DoomMof

The World Bank

FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY

Rqwt No. 12339

PROJECT COMPLEWION REPORT

SUDAN

THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT(CREDIT 1450-SU)

SEPTEMBER 22, 1993

MICROGRAPHICS

Report No: 12339Type: PCR

Infrastructure Operation DivisionEastern Africa DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This docmnt ha a restiNcd distibuion and may be used by recipiets only in the perforanae oftKeir offlcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bak autorizatioL

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Currecy Exchng Rates

Currency Unit = Sudanese Pounds (LS)

1 US$ to ghe LS

1982 1.511990 4.451991 1 301991 15.501952 121.001993 143.00

Weight and M res

1 meter (m) - 3.28 feet (ft)1 kilometer - 0.62 mile (mi)1 kilogram 2.20 pounds (b)1 metric ton (m.ton) - 2.205 pound (b)

Acronyms and AbbreviatiMns

CAD = Civil Aviation DepartmentEEC European Economic CommunityROIS = Highway Organization and Investment StudyKPI - Khartoum Polytechnic InstituteLWOST - Low Water Ordinary Spring TideMCPW = Ministry of Construction and Public WorksMFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic PlanningMfC = Ministry of Transport and CommunicationsNRIU = National Reconstruction Implenentation UnitODA = Overseas Development AdministrationPPU Project Preparation UnitRBPC Roads and Bridges Pubrlic CorporationRTC = River Transport CorporationSPC = Seaport CorporationSRMCIR = Former Southern Regional Ministry of Communications, Transport

and RoadsTPU = Training Production UnitUNDP = United Nations Development ProgramUSAED = United States Agency for International DevelopmentVOC = vehicle operating costsVPD = vehicles per day

Government of SudanFiscal Year

July 1 - June 30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE;WORLGD ANKWaahlo.D 20433

U.SA

Office of Directo.-GaeverlaOperattons Evalutlo

September 22, 1993

ENEORANDU4 SO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND TEE PRESIDENT

SUBJECTs Project Completion Report on SudanThird Highway Project(Credit 1450-SU1)

Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Sudan - Third HighwayProject (Credit 1450-SU)" prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division,Lbstern Africa Department, Africa Regional Office, with the Borrower providingPart II.

The project was successful in meeting its physical investment goals,albeit with some delay and at slightly higher costs than anticipated atappraisal. In addition, under the project progress was made in strengthening theinstitutional capacity in the highway sector though not to the full extent asexpected, partly because of too ambitious expectations at appraisal and partlybecause of unanticipated problems during implementation. An important stepforward was the introduction of appropriate (economic) fuel prices; though noadequate provision was made for subsequent regular price adjustments to reflectinflation. The objective of trucking deregulation -- a covenant -- was notrealized under the project. The economic rate of return of the project is 402.

Overall the project's outcome is rated satisfactory. Itssustainability is likely given the Government's commitment to continued roadmaintenance, the strengthened institutional capacity in the highway sector, andcontinuity in the Bank's lending to and involvement in the highway sector in theSudan. The project's institution building impact is rated partial.

The PCR is fully satisfactory: it addresses the right questions inan appropriate fashion, provides adequate detail, and furnishes a balancedassessment of the project experience and outcome. No audit is being planned.

Attachment

This docuan has a restricted distribution end my be used by recipients only in the perfon ce oftheir officiast dties. Its contents my not otherwise be disetsed without Wortd Bsn* authorization.

FOR OMCIAL US 014LY

PROMEC1 CBANSERPCIVE

TAML OF QOMMMIPa8be No.

Preface ...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .................. iEvaluation Summary ..................... ii

PART I- PROJECT REVIIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVEProject Idendty .. 1....................................... IBackground IProject Objectives and Descrption ........................ . 2Pro jeet Design and Ornarg nztton ................................. 2Project Implementation. 4Project Results. 6Project Sustainability ............... , 7Bank Performance. 7Borrower Performance. 8Consulting Services. 9Project Documentation and Data. 9Findings and Lessons Learned. 9

PART 1 - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVEEvaluation of Bank Performance and Lessons Learned .10Borrower's Performance and Lessons Learned .12Project Relationship .13Consulting Services .13

PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATIONTable 1 - Bank Related Credits ............ 15......... isTable 2 - Project Timetable ................... 16Table 3 - Project Costs . 17Table 4 - Project Financing .. 18Table 5 - Allocation of Credit Proceeds .. 19Table 6 - Schedule of Credit Disbursement .. 20Table 7 - Mission Data ...................... 21Table 8 - Project Implementation ................. 22Table 9 - Compliance with Credit Covenants. 23

Annex I - Recalculation of EER

This document has a restricted distributon and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

SUDANTHIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT

(Credit 1450-SU)

PRO.IECICOMPLETION RLEPO!t

PREFAC1

TIis is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Third Highway Project in Sudan, forwhich Credit 1450-SU in the amount of SDR 15.5 million (US$16.0 million equivalent), wasapproved on }March 20, 1984. The Credit was closed on December 31, 1992, three and a halfyears behind the original schedule. It was disbursed to the amount of SDR 13.668 million andSDR 1.832 million was canceled. The last payment was made on January 15, 1993.

The PCR was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division, Eastern AfricaDepartment (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Roads and Bridges PublicCorporation (RBPC) on behalf of the Borrower (Part II).

Preparation of this PCR was started in May 1993, and was based inter alia on the StaffAppraisal Report; the Credit Agreement; the Grant Agreements (The Netherlands and Norway);Part II from the Borrower; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and theBorrower; and internal Bank memoranda.

- it -

SUDANTHIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT

(Credit 1450-SU)

POJECT. COMLTIMN REPORT

EVALUATION SUMMARY

The objectives of the Project (from SAR 4290-SU) were to support specific goals inSudan's Three-Year Public Investment Program (FY 1984-86), namely to:(a) initiate irmproved planning and execution of road maintenance works: and (b) carry out stud!esof high priority for main and feeder roads. (Credit Agreement, Schedule 2). The Project wouldalso improve transport planning and coordination and reorganize highway administration.(SAR,3.01)

Im2lementation Experience

The Project start was delayed for about six months as a result of difficulties in obtainingthe Borrower's legal opinion on the Credit Agreement. The Credit closing date was extended fourtimes, with a total of three and a half years, from June 30, 1989, to December 31, 1992.Extens.ons were needed pardy to accommnodate the flood emergency repair works, which wereIncluded in the Project through an amendment, dated April 4, 1989. T1his resulted in an extensionof 18 months, up to December 31, 1990. Other extensions were due to delay in award andcompletion of contracts. Contracts for civil works were completed within their stipulated contractperiods. The two ferries were commissioned within the schedule of the contract with the shipyard.The original design concept was found to be unsuitable and had to be amended to suit the localconditions. The procurement process was delayed as a result of necessary changes to the biddingdocuments. The political unrest in Sudan during the implementation, culminating in a change ofgovernment in April 1985, also had an adverse effect on the administration of the Project.

ResultsThe physical targets of the Project were achieved substantially as planned. The consultingservices; technical assistance for the Roads and Bridges Public Corporation (RBPC) and thehighway investment and organization study for the Project Preparation Unit (PPU), were procuredand provided in full. About 300 pieces of equipment were rehabilitated in the workshop at "Kilo10" through the equipment rehabilitation program initiated through the technical assistance toRBPC. This represents about 15% of the 2000 pieces that were considered suitable forrehabilitation. Another 300 pieces of equipment are expected to be rehabilitated by the end of1993. The technical assistance component further initiated systems to enhance RBPC's capacityfor management of maintenance operations and minor rehabilitation works. The Khor Shambatbridge was successfully completed. The shoulders on the Khartoum-Wad Medani-Gedaref roadwere properly reinstated, arresting further serious deterioration. The two ferries at Ed Dueimprovided access of the economically important area across the river to the road from Jebel Auliato Rabak. In the absence of the ferries, traffic would be forced to travel 158 km over sandy tracksthrough the desert on the west bank of the Nile rather than using the paved road.

