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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY

Report No. 11410

PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT

TURKEY

ERZURUM RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(LOAN 2094-TU)

DECEMBER 7, 1992

Agriculture Operations DivisionCountry Department IEurope & Central Asia Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = Turkish Lire (TL)US$ 1.00 (at Appraisal - May 1981) = TL 100US$ 1.00 (at Closing - April 1990) = TL 2,310

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 kilogram (kg) = 2.20 poundsI metric ton 1,000 kilograms1 metric ton = 0.98 long ton

ABBREVIATIONS

Al Artificial InseminationCP FAO/World Bank Cooperative ProgramERDP Erzurum Rural Development ProjectERR Economic Rate of ReturnESC Erzurum Steering and Co-ordination CommitteeFAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United NationsGDPI General Directorate of Project and Implementation (Renamed in AugustGDPD 1991 as General Directorate of Agricultural Production and

Development [GDPD])GDRA General Directorate of Rural Affairs of MAFRAGNP Gross National ProductGOT Government of TurkeyIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentKOYD Less Developed Regions DepartmentMAF Ministry of Agriculture and ForestryMAFRA Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Village AffairsMVA Ministry of Village AffairsPCC Project Coordinating CommitteePCR Project Completion ReportPDA Provincial Directorate for Agriculture of MAFRAPDRA Provincial Directorate for Rural Affairs of MAFRAPMU Project Management UnitSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSPO State Planning OfficeTCZB Agricultural Bank of TurkeyTOPRAKSU Land and Water Development Agency of MVAVGT Village Group TechnicianWB The World BankWUA Water Users' AssociationYSE General Directorate for Rural Affairs of MVA

FISCAL YEARS

Government of Turkey - January 1 to December 31TCZB - January 1 to December 31World Bank - July 1 to June 30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Oifice of Director-GeneralOperations Evaluation

December 7, 1992

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on TurkeyErzurum Rural Development Project(Loan 2094-TU)

Attached, for information, is a copy of the report entitled "Project CompletionReport on Turkey - Erzurum Rural Development Project (Loan 2094-TU)" prepared by theFAOfWorld Bank cooperative Program and the Europe and Central Asia Regional Office withPart II contributed by the Borrower.

The project achieved most of its physical targets and improved agricultural andlivestock services in a remote area. The project outcome is rated satisfactory. However,sustainability is uncertain because of difficulty in staff retention, high recurrent costs, non-functional water users associations, and low quality infrastructure.

The PCR is of good quality except for the economic evaluation which excludes are-estimation of the rate of return. An audit is planned, focusing on the economic impact andsustainability of project achievements.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

TURKEY


TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .............

EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................................... iii-vi

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ..................... 1

1. Project Identity ................................................. 12. Background ................................................... 13. Project Objectives and Description ..................................... 34. Project Design and Organization ...................................... 45. Project Implementation ............................................ 56. Project Results and Impact .......................................... 87. Sustainability .................................................. 118. Bank Performance ............................................... 129. Borrower Performance ............................................. 1210. Lessons .......................... ............................ 1311. Project Relationships ..................... ........................ 1412. Consulting Services ...................... ........................ 1413. Project Documentation and Data ...... .......... ...................... 14

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTVE ................ 15

1. World Bank's Performance .......................................... 152. IFAD's Performance .............................................. 163. Borrower's Performance - GDPI of MAFRA .............................. 174. Borrower's Performance - Organization in Project Area ........................ 185. Conclusions and Lessons Leamed ...................................... 22

PART m: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ................................. 26

1. Related Bank Loans .............................................. 262. Project Timetable ............................................... 273. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements ........................ 284. Project Implementation ............................................ 295. Project Costs and Financing ......................................... 306. Project Results ................................................. 317. Status of Covenants .............................................. 328A. Use of Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .............. ..................... 348B. Use of Bank Resources: Missions ............... .. .................... 35

ANNEX: Crop and Livestock Activities in Erzurum Province ...................... 37

MAP: IBRD 15986R

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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TURKEY


PREFACE

This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Erzurum Rural DevelopmentProject in Turkey, for which IBRD Loan 2094-TU, in the amount of US$40 million equivalent,was approved on March 5, 1982. The project was co-financed by IFAD by Loan 96-TU in theamount of US$20 million which was approved on August 3, 1982. The loans closed onDecember 31, 1989, almost three years behind schedule. US$9 million of the IBRD Loan andUS$4.5 million of the IFAD Loan were cancelled.

