Doc_mt of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICaAL USE ONLY

Repot No. 8356

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

URUGUAY

MONTEVIDEO PORT PROJECT(LOAN 1798-UR)

FEBRUARY 7, 1990

Infrastructure Operations DivisionCountry Department IVLatin America and the Caribbean Regional Office

Tis docmet has a restricted distribution and may be used by reipiens only in the performan ofthdr offlcal duties. Its contents may not othrwise be didosed without World Bank authorization.

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cURrCY !QIVALNTS

Currency Unit - new pesoUS$1 - WUrS 7.30 on Decmber 31, 1979

a NUr$ 11.56 on December 31, 1961- NUr8 33.50 on December 31, 1962a NUrS 43.00 on December 31, 1963a NUr$ 74.00 on December 31, 1964* NUr$124.73 on December 31, 1965* WUr$180.00 on December 31, 1986- NJr$279.50 on December 31, 1987- NUr$329.00 on March 31, 1986

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBRZVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFE State Railvay AdministrationANCAP State 011 ComanyAMP National Port AdminLestrationAXSI National Administration for Stevedore ServicesDUE National Directorate for HydrographyDNT National Directorate for TransportDMV National Dlrectorate for RoadsGDP Gross Domestic ProductICa International Cowpetitive BiddingIDB Tnter-American Developmt Bankilnn Rational lishing InstituteLCa Local Competitive BiddingLIS Limited International BiddingLS Local ShoppingMIOP Ministry of Transport and Public WorksOPP Office for Planning and the Budget0O3 state water Authority (Obras Sanitarias del Zstado)PLUM& First Uruguayan AlrlinPUN National Naval PrefectuhipTC General Comptroller's Office (Tribunal de Cuentas)UNDP United Nations Development Programme

n* WOOD BANK FM OCALE W OTmW"'ngton O.C Z0433

USA.

04k. . OiuawGuuw.iOplias uhAutm

February 7, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO THE MECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Urugu4y - Montevideo Port Project(Loan 1798-UR)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'ProjectCompletion Report on Uruguay - Montevideo Port Project (Loan 1798-UR)lprepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. No auditof this project has been made by tho Operations Evaluation Department atthis time.

Attachment

_ This daumom ma re-udFe dMuibutloanodmaybed byecipoalpJus* Pe.aof their oii duLu kg sowssts way noe oduwm be diaoud wWiwo WO Oank wad ua.

MR OfVL USE ON

I~UIYZIO ORTPROECT(LOAN 17W-DR)

zw or gamim

Loue No.i

nAI MT. 5533 ***************.......... . ii

U AITC DIO SUMAR l .................................................... vi

SELTWION SM YV

II. PROJECT PRE 7A&NMO, AM;RiUL OA*ND* 3UOIfOS. ..

Ill.. P-.3-C- Dv3*A ION AMID COT 6IV. TRAFFICAOPERATIOIS................................. A0V. FIInm O3(ANQ ................................ 21VI. IS, IUTON"AL AND ELOr ............ 3VIz. ECONICS R1-EVALULTION .. COST.................. ... 14VIII. 2ROLEOf TimuE NK *.... ................. .... 16U. CONCLUS013 .. 16

TABLES

1. Estimated and Actual Schedu of Disburemmt ....... I82. Estmated and Actual Pcur t from ank toa ..... 203. Comparison btwee Apprisal Estimates and Actual Costs 224. Comparison betwe latimated and Actual Completion time

for Project Items .................................... 235. Comparlson of Actual Traffic with Appraisal Forecasts 246. Miscellaneous Traffic Data ...... ............. ....... 257. Actual and Original Expectation of Project Finaning 26S. AMP's Actual and Projected ncous Statements (US$) ... 279. AhP's Actual and Projected Balance Sheets (US$) ...... 2810. AIP's ncome Statemets (NMr$) ....................... 2911. ANP's Audited Balance Seets (NUr$) ..... so12. Econamic late of Return 3........31

IBID No. 1436-7B - Montevideo Port Project, Uruguay Transport System.

This dcuno ha a rtdct ditriution and way be ued by i oin thof their official dutIes 1 tont may sot ohewwi be dod Word 1a l

URUGUAY

MONTEVIDEO PORT PROJECT(LOAN 1798-UR)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the MontevideoPort Project in Uruguay, for which Loan 1798-UR in the amount of US$50million vas approved on January 20, 1980. The loan was closed onDecember 31, 1986, three years behind schedule. An amount o*L US$16.2million was cancelled and the final disbursement was on December 28, 1987.

The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division,Country Department IV, of the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Officeand Is based, inter alia, on information obtained from Project files, theStaff Appraisal Report, Staff Supervision Reports and Working Papors andsome data received from the Administration Nacioi-al de Puertos (ANP).

This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).The draft was sent to the Borrower on October 11, 1989, for comments byNovember 29, 1989, but none were received.

M!IYU NO??RJC (;LOA 1796U)

Mac aTm

Appraisal Actua orItem Zzpectation Curat Zatimte

Total project cost .(CUS$ ulUa) S8.2 35.8

Loa inimt CUS mLlUon) 30.0 37.0

Xsbu-ed 37.0 33.8Canelled - 3.2Outstamdin -

Date phyalal campesta coWpleted 12183 121$6

Proportion cmlet*d by aboe date (Z) 100Cii wu ao (X) soProcuramut of mteral () *i 7S

-'omomic rate of retum (ClR) (l) bI 24 16S

Intitutioal perfoce c/ good FaLr

Sorro'a poersce dI lair Poor

*1 As a pentage of tbh iut origially emitapd at appraLeal.kI weloted ara.£1 Refers primarLly to xWetq of trsport..1 Refer to AdintitraciAm Wacional de Puerto* (AMP).

IIOUTZY!DIO P0t 13.Og (HE 1796U)

DAIC DATA WE

Otua OnZC DATA

Orl41al Actual orItem Plan Current 3tsatt.

First mntion 6177

Gov.rimnt application */ 9/78

Appraisal 11/78 6/79

Negotiations 04/79 11/S-14/79

Bard approal 06/79 11221/80

Loan Agreemet date - 3/06180

Zffectivless date - 2126/81

Clolg d4ate 12131183 12/31/86

Borrower Ad.izistracift Vacional de Puerto. (AMP)

Guarator Governmt of Uruguay

Iucotin Aency Admiisetracids Macional de Puertos (AUP)

Pisal Toa of borror 01/01-12/31

&/ Letter dated March 3, 1976 fun Dr. Valentin Arismendi l1que, Mlnisterof 3econy and Finance to Dr. Adelbert riegr Vasna, Vice-President,Latin Aerica and the Caribbean Region, World Bank.

(IT)

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tal6SonI du r. iwe I I I 0/17

Pr _ipsll Sm. 9 I * 4 t0/0Spe rv tIs in V. 1n 11S,/1UPcpstinn so. 9 1 $ 1 WI

PJa bII 61.8 OW/2/

a.1hu- Smhen,, saw,I U 4waiep &01e1 AG.ion m Jam. 1976 0 140 a 4 @10T6

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1_w_I tal o i. 1.W a 1 / t Wimm

Smwn le i b Ml in Iw 041

-1eIIlm ig- .101. II 8 *W s 4wl*@UwmIisiol4 0.5O. 11I0 I4 I 1 / 10/5/6

bw eI d W la. 1ea l 2 du1 0

11w_e uviln t11 . 191 1 d. 1 1. 04I/1TM

_IlSIm Dll . 1416 9 dps 8 I UAWt

low _ DO *t 11 1 1 1 04/

_Smfli t2Ow.U *_ * * 1 1/

Smm-1_ n . 1no, 1O 1 0* 0/USmwbel ~ . 146 14 1 w 1 @7/28

_i i.Wf wit AP ow . *R sa SW A Oe Xmt la0, w

SbewvIeIm a A . a1 1lip 2 23/17/in

W ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m 11 1 8 12/

SmwvIium /Sm .1 _W 1 1 _ 1 _10/5/,

sT ur_ns..$ |16 5$_^_^_|lab14"

6/II I 6 dWu W m Sm.. _Ap.m _ml 61 16WS -_ Singdm0e U 1919.hibOi Imi um. Pse i eueI@eelm

6/ Ta~sIei wS.ieIaI h emstdune.atW meni 1m ii algeu

obehpwth aeh i PiUM We6.. la6.~~

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IO1 IMd A u4l S b

Appraleal Estimate 1.5 25.5 45.5 W. 1 11 =t1 Touta plborent - - - 8.2 s..7 2;4 Sg.s u.8 U..

Actual as, U of Approlai -l.Elme - - - 6.4 2.4 49.9 1. 6.6 61.6

Althogh the fuo_l loa1 CloeIu Cate woo eostAd up to Ocee.mbr aI, 16,w re grse ported ofdiabraesmt wes extedd to Nowvmer, 16, In order to take care or iewre.mstosuitr_ad up tothe closrig date.

2/ The Io * .ount mm Iintlally reducedf fmUm liiefltn oS4UllllOtM6 latertoSW?millo1n. Theremaining auoust of U8.2 eillon after the ast dileemat In oWber, 1967, mm cane led.

