Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 4547

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

UPPER VOLTA: BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 496-UV)

June 15, 1983

Operations Evaluation Department

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

The Metric System

ABBREVIATIONS

CCCE Central Economic Cooperation Agency

(Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique)

EEC European Economic Community

CIDR International Rural Development Company

(Compagnie Internationale de Développement Rural)

ORD Regional Development Organization

(Organisme Régional de Développement)

SOFITEX Voltaic Textile Fibre Company(Société Voltaique des Fibres Textiles)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

UPPER VOLTA: BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Credit 496-UV)

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage No.

Preface ............................................................ iBasic Data Sheet ................................................... 1... . iiHighlights ............................................................ iii

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I. SUMMARY .................................................. 1

Project Design ............................................. 1Project Implementation .................................... 2Project Impact ............................................. 2

II. MAIN ISSUES ............................................... 3

Slow Pace and Cost of Development ...................... 3Cotton Policy and Project Justification ................ 5

Annex 1 Comments from SOFITEX .................................... 9

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. Background .................................................. 13II. Costs and Financial Arrangements ........................... 17

III. Implementation .......................................... 19IV. Agricultural Impact........................................... 31

V. Institutional Performance ................................... 39VI. Economic Evaluation ......................................... 42

VII. Bank Performance ............................................. 43VIII. Conclusion .................................................. 44

Annexes .................................................. ........ 45

Map: IBRD No. 17821 (PCR)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

UPPER VOLTA: BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 496-UV)

PREFACE

This is a performance audit of the Bougouriba Agricultural Develop-ment project in Upper Volta, for which Credit 496-UV was approved in May 1974in the sum of US$8.0 million and closed fully disbursed on December 31, 1981.

The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by theOperations Evaluation Department (OED) and a project completion report (PCR)dated July 1982. The PCR was prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office,following a mission in May 1982 and on the basis of a completion reportprepared by the Regional Development Organization (ORD). The memorandum isbased on the Staff Appraisal Report (No. 297a-UV) dated May 10, 1974, thePresident's Report (No. P-1359a-UV) of May 15, 1974, the Credit Agreementof July-19, 1974, the Staff Appraisal Report of the Second Bougouriba Agricul-tural Deveopment Project (No. 3126-UV), and the PCR; correspondence withthe Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained inrelevant Bank files have been consulted.

An OED mission visited Upper Volta in February 1983. Discussionswere held with officials of the Ministry of Rural Development, the DiebougouORD and SOFITEX, the Voltaic Textile Fibre Company. The information obtained

during the mission was used to test the validity of the conclusions of thePCR.

A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower and to SOFITEXon April 1, 1983. Comments received from SOFITEX are in Annex 1 of the Pro-

ject Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM). Suggested changes have been

introduced.

The audit finds that the PCR covers adequately the project's salientfeatures, and the PPAM generally agrees with its conclusions. In addition to

summarizing the objectives and results of the project, the PPAM expands uponcertain aspects, particularly the slow pace of development and the cottonpolicy, because of their importance to this and other agricultural and ruraldevelopment projects in the same region.

The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Upper Voltaand the project staff met during the preparation of this report is gratefully

acknowledged.

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET

UPPER VOLTA: BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Credit 496-UV)

KEY PROJECT DATA

Appraisal Actual or Actual as % ofItem Estimate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estimate

Total Project Costs (US$ million) 10.2 9.7L 95Credit Amount (US$ million) 8.0 8.0 100Date Board Approval 05/30/74Date Effectiveness 10/17/74 07/18/75 28bDate Physical Components Completed 9/78 10/80 12L

Proportion then completed (%) 100Closing Date 03/31/79 12/ 3 1/81/c 158LbEconomic Rate of Return (%) 68 17Institutional Performance goodAgronomic Performance averageNumber of Direct Beneficiaries 16,000 10,00.14

CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS

FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80

Appraisal estimate (US$ million) 0.7 2.5 4.6 6.8 8.0 -Actual (US$ million) 0.6 2.4 4.2 6.1 7.8 0.2Actual as % of estimate 86 96 91 90 98 100Date of final disbursement : 12/04/80Principal repaid to date (US$ million): None

MISSION DATADate No. of Mandays Specializations Performance Types of

Mission (mo.Iyr.) Persons in Field Represented/f Rating-/ Trend/h Problems/i

IdentificationPreparationAppraisal up to 1974 N/A 476NGB up to 1974 N/A 89Subtotal 565Supervision 1 11/74 1 1o a 3 1 MPSupervision 2 4/75 1 13 a 2 1 TSupervision 3 9-10/75 1 13 a 2 1 MTSupervision 4 2/76 3 19 a,a,b 1 1 MTSupervision 5 10/76 2 5 a,a 1 1 MTSupervision 6 4/77 1 21 a 2 2 MTSupervision 7 9-10/77 2 14 a,c 2 2 MTSupervision 8 2/78 1 4 a 2 1 MSupervision 9 9/78 2 7 a,c 2 2 MTSupervision 10 2-3/79 2 7 a,c 2 1 MTSupervision 11 10/79 2 5 a,c 2 1 TSupervision 12 5/80 2 5 a,c 1 2 -Supervision 13 9/80 1 6 c 1 2 0Supervision 14 2/81 3 6 a,a,c 1 2 0Supervision 15 10/81 2 6 a,c 1 2 0

Total 706

OTHER PROJECT DATA

Borrower Republic of Upper VoltaExecuting Agency Bougouriba ORD (Regional Development Organization)Fiscal Year April 1-March 31Name of Currency (abbreviation) CFAFCurrency Exchange Rate:

Appraisal Year Average US$ 1.00 - CFAF 250.00Intervening Years Average US$ 1.00 = CFAF 231.00Completion Year Average US$ 1.00 = CFAF 211.3

Follow-on Project:Name Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development ProjectCredit Number Credit 1097-UVCredit Amount SDR 12.4 million (US$16.0 million equivalent)Date Board Approval 01/28/81

/a Or US$11.7 million if additional EEC loan of US$1.5 million to bridge the gap between Bougouriba I and II istaken into account. Appraisal estimates in CFAF 2,550 million equivalent to US$10.2 million at the exchangerate of US$1.0 - CFAF 250; total project expenditure was CFAF 2,204 million, at an average disbursement dateof CFAF 227.50.

/b, Calculated from Board approval date.7- The closing date was extended to allow disbursing EEC additional loan.Td 10,000 is the estimated number of farm families reached by the extension service; the whole farming

population (33,000) of the project area benefited from water supply and feeder roads constructed andrehabilitated under the project.

/e Mandays in the field for Spn. No. 1-4, 6 and 7 are for the supervision of several projects jointly(3 or more). There is no breakdown for time spent on this particular project.

/f a - agriculturist; b - agricultural economist; c - financial analyst.T I = problem-free or minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; and 3 - major problems./h I - improving; 2 - stationary; and 3 = deteriorating.71 M = managerial; T - technical; P = political; and 0 - other.

a

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

UPPER VOLTA: BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 496-UV)

HIGHLIGHTS

The project aimed at developing the relatively isolated and undevel-

oped southwestern region of the country. Its objective was to achieve self-sufficiency in food for the local population and to increase farmer incomesthrough expansion of cotton, the cash crop the best suited to the region. The

project's main components were the provision of buildings, equipment, vehicles

and staff to the project authority, establishment of supporting services tofarmers and the construction of roads and village wells.

Due to the difficult conditions of this backward region, the firstthree years of the project were spent mainly on constructing housing, build-

ings and road infrastructure. Agricultural development started later thananticipated and the project had to be extended for two years, with additionalfinancing from the EEC. At project completion, the construction program had

been completed as planned and the extension and farmer support services wereoperating adequately. The project costs were slightly (15%) higher thanappraisal estimates. A follow-on project, approved by the Bank in 1981, is

expected to reinforce and extend the results obtained by the first project.The agricultural achievements of the project were significant but substan-tially lower than appraisal expectations. The number of farmers reached bythe project was about 50% of appraisal estimates for cotton and 30% forfoodcrops. The project ERR is now estimated at about 17%, well below theappraisal estimate of 68%. On the other hand, the institutional impact of the

project was positive. The project authority is now a dynamic and efficientorganization; its experience is expected to be fully utilized during thesecond project.

In retrospect, the project consisted more of laying the foundationsfor future development than comprising in itself a lasting developmen7 of the

region. The project illustrated (i) the difficulty and relatively high cost

of a rural development project when it is first introduced in a backwardarea and (ii) the need, unforeseen at appraisal, to consolidate the resultsobtained by one or more follow-on projects.

The following points may be of particular interest:

- the implication of a succession of projects for regional developmeat

is a cost per beneficiary that is generally higher than envisagez(PPAM, paras. 12-14);

- the cotton price policy offered little incentive to coton groWSEeduring project implementation (PPAM, paras. 15-17);

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- the project-s high capital and recurrent costs can only be justified

by a clear emphasis on the crop offering the best return both tofarmers and Government but not by self-sufficiency in food (PPAM,paras. 18-21); and

- the project was instrumental in developing successful farmers-

groups (PPAM, para. 11 and PCR, para. 5.06).

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

UPPER VOLTA: BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 496-UV)

SUMMARY

Project Design

1. The project was designed to develop the Bougouriba region, locatedin the southwest of the country and covering about 17,000 km2 , or 6% of UpperVolta's total area. In 1973 this relatively thinly populated region (about360,000 inhabitants, or 21/km2) with an annual rainfall of 1,000 to 1,300 mm,i.e., more than the average for the country, was considered one of the more

favorable areas for crop production because of its relatively fertile soils.

2. The project, which was to be implemented over four years, aimed at(i) increasing cotton production fivefold through an increase in areas andyields, and (ii) raising foodcrop production by about 5% through betterfarming practices. The ultimate objective was to achieve self-sufficiency infood for the local population and to increase farmer,incomes through expansion

of cotton, the cash crop considered the best suited to the region. The number

of cotton growers was to be increased from 10,000 to 16,000 over four years.

3. The main project components for achieving these objectives were thefollowing:

(a) Provision of the staff, buildings, vehicles and equipment tothe Bougouriba Regional Development Organization (ORD), which

was responsible for project execution;

(b) Establishment of extension, input supply and credit services for

the farmers;

(c) Construction of 660 km of secondary and tertiary roads, 120 wellsand an applied research and seed multiplication center.

The total cost of the project was estimated at US$10.2 million, of which

US$8.0 million (79%) was to be financed by the Bank and the rest by the

Government (12%), the National Development Bank (6%) and the farmers them-selves (3%). The project rate of return was estimated at 68%.

4. In order to enable the Government to provide its contribution

to regional development, a Development Fund was to be set up that would be

financed through a fee levied on cotton sales. SOFITEX, the agency respon-

sible for the processing and sale of cotton, was to act as collecting agentfor the Development Fund.

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Project Implementation

5. The effectiveness date of the project was postponed three times,mainly owing to problems in recruiting the extension staff. It also proveddifficult to retain this staff in the harsh conditions of this backwardregion. The first three years of the project were spent mainly on construct-ing housing, buildings and infrastructure and reorganizing the extensionservice. Agricultural development did not really start until the third year.As a result of this delay, the closing date for the project was postponed byone year. Eventually, it became necessary to extend the project for a sixthyear (1981), the financing for which (US$1.8 million) was provided largely(US$1.5 million) by the EEC.

6. At the final project closing date (December 31, 1981) the building,road and well construction had been completed as planned. The ORD staff werein post, and the extension and farmer support services were operating asexpected. A program of applied research was under way. Input supplies andagricultural credit for the farmers, however, remained well below estimatesbecause of a low fertilizer adoption rate and the financing of animal-tractionprograms by other institutions. The project costs remained close to appraisalestimates, except for inputs (20% of initial estimates). The actual totalcost of ,the project was US$11.7 million, i.e., 15% more than the appraisalestimate if the additional year financed by the EEC is included, or US$9.7million (95% of appraisal) for the five years financed by the Bank. The IDAcredit (US$8 million) represented 68% of the total investments in the firstcase and 82% in the latter.

Project Impact

7. In the absence of monitoring and evaluation, which were not intro-duced until the start of the follow-on project, the impact of the project onagricultural production and farmer incomes is difficult to measure. Neverthe-less, it became apparent during project implementation that the estimates madeat appraisal were grossly exaggerated as regards both the situation beforethe project and the projections with the project. It was envisaged that totalcotton production would increase fivefold as a result of expansion of the areaunder cotton from 5,000 ha to 12,000 ha and an increase in yields from 400 kgto 813 kg per hectare on average. Cereals were estimated on the basis of25,000 ha before the project with a production of 700 kg per ha, which wasexpected to rise by 5% with the project. However, these figures were over-optimistic in terms of,areas and yields, for both cotton and foodcrops.