- iii -

S;stainability

Although the technical assistance component overall did not achieve all its objectives itwas partly successful in initiating systems for workshop management, cost accounting andimproved transport planning. Some of the elements of the technical assistance component werecarried forward to be achieved under the ongoing Khartoum - Port Sudan Road RehabilitationProject, Credit 2070 -SU. These included; follow up of the government's commitment toadequately maintain the present road network by allocation of necessary funtis, through enhancedprocedures for maintenance budgeting, planning and monitoring of maintenaice expenditures; andR.BPC being required to present to the Bank a maintenance plan by September 30, each year,relating budget to physical works programmed for the subsequent year and relating work to beaccomnlished with maintenance needs of the road network in the long oerm.

The operation of the two ferries at Ed Dueim has proved to be financially andeconomically viable as evidenced by the recent traffic figures at the crossing and the confirmedsatisfactory rate of return on the investment. The ferry operator failed to maintain the ferriesadequately after being handed over the ferries in 1989. Arrangements were made through theproject for training of local staff to maintain and operate the ferries, and for provision of a stockof spares and mobile workshop facilities.

Findings and Lessons

The government eventually carried out a review of transport cost, as called for in theagreement, and the fuel prices were adjusted. However, no mechanism was instituted by theBorrower to adjust fuel prices in step with the high rate of domestic inflation that ensued. Inhindsight the lesson is that monitoring of policy issues which carry substantial implications on thecountry's economy can be started through specific investnent project covenants, but need to bereinforced through the Bank's dialogue with the government on macro economic matters.

Another major lesson would be that technical assistance for institution building needs tobe specific and adapted to the absorptive capacity of the recipient insdtution. Also that the Bankshould be careful in including technical assistance as a major coknponent of a project (27%) whenit is not fully appreciated by the Borrower. The evidenced lack of ownership experienced duringimplementation, was a reflection of this weakness.

The SAR provided a useful framework for monitoring during project implementation.However, major changes made to the project during the unusually long preparation period, werenot fully reflected in the SAR. The Bank made appropriate use of the grants extended as co-financing by the Dutch and the Norwegian governments.

SUDANTHIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT

(Credit 1450-SU)

PRO=T COQMPN RUET

PART 1: PROJECT REVIEW FRQM_ BAIN IQRSPEIVE

1. Projec Identitv

Name : Third Highway ProjectCredit No. : 1450 - SURVP Unit : Eastern Africa Department

Infrastructure Operadons DivisionCountry SudanSector TransportSub-sector Highway

2. Baground

2.01 Sector Development Objectives: Government's broad development objectives in thetransport sector at the time of project preparation centered around measures designed towardsstimulating agricultural production and reducing transport botdenecks: (a) to attain a higher levelof utilization of existing facilities by promoting operating efficiency; (b) to provide increasedcapacity in existing traffic corridors where required, pardy by promoting competition betweenmodes; and (c) to spread the transport network wider to encourage dispersal of economic activityto less developed areas, and to achieve a more equitable and balanced pattern of economic andsocial growth.

2.02 Policy Context: At appraisal the Sudan's transport netvork was considered inadequate forthe demand due to the declining operational efficiency of the railways and the high costs ofproviding an adequate road system. The relative import:nce of transport was recognized in theGovernment's Three Year Public Investment Program (FY 1984-86). Of the total L.S. 1650million, L.S. 343 million (21%) was devoted to transport and communication. The country'sbasic highway system consisted in 1982 of about 16,000 km roads, of which 2,245 km wasreported to be paved.

2.03 Highway investment planning was primarily the responsibility of the Roads and BridgesPublic Corporation (RBPC), which provided planning proposals based upon a series of studiesexecuted by international consultants. Planning was found to be fragmented and carried out byforeign consultants with only limited participation by the RBPC staff, which had not developedthe required capability to make qualified judgement on economic feasibility of priority roadinvestments.

2.04 The RBPC was also responsible for maintenance of paved roads and bridges through itsregional managers. The maintenance organization was satisfactory, and was based onrecommendations made by a foreign consultant in 1979 in a study financed under the First

-2-

Highway Project but road maintenance had suffered from lack of adequately trained staff and lowavailability of equipment. The RBPC had benefitted from provision of equipment and sparesthuough the same project as well as from a Japanese Credit, British ODA assistance, andequipment left over fom completed road construction projects. But due to ill trained mechanics,poor workshop management and insufficleot spare parts, many equipment items had become scrapand the equipment availability was low.

2.05 The Bank's strategy in the sector was to concentrate on improving the use of existingfacilities, which in the highway sub-sector was identified as maintenance oriented projects.This Highway rrojec4 was the third IDA funded project in the highway sub-sector in Sudan. TheFirst Highway Project (Credit 331-SU, US$ 7.0 million), approved in 1971, was satisactorilycompleted in 1980. The Second Highway Project (Credit 882-SU, USS 41.0 million), approved in1979, was completed in 1985 with considerable cost overruns.

3. Proet Obiectives and Desitgion

3.01 roj Objectives: The objectives of the Third Highway Project were to supportspecific goals in Sudan's Three-Year Public Investment Program (FY 1984-86)n namely to:

(a) initiate improved planning and execution of road maintenance works; and(b) carry out studies of high priority for main and feeder roads.The project also aimed at improving transport planning and coordination and reorganizing

the highway administration in Sudan.

3.02 Prect De Tbe TheTird Highway Project provided for;(a) assistance to RBPC consisting of: (i) technical assistance to improve workshoporganization and management, spare parts management and equipment rehabilitation,strengthen planning and road maintenance capability, and implement the road maintenanceprogramn; (ii) training; (iii) procurement of workshop tools and equipment, roadmaintenance equipment and spares and limited provisions for fuel ai d bitumen;(b) procurement of two ferries Lor he Nile crossing at Ed Dueim; and(c) other consulting services for a high.way organization and investment studyincluding the establishment and training of an RBPC pavement evaluation unit.(d) added through the credit amendment,April 4, 1989; repair of the Ed Dueim ferryramp and the Khor Shambat bridge, and the acquisition of road maintenance materials.

4. Prolect Design and Organization.

4.01 Projc Desien; The Third Highway Project was designed to continue and to consolidatethe institutional efforts initiated under the first and second highway projects with emphasis onmaintenance. Modal coordination was emerging as an important issue in the transport sector, asnewly built or planned roads offered an alternative to the existing railway network.Thus,coordination of transport planning, investments and operations was assuming importance andrequired more careful consideration.

4.02 The technical assistance component of the Project was designed to strengthen theorganization and overall management of RBPC, through introduction of appropriate systems forplanning, budgeting, scheduling, directing and monitoring of road maintenance and minorrehabilitation. The design was based primarily on the supply of 276 man-months of advisors andinstructors over a period of about three years.

-3.

4.03 The civil works component, including provision of two ferries across the Nile at EdDueim, was designed to improve existing facilities and to provide access of the economicallyimportant area across the river to the road from Jebel Aulia to Rabak.

4.04 Since the Initial Project Brief of June 1976, the project underwent a series of designchanges to reflect shifts in priorities as determined by nacro and sectoral developments; withincreasing emphasis on maintenance operations and institutional development at the expense ofconstruction works. Financing of construction of the New Hatfa Access road (96 km) was deletedin the process. Although reallocation of the amount was readily accepted by GOS, this deletionlessened the enthusiasm for elements of the project on the part of RBPC.