(Safwase)

VE M so PR TOW _Preappralml 26.0 - - - - - - 2_.6

Appreleal 29.8 51.4 _ _ _ .7Negtialeon - 14.8 - - - - - - - - 14.8Supervislon - 8.6 10.5 19.4 14.2 16.2 9.9 8.4 7.1 10.5 94.6Other .5 2.8 .0 .6 - .1 .1 - - - 8.1

TOTAL $7.6 n.6 19.5 16.4 14.2 16.8 1J.0 . .4 7.1 19.5 23.9

-~~~~~~~ vt

EVALUATIOW SUMARY

so project hd basically two objectives 1) t f portefdaciy by Inc"s" the throughput capacity of the ezistin facilitisIn the MOntVIdeo Port sd iI) aionaliztion of Ails tariff *tctue toeducs the cost to the users whle.introducing cost-based tariffs to ensureA' profitabiliand the chi t of targted wo*lng ratios.

fTe mjor componets of the project were directed at theachievetnt of the aboe two objectives ad camprised (i) the acquisitionof equlpmnt nd marine crft partly to replace old equipmt and partly tostreWl1160 ad modernize port operations, (ii) studies and technicalassistance to Implement the project, prepare a Mater Pla and iprove thesyst_e of AMP, and, finaly (ILL) to reduce AMP's staff and to impro its

on tation. Exerience

Th objectives of the project which tooc lonr than anticipatedto uplumt (6 years Instead of 3) were partially naievd. TS is notto say, thatuwht vas do was not substanttl, although, clearly muchrmidsd to be don In se*ra project ares. fTe equipNOnt purcases weremad on the lins proposed gt apraial although the nowbers pOrcasd weresmallr tha anticipated (para. 3.03).. The triing of equuMnt purchsesc_ about as a reudt of rwie by the supevisio missios ad studlesroposed In tbh project. Sho Tecbnical Assistaea studes for

systematizing cost-accounting operatios were well ezcuted but latet andcost accouting Was institu ted after the project vas closed with t' resultthat res ructuring of tariffs had to be postponed until a follow-up Bankproject. The Master Plan Study, done In considerable depth, focussed on thepriorities for the futur developant of Mntoevideo Port. although the louaclosin date had to be postponed for a third yer, to Decembr 1966, mstlyto *ccomozdt the completion of the Maotor Plan. Planning and Projectamplemntati1 Units vere set up In Ai? for anlysis of future plans and

for implmenting investm_nt projects (para. 5.07) bowever, these unitshav not yet becom fully operational as reponsiblities for projectimplementatio were dispersed *mug AP' s mnrs, without the plani1ngstaff being fully in the pleture. t should be noted, however, thatsubstantl ad timely reuotioss were made Ln the staff of AMP (para.6.05).Restlts and Sustainability

A start ws made with the partial restreturing of tariffs at thebeginning of the project but the institution of a cost-related tariffsystem dd not matera lize in the following years. ThSb coupled withdtclining trsffic (para. 4.01) eroded AMPs financial capacity, tur=nig netprofits into net 10sses. As a result, the fiancia1 targets which dependedupon steadly inCrasing traffic ad the timly and adequate rwision of

- vi -

tariffs, Vero achieved only durtng the first few years nd the finantialindiectors gradually deteriorated towrcd the end of the project. As arosult, the project's suatainability must be judged doubtful. However,with the completion of the costing studies the basis exists for revisingthe tariff. The work of rovising the tariff structure ha started and thoimprovement of ANP's financial position will be monitored under tho nawlank project (Transport Project I) approved by the Banks Board on February7, 1989.

The project resulted In Important replacements and renovation ofport Installations and equipment, in technical ssistance to develop aMAster Plan for tho port of Montevideo, and in the reorganisation of ANP'smanagement structure.

. 3

URUGUAY

MOWEVMIDNO PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1798-UR)

PROJECT COMPLETION BUR?

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General

101 Uruguay is a small fertile country with a population of less thanthree million. Bordered by Argentina on the west, Brazil on the north, andwith more than half of its national boundary lying along a navigablecoastline oan the south and the east, the country is well endowed for theexport-oriented development strategy which it has been pursuing for thelast several years. The country's commercial activity and population isconcentrated in and around the capital city of Montevideo and this isreflected in the transport system which comprises roads and a rail networkradiating out of the seaport of Montevideo (Map IBRD 1436 7R). This portstrategically located at the mouth of the La Plata River, is the country'sfocal point for foreign trade, and also serves inland and coastalnavigation.

1-02 Most of the existing transport system of Uruguay is antiquated andinadequate for its future needs. To define key development issues in thesector, a comprehensive survey of the national transport system was.undertaken with UNDP assistance in 1976-1979. This survey established ageneral framework for transport investment, and identified four high-priority areass (a) strengthening of national planning; (b) improvements inroad rehabilitation and reconstruction; Cc) reductions in railroadoperations; and (d) port modernization.

B. Ports and Maritime Transport

1.03 Uruguay's foreign trade depends largely on maritime transport,most of which is served through the port of Montevideo. This port has asheltered bay which was made accessible to the largest vessels andtherefore the country's inland transportation system grew around it, as didthe metropolitan city of Montevideo. Major investments in portinstallations were made in the years 1905 to 1931. Thus, when thetransport sector survey was done in the seventies, the port was consideredready for capacity adjustments and modernization to suit the changing needsof the country.

1.04 There are four secondary ports in Uruguay located along the LaPlata and Uruguay rivers, where draft limitations range from 4.5 m to 9.0m. These are Colonia, Nueva Palmira, Fray Bentos and Paysandu. Trafficthrough these ports consists mainly of cereals and construction materialswhich are exported to Argentina and Brazil. The merchant fleet of Uruguayconsists of about 30 vessels with a gross tonlage of about 280,000 tons.Uruguay's foreign trade is handled predominantly by foreign flag lineservices which call at Montevideo on their way to and from Buenos Aires.

-2-

Historically, Uruguay has always had the potential for being a majorgateway for foreign trade for the adjacent countries (Paraguay, northernArgentina, Bolivia, southern Brazil).

C. Montevideo Port

1.05 The port of Montevideo is the deepest sheltered harbour In theestuary of the La Plata River, and the terminal facilities adjacent to thedowntown waterfront are well protected from the open sea to the south.Navigational access to the port from the natural 10 m depth contour in theAtlantic South of the port entrance is via a 200 a wide straight channelabout 9 km in length. This channel originally dredged to a nominal depthof 10 m leads to the port entrance in the main breakwater and into theouter harbour where a large anchorage area is available. Within the innerharbour, basins for ocean vessels were dredged to a nominal depth of 10 mand for coastal and river traffic to 5 m.

1.06 Wharf construction at the ocean vessel berths consists of concretecaissons with the spaces between the caissons spanned by concrete decks atthe high water line. Railroad tracks, crane rails and wharf apron pavingrest on a 2 m fill above the decks and the wharf face consists of a stonemasonry wall. There are 11 transit sheds and the total area of coveredstorage is about 70,000 m2. Lifting equipment in the port consisted of.before this project. 49 gantry cranes, a derrick of 200 ton capacity, afloating crane of 60 ton capacity and about 50 mobile cranes almost allpurchased in the 1910s or 1930s. Floating craft operating in the portincluded four dredges, 16 tugs and various miscellaneous barges and smallcraft obsolete in design and uneconomical to operate.

1.07 General cargo in the port was handled predom-nantly by break-bulkmethods using dock cranes, and increasingly ships' gear in combination withdock cranes. Very little of the cargo in the sheds was palletized. At thetime of identification of this project, about 10 million m3 of deferredmaintenance dredging was needed in the port of Montevideo to bring theaccess channel and the harbour basin for ocean vessels to their originaldesign depth of 10 m.

D. Institutional Fremework and ANP Organization

1.08 A multitude of agencies are involved in port administration,operation and marketing. includings MTOP through DUN and DUT; ANP; theMinistry of Labour and Social Security, throigh the National AdmiDnistrationfor Stevedore Services (ANSE); the Ministry of Economy and Finance, throughthe customs, foreign trade regulations and naval industries; the Ministryof Defense and the Navy, through the National Coast Guard (PNN), and theMinistry of Agriculture, through the National Institute of Fishing (INAPE).Although, in general a case exists for the participation of all theseagencies in the port subsector, the areas of authority for each need to beclearly defined. ANP which is an autonomous state enterprise responsiblefor the administration of the ports, has an obsolete organizationalstructure, is overstaffed, and is not particularly well-geared to acommercially oriented operation. Moreover, although nominally autonomous,ANP's decision-making has been undermined by intervention in its day to dayoperation by its Board of Directors. ANP also suffers from weak in-housecapacity for investment planning and pluriannual budgeting, and itsfinancial planning and its accounting systems have been in need of

-3-

upgrading. This work was initiated In the Montevideo Port Project and isto be followed up in a more substantalo way In the Transport Sector Projectnow und.ay.

S. PROJECT PREPARATION. APPRAISAL AD NEGOSIATIONS

2.01 A Rot mislon sent In 1977 Identified the need for a lank-financed ptujact but found the Administracin Nac lonal de Puerto* (AMP) notparticularly Interested In or perceptive of the need for external help. Aletter was therefore sent from the Bank to the Minister for Transport(October 1977) expressing Bank interest in a port project almed atmodernising the port operations and studies to improve the organization,management and analysis of iuvestments, and asking for official indicationof interest by the Government of Uruguay. The Government of Uruguayexpressed interest in such a project and the Bank felt encouraged to mounta full transport Lsesion in October-November of that year with a portengineer to assess the needs of the port. In March 1978 the Minister forEconomy and Finance confirmed the Government of Uruguay's request for alank-financed project indicating, however, that this was subject to thecondition that no technical assistance would be Imposed by the World Bank.This reluctance arose from ANP's unsuccessful experiences with otherlenders in this regard.

2.02 A port preparation mlssion was sent to Uruguay in April 1978.Upon return of this mission the first Project Brief was prepared for theMontevideo Port Project delineating US$74 million as the estimated cost ofthe project. The mission noted that the port had ample capacity and thatits financial condition was good, but highlighted the following areas ofconcerns

(a) improvement of port efficiency;

(b) Improvement of cargo-handling facilities; and

(c) rationalization of the tariff structure to reduce costs to theport users.

2.03 The next preparation mission from the bank in September 1978concluded that ANP did not have enough technical staff to prepare theproject by the proposed appraisal date in November-December 1978 and thattecbnical assistauce was required over a period of several months toprepare the project. It was proposed that UNDP could provide 50 of thecost of this study which was expected to cost US$150,000 and that the other50 would be provided by the Government of Uruguay. The Bank mould act asthe Executing Agency for the UNDP. There were three more preparationmissions during which AN?P's opposition to and the Bank's insistence ontechnical assistance appeared to run as a continuous thread. In thesemissions the terms of reference for technical assistance were hanmmered outand the consultants put to work on the preparation of the project, with asubstantial amount of help from Bank missions.

2.04 Appraisal of the Montevideo Port Project was done during theperiod May 15 to June 1. 1979. The Issues Paper described a projectcomprising principally of equipment purchases (bridge cranes and cargohantdling equipment), marine craft (tugs and dredgers), and technical

-4-

assistance for ANP to help in project Implementation. The main issueshighlighted weres (i) the form and content of the technical assistance;(ii) the reform of the tariff structures (ii) the timing for thecompletion of engineering for the civil works; (iv) the extent of dredgeracquisition, and finally; (v) the scope and content of ANP's five yeardevelopment program.