8. The appraisal assumptions were therefore corrected during projectimplementation and more realistic estimates made for areas and yields by theend of the project. From these figures, it is apparent that as regardscotton: (i) the project had no more than a slight impact on productionprior to the third year;. (ii) areas expanded by about 40% (from 4,850 ha toabout 6,800 ha) between 1975/76 and 1980/81; (iii) yields increased by about56% (from 378 kg to 592 kg/ha) over the same period, and (iv) total cottonproduction increased by about 2.2 times. The number of cotton growers reached

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by the project was 7,822 instead of the 16,000 estimated at appraisal. Thehigher production is due primarily to a certain improvement in yields and alsobecause the farmers have slightly expanded the areas under cotton. Althoughthese figures are lower than appraisal estimates, they show that the projecthad a significant impact on cotton production which, however, has stabilizedsince 1979/8C. Yields are also stagnant, partly because of the underutiliza-tion of fertilizer by the growers.

9. As regards cereals and groundnuts, production of which was alsooverestimated, the increase has been 5%, as envisaged at appraisal. Areas andyields with and without the project remain, however, well below projections.The number of farmers benefiting from the foodcrop component of the projecthas not exceeded 10,000 instead of the 33,000 initially estimated. Livestockowners have also benefited from the vaccination programs undertaken during theproject.

10. On the basis of these figures, the economic rate of return is nowestimated at 16.7%, i.e., well below the appraisal estimate of 68%, whichreflects the relatively modest impact of the project on agricultural produc-tion in the Bougouriba region. A follow-on project, the Second BougouribaAgricultural Development Project, was approved in January 1981 for an amountof US$16 million equivalent, to help reinforce and extend the results obtainedby the first project.

11. The institutional impact of the project has been significant. TheBougouriba ORD is now an effective and dynamic organization able to providethe support services needed by the farmers. The experience gained due to thedifficulties encountered during the first project is expected to be fullyutilized during the second and facilitate its execution. The formation offarmer groups responsible for collecting the cotton for SOFITEX can be con-sidered a success of the project. These self-managed groups are alreadyhandling the collection of about 20% of the cotton produced in the region andhave begun to market their own cereals production. The Development Fundcalled for at appraisal has been set up; it receives as income a levy of CFAF

4,500 (about US$13) per ton of seedcotton marketed through SOFITEX.

MAIN ISSUES

Slow Pace and Cost of Development

12. The Bougouriba project illustrates the difficulty, slow progressand relatively high cost of rural development when it is first introduced in abackward area. Prior to the project, little development effort had beenundertaken in Bougouriba with the exception of some cotton programs carriedout by SOFITEX. Unlike the regions with basic infrastructure on which aproject can easily be grafted, in 1973 the Bougouriba region was still rela-tively isolated and undeveloped. By its nature and notwithstanding the fact

that cotton was its target crop, the Bank-assisted project was more an inte-grated regional development project than a cotton project; this meant that theinfrastructure had to be constructed, ORD staff recruited and the rural roadsopened before any significant extension work could be started. In retrospect,a shortcoming of the appraisal was the failure to recognize hiis constraint byassuming a rapid agricultural development. In the circumsLances, three yearswere needed to build the infrastructure required. In the cn the project cor-sisted more of laying the foundations for future developman_ than comprisingin itself a lasting development of the Bougouriba region- Extension of theproject from four to six years, one of which was an addit_Icnal year financedby the EEC, followed by the approval of a second five-yea: project, showedclearly that: (i) the time needed for achieving a significant impact onagricultural production is particularly long for this type of project, and(ii) the results obtained very often have to be consolidated by a secondproject, whose achievements frequently need to be sustained by a third. OEDhas found1/ that with rare exceptions rural development pojects have beenmultiple-phase projects but that each of these phases could be economicallyviable, as is demonstrated by the present project which sows a small butpositive rate of return. This phenomenon is not typical cnly of Africa. Inother regions, the Bank also found that insufficient knowledge about the areatargeted and the inexperience of the project personnel almost invariably ledto a first rural development phase where tangible achievements proved minimal.

13. The implication of a succession of projects for regional developmentis a cost per beneficiary that is generally higher than envisaged. On thebasis of the 11,000 families presently supported by the project, Bougouriba Iactually cost US$1,063 per beneficiary family instead of the US$293 originallyestimated. The second project aims at raising the number of families reachedby the extension and support services from 11,000 to 22,000 at an additionalcost of US$13.6 million, which will increase the final cost per beneficiary toaround US$1,150. A possible third project would increase this cost further.Although this figure is within the limits of the averages observed for agri-cultural development projects, it is, however, higher than the average costper beneficiary for West African countries.!/ It should also be noted thata significant part of the investment costs (33% in Bougouriba I and 57% inBougouriba II) is represented by costs inherent in the administration of

1/ A special OED study (Report No. 2242) on the Bank's experience in Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that follow-on projects have been necessary inmany cases to sustain projects that were expected to be self-sufficientby the end of the disbursement period.

2/ A study made in 1980 by the Western Africa Region of the cost of 72agricultural development projects financed by the Bank between 1977and 1979 arrived at an average of US$1,575 (1980) -er beneficiaryfamily. However, this average did not exceed US$597 for the nineprojects actually located in the Western Africa Region,

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the project (buildings, housing, vehicles, staff salaries, etc.) while onlya relatively small part of the cost goes toward productive investments. Heretoo, the Bougouriba project is no exception, but like other projects of thesame type, carries the risk of benefiting primarily the administrative machin-ery if its production goals are not achieved (see para. 19).

14. In the present situation, the project-s high recurrent costs alsopose a problem that can only be overcome by considerably increasing productionin the years ahead or drastically reducing these costs. The Completion Reportestimates the ORD-s annual operating costs for the first project at US$323,500and those of the fertilizer subsidies at US$220,000. Against this total ofUS$543,500 per year, the budgetary revenues for the State can presently beestimated at around US$62,000 from cotton (US$13/ton) for the DevelopmentFund, to which can be added a small amount in tax revenue from the few cerealproducts sold. Altogether, the revenue from the project for the State canhardly exceed 20% of the recurrent costs in the present situation. The netdeficit to the State per beneficiary family (11,000 at present) thereforeamounts to around US$49 per family per year. Although this figure is notexcessive compared with other projects of this type,1l the Bougouriba regionis one of the few from which Upper Volta can hope to derive any benefitwhereas the other regions of the country require permanent subsidizing.l/

Cotton Policy and Project Justification

15. One of the features of the project is that it was based initially onrapid growth in cotton production and a small increase in foodcrop production.However, whereas foodcrop production is tending to rise steadily (and evenfaster than expected over the past two years), cotton production now tends tobe static. After improving markedly in the 1976-79 period, areas under cottonand cotton yields have since remained stagnant and are far from reaching theiroptimum. In the Hauts-Bassins region, where climatic conditions are similarto those of the Bougouriba region, but where cotton is a more traditionalcrop, yields increased progressively from an average of 864 kg/ha in 1976/77to 1,276 kg/ha in 1981/82.

16. One of the main reasons for this stagnation of cotton production wasthat farmers are concerned first and foremost with assuring their food supply,so that they sow their foodcrops before they move on cashcrops. Since inUpper Volta early sowing is a determining factor for the success of the crop,the result will be a mediocre yield of cotton. Another reason was a national

1/ The study referred to in para. 13 shows that of the nine projects inAfrica, six had cash flows representing deficits for the State, with aper-family average of US$125. Three projects, on the other hand, broughtin a surplus for the State of around US$120 per family. The average forthe nine projects came to a negative cash flow of US$11 per family.

2/ See Upper Volta: Rural Development Fund, OED Report in preparation.

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price policy that offered little incentive for cotton during project imple-mentation. Whereas the economic farm-gate price of seedcotton was estimatedat CFAF 93/kg in 1981 by the appraisal report on the Second Project, the pricepaid to the grower, which was CFAF 40 in 1976, was raised to CFAF 55 in 1977and held at that level for four years until 1980, then raised again to CFAF 62in 1981 and 1982. If to this is added the CFAF 13 per kilogram of cottonrepresented by the fertilizer subsidy plus CFAF 4.50 for the Development Fund,i.e., CFAF 17.50 in all, the real producer price remains about 15% below whatit should be. In contrast, the prices for cereals (sorghum, millet, maizeand rice) fixed by the Office National des Cereales (OFNACER) were raisedregularly by 12-15% each year from 1979 to 1982. Although OFNACER purchasesonly a small percentage of the cereals, which are mostly bought by the privatesector (and often below the government support price) a continuous increase inproducer price for cereals was noted during project implementation while thatof cotton remained stagnant for four years.

17. Undoubtedly this policy of holding prices unchanged for a longperiod and the low prices paid to growers throughout the duration of theproje-t have had an adverse effect on the expansion of the cotton area anda negative impact on cotton production.!' This underproduction of cottoncompared with the optimum obtainable leads in turn to undersupply to theginnery which is currently working at only two-thirds of its capacity andis, therefore, operating at a deficit. The snowball effect of low yields andlow price did not induce farmers to use more fertilizers and to significantlyincrease cotton production.21 It is hoped that price increase in 1981/82 anda continuous extension effort under the Third Bougouriba Project will helpincrease both area and yields of cotton.

18. With the exception of yams, grown in the southern part of theregion, cotton is acknowledged to be the most profitable crop in the Bougou-riba region provided it is properly cultivated. The problems of high capitaland recurrent costs mentioned above (paras. 13-14) show that a project of thisnature can only be justified by a clear emphasis on the crop offering the bestreturn. A goal limited to self-sufficiency in food would not require thepresent substantial infrastructure of Bougouriba; an approach similar to thatof the Rural Development Fund in the Mossi plateau, with a low cost perbeneficiary and per hectare, would be more appropriate for promoting onlyfoodcrops and cereals production.

1/ The negative impact of low prices paid to growers for their cash cropshas been observed by OED in a large number of agricultural projects inSub-Saharan Africa, and in particular for West Africa, in Senegal(Report Nos. 2056, 3514 and 3662), in Benin (Report No. 2034), in Niger(Report No. 2055), in Ghana (Report No. 3526) and in Sierra Leone (ReportNo. 2066).

2/ SOFITEX comments that poor climatic conditions also adversely affectedcotton production in the whole country since 1980.

19. Moreover, experience has shown that in West Africa, cash crops, whenthey are possible, are generally likely to generate greater earnings thanfoodcrops for both the farmers and the Government, which is able to collectits share at the time the crops are marketed. Price policy should thereforefavor optimum output rather than acting as a barrier. However, by underpayingfor cotton, the Government deterred farmers from planting it and indirectlycontributed to the present low yields and limited areas of cotton.

20. It is very likely that by paying growers a fair economic price andprogressively doing away with the fertilizer subsidy (the effects of which areacknowledged to be negative), the areas planted and cotton yields could bedoubled in the Bougouriba region. Moreover, higher productivity per hectareand per working day would permit increasing the levy per ton of cotton, thusincreasing the revenue of the Development Fund. The project and its longer-term return prospects will continue to be threatened as long as the Governmentis unable to derive from the project itself the resources necessary forfinancing the recurrent development cost;.

21. The Government-s concern to ae self-sufficiency in food a priorityfor the country is probably the reason why the price paid for cotton forexport has been kept artificially low. Experience shows, however, that thecareful cultivation of cotton as the lead crop in a rotation system is bene-ficial for the foodcrop that follows it, thanks to the mineral fertilizerresidue. The problem is not therefore so much a matter of choosing betweena cash crop or a foodcrop, but of raising the two together by means of arational rotation system, appropriate fertilization and a motivational pricepolicy.

Annex 1Page 1

May 13, 1983E-1042/83French (Upper Volta)OEDENMcM:pa

Soci6t6 Voltaique des Fibres Textiles - SOFITEX

Bobo-Dioulasso, April 19, 1983No. 043663 TF/efs

The DirectorOperations Evaluation DepartmentThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Dear Sir:

We acknowledge receipt of the Project Performance Audit Report for theBougouriba Agricultural Development Project and thank you for involving us inthis evaluation.

Our comments will relate to the chapter that affects us directly, namelypolicy with regard to cotton. Without denying the impact of price as anincentive for increased production, we feel that in this specific case accountshould be taken of other factors to explain the failure of production toincrease in the Bougouriba ORD over the period 1977-1980. Examination ofnaional statistics will show sizable fluctuations in output: 38,043 tons in1977/78, 59,956 tons in 78/79, 77,520 tons in 79/80, 62,538 tons in 80/81, and57,534 tons in 81/82. There was a general drop in all the ORDs starting in1980, due essentially to poor rainfall at the start of the crop year.Performance in the Bougouriba ORD can in fact be viewed as relativelysatisfactory, since it held steady (4,679 tons in 79/80, 4,050 tons in 80/81,and 4,178 tons in 81/82).