4.05 Although the late timing of the Bank's decision to delete the road construction componentwas unfortunate, the new road construction had been a feature throughout the preparadon phaseand a decision was dependent on an analysis of the full data, which became available only duringappraisal. The progressive changes in the project design over an excessively long preparationperiod led to reluctance on the part of RBPC to be fully committed to the large technicalassistance and institutional development components in the final project. Also the design of thetechnical assistance to RBPC was not tailored to their ability to absorb the training offered, andwas not specific enough to ensure a close monitoring of the results. Especially given the concernvoiced by the Borrower during negotiations of the excessive scope of the component, a review atthat stage should have been considered by t*e Bank.

4.06 Proiect-Organization: The RBPC was responsible for implementation of the technicalassistance, the procurement of road maintenance equipment and spares, procurement of the twoferries and for the civil works. The Project Preparation Unit (PPU) in the Ministry of Finance andEconomic Planning, was responsible for commissioning and monitoring of the HighwayOrganization and Investment S.sdy (HOIS), carried out by a Norwegian consultant in associadonwith a local consultant. The techni;al assistance services were assigned to a joint venture of twoconsultants from Germany and France. The two ferries at Ed Dueim were designed and procuredby a German consultant, and were delivered by a shipyard in the Netherlands. The building of theKhor Shambat bridge and the supply of shoulder materials to the Khartoum-Wad Medani-Gedarefroad were fully local operations. The bridge was designed by RBPC and constructed by a localcontractor.

4.07 Financing of the Project was provided by IDA, the government of the Netherlands, thegovermment of Norway and the Borrower as shown in Part III, Table 4. The Project wasnegotiated in March 1983 on the basis of US$ 8.0 million co-financing from USAID, for projectcomponents to be executed in the Southern Region. When the IDA proposal was delayed, USA]Dproceeded with a project in the South covering all requirements. Thus the IDA amount originallyearmarked for the South (USS 5.2 million), became available for reallocation.

4.08 The Emergency Flood Reconstruction Project (EFRP), identif.ad some urgently neededroad repairs. An Agreement was signed December 19, 1988 for IDA to act as Administrator of aDutch Grant amounting to USS 1,441,000 equivalent ( DFI 2.882 million) for financing of someof these repairs, namely; rehabilitation of Khor Shambat bridge and the ferry embankment at EdDueim and provision of shoulder material on the Khartoum-Wad Medani-Gedaref road. Inaddition to the Dutch Grant for this purpose the Credit 1450-SU was amended to accommodatepart financing of the new components for civil works and maintenance materials by reallocadon offunds from the unallocated category, totalling SDR 2,425,000. Amendments to the Credit and theDutch Grant Agreement were fiuther made on February 12, 1992, to enable the Borrower to

-4-

complete awarded contacts in an orderly fashion and to provide urgently needed maintenanceequipment and materials, retroactively for foreign expenditures from June 30, 1990. A similarAgreement was signed on May 10, 1988 for IDA to act as Administrator of a Norwegian Grantamounting to US$ 0.3 million equivalent (NOK 2.0 million) for financing of consultant servicesunder the Project. (Engineering of rehabilitation works on Khartoum - Port Sudan road on thebasis of recommendations contained in the Highway Organization and Investment Study (HOTS).)

4.09 The project concept and design and the institutional arrangements for implementation asenvisaged during project preparation were reasonable. In hindsight, and given the Borrower'sobvious lack of sense of ownership of the technical assistance component, the total scope of thecomponent and more clearly defined procedures for monitoring could have teen reconsidered.

5. Project Imniementation.

5.01 Loan Effectiveness and lmDlementation: The Credit Agreement was signed on April 12,1984, but was delayed as difficulties in obtaining the Borrower's legal opinion held up crediteffectiveness for about six months. The Credit closing was extended four times, with a total ofthree and a half years, from June 30, 1989, to December 31, 1992. The first extension, datedApril 4, 1989, resulted in an extension of 18 months, up to December 31, 1990; and was neededto accommodate the flood emergency repair works. A second extension of 12 months was agreedon September 4, 1990. A third extension up to June 30, 1992 was agreed through a telex fromIDA dated January 28, 1992. Finally a fourth extension was granted in August 1992, bringing thefinal closing date to December 31, 1992. Accommodation of the repair works after the flood in1988 under the Project, was a major cause of the delayed closing date. Other delays were causedby late preparation of procurement documents and slow award of contracts. Contracts for civilworks were completed within their stipulated contract period when awarded. The two ferries atEd Dueim were delivered and commissioned within the stipulated contract schedule of completiontime and cost. The polidcal unrest in Sudan during the implementation, culminadng in the militarycoup in April 1985, also had an adverse effect on the administration of the Project. The risks ofthe Project were correctly identified at appraisal and related to the problems of achieving allobjectives of the institutional component, because of difficult working conditions and possible lackof motivation on the part of the Borrower's staff and leadership.

5.02 Equipment. Tools, Spare Parts. Fuel and Bitumen; The procurement of road maintenanceequipment was delayed, but the majority of contracts had been awarded before October 1985.Due to delays in making awards RBPC was experiencing difficulties in obtaining extensions of thevalidity period of some of the bids. All contracts for equipment and materials had been awardedand goods received by the closing date. The training arrangements with Khartoum PolytechnicInstitute (KPI) were not implemented as envisaged under the project, and the component wasincluded in the Third Education Project. Training equipment for a total of US$ 200,00 wasprocured through ILO in Geneva and taken over by KPI in October 1987. Delivery of surveyequipment was delayed in Port Sudan, because of problems with payment of port fees and generallack of communication between the various govermnent agencies involved. The survey equipmentwas finally located and cleared in Port Sudan in March 1988 and taken over by RBPC.

5.04 Two Ferries at Ed Dueim: The Borrower had received bids from suppliers of the twoferries as part of the Second Highway Project. As funds were not sufficient under that credit, dueto cost over-run on civil works, these bids were returned, and eventually requested to be

-5 -

resubmitted. The design concept was reviewed and found unsuitable, as the ferries proposed weretoo large to be operated at the actual crossings. A contract for redesign and constructionsupervision was concluded between RBPC and a marine consultant in December 1985. IDAapproved the bidding documents after a lengthy process of commenting and redrafting.Documents were issued to the same 10 shipyards that showed interest for tendering in 1984.lTree bids were received. The first bid evaluation report from the consultant, prepared ;n lanuary1987, was unacceptable to IDA. The Borrower was requested to ask the consultants for a revisedreport. The consultant was not familiar with Bank procedures and the requirements fordocumentation and evaluation, which caused long delays. The contract for delivery of two ferrieswas awarded to a Dutch shipyard and signed in November 1987. The ferries were pre-assembledto the extent possible in the Netherlands and the units were ready for shipment in June 1988.Assembly in the RTC yard in Khartoum started in January 1989, and the launching took place onMarch 24, 1989. Successful trials on the Nile were made on April 10, 1989, after which theferries were sailed to Ed Dueim for handing over on April 14, 1989. The official opening of theferry service was held on May 18, 1989 attended by the Minister for Public Works and Housing.After expiry of the maintenance period on April 19, 1990, the White Nile Governor in Ed Dueimwas intended to become the official owner of the ferries, using RTC seconded staff for the iritialperiod in the actual running and maintenance of the service. The Bank supervision missior. inMay 1989 pointed out faults with the ferries, which had been noted before but not rectified, andalso to some additional faults which had occurred. During the Bank mission in Feb/March 1992,it was agreed that major repairs were needed on the two ferries, and to the causeway that hadbeen badly damaged by the river and by the ferries using the lee sideof the causeway that did nothave a concrete ramp. An addendum to the contract with the shipyard was negotiated andapproved by IDA in March 1992, including provision for spares , materials and mobileworkshop- stores facilities, as well as technical assistance to assist GOS staff during repair work.The work included in the addendum was completed in April, 1993.