2.05 The Decision Neeting, held on June 26, 1979, largely accepted theoverall approach of the appraisal mission to the project and its mainrecommendations. In regard to the technical assistance it was agreed thatsuch assistance as required would be provided for the Planning andInvestment Departments, the Finance and Accounting Department and forspecialized personnel to handle the necessary engineering and procurementfor the project. In deference to ANP's hostility to the concept oftechnical assistance it qas agreed that such help would be provided througha few contracts with specialized firms and that some of the individualadvisers vould work within the ANP organization. In regard to tariffs, itwas felt at that time that ANP had sufficient cost information toprogressively introduce cost-based tariffs, and to set financial workingratio targets at levels permitting sufficient profits for ANP to finance areasonable share of investments. Under this arrangement. the abolition of"ad-valorem" tariffs and 'exemptions' would be enforced.

2.06 The recommendation of the Issues Paper that substantial completionof detailed engineering would not be required before Board presentation wasapproved, on the basis that civil works represented only about 102 ofproject costs, and the resultant uncertainty in costs, however minor, wouldbe covered in the sensitivity analysis, and by providing larger physicalcontingencies. The overall scope and content of the investment programwere considered appropriate including the acquisition of a dredger and twotugs, and a US$30 million loan to cover financing of the full foreignexchange component of the project cost was endorsed.

2.07 Loan negotiations were held between November 5 and 16, 1979.During negotiations, agreement was reached with the Government on thefollowing:

(a) allowing selective salary increases for ANP;

(b) allowing ANP to continue staff reductions;

(c) allowing ANP to adjust tariffs as required to meet its finncialobjectives, and to discontinue the practice of allowing'exemptionse from port tariffs; and

(d) authorizing ANP to carry out all procurement related to theproject.

Furthermore, agreement was reached with ANP, inter alia, on the followings

(i) scope and content of the 1978-1982 Development Program;

(ii) technical studies for costing, the raising of tariffs to cover atleast marginal costs, and for periodic adjustment of tariffs tomeet financial targets;

(1U) timing of the retirement of old dredgers amewd by AMPt

(Iv) timing and nature of organizational cbanga a*nd goals for staffreductions;

Cv) method and procedurea satisfactory to the Bank for engineeringpreparation and supervision of construction and equipmentmanufacture and for long-terz port planning8

(vi) preparation of a detailed analysis of container and bulk cargooperations wlthin the new terninal complex at Muelle de Escala;ad

(vii) development of the tug replacement program.

2.06 As conditions of effectiveness it was agreed that AMP oulddiscontinue the practice of *exemptions", implement the new port tariffsystem and that the Government vould issue a decree granting approval ofall procurement related to the project. A loan of US$50 million equivalentbased on the revised cost estimates for the project was recommended to theBoard to cover 983 of the foreign exchange costs of the project detailedbelowt

Por ,iExmobeh Bak

US$WiI I" Comot Paetlelp.tlooeej Foreutm Totel X UN. X

Prolset C enet

1. Contair and Bulk Car.. TestniL

(a) lrd. Cranes A Acesesoris 0.31 6.5 6.9 es .3 U(b) lard HWallg tqu7ipmwt - 0.9 0.9 100 0.9 92Ce) Altertios to WWII-i de Komi* 1. I7 4.1 40 17_ 40

Subto tl: 2.6 9.2 12.0 7i *.9

2. Geerl Ca. 1andltIn E=umt

(a) Mobile Land-Iael 6Ipq_ut 0.1 3.5 5.5 9U 3.4 9(b) Pavement an Se Altertisne 0*.7 0.4 J4 40 0.4 40

Subtotal: 0.0 8.9 4.7 e1 t.8

S. arboer Tugs 0.3 6.6 6.9 I 6.5 92

4. DreWlans I1iemnt 1.3 24.0 25.3 95 28.3 U

5. Tecleical Asistanc to AW 0.5 2A 2.5 090 .80

Bas Cost 5.7 46.7 51.4 44.5

Contaml_eh

(a) Pbysteal 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3(b) Price LI jj 0.0 U

Subtotal: 1.J 5. 6.5 5.5

TOTAL: 7.0 1.2 $8.2 s 50.0 so

.6-

2.09 Board approval of the loan of US$50 million was given on January22, 1980. and the loan agreement was signed on March 6, 1980. The loanbecm effective an February 26, 1981, with a closing date of Decembr 31.1983 which was eventually etended to Deceber 31, 1986.

Il. PROJECT ILEMENTATION AND COSTS

5.01 Implementation of the project had a slao start, and supervisionmissions In 1980. 1981 and 1982 noted that in addition to the delays insigning of the Loan Agreement, nd the loan becoming effective, themobilixtimo of consultants, Fir pactions and disbursements werebadly delayed. Up to the end of September 1982, almost 19 months afterloan effectiveness, there had been no disbursements. By the end of 1983only US$3.2 mlllion were disbursed and thereafter US$16.9 million in 1984,US$9.9 million in 1985 and US$1.5 mLIlion in 1986. After closure of theloan in December 1986 the Bank agreed to continue disbursements for thoseitems already contracted and the last payments were made in November 1987when the balance US$3.18 million of the reduced amount of the loan ofUS$37.0 million was cancelled. A comparison of the actual disbursementswith the disbursement schedule agreed at appraisal is given in Table 1.Although the rate of disbursements bears no comparison with the appraisalforecasts, it approximates more closely to the standard profile forUruguay, which suggests that the pr6ject timimg was over-optimistic,particularly taking Into consideration the fact that this was ANP's firstproject with the Bank. Also. the reduction of the loan amount from US$50million to US$40 million and eventually to US$33.8 million indicates thatthe project was somewhat over-dlmensioned at appraisal and needed to besubstantially pruned during the course of implementation.

3.02 As evident from the details of the project given in para. 2.08above, the project, as appraised, was largely equipment oriented, with themajor portion of the loan US$40.1 million out of US$50 million designatedfor the acquisition of cargo and terminal handling equipment (257) andmarine craft comprising tugs and dredging equipment (75Z). *A asount-ofapproximately US$2.0 million was set aside for civil works, US$2.0 millionfor consulting services and technical assistance, and US$5.9 million tocover physical and price contingencies. As the implementation of theproject proiressed and the needs of ANP were more precisely defined theloan amount was first reduced to US$40.0 million, then US$37.0 million andfinally when it was closed, to US$33.8 million.

3.03 The reduction in the loan amount corresponded approximately toreductions in the project costs from the original total of US$58.18 millionto US$35.8 million and the foreign exchange element from the originalUS$51.17 million to US$33.8 million. The comparison of what the Bank loanwas expected to finsace at Appraisal time to what it actually financed isgiven in Table 2, and is suumarized below:

Appraisal ActualCategory 1 - Civil works 2.000,000 451.112,17Category 2 - Equipments 40,100,000 31.322.526.84Category 3 - Technical

Assistance 2,000,000 2,040,963.20Category 4 - Unallocated 5.900.000 _

TOTAL 50,000,000 33,814,602.21

3.04 Chmages In civil works arose mainly out of reduction in the scopeof the works connected vith the Muelle de hcala, to bring it In line withthe reduced purchases of bridge cranes (two to one) and some reductions Intbo structural alterations to the sheds and the paving. Reductions in theequipment financing were caused firstly by the reduction in the number ofbridge cranes but more Importantly by the elimination of the 2400 BP tugand the grab-bucket dredger and the accompanying tug. The purchase of the4000 BP tug and the 3000 m3 capacity dredger was done as originally plannedand most of the cargo handling equipment tractors, fork-lift trucks, etc.were purchased, with some alterations, more or less as originally planned.

3.05 Technical Assistance was procured as forseen at appraisal, andproved to be indeed an important and effective part of the project. Thestudies to be conducted were generally well conceived. The terms ofreference were defined in full consultation with the Bank, and theexecution of the studies was carefully monitored, both by the Bank and bythe Borrower whose representatives participated in the work done by theconsultants. Consequently, the training aspect of the studies wassignificant, as also their contribution to the refinement of the projectand the planning for the future. Only the restructuring of ANP's tariffsbased on the new costing system failed to be implemented under the projectand was postponed until a new follow-up Bank project (Transport Project I).Broadly speaking, the consultants' work can be divided into two categories:

(a) Work related to the definition and implementation of the project;and

(b) Studies for the improvement of systems in the ANP, and the futuredevelopment of the port.

3.06 Under the first category fall the consultants' study for theimprovement of the container and bulk handling terminal and the study forthe definition of the marine equipment required. The former helped reducesubstantially the cost of the works in the Muelle de Escala and theseparation of the container and bulk-handling terminals whereas the latterled to a significant pruning of the requirements of tugs and dredgers.Prominent in the second category were the three studies for the improvementof the Accounting, Budgeting and Financial systems, the work for the studyof the subsoil in the Montevideo Port area and above all the Master PlanStudy for development of the Montevideo Port. The consultants' work forthe financial and Accounting Systems was excellently done and has formed asound basis for providing reliable cost data for restructuring andreorganizing the tariff system, a task to be carried out under theTransport Project I. The sub-soil and Master Plan studies have providedimportant directions for the dredging and future development works ixi theMbotevideo port area. an initial phase of which is also covered under theTransport Project I. These studies also focus on the priorities in thelong term plans for the improvement of port operations.

3.07 Performance in the developmeat of the Planning Office of ANP assuch was indifferent and not everything that was to be done by way ofrecruitment of the qualified staff required was done, although the processof implementing this project and the consultants' help in the refinement ofproject needs did lead to the formation of a project implementation unit.

-8.-

This unit coordinated project implementation, and despite the delays thatoccured (paras. 3 08 to 3 10 below) kept track of the work done and thetasks that rem mined undone or inadequately completed. Some of thisremining work is being taken up under the Transport I project.

Project Costs and TSilna

3.08 Analysis of project costs was made more difficult not only by therelatively high inflation rates but also because the parity between thedollar and the Uruguayan peso was rather unevenly maintained during theproject years. A comparison between Appraisal estimates and actual costsis given in Table 3 and the actual completion dates for each project itemin relation to the Appraisal forecast dates is given in Table 4. Ananalysis of Tables 3 and 4 illustrates that the main features of theproject implementation were as follows:

(a) the project was actually completed in 1986 instead of 1983;

(b) project implementation delays occurred mainly due to delays inmobilization of consultants and procurement delays arising fromsystem delays (para. 3.08 to 3.10 below);

(c) the actual cost of the Project at US$35.8 million wassubstantially (38Z) lower than the Appraisal estimate of US$58.2million. This occurred primarily due to refinements in theproject as a result of post-appraisal studies;

Cd) Major reductions occurred in the procurement of port equipmentand marine craft which at about US$31.7 million was about 35Slower than the original estimate of about $48.8 million;

(e) The reductions in civil works although important in terms ofpercentage (78Z), involved a smaller amount (US$5.3 million) asthe original estimate at US$6.8 million was relatively small; and

(f) the technical assistance and consultancy tasks were adequatelyaddressed. somewhat over (2?) the original cost estimates.