We are also in agreement with you in recognizing that early sowing is adecisive factor in obtaining high yields and a successful cotton crop. Thispoint is made repeatedly to the producers, who are pretty much aware of it.But regardless of conditions, the farmers are legitimately concerned first andforemost with assuring their food supply, so that they sow their grain cropsbefore they move on to cotton.

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On the issue of fertilizer subsidies, the new government policy, approvedby the Bank, seeks to gradually reduce them in light of producers' reactions.It may therefore be somewhat premature to state that the effects of suchsubsidies are negative, and it should be noted that in Ivory Coast, whereyields are high, fertilizers and insecticides are supplied to cotton producersfree of charge, while Mali has witnessed a sizable and significant reductionin output following a decision in that country to eliminate subsidies (we havesince heard that the question was being reconsidered there).

In short, we fully share your conclusion on the need to step up cottonproduction without at the same time neglecting foodcrop production, as the twoare complementary and should be pursued simultaneously. The problem is toensure that both activities are done properly in order to benefit both theproducers and the country.

Yours etc.

/s/ Fulgance TOEDirector General

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UPPER VOLTA

Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project

(Cr. 496-UV)

Project Completion Report

July 16, 1982

Western Africa Projects DepartmentAgricultural Division 4

s

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UPPER VOLTA

Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project

Project Completion Report

I. BACKGROUND

Sector Background

1.01 Economic growth in Upper Volta is necessarily closely linked toprogress in the agricultural sector which employs 80-90 percent of thepopulation and comprises almost 40 percent of GDP and almost all exports.However, soils are poor, rainfall is low and uncertain, and the potential forirrigation is economically limited, requiring costly investments to develop.Improving agricultural productivity as is necessary for maintaining foodsecurity and increasing national income is thus a challenging task.

1.02 Although the country is relatively flat, there are pronouncedregional differences in climate and soils. The low and erratic rainfall(600 mm)in the north results in unreliable harvests and greater reliance onlivestock for survival, and consequently low population densities. On thecentral plateau, crop farming is at a subsistence level because of populationpressure, over-exploited soils and unreliable rainfall. In the southwest soiland rainfall conditions (reaching 1,200 mm) are more favorable, populationdensity lower, and production more market-oriented.

1.03 Agricultural production over 1961-79 has performed as well as couldhave been expected given the severe constraints. Foodcrop areas, whichaccount for almost 90 percent of cultivated land, have increased less than thenet annual growth in rural population. In contrast to most other food crops,sorghum production has grown more rapidly than population reflecting in partthe residual effects of cotton fertilizer in crop rotation, as well as directfertilization. Overall, the country has continued to satisfy all but a smallshare (5 percent) of its consumption of food crops from local production inyears of normal rainfall. But this has only been achieved through increasingdependence on the southwest as a source of food surplus, which tends to limitthe resources available in that region for growing the country's major exportcrop, cotton. This dependence must continue, however, in the short term,whilst adaptive research attempts to develop improved approaches for increasingproductivity over wide areas of the center.

1.04 Cotton yields have risen markedly in the last decade and output rosefrom 36,000 tons in 1970 (from yields of about 380 kg/ha) to over 78,000 tons(from yields of about 960 kg/ha) by 1979, due to cultivation shifting to morefertile areas and to the use of fertilizers and insecticides, coupled withextension programs. Since 1979, cotton area has fallen, indicating that closeattention needs to be paid to the relationship of cotton and cereals prices,including reviewing whether current taxes on cotton which are not high shouldnevertheless be reduced.

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Sector Strategy and Bank Group Lending

1.05 The Government's strategy in agriculture has given priority to:(a) improving the productivity of rainfed agriculture; (b) promoting migrationfrom the densely populated and relatively infertile central plateau to themore fertile and less densely populated areas in the southwest; (c) expandingirrigation and swampland production schemes; and (d) ensuring national foodsecurity. In line with this strategy, Bank Group lending for Upper Volta hasemphasized development of rainfed agriuclture for food and cash crops in thesouthwest, small-scale land development schemes to expand the agriculturalproduction base in the central plateau, and testing a larger scale swamplandproduction scheme in the southwest.

1.06 Since 1970, IDA has financed eleven projects in the rural sectorof which five have been completed. The Cotton Project (Cr. 225-UV), US$6.2million, 1970) demonstrated that an improved technology, within the means ofsmall farmers, could be spread widely and rapidly. The project's Audit Reportnoted substantial improvements in farming practices and yields. The FirstBougouriba Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 496-UV, US$8.0 million 1974,object of this report). The Drought Relief Project (Cr. 442-UV, US$2.0million, 1973) and the First and Second Rural Development Fund (RDF) Projects(Cr. 317-UV, US$2.2 million, 1972 and Cr. 640-UV, US$9.4 million, 1976) aimedat financing small discrete works with community participation. The ProjectAudits described the Drought Relief and First RDF Projects as highly innova-tive and successful in implementing diversified and scattered subprojects.The second RDF project, completed in December 1981, continued the developmentof bottomlands, wells and anti-erosion works on the central plateau. A thirdRDF project was approved by the Board on March 30, 1982, while the two VoltaNoire and Hauts Bassins Agricultural Development Projects (follow-up of theongoing West Volta ADP) were negotiated in June 1982.

1.07 The ongoing IDA-assisted agricultural projects are: the WestVolta Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 706-UV, US$3.6 million, 1977,Cr. 706-5-UV for Can.$3.0 million and Special Action Credit 49-UV for US$3.0million equivalent), the Livestock Development Project (Cr. 557-UV, US$6.0million, 1975); the Forestry Project (Cr. 982-UV; US$14.5 million, 1980); theNiena Dionkele Rice Development Project (Cr. 1013-UV, US$6.5 million, 1980);and the Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 1097-UV1US$16.0 million equivalent, 1981). They are being implemented satisfactorily,although the swamp drainage Niena Dionkele Pilot Project has run into tech-nical problems of water availability and rice varieties, and the LivestockProject had difficulties with its group ranch component which necessitateda redesign and a reduction in the credit by US$3.0 million.

Project Background

1.08 Project Area. Located in the southwest of the country, betweenthe Black Volta and Bougouriba Rivers, the project area covers the territoryof the Bougouriba ORD (Organisation Regionale de Developpement - RegionalDevelopment Organization). This territory is divided into the administrativedistricts of Diebougou (7,090 km2) and Gaoua (10,360 km2 ) covering about6% of the total area of Upper Volta.

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1.09 At the time of appraisal, population was estimated at 360,000inhabitants, about 6.5% of Upper Volta's total population (divided into190,000 people in the Diebougou District, and 170,000 in Gaoua), and wasexpected tc -row at 2% yearly. Recent figures put the population at 390,000,of which 85% (about 33,000 family units) are engaged in agriculture. TheDagari tribe is predominant in Diegoubou, and the Lobi in Gaoua; people fromthe densely populated Mossi plateau are steadily migrating into Diebougou,reaching between 15% and 20% of the population.

1.10 The project area shares with the adjacent Banfora ORD the bestclimatic conditions for agricultural development in Upper Volta. Total annualrainfall varies from 1,000 mm in the North to 1,200-1,300 mm in the South,water is in surplus for plant growth from June through September, this isadequate for the successful cultivation of a wide range of annual crops.

1.11 There were about 35,000 farms and 750 villages in the project area.Altogether some 200,000 ha of land are cultivated and this is equivalent to10% of the total land cultivated in Uper Volta. Average population pressureis low at about 24 inhabitants per km , but in the onchocerciasis free, orrelatively free zones, population is much more dense and more than 50% of theland is under cultivation. About 80% of cultivated land is under cereals,mostly sorghum, and, the rest under a variety of crops of which groundnuts,yams, sesame, cowpeas and cotton are the most important. The area's cattleherd was estimated at about 106,000.

1.12 The area was well served by main roads, 375 km of primary roadsadequately maintained by PWD. However, most of the secondary roads (about200 km) and all of the rural tracks had been neglected for years; communica-tions were also adversely affected by the collapse of culverts and smallbridges.

1.13 Project Design. The project was conceived as the first major effortto develop natural and human resources of the Bougouriba area. Previousefforts, mainly by CIDR (Compagine Internationale de Developpement Rural), aprivate management consultancy firm, achieved limited results, the lack offunds being the main reason. The creation of the ORD, while a step in theright direction, was also constrained by limited budgetary allocations. Inview of enlisting IDA's support, the Government of Upper Volta commissionedCIDR to prepare the project, indicating highest priority to development ofagriculture in the better rainfall areas of the country with the tripleobjective of: (i) self-sufficiency in food production; (ii) higher farmincomes; and (iii) increasing livestock resources The preparation reportwas financed by funds provided under Credit 225-UV, an ongoing West VoltaCotton Project.

1.14 The project was appraised in April/May 1973; as designed by theappraisal mission, the project contained the following specific elements:

(i) providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Plan, RuralDevelopment, Environment and Tourism;

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(ii) providing Bougouriba ORD with the staff, housing, offices,equipment, transportation, and finance to implement an effectivedevelopment program in the project area;

(iii) providing about 16,000 farm families with the extension and othersupport services needed to increase their production and incomes;

(iv) providing efficient veterinary services for the ORD;

(v) creating a training center with teaching facilities for projectstaff and farmers;

(vi) creating a research center to carry out adaptive research demon-stration and operate a seed multiplication unit;

(vii) improving domestic water supplies through a digging and rehabi-litation program covering about 120 wells;

(viii) improving about 660 km of secondary and tertiary roads;

(ix) establishing a topographic unit to map and prepare for thedevelopment of land for settlement by migrants;

(x) providing participating farmers with seasonal credit for fertilizerand insecticides and medium-term credit for farm implements; and

(xi) carrying out the studies and surveys needed for the improvement ofthe road network in the project area and in the Leo district.

1.15 The project was to be carried out over a period of four years, from1974/75 to 1977/78. Being essentially directed at increasing incomes, theproject under this first phase would not include measures to improve socialinfrastructure or services other than water supplies. The Government intendedto continue to support existing social services and to develop, with its ownor foreign charitable resources, a farmers' cooperative program; cooperativeleaders would, however, be trained in the project training center. Theimprovement of social facilities, especially health and education, and thedevelopment of cooperatives would eventually be part of subsequent phases ofdevelopment in the project ORD.

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II. COSTS AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

2.01 Total costs at appraisal had been estimated at CFAF 2,550 million(US$10.2 million equivalent at the exchange rate of US$1=250 CFAF), includ-ing contingencies. Foreign exchange costs represented 53% of that total(US$5.4 million). Financing was to be provided by: IDA, US$8.0 million(79%); UPV Government, US$1.2 million (12%); the National Development Bank,for agricultural credit, US$0.7 million (6%); and the farmers, for the down-payment part of credit, US$0.3 million (3%).

2.02 Although Government's contribution was modest, it was essential toensure a regular flow of such funds to the project. For this purpose theAppraisal Report recommended, and Government agreed to, the setting-up of aDevelopment Fund, which would receive as income a fee levied on cottonproducts sales. These funds would serve to finance agricultural developmentactivities in cotton-producing areas; the project area's ORD, together withthe adjoining ORDs of Bobo-Dioulassu and Dedougou yield 75% of Upper Volta'stotal cotton production. Withdrawals from the Fund account would be in thecontext of the approved ORDs annual budgets. As the first payments intothe Fund were not expected until the following cotton season, Governmentagreed to advance CFAF 150'million to finance start-up operations.

2.03 The main cash crop of the area, cotton, would continue to bemarketed by CFDT (Compagine Francaise pour le Developpement des FibresTextiles), which is also running the ginneries. CFDT would be responsible forpayment of the levies to the Development Fund. The contract between CFDT and

Government, setting an "Association en Participation" (A.P.) which was due to

expire by project start-up time, was to be extended, and amended to includeprovision for the above payments.

2.04 The EEC Special Credit. As the project was being implemented, and

despite the limited impact on agricultural production during the first years(substantially below appraisal estimates), it became obvious that the permanent

features developed, i.e., infrastructure and the build-up of a motivated

extension services, would in the long-run permit an efficient exploitation ofthe area's agricultural potential. A second phase project was therefore

introduced into the pipeline; the timetable schedule showed however, that

there was a strong possibility of a one-year gap between the time that fundsunder the first project were exhausted, and the time when the follow-up

project would become effective. When that possibility was confirmed in

1978/79, a special credit from EEC funds was processed, to secure interimfinancing for the 1980/81 campaign.

2.05 The EEC Special Credit was in the amount of US$1.5 million; together

with Government funds of about US$0.3 million, it was to be used to finance

essential items such as agricultural extens ion, headquarters support services,

feeder roads and technical assistance. The following table shows the originalfinancing arrangements, and the changes after the allocation of the EEC credit:

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Table 2.1: FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS

Original Project Interim RevisedFinancing at Appraisal Financing Project Costs

---------------------US$ million--------------

IDA 8.0 - 8.0EEC - 1.5 1.5Government 1.2 0.3 1.5

Farmers and BND 1.0 - 1.0

TOTAL: 10.2 1.8 12.0

The provision of this interim financing extended the project by a sixth

year, covering the 1980/81 Agricultural Campaign. The second phase projectbecame effective in December 1981.

