for larger SMEs was exceeded (110 percent). One positive result for small SMEs is that the funding they mobilized from Partner Financial Institutions amounted to twice the amount of the Matching Grants they received (multiplier of two in terms of mobilization of commercial funding).

23. Intermediate Outcome 3. During the initial phase, the IO 3 indicator of 2,000 ha regarding irrigated areas receiving protection by weirs and catchment construction was surpassed by 182 percent (5,646 ha achieved); for the AF phase the revised target of 7,550 was almost met (7,269 ha achieved). 35 management committees were created; this benefited an estimated 97,640 beneficiaries. Evidence from interviewed beneficiaries suggests that these investments have had a positive impact notably on the level of aquifers and water availability, although this remains to be scientifically measured. In contrast the target of 105 km of feeder roads built or rehabilitated during the initial phase was not achieved; this target was revised downward for the AF to 64.4 km; it was exceeded at project end (11 percent above target); seven road links were rehabilitated serving about 380,000 people; management committees for all these investments were created. It is to be noted that this was achieved with the original budget earmarked in the costab and transcribed in the annual project budgets (PTBAs), i.e., the unit costs per km was higher that planned in the costab. This said the project road investment costs were of similar magnitude in comparison with recognized norms in Niger (see para 30).

24. Intermediate Outcome 4. IO 4 regarding the number of reports produced was only established for the AF phase. It was exceeded for the number of financial and progress reports (14 percent above target) and was exactly on target for the number of timely unqualified audit reports.

representing about 84 percent of total)


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Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

25. Attribution of results to project interventions. PRODEX was the only externally-funded project with national coverage intervening comprehensively in the selected VCs during its implementation period. Although increase in marketed production can be marginally attributed to other interventions at local level, it can be argued safely that the major impact on these VCs was due to project interventions. The justification for a Substantial rating is based on the following attribution aspects for each major commodity: (i) project-supported inter-professions have played a significant role in strengthening the capacity of the producers’ associations; this is evidenced by the content of their operational plans, the technical services they provided to producer associations that improved product quality, the market/ trade roundtables that opened up additional domestic and international markets, the generation and dissemination of good ag practices adopted by the producers, etc.; (ii) the number of matching grants and the technical assistance provided by the project to support sub-projects, as well as the nature of such sub-projects generally oriented toward production increase, and improved quality; and (iii) for onions, the additional irrigated area developed or rehabilitated, and the feeder roads rehabilitated by the project that have contributed to the increased value of marketed produce; it is to be noted that the export data regarding onions were estimated based on the marketed production handled by the project-constructed conditioning centers. 26. Causal relationships between project activities and achieved outcomes. A number of outputs embedded in the project activities, combined to have positive impacts outcomes (see Annex 1), as follows:

PDO and IO 1: The increased in the value and volume of marketed production was accounted by (i) better organization of IPs, capacity-building of operators, development of market knowledge and operational plans of VCs, together with training of investors and participants in VC activities all along the chain, (ii) co-financing of sub-project-activities based on technical references and GAPs, better knowledge of markets, development of norms and testing of products, etc., and (iii) development of production and marketing infrastructure The development of the production generated a large increase in employment, including female employment; IO 2: The reasons explaining that the overall number of MPs was exceeded are several fold: (i) there were profitable activities to be developed in the main VCs selected at production, storage, processing and marketing level; (ii) the level of funding through the MGs was attractive (50 to 90 percent); and (iii) the demand driven process spearheaded by the regional project executing agencies (AGEXs) with the help of the small local service providers worked well. Against the above achievements, two difficulties need mentioning: (i) the number of SME-type sub-projects proved only to be only 45 percent of the target (18 vs. 40 SPs) for the AF phase: the main reason was that the Partner Financial Institutions (PFIs) were not equipped to prepare SME business plans and had not yet developed adequate financing instruments; and (ii) the mobilization of beneficiary contributions was below target: this contribution which was expected to be 20 percent amounted to only about 10 percent; and IO 3 and IO 4: (i) targets were met or exceeded for IO 3 essentially because the contracting process for weirs, dams and protection works, as well as road work, was well organized by the TFCU with the help of the International Assistance Team (IAT) at central level and through the AGEXs at regional level; management committees were established for each investment; and (ii) for IO 4, it denotes that the TFCU was well managed overall; in particular the financial management was flawless (no qualified audits); this is all the more to be underscored that the TFCU also managed the preparation and execution of several other operations8

27. Beneficiary satisfaction. The PCU conducted a beneficiary satisfaction survey at project closure with representative sample of 215 project beneficiaries in all eight regions of the country. Survey results indicated that respondents were almost unanimously satisfied with project support, the main reason being that project actions were adapted to their needs; they were satisfied, to a lesser degree, with input and equipment suppliers, and service providers. Respondents indicated that their sub-projects would be sustainable following project closure (see details in Annex 1).

8 These operations were: ???


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C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

Efficiency Rating: Substantial

28. This section demonstrates that the activities involved in achieving the project’s objectives were efficient in terms of ‘value for money’, i.e., in comparison with both recognized norms (cost-effectiveness analysis) and benefits (cost-benefit analysis). The details of the efficiency analysis, including the underlying assumptions about costs and benefits, and other information supporting the analysis, are presented in Annex 4. Aspects of design and implementation that either contributed to or reduced net efficiency gain, are mentioned; they include delays in implementation of key activities, procurement issues, cost overruns, and planned vs. actual project timeframe.

29. Cost-effectiveness analysis. The project has performed efficiently in the management of infrastructure investments under Component C to attain the identified and measurable benefits; these investments have typically been completed under high labor intensity methods (HIMO) and represented the expected least-cost solution (cost per unit of output). The project’s private partners composed of consulting firms, works contractors and NGOs have been generally efficient in the implementation of project activities with the exception of some contractors that have incurred delays in implementation. Project implementation experience bears evidence that the procurement procedures have commonly represented the most binding constraints in terms of delays incurred especially for the road construction/ rehabilitation. The Directorate General of Rural Engineering has supported the project in the management of infrastructure through the mobilization of a part-time technician. But the absence of a permanent technician within the TFCU team and the changes of the focal technician at the level of the Rural Engineering have affected negatively the project's performance and its capacity to capitalize on investments.

30. The cost-effectiveness analysis relates to the costs of achieving weirs/ thresholds for groundwater recharge and protection work in watersheds and rivers, as well as farm tracks. Regarding thresholds, project implementation costs were competitive at national level with an average cost per secured hectare (about CFAF/ha 460,000) well below average (over CFAF/ha 1.0 million) for similar interventions. For agricultural roads, the average unit cost per km achieved (CFAF 28.3 million) is slightly higher than the average cost per km (about CFAF 22.0 million) of similar projects; but it remains acceptable in the Niger context. During the AF phase, the project greatly improved its performance in keeping control over implementation costs with a cost of implementation of about CFAF 21.0 million. According to interviews of beneficiaries, the impact of the rural tracks on access to production areas and commercial flows has been extremely positive, on the following accounts: (i) an increase in the number of vehicles during market days (20-40 vehicles per locality on average); (ii) a decrease in travel time and corresponding passenger travel cost by at least 50 percent; and (iii) a similar decrease in the cost of transports of goods9. In fact, certain localities were only reachable on foot, by motorcycle or by camel back before PRODEX rehabilitated/ constructed the rural tracks linking to feeder roads. Similarly, according to evidence from field interviews, weirs and thresholds have had a substantial impact on the availability and quality of groundwater year round. For monitoring purposes, PRODEX provided 160 piezometers to gauge the change in the aquifers impacted to the National Center for Economic and Environmental Monitoring (CNSEE); however, the monitoring entrusted to the Regional Directorates of Hydraulics was not performed regularly.