Procurement

3.09 This is a project in which problems related to procurement wereperhaps the predominant cause of delay. To begin with, it is apparent,with the benefit of hind-sight, that the project as originally conceived,was overdimensioned, as attested by the significant reductions in theequipment and marine craft purchases, leading eventually to a sizeablereduction of ths loan amount, by over 302. The forecast of dredging workrequired was excessive, which resulted in an overestimation of the dredgerrequirements. Only one of the two dredgers proposed was purchased, andeven this, after the arrears of dredging work were taken care of, isreported to have surplus capacity. Similarly, only one of the two tugsproposed at appraisal was procured. The consultants' work in refining therequirements of marine craft and the bank supervision missions' oncern forthe avoidance of unnecessary investments were undoubtedly responsible forthe reductions, but there was, inevitably, a cost in terms of time for therather s'.gnificant pruning operation.

9-_

3.10 Secondly, a whole series of delays in procurement occured due towhat can best be described as system delays, which were exacerbated, atleast in part, due to ANP's lack of familiarity with International biddingprocedures. In the procurement of the container crane for instance theBank did tot agree with ANP's award recommendtion, which resulted Inprotracted correspondence between the borrower and the Bank. Eventually,the Bank's view prevailed, but much time and effort was lost in arriving atthe appropriate decision for the bid-award. Then there was the problemcaused by the practice of simpugnaciones' by which contending bidders canbring forth claims of unfairness against the purchaser. More often thannot these protests delay and paralyse procurement proceedings till suchtime as the claims have been cleared by the highest levels of theGoverument's 'Tribunal de Cuentasc. This is really a delay for which thesystem is responsible, and one which is often exploited by unsuccessfulbidders to the detriment of project timing. Aother problem that ariseswith 'impuguacioanes is the right the system confers on the bidders toexamine the bid evaluations, a practice that in a sense runs contrary tothe confidentiality of the bid evaluation process under ICB procedures. 1Be that as it may, 'impugnaciones' contributed substantially to the projectimplementation delays in the Montevideo Port Project.

3.11 Finally, the project had its share of delays for which only theborrower can be held accountable. These included more than one tender forwhich ANP recommended the tender 'Concursos' to be Oanulled%, sometimes fordubious reasons, when it was perceived by ANP (not always correctly) thatthe bids did not suit the requirements of ANP. In the case of the rathersubstantial study for the Master Plan, for instance, the Bank did not seeeye to eye with ANP an the vecommendation for award, as the various offerswere not correctly evaluated. However AMP was reluctant to agree withthis, and a protracted controversy ensued. Finally, when the Bank'sposition was accepted, ANP recommended the postponemeat of the studywhereby a few months later fresh bids were called and the contract awardedto a party better suited to the important task. On the positive side, ithas to be said that this was the Bank's first operation with ANP, andalthough serious delays occurred in project implementation, the give andtake of the procurement process definitely helped ANP to understand ICBprocedures better.

Proiect Financing

3.12 Table 7 sets out the actual financing of the project by source.No major difficulties were encountered in the financing of project costs,specially since 942 of the actual funds required were provided by the Bankloan.

11 This is a matter that will sooner or later have to be addressed by theBank in relation to the implementation of ICB procedures, because ICBrules discourage the type of practices implied in 'impupiaciones' whichare now well known to cause serious delays in procurement actions incountries like Argentina and Uruguay.

_ 10 .

IV. RAFC AND OPRATIONS

4.01 Over 901 of Uruguay's foreign trade is maritime, and about 702 ofthis trade is handled through Montevideo port. At appraisal, port trafficvas expected to grw from 1.5 million tons in 1978 to 2.7 million tons in1990. However, the actual Increases fell far short of the projectodincreasoe. Table 5 gives a comparison of the actual traffic over theproject years with tbh traffic forecast at appraisal. This comparison issumarized below:

Traffic In tons (thousands)Appraisal stimate Actua121

1978 1540 1 15401979 1543 11 16051980 1614 11 13261981 1691 15061982 1801 9711983 1920 10961984 2028 10831985 2122 11511986 2233 12101987 2349 13111988 2470 1575

11 These figures are taken from the "Best Estimate' in tables 2.3 and 2.4of the Appraisal Report.

21 Actual figures have been obtained from ANP.

4.02 The figures of the actual traffic above indicate fluctuationsvithin a range defined by a high around 1,500,000 tons in 1978, 1981 and1988, and a depressing low of 971,000 tons In 1982 almost at about 54S ofthe estimated traffic for the year. Various reasons have been given forthe poor traffic performance and certainly the severe recession in thecountry and particularly the world depression In and around the year 1982played their role. As a result the projected increases in the export ofrice, meat and general cargo did not materialize, neither did the importsof wheat, primary materials, fuels and lubricants grow as forecast. Thisleads one t- the rather obvious conclusion that traffic forecast for theproject period were over - optimistic. Over the past five years however,traffic has been increasing slowly and steadily, and in particular in 1988there has beem a substantial increase in keeping with the upswing ineconomic activity in Uruguay.

4.03 The equipment purchases, primarily the acquisition of thecontainer crane did encourage the growth of container traffic, which haveexceeded appraisal expectations (see table 6) The works in the Huelle deEscala, the acquisition of port handling equipment and the introduction ofpallets and fork lift trucks, mobile cranes, a tug and dredger did help tostreamline port operations and arrears of dredging work in the port werecleared. However, the decline of traffic limited the improvement ofoperations as, to some extent, the improvement of operations is contingent,ter ala, upon a healthy growth of traffic which in this case was not

realised. It is not surprising therefore that the follow-up transportsector project picked up the productivity of Montevideo port as an area inwhich improvement could be brought about not only in cargo handling andgang productivity, but also in the waiting time of ships alongside berths

a 11 -

In Montevideo port. To somo extent low productivity In Montevideo port isthe result of 'iadequate coordinAtion between stevedoring and on-shorecargo handling on the ane hand, and lack of incentives for Improvingworkers efficiency and skills on the other. This and other related issuesincluding equlpment maintenance have been analysed as part of the portcomponent of the Transport Project I and various steps have been outlinedto bring about improvements in the operations of Montevideo port.

V. FINANCIAL PRFOIMANCE

Financial Results

5.01 Although ANP had remained a highly profitable institution duringthe second-half of the 1970's, it was experiencing a gradual decline inoperating revenues because of increasing esemptions being granted by theGovernment. In order to prevent a further deterioration in the entity'sfinancial capacity, the Bank and the Government agreed that the followingactions would be undertaken during project processing and implementation:(i) AMP would revise its tariff structure based on the cost of servicesrendered in order to reduce cost to users while ensuring cost recovery (afull discussion is provided in paras. 5.05 through 5.08 below); and (ii)ANP would achieve a 26? staff reduction in 4 years (by end 1083).

5.02 A comparison of ANP's actual and forecast financial results(Income Statements and Balance Sheets) in current USS terms is presented inTables 8 and 9. Although actual figures generally reflect the evolution ofAMP's finances, the comparison of actual with forecast data is complicatedby the currency in which projections were originally made. At appraisal,projections were denominated in current US$ terms in order to avoiddistortions arising from local inflation. Difficulties arise, however. inexpressing actual data in USS terms because of the wide fluctuationsexperienced by the real exchange rate as a consequence of the exchange ratepolicy followed by the Government during the project period. Therefore,for purposes of evaluation. ANP's financial statements in constant 1988Uruguayan pesos covering 1982-1986, have also been attached to this reportas Tables 10 and 11.

5.03 Contrary to appraisal expectations, ANP's financial resultsdeteriorated sharply during the project period, the main reasons beings: (i)declining traffic, particularly the high revenue-earning mport traffic(paras 4.01 and 4.02); (ii) failure to institute a systematic tariffadjusting system to ensure cost recovery of port operations; and (iii) highinterest costs arising from the entity's increasing indebtedness (para5.04). As a consequence, ANP's working and operating ratios deterioratedfrom 72 and 89 in 1982 to 93 and 109 respectively in 1986. Furthermore, byend-1984 ANP was already experiencing net losses. It is noteworthy that byend-1982, ANP had reduced its staff levels beyond appraisal targets. Thecorresponding cost reductions, however, were insufficient to make up forthe reduction in revenues.

5.04 Because of its satisfactory financial performance during the1970s, ANP had accumulated a cash surplus of about US$50 million by the

- 12-

early 1980C. oeve"r, since tho Covemnt s ea perincing seriouscooMIc ad fiancial difficUlties at the time, It instrueted ANP, In

1983, to transfer US$22 Million of its surplus to the Treasury. Inaddition, AMP vas required to finance 0S of the construction of thecontainer terminal and tes fishin berths, ounting to US$10 million,which the Goverinnt had intially agreed to finance but failed to do.These two important cash outflows, coupled with the deterioration in AMP sfinancial results aggravated APM's cash position substantially, and from1984 onwards, total AMP revenues were insufficient to cover cash deficits.Consequently, AMP had to resort to short end long-term loans to cover itsfinancing gap.

Port Tariffs

5.05 At the tim of appraisal, ANP's tariff system suffered from anumber of dlsparities import end esport cargo tariffs were quoted on anad-valorem basis, bearing no relationhip to costs; Import charges weresubstantially higher than those applied to exportas at lmporters' requestan increasing portion of traffic handled was being exempted from portcharges by the Government, with total exemptions reaching an amountequivalent to 232 of total revenues in 1978s and, ship charges weresubstantially underpriced In order to encourage vessels to and from BuenosAires to call at Montevideo port.

5.06 In order to reduce these distortions, the Government issued adecree in 1979 requiring the institution of cost-based tariffs by AMP.Further, and backing the Government's initiative, the Bank established thatsuch a tariff system rs well as the discontinuance of exemptions would beconditions of loan effectiveness. However, ANP's reluctance to completelyeliminate ad-valorem charges until reliable cost data was available led toconsiderable delays in loan effectiveness. Finally, in early 1981. inorder not to delay further project execution, the Bank agreed to waive thiscondition for effectiveness on the understanding that the tariff revisionswould be carried out in two stages: (i) AMP would imediately reduce ad-valorem charges on imports, Increase charges on exports and on vessels, andeliminate exemptions; and (ii) one year later (early 1982), ANP wouldestablish a new cost-based tariff system, satisfactory to the Governmentand the Bank, once cost accounting systems had been adequately developed bythe consultants.