This PCR was prepared by the staff of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme(FAO/CP) (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). It was modified by the AgricultureOperations Division of Europe and Central Asia Regional Office, as necessary to reflect thecomments from reviewers and the Government of Turkey (GOT). GOT has prepared its ownassessment of the project which is contained in Part II of the PCR. It has also confirmed thatthere are no comments to Parts I and III of the PCR.

The report is based inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan and Projectagreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; internalBank memoranda; and information gathered by the FAO/CP mission which visited Turkey inJuly 1991.

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TURKEY


EVALUATION SUMMARY

Objectives

1. Although Turkey had developed a large, modem and urbanized sector by the end ofthe seventies, and had experienced rapid economic growth and rising income levels during thepreceding two decades, a large rural-urban gap in incomes and standards of living persisted andurban drift continued to gather momentum as more people, particularly the young and educated,left the depressed rural areas in search of better life in the cities. Government was concernedabout the potential for social and political instability which could arise if the above disparitieswere not addressed. It therefore moved to tackle the particular development needs of the poorestregions, particularly in the fields of agriculture, which despite industrialization remained crucialto the economy, contributing about 25 percent of GNP, employing nearly 65 percent of the laborforce, supplying much of the raw materials for industry and providing for about 60 percent ofexport earnings. Government decided that from the perspective of rural development, ErzurumProvince in Eastern Anatolia, where the majority of the population was extremely poor, neededthe most urgent attention.

2. This project was therefore formulated with the main objectives of raising income andemployment levels in Erzurum through agro-related activities and the quality of life throughimproved rural infrastructure.

Implementation

3. The loan became effective in December 1982 after a five-month delay to enableGovernment to comply with all the conditions for loan effectiveness.

4. Project implementation was initially slow because of lack of a full-time projectmanager for about two years, a severe earthquake which hit the project area in autumn 1983disrupting activities for more than one year, and later, a ministerial merger and reorganization

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of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs (MAFRA), which resulted in staff andinstitutional changes affecting the project. Many of the project's infrastructural targets wereattained by the end of 1986 and exceeded by the time the project closed at the end of December1990. Within the limits imposed by staff availability, quality and mobility constraints,agricultural and livestock programs were undertaken and both farmer and staff training wereintensified. After a disappointing start caused by disagreements between MAFRA and theAgricultural Bank of Turkey (TCZB) over their respective roles, and World Bank restriction onsub-loan beneficiaries, credit targets were met and far exceeded by the end of the project.

5. The slow start of the project meant that loan disbursements were extremely low inthe first two years with only US$8 million or 20% of the Bank loan disbursed by June 1984 vis-a-vis the appraisal estimate of US$22.5 million or 56%. The project closing date was extendedthrice involving a period of about 3 years to enable project activities to gain ground lost in theinitial years.

6. Actual project costs are estimated at US$94 million or 69% of SAR estimate ofwhich the World Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) respectivelycontributed US$31 million and US$15.5 million or 49% of total costs while Government, TCZBand the sub-borrowers contributed US$47.5 million, or 51 % of total costs. Because of the over-estimation of project costs, the low rate of disbursements in the first few years of the project,and the sharp devaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL) vis-a-vis the major world currencies,US$9 million of the World Bank loan and US$4.5 million of the IFAD loan were unutilized andtherefore cancelled.