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III. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Effectiveness and start-up

3.01 The Credit Agreement stated four conditions of effectiveness:

(a) Establishment of a Development Fund (para 2.02 above);

(b) Payment by Government of the CFAF 150 million advance;

(c) Two senior officials (Deputy-Director and Accountant) hadbeen appointed; and

(d) A revised contract with CFDT (Compagnie Francaise pour leDeveloppement des Fibres Textiles) had been signed.

3.02 The original date of effectiveness was postponed three times: (i)

from the original October 17, 1974 to December 31, 1974; (ii) then to May 31,1975; and (iii) to July 31, 1975. In fact, all the conditions were met ontime, except the.recruitment of key personnel under (c) above, which tookplace early in July 1975; the credit became effective on July 18, 1975. PY1became 1975/76.

3.03 A Manager for the Bougouriba ORD (who is ex-officio the ProjectManager) was appointed in May 1974; he was previously ORD Manager at Yatenga.Pending effectiveness, the Project Manager together with the supervisionmission of October 1974, drew-up a start-up program for the immediate execu-tion of most essential items such as housing and office space, utilities,

vehicles and appointment of key personnel. This would be followed-up by the

preparation for agricultural activities.

3.04 The Project Manager left very shortly after the project becameeffective (going overseas for a two-year course); he was replaced by anotherVoltaic. With the arrival of the expatriates and local hirings, the projectwas staffed by end of 1975, albeit sketchily; the recruitment of localstaff in adequate numbers at a reasonable level has been a constant problem,and has seriously hampered the expected agricultural development. In 1978, anew ORD Manager (the third in three years) was appointed. His performance hasbeen reasonably good although he is more of an administrator than an agricul-tural specialist. The Technical Projet Manager (an expatriate Agriculturistrecruited by APMU) has been on the project since its inception.

3.05 The project was originally planned to be carried-out during afour-year period, covering the agricultural campaign of 1974/75, 1975/76,1976/77 and 1977/78. Due to the delay in effectiveness, and the difficultiesin staffing and building the infrastructure PY1 was actually 1975/6; the agri-culture activities did not really start before the follow year and as a resultof savings made in the slow start-up, the project could be extended to a fifthyear. Eventually, with the EEC interim financing (paras 2.04 and 2.05)the project lasted 6 years.

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B. Development of Agricultural and Livestock Services

General

3.06 Development of trained extension workers, and subsequently theirimpact on farming practices, took place more slowly than anticipated atappraisal. But the creation of agricultural extension services was part ofthe larger institution building effort of the project: establishment of theORD in Diebougou (the HQ) and in the field, organization and staffing of itsdifferent services, such as accounts, credit, livestock and ox-drawn equipmentdistribution, seed mnltiplication, fertilizer distribution. In this context,the project has achieved its expectations.

3.07 The agricultural achievements of the project were substantiallylower than appraisal expectations which, however, project management found tobe grossly over estimated. Total production by PY5 of cotton at 4,700 tonsand cereals at 77,000 tons were respectively 48% and 64% of estimates.Nevertheless, cotton production increased significantly and the projectprobably helped maintain food self-sufficiency in the ORD since there wereperiods in the past when imports were needed. The evaluation of the agricul-tural impact of the project is dealt with in Section IV.

Agricultural Extension and Staff Training

3.08 By PY5 some 10,000 farmers were estimated to have benefitted fromthe extension services or 60% of appraisal estimates; see Section V. The slowbuild-up in trained extension staff was partially due to a decision takenearly in the project not to build an extension training center at Bobo-Dioulasso and instead to rely on short-term courses at an existing school.After this school stopped offering these courses in Year 2 of the project, theORD Director decided, with the Association's approval, to organize in-housecourses.

3.09 Progress has been slow and the need for on-the-project facilitiesbecame imperative. The follow-up project has provided funds for the con-struction of a 125 m2 classroom with audio-visual and other equipment tohouse a training section for recycling groups of up to 30 extension agents.Funds have also been allocated for a Training Specialist to be on the projectfor two years.

Veterinary Services

3.10 The project has reinforced the veterinary services in the region,and the Regional Head of Livestock Services in the region was made responsiblefor the Livestock component of the project, working with staff hired under theproject. Two Livestock Sectors have been set-up, at Diebougou covering thenorth and the centre, and at Gaoua, covering the south. The Diebougou Sectorhas three outposts, at Dano, Babora and Dissin; the Gaoua Sector has five

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outposts, at Batie, Nako, Kampti, Lorepeni and Gaoua. Veterinary supplieswere procured by the project and distributed at cost price. Results of theveterinary services are evaluated in Section V.

Applied Research

3.11 At appraisal an applied research station of 65 ha was recommendedwhich additionally to research activities would be involved in seed productionon a large scale. This was not considered justified by the project whichproposed to replace it by three substations; a supervision mission, latein 1976, agreed to that change. The three substations, each over 2 ha, wereset up at Tiankoura (centre), Batie (south). and Oronkua (north), with therelevant Research Institutes (IRAT, IRHO, IRCT) providing seeds and researchplanning, and also analyzing the results at Bobo-Dioulasso. Seed production,which remained very limited throughout the project life, was entrusted toselected farmers. Useful applied research was done on cotton varieties andfertilizer needs, on improved sorghum varieties and on rice varieties. Inconjunction with FAO an important demonstration program of fertilizer use onupland crops was conducted from 1978 on.

Agricultural Credit and other Inputs

3.12 Animal traction cultivation is one of the technological improvementsencouraged by the project with a medium term credit program; progress has beenslow but shows that there is an increasing interest in adopting this technique.The following table indicates the evolution under the project (figures cumula-tive):

Table 3.1: ANIMAL TRACTION - NUMBERS

Number of Number ofParticipating Pairs of Equipment (sets)

PY farmers Oxen Plows Maintenance Transport Other

1/2 n.a. n.a. 242 224 127 8

3 328 346 315 333 186 5

4 363 431 398 529 308 16

5 559 499 543 887 401 186 705 704 768 1,271 474 29

The relevant figures is the number of plows under animal traction, which hasincreased by 6% from PY3 to PY4, by 36% in PY5 and 41% in PY6.

3.13 The funds provided by the project for credit to finance the procure-ment by farmers of animal traction equipment were not used since lines ofcredit were made available by USAID, the Conseil de l'Entente and the FrenchCCCE as follows:

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Table 3.2: ANIMAL TRACTION: CREDIT

Donor Campaign No. of Borrowers Cost of Equipment Interest Rate(CFAF million)

USAID 1976/77 38 3.4 5.5%1977/78 152 8.4 "

C.E. 1978/79 122 5.2 "1979/80 146 7.1 "

CCCE 1980/81 238 12.1 8.5%

Terms were usually one year of grace, and principal plus interest payable over4 years.

3.14 From statistics collected on the project, the collection rate isestimated to be as follows, starting in 1978 when first repayments weredue:

Campaign Amounts due Payments Collected %(in CFAF)

1978 877,830 642,015 79.131979 2,935,630 2,151,100 73.03

Further development of ox-drawn cultivation has been included under theSecond Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project, which also provided fundsfor related animal-traction agricultural implements (US$1.1 million for a sixyear period).

3.15 Uptake of other inputs was less than expected, due not only to thelower absolute increase in crop areas, but also below optimum use of fertilizerper hectare on cotton. The expected uptake of fertilizers of foodcrops didnot materialize; farmers' interest developing late in the project with theadvent of the FAO fertilizer demonstration program.

C. Civil Works

Buildings

3.16 Successful project implementation required that a large buildingprogram be completed early in the project period. The only realistic wayto complete such a program was to undertake the work using existing localbuilding contractors. Unfortunately, such contractors were not available inthe project area, and some outsiders who bidded on the building tenders provedto be unable to finish the work. Some of the sites had to be completed on

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force account by the Project. This involved considerable delays and thebuilding program stretched throughout the project life, with the last unitsdelivered at the end of FY5.

3.17 The following table indicates the scope of the building program:

Table 3.3: BUILDING PROGRAM

CFAF m Total CFAF CFAF m TotalUnits Unit Million Units Unit CFAF Million

Offices: HQ 1 9.4 9.4 1 7.8 7.8Diebougou 2 4.1 8.2 2 4.8 9.6Sectors 7 2.0 14.0 7 3.5 24.5

Houses: Senior 9 4.7 42.3 )Middle 11 4.1 45.1 ) 14 - 61.5Junior 2 2.9 5.8 )

Stores: 500 m3 1 10.0 10.0 1 7.2 7.2200 m3 9 4.7 42.3 6 4.5 26.050 m3 36 1.4 50.4 30 2.0 60.0

Training Center 1 11.3 11.3 - -

Garages 2 3.0 6.0 1 8.2 8.2

Miscellaneous 1/ 37.3 3.8

TOTAL: 282.1 208.6

1/ Utilities (15% of houses and offices costs), vaccinations yards, oxenstables, etc.

3.18 It will be seen that the building program closely met the targetsset for it, except that less staff housing was constructed than projected.This was caused by a project decision to pay a living out allowance to manyof the junior staff assigned to field locations. The cost of buildingsconstructed was generally in line with the appraisal estimate. The trainingcenter was not built as facilities were available at Bobo-Dioulasso, and thevaccination yards were postponed to second phase. Costs would have beenhigher if it had not been for close supervision of contractors by projectmanagement.

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Roads

3.19 Except for the main highways the very few rural roads in the areabefore the start of the project were in poor condition and suitable for dryseason use only. The appraisal proposed the rehabilitation of 660 km ofunsurfaced road and about 200 km of laterite surfaced road to bring most ruralfarmers within walking distance of a road. This was considered vital toenable extension work to be carried out and for fertilizer and other inputs tobe made available to the farmer.

3.20 Construction techniques recommended at appraisal were the same asthose for other areas in Upper Volta. The road construction unit adopted theconcept proposed by appraisal of using the light motor grader as the principalconstruction machine. However, the project soon realized that these motorgraders could not handle the work alone, and acquired a crawler tractor (D-6type) as well as two heavier graders to carry out the heavier earthmoving andreshaping. These worked well, and the unit was completed with water andtipper trucks, and a self contained concrete production unit.

3.21 The rehabilitation work on the deteriorated feeder roads includedthe reopening of the tracks, reshaping, regravelling and the manufacturing ofconcrete elements (bridges, culverts and concrete slabs). The feeder roadsunit improved about 646 km of roads (against 660 km scheduled at appraisal) ofwhich 539 km were fully regravelled and 107 km partially. It was one of themost successful project components. Progress of work followed the appraisalcalendar and the technical standards throughout were 5 m width for roads andbridges, and regravelling with between 2 and 3 inches of surfacing.

3.22 In addition to the road building and rehabilitation, the feeder roadunit carried-out maintenance totalling 1,492 km during the 5-year period. Thelist of roads built, rehabilitated and maintained is at Annex 1. Analyzingthe data available at the project, and from entries in the accounts department(which did not determine unit costs), the outlay for road building and/ormaintenance can be summed-up as follows:

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Table 3.4: ROAD CONSTRUCTION COSTS

PYl PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 Interim Year Total

km constructed 646km maintained (1,492)Maintenance/Construction 1/ (no breakdown available)

8:1 186Total Unit km 832

Capital Costs 170.8 - 23.3 9.3 - 203.4

Operating Costs:

Salaries/Allows. 0.8 12.8 21.7 35.1 23.2 17.6 101.2Equipment Oper. 3.4 25.7 49.1 70.8 73.8 23.7 246.5Euip. rental 2/ 12.9 76.5 7.6 - - - 97.0Transport 0.1 7.0 - - - - 7.1

Sub-total:

Cement - materials 12.6 27.5 24.9 4.2 - 69.2Misc. 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 - 0.6

Total Op. 17.2 134.7 106.2 120.9 101.3 41.3 521.6

Oper. plus Capital 17.2 305.5 106.2 144.2 110.6 41.3 725.0

Without Capital Investment (CFAF '000)

Average cost of km road built (US$2,322) 626.9Average cost of km road maintained (626.9:8) (US$290) 78.4

With Capital Investment

Average cost of km road built (US$3,227) 871.4Average cost of km road maintained (871.4:8) (US$403) 108.9

1/ Assuming cost of building/rehabilitating a km of road costs eight timesthe cost of maintenance (a ratio obtained by examining the little dataavailable, taking in consideration acceptable criteria).

2/ In view of late delivery of equipment procured, plant had to be rented tostart the programme.