5.07 However, ANP's general reluctance to employ management consultantsi- view of bad past experiences, led to considerable delays in thedevelopment of the new costing system, and it was not until September,1984, that a contract was signed with the consultants. Although thestudies were agreed to be carried out within an 18-month period, the newcosting system became fully implemented only by end-1988, more than fouryears after contract signing. Further, the revision of tariffs based onthe new costing system did not materialize under the project, but an actionplan for the establishment of such tariffs was included under the new Bankproject (Transport Project I) approved by the Bank's board of ExecutiveDirectors on February 7, 1989.

S.08 Although the task of rationalizing tariffs was only partiallyaccomplished, the project proved successful in that the new costing systemlaid a sound basis upon which a systematic tariff adjustment mechanism isplanned to be developed under the new project. It is also noteworthy thatthrough this exercise ANP regained confidence in the use of management

_ 13 -

consultants whsnever in-house expertise is not available. However, had theBank and the Government exercised more presure upon ANP, cost-relatedtariffs could perhaps have been introduced years earlier preventing, to anImportant extent, the deterioration of ANP's finances (para 5.03).

VI. INSTITUUAONL PRFOEUWCEAND DEVELOPFENT

6.01 AMP was created by Law In 1916, and charged vith theresponsibility for all aspects of comercial port operations in Uruguay.The institution was governed by a three member Board of Directors named bythe Goverrment which designated two of its members as the President and theVice President. The President has the responsibility for the policydirection and the decision making with some of the less important dutiesassigned to the Vice President. At present. the Board consists of fivemembers, three of hom ar* appointed by their political parties. The basicstructure of the organization had changed little since its inception andthe day-to-day affairs of the port were managed by four key managers incharge of Finance, Administration, Technical affairs and Port Operations.Another significant factor at the time of appraisal was that the Presidentand the Vice President of ANP were retired officers from the armed servicesand were appointed by the military Government. There bad therefore beensome improvement in the discipline in port administration but the militaryauthorities tended to be rigid in management style and often resistant tothe delegation of authority and to changes in systems. Port operationswere 'Intervened' by the military which dislocated the normal channel ofcommand and introduced an element of unpredictability in importantdecisions.

6.02 The appraisal mission, considering the rather obsolete structureof the management organization generally not well-suited to a commercialoperation and the overstaffing in rank and file, recommended and theUruguayan authorities agreed upon the following changes as part of theBank-financed project for ANP:

(i) appointment of a General Manager to be responsible for the dayto day management of ANP, leaving the President and VicePresident to devote more time to policy-related issues;

(ii) creation of a Planning Unit responsible for the planning of thePort and the related institutional and financial matters;

(iii) creation of a Project Implementation Unit for the supervisionand control of ANP's investment projects; and .

(iv) a general streamlining of the institution by the achievement ofagreed targets for staff reductions, and selective salaryincreases.

6.03 The staff reduction targets were successfully met and althoughsome increases In staff took place after the initial reductions, theoverall staff of ANP was reduced from 6300 to the targeted 4500. Further

_ 14 -

reductions of staff are possible and this question is being addressed inthe foUow up Trasport Project 1. Considerable tim and effort was *lsospent upon wock for the selective Increases of salaries, whereby salarylevlel related to certain key posts were raised to attract and retain movecompetent staff. A project l emlentation unit was set up although withsome delay. The Planning Ut vas established as proposed vithin theorganizational structure of ANP, but vithout the full complement of staffforeen. Iowsver thit unit did participate with the Consultants in theMaster Plan study. Further work on the consolidation of the plrnning unithowevr. goes on under the follaw-up Transport Project I.

6 04 Notwithstanding the fact that the accomplishment in the area ofInstitutional development was s*omhat short of the project expectations,an important begining was made. and the groundwork laid for thetransformation of ANP into a leaner, stronger organization.

VII. ECONOMC R-EVALUATION

7 01 The general methodology for the economic re-evaluation and thespecific methodologies for the sub-projects are basically the same as theones used at appraisal. There are three groups of investment which werefinanced under the Loans li) container and general cargo handlingequipmnt, together with some associated infrastructure; (ii) tugs; and(iii) dredging equipment. Although the composition of these sub-groupschanged during implementation from that which formed the basis of theeconomic evaluation at appraisal, and the overall investment costs werereduced, the broad groupings and their intrinsic economic rationale werenot substantially altered. The underlying sources of economic benefits,and the way in which the values were implicitly altered during the courseof implementation of the project, are detailed for each of the three groups.In the following paragraphs.

7.02 Container and General CarRo Eauipment

The SAR forecast an increase in total traffic from 1.5 milliontons (1978) to 2.3 million tons (1987) and 2.7 million tons (1990). Infact traffic declined, then recovered, and in 1987 totalled 1.3 milliontons. Of this, 124,000 tons were containerized (about 9.5Z) the sameproportion as was forecast. The average tonnage per ship was less thanepected, at 730 tons against 1,065 tons. This has Implications, fordredging, but probably was not a significant factor in regard to shiphandling operations. In reassessing the benefits, the assumption istherefore made that the ship service and cargo handling tin/inputsrequired in the absence of the project would have been proportional to thetraffic volumes i.e. instead of increasing by 50Z in 1978-87 these wouldhave actually declined, or at best remained stable. This is important asthe projected benefits from avoidance of delays to ships constituted amajor part of total benefits from this set of ivestments and wereprojected to increase sharply with increased berth occupancy, in accordaneswith the Erlang queuing model employed. The revised assumption is madethat the berth occupancy expected In 1983, obtains, on average, over theproject forecast period. The investment costs of this component group havealso been reduced fron appraisal forecasts, due to substantial reduction ofthe civil works, a reduction from two to one bridge cranes, and a reduced

-15-

amount of cargo handlig equipment, the reducion being frao $13.9 Millionto $8.2 miion. The revised EU on this assumptio works out at about21?.

7.03 Tu

The projoct origially included two tugs, one of 2400 hp uad thethe other of 4,000 hp. Whereas the maller tug was neded for operationsin the sheltered harbour, the larger tug was designed for seagoingoperations ze1luding the important but not easily quantifiable benefits of(a) emergency service at the offshore tanker facilty at Ponta Jose Ignacioand (b) provision of capability for assisting vessels In distress outsidethe port of Montevideo. Is any event, only one tug, of 4,000 hp waspurchased, complete with the additional capablities for seagoingoperat4ons. The main non-environmental benefits were expected from reducedship delay time and reduced tug operating costs, resulting particularlyfrom retirement of an old tug with high maintenance costs. From theavailable data it is clear that their translation lAto benefits streamswould be affected by traffic failing to increase as forecast. Furthermore,although the number of tugs was reduced to one, the cost reduction at 128was less than proportional. By contrast, traffic levels reached only abouthalf the forecast levels over the project period. The original EUR wasexpected to be 14S for a 2,400 hp tug. If the actual cost and benefitreductions are assumed, the EM declines to 8-92. If, however, theunquantifiable benefits of the emergency and rescue capabilities of the4,000 hp tug are taken into consideration, the ERR could improve to perhaps13-142 . For working out the overall ERR on the project (table 12) an ERRof 92 has been taken for this subproject.

7.04 Dredgers

The proposed procurement of the two dredgers at almost 50 of thetotal cost of the project was a major component of the project. Therationale was (i) the need to retire the old dredgers and to eliminate abacklog of dredging which was estimated to have reached over 11 million m3

by early 1979: (ii) to remove the annual volume of siltation (over 3million =3); and (iii) to deepen the access channel (nearly 2 million mnplus annual siltation of 0.3 million mz). Apart from the fact that thedredging requirements were overestimated, it seems clear from the SAR datathat only on very conservative assumptions regarding productivity could thepurchase of two dredgers be justified. It is also equally clear that thesmaller dredger by itself vould not add sufficient capacity to eliminatethe backlog reasonably quickly. As a matter of fact review of dredgingrequirements by the supervision missions and the coasultants resulted inreduction of the purchase program. The procurement of the grab bucketdredger vas cancelled but the suction type dredger of 3,000 m3 capacity waspurchased together with three barges. The ER is, accordingly,recalculated on the bases thats Ci) the reduction in the dredging equipmentinvestment resulted from elimination of the smller dredger; (ii) thecapacity of the dredger procured, although well suited to the expeditionsclearance of arrears of dredging, was still somewhat in excess of theregular requiremeats of AhP and (iii) between the two sizes of dredgers,the capital cost would increase at 0.43 times the increase In capacity(capacity increases by 2,300 m3, price Increases by 1002); (iv) benefitsper m3 were as forecast. These considerations actually lead one to the

- 16 -

conclusion that the ideal investment in dredgers should perhaps ha". beenabout 501 of the projected cost instead of 66S as actually happened. Onthis basis the ERR for dredgers works out to 182.

7.05 The overall ERR on the project works out to 161 instead of 241forecast at appraisal. A statement of estimated and revised ERR for eachubproject and the overall ERR for the complete project is given in Table129

VIII. THE ROLE OF THE BUNR

8.01 It appears from this review, that although much remains to be donein the port subsector, the Bank's contribution in its first port project inUruguay was a positive one. The Bank's analysis of the port situation was auseful one that helped focus on the need for equipmttt renewal, system andorganizational improvements and the rationalization of the tariffstructure. The equipment acquisition program as originally appraised wasoverdimensioned, and with the benefit of hindsight the traffic forecastsappear to have been overoptimistic. However, the improvement of costingsystems, the staff reductions, the creation of the planning and projectimplementation units, the sub-soil and Master Plan studies, all done on theInstigation of the Bank, were positive aspects of the project which enabledANP to update its equipment and systems, provided ANP with improvedcapability for cost analysis, some semblance of corporate planning andbetter control ov#r investments in the future.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

9.01 The project was initially overdimensioned mainly because ofoveroptimistic demand forecasts. However it proved fairly successful bothin regard to its timing and its general design. Port installations andequipmen were getting old and obsolete and needed replacement. Theproject helped identify the replacements needed and, by building intechnical assistance to undertake a rigorous review of the investmentsrequired, achieved the task at 621 of the costs originally estimated,albeit with substantial delays. More importantly, ANP was persuaded of theneed for technical assistance which helped initiate improvement of AMP'ssystems and organization and helped formulate the Master Plan for thefuture development of ANP.