Results

7. An ex-post survey commissioned by MAFRA to measure the farm impact of ErzurumRural Development Project (ERDP) was completed but not adequately analyzed and interpreted.Upon request by the Bank, this task has now resumed and results are expected to be availablefor the project audit. However, from other sources such as field visits, interviews with thetarget group and local administrators, it can be seen that much was achieved. The mostimpressive results and more visible impact of the project were in the infrastructure componentwhere the project constructed or rehabilitated 197 irrigation schemes covering an area of 13,315hectares; undertook soil conservation works over an area of 1,775 hectares; constructed 519 kmof new road and 1,341 bridges; stabilized 814 km of existing roads and put in place 218 villagewater supply schemes. The above results substantially exceeded appraisal targets.

8. In agricultural production, the project improved and expanded extension services andmade- commendable efforts to strengthen research/extension linkages. These, along withimproved irrigation facilities and easier access to farm credit, led to a noticeable improvementin farming practices particularly in the use of inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides and fallowreduction. However, these improvements do not appear to have resulted in a sustained increase

in crop yields except for potatoes, for which yields increased by 22% between 1982 and 1990.Increased crop production has been largely due to more area planted to crops.

9. In animal health and breeding, the project demonstrated to the farmers the benefitsof using vaccines and parasite control chemicals. For example, a MAFRA survey shows thatthe mortality rate among animals due to disease decreased from 8.5% in 1982 to only 1.8% in1990 for bovines and from 9.8% to 3.4% for ovines. Efforts to improve animal breeds wereless successful because of conservative beliefs by the farmers who did not accept the artificialinsemination breeding method.

10. As regards institutional support, the project contributed to the strengthening ofProvincial Directorate for Agriculture of MAFRA (PDA) and other co-operating agenciesthrough the provision of office buildings and living quarters, vehicles, and improvement of skillsthrough training. However, many people trained under the project did not always stay with theproject after completing their courses. They transferred to more attractive and less remote partsof the country leaving the project and Erzurum province short of skills which ERDP had funded.The project failed, however, in attaining one of its important aims, namely to help farmers inirrigated areas organize themselves into Water Users Associations (WUA) so that they, and notthe Government, would be responsible for the management and maintenance of the completedirrigation schemes.

11. It has not been possible to estimate the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) which theproject is expected to achieve. Data collected by the MAFRA ex-post survey for this purposewere not sufficiently analyzed to permit such calculation. However, given the substantial cost-savings particularly in the infrastructure component and the absolute increments in crop andlivestock production as a result of substantial reductions in fallow areas brought about by theproject, it is reasonable to expect that the project has attained or exceeded the SAR estimatedeconomic rate of return. No adequate data is available to indicate the project impact on farmincomes but the emigration of young people to other parts of the country has slowed down. Inaddition, the project had considerable intangible benefits particularly in the infrastructurecomponent.

Sustainabilitv

12. Although the project made commendable efforts to improve the rural infrastructure,the works were not of as high a quality as would be desired and some are already in need ofrepair. A carefully supervised maintenance program of the physical facilities is thereforenecessary if they are to last their full economic life. The survival and expansion of agriculturaland livestock activities started by the project are threatened by lack of adequate numbers ofVillage Group Technicians (VGTs), many having vacated their postings since the project ended.Without them, the extension efforts will not continue unless some other alternative medium isdevised. Regarding farm credit, TCZB has continued, after the end of the project, to lend to