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3.23 These costs are more than double the appraisal figures, which haveevidently been grossly underestimated; the nature of the terrain required muchheavier equipment than originally forecast, which also increased substantiallyoperating costs. The delay in procuring the heavy equipment made it necessaryto rent engines to start the program, thus incurring an additional CFAF 97.0million in unforseen expenditure. Even thus, the estimated real costs arewithin the West-African range of outlay for feeder roads. Two of the threeNorthern Nigeria ADP's spent an average N 10,000 per km built (approx.US$16,000) which is equivalent to about CFAF 4,000,000, i.e., six times theBougouriba average; even taking into consideration the higher standard of theNigerian roads, the Bougouriba costs are still acceptable.

Wells

3.24 The appraisal target was 120 wells to be built at an estimatedcost of CFAF 280 million (including contingencies). The project drilled 119wells, of which 103 were completely successful, 13 had to be deepened, and 3to be abandoned; total actual costs for the well program was CFAF 111.3million, an average of CFAF 935,000 per well, as compared to CFAF 2,333,300 inthe appraisal estimates. The technical characteristics were:

Internal diameter 160 cmExternal diameter 180 cmDepth recommended 15 mAverage depth achieved 15.31 m

Rate of sucess:(no drying-up at the end 77%of the rainy season)

3.25 This component was considered by the project as a very satisfactoryachievement. However, it is very possible that because of the way accountswere kept on the project, some of the wells program expenditure may have beencharged to the feeder roads unit, although it has not been possible to ascer-tain this fact (this may partly explain the higher costs of the roads).Notwithstanding this possibility, it can be said that the project managementcarried out the wells program reasonably well.

Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Rural Development

3.26 At the time of appraisal, the Ministry having jurisdiction overthe project was the Ministry of Planning, Rural Development, Environment andTourism, which was recently set-up and took over the former Ministry ofAgriculture and all its technical services; development, planning and agri-cultural activities were thus placed under one roof. The project providedfor a senior expatriate technical assistant to the Ministry, to assist insupervizing ongoing activities, planning future projects and coordinatingactivities with other Ministries and Agencies. A short time after his arrival(end 1975), there was another change and Planning was set up as a Ministry, aswere Environment and Tourism, and the usefulness of this technical assistance

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was reduced during the ensuing period of reorganization. In spite of verbalassurances, it does not seem that the Ministry knew how to use these servicesin a position where the expatriate could have an impact (for obvious politicalreasons), and the technical assistant himself could not impose himself induties of ecine influence, a difficult task under any circumstances. APMUfeels that not enough support, or attention, was given to this problem bysupervision missions; the contract was not renewed after its original two-yearperiod.

Project Staff

3.27 Three expatriates were employed under the project, two recruited byAPMU under secondment status, the Technical Director of the Project (alsoDeputy-Manager), an Agriculturist, and a Chief Accountant. The third was aCotton Specialist, seconded by CFDT. Their performance was adequate.

Studies

3.28 Two studies were carried out by the project, both relating to theroads program: the engineering of the Pa-Dano-Djipologo road (73 km), and aroad survey in Leo district to establish priorities for improvement andextension of the district's road network.

E. Project Costs

3.29 The table comparing actual project costs with appraisal estimates isat Annex 2, Table 1 and is summarized below:

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Table 3.5: PROJECT COSTS

EEC Apr. Actual TotalApr. Act. Inter. Total Est. CostsEst. Expen. Finan. Costs in US$ in US$ 1/

(4 .) (5 yr.) E/A (6th yr.) Phase I (@ 250 CFA) (@ 227.50)---------------- CFAF million------------- -------- US$ '000--------

A. Operating Expenditures

Ministry Support 80.9 10.7 13% - 10.7 324 47

ORD Administration 317.4 375.6 118% 90.0 465.6 1,270 2,047(including training)

Agricultural Develop. 811.4 606.0 75% 186.6 792.6 3,246 3,484(incl. livestock,research)

Wells Program 202.3 108.4 54% 2.8 111.2 809 489

Roads Program 251.7 480.3 191% 41.3 521.6 1,001 2,293(incl. studies)

Topographical Unit 16.1 48.7 302% 9.0 57.7 64 254

Input Supplies 330.8 66.1 20% - 66.1 1,323 291

Sub-total: 2,010.6 1 695.8 84% 329.7 2,025.5 8,037 8 905

B. Investments

Buildings 267.5 188.5 70% 20.1 208.6 1,075 917

Vehicles 104.7 88.7 85% - 88.7 419 390

Road Bld. Equip. 62.2 203.4 327% - 203.4 249 894

Other equipment 105.0 27.6 26% - 27.6 420 121

Sub-total: 539.4 508.2 94% 20.1 528.3 2,163 _21322

Total Project Costs: 2,550.0 2,204.0 86% 369.8 2,553.8 10,200 11,227

plus EEC Special Credit 1,500

11,700

1/ Average rate of disbursements up to March 1981.

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3.30 Input supplies have reached only 20% of appraisal estimates for thefollowing reasons: (i) about CFAF 78 million allocated for procurement ofanimal traction were not used since other donors had provided for lines ofcredit for the same purpose (para. 3.13); (ii) the expected take-off in fer-tilizer use by food crop farmers did not materialize - the project estimatesthat as little as 150 tons were used against a 1,900 tons forecast; and (iii)fertilizers for cotton growers is now distributed on seasonal credit by thecotton company, SOFITEX, which receives financing from commercial banksfor that purpose on a national basis.

3.31 The project lasted five years, instead of the appraisal forecast offour years, and total costs for the five years were CFAF 2,204 million ascompared to CFAF 2,550 million at appraisal. The IDA Credit of US$8.0 millionwas disbursed at an average of CFAF 227.5 for US$1.0 instead of CFAF 250 onwhich appraisal estimates were based; for that reason, funds were exhausted bythe end of the project span, and financing for a sixth year (to bridge the gapbefore the Bougouriba II project.could be effective) was obtained through anEEC Special credit of $1.5 million, approved on January 31, 1980.

3.32 The following table shows how the total six-year program was financed:

Table 3.6: FINANCING

With EEC financing of Sixth YearOriginal Project (to complete Phase I)

US$ Million CFAF Million % US$ Million CFAF Million %

IDA 8.0 1,832 84 8.0 1,832 72

EEC - - 1.5 310 1/ 12

Government - 359 16 - 408 2/ 16

2,191 100 2,550 100

1/ Only 1.4 m of EEC funds have been disbursed; the small balance wasapplied to Phase II.

2/ The auditors, Coopers & Lybrand, have certified the receipt of thiscontribution.

3.33 As for project costs, apart from the Roads Component, which has beenalready said was substantially understimated at appraisal, they remainedgenerally in line with original estimates. Auditing of the project accountswas carried out regularly by Coopers and Lybrand. In their final report,dated July 17, 1981, they state that:

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(a) withdrawal requests had been established as per IDA guidelines;

(b) goods and services included in these requests originate fromcountries members of IDA and Switzerland;

(c) such goods have been received (or are in transit) and serviceshave acutally been rendered; and

(d) all goods and services (including on force account) financed byIDA have been used within the Project framework.

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IV. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT

A. Crop Production

4.01 The agricultural program followed a multi-crop approach directed at

both cotton and foodcrops. At appraisal it was assumed that farmers' adoptionof improved technical packages would result mainly in an increase in cash crop

production -- cotton -- of 380%, with foodcrop production, mainly for home

consumption, rising by only 5%. Assessing the project achievements in this

field has been very difficult, particularly for foodcrops. Apart from cotton

statistics for which reasonably reliable information was recorded, both on the

project and with the marketing agency SOFITEX, data on cereals is generally

sketchy; no data was collected in PY1 as the project was in the process of

getting organized, and no comparative figures were available as a baselinestarting point. This problem remained throughout the project life, even when

material was gathered for the preparation of the follow-up project, specifi-

cally since there was no specific project-financed unit in charge of monitor-

ing and evaluation.

4.02 By the time the project organized its extension services and startedhaving a good look at areas under production, estimating yields and total

output, it became obvious that appraisal estimates were grossly over-estimated,both in its starting figures and in its progress assumptions. Cotton areas

were estimated to grow from 5,000 ha in Year 0, to 12,000 ha in Year 4, an

increase of 240%; yields were expected to double, from 400 kg/ha in Year 0 to813 kg/ha in PY4. Total cotton production was estimated to increase fivefoldby FY4. As for cereals, the starting yields were estimated at appraisal at700 kg/ha for sorghum and millet; such yields were never achieved in the

project area, Only the maize yields were correct, reflecting the ongoing

performance in the project area, but the area under production was over-

estimated in the appraisal report at 25,000 ha, while the project's inventory

discovered only about 7,700 ha. Progress of maize plantings was estimated at

10% over 4 years (from 25,000 ha in PYO to 27,500 ha in PY4). The projectestimates that maize area actually increased by 20% (to 9,237 ha) by PY5.

4.03 Following the 1978 cropping season, project management prepared a

production data series for each crop. The matter of greatest importance was

the selection of a reference year of yields under average climatic conditions;

1975/76 was retained as the base year by project management because the

rainfall that year was 977 mm distributed over 77 days. This is the nearest

to the regional yearly average rainfall of 1,050 mm spread over 82 days, asrecorded over a 30-year period. 1975/76 was also the project's first year ofoperations. The first two years (1975/76 and 1976/77) were based on the

best estimates of field staff. The 1977/78 and 1978/79 data were developed

from best estimates and field survey data. The results thus obtained were

examined by the February 1979 supervision mission, commented upon in the

supervision report (Annex 7) and discussed with the Project's management.

These remarks were taken into consideration when the final project figures

were tabulated for the PCR in October 1981.

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4.04 The final figures are Presented in two tables in Annex 3, Table 1for cotton and Table 2 for cereals. The first part of each table showsappraisal estimates for areas, yields and production, from which percentagesof expected progress (yearly and overall) have been calculated. The bottompart of the tables show the project's best estimate of actual results with thesame percentages calculations.

Cotton

4.05 Cotton was cultivated in the Bougouriba ORD well before the projectstarted, as records go back to 1963. From 1970 to 1975, the land under cottonaverage 4,210 ha and yields about 326 kg/ha. The appraisal report decidedhowever to use the 1973/74 area (about 5,000 ha) as baseline, applying to ityields of 400 kg/ha, obtaining a baseline production of 2,000 tons which wasseldom reached in the area. Area planted under the project increased sub-stantially, from 4,879 ha, in 1975/76, to 7,036 ha, in 1979/80. With theexception of 1977/78, which experienced a severe dry spell in April andinsufficient rains in July, the project cotton area has now levelled at around7,000 ha per year. Yields and Production have also increased significantly.

Table 4.1: COTTON AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELDS

Year Area (ha) Production (tons) Yield (kg/ha)

Pre-Project

1970/71 3,940 1:,109 2811971/72 4,100 1,416 3451972/73 3,655 1,607 4381973/74 4,973 1,497 3011974/75 3,981 1,062 266

Project

1975/76 4,859 1,837 3781976/77 7,016 2,483 3541977/78 7,208 1,802 2491978/79 6,000 3,412 5681979/80 7,036 4,679 6651980/81 6,835 4.050 592

4.06 In 1979/80, the Bougouriba ORD produced some 4,700 tons of cotton,or about 6% of the total 75,100 tons purchased by CFDT nation-wide, thehighest percentage of the national production ever. Because of adverseclimatic conditions in 1977/78, the area under cotton decreased from 7,208 hato 6,000 ha the following year; farmers probably decreased the amount of landunder cotton to switch to foodcrops. From discussions in the field, it is

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believed that the total land under cotton, in the Bougouriba ORD, wouldremain in the range of 6,000-8,500 ha, for the next few years, depending onclimatic conditions. Appraisal forecasts were generally correct regarding theannual area increases for cotton during the first two years of the project,but were over-optimistic beyond 1976/77. As a result, it is expected thatthere would be a lag of 2/3 years in reaching appraisal targetL for area undercotton; the targets are expected to be achieved under Phase II.

4.07 On examining the yields' column of the table in para 4.05, it isnoticed that during first three project year no progress is shown and even thebaseline figure of 400 kg/ha was not reached. Several observations have to bcmade: (i) as said in para 3.05, the project did not have any impact beforePY3, being totally involved in recruiting adequate extension staff, trainingit, and being otherwised occupied in completing its organization; (ii) 1977/78suffered adverse climatic conditions, not only affecting yields, but alsoforcing farmers to reduce their cotton acreage in the following year; and(iii) by that time, on the recommendation of the supervision missions, theproject hired an expatriate specialist in cotton-production (from CFDT). Onlythen could serious extension work (and distribution of inputs) begin; theresults are felt in the following years, with yields immediately rising toabout 600 kg/ha (665 kg/ha in 1979-80). This is still below the appraisalestimate of 813 kg/ha (-22%), and also below the national average of 837 kg/haachieved in 1978/79.