5.05 TechnicW Assistance to RBPC Under the Project, a technical assistance tearn, providedby a joint venture of two consultants; assisted RBPC to strengthen its management of equipmentuse and maintenance operations. A contract between RBPC and the joint venture consultant wassigned in August 1986 and the Team Leader arrived in Khartoum in September 1986, about oneyear late compared to the appraisal estimate. The technical assistance covered three areas; (i) roadmaintenance, (ii) workshop management, and (iii) transport planning. ne 19-member teamcomprised; I Road Maintenance Engineer, 2 Training Specialists, 2 Civil Eng. Instructors, 3 .Technical Instructors, 1 equipment Instructor, I Cost Accountant, I Workshop MechanicalEngineer, 6 Spare Parts Specialists/Mechanics and 2 Transport Planners. At the end of the firsthalf of 1987, fifteen of the team members had been mobilized. Implementation effectiveness washampered due to difficulties related to; the consultants inability to provide experts acceptable tothe Client; lack of cohesion within the team itself; problem with language in the lower level on-the-job training; delay on the client's part to provide offices, houses and other support; delays inprocuring spare parts and equipment which was required for training purposes; lack of head officesupport to the technical assistance team; and a general lack of appreciation within the RBPC ofthe component itself. To avoid disruption of the ongoing program and arrival of equipment, theservices of the Team Leader, two Road Technicians and the Economist/Planner were extended by6 months each, bringing the total input to 285 person months.

5.06 Highwa Investment and Organization Study; The Study was prepared over a period ofone and a half year, and was provided by a foreign firm of consultants in association with a localconsultant. The issues addressed in the Study included recommendations for improvement of thehighway administration, review and recommendations on specific improvements to transport

planning, axle load control, tariff and user charge policies and a highway investment program upto 1998. Invitation for proposals was extended to six shordisted consultants in May 1985, wihclosing date for proposals June 15, 1985. The draft final report was submitted on time inDecember 1986. The final report of the study was delayed due to late comments by the PPU andthe time needed by the consultant to take account of the substantial comments given by both theBank and the client. As a result of the study, 4 sets of mobile weighbridges were flnanced underthe Credit to initiate enforcement of the new law on vehicle weight restrictions. The pavementinvestigations on the Khartoum - Port Sudan road carried out under the study confirned excessiveaxle loads on some heavy vehicles. The Bank voiced deep concern about the intolerable situationof overloading and the consequences on a sustained level of service. The contract with theconsultant was extezided, financed from the Norwegian Grant, to provide for detailed engineeri .gservices for rehabilitation of the Gedaref to Port Sudan section of the Khartoum - Port Sudanroad.

5.07 Civil Works; The civil works component comprised two contracts that were prepared andimplemented fully using local resources. One contract was awarded for; (i) Delivery and placingof protection stone on the Ed Dueim Ferry causeway, and (ii) Supply of Rip Rap stones andgravel for road maintenance work on the Khartoum-Wad Medani-Gedaref road; and one wasawarded for rehabilitation of the Khor Shambat Bridge. Detailed engineering for the bridgerehabilitation was carried out by RBPC's own staff. The contract was awarded to a localcontractor, essentially a small building contractor. The contract period was 6 months. The bridgecontract was satisfactorily completed on July 15, 1991, four weeks ahead of schedule, and wasofficially opened to traffic on August 15, 1991.

5.08 Proiect Costs: The estimated cost of the Third Highway Project at appraisal was US$ 17.1miMon as shown in Table 3 in Part I1I, and to be financed by IDA and the Borrower. ITe totalProject costs, including financing from the Dutch Grant and the Norwegian Grant was US$ 21.59million equivalent.

5.09 Disburement: The estimated and actual disbursements of Credit 1450-SU are given inTable 4 and Figure 1 in Part III.The disbursements were slow due to delays in implementation ofthe project. The final payment was made January 15, 1993. when the undisbursed balance of SDR1.832 was canceled. The total disbursement under the Project, including Credit 1450-SU, theDutch Grant and the Norwegian Grant was SDR 14,957 million.

6. Project Results

6.01 rioect gbiectives: The Project successfully achieved the defined roriect objectives; ofinitiating improved planning arid execution of road maintenance; and also successfully completedthe identified studies. The technical assistance to RBPC did not achieve all its objectives due todifficult working conditions, inadequate head office support, inadequate qualifications on the partof some of the team members and over optimistic expectations in the program design. Training ofthe RBPC staff was also not fully effective but provided valuable training to store supervisors inthe field. It is still too early to quantify the full impact of the project, although some effect is-already apparent on the RBPC as an institution through implementation of organizational changesrecommended in the HOIS . The continuous dialogue with the Borrower on importantmanagement issues, like level of maintenance funding and control of vehicle overloading, wasfacilitated through the implementation of the project, and had an impact on the level of service.

-7-

6.02 Physical &esults:1he physical targets of the Project were achieved substantially asplanned. The consulting services; technical assistance for RBPC and the highway Investment andorganization study for PPU, were procured and provided in full. About 300 pieces of equipmentwere rehabilitated in the workshop at "Kilo 10" through the equipment rehabilitation programinitiated through the technical assistance to RBPC. This represer.s about 15% of the 2000 piecesthat were considered suitable for rehabilitation. Another 300 pieces of equipment are expected tobe rehabilitated by the end of 1993. The technical assistance component further initiated systemsfor improved management of maintenance operations and minor rehabilitation wnrks. 'he KhofShambat bridge was successfully completed. The shoulders on the Khartoum-Wad Medani-Gedaref road were properly reinstated, arresting further serious deterioration. The two ferries atEd Dueim provided access of the economically important area across the river to the road fromJebel Aulia to Rabak.

6.03 Pect Benwe The economic rate of return (ERR) was calculated by the Bank atappraisal separately for the Road Maintenance component and the two ferries at Ed Dueim; (i)The ERR for the maintenance component was calculated at 154%. The calculadon was based on.an assessment of the total savings in vehicle operating costs (voc) from avoidance of doubling ofsurface roughness of paved roads over a period of seven years. The savings were then related tothe estimated current and future traffic volumes, and translated into economic benefit streams -which in turn were compared with the aggregate cost of maintenance. (ii) The ERR for the ferryoperation at Ed Dueim was estimated at over 100%. It was based on an estimate of the savings in(voc) because of the ferry, compared to vehicle traffic through the desert over 158 km on thewest bank of the Nile rather than using the Jebel Aulia - Ed Dueim road over the same distanceon the east bank.

6.04 The recalculation of EER, included in Annex 1, was done using the same method as at thetime of appraisal, but with current traffic levels. It was found that both the Road MaintenanceProgram and the investment in the two ferries at Ed Dueim would yield satisfactory rates ofreturn, although lower than estimated at appraisal.

7. Project Sustainability

7.01 The operation of the two ferries across the Nile at Ed Dueim is expected to have anacceptable level of net benefits throughout its economic life. Lack of maintenance which wasnoticed towards the end of the project, may adversely affect the outcome. Steps were taken toreduce this risk by training of personnel and provision of most needed spares and maintenancefacilities. The achievements made in initiating improved planning within RBPC may be sustainedthrough follow up in subsequent projects in the highway sub-sector, such as the ongoingKhartoum-Port Sudan Rehabilitation Project. At the time of preparing the PCR, the disbursementof IDA Credits in Sudan were suspended. A long disrupdon of Bank involvement in the sub-sector will reduce the likelihood that these achievement are sustained.