9.02 Project execution was substantially delayed mainly because of slowbureaucratic procedures which first caused a late start and subsequentlyled to inordinate delays in procurement actions and the engagement ofconsultants. The fact that the military governed the country for thegreater part of the project period also contributed to the slow progress inas much as there was a certain rigidity in the management style and anunwillingness to submit to the discipline imposed by the conditionality ofthe project. As a matter of fact serious action on the financial andtariff covenants did not start till the Government changed and thedemocratic regime came to power.

4~~~~~~~~~~~ PH

*W1 S..f£R l|

S.' S IIX ig

*X i fi ii| e!

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.&L 1Pa I of 2

Estlmted and Actual SLchedule of flsbur_nmt

I3 Flsecl Year Apra1al Actua Total ACtual as X ofad Qua rtr stiate Dlsbus r l Est t

IU Mar. 30, 1980 0.5IV Jun. 30, 1980 1.5

nT 1981

I Sept. 30, 1980 5.5II Dec. 31, 1980 13.5III N4r. 31, 1981 19.5IV Ju., 30, 1981 25.5

TY 1982

I Sept. 30, 1981 32.5IT Dec. 31, 1981 39.5III Mar. 31, 1982 43.5IV Jun. 30, 1982 45.5

pT 1983

I Sept. 30. 1982 48.0II Dec. 31, 1982 50.0 2.3 4.6III Mar. 30, 1983 2.3 4.6IV Jun. 30, 1983 3.2 6.4

PY 1984

I Sept. 30, 1983 3.2 6.4II Dec. 31, 1983 3.2 6.4III Mar. 31, 1984 8.4 1X.8IV Jun. 30, 1984 12.7 25.4

- 19 -

Pam 2 of I

RIMriscal YTear Appraisal Actual Total Actual as S ofand Qarter Istimate Disbursemt hAraisal Istimt

IT 19U5

I Spt. S0, 1964 16.0 32.0n Dec. 31, 1944 20.1 40.2Ut Mar. 31, 1965 22.1 44.2IV Ju. So, 1965 24.5 49.0

n 19W

I Sept. "0, I 25.7 51.4U Dec. s1i 1985 s0.0 80.0M Mar. 30. 1986 30.0 60.0

IV Jun. 30, 296 30.5 61.0

I 1987

I Sept. S0, 1986 31.0 62.0U Dec. s1. 1966 31.5 63.0II Iar. 31, 1967 32.0 64.0IV Jun. 30, 1987 32.5 45.0

if 196

I Sept. 30 1967 55.0 66.0Ul Dec. 31. 1907k' 55.8!1 67.6

±' Although the foom lon Closing Date was extended up to December 31,1986, the grce perlo of dsbt extended to November, 1986,In order to take cae of disbunem ts contracted up to the closingdate.

21 bs lo munt was Initially reduced frm $50 million to $40 millionand later to $37 million. te rema_ng amount of $3.2 million afterthe lst d s ovember, 1987, was cancelled.

-20- TABLZ

Iof

qj3X t x^ f

.... ^ . . . . * . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4stg3t ¢ X s " si v a~~~~~. . O . . .

I l!gaSi | lS Z | ifl~~~~~~~~a

it1s~~~~~~~~ iz3st'ai lj

(cont'd)

AIPRASAL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Item_ Cost Itma XLms Cost

5. technical Assistance

Contaibnr and bulk DIVO VAN 262,062.64,andling study UUTuR

Marne Craft study 149,603.71

Accounting S Financal. IC"C 346,936.12Systems prtovemt

Sub-soil studles 3.I.3. 227,022.05

Master Plea Study 1313CM 1,055,355.6Subtotal (5) 2.000,000.00 2,040,963.20

6. ContLagencLis 5,900,000.00 wit

TOTAL 50.000.000.00 33,3814602.21

4ptl. 19591i

. fE~~

N

URUGUAYHOUTYI PORT3. 130330 (LUXM 179*-OR

?ROJM COMWL3TOK 3310R?C.iarison Between Appraisal stImtOs and Actual Costs

(05 mllon)

Appraisal Actual Actual Costs as Percentae-_Iatistes 11 Estmates 21 of E*stimted Costs

Local Foreign Total Local Fore4p Total Local Voiga totalA. Cotainer Bulk Tozinal

Contaier Crans 0.41 7.70 6.11 - 3.40 1.40 0 44 42Yard euplmt 1.04 1.04 - 2.19 2.19 0 210 210Altefations to 1I1ee 4e

la Escala 3.26 2.17 5.43 1.49 1.49 46 0 27Bub-Total A 3.67 10.91 14.56 1.49 .S0 7.08 40 51 49

B. General Cargo Eandli

Mobile equipmetand pallets 0.15 3.92 4.07 - 1.61 2.61 0 41 39

Pavamt 0." 0.5, 1.44 - - 0 0 0Sub-total 3 1.03. 5.51 1.61 161 0 36 29

C. arbor TD* 0.39 7.42 7.61 . 5.98 5.98 0 77

D. Dredgina pIUmeut 1.40 26.3 27.7S - la. 5 6

3. Technical Assistance 0.50 2.00 2.50 0.51 2.04 2.SS 102 102 102

TOTALs Protect 7.01 51.17 Sf-l$ 2.00 33.0 j 0 29 66 ]2

Loin Amount to be cancelled

11 Including contiigencles2 Slased on actual contract costs nd palmaens made.

Source; AlP/issiotn Reports

Is

- 23 -

TAUSE 4

32.~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I0UUVZIO 1 PRJU? LcM 1798-U)

Ca uison between gstimted and Actual C2oltion Time for Project IteLs

Appraisal Relsed ActualProtect Item1 Estiate 2 ' Estimte31 Date of Comletion

1. 1IeUO de Zsc 8aContainer Crane Dec. 31, 19i2 Ag. 15, 1984 Apr. 15, 1986Yard Y aWdlng Equip. Jun. 30. 2981 Aug. 15, 1984 Jun. 30, 1983Nbdifications to

Masile do lscalsa June 30, 1925 Aug. 15, 1984 Jul. 31, 1986

2. Cargo Handling OperationsEquip. Procurement Sep. 31. 1981 Mar. 31, 1983 Jun. 30, 1983

Civil Works Sep. 31, 1981 Sep. 31, 1983 not dome

s. zHrbor TUgs Mr. 31, 1982 Sep 31, 1983 Feb. 28, 1986

4. Dredging Equipent.grab Dredger Jun so, 1982 Jun. 30, 1983 not procuredsuction Dredger June 30, 1982 Dec. 31, 1983 Dec. 31, 1984

3. Teclhncal AssistanceAdvisory services Dec. 31, 1982 Dec. 31, 1983 Jun. 30, 1987Sub Soil Studles Dec. 31, 1981 Jun so, 1983 Jun. 30, 1987Master Plan Jun. 30, 1982 Jun. 30, 1983 Sep. 30, 1967

/ Changes made In the scope of each project item are detalled in Table 2.

2! As indicated in the Iplemntation Schedule In the Appraisal Report.

31 the rvised schedule was-made after taking Into account the delays In thesigning of the Loan Agrement end the effectiveness of the Loan.

T PORT oncs (LO 1798-Uk)

Proeect Comletim Reort

*Cmrisom of Actual traffic with Ar ial. MOrMSteet(In thousands of Tons)

AebS Fmmc _ Fue_ _mg Pseee SISm Fuom Leue Fugm £dl _em _eI dl Fu_ Aebl F _ v _uTAVFX an g.e U UKm UK ge US U 51 5 1011U l Us IS

FuN 515 a... U~roma em. ft A...t Ut UemFOwbA Uoeeas&M AmS MS * p Att VWOU US US_ . u.a P . IS a.... at e. uS ... N U U u pnu a w a " Z w no U

_ rI n bS.Ig dP *.... 54 g. S *e. sS aM am M IU at M in US 1B so in4 &Ab tIa No *. . S o M. 5 .M. M US S no SP S S U 5 dS

Cgl d a s.o. U e.g. *.0. U U S aS A I U t * aS U 5 Uso"sS10 Iwei no* 0 noM0am M U 6 47" 5w 45 ISIm 45 $*4U 4t an M "a M Io

Sa. . e *.g. P g.g. U 15 6 e.g. MS U5 US 44 U a * so

_ b " &. or *.* s . .M 4 S.*.. n01 M M" I" u$ 110 n s o w so" a"-*teetmI_ US 0 J. MS c.e. US S 5 UPt US 55 UZ 51 U US U ItS 55 US

PlS "M e4. M a am. 0 3t0 M e U so M U M so

66mmeelI w"e US M 4a e. aM am aM US am as mu sa in as l as U aM am a*_-ses hagmebe . * am at am am see o 1t am an am et ms an am Aana am

Smtns I1_l S _umte 55B ItS 515 533 15 SUP UlS MS MIS MI US AW laSP MUl 51 UU ,35 . W

tEL~~~~~~ ae a _ u U t * 55 1 16 a.1uF

oh S SU S iiN __ 1 15 51 ISS _ st s m_) s tr a_i _. UtS She f ug

&we"

-25

TABLE 6

ii

ILii Xi 3

*0~ ~ I jiti.j Ii, ft..

- 26 -

TANSLI7

URUGUAY

Montevideo Port Projtct (Loan 1798-UR)

Pro1ect Completion Resort

Actual and Original Ezmectation of Project Financins

Foreign Currency

Actual Original Expectation

US$ Million 2 U18$ Million 2

Source of Fundb

AMP 1.4 4 8.2 14

GoveZuMet - - - -

ZUBD 33.4 96 50.2 s6

Other - - - -

Total 34.8 100 58.2 100

Sources AhPIMLsion Reports

5-22-89

HOU?EVXDRO P01? SROJZC? tLAI 1798l-U)pro] ct mpletLa Iao"rt

A1P Actual and Prolectnd !acm statat*. 1978-1985(thousand of Dollars)

44863 oSrg 440.3 Nmuml A~.. 33emb 6hS Pme 4. ... io o.6 408 Pg6 4. oi

a... 8.160 3.03.6 g.m.. 1.6.4 4.14. "LT6.1 163.4 1.63. 3.61.?0 1.6-. 11.111.81 1.63. 1.63 .6. 36.

biIe *.. 63.0, 86.0 16.4. 483.8 ? 86.4* 46. MW.r 63.1 181. S0.0 We 63. 630t.X.. 4. bet. . .. - V.8 - S.* .,-~46433.e .30 81. .30 .36 8.68 64. 34. 18.63.t63.601 0.86 0111.16*1. 41,41.41 0.11111.1 4.63.4 .6834in13 a*.. 1111.0 44.4 n.* 1.61.1 &.S.* 0AI3.8 1,41 4.10.9 &.wss.? 6.4_.4 s.us a.1,a *. .1.o u.1. 11.

d-vao.r.s. ewgg. f... ,m... a.m.- W4.11e , s,..? ,., S..m* 3s4.0 0.63.# 1.68*,Sport F.. a.e. 4,.0 0.46.0 41.11.3 .. 1. ,.M.* 16.0 _.* 1.* W* 1.M.4 J-0 611.4.11ger. gm~ ,004.4 f.33.4 31.16.0A 41.4031 31.161*.1 36*3.8 10111.16.0 ,1111.41 1.116.40 %SINI., 31401,43. J.3.0 3t.11111 .1.41,3.16.