31. Cost benefit analysis. A cost-benefit analysis was conducted during project preparation to assess the project economic and financial viability. The PADs for the initial and AF phases indicate the following results for the economic analysis: (i) initial phase: 26.5 percent economic rate of return (EIRR) and a Net Present Value (NPV) of about US$11 million; and (ii) AF phase: 16.9 percent economic rate of return (EIRR) and a Net Present Value (NPV) of about US$13

9 See details in A. Dicko’s completion report on Component C, December 2017


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million. This means a weighted EIRR10 for the two phases of 23.6 percent and a total NPV of US$24 million. The various scenarios of sensitivity to price fluctuations indicated that the project would remain viable in the face of increase cost, price volatility and delays in implementation. The ERR was re-estimated at project completion. The following are the ex-post estimates: (i) initial phase: 26 percent; and (ii) AF phase 17 percent. Weighted on the basis of the respective costs of the two phases, the re-estimated ERR is 23.7 percent or about the same order of magnitude as the ERRs estimated ex-ante at appraisal stage.

32. The financial analysis considered the representative business models identified for the primary target groups (producers and herders) such as small-scale irrigation plots (with mechanized or manual technologies), community input supply warehouses, fattening farms, and commodity storage and marketing facilities, etc. The financial analysis showed a net profitability for project beneficiaries, which confirms the soundness of activities identified for project support along the selected supply chains. The financial analysis was redone based on the extensive M&E data collected regarding sub-projects financed under the Matching Grant Mechanism. The difficulty in re-estimating the financial results has been that the models in the PADs for the initial and additional phase based on anticipated types of activities and sizes of holdings turned out to be different from actual ones. This is understandable, since sub-project selection was demand-driven. In that sense, the project ended up supporting more appropriate models in the main targeted VCs. Considering that situation, the ex-post FA was prepared for the six models most representative of the actual project portfolio for which the relevant technical and economic data were available. The ex-post results for the six models as compared to the ex-ante estimates11 are as follows: (i) onion production: 55.4 vs. 32 percent; (ii) production of improved seeds of cowpeas: 33.4 percent; no ex-ante estimate; (iii) animal fattening: 49.9 vs. 38 percent; (iv) hides and skins processing: 48.3 percent; no ex-ante estimate; (v) onion storage: 33 vs. 66 percent (RUDU-type/ 3t storage); and (vi) dried meat (‘kilichi’): 57.6 vs. 66 percent. The above ex-post estimates are evidence that project-supported investment activities have been clearly positive and beneficial for investors. Even though no full systematic comparison was possible with the ex-ante models, the data show that the ex-post results are in line broadly with ex-ante estimates and have in cases exceeded these estimates. This is not counting the positive externalities brought about by project-sponsored infrastructure investments (markets, roads, public storage platforms, etc.) provided at no cost for beneficiaries. The details of the underlying

assumptions about costs and benefits and other information supporting the analysis are presented in Annex 4.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

Overall Rating: Satisfactory12

33. In weighing achievements and possible shortcomings based on the prior assessment of the relevance of objectives, efficacy in achieving objectives, and efficiency, the overall outcome rating for the project is rated satisfactory, i.e., the PDO was relevant, there were only minor shortcomings in the project’s achievement of its stated objectives, and its results were achieved efficiently. This rating is in line with the Bank team rating: all the along project duration the rating given in the ISRs has been satisfactory, except for a couple of years at the beginning of the project (2009-11) where it was rated moderately satisfactory13. In fact, the ISRs have noted that some of the project activities could be considered as ‘best practices’ deserving the rating of very satisfactory; this is the case of the construction of the marketing platforms

10 Based on the respective cost of the two phases. 11 Source: PAD for Additional Financing dated July 11, 2014. The figures are provided to the extent that models are the same; the PAD included other models: (i) onion storage: 46 percent (RESEDA 12t model); (ii) veterinary inputs storage: 61 percent; and (iii) marketing infrastructure for onions and cowpeas: 66 percent. 12 It has been determined that, for the sake of the preparation of this report, the revision to the outcome targets did not trigger a ‘split rating’ method. 13 This period coincided with the time where the Bank had to stop operation due the military coup of 2010. This led to delays in project implementation, notably the recruitment of the international technical assistance.


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for onions or the establishment of the Transport and Marketing Certificates (BECs). The TFCU has undertaken a study of some of these best practices.14

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

34. This section assesses the operation’s effects and impacts that were intended or unintended, whether positive or negative, including impacts on gender, institutional strengthening, mobilizing private sector financing, and poverty reduction and shared prosperity.

Gender

35. PRODEX was a ‘gender-tagged’ project aimed to increase women’s assets, income earning and employment opportunities, through meaningful participation in key project activities designed to close gender gaps related to human endowments, jobs, and ownership/ control of assets. Out of 316, 570 project beneficiaries about 43 percent turned out to be women: this result surpassed the project target of 35 percent. The project provided training to female beneficiaries, to the same extent as their male counterparts, in improved production and processing techniques, as well as business skills; it also supported their access to credit. Entrepreneurial skills training programs aimed at women included the ILO GERME (Gestion Efficace de Mon Entreprise) program which had modules specifically targeting women’s needs. In addition to training, women, like their male counterparts, benefitted from back-up services provided by private service providers (GSCs). The GSCs were contracted by the project to help women’s groups improve their business organizations, including perform specific tasks such as maintaining basic record keeping.

36. The training and support services have resulted in improved business organizational structures and better understanding of business amongst women. As a result, project-supported women producers have seen their agriculture production rise between 2015 and 201615: the average production sold by sub-projects promoted by women increased by 93 percent for onions, 15.4 percent for beans and 40 percent for livestock products. These achievements are important in increasing women’s empowerment. However important challenges remain. The 2017 impact survey mentions two of these challenges: (i) access to land: men continue to exploit most of the land; the average plot size exploited by women was less than a third (28 percent) of those exploited by men; and (ii) the low level of participation of women in the management committees set up by the communities: on average women represent only between 10-20 percent of committee membership which prevent women’s concerns and interests to be adequately captured in the decision making process.