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the farmers from its own internal resources and from funds of the on-going Bank-assisted ThirdAgricultural Credit project. However, the expansion and sustainability of the credit programcould in the long run be undermined by the high level of defaults if not brought under control.Perhaps the most crucial key in the sustainability of the activities and programs started by theproject will be the continuity of adequate budget allocations from Government. ERDP initiatedactivities with a substantial recurrent expenditure requirement. Given Government's financialconstraints, and competing demands, ways and means should be devised to ease its financialburden, for example by encouraging the resource users, such as those using the irrigationschemes, to take on the responsibility for the management and maintenance of the facilities.Government would then only give them logistical and technical support. This was the systemexpected at project appraisal. However, with the merger of the former implementing agencyLand and Water Development Agency of MVA (TOPRAKSU) into MAFRA, the staff whoformerly organized such water users associations were transferred to other responsibilities andlittle progress was made in forming such associations. Govemment is now committed to renewits efforts to establish more water users associations under other projects, e.g., the forthcomingEastem Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Project. With regard to extension service operationsand demonstrations, the Government budgeted funds for such operations under the investmentbudget (even though they were entirely funded by the Govemment and not from the loans). Asa result, there was a sharp drop in funding upon project completion. The following year,funding for such services was restored through MAFRA introduction of a new investment projectunder which such funding could be included. While this was a pragmatic short-term solution,ways must be found to gradually obtain required recurrent funding for improved extensionoperations into the regular budget.

Findings and Lessons Learned

13. First, the project demonstrated that even in comparatively less developed areas likeErzurum, farmers readily respond to a well-mixed development package. In ERDP, a packagewhich brought together extension services, credit and improved infrastructure facilitated thefarmers' favorable response and participation in the project. Secondly, the project highlightedthe need for the project preparation team to consult adequately with the beneficiaries and the keypeople in the project area so that they and the people over whom they have influence canidentify themselves better with the project. Project preparation would also then be able to takeaccount of local cultures and preferences (religious beliefs, diet biases, etc.). Finally, theproject demonstrated the advantages of decentralization of project management for quickdecision-making and to facilitate coordination. But it also showed that the Project Manager ina decentralized operation should be given adequate decision-making authority over the peopleand resources for which he is responsible.


TURKEY


PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Project Identitv

Project Name Erzurum Rural Development Project

IBRD Loan No. 2094-TU

IFAD Loan No. 96-TU

RVP Unit Europe & Central Asia Region

Country : Turkey

Sector : Agriculture

Subsector Area Development

2. Background

Genera

2.1 The Erzurum Rural Development Project (ERDP) was the second Bank-assisted ruraldevelopment intervention in Turkey. The project had its origins in the Government's increasingawareness of the need to reduce regional income disparities and especially to promote thedevelopment of the least developed provinces in Eastern Anatolia. The then Ministry ofAgriculture and Forestry (MAF) engaged a local consulting firm to study developmentpossibilities in that area. This was followed by project preparation assistance from theFAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (CP) in 1976-77 who submitted a provisionalpreparation report in August 1977. After the change of Government in early 1978, the Turkishauthorities expressed dissatisfaction with the project concepts and design and asked MAF toprepare a new version of the project for Bank consideration. Since the project activities involvedseveral ministries, the State Planning Office (SPO) assumed responsibility for the final projectpreparation and coordination in late 1979 and eventually produced a report which formed the

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basis on which the project was appraised by the World Bank in May 1981. The loan wasapproved by the Board in February 1982.

2.2 The project was scheduled to be completed on December 31, 1986 and the loan closedby June 30, 1987. However, project progress in the early period was slowed by lack of aproject manager for about two years, a severe earthquake which hit the project area in autumn1983, and the re-organization of MAFRA which resulted in staff and institutional changesaffecting the project. Therefore, to enable the project attain its objectives, it became necessaryto extend its closing date several times. The project was eventually completed in December1989 and the loan closed in April 1990 about three years behind the original schedule.

Sector Development Objectives and Strategy

2.3 At appraisal, although Turkey had a large, modem and urbanized sector, 54 percent ofthe people still lived in rural areas and the rural population was growing at about 1.6 percentper annum. Despite economic growth and rising income levels during the preceding twodecades, a large rural-urban gap in income and levels of living persisted and urban driftcontinued to gather momentum as more people, particularly the young and educated, left thedepressed rural areas in search of better life in the cities.