8. Bank Perfonnance

8.01 Preparation of the Project took unusually long time, from 1976 to 1984, and required ninemissions, including appraisal. The Bank's supervision efforts did not meet with the Bank'sguidelines of two missions per year, as it included fifteen missions fielded over about nine years..The Bank's supervision during the period from 1988 through 1991 was less than adequate, as onlyone mission per year was provided. The missions were appropriately staffed and provided goodstaff continuity, with the same Task Manager responsible throughout the implementation period,

- 8 -

apart from nine months in 1992. The main strength of the Bank's performance was the positivedialogue and relations established with the Borrower during implementation, which enabledneeded amendments to be made and the successful use of RBPC's own and private sectorresources for execution of civil works. The Bank supervision staff contributed to enhanceimplementation of the Project through supportive working relations and professional advice. Earlyattention to the inadequacy of earlier desigp of the ferries at Ed Dueim, made the required reviewand modifications of design possible.

8.02 The relations between the Bank supervision and the Borrower improved gradually over theimplementation period. The Borrower's project management also improved through appointmentof a project coordinator in RBPC. The trust established between the Bank and the Borrower led tosuccessful implementation of some of the civil works component by use of exclusively localresources for design and construction.

8.03 Lessons: One major lesson from implementation of this project was that technicalassistance for institutional building needs to be specific and adapted to the absorptive capacity ofthe recipient institution. Also, that the Bank should be careful in including technical assistance asa major component of a project (27%) when it is not fully appreciated by the Borrower. Theevidenced lack of sense of ownership experienced during implementation, was a reflection of thisweakness.

8.04 Negotiations of the Credit were delayed for about one year, to a large extent in order toreach an agreement on the issue of fuel prices, which reflects both the importance attached to itby the Bank and the sensitivity of it on the part of the Borrower. The government eventuallycarried out a review of transport cost, as called for in the agreement, and the fuel prices wereadjusted. However, no mechanism was instituted by the Borrower to adjust fuel prices in stepwith the high rate of domestic inflation that ensued. In hindsight the lesson is that monitoring ofpolicy issues which carry substantial implications on the country's economy can be started throughspecific investment project covenants, but need to be reinforced through the Bank's dialogue withthe government on macro economic matters.

8.05 The SAR provided a useful framework for monitoring during project implementation.However, major changes made to the project during the unusually long preparation period, werenot fully reflected in the SAR. The Bank made appropriate use of the grants extended as co-financing by the Dutch and the Norwegian governments.

9. Borrower Performance.

9.01 The Borrower's performance was consistently given fairly low ratings by the Bank staffduring implementation, indicating 'moderate problems" (2); and "major problems" (3); attributedto managerial weaknesses. The Borrower's performance improved toward the end of the project.The procurement of urgently needed equipment, materials and supplies for road maintenance, andcomnpletion of civil works on Ed Dueim ferries ramps and protection of road shoulders werecarried out in a satisfactory manner.

9.02 One exogenous factor that had an effect also on project management and the sustainabilityof the institutional building efforts extended, was the continuous worsening situation in respect ofsalaries and benefits for the personnel working in the Borrower's institutions. This was caused bythe high rate of inflation during implementation of the project. Many of the most experienced staffof RBPC left the service and in general there was a high turnover of professional staff.

9-

10. Consulting Services

10.01 As more than one quarter of the original project was related to technical assistance, theassignnrents for consulting services played an important part of the project.

10.02 Technical assistance provided to the RBPC met with numerous problems duringimplementation and did not fully achieve its objectives. The consultant joint venture was effectivein mobilizing the relatively large number of staff, but failed to provide the .equired type ofpersonnel in a timely manner and to the full satisfaction of the Borrower.

10.03 The Highway Organization and Investment study for PPU was satisfactorily completed.Following review and extensive comments both by the Bank and the Borrower, the final versionof the study provided sound and valuable recommendations for improvement of the organizationand management of RBPC, as well as vehicle regulations and axle load control.

10.04 The consultant for the design and procurement services of the two ferries at Ed Dueimwas not sufficiently familiar with Bank procurement procedures and bid evaluat.ons. This causedconsiderable delay in commissioning of the ferries.

- 10-

SUDAN

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

Third Highway I.D.A Credit No. 1450-Su

and

Related Dutch Grant (Trust Fund No. 052493-Su-EFRP)

EARTU

PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSP-ECTVE

(A) Evaluation of Bank Performance and Lessons Learned

1. Major Strengths and Weaknesses:

Bank staff contributed to the success of the project through supportive working relationshipsand professional advice. The Supervision Missions that have visited Sudan to review withGovernment Officials the progress made on the various project components, wereprofessionally qualified in Highway Engineering. Consequently, implementation problemsand, sortmetimes, allowable modifications that were strongly needed to promote progress of theworks, were manifested to be easily solved and speedly approved.

However, some shortcomings were evident:

I- At the early stage of the project it had been recognized that the length of interval between oneSupervision Mission and the other, was excessive (e.g. August, 1991 Mission was preceededby February 1990 Mission). Due to the effectiveness of the visits, RBPC recommended tothe Bank to see frequent Missions during the remaining life-time of the project. As a matterof fact, the Bank's concurrence and positive reaction in accelerating the number ofconsistently interim follow-up visits had its impact In Improving the implementation rate to alarge extent. This could be clearly indicated by comparison between time lapsed inimplementing Category (1) during which theBank fielded unfrequent and less SupervisionMissions - and the higher rate noticed in inplementation of Categories It, m and IV of theproject Components during which more frequent visits were made.

-11 -

II- Slow disbursements process (either through Direct procedure of issuance of SpecialCommitunents) by the time when payments to beneficiaries were effected through tie ankRegional Office in Nairobi (Kenya). A concrete example proving such delays were the civilworks Contractors and Suppliers (namely: TOMAK Engineering Co. (Khor Shambat-BridgeContractor), Fadul Hassan (Gravels supplier) and Seletat Quarry Co. (Dueim RampProtection) who by the time they had executed more than half of the works, they did notreceive any payments from the Bank.

111- Delay in extending the closing date for the Dutch Grant (IDA was the Administrator of theGrant).

IV- Procurement restrictions that accompanied our requests to utilize the remaining uncommittedbalances from the proceeds of the Credit and its related Dutch grant. Only volume increasesup to a certain ceil were approved from the ongoing procurement packages instead of fullutilization. Consequently, about USD 2 million were cancelled by the Bank. It was true thatthe remaining balances were attributed to the following factors:

1- Gains from SDR exchange rate

2- Gains from LS devaluation (whenever IMA was financing local costs).

But we believe from the economic viewpoint such gains should be considered as integral partof the credit value.

2. Lessons Learned:

a) Accessibility of the Bank Missions to the respective pertinent Government Authorities (e.gDirectorate of Planning, National Reconstruction Implementation Unit (NRIU)...etc) used tobe forcefuxl in giving higher priority and consideration to the project requirements (such asallocation of local funds, issuance of financial approvals, customs exemption etc..). Thiselement helped in speeding up preparation and procurement action.

b) Unity of command and co-ordinaton during the phase of implementation: at the beginning,the project components were administered by five different Directorates within RBPC,namely:-

- Maintenance- Planning and Research- Mechanical- Finance- Stores

Due to lack of co-ordination between these departnents, the implementadon rate was slow.The abscence of a body like a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) which was not forseen inthe Credit stream, made it inconvenient and even impractical to achieve the project objectiveswithin the programmed schedule. Upon recognition of this unanticipated hindering factor, thesupervision mission suggested the appointment of a project co-ordinator authorized byRBPCfD.G. to harmonize the different activities into one package whenever possible. RBPC

^ 12 -

immediately adopted the Bank's proposal and the project co-ordinator was appointed. Meritsof this action were:

- Unity of command was attained,- Minimization of costs was reached by sorting out and grouping of similar needs of thevarious components through package procurement.- Avoidance of cost over-runs; awareness of the exact funds allocated during the co-ordination process, for each cost item had prevented over-expenditures.- Improved and developed the sequence of Reporting.

c) Team-work concept resulted in self-reliance:

The team work that featured the relationship between the Supervision Missions and therelevant executing agency's personnel was one of the major elements towards the satisfactoryimplementation of the project components. This close contacts between the team members,created a sort of confidence in Sudanese capability to carry out some of the project workswithout the involvement of foreign Contractor and Consultants. Intiation of the Bank toexecute Khor Shambat Bridge by a local building Contractor (TOMAK Engineering Co.)according to a design drawn by RBPC staff was the outcome of this relationship. This trialproved to be successful and the Contract was substantially complete on July 1991 four weeksahead of contractual completion date.