Institutional Strengthening

37. PRODEX did not have a typical project-type institutional set-up. Its set-up was meant both (i) to facilitate project implementation, with execution entrusted to third parties (‘faire faire’ approach), and (ii) to transfer of responsibilities to permanent entities at project closure. The third parties that were part of the institutional set-up were either (i) government parties: technical services of ministries, both at national and regional level, such as rural infrastructure services, or independent public entities such as the National Center for Ecological and Environmental Monitoring; or (ii) private international or national service providers such as SOFRECO, a French service provider that supplied the International Assistance Team, or the Executing Agencies (AGEXs) some being NGOs and independent cooperation agencies; or small service providers at the grassroots (GSCs); or (iii) simply individuals, coming from the private or public sector recruited specifically to fill certain positions, such as the Regional Focal Points (RPFs). In addition, the project was expected to work with Inter-Professional (IPs) organizations in each selected VCs. The above ‘mixed’ institutional set-up worked well overall. One shortcoming is that the executing entities were not given sufficient staffing resources or equipment. The RFPs particularly were housed within the local branches of the ministries; their remuneration was not commensurate with their level of responsibilities or workload. The system worked to the extent that the RPFs were

14 See Etude de Capitalisation du Projet, September 2017 15 See Project Impact Study, November 2017


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motivated in being part of a major externally-funded operation, but clearly was not sustainable. In contrast, one major achievement at project closure is that the IPs for the three main targeted VCs had been fully organized and strengthened; all had prepared their operational plans and had started to provide services to their members. The aim of the project was similarly to reinforce all other permanent institutions so that they would take over. This objective was achieved partially. The service providers on the ground particularly did not get to the level of operational capability where they would have been able to operate independently; similarly, the technical services of the line ministries still remained weak. It is clear that, to ensure long-term sustainability, additional support will be necessary.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

38. The project was designed fundamentally to strengthen the environment for private business and promote private operators so that they take advantage of opportunities and set up their own businesses. The matchings grants supplied by the project were geared to helping operators generate sufficient profitability so that they would have an incentive to invest in new technologies, and cover their initial negative cash-flow and attendant risks. In order for them to have sustainable operations, however, business people needed access to funding on a permanent basis. In this regard, the project deployed large efforts to link operators to Partner Financial Institutions (PFIs) so that the latter would extend this funding to agriculture investors; on one hand, it provided technical assistance to commercial banks to build their capacity and gave them training to better understand agriculture activities; one the other hand, it gave support to private investors, through service providers, so that they could develop sound business plans to be submitted to PFIs. This activity has constituted one of the thrusts of the AF program, with specific support provided to a number of successful investors to graduate from micro-scale enterprises to SMEs.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

39. Even though the project was not directly centered on poverty reduction, its results were meant to trickle down from the ‘champions’ receiving direct support to other small producers and operators who would benefit indirectly; the latter would also benefit from spillover effects arising from the general infrastructure being put in place that would serve entire communities, localities or regions. The ratio of number of individual beneficiaries of matching grants (4,439) to the total number of beneficiaries (about 316,570) bears testimony to that fact. The substantial level of employment generation also testifies that there was a large measure of shared prosperity.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

40. This section provides an analysis of key factors and events influencing the operation’s achievements or non-achievements during preparation and implementation. This section also discusses actions taken by the Bank and/or the borrower to address and correct each factor undermining project performance.

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

41. PRODEX preparation benefited from a Project Preparation Advance; the project was prepared under the aegis of the Private Irrigation Promotion Project 2 (PIP 2) together with national counterpart staff who had Bank experience regarding project implementation. Subsequently, PRODEX’s TFCU was actually established using PIP 2 staff. The overall project design was straightforward with clearly structured components and clear operational logic that reflected the underpinning theory of change, consisting of removing the major constraints to incremental production, giving incentives to VC operators and tackling the major infrastructure issues (regarding water resources and road connectivity in particular). The project built on the results and lessons of several previous projects, notably the Promotion of Agro-Pastoral Exports Project (PPEAP, 2001-2005) and the PIP 2. The sequencing of tasks was appropriate, given country context. There was an appropriate selection of stakeholders to engage or beneficiary groups to target as part of the


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investment sub-projects; in this regard, the project focused on change agents in each VC and leaders in the productive alliances who could give traction to the expansion of VC activity. There was an adequate assessment of risk and design of mitigation measures. The project was ready for implementation

42. The Results Framework was well designed in the sense that indicators were aligned with operational objectives, and had appropriate targets overall. The project had a realistic PDO in terms of the level of ambitiousness, i.e., 25 percent increase in the value of marketed production to be expected overall, on account of the increase in the volume of production combined with an increase in commodity price. This indicator was complemented by an intermediate indicator regarding the additional volume of marketed production set at 15 percent increase; this meant that the incremental production was expected to fetch on average an additional 10 percent in terms of the prices it would command; this somehow was not overly ambitious since incremental production was expected to come from product varieties (in particular onion varieties such the ‘violet de Balmy’) in high demand and be of higher quality.

43. However, there were a couple of flaws in the project design that came to the fore during implementation: (i) PDO and IO 1: neither the PDO indicator, nor the intermediate outcome indicator concerning incremental production, were disaggregated to allow for accurate data gathering and close monitoring of the targeted supply chains; this disaggregation across VC was not done until the preparation of the additional financing phase; in addition, the targets were set in the PAD as percentages somewhat arbitrarily; it was only during implementation that actual baselines were estimated using MAE’s statistics to gauge the value and volume of project incremental marketed production; finally some targets set at appraisal were not realistic and had to be adjusted downward for the AF phase; and (ii) institutional set-up at regional level: another flaw of design is the failure to assess the amount of work that would be needed at regional level to manage project activities; the institutional set-up at regional level was meant to be a light structure to avoid some of the heavy management costs that had plagued other projects previously; it was designed around the belief that the Regional Focal Points (RFPs) would be able to handle multiple varied tasks such as managing the sub-project selection committees, overseeing the implementation of sub-projects and collecting data on all project activities; all these tasks proved too much of a work load for the RFPs; it is not until the Mid-Term Review that the problem was recognized; it was resolved partially, with the reinforcement of the focal points’ offices with additional staff and means to operate.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

44. Three groups of implementation factors are distinguished below: (i) factors subject to government and/ or implementing entities control, (ii) factors subject to World Bank control, and (iii) factors outside the control of the government and or implementing entities.

45. Factors subject to government and/or implementing entities control. The Government promptly established and staffed the Technical and Fiduciary Coordinating Unit (TFCU) under the Secretary General of the MAE, to be responsible for the daily project management, and technical coordination of executing agencies (AGEXs) and service providers (technical services within relevant ministries, consulting firms, NGOs in charge of implementing part of the project activities). The TFCU received the technical support of a high-level TA team who developed the work methodology and systems. In line with the ‘faire faire’ approach the TFCU appointed Regional Focal Points (RPFs) located within the regional technical departments who worked with the Governorats (the state administration authority at regional level). The idea was to create a project structure at regional level that was light and agile, and did not entail any heavy administration; it was also to avoid ‘institutionalizing’ this structure as project unfolded and ensure that it would be taken over by existing permanent structures either public or private thereafter at project closure.