4.08 Within the Bougouriba ORD, the area under cotton, number of farmersand size of plots have varied since 1975/76, as shown in this table:

Table 4.2: NUMBER OF COTTON FARMERS AND SIZE OF HOLDINGS

Area (ha) Average Area per Farmer Number of Cotton GrowersYear North South ORD North South ORD North South ORD

1975/76 4,784 75 4,859 0.73 0.15 0.69 6,519 493 7,0121976/77 6,811 205 7,016 0.92 0.20 0.81 7,347 1,025 8,3721977/78 7,022 186 7,208 0.99 0.20 0.90 7,061 930 7,99i1978/79 5,685 315 6,000 1.02 0.20 0.84 5,555 1,565 7,1151979/80 7,690 445 7,035 1.09 0.25 0.89 6,042 1,780 7,822

The difference bctween the North, the main cotton zone, and South should benoted. The take-off in cotton plantings was slow in the South reaching atotal of 445 ha by project's end. On the other hand it increased by 38%, to6,590 ha, in the North. The number of farmers in the South rose by 72% to1,780, whereas their number decreased by about 7% in the North; one particularreason for this was the drought in 1977/78. Also of interest, the averagesize of cotton plots per farm unit amounts to 1.09 ha in the North and 0.25 hain the South. At appraisal, it was estimated that by 1978, some 16,000 farmunits would be involved in growing cotton. In fact, the actual number in1978/79 was only 7,822 growers.

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4.09 Total production in PY5 (1979/80) was 4,679 tons, compared toappraisal estimates of 9,756 tons, or 48%; but as the project was very slow instarting having an impact, and the take-off did not really start until PY3, wewill compare the project's PY5 achievements to both PY3 and PY5 appraisalestimates:

Appraisal EstimatesProject's

PY5 Percentage of Percentage ofAchievements PY5 Achievement PY3 Achievement

Number of farmers 7,822 16,000 49 13,200 59Average plot (ha) 0.89 0.75 119 0.65 137Area under culti-

vation (ha) 7,035 12,000 59 8,750 80Yields (kg/ha) 665 813 82 720 92Total production(tons) 4,679 9,756 48 6,300 74

4.10 The main reason why the project's achievements seems low, even ifcompared to the appraisal's PY3 target, is that the baseline estimates wereoverestimated in the SAR. One of the assumptions used were that there were10,000 cotton farmers in the project, which would increase as follows:

PYl PY2 PY3 PY4

Number of farmers 10,000 10,500 13,200 16,000Increase 500 3,200 2,800Percentage of increase 5 26 21Overall increase - 32 60

The project seriously questions these figures. Their field surveys lead themto state that there was a core of farmers (about 7,000) who have been cottongrowers for years, and will probably stick to that crop and both slightlyexpand and improve, to whom marginal numbers could be added as a result of theextension action. Even then, the new farmers would remain shy and abandoncotton for foodcrops whenever climatic conditions are adverse and susbsistencebecomes the main problem. Even for the core of cotton growers, 60% apply only105 kg/ha of fertilizer, instead of the recommended 150 kg/ha plus 50 kg ofurea. The only way for these farmers to reach the 800 kg/ha yield target isto follow the fertilization recommendation, which, together with improvedhusbandry already making progress, could even result in yields of between1,000/1,200 kg/ha; these are the targets of the Second Bougouriba Project.

Cereals (Sorghum, Millet and Maize)

4.11 Returning to the Production Table, Annex 3, Table 2 (para 4.04), thecomparison of both lines for cereals production is as follows, using PY1 asbaseline:

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Table 4.3: COMPARISON BETWEEN APPRAISAL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATEDACTUAL PRODUCTION OF ALL CEREALS

(Sorghum, miliet and maize) PYl PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6

Appraisal Estimates:Production (metric tons) 116,200 117,800 119,400 122,500 122,500 122,500

Estimated Actual Production: 73,432 69,111 73,028 75,778 78,063 77,115

Appr. Yearly Progress % - 101.4 101.4 102.6 100.0 100.0

Appr. Overal Progress - - 102.8 105.4 105.4 105.4

Estimated Real Achievements:Yearly - 94.0 105.7 103.8 103.0 99.0Overall - - 99.5 103.2 106.3 105.0

4.12 The percentage of production increase shown by this stream is inline with appraisal estimates, an overall 5% over the 4-year period; thelatest production figures indicate that this performance is maintained.Evidently, this percentage applied to a lower baseline shows an incrementalproduction due to the project much lower than appraisal estimates, but thenit is obvious that these estimates were inflated.

4.13 Project managemcnt has established its estimates of actual produc-tion (Annex 3, Table 2), essentially by analyzing population figures, averagefood consumption requirements, the number of farms, and the estimated averagefarm area under millet and sorghum; gross yields of these crops in 1980/81 inthe area were estimated to be in order of 530 kg/ha, for all project farmers.The impact of the project on foodcrops farmers reached only about 10,000farmers out of the estimated 33,000 in the area. These "progressive" farmershave improved their yields to an estimated 625 kg/ha PY5, thus indicating thatthe other farmers have remained with yields of under 480 kg/ha. In theappraisal of the Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project, fourmodels representing the lowest level farmers were presented, with bracketsshowing the range of yields within which these farmers were expected toprogress. 1/ The appraisal report stated (para 5.02) that the emphasis in themodels was on the incremental yield changes possible (on average an increaseof 150 kg/ha was forecast for sorghum) 2/, in view of the fact that data on

1/ Sorghum 400-600 kg/ha millet 350-550 kg/ha and maize 700-900 kg/ha.

2/ Which is a reasonable expectation based of Phase I results.

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actual yields was inadequate, and the monitoring service would attempt toimprove the statistics of actual yields. Comprehensive survey were carriedout in 1979/80 in 1981/82 and the results are currently being analyzed.Consultant services under Bougouriba II will be used to establish a system bywhich areas, number of farmers and actual yields could be efficiently monitored.

Groundnuts and Rice

4.14 Groundnuts. The appraisal data for this crop was that about 20,000ha were in cultivation before the start of the project, producing about 8,700tons at yields averaging 435 kg/ha. The project's targets for groundnuts weremodest: only 600 ha would shift to improved cultivation (mainly throughselected seeds and fertilizer) to reach yields of 800 kg/ha, while the otherareas would rise their yields to 450 kg/ha only. Statistics drawn by theproject show that groundnuts occupy a much smaller area than estimated atappraisal. Basic data of groundnut cultivation under the project is asfollows:

Table 4.4: GROUNDNUT PRODUCTION

Average sizeYear Acreage Production Yield of pilot

(ha) (tons) kg/ha (ha)

1975/76 5,439 2,311 425 0.171976/77 5,820 2,328 400 0.181977/78 5,241 2,106 402 0.161978/79 5,344 2,538 475 0.171979/80 5,456 2,728 500 0.17

4.15 Project management reports that some 100 tons of selected groundnutseed were distributed to farmers between 1976/77 and 1979/80. Assuming asowing rate of 80 kg/ha of unshelled seed, the 100 tons of selected seedallowed for the sowing of 1,250 ha. Based on numerous FAO demonstration plots(i.e. 182 trials in 1978/79) the average yield for the local varieties chosenwas 1,100 kg/ha compared to a potential yield of 1,500 kg/ha. It is estimatedthat, in the farmers' environment, the obtaintable average yield is about700 kg/ha, as most cultural practices were not adopted until 1978/79, at thetime that the extension services started reaching groundnuts farmers.

4.16 The project also provided farmers with some 65 tons of fertilizersduring the last four years. It is estimated that, based on a traditionalapplication of 75 kg/ha, some 860 ha of land received some fertilizer. Thecombined effect of the selected seed and the use of fertilizers (assuming thesame farms are considered) allows a final yield of 1,000 kg/ha over 860 ha and700 kg/ha over some 410 ha. The ensuing production is evaluated at 1,150 tons.

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It is assumed that the overall production without the project would have beenabout 570 tons (with an average of 450 kg/ha). Therefore, the induced produc-tion over the past four years is estimated at some 580 tons or 145 tons peryear. This represents only 5% of the project's annual average production of2,500 tons of groundnuts.

4.17 Rice. It was estimated at appraisal that the project area had some3,000 ha under rice cultivation, producing 2,700 tons with an average yieldof 900 kg/ha, in 1972. It was thought that the total area would hardly vary,from 3,000 ha to 3,050 ha, by PY4, but that some 550 ha of both upland andswamps would be improved, of the latter total. The overall production wasforecast to increase from 2,700 to 3,017 tons. Yields from the 500 ha ofimproved upland area would rise from 900 kg/ha to 1,200 kg/ha. Similarly,yields would increase from 1,000 kg/ha to 2,000 kg/ha in the sixth yearof development. The following table provides the basic data for rice cul-tivation over the past five years:

Table 4.5: RICE PRODUCTION

Year Acreage Production Yield Average Size of Plot(ha) (tons) (kg/ha) (ha)

1975/76 3,200 2,240 700 0.101976/77 3,200 2,240 700 0.101977/78 2,879 2,225 773 0.091978/79 3,686 2,949 800 0.11

Project management cautioned that the data provided was based on rough esti-mates, especially for the first two years. Furthermore, although the projectsold some 19 tons of selected rice seed that allowed for the sowing of 316 ha(at a sowing rate of 60 kg/ha), no distinction was made between upland andswamps.

4.18 Apart from selected seed, the project has not yet brought in anymajor improvement in rice cultivation. Water control measures should beimproved and the use of fertilizers and pesticides need to become more wide-spread. Based on the quantities of seed sold to farmers and in the absence ofother improving cultivation methods, the mission estimates the possible annualproduction increase at 20% for the limited areas with selected seed. It isestimated that the average annual rice production due to the project is about20-25 tons, which is minor indeed when compared to the total production of2,949 tons.

B. Livestock Development

4.19 Upper Volta is a transit area for cattle, and the Bougouriba regionis on the path of travelling herds, hence the high risk of contagion of cattlediseases. This situation created numerous centers of contagious rinderpest in

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1974, and pleuropneumonia appeared in 1972 and remained a threat. The maineffects of the first phase project have been to improve the health of thevarious herds in the project area; vaccination of all cattle against rinder-pest was carried during the first years of the project, followed by a sys-tematic vaccination annually for all cattle under one year of age, accompaniedby continous vaccination of cattle where contagious bovine pleuropneumoniaappeared. The following statistics have been computed:

Rinderpest 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79

Contagious centers 19 - - - -

Vaccinations 58,061 40,361 70,764 57,015 65,863

Pleuropneumonia

Contagious centers 2 6 - 1 -Vaccination 33,841 38,353 50,042 54,145 21,980

These campaigns have been successful, as no new contagious centers wereobserved since. Intensive campaigns of deworming have also been carried outthroughout the project area.

4.20 The herd population remained constant during those years; theconsultant involved in the preparation of the second phase project estimatedthe herd population to have remained practically unchanged, from 128,485 headsof cattle in PY2 to 130,000 in the final year. The benefits of the healthcampaign and the ensuing lower mortality rate resulted in a higher output ratewhich improved by about 18%; this output rate was estimated at appraisal at10.5%, advancing thus to 12.5%. The value of the incremental meat productionhas been estimated in the following table prepared by the Consultant (inmillions of CFAF, 1981 prices).

Table 4.6: MEAT PRODUCTION

Meat Production Meat Production Value of IncrementalPY with project without project Meat production

1975/76 1 n.a. n.a. -1976/77 2 421.2 401.0 20.21977/78 3 444.6 394.3 50.31978/79 4 464.7 410.6 54.11979/80 5 469.4 426.2 43.31980/81 6 458.4 428.0 30.4

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V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

5.01 Tb- project was instrumental in establishing at Diebougou a completeagricultuidl development organization. The ORD of Bougouriba, with itsoffices, equipment, fleet of vehicles, repair workshop and other auxiliaryservices serves as a support to the main operational divisions: agriculturaldevelopment, which includes extension services sprcad over seven sectors, seedmultiplication services, ox-drawn cultivation training and support, assistanceto farmers' groups and a household economics section; a supplies and storesdivision, a Livestock division, and an anti-erosion works section. Theextension services, together with the farmers' group section, supervize theallocation of credit to farmers for cotton inputs (seasonal credit), and foranimal traction equipment. The credit officers are now being trained andorganized by CNCA (The National Agricultural Credit Organization), which willtake over responsibility for agricultural credit, but would continue operatingthrough the ORD's credit offices.

5.02 The agricultural impact of this organization was very slow todevelop (mainly due to underestimated difficulties in attracting and keepingqualified personnel, and to the needs to train them); however, its activitiesin the project area were certainly a determining effort in motivating farmers,in rehabilitating infrastructure (the roads and wells program were certainly asuccess), in improving input supplies (although practically limited to cottongrowers in Phase I, but slowly expanding to the whole farming population),in organizing credit through farmers' groups, in forming seed-productionfarmers--in general in building itself as the motor of agricultural drive inthe project region.