B) Borrower's Performance and Lessons Learned:

1- Major Strengths and Weaknesses:

Except for some delays in reporting to the Bank in accorance with the time schedule stipulatedin the Credit Agreement (such as quarterly Reports and Audited Accounts); the Borrowersperformance, in our opinion, was satisfactory. During project preparation and appraisal;RBPC provided all the necessary support needed. However; some weaknesses had beenconceived in the Borrower's performance. These can be summarized as follows:

(a) Intially, co-ordination was not efficiently carried out. Later on this task was assignedto the Director of Maintenance (being the most concerned in the project) who provedas reported by the Mission to be more effective.

(b) Implementation of Category IV (New Components - FLOOD) manifested an apparentdelay. TIis component was co-financed from the proceeds of savings in IDA creditand the Dutch Grant to accomodate the additional works in the road sector under theEmergency Flood Reconstruction Programme (EFRP). Administration of this part ofthe Credit was, therefore, transferred to the National Reconstruction ImplementationUnit (NRIU). Discontinuity of the former administration resulted, in distorting thesequence of actions and caused delay in the implementation due to lack of projectawareness by the NRIU. This could be clearly evidenced by the abnormal delay inapproving entidements of the civil works contractors.

(c) Khartoum Polytechnic Institute failed to fulfil its role in practical training; althoughthe required survey and laboratory equipment were procured and handed over asscheduled.

- 13 -

2. Lessons Learned:

(a) RBPC succeeded to be self reliance in preparing the advance arrangements incompliance with the Bank guidelines and procedures pertinent to (aC>), sole sourcprocurement and Limited Quotations, whenever applicable, without the assiuance ofany foreign Consultant or procurement agents as used to be the case in prviousprocurements made under the Bank Crdits or other donors.

(b) RBPC capability was evidenced by the efficient constuction supervision of KhorShambat Bridge.

(c) Although the size of the Bank Credit, in money terms, was small as compated withother sizable projects, but still we believe its economic returns as well as the valuablepractical experiences gained by RBPC from the high professionalism monitoring theimplementation of the project components were more adequate. Such know-how willhave its impact in upgrading RBPC or onal, Technical and administtivecapabilities to be envisaged in executing road network maintenance programmes.

(d) Instalation of computers facilitated availability of desired data for proper planning andprogramming of maintance activities.

C- Proiect Relationship:

Bank reladonship with the Execudng Agency and other concerned authorid3s was excellent.An addidonal contributing factor that had promoted the implementation standard, was the highlevel of professionalism of allparties involved.

D- Consulting Services:

Role, performance level and implications of Involvement:

The Consultancy services as performed by the two companies; J.V. RRI/BCEOM andNORCONSULT for Technical Assistant and HOTS respectively, were satisfictory. Theirinputs resulted in the following achievement:

1. Improvement in planning and execution systems of Road Maintenance Programmes.

2. Introduction of Cost Accounting System.

3. Improvement of Transport Planning.

4. Improvement of Workshop Organization.

5. Co-ordination and Reorganization of Highway Administration.

6. Computerization of data processing.

7. Instalation of Radio Coitamunicadons System.

- 14 -

Apart fom these strengths, comes some weaknesses that were debugged fom the Consultantsperformance:

1) Training component was wOt handled satisfactorily. Unticipated obstacles hinderedits progress. On-job training was distorted due to late arrival of spare parts orderedfor rehabilitation of machinery and equipment (TPU). Delay in preparing theshopping lists, by the Consultants, shared in this distortion.

2) Lack of continuity of some expatriates. Many changes and replacements in theTechnical Assistance Team members took place.

However, despite these weaknesses, nobody can deny the Consultancy services input instrengthing RBPC capabilities.

- 15 -

SUDANTHfIRD HIGPYPROJCIw

(:KGdit II=- U)

PRQE:CT S:QMZLL RBT

PART III: STAIISllCAL INFOR,ZQO

Table l: Ban Rela Credits

Avpp, 1A USD

19S6 Ut 39.0 F,r ;Aiwv PrLjcqiimo f dW octtwivsd Cmv&wSU rolUag stock. wuionof ftadhy line. I tand a

uxaioa of Pott Suda. aad itpovwn_tof tver UvpOtL

1965 t4m 40. 31.0 Second Roiwv Pmoi*Mt Pntauofb_ u Wemk oa Uia CoImplde4SU stock. inprovetaof siver tpMon pro mttof eq_pset

aNW db mof facilte atPat,Sudu.

1972 Cte&3 31- 7.0 F^t HiLMEMt riect: Tocbnk«l a - ianec to RBPC, fmsbUq Compkxt

SU dWt and detie doedp of prority road ptojC; spe pmSYI eqipet for h,wy muonc and wYlii _DDmwmd st akf to Mwisy of Tnnw

1974 Crmdit457. 24.0 3nivd R^ih Poie: Faig of SRC invem_uptOgtwtup Coalee

i ~~~~Su to 1973; eupnt o adma us_ I for die RTC;

i ~~~~~~~~~~~ptcisv_mt fowr fut An=aiport developmeutand trannof ftff at tbAudkor Gmcol.

1976 Credit 614- 4.0 Tcchnic l Assisuiec Poicet: Tecbcll asitace to inceuc Compbud

SU capacif to execute ptWiDVeeJt work iA ag1 semao.

1976 La 20.0 Domestic Aviation Propet. Coaozua of two mcgiong po.wt Compktcd

1267r-SU and tcchniel cekuf to CAD.

Credit 643- 9.0

SUI

1977 Cndit 727- S.0 Founth Rsihav P_roba: Compbtlon of tsa whool. track Coptidc

SU upgr ding. proviso of locmotives cd equqpmer

tLo 1467, 12.0

T-SU

1973 Cmdt 78t- 20.0 Pon Pr* Inccm phya caciy. toPMOR ptiuevity Cotcd

SU and m .gemnt ctticeacy of Port Sudm

1979 C"ldkM3. 41.0 Second Hijthwtv Proict:1 Coarutctioa of lebd Aulio-Ed Dudsm Coompkeu

SU asd teo asisace to tbe Rood tewa in Sendw

Suan.