46. The following positive factors accounted for the project success in terms of implementation processes: (i) Coordination and engagement: from the beginning there was a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders involved in project implementation, particularly between the TFCU and the implementing structures; as part of the faire faire approach, the TFCU was clearly slated to ensure facilitation, coordination and follow-up, whereas execution proper was the responsibility of the executing structures, in particular the AGEXs and the service


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providers (GSCs) at regional level; work execution was entrusted to contractors and NGOs on the ground; there was good cooperation and collaboration with the technical government services (a case in point is the collaboration with the Rural Infrastructure Directorate of MAE) that permitted good synergy and the lifting of the administrative barriers or structures that could have slowed down implementation; (ii) commitment and leadership: the project enjoyed continuous commitment in the part of the Government or relevant stakeholders during its implementation; they provided clear strategic and organizational priorities, without hiatus, first around the RDS and subsequently the 3N initiative (Nigeriens Feed Nigeriens); (iii) human resources and organizational capacity: the project coordinator and most of the project management team came from another Bank project (Small Irrigation Development 2); they were familiar with Bank procedures and project implementation processes; most of them remained in post during the entire project implementation period; they provided solid leadership; they had substantial organizational capacity and proved able to mobilize skilled human resources; this was done with the help of a strong technical assistance team that provided the required technical guidance and support; (iv) limited political interference: in spite of the difficult security situation that prevailed in the country during most of project implementation, the project was never subjected to pressure of a political nature, including pressure to divert project resources for non-project activities; (v) fiduciary: fiduciary management by the TFCU, including adequate procurement, budgeting, and financial management proved to be remarkable, with trained and able staff (including a Financial Management Specialist, two accountants, an Internal Comptroller and a Procurement Specialist) who stayed during the entire implementation period, and adequate mechanisms put in place in a timely fashion right from project inception; the annual work program and financial program (PTBA) was always adequately prepared and timely; all audit reports were similarly prepared on time; and were all unqualified; the project was audited by the national Court des Auditors (CA)16 in late 2016 as a matter of routine; it gave its official approval of the project accounts; and (vi) Social and Environmental: the TFCU dealt adequately with the implementation of the ESMF and the Involuntary Resettlement Plan, including compliance with overall safeguards requirements at both overall project and sub-project level; the SPs were subjected to environmental and social screening and appropriate measures were requested before releasing the matching grants to address problems that had been flagged.

47. The two factors under the control of the TFCU that were not appropriately handled during implementation were the following: (i) the relative weakness of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system; data collection was performed appropriately and used for securing the required information for project management and monitoring purposes, and reporting was done in a timely fashion; however, the project failed to conduct comprehensive impact studies for the entire project duration17 which would have helped inform in-depth the results framework, notably regarding the causal relationships between project outputs and activities and the achievement of project objectives and outcomes; and (ii) as mentioned earlier, the project regional set-up proved to be too weak to handle project tasks; even though the focal points offices were strengthened at Mid-Term Review, they proved not to have enough capacity to handle the work load; this led to difficulties regarding support to sub-project implementation, data collection and reporting.

48. Factors subject to World Bank control. The following positive factors accounted for project success on the Bank side: (i) supervision effort and arrangements: a total of 15 semi-annual support missions were fielded systematically during the eight-year implementation period; the Bank conducted a Mid-Term Review of the initial phase in 2012, and a completion mission prior to the launching of AF phase; there was a low turn-over of TTLs, and transition arrangements were aptly organized; and (ii) adequacy of supervision: the Bank supervision missions were organized with participation of specialists in the fiduciary and safeguards fields as required; specialized missions were also organized to examine in-depth certain areas such as financial management; through such missions, the Bank team provided appropriate and timely advice

16 The Court of Auditors (in French Cour des Comptes) is an independent administrative court charged with conducting financial and legislative audits of most public institutions and some private institutions, and verifying the good form of accounting and the proper handling of public money. 17 The Impact Study conducted toward project-end (Oct. 2017) was elaborate and touched upon many aspects of project implementation. However, it gave results only for the two year-period 2015-16 (AF phase), and did not cover the project original phase.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_language

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_of_France#Administrative

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audit


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and support to the TFCU; in doing so, it was proactive in the identification of opportunities, appropriate follow-up and resolution of implementation issues; it proved to adapt appropriately to changing conditions; the reporting of implementation issues in ISRs was candid and to the point.

49. Factors outside the control of government and/or implementing entities. Project implementation took place during a difficult period from different perspectives: (i) macroeconomic environment: there were several episodes of drought during project implementation resulting in poor food production and shortage of food in the country; the Government had to resort to large food imports during these events, at a high cost, despite food aid; government finances were severely constrained and priorities regarding food production were re-emphasized to the detriment of agriculture exports; and (ii) conflict and instability: during the project implementation period, both Niger and neighboring countries (Mali, Chad and Nigeria) experienced serious conflict situations and attendant insecurity in certain areas, due to terrorist and illegal activities; this is the case of Niger’s Western border with Mali, the northern part of the country bordering Algeria and Chad, and the South-Eastern border with Nigeria (Boko-Haram conflict); also the Bank suspended its activities at the beginning of the project following the military coup of 2010; on that account alone, project implementation was delayed by close to a year, with consequent delay particularly in the recruitment of the PFRs, the International AT and the AGEXs; and (iii) natural disasters: animal epidemics (e.g., avian flu in particular in 2016) caused disruption in animal production and the country experienced droughts that resulted in food shortage in 2009 and 2011.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

50. Other factors linked to the project being assessed discussed below are (i) the quality of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), (ii) compliance issues, (iii) Bank performance, and (iv) risk to the development outcome.

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design, Implementation and Utilization

51. The assessment of the quality of M&E is based on three main elements: (i) quality of M&E design: the project’s theory of change was clear and adequate indicators were identified at appraisal to monitor progress toward the PDO using effective M&E arrangements; (ii) quality of M&E implementation: M&E data were collected and analyzed in a methodologically sound manner by the M&E section at the TFCU through the Regional Focal Points; the section prepared regular semi-yearly progress reports on project outputs used to inform the project’s Results Framework as prescribed in the PIM; the M&E also conducted impact and capitalization studies at project closure; this said, it is clear that the means given to the RFP offices for M&E purposes were insufficient to do a thorough job at data collection, especially regarding the impact of project activities; this was remedied to some extent after the Mid-Term Review with the assignment of M&E assistants to RFPs; a similar weakness during the AF period was that only one specialized staff was in charge of M&E at the TFCU (the assistant seconding this staff was not renewed); the M&E section, also, at central level, clearly had insufficient capacity for data collection and analysis; it was not able to interact efficiently with other data collection units, in particular the MAE Statistical Unit, which should have provided secondary information on production/ marketing/ export flows to be crossed-checked with the project-generated own information; finally, the impact and capitalization studies, although they were elaborate, only covered the AF phase, and therefore were insufficiently comprehensive to fully inform the project impact over the entire project duration; and (iii) quality of M&E utilization: M&E data on performance and results progress, despite its flaws, was generally used effectively to inform project management and decision-making; the progress reports based on these data were systematically prepared and were of good quality.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

52. The M&E system as designed was generally sufficient to assess the achievement of the project stated objectives and test the links in the results chain. However, there were significant shortcomings in M&E implementation and utilization making it difficult at times to generate and analyze the required data; in particular, there were insufficient


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coverage and weaknesses in areas such as the impact of project activities. In view of these shortcomings, the quality of M&E is rated as Modest.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

53. The project was classified as a Category B project regarding environmental and social safeguards. To address the potential environmental and social risks, an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) (OP/BP 4.01), a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) (OP/BP 4.12) and a Pest Management Plan (PMP) (OP/BP 4.09) were prepared and disclosed. A safeguards specialist was recruited to the FTCU in compliance with the covenant in the financing agreement. At the time of the AF appraisal, the safeguards instruments were updated and re-disclosed. During the entire project completion, the Government’s Bureau d’Evaluation Environnementale et des Etudes d’Impacts (BEEEI) provided regular project monitoring supervision at national level. The Bank also provided specialized support during supervision missions to ensure that the project would manage social and environmental risks in conformity with the safeguards policies.