5.03 Project management made the extension service its first staffingpriority; recruiting adequate agents in sufficient numbers, training them andtrying them in the field, eliminating deadwood and training new recruits --this process took the project the best of its first two years of existence.All supervision reports from October 1975 to February 1978 described theextension service as "inexperienced". Efficiency of the extension servicesstarted improving in PY3 (1977/78). Project management estimates that farmersadopting either part or all of the improved package for cotton started from alow of about 2% in 1976, and had increased to 70% in 1979. Appraisal forecastswere clearly optimistic in the assumption that 90% of the cotton growers wouldhave adopted improved practices by 1977. According to project estimates,the number of cotton farmers reached by the project extension service since1975/76 amounts to:

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Table 5.1: EXTENSION SERVICE AND COTTON FARMERS REACHED

Estimated %Progressive Total number of farmers

Ext. farmers per of progressive Number of adopt-newYear Agent ext. agent farmers Cotton growers methods

1975/76 13 10 130 7,012 21976/77 129 10 1,290 8,372 151977/78 139 20 2,780 7,813 351978/79 140 30 4,200 7,115 601979/80 134 40 5,360 7,822 70

5.04 It is, however, more difficult to determine the effectiveness ofextension agents in relation to foodcrops. Besides the cotton-growing cerealsproducers, the number of which is well known, there is little information onthe other cereals producers likely to have adopted extension agents' advice.Most assumptions are based on the adoption by farmers of better husbandrypractices (i.e. early planting and weeding). Farmers having improved theircultural practices are estimated as follows, with the percentages relating tothe whole farming population.

Table 5.2: FOODCROP AND COTTON FARMERS REACHED

ProgressiveNumber of Number of Number of farmers Percentage

Year ext. agents farmers foodcrops cotton Total of total

75-76 13 32,000 1,500 130 1,650 576-77 129 32,320 2,500 1,290 3,800 1277-78 139 32,643 3,500 2,780 6,300 2078-79 140 32,970 4,200 4,200 8,400 2579-80 134 33,300 4,700 5,360 10,000 30

5.05 The impact of the extension service started to be effective onthe cotton farmers after 1978, with the arrival of the expatriate specialist(para 4.08) while its influence on foodcrop farmers has been marginal; therehas been no take-off in fertilizer use, and farmers are reluctant to use newvarieties for "safety" reasons, as subsistence still remains their underlyinggoal. The traditional system emphasizes food security and high returnsthrough mixed cropping and considerable variability in time of planting,density, etc. The recommended practices stressing on sole cropping, newvarieties and rigid guidelines for time of planting, spacing and otherhusbandry improvements were accepted very slowly, and even then limited toimproved husbandry. Use of selected improved seeds were limited to rice andyam plots.

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5.06 The project has also been instrumental in developing farmers'groups, a stage preceeding the setting-up of a cooperative; the number ofcooperatives in the project area remained the same throughout the project life(six cooperatives), while the number of farmer's groups increased from 24 inPY1 to 63 in PY6. These groups are very important for the development ofagricultural credit, particularly for animal traction equipment; the number ofmembers increased from 6,088 in PY1 to about 8,000 by the project's end.

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VI. ECONOMIC EVALUATION

6.01 There are reliable data on cotton production figures compiled bythe national cotton marketing agency. Data on production of foodrcrops areless certain and consist of estimates worked out by the project based onvarious assumptions, the main one being the level of production necessary tokeep the area self-sufficient (which it is). Although this approach has itsvalue (and some of the supervision missions who examined the results agreedthat these figures were indicative of production levels), these estimates,in the absence of reliable baseline data could not be used in analyzingthe economic impact of the project. It was therefore necessary to betterevaluate the incremental production of foodcrops as a direct result of theproject's activities.

6.02 The supervision mission of December 1979 (report dated February 14,1980) made an elaborate analysis of higher production due to improved agricul-tural techniques, the use of fertilizer and chemicals, and improved seeds.Incremental production measured in that way was used in the economic reevalua-tion of the project. To the benefits of incremental production have beenadded the value of labor savings resulting from the availability of the 119wells built by the project, road users savings resulting from the constructionof 660 km of rural roads, and the value of higher meat production resultingfrom improved animal health achieved by the project. The methodology isexplained in a working paper 1/ on file, which must be read in conjunctionwith the supervision report mentioned above.

6.03 Project costs have been taken from project audit reports. Inaddition, the value of inputs paid by farmers, Government subsidies on inputsand the estimated value of the additional farm labor necessary to achievehigher production have been taken into account.

6.04 The economic analysis is based on a time span of 20 years, of whichfive have elapsed. For the future, the project induced incremental productionin 1979 (which had about average climatic conditions) reduced by 90 percentto account for periodic droughts, have been retained. On the cost side, theestimated expenditures necessary to consolidate achieved production levels andto maintain roads and wells have been included, together with inputs (at theirfull economic cost) and the imputed value of incremental farm labor. Projectcosts and benefits are given in Annex 4, Tables 1-3.

6.05 Under the above assumption, the rate of return of the project isestimated at 16.7%. This is considerably less than the 68% estimated atappraisal. The lower rate is primarly due primarily to lower absoluteincreases in cotton and cereal production.

1/ Intermediary Evaluation of the First Bougouriba Agricultural DevelopmentProject - updated June 1982.

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VII. BANK PERFORMANCE

7.01 ' 3 was one of the first agricultural projects appraised by theBank in Upper Volta (1973), and it would be useful to try to identify theweaknesses in the appraisal report which led to what appears as below-parimplementation. In the first place the sketchy data available at appraisalresulted in setting physical targets which soon proved to be unattainable.Even in cotton production, where relatively reliable information was col-lected, the appraisal report substantially overestimated the number of newfarmers that would shift to cotton; this simply did not happen in an areawhere farmers give priority to foodcrops, and, apparently, venture into a newcultivation only if limatic conditions are particularly favorable, and if theyfeel sure that their foodcrop production is not threatened by the change.

7.02 The technical assistance offered by the SAR to the Ministry ofRural Development was not a success; the Bank knows now that you cannot expectmuch from an isolated effort, in one Ministry, with one technical assistant.Providing adequate technical assistance to a Government, at the right level,in sufficient strength and with a clear understanding of purposes and resultsexpected, is one of the most difficult exercises, and we still have a long wayto go. The failure of the effort under Bougouriba I should not be a surprise.

7.03 Finally, it is now obvious that more attention should be given todesign. In formulating the follow-up to this first project, a number oflessons were drawn, and changes in emphasis which seemed to be desirable in thelight of experience introduced. Firstly, although technical packages are nowbetter adapted to the region, emphasis should continue on basic husbandrythemes at farmer level, coupled with improved communications in both directionswith research. Secondly, whilst the first project has organized in-housetraining and introduced the training and visit system, greater attention totraining, to organization of the extension program, and the separationof commercial functions from extension has proven to be desirable. Thirdly,although much better knowledge of the project area is now avalable, it will benecessary to devote more resources to monitoring project progress. Managementattention needs to be focussed on clearly set production objectives, in orderto avoid the ever-present risk of attempting to tackle too much in an areawith many avenues of development potential.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

8.01 The Bougouriba ADP was the first phase in a long-term program todevelop human and agricultural resources of the region; it was also one of thefirst projects of that nature, centering around small farmers in the SouthWest. The very sketchy, and often unreliable, data on all aspects of agricul-tural production in the area resulted in appraisal estimates (and developmenttargets) which could not be retained as working hypothesis. As a matter offact the collection of reliable data is still to be carried-out, and isexpected to be seriously addressed under the follow-up project, both throughbetter monitoring and the use of consultants.

8.02 The project did not have as large an impact on agricultural produc-tion as originally forecasted; yet it improved productivity on cotton substan-tially and very probably helped keep the area self-sufficient in foodcrops.The influence on foodcrop farmers has been very limited and more vigorousextension activities geared mainly at improving yields are envisaged underPhase II; this improved productivity could release labor for other activitiessuch as expanding cotton acreage. The project has been much more successfulin providing the area with essential and badly-needed infrastructure: itswells and roads building programs have achieved their targets. Its institu-tion-building was positive, and the area is endowed now with a completeagricultural development organization, whose potential is expected to be fullyexploited under the follow-up project.

8.03 The economic benefits achieved, based solely on incremental produc-tion that could be directly attributed to the project's impact, result in anERR of about 17% which is reasonable for a first phase project in a backwardarea. The building-up of agricultural services of the kind existing now inthe Bougouriba region would have been justified even if the return werenot at that level. It must be stressed that, in the absence of carefully

monitored data, most benefits (except for cotton) are best estimates checkedand accepted by successive supervision missions.

8.04 The project has also maintained accounts in a most satisfactorymanner, as vouched for by the Auditors, Coopers and Lybrand. The need forbetter cost-accounting and determination of unit prices has arisen, and

steps have been taken to remedy that shortcoming under Phase II. Withdrawalapplications have been presented in a timely fashion, and together withgenerally regular Government contributions, enabled the project to run itsfinances without constraints. Because of the slow start, and the lapse oftime before full project development took place, the estimate contained inthe SAR for a 4-year project span was sufficient to expand the project life

to a fifth-year within the original funds.

- 45 -

UPPER VOLTA Annex 1

Bougouriba Agricultural Dev. Project

Project Completion Report

Roads Built and Maintained

Roads or Track Opening & Regravelling Maintenance and RepairsShaping

(km) (ko) (km)

Djipologo- PA 80 80 15 + 80 + 80 + 80 +8o + o

Dano - Dissin 38 38 20 + 38 + 38 + 23

Bouroum - Nako 26 - 1/ 26

Nako-Dapola-Malba-Borml 49 49 49 + 17 + 49 + 49 + 49

Dissin - Zambo 17 17 5 + 17 + 17 + 17

Tiankoura - Diassara 56 56 56 + 56 +-56

Bouroum-Dipio-Lorop6ni 70 70 70 + 70

Lorop6ni - Kampti 20 20 20 + 20

Lonkoura - Mougu6 28 28 28 + 28 + 28 + 28

Bondigui - Wan 5 5 5

Latara - Bati6 66 66 66

Oronkua-Ponlaba-Founzaa 59 59 59 + 59

Oronkua - Indini 34 - 34

Dissin-Binvar 6 6 6 + 6

Gora - Tovor 7 - j/ 7 + 4

Nako-Jonct.Gaoua 31 31 -

Dano-Gu6gubri-Nakar 30 - 2/ 17

KoVIoho - Founzan 10 - 2/ 10

Iridiaka - Boussera 14 14

TOTAUX( 646 539 1.492

1/ No need for regravelling.

2/ Spot regravelling only - complete regravelling yet to be done.

UPPER VOLTA

Bougouriba Agricultural Developnent Project

Project Completion Report

Comparison between Appraisal Estimates and Total Pro3ect costs

(CFAF million)

PYI 1975/76 PY2 1976/77 PY3 1977/78 PY4 1978/79 P15 Total Project EEC Financed

Appraisal / Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Actual Appraisal Actual Interim Year TOTAL4/80-3/81 1st Phase

SALARIES & OPER. EXPENSES

MRD Support 10.8 1.1 21.2 3.7 23.2 3.3 25.7 2.6 - 80.9 10.7 - 10.7

ORD Headquarters 29.7 34.7 45.6 77.4 49.9 76.1 55.3 79.1 89.7 180.5 357.0 88.5 445.5

Agricultural Development 61.3 41.9 137.1 68.9 156.7 104.3 180.5 143.6 159.0 535.6 517.T 163.2 680.9

Livestock Services 15.8 3.5 24.7 8.4 25.4 16.1 27.8 15.0 18.1 93.7 61.1 14.7 75.8

Training 16.8 0.5 35.3 7.8 4o.o 6.2 44.8 2.7 1.4 136.9 18.6 1.5 20.1

Research & Seed Multiplication 24.7 0.5 48.7 2.3 51.9 7.0 56.8 7.2 10.2 182.1 27.2 8.7 35.9

Wells Program 22.6 6.8 56.1 23.2 59.4 32.5 64.2 32.6 13.3 202.3 108.6 2.8 111.2

Roads Program 6.0 17.2 44.9 134.7 47.3 106.2 51.0 120.9 101.3 149.2 480.3 41.3 521.6

Topographic Unit - 0.9 5.0 4.6 5.4 11.3 5.7 18.9 13.0 16.1 48.7 9.0 57.7

Farm Inputs 12.3 9.3 52.9 28.3 113.8 15.9 151.8 12.6 - 330.8 66.1 - 66.1

Studies 8.4 - 32.8 - 45.1 - 16.2 - - 102.5 - - -

Sub-total: 208.4 116.4 04.3 359.3 618.1 378.9 679.8 435.2 406.0 2,010.6 1,695.8 329.7 2,025.5

INVESTMENTS:

Buildings 170.0 29.5 67.1 ,6.4 15.4 32.0 15.0 38.1 62.5 267.5 188.5 20.1 208.6

Vehicles 41.5 42.0 17.2 23.3 - 9.3 46.0 14.1 - 104.7 88.7 - 88.7

Road Bldg. Equipment - - 52.2 170.8 4.8 - 5.2 23.3 9.3 62.2 203.4 - 203.4

Other Equipment 29,6 10.2 61.6 3.4 6.7 8.7 7.1 5.3 - 105.0 27.6 - 27.6

Sub-total: 241.1 81.7 198.1 223.9 26.9 50.0 73.3 80.8 71.8 539.4 508.2 20.1 528.3

Yearly Total: 449.5 198.1 702.4 583.2 645.0 428.9 753.1 516.0 477.8 2,550.0 2,204.0 349.8 2,553.8

1/ From Table 1, Annex 15 of SAR (inflated).