1990 Crotk 200 82.2 KPSRP Rdsabiiito of* Mclawto - PorttSudan ra. uowing

SU

- 16 -

Table 2. Proiegt llm

Dat Date DateItem Planned Revised Actual

- Identification 02/76

- Preparadon 08/82

- Appraisal MissIon 10/82

- Credit Negotiations 03/83

Board Approval 03/84

Credit Signature 04/84

- Credit Effectiveness 10/84

- 2Credit ClosIng 06/89 1219212/9106/92 12/92

Credit Completion 12/92

- 17 -

Table 3. Proect Costs

(USS million)

ITEM Est. Cost Actal Cost

__ __ __ ____ Local Foreign Total Local Forein Total

I. 6SSISTANCE TO-RBPCA. Technical Assistance 0.28 2.07 2.35 0.20 4.59 4.79

B. Training 0.30 0.20(i) Instuors 0.12 0.88 1.00(u) Scholaships at KurT 0.18(iii) Training aid and eqttipment for KP 0.14 0.14(iv) Rd. Mait. Equipment and Spares for TPU 0.86 0.86(v) Fuel for TPU 0.18 0.18

C. Road Maint. Equipment and Spares 2.62 2.62 3.90 3.90D. Workshop Equipaent and Tools 0.22 0.22E. Spares for Equipment Rehabilitation 2.34 2.34 5.14 5.14F. Bitumen 0.57 0.57

SUBTOTAL I 0.58 9.88 10.46 0.50 13.32 13.83

II. FEIIRIEA. Constuction 0.23 2.00 2.23 0.54 2.62 3.16B. Rehabilitation 0.42 0.42

SUBTOTAL 11 0.23 2.00 2.23 0.54 3.04 3.58

II.QTMER CONSULTING SERVICESA. Highway Ornisation and Investment Study 0.09 0.75 0.84 0.10 1.00 1.10B. Rehabilitation Design, Port Sudan Road 0.30 0.30

SUBTOTAL III 0.09 0.75 0.84 0.10 1.30 1.40

IV. CIVIL WORKSA. Ed Dueim Ferry Ramp Protection .B. Khor Shambat Bridge

SUBTOTAL IV 1.17 1.41 2.58

V. ROAD MAJINTENACE MATERIALS 0.20 0.20

BASE COST (EST. 1983) 0.90 12.63 13.53

VI. CONTIMGENCIES

A. Physical (10% I and IM) 0.05 1.06 1.11B. Price 0.19 2.31 2.50

SUBTOTAL VI 0.24 3.37 3.61

TOTAL PROJECT COST 1.14 16.00 17.14 2.52 19.07 21.59' 1.|_1 -' __ ... _ , ,.

- 18 ^

Table 4. Proiect Finaing

Planned Including Including Fuial(Credit 1450 SU) Amendtnents AmendmentsAgreemeat 1 up to 2 up to(SDR '000) 04/89 02/92 (StR '000)

(SDR '000) (SDR '000)

lRxvendjturesCatefowns

1. Equipment. Tools, Spare Pats. Fuel and 6,700 6,700 6,100 6,211Bitumen

2. Two Fernies 1,950 1,950 2,500 2.5013. Consultant Services

(a) for RBPC; 2,860 2,860 3,370 3,427(b) for PPU: 730 730 8S4 854

4/(6). Unallocated 3 ,60 835 350

(4) Civil Works 195 1,900 675(5) Road Maintenance Materials 2,230 426 Nil

SUBTOTAL IDA FINANCING 15,500 15,00 15,500 13,668

(Amount Canceled as of 01/15/93) (1,832)

THE DUTCH GRANT(DFI 2.882 mill)1. Equipmnent, Tools and Spare Parts 232 276(4) Civil Works 623 745(5) Road Maintenance Materials 222

SUBTOTAL DUTCH GRANT 1,067 1,021(Amount Canceled as of 04J2U/93) (46)THE NORWEGIAN GRANT(NOK 2.0 mill)3. Consultant's Snrvices 222

GOVERNMEN844 44 844 1,037

16,344 16,344 17,633 15,948

1/ ReallOCatioS within Credit 1450-SU, included; (i new Categoy (4) CivU WOr*S was added, Khor Shambat

Bridge and rep4:r of Ed Dudim ferry ramp, amount SDR 195,000; (U,l new Category (5) Road MaintanCe

Materials", amoun 2,230,000; and (ii) Caxegory ((4) beame Categos y (6).2/ Reallocations within Credit 1450-SU and addtion of Dutch Grant and Norwegan GrauL

- 19 -

Table S. Allocaton of Credit Proceeds(SDR)

CATE- DESCRIPTION AMOUNT AMOUNT AMOUNTGORY DISBURSED DISBURSED DISBURSED

IN CREDIT DUTCH GR. NORW.GR._______SD R SDR,(EST) SDR. (ES)

I Equipmexnt, Tools, Spare Patts, 6,210,902.98 275,810Fuel and Bitumen

2 TWO ermae 2.500,473.9S

3 Consultant's Services

(A) For RBPC 3,426,939.12(B) For PPU 854,151.23 222,000

4 Civil Works 675,413.85 745,332

5 Road Maintenance Matenals None

TOTAL DISBURSED 13,667.845.13 1,021,142 222,000

AMOUNT CANCELLED 1,832,154.87 46.265

TOTAL AMOUNT 1S,500.000.00 1,067,407 222,000CREDIT/GRANTS

Figure 1. Disbursement

SUDAN-CR.1450-SU AND GRANTSSCHEDULE OF DISBURSEMENT

USS MILUON

15 _ _4_Tt 230; (F :;it ;_ 4 5

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

FY. AND QUARTERS

[-SAR + GRANTS * ACTUAL

- 20 -

Table 6 Schedule of Credit p -

am Tint D5// et 11.42.20

vP - AICAARICA* O=a CIUMII ti22U46@ 1mVAThJcW PUTIOS OIVS"

Di b ali In"MoomMUS. S MILUM8)

(LOA Cats of 4/30/ HNitS Deta Ss of 05369)........ ...................... _......

Prokett 35U09AC16 * NtcnAvS tti Ifa.etIw DOW 10/12/8provwd A~ts 16.00 C.wltatla': .00

Formityfilt ActMI AN. Prot#It #M. R#s. kat. Orlgltt At. Svsad Aet.yowu Ceativl CwurLtiv. o i.,.tFo,ve. cuwl.ttv. Ouatai

....... .... ........ . . ............ ................ ............ ................ .... .... fi......... ....

9U4

up., 1983Jit, 1964

195

-a, 1984 .20 .050, 1984 .40 .10Mar, 95 1.00 1.0Jun, 1965 1.e0 1.97

1986

Sop, 1985S 3.34 3.03Dee, 1915 .02 2.88 4.09fur, '98 .03 3.84 5.S

a, 18 .27 4.80 6.Z4

1987

Sao. 1966 .60 3.76 7.330.c, 194 1.43 6.72 8.43Mar, 198? 1.57 7.68 9.91Jun. 1987 1.6 8." 10.60

S ip 1987 2.31 9.38 11.60oC 198w 2.65 9.92 12A0

Map, 198 3.08 10.88 13.20jun, 1988 5.26 11.84 14.10

1989

srp 1i9t 7.26 12.48 15.00Oa, 1988 11.33 13.12 16.00Mr, 19 11.87 13.4 16.00Jun, 199 13.55 3.76 86.00

199

Sp, 1989 14.1 14.40Dec, 1989 14.19 1s.04mar, 1990 14.62 IS.36Jun, 1990 1t4.90 15.68

1991

SP, 199 14.91 15.84cc, 190 15.20 16.00

Mer, 1991 15.57 16.00Jun. 1991 15.79 1600

1992

Sop, 1991 16.46 16.00 17.17 17.170cc, 1991 17.16 16.00 17.t7 17.17Nar, 1992 17.T9 16.00 17T. 17.75Ju, 19t2 17.60 16.00 18.33 18.3

1993

iWp, 1992 17.73 20.16 19.33D.c. 192 17.90 19.33He, 1993S 1i8o 19.35Jun, 1993 19.33

1994

Sap, ¶993 |1

e- W @ -- - - - = q~~~i- ~~~

8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~imB Bg8B8, ., .