54. All sub-projects were screened before implementation and categorized according their potential environmental and social impacts taking into consideration both their individual and cumulative potential impacts. The appropriate mitigation measures recommended were implemented; they were evaluated ex-post after implementation based on data collected during sub-project implementation monitoring. Specific cases, such as the road sub-projects, required the preparation and implementation of brief resettlement action plans.

55. The Project also carried out capacity building and sensitization programs in collaboration with BEEEI for project partners and beneficiaries to ensure greater awareness of environmental and social risks associated with the Project, and train the partners and beneficiaries on measures to take to address these risks. A specific activity has been the support provided by the project to the Centre National de Suivi Ecologique et Environnemental (CNSEE) and the University of Niamey, for the monitoring of the ground water resources in the zones where the irrigation sub-projects were located. The support included the provision of 160 piezometers. However, in some cases, the monitoring has not been systematic which affected the quality of the overall data. Whilst at present the ground water resources in these zones may not be under threat, it is important to take account of the cumulative impact of the small project-sponsored irrigation sub-projects; these sub-projects could, together with those implemented under other projects, lead to adversely affect the water table in the long term. An improved water resources management system including a functional monitoring system that collects, processes and feeds back information to users and planners is important for environmental and socioeconomic reasons; it will need to be implemented.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

56. The Bank team identified, facilitated preparation, and appraised the project such that it was most likely to achieve planned development outcomes and was consistent with the Bank’s fiduciary role. The following are relevant elements that were considered for Quality at Entry: (i) strategic relevance and approach: the Bank team ensured that the project would be duly aligned with both the Bank’s and the Government’s strategy and action plans; for preparation of both the initial and AF projects, it took into account the CPS on the Bank side, and the RDS (later replaced by I3N in 2012) on the Government’s side; (ii) technical, financial, and economic, and fiduciary aspects; (iii) poverty, gender, environmental and social development aspects; (iv) institutional aspects, and implementation arrangements; and (v) risk assessment.

Quality of Supervision

57. The Bank proactively identified and resolved threats to the achievement of development outcomes. The following are relevant elements that were considered in this report for Quality of Supervision: (i) focus on development impact: the Bank team clearly identified the key areas where results had to be secured to achieve the development objective of ‘increased value of exports’; these areas had to do inter alia with strengthened dialogue on key technical topics and


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regulatory matters (such as product quality or transportation hurdles), training and capacity building (e.g., of investors, PFIs or IPs), access to funding and the implementation of critical investments (e.g., the marketing platforms or the rural roads); in addition, particular attention was given to gender aspects; (ii) supervision of fiduciary and safeguard aspects: the Bank supervision teams always incorporated fiduciary and safeguards specialists (generally Bank staff, sometimes consultants); the presence of these specialists enabled supervision missions to adequately cover the corresponding implementation aspects; (iii) adequacy of supervision inputs and processes: missions were fielded periodically at six-month intervals, with regular upcountry field visits despite the country’s security situation; whenever key supervision staff were not available, they were either replaced or their visit was programmed separately; most of the fiduciary supervision work was performed by resident staff of the Bank field office in Niamey; this eased the staff participation and programming process; (iv) candor and quality of performance reporting: Bank mission did not hesitate to flag thorny issues, including those had to do with staff performance and staffing arrangements; and (v) role in ensuring adequate transition arrangements whenever TTLs had changed: the transition arrangements between TTLs were as seamless as possible; there were no major hiatus in project supervision and the project institutional memory was maintained; what helped in that process is that the national counterpart team overall stayed pretty much the same during the project implementation period.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

58. In view of the good-standing of the Quality at Entry and Quality of Supervision, taking into account the overall difficult project implementation context, the Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

59. At the time of the writing of this report, the risk that the development outcomes achieved will not be sustained, i.e., the probability and likely impact of threats posed to achieved outcomes moving forward, is rated as Low, on account of the three main reasons: (i) a high percent of the sub-projects are still in operation (72 percent of ‘executed and functional’ sub-projects); a small fraction have evolved into self-sustaining mini-enterprises, including those that received additional support under the AF phase; some of them are expected to scale up activities and become full-fledged SMEs; (ii) access to funding has been eased through increased dialogue and relationships between sub-project operators and Partner Financial Institutions (PFIs); this is expected to help sustain sub-project operations; and (iii) key project actions have resulted in an improved operational environment for investors: the strengthening of professional organizations has created an operational institutional framework to support VC operators, the project dialogue with regulatory authorities has resulted in a more business friendly regulatory framework, administrative measures have been developed (e.g., the Marketing and Transport Certificate - BEC); etc.; these actions are proving very useful and are expected to have long-term impacts; and (iv) the physical infrastructures set up by the project are anticipated to offer sustained conditions in terms of water availability (weirs and watershed protection) or access to markets (access roads, marketing platforms, livestock markets, etc.); these structures must be properly managed and maintained; in this respect, a negative factor that needs to be addressed is that management committees are not adequately composed of direct beneficiaries as required.

60. All in all, the project on many fronts is an 'unfinished business' to be pursued. Some of the attendant challenges are already taken up by follow-on projects such as the Climate-smart Agriculture Support Project (PASEC – P153420); other challenges are expected to be taken over by future projects such as the Integrated Project for the Modernization of Livestock and Agriculture in Niger (PIMELAN) currently under preparation. In the meantime, ongoing efforts to support interim programs, based on the capitalization of PRODEX’s best practices, should be pursued based on the Government’s own budget or other donors’ funding, to ensure that lessons of experience are not lost.


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V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

61. The most significant positive and negative lessons learned from PRODEX’s implementation experience are developed below.

62. Integrated VC approach. PRODEX intervened by taking into account all the critical parameters that govern the structure and operation of targeted VCs. It has demonstrated that an integrated approach to VC management is required and that there is the need to intervene at all critical links where difficulties arise. To this end, it is necessary to identify the key points on which actions are needed (e.g., production of cowpea seeds, assembling, sorting/ sizing and conditioning of onions in marketing platforms, support to the fluidity of transport through the BEC procedure, or rehabilitation of rural tracks). In this context, efforts should be made to support enterprises that can act as ‘leaders’ to strengthen VCs moving forward. It is also important to define the proper regulatory framework for each VC and strengthen professional organizations so that they can play their role. The attendant lesson is that physical investments need to be complemented by regulatory measures, in particular those that create a more friendly business environment and facilitate trade flows.