*.... (0.83.. pk.m PA.N 60-.6.1)legal f.t.". 1,*010 J.I . ".I .. a .. 3.4 O.er.8 4.1*M. N.00.6 p.m.. 41.41.0 .411.4 4*._11P JIa11.1 , 6

4.06or* . _ . ,Z. IIIAVS. man-st aw .* aJ ,So.w w_.t n., 111.101 t1.t0 11111F4 111111.4

.t_.. &... 18.16A 1,41116.3 11.6 411 4*.8 11.6.00 . .6 .1 34 .3.? 83.. 3.6. 11 .#.". 2.6.6 *.W" 6.11-0 n_a3 8.

r 0... 4.1.0 e .1. * .ma.o S.M.$ 6.1.4 ..4m.. I.01.. 3.16. a.m.a $.M.$ 6III0 8.63* 8.m.t S..1111.l_t h _ *.*. 36,t83.0 3.t. t t.mo m.8 3.63.0 .410,.1 *.m.. 3M.1 .0 .8 0. 0410.9 3.43.1 1.6s SAM." S.M*. .

_41 *111 bWJI. .&W. M.?.33. 83.. *.1. W.* 411.. 8.6, 8C.. 3.1* 1,6. 83.0 .. . 8

_ f.e. . .e e-. -J*. ". _ _

lwlemma .. a M.43 M*4. 011.41 116,1.0 0.18MA 4 3, 3.0 0.16USA3.6.0 3648 .60 183 .3. .6. .41. 3.33 8.6-.

bstates baesm I... M.6.0 3.631 146.0L 3.61130.1 011.183 6II.6.0 8.63.0 111.60-1 31.611.11 61.11.01 34.06.4 183.0A 8480 8.63* 3.63*0St hem _8.* 1010.8 1160. 1.* We 4..1 1 ,.0 8.4 16.0 1..13.1 .3* 1.63. 1.-.* 4.41 63. 0 8mm. 1 _ p... 11 .0 41.64. 1 818.3 1.16.0 1 NASA 41 8.M.* o.* _ .J *. 41.63.* -. 1 . .

T_l. bm. g .e. 4310e 831.8t t86l.0 16. 16.0 4,* 683.0 t, 183* -I," 133 t.0 * t-l 03h.0 -t 4t

601" _ter *.. 146.*1. 4.1. 6 11 3.1 c -4 01.1 *,.0 U_. 4* 01. 11 .* 111.* .8 11.01 .0 6.31*

laeroe -6o"t bee...a.*..8*0 We.6. M..63* 13.60 11183.06 3".16 114.0 11.* 81418.1 46.1113* 81.201 641.6.8 3.46. 836.0 8.3.16* SAW..3

_ 1a bta br. a.e. 33.1 48.#16* t8t.83 8.1.0 83.16 h* 488.3 8.83.1 83^.6. 83tA.61 * 181.0 8.8* 83.31 833 36.65.? 41.63

,le hes a.*.. *.M.. me6.14.16.8 8.40.8 6.10.4 1.38.1 1.411. 41.011. 4 83.11. 3W.43. 4.716. 0.1141.041 83,. 0S.4.0 10.6.tIO S blc P e. a .0 41.16. 1a.0 1.41 16. .. 3.8 1*.4 ta .. 3,.0 4a6.0 ",-. 6.4 -41* .41.6 41..*

lt bee36Ie Seame a.s 3.61 141.61. .1118 8- 1. 0.8611.4 4.11.01 610113 .16. 10.63 "A3. 36.6-46 0.4* MA.13 011.1 v5.*

Co-ft"~eg~ 460e, .41. 818.0 160.3 613.0 W'.S 1.33 63.4 3.411 3.15. 3 1.184 3.0. 0.4* 16.0 S.81* 116.8 4.63

_6e6r 0 .a *... - - - * . 6.8 . . - . . 6.4 .. .-

Obwet GM 16 .6. a4"W gmt. 112011 ,4m m * . t MS, 6 Aw a am t- * * . ^ * , . Om***_. .. t.. .836O hemfl .8.O .. .301.6.0 3030.0 &.63.* 14".6. 83.46*0 3. .1.414. . 3.1318 .6.4.10 A. .0. MA608 SAI1*30 (3.4116.41) 1.

W.I. 41 Prn. a... 83.8 3.8 6.0 83.6 8. P8.3 33.4 83.1 14.0 83.0 63.1 83J 8.3 3* 61.be.31b~meee6 *... 83 t* 83. 3. 83.1 01* 3.3 61.1 3.1 83.8 8t.0 3t.6 6.4 18.* 6*t 13.

C_ne m.g a.*. 3.1 63.1 88.3 61,3 3.* 360.3 ,. 3 .1 8.1 4.1 8.6 0*. 3.4 1* 4.8

bee aD Bef a... 633 86 61o 86 83 410 438 0*1 68 483 43 483 3

tet.lei 3. 3.8. 8,.e . ,. 64.0 1.60 33_016 .o3. 3.63.0 m. a.mz.o 3*..e 3. o.0 _.* 8.63.0 ,*s 11 8.*60_*sit. 3.16.0 11.0 8.0 3.06.0 71.0 1.14*4.0 414.0 1.10.0 630 1.16* 4*8.0 $.11.- 43.e0 A.0

1..eit. Et.e t4t 0 ^.0 F4).0 830 63.0 4310 88.0 60.0 1.0 43e.0 604A 41.0A 68.0 81..8 118.0 88.0 1:*

HONTIVIDOa9? MaOJD? (LOAN 1796.UR)Project C lo.ltlio Re"ort

ASP Actual and protected alaice Sbopts. 1978-15"(thous d. of Dollars)

*9 5 am ia am iWS 36a_Xd bvaaa 4Awl _B Agas 8 As_eI hrda_b _ .s bft i Lebal bsga 6k h _am*

h "a, a.M.$. a. e.0 ,5.35. 38.3.8 56.4 ai6v.a 41.. ii.Ui.# 1.35.0 ua,a16.a 4.aw.4 4a.1a .h_ Au.* a.a 5A5.8ie.etaIa a.m.o a,a a.m. a,.ua a.m. 4,31. a.m.a *.aa.a 3,44.1 .r 8 8,.1. 3.8t 3A5.a *.133. 3.66 *.3LAs ome. ug.as.0 a..0. ,41.0 ,S..o ".0M- a.a eM. 11.m,41 a.1m. 1.45. 4,I..6 a,.1.a a.IW.? 4.35.2 6.t1? Sa.m. a.1.4_ er crnaw A3.gw W5.$ a.m.0 a.m.a a.M.* SA.aio. a.".0 #.M.a a.m.a i1.7 a.am. ama &Am-* ma a.m.a aMs. A.*

ro Fl" As_f O.M.4 Sirc0 *.J". *,4.0 J0.0111.4 ,S4J. 411*41.4 ,"41.0 M.0,.0 11.4111 Mo,741.1 1,410.4 1119.001 0,.0. O7.M. 11.401

w_e.sCff.ine. a".m. a.m. m.a. a.e. a s 5.31. aa.hi. ua.me u.ws.a a,.m. r,a.m. 68.s * a.o u,o .s. .. 33.3.0a. 3).a_ *a... am. a.m.a ,a.m *.ina ama a..e au.aa a8 o 3.5.O 33.5. SN.0 73.3 3e.35u.0 6,8u.45st.1 _.m. 3.35. 6.45.3*e.itn5ed vuima3lm 8. d38.0 433.7 at .. ,.a 4,".0 t9,_ 1.1.0 8.4l7.a am. I.m.i a.41.a u.m.1 1a.74i.0 UAW-11 a1.11.0

M"__" Am"Im 11.214 SII-s I.M.41 S.o41 ,"6101. So.M *".W. IAII0 ".P. 001.6 ,".*U. O.6. ?*A.u O.0 mm. ma* I. Pioegri 1.358 ia.0 *.iM.? IA.m. "m.4S3. INA.. 91.m01.a 51.101.0 "A.18. 11.111.4 4A..1 33".01

be,*.a a.ma ,aue.a U,_a .o a.uu.4 m*.o a.m.a m t.o 8.a me.o av.a t.a. ma .sm.a mZ.a aa.a tU.a

Other A S. a0mp.a am.0 . ..a.* aso.* i.aa. a.m.a 4.a.a1 u.t t. aI1. w.e' 3.$U.? 1.aa.. II.M.wa .o. *.m.a JM..36t b fftS3 UbaUaj 7 1a1a r11.. U.1 ar.a11 11 3.0 .11O. 0 r16.8 1.oo7.0 0.0 107.0 e.o 1.0.4 .0. r.1, ao.a r.e*L7.80m" hAo.e. ua tIO. aa.m. a.m0.a a4.as.6 a1.m. "ASa.-.a 3k.411.1 10.460.a1 va6.s 3.45.8 S.436.7 33.04.? .01.35. W.01.6 411.010.1 38..184 aa.W.a

6mW Two. beebaJgm 5g* 4,336.0 8.95.0 816.8- saoa ,.o aI.M.a 1.m.0 a.W.0 0.31.9 ,3.a al.100.o aa,l.4 8835.0 0.1.6 *.ua.a 11.2A 4SAW.0laos LNO. 1.35.5 n1.. 1.35.0 a.m.o 7win t t.t.a aa.4.. 3.M.O s.5a ask.1.O *.0 tO.,.0 "$a *.m.a a1.. r.so11 t_ r Tom D" 13.415.2 6*.0 Ua741.4 U,Ot.0 t.m.a Aa.m1a 8.3.0 t,ua.0 a"a.4 7D0.0 U,3.1 "68.056 am.a11 ".i1.4 ".b0t.a a.*.

rags uasa..f 5.3460 aa.. a.. a.m. a.sa. ,a.m u.s. 13.m. rw..s 867.gi. 11.35 wa,m. .. 8s.ma.6n. a.m.a a.m.