47 Annex 2Table 2

UPPER VOLTA

Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project

Project Completion Report

Breakdown of Expenditure by Categories (Million CFAF)

1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81

Salaries

Administration 10.8 25.6 29.4 37.2 40.8 40.2Agricultural Develop. 29.4 53.9 81.3 106.9 132.4 124.1Livestock 1.0 3.2 7.2 11.3 12.2 10.5Training 0.5 6.4 4.4 2.7 1.4 1.5Research & Seed Mult. 0.5 2.0 5.0 5.8 5.9 5.2

42.2 91.1 127.3 163.9 192.7 181.5

Buildings 29.5 26.4 32.0 38.1 62.5 20.1

Vehicles & Equip. 52.2 26.7 18.0 19.4 - -

Operating Expenses 40.0 77.4 85.7 86.3 85.7 95.1

Roads Program: Equip. - 170.8 - 23.3 9.3 -Operating Expenses 17.2 134.7 106.2 120.9 101.3 41.3

Sub-total: 17.2 305.5 106.2 144.2 110.6 41.3

Wells Program 6.8 23.2 32.5 32.6 13.3 2.8

Topographical Unit 0.9 4.6 11.3 18.9 13.0 9.0

Farm Inputs 9.3 28.3 15.9 12.6 - -

Total: 198.1 583.2 428.9 516.0 477.8 349.8

UPPER VOLTA

Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project

Project Ccmpletion Report

Comparison between Appraisal Estimates and Actual Production

Cotton

Acreage, Yields and Production 0 197/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81

A. Appraisal Estimates

Area:ha 5,000 5,500 6,000 8,750 12,000 12,000 -

Production:tons 2,000 2,684 3,798 6,300 9,756 9,756 -

Estimated average yields (kg/ha) (4oo) (488) (633) (720) (813) (813) -

B. Estimated acutal results

Area:ha 4,859 7,016 7,208 6,000 7,036 6,835

Production:tons 1,837 2,483 1,802 3,412 4,679 4,050Estimated average yields (kg/ha) (378) (354) (249) (568) (665) (592)

Estimated yearly increase 134.2% 141.5% 166% 154.9% - -

Estimated overall iicrease - 190% 315% 488% - -

Actual yearly increase - 135% 72.6% 189.3% 137% 86.6%

Actual overall increase - - 98% 185.7% 254.7% 220.5%

P(aXF, ~

UPPLR VOLTA

Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project

Project Completion Report

Comparison between Appraisal Estimates and Actual Production

PYO PY1 PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 P6Acreage, Yields and Production (1974/75) 197/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81

A. Appraisal Estimates

Sorghum and MilletArea:ha 141,000 141,000 140,750 140,000 138,500 138,500 138,500Production:tons 98,700 98,700 99,800 99,900 100,000 -100,000 100,000

Estimated yields (kg/ha) (700) (700) (709) (714) (722) (722) (722)

MaizeArea:ha 25,000 25,000 25,250 26,000 27,500 .27,500 27,500

Production:tons 17,500 17,500 18,000 19,500 22,500 22,500 22,500Estimated yields (kg/ha) (700) (700) (713) (750) (818) (918) (818)

Total all CerealsArea:ha 166,000 166,000 166,000 166,000 166,000 166,000 166,000Production:tons 116,200 116,200 117,800 119,400 122,500 122,500 122,500

Estimated average yields (kg/ha) (700) (700) (710) (719) (738) (738) (738)

Estimated yearly progress 101.4% 101.4% 102.6% 102.6% 102.6%Estimated overall progress 102.8% 105.4% 105.4% 105.4%

B. Estimated actual results

Sorgnum and MilletArea:ha 131,474 132,080 133,288 133,269 i32,542 132,126Production:tons 67,768 63,794 67,443 69,966 71,572 70,160

Estimated Yields (kg/ha) (515) (483) (506) (525) (540) (531)

MaizeArea:ha 7,696 7,729 7,800 7,802 8,510 9,237Production:tons 5,664 5,317 5,585 5,812 6,501 6,955

Estimated yields (kg/ha) (736) (688) (716) (745) (764) (753)

Total all CerealsArea:ha 139,170 139,809 141,088 141,071 141,052 141,363Production:tons 73,432 69,111 73,028 75,778 78,063 77,115

Estimated average yields(kg/ha) (527) (494) (517) (537) (553) (545)

Estimated yearly progress 94% 105.7% 103.8% 103% 99%Estimated overall progress 99.5% 103.2% 106.3% 105%

UPPER VOLTA

FIRST BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

INCREMENTAL CROP PRODUCTIONY ECONOMIC PRICES AND VALUES

(QUANTITIES IN METRIC TONS)

(PRICES IN 1,000 CFA FRANCS)

(VALUES IN MILLIONS OF CFA FRANCS)

YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 986-1994

QUANTITIES

COTTON 24.0 1043.0 575.0 1444.0 2696.0 2210.0 2210.0 2210.0 2210.0 2210.0 2210.0 2210.0GROUNDNUTS (UNSHELLED) 0.0 104.0 58.0 145.0 273.0 224.0 22440 224.0 224.0 224.0 224.0 224.0RICE (PADDY) 0.0 22.0 12.0 31.0 57.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0CEREALS 0.0 1291.0 717.0 1793.0 3371.0 2764.0 2764.0 2764.0 2764.0 2764.0 2764.0 2764.0 0

ECONOMIC PRICES

COTTON 110.5 176.6 154.0 110.5 102,4 118.6 109.6 97.8 109.6 115.9 127.7 127.7GROUNDNUTS (UNSHELLED) 0.0 67.8 68.3 68.7 69.1 69.4 69.8 69.9 70.1 70.4 71.1 71.1RICE (PADDY) 0.0 105.1 79.9 79.1 86.9 74.7 84.2 94.5 68.1 70.6 77.1 83.9CEREALS 0.0 84.1 73.5 70.0 71.0 73.5 74.6 68.1 68.4 71.3 75.1 75.1

VALUE OF INCR. PROD.

COTTON 2.7 184.2 88.6 159.6 276.1 262.1 242.2 216.1 242.2 256.1 282.2 282.2GROUNDNUTS (UNSHELLED) 0.0 7.1 4.0 10.0 18.9 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.9RICE (PADDY) 0#0 2.3 1.0 2.5 4.9 3.5 4.0 4.4 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.9CEREALS 0.0 108.6 52.7 125.5 239.3 203.2 206.2 188.2 189.1 197.1 207.6 207.6

TOTAL EC. VALUE 2.7 302.1 146.2 297.5 539.2 484.3 468.0 424.5 450.2 472.3 509.3 509.7

UPPER VOLTA

FIRST BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

WELL CONSTRUCTION AND ROAD BENEFITS

(MILLIONS OF CFA FRANCS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)

YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 986-1994

(1) WELL BENEFITS 0.00 17.80 44.40 88.70 132.00 132.00 132.00 132.00 132.00 132.00 132.00 132.00

(2) ROAD BENEFITS 0.00 38.80 77.60 116.40 155.20 194.00 194.00 194.00 194.00 194.00 194.00 194.00

(3) WELL+ROAD BENEFITS 0.00 56.60 122.00 205.10 287.20 326.00 326.00 326.00 326.00 326.00 326.00 326.00

(4) TOTAL BENEFITS 2.65 358.73 300.87 584.09 914.02 880.32 843.20 807.17 832.88 855.00 892.04 892.36

(5) .... (1) AS % OF (4) 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15

(6) .... (2) AS % OF (4) 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22

(7) .... (3) AS % OF (4) 0.00 0.16 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37

UPPER VOLTA

FIRST BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

PROJECT COST AND BENEFITS

(MILLIONS OF CFA FRANCS)

YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 986-1994

BENEFITS

INCR. COTTON PROD. 2.7 184.2 88.6 159.6 276.1 262.1 242.2 216.1 242.2 256.1 282.2 282.2

INCR. GROUNDNUT PROD. 0.0 7.1 4.0 10.0 18.9 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.9INCR. RICE PROD. 0.0 2.3 1.0 2.5 4.9 3.5 4.0 4.4 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.9INCR. CEREALS PROD. 0.0 108.6 52.7 125.5 239.3 203.2 206.2 188.2 189.1 197.1 207.6 207.6

INCR. BEEF PROD. 0.0 0.0 32.7 81.5 87.6 70.0 49.2 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7WELL CONSTR. BENEFITS 0.0 17.8 44.4 88.7 132.0 132+0 132.0 132.0 132.0 132.0 132.0 132'.0 tROAD USER SAVINGS 0.0 38.8 77.6 116.4 155.2 194.0 194.0 194.0 194.0 194.0 194.0 194.0

TOTAL PROJECT BENEFITS 2.7 358.7 300.9 584,1 914.0 880.3 843.2 807.2 832.9 855.0 892.0 892.4

COST

SALARIES 69.1 142.8 175.1 199.6 220.2 184.1 59.0 59.0 59.0 59.0 59.0 59.0EQUIPMENT 96.6 345.9 69.5 91.7 25,8 2.8 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

OPERATING 93*6 332.4 264.0 252.4 213.7 138.3 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0CIVIL WORKS 48.3 41.4 44+0 46.4 71.4 20.4 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0MISCELLANEOUS EXP. 1.5 7.2 15.5 23.0 14.9 9.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0IMPUTED LABOR COSTS 0.8 102.7 50.7 989 161.9 132.8 135.1 151.9 159.2 166.4 176.8 176.8INPUT SUBSIDIES 84.2 148.3 97.3 54.0 85.1 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0

TOTAL PROJECT COST 394.1 1120.7 716.1 766.0 793.0 562.5 320.1 336.9 344.2 351.4 361.8 361.8

m

Aw 4

-S3- Annex 5

UPPER VOLTA

DOUCOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - CREDIT 496-UV

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Key Indicators for PY5 (1979/80)

(Note: For detailed discussion of project results, see Annex 7 and associatedtables of Supervision Report of February 14, 1980.)

Indicator Unit Appraisal Estimate Percentage

Area: Cotton ha 12,000 7,035 1/ 58Sorghum, Millets ha 138,500) 123,876 75Maize ha 27,500) - -Groundnuts ha 20,000 5,456 27Rice ha 3,050 3,686 121Yams ha 3,000 3,312 110

Yields: Cotton kg/ha 813 665 82Sorghum kg/ha 722 540 75Maize kg/ha 818 764 93Groundnuts kg/ha 462 500 108Rice kg/ha - 800 -Yams kg/ha 9,000 6,000 66

Production:Cotton tons 9,756 4,679 48Sorghum, Millets tons 190,000) 71,572 58Maize tons 22,500) - -Groundnuts. tons 9,247 2,728 29Rice tons 3,017 2,949 97Yams tons - 19,872 -

Inputs: Cotton fertilizer tons 480 483 100Urea tons 80 - -Cotton treated ha 10,800 2,588Improved seed used tons - 58.7 -

Infrastructure:Second roads constructed Km 200 )Feeder roads constructed Km 460 646 98Wells constructed No. 120 119 100

1/ Project entimates include all cereals.2/ Treated three times, which is a minimum.

54 Annex 6

UPPER VOLTA

BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - CREDIT 496-UV

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Project Organization and Objectives

Appraisal Actual

Project Objectives or Focus

Increased Acreage - Cotton 100% 59%- Cereals 100% 96%

Increased Yields - Cotton 100% 82%- Cereals 100% 75%

Technological Improvement 100% 25%Integrated Rural Development:

Rural Roads 100% 98%Village Water Supply 100% 100%

Project Organization and Performance

Project Unit Just Established AdequateRural Development Works (HER) Existing AdequateMinistry of Rural Development Existing AdequateMixed Economy Corporation (SOFITEX Cotton Co.) Existing Good

Institution Building

Focus of Effort 100% 100%Means - Financial 100% 100%

- Qualified Manpower 100% 70%Achievement of Objective 100% 80%

IBRD l 728 1 (PCR)UNE 1983

4-UPPER VOLTA J915HA U TE- VOLTA

FIRST BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTPREMI/ER PROJET DE DEVE/OPPEMENT AGR/OZE DE / A BOUGOUR/BA

FOUNZAN

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