63. Productive Alliances. PAs are based on the establishment of commercial alliances between partners both producers (groups or individuals) and other investors upstream or downstream of production (input and feed suppliers, collectors, buyers, processors, transporters, agri-processors, etc.). These partners develop joint business plans reflecting their interests and common vision to bring products to specific markets; these plans include the specification of the attendant investments to be made. The governance of a PA can be assumed by a producer organization or by individual investors able to take the leadership. In the case of a producer organization, the partnership usually specifies which investments in production will be made by individual members and the contribution of each member to the joint investments. The PA also specifies the marketing arrangements that partners must respect, including the quality and quantity of products to be produced and exchanged by each partner, the price level, the price determination criteria, etc. Finally, the partnership specifies the financial and organizational arrangements according to which it will operate. All of the above takes time. A measure of such a development was supposed to occur during the additional phase of PRODEX. It is clear that time was insufficient to get to the point where fully developed PAs would have emerged, in particular, as regards the develop of legal and enforceable contractual relations, in a context such as Niger where transactions typically remain informal.

64. Matching grants. PRODEX has contributed to fund investment sub-projects on the basis of shared-cost financing or matching grants. The concept behind the grant has been the promotion of the 'infant industry', i.e., give financial incentives and technical means to producers and entrepreneurs to develop their businesses on the basis of new, more effective approaches to doing business. Matching grants had two objectives: (i) to improve the profitability of the enterprise beyond a threshold that would cover the risk of adopting the new approach, and (ii) to cover the possible negative cash flow that the enterprise could incur during the first production cycles, before reaching the steady state or ‘cruising’ period and generating a positive cash flow. PRODEX’s sub-project financing was based on investors' own contributions (varying from 10 to 50 percent), and a matching grant from project resources for the remaining funds. For the larger, SME-type sub-projects, the matching grant funding was to be completed through credits from Partner Financial Institutions (PFIs) covering the remaining financing needs, including working capital needs; one important point in that case was to establish permanent business links with these institutions to ensure continued funding and operational sustainability. The lesson from PRODEX's experience is that matching grants work well to the extent that the investment is sustainable in the long-term (during the cruising period), meaning that the investor can take over project funding and renew investments after project closure, using the proceeds of his own sub-project; another condition is that commercial banks would be ready to contribute to both the long-term and short-term funding needed by investors.

65. Management and preservation of water resources. In the context of irrigated agriculture in Niger, the recharge of groundwater aquifers is critical to resupply wells and boreholes. Under the project, the recharge was supported by the creation of weirs and thresholds and the protection of watersheds. Two conditions need to be adhered to in constructing


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this kind of infrastructure: (i) the development efforts should be commensurate with the existing volume of water resources; and (ii) the impact on water resources should be accurately measured. In measuring the need for recharge, it is imperative to assess not only the needs at the level of individual irrigation subprojects but also at the level of sub-project clusters, including the spillover effects (farmers not directly supported by the project who are emulating the project’s good practices) so as to calculate aggregate demand of water and ensure that the resource is sustainable. Lastly, it is necessary to make beneficiaries participate in the management and maintenance of works insofar as they have an interest in ensuring their durability. This was only partially done under PRODEX. The specific lessons that can be drawn are as follows: (i) regarding weirs and thresholds, sufficient attention needs to be given to properly target beneficiaries, and establish sustainable management and maintenance mechanisms involving their participation, which are the main ingredients for their sustainability; and (ii) regarding watershed and watercourse protection, since their impact is much larger, and hence it is difficult to identify beneficiaries and get them to participate, proper organizational arrangements based on outside structures are typically more efficient.

.


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Increase the value of selected products marketed by project-supported producers

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Value of marketed products in the selected supply chains by project supported producers (KPI)

Percentage 0.00 25.00 64.00 81.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):


Target


Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 0.00 146000.00 316570.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 0.00 35.00 43.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017


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A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Improvement of Supply Chain Coordination and Marketing Conditions


Target


Operational annual plans for at least three targeted supply chains are implemented on regular basis

Number 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017



Target


Incremental volumes of marketed selected products by project supported producers have reached 15% on average (KPI)

Percentage 0.00 15.00 25.00 39.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017


Component: Development of Financing Instruments


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Target


Funded subprojects successfully implemented (KPI)

Percentage 0.00 80.00 80.00 93.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017



Target


Sub-projects are successfully implemented under the matching grant program

Number 0.00 2300.00 3962.00 4421.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017


Component: Securing Irrigation Potential


Target


Irrigation area developed or rehabilitated (KPI)

Hectare(Ha) 0.00 5646.00 7550.00 7269.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

rehabilitated Hectare(Ha) 0.00 0.00 3750.00 4982.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017


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developed Hectare(Ha) 0.00 0.00 3800.00 2287.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017



Target


Roads constructed, Rural Kilometers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

Roads constructed, rural Kilometers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

Roads rehabilitated, Rural Kilometers 105.00 105.00 64.40 71.50

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017



Target


Area provided with new/improved irrigation or drainage services

Hectare(Ha) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

Area provided with Hectare(Ha) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00


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improved irrigation or drainage services

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017

Area provided with new irrigation or drainage services

Hectare(Ha) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017


Component: Project Coordination, Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation


Target


Periodic implementation and financial reports produced

Number 0.00 20.00 28.00 32.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017



Target


Annual audit reports submitted on time wihtout major qualifications

Number 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.00

30-Sep-2009 02-Mar-2009 11-Jul-2014 31-Oct-2017



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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

COMPONENT A

Institutional organization of VCs

- 3 inter-professions (IPs) for livestock-meat, hides and skins, onions and cowpeas - 3 VC Strategic Orientation Plans (SOP) and 3 Action Plans - 11 national associations at professional family level - 1 draft bill on inter-professions (IPs)

Improving the business environment

- Technical assistance to BOA Niger for the establishment of an agribusiness SME finance unit, market research, preparation of policy and credit manuals

- Establishment of the Transport and Marketing Voucher (BEC) for onion - Preparation of technical and economic production/ processing guides and references widely distributed to VC actors (OP, platforms), RECA and

Inter-professions. These documents have included: ▪ Guide of Good Practices for production and conservation onion ▪ Guide of Good Practices for storage and conservation of onion bulbs ▪ Guide of Good practices for the production of hides and skins ▪ Guide for onion bulb export ▪ Guide for onion packaging and marketing for exports in special ‘net’ bags ▪ Guide for cowpea seed export ▪ Guide for cattle export ▪ Guide for hides and skins export ▪ Technical and economic reference elements for commercial fattening of cattle, sheep and goats

- Development and updating of the directory of exporters and seed companies - Strengthening of the commodity Market Information System (MIS) - Completion of studies of domestic market for processed products and of regional market for unprocessed products (cattle, onion and cowpea) - 3 regional market surveys for onion, livestock and meat - 3 studies of technical and economic parameters of the national market for processed products for onion, meat (Kilichi) and cowpea

- Five export tests for onions (using the ‘net’ bag)

COMPONENT B


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Training and access to finance