U1Xs a.a *.eO o *.7 *I.u.O .o a.m.a 4.* ae.m.0 .e *.i *,M.e r.o e.o0 0.* oa .. 0.4 6,_.oUg*atm _ balms. aa.4 8a.m.0 s..m. s 7111.1 asO.4.1 St,m.1 4.n.3 .L4t.1 =.SUa. aa.a.11 AS .4. 0.m.a Ift.a .in.6 j5.. , .T_ss Ut.St 33U.M.3 M4.s.o 68.31.3 U.a.$ 4 4.0.7 U.m.a ts.in ".40.1 ua.7 N.i 111.m1.a m.a1,.6 33.O03.4 aa.w.. "AMA S",jm.. *.aa.argw tbpl. * ut llaj.a ro.a 111.m1a a..a.o u.oa.a m.ema 6.ja.r a1.5 5.18 ,in1.7 a W .M.o 2181.40156.0 #301,68.1 5.3. 10.m.a aa.m.a uo,t.0a

a.wmS 1tl 3.3 5.6 L.4 3.8 3.4 L.S 3.0 5.3 3.8 3.0 1.4 3.3 I.- 3.8 8.8 3... Iq.ldt1e J.3 3.8 3.3 3.3 3* *.J 1.9 3.1 1.4 3.7 .. 2 .. 3 3.0 I.8 0.6 J*36* to "air Pt amag _ 8.4 4.a 47.7 a a..4 Ua41. 0.4 u.a41 0.3 01.3 0.3 52.7 0.3 1a41. 0.3 l6.41

I

- 88

1a

29 -

ot.Z4d. Port Prompt (.a. 1798-U)}'PIet CSEW hbo,1S 19.a

, _ lb t 6111 w lit~ 141 33. 1906l- U

59 A 101 611 1 41 "._l _ _ ... . .......................... -e .

I g4etitIl baues* Cr. Cg.I Cxt.s C36 ,u Caz.1 CgI.u ct.4 Cer.U Cag.act

Dpi ha 55.01d 2454J" 35n4 4 " ZkLoos 3 *1 1 su,o 74,. -1.,3zs 10.04 522.100.4

It id.04 twi i."t.nt waLo i,n*. ^ " a w4a.t ouns m.isr ^A1 Xowil

7uot 27.31 0Ll 3.331,438 W1.41? 5.61SA4l 3Ll 1 4M 1.5 I6.J111 5.r 394 I-6.106 402".69w93a t. U PAU1 114*4 11,30 X1.1417 W1 1 2.1 4.93 :ss M0.M o132

Pt4t $WOO 010t1 L.O1.4 "O.o lift.s MN.2111 5.111M 44944 1.431",0 140.1 l3.13

?d a 6A.o 2I.15a 3 4 593.130 .1 I0E 0.4.tl I-Mill 3.31,461 43,154I 1..31

#df4 up* *I. U F1s. e Z Ia,anl*T<

no uat eruel)21.111 3.317.3 331.2 L34.016 .033 SAWN0306.3 1£0.3161 2.9.63,4 1.1.140 3.37L09

lasseS tatff 1* 34.40L 341.11 41912 0. l 16Z WAR 31l.01 9111910 107.103 14130.3 MM5

01St In01 Ru )101.431 3.443.95 9949 w191 9103.1 41011.111A 305433 5.3494 43.44A13 ,31.133Beta aiim¢.ea. . *...

=. . .. e if f C*f nl

in" 60tt4.1* LOAN 3 941 U AI 1,3493L 1132 2.296,1 0,59 0 64,2119 1.014.,3UStaufCm 45.06 .014 1630 39M N 34 241.6 413.0 3.091A.6 5.2151 3.0,11.1 3,1.61 MM0M t1w 4 .. *A 2301 402.0L4 194.L 549.4 3,31 I.3 13,1 115,312 70.433 40.1491

741454l3vel" 1414335 U1.IU.4 43 031485 ,39 1.1143 9013 4IoW.339 3.031,033 1.451,316 4.1%4000 14.10.1i69W la. i-21 11,4 2.01.11 ALUS 3.1.on 311,10 5U.=9,13 3 ,111,f0 4*0 .4u l1e1149,

inmio m i "i 3.A1 1.13M I2401 30460 1.3l953 009.13 W 3.432 0. 910P 4M4.30 1.63I easS 25m 1 30 20.00 20.26 5,04 6A.31. "L4.443 30.21053 10.s94 1504,9060 bduitJtsl 559 11011 4340Z1 39,50 91 403,3 131.01 39.&e.4 40343 0,u4.03

t W's Idaos a.. te. s4 162 1*1 .3111. 5 900S 9,3.144 1,,034 1,427.33 2'3-.133 LO.IS 4."0,6 164

1 not aW.s41 t910 .I3U 1 1.791 A1.31 411.21 U M3 4%.4 4a.3 1340.936 10.3w0It6 w h cuata 1HA.51 5.10.4 101490 5,1643.1 33ne0" 1,09.33 I940.14i 31 1..9 1143 1349016

learnt hwJmw.4548 79.11 U1,20.01 111,36 1.11.13 11233 1 *395 90,16 27ISAMU0 41.2.1311 1409,310),is Idtt AN 4. *.3 16.413 34.9 19.3* I9.11 4.o 1i.911 35.9 *430

Ia OWU" A" tu - a a al itu I, lb. to " $.toI3t rwei*llle * * * - 11*0 S

*5 51 5g, -b - x-- - _ - - - _ _ - -

* X,WuLggsst.55'1-t 16.040 51,011., 109.1 1,0.155, 4331,110 491.409 tS*.04.o5 sS.103.431 43.912.031 ,5,11,34a- -- - -- - - _- -

toas *VA 2 n 4e 1o n 13 9 n

IlltiusaweI ,. 3.4 - * 0.0 * 1.2 * 10.71

_ue _ t ie Es 593 * 6 0 - 65.319 1 53,It 605w. a Mt ftug

*" tu i *e o

bt w tFi g W* 3_1. 10 ' 314 315 31* 310_ulk do t'eft 51.92 WS $1.3 - 101.41 - 512.0

Fe9tew ftgod- i*,ns, * b5l 0 31 * 9.a70 14s90 &- 15 5.nzs

Sore:t UWAT-?raapote Projt 1

-30-

1btwL a. oft lv.1e.S tLa 1796-U)

Its l ali cow. Ns t itF Nsw t 31. 198 49o

t . . - t. " f.nbn #."Ct "tm u n

Num

currut A""t

Cab la 4.9 2in 2.53 413 2.01n 213 4 to 1,20Ila 1io 9 4.41" 311 39230 354 1, 49 3.414 49 5

-6t 7 lia IW to toU m" us .!esw 13 1.143 102E tU4 34? 931 53 49 39 4iffaut 13 I9 23 20 I9 9 84 43 24 43*

- -~~4,1 .u mm% -o ~suinm I'm IIIFl.. *1M

11a1 - - 13 10 n 6 4 13 14 3 1234, 10, 9,24 "t,u 16n 1330411 314 4,43S ,315 "te.1

aw 1m ue . IOl) (.1iF 13251 1."$) (681 (4,434) f2,2311 44,9 34.5 1,9SuROfW49 - - -0 0 59 S.00

(aWpBIe X t3 14 6 -

Sum-total X4.40 103,594 6.959 83'482 15,71A 19,031 9*514 591511 47,193 613315

totw kw$t 1.042 113.143 9.449 88.64 34,173 84,018 30.541 43,11 49,3 5,415

Curst Liali 303 313 s51. 4,t11 1 3.844 19114 4,9 I,' 0,4H9s tr Lo u 45 L.m 6 4.s34 1.50 9,26 1,'m 9.16 d.?1 13,44

ouG, - S I - _ _

a1 1s Lo4 .4 8.34 49 14,49 12,5 v,11 13099 4.0049 15.18beap Saw Wm - - -ea -91 U2,6441 I1,43il 13.3111 13.,) 1.4^l1ttIu s1(1aua1 U 110 1,013 44 3111 3061 54I5) 1* (nil I4 11 1 {i.n

Tote udlittu 1,05 313.36 9,469 88,94 3411 64,0 3 1 31,61 49.43 5.49

U141 Sall 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1e 0.5 0.5 0.5s 0.Curut 3ttU 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4hotIEt ItWo 3u 13v 3331 till 9191 9ot 91 1"/3

Soul. UW rY-?eeft ftJ'.t S

- 31 - L. .

I

INTIO 3?Poll MOJT (Lam 1796-U)

*rsiect camletLOu &WM

Ieulc Rate of Return t(3)

Ja a sm

33 b"S 033

Co"talaev end @arnal camp3quLCm.t tc. ' 34 2? 21 23

- 13 is 17 9

_va4gewa 47 25 54 i8

5 0 7 0

TsOTAL too 0 241/ too

v/ Uuoludtng ecet of !a.

A--Ad- . - 1880~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I ND 4367R

.- . r ./ { 8 , - s _, __ U R U URUGUAY

MONTEVIDEO PORT PRQJECTU'UG. AY TRANSPORT SYSTEM

WARGE INA

) A~~~~~~~~n~~~~ M~~~I C

. S f ...

AMERICA ~ AYND

. , fl< .wl , ,s .- t . I ., 'E._...i.,

«s;- B-- \x*; s I 8, .-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~MAlt,

F too * g )t / , ) *

1~~~~~~~. - C, 9 59 909029

. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a Mp4. payee. r 0.L0'ETEM I | in

..0;ARES ",. - \ANEI ; d. M / : ° t

. \ i- , ., gt 'I ee E & / .a.e t Oeado...

-3s A R G E N T I N A <> X . MONTEVI 5lp

L i dy....~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......

__ SOUTH ,___j _ _ _ __________R36

¢ . | / v +_ +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P RclPd

RJ UGUAY '.00 c@'Tha ; t neo h.

x, { . t_*dr O 50 lSO + Ems~~~~~~~~~~~~~~D- A"

. < t g , , dd=_g IUtCETEIIS ~ J s R_t Por