. a . , ., .S. ' :1

t _ ew 00000O00000"'00O0 I

g a

- 22 -

Table 8. Prject ulSmgntaton

PROJECT COMPONENT Planned Completion A.tu.l MonthsAt Appraisal Completion of Delay

06188 12/92 54Procurement of: Equipment. Tools. Spare Parts, Fuel andBitumen

Two Ferries; Prcurement and Commissioning 04/89

Consultant's Services

(A) Technical Assiaance for RBPC 06J88 02/90 20

(B) Highway Organization and 1nvestment Study for 07186 07/87 12PPU

Civil Works;

Khor Shambat Bridge 0891 1/ 07/91 -1

Faey Ramps at Ed Dueim

Supply of Road Maintenance Materials

1/ Included in Credit Amendment of 04/89

- 23 -

Table 9.

CompTlance with Credit Covenants

The Borrower shall farmish toCovenant IDA, not lter thaa nine months Section 3.07

after the end of the fiscal year, anThe Borrower shall employ audit report on tOm projectconsultants whose quasiftcations accounts.are satisfctory to IDA.

The Borrower shall (a) insure Soetion 4.01inported goods and (b) ensure that Rafeatl proceeds are used exclusivelyfor the purpose of the Project.

Section 3.02The Borrower shall furnish IDAwith plans, specifications reportsand contract documents for theProjet. He shall maintain records Section 3.03 Status of Comolianceand procedures adequate tomonitor the Project. He shatl Complied witheable the Asweiationrepresentative t examine the goodsand services out of the proceeds of Section 3.04the Credit. The Borrower shail Complied withfurthermore, on a quaterly basiswithin 30 days of the calendarquarter concerned, provide aUsuch information as theAssociation shall reasonably Complied withrequest concerning the Project.

The Borrower shall prepare aProject Completion Report notlater than six months after theClosing Date.

The Borrower shalt, not later thanJune 30, 1987, implement theagreed improved organization planfor RBPC. The Borrower shall Section 3.04 (d)also, by July 1, 1986, revise theformate for the annual estimates ofRBPC expenditures and, by July 1,1986, establish with RBPC aTraining Production Unit. Section 3.06

Complied withThe Borrower shall, through theKhartoum Polytechnic, offerannually, ten places to RBPC inthe three-year highway technicalcourse.

- 24 -

Not yet. The covenant cariedforward to Credit 2070-SU,KPRP.

Program revised

Prepared by Auditor General up to90/91.

The Borrower shall: (i) undertakea Trnsporttion Cost Review onterms and conditions satisfactory to Scdtion 4.02the Association and complete thisreview not later ftan December Study completd. Now fue prices31. 1984, or such other datm as the introduced in October, 1987. RatesAssociation may agre; and (ii) may need updating due to tapidbased on the findings of this increase in domestic rate ofreview and the diseussions with the inlation.Associaion, maintain appropriatefuel prices.

The Borrower shaU cause itshighway system to be adequatelymaintained, and shaU provide Secdon 4.03promptly as needed the funds,facilities, services and other Not complied with. A three year-resources required for such year Railway Investment Programmaintenance. By November 30 of is being coordinated with MlAeach year, the Borrower shall under a separate projectsubmit to the Association for itsapproval, the maintenance budgotrequirement and physical tret ofRBPC for tle following calendaryear and, at the same time,proposals for the implementationof its three-year investment plan.Upon receipt of the Association'sapproval, the Borrower shallrelease funds to RBPC inaccordance with such approvedrequirements and targets and beginthe implementation of suchproposals. By June 30, 1986, theBorrower shall adopt a coordinatedhighway and railway investmentprogram for the following three-year period.

The Borrower shall, by January 1,1987, take measures satisfactory tothe Associalion for the regulation Secdon 4.04of vehicle dimensions and axkloads. He shall also take adequate Not complied with as yet GOSaction to enforce such measurs. has caried out k pilot project for

control of axde loads. Thecovenant has bees carried forwardto KPRP. Ctedk 2070-SU.

- 25 -

Annex 1Page I of 3

Reassessment of Costs and Benefits

1. Maintenance Program

For ease of reference, the assessment made In the SAR, Annex 13, is appended below:

"The following assumptions were made in calculadng the ERR on the road maintenanceprogram:

1. The total freight traffic which was established at 5:24 billion tops km in 1980, willcontinue to grow at 5% p.a.

2. The above traffic translates into 600-650 million freight vehicle km taking account of theapproximate 100:13 ratio of hed3ium of heavy trucks in Sudan.

3. Approximately 75 million gallons of gasoline were consumed in Sudan in 1981, in thetransport sector and presumably largely by passenger vehicles. Tnis can be translated into aminimum 2,000 million passenger vehicle km per annum. This is also assumed to grow at 5%p.a.

4. The main benefit on paved roads - essentially the network under RBPC control is theavoidance of an approximate doubling of surface roughness due to potholes, broken pavementedges etc from 2,000 to 4,000 over about seven years, the project benefit being proportional inthe ratio 4/7.

5. The average vehicle operating cost (voc) savings from avoidance of paved roadsdeterioration is 24% for passenger vehicles, and 47% for freight vehicles.

6. The voc savings are applied to the voc presented in para 4.04.

7. The proportion of ultimate deterioration experienced in years 1 through 4 is assumed to be25, 50, 75 and 100% respectively".

The EER was calculated at 154%.

Reassessment: With reference to assumptions v1i and (2) above it was found from the "TransportStatistical Bulletin, 1989-90" that total road freight traffic in 1989 was about 6.1 billion tons km.This would translate into about 800 million freight vehicle kan. With reference to assumption (3)above, it was found that in year 1989 about 563,000 metric tons of gasoline had been consumedin the road transport alone. About 110,000 passenger vehicles were registered the same year.These 'igures would correspond to about 2,000 million passenger vehicle Ikm per annum, or thesame as assumed in Year 1 at appraisal.

- 26 -

Annex IPage 2 of 3

Approximate average RBPC maintenance cost per annum is about USD5.0.

vm Cost a=PC Benefits(US million (USS mOin

1989 5.01990 5.0 15.81991 5.0 31.51992 5.0 47.01993 5.0 63.0

The economic rate of return (ERR) is 54% and the net present value (NPV)(atlS%) about US$ 89 Million.

Conclusion: The assumptions made at appraisal about volume of road traffic in Sudan werebasically sound, and the rate of return on the Maintenance Progran is fully satisfactory.

2. Two Ferries at Ed Dueim

At the project appraisal an EER of over 100% was indicated, based on a total cost of thctwo ferries of US$2.3 million and an esdmated savings in vehicle operating costs per year ofabout US$8.6 million. The savings in voc was based on a traffic in 1985 of 417 vehicles per dayand a growth rate of 10% per year.

Reassessment:

lThe present traffic on the two ferries was found to be considerably less than estimated atappraisal. It had been recorded by the ferry operator at about 10 heavy and 50 passenger cars perday. The ferry traffic is expected to increase when the road between Ed Dueim and Wad Medaniis reconstructed by RBPC in 1995 and the feeder road from Ed Dueim to Es Sufi is constructed inthe near future. A recent engineering study for the Ed Dueim to Es Sufi road estimated a trafficvolume of about 200 vehicles per day on this road in year 2005. A fairly conservative estimatewould be that the present volume of ferry traffic would double by the end of the century, tobecome about 20 heavy and 100 passenger cars per day.

In addition to the car traffic, more than 1000 pedestrian passengers are using the ferriesevery day, which at present provides about half of the income from the ferries.

Cost of ferries: US$3.58 million

Income per day: SL 30,000 - SL 35,000

Cost per day: Diesel SL 20,000Lubricants SL 1,000Wages SL 5,000Spares SL 2,000

- 27 -

Annex 1Page 3 of 3

Conclusion:

(i) Using the same assumptions about voc savings as at appraisal (paras 4.06, 4.07),the investment in the two ferries would still yield an ERR of more than 20%, notcoundng the considerable time savings by pedestrian passengers using the ferriesto reach the administrative center in Ed Dueim.

(ii) The present income from the ferry traffic Is sufficient to recover the operationalcosts.