- Training of 1063 investors including 145 women on GERME enterprise management guide - 11 specific contracts with service providers (GSCs) for capacity building and monitoring of the use of the GERME guide by subproject operators - Bank credit of 18 SME Type 1 for an amount of CFAF 250 million and a PRODEX subsidy of CFAF 127 million - Bank loan to 11 Type 2 SMEs for an amount of CFAF 715 million

Sub-projects

- Matching grants for 4421 subprojects, of which ▪ 3189 ‘functional’ or 'executed' sub-projects ▪ 265 converted into micro-enterprises and SMEs ▪ 13 onion collection and marketing platforms ▪ 5 onion marketing hub

- Investments in income generating subprojects ▪ 3034 boreholes and 1031 wells ▪ 4439 2 to 5hp motor pumps and 377 hand pumps ▪ 304 km of californian irrigation network ▪ 431 water supply basins ▪ 172 km of wire fence and 56 km of barbed wire fence ▪ 293, 895 forest seedlings for live hedges ▪ 2311 cattle-drawn carts, 512 donkey-drawn carts, 2074 plows and 3260 lots of small agricultural equipment ▪ 400 onion conservation stores of which 382 improved ‘RUDU’ type and 18 ‘RESEDA’ type ▪ 19 onion processing units ▪ 32 cowpea storage units ▪ 20 cowpea processing units ▪ 17 livestock markets ▪ 116 improved cowpea seed multiplication ▪ 18 agricultural input shops ▪ 88 cattle feed banks ▪ 112 beef and sheep fattening farms ▪ 14 collection centers for hides and skins ▪ 16 slaughter areas for meat for consumption ▪ 25 managed forage perimeters ▪ 20 improved meat outlets


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▪ 11 centers of modern ‘Kilichi’ meat processing

COMPONENT C

- Development/ protection of 12,878 ha of irrigated perimeters as follows:

▪ Construction of 19 weirs to recharge ground water supply for 5,867 ha of irrigated and establishment of corresponding 17 management committees

▪ Completion of 18 site protection works to secure 2,426 ha of irrigated land and attendant creation of 18 management committees ▪ Development of 4585 ha of irrigated land.

- Rehabilitation / construction of 71.8 km of access roads for production sites

C. RESULTS OF SATISFACTION SURVEY

Nb. respondents

% respondents

I. Project Support

Are you satisfied with PRODEX support?

Very satisfied 167 68.2

Satisfied 68 27.8

Little satisfied 9 3.7

Not satisfied 1 0.4

Total 245 100.0

Reasons for satisfaction or non-satisfaction with PRODEX support?

Adapted to our needs 214 93.0

Partially adapted 16 7.0

Not adapted 0 0.0

Total 230 100.0

II. Input and equipment suppliers

Are you satisfied with input and equipment suppliers?


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Satisfied 131 53.3


Not satisfied 0 0.0

Total 246 100.0

Reasons for satisfaction or non-satisfaction?

Good prices 125 51.2

Supplier's credit 13 5.3

Social assistance 6 2.5

Steady supply 18 7.4

Products of good quality 73 29.9

Other 9 3.7

Total 244 100.0

III. Irrigation equipment suppliers

Are you satisfied with irrigation equipment suppliers?


Satisfied 114 47.1


Not satisfied 4 1.7

Total 242 100.0


Good prices 88 37.0

Supplier's credit 10 4.2

Social assistance 4 1.7

Steady supply 23 9.7

Products of good quality 92 38.7

Other 21 8.8

Total 238 100.0

IV. Service providers


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Are you satisfied with service providers?


Satisfied 113 45.7


Not satisfied 6 2.4

Total 247 100.0


Adapted to our needs 83 83.8

Partially adapted 10 10.1

Not adapted 6 6.1

Total 99 100.0

V. Sub-project sustainability

Will your project be sustainable after PRODEX closure?

Yes 210 92.1

No 8 3.5

Don't know 10 4.4

Total 228 100.0


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Supervision/ICR

Yeyande Kasse Sangho Task Team Leader(s)

Yao Wottor, Sylvain Auguste Rambeloson, Harouna Djibrilla Djimba

Procurement Specialist(s)

Beth Wanjeri Mwangi Financial Management Specialist

Hadidia Diallo Djimba Team Member

Cheikh A. T. Sagna Social Safeguards Specialist

Medou Lo Environmental Safeguards Specialist

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY06 .725 81,379.43

FY07 16.550 47,706.02

FY08 34.455 113,150.25

FY09 48.091 160,019.00

Total 99.82 402,254.70

Supervision/ICR

FY09 4.926 17,038.27

FY10 17.684 63,867.99

FY11 14.525 156,932.13


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FY12 17.859 100,601.65

FY13 11.982 118,473.62

FY14 18.510 66,361.85

FY15 8.562 26,264.70

FY16 20.900 81,215.89

FY17 18.844 75,481.91

FY18 10.117 78,325.06

Total 143.91 784,563.07


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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

a) Project Cost by Components (US$ million)

Component Original

Allocation Additional Financing

Total Allocation

Disbursed %

Component A: Improvement of supply chain coordination and marketing conditions

10.0 2.0 12.0 10.7 89%

Component B: Development of financial instruments

17.0 4.6 21.6 22.2 102%

Component C: Securing Irrigation Potential

9.2 4.3 13.5 11.6 86%

Component D: Project Coordination, Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation, and Support to the I3N

3.8 2.9 6.7 9.3 140%

Total 40 13.8 53.8 53.8 100%

b) Financing (US$ million)

Source of Funds Appraisal Estimate Disbursed % appraisal

IDA Credit 53.8 53.8 100%

Beneficiaries 8.0 4.818 60%

Total 61.8 58.6 95%

18 This amount includes both the personal financial contribution of promoters of US$ 3 million for their sub-projects (see Annex 1 B.) and the amount of funding mobilized by the project-sponsored SMEs with the PFIs (CFAF 964 million or US$ 1.83 million) (see Annex 1 A., footnotes 18 and 19).


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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Methodology for Ex-Post Economic and Financial Analysis

1. This annex presents the ex-post economic and financial analysis of PRODEX. It aims to assess the efficiency of use of resources by beneficiaries and society in general in the ex-post with project situation vs. the ex-ante without project situation. The approach adopted is based on an analysis of the incremental costs and benefits associated with the implementation of the following four project components: (i) improved coordination of supply chains and marketing conditions, (ii) development of financing instruments, (iii) securization of irrigation potential, and (iv) project coordination, management, monitoring and evaluation. The benefits considered are those generated by the productive investments at the level of the enterprises/ farms supported under PRODEX as part of its sub-project portfolio; these benefits have been objectively quantified. No attempt has been made to quantify the benefits of the public infrastructure and capacity building investments. These benefits are quite positive but difficult to quantify. They were therefore not taken into account in the analysis. Hence, the estimates of the project efficiency are conservative.

2. The costs and benefits in the ex-post project situation were estimated and compared with those in the ex-ante situation without project in order to determine the additional costs and benefits due to the project. This was done based on six typical models: (i) 0.5 ha irrigated onion crop; (ii) 3 ha of cowpea seed production; (iii) storage/ conservation of onions (type RESEDA 12t); (iv) cattle fattening (50 animals); and (v) processed/ dried meat (kilichi) production. The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Net Present Value (NPV) computations are based on these models.

Financial analysis

3. IRR with and without project support. The graph below shows for all financial models the IRRs for the situations with19 and without project.

Graph 1: IRR of typical models with and without project support

Typical Models IRR without

project IRR with project

1. Onion production 28% 55%

2. Production of cowpeas seeds 19% 33%

3. Cattle fattening 24% 50%

4. Hides and skins processing 21% 48%

5. Onion storage/ conservation 22% 33%

6. Meat processing (kilichi) 25% 58%

4. The analysis reveals that the project has made it possible to strengthen the resilience of households who have adopted the technologies promoted by the project in the face of rising costs and possibly delayed benefits. In the ex-post situation with project, the IRRs for all models are higher than in the ex-ante situation. Clearly, this is because the increase in benefits over the investment life-time more than compensates for the cost increase borne by beneficiaries, except in the first production cycle(s) where they may experience a negative cash-flow.

5. IRR with and without project Matching Grants. In order to test the effect of the Matching Grants (MGs) on the results of the models, the IRR was computed without and with project matching grants. The situation without MGs

19 The situation with project, includes all project support with the exception of the Matching Grants the impact of which is treated separately (see para 5).


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corresponds to the intrinsic profitability of the model under the situation with project support (see Graph 1). The IRR after project funding is the one obtained with PRODEX funding after the use of project Matching Grants (MGs). As can be expected, the IRRs with PRODEX’s MGs are higher than those without MG funding for all financial models (see Graph 2). The IRR is increased substantially which incentivizes producers to adopt the new technologies. The cash-flow analysis further reveals that the PRODEX’s Matching Grant mechanism has proven to be an effective instrument for improving the level of financial flows. It has led to an increase in revenues (gross margin) of the actors (producers / processors) supported by the project all along the production cycle. It has allowed them, in particular, to better meet their cash flow requirements at the start of their sub-project cycle in an environment where access to bank credit and non-bank financing institutions was limited.

Graph 2: IRRs of typical models with and without project Matching Grants (MGs)

Typical Models IRR without project MGs

IRR with project MGs

1. Onion production 55% 75%

2. Production of cowpeas seeds 33% 97%

3. Cattle fattening 50% 90%

4. Hides and skins processing 48% 70%

5. Onion storage/ conservation 33% 91%

6. Meat processing (kilichi) 58% 132%

Economic analysis

6. The following assumptions were adopted for the economic analysis: (i) the economic costs were generated on the basis of the Costab software used to compute project costs, (ii) the economic benefits were estimated at 83.1 percent of the financial benefits because the financial selling prices of the products are considered without taxes, and certain transfers between agents are eliminated, (iii) the economic opportunity cost of the labor was considered, corresponding to about 56 percent of the financial cost, (iv) the 8.3 percent discount rate used in the ex-ante financial and economic assessment of the initial project, corresponding to the long-term capital cost for the country, has been retained to compute the Net Present Value (NPV), (v) the analysis period is 15 years (same length as the financial and economic analysis of the initial project), (vi) the total financial cost (initial project phase and Additional Financing phase) has been retained, deduction made of 60 percent of the amount of Component 2 ‘Development of financing instruments’ corresponding to the amount of the project-provided matching grants taken into account in the financial models, and (vii) none of the benefits of infrastructure and capacity building investments that are difficult to quantify have been taken into account.

7. Based on the above assumptions, the ex-post project’s Economic Rate of Return (ERR) is 24.7 percent, or of the same order as compared to 23.7 percent for the ex-ante weighted average of the economic analysis of the initial project and the Additional Financing. The sensitivity analysis based on decreases of 10 percent, 30 percent and 50 percent in additional gross margins of the project shows ERRs of 22.6 percent, 17.8 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively; the corresponding NPVs are $ 54.2 million, $ 32.3 million and $ 10.4 million. The sensitivity analysis based on the 10 percent, 30 percent and 50 percent increases in project costs yields ERRs of 22.8 percent, 19.6 percent and 16.9 percent, respectively; the corresponding NPVs are US$ 60.7million, US$ 51.8million and US$ 41.9 million. The sensitivity analysis based on one-year and two-year lag in the generation of benefits shows ERRs of 20.0 percent and 16.1 percent, respectively; the corresponding NPVs are US $ 47.1 million and US $ 31.0 million (see Table 1 below). The above demonstrates that the economic profitability is robust in the face of possible risks the project may confront.


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Table 1: ERR sensitivity to increased costs, decreased revenues and lag in project implementation

Hypotheses IRR NPV at 8.3%

CFAF US$

Baseline 24.7% 32,576 65.2

10% decrease in profits 22.6% 27,098 54.2



10% increase in costs 22.8% 30,355 60.7



Profits delayed by one year 20.0% 23,527 47.1

Profits delayed by two years 16.1% 15,484 31.0


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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS


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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

EXTERNAL DOCUMENTS

− Evaluation du Dispositif Institutionnel du PRODEX : Consultants Elhadj Salifou Mahaman and Issaka Idrissa Mossi, May 2012

− Etude de Capitalisation du Projet, November 2017

− Initiative 3N (Nigériens Nourrissent les Nigériens), 2012

− Manuel d’Exécution du PRODEX, December 2008

− Manuel de Financement des Sous-Projets, Juin 2014

− Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage: Rapport d’évaluation interne à mi-parcours du Projet de Développement

des Exportations et des Marchés Agro-Sylvo- Pastoraux (PRODEX)

− Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage : Rapport d’Etude de l’Evaluation d’Impact du Projet Développement des Exportations et des Marchés Agro-Sylvo- Pastoraux (PRODEX), Oct. 31, 2017

− Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage: Rapport Interne d’Evaluation à Mi-Parcours du Projet de Développement des Exportations et Marchés Agro-Sylvo-Pastoraux, May 12, 2012

− Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage: Rapport Interne d’Achèvement du Projet de Développement des Exportations et Marchés Agro-Sylvo-Pastoraux, November 30, 2017

− Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage: Stratégie de Développement Rural (SDR), June 2008

− Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage: Capitalisation des résultats de la Composante C ‘Infrastructures de sécurisation du potentiel d’irrigation’, Abdoulaye Dicko, Irrigation Engineer, December 2017

BANK DOCUMENTS

− Bank Guidance, Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for Investment Project Financing (IPF) Operations, July 1, 2017

− Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Niger for the period FY18-FY21, November 21, 2017

− Financing Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Development Association for an Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project, April 24, 2009

− Financing Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Development Association for Additional Financing for the Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project, September 19, 2014

− ISRs and Aide-Memoires from 2008 to 2017

− Project Appraisal Document on a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 26.5 million (US$40.0 million equivalent) to

the Republic of Niger for anAgro-Sylvo-Pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project, March 2,2009

− Project Appraisal Document on a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 9.0 million (US$13.8 million equivalent) to

the Republic of Niger for anAgro-Sylvo-Pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project, July 11, 2014

− Staff Appraisal Report ‘2nd Private Irrigation Promotion Project.’


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Annex 7. MAP

world bank document...in 2009 and 2011, and an increasingly adverse external environment. gdp growth...

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