2.4 Government was concerned about the potential for social and political instability whichcould arise if the above disparities were not addressed. Therefore, in order to tackle theparticular development needs of the poorest regions, the Government established the LessDeveloped Regions Department (KOYD) within the SPO. KOYD identified the structure ofsettlement patterns throughout Turkey, and ranked the economic status and potential of allvillages and settlements. From KOYD's point of view, and from the perspective of ruraldevelopment, Eastern Anatolia, where the majority of the population was extremely poor, neededthe most urgent attention.

2.5 Although successive Governments had put increased emphasis on dispersingindustrialization to less developed areas as a tool of development, by the end of the 1970s,agriculture still remained crucial to the economy contributing about 25 percent of GNP,employing nearly 65 percent of the labor force, supplying much of the raw materials for industryand providing for about 60 percent of export earnings. The Corum-Cankiri Rural DevelopmentProject assisted by the Bank (Loan 1 130-TU) had proved that effective extension services backedby credit can significantly improve the productivity of agriculture. An increased volume ofinvestment in agriculture, along with institutional and other reforms, was therefore needed toabsorb the increasing population in rural areas, and more importantly to check the drift of therural under-employed to over-crowded urban centers, and to realize the considerable agriculturalpotential of disadvantaged areas like East Anatolia.

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3. Project Objectives and Description

Project Objectives

3.1 The project's main objectives were:

(i) to improve the income and employment levels in the project area, through increasedagricultural and livestock production; and

(ii) to raise the quality of life by providing essential infrastructure such as roads andwater supply.

Project Description

3.2 The project's objectives were to be achieved through implementation of the followingsix components over a four and three quarter year period:

(i) Agricultural Services - consisting of expansion and reorientation of agriculturalextension and plant protection services, the equipping of the regional agriculturalresearch station, and improved linkages between research and extension;

(ii) Animal Health and Breeding Services - consisting of expansion and reorientation ofanimal health services; and expansion of artificial insemination services for cattle andsheep on a pilot demonstration basis;

(iii) Investment and Production Credits - for purchase of agricultural machinery andimplements, inputs, barn and feed storage renovation and feeds, beekeeping, and milkcollection centers;

(iv) Rural Infrastructure - consisting of improvement and expansion of small-scaleirrigation works, soil conservation works, the upgrading and some new constructionof rural roads, and provision of protected drinking water systems;

(v) Project Management - consisting of establishment and staffing of a project officewithin the office of the provincial governor, consulting services, surveys and studiesfor monitoring and evaluation; and

(vi) Training - consisting of in-service and overseas staff training.

3.3 Total project costs were estimated at US$137 million equivalent. The World Bank andIFAD would contribute 44% of total financing requirements by respectively providing US$40million and US$20 million by way of loans. The remaining US$77 million or 56% of total costs

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was to be raised locally by the Government (US$65 million); TCZB (US$7 million) and the sub-borrowers (US$5 million).

4. Project Design and Organization

Design

4.1 The original design of the project was heavily influenced by political considerations.This led to a lengthy and expensive preparation process as senior government officials changedand, with them, the project ideas changed. However, after a lot of fine-tuning between the Bankand SPO, a fairly well-designed project finally emerged. One of the draw backs by the project,perhaps inevitable under the circumstances, was that it aimed to do too many things in a ratherlimited time. Had it not been for the considerable diplomatic skills of the project manager andthe subsequent re-organization of MAFRA whereby most of the cooperating agencies were putunder one Ministry, the project, as designed, would have encountered serious co-ordination andorganizational problems. The project also did not put adequate emphasis on the livestockactivities which form the back-bone of the economic life in the area. In retrospect, there seemsto have been inadequate consultation with the regional MAFRA officials and administrativechiefs. Had these been adequately consulted, perhaps errors of judgement like introducing avariety of wheat unsuitable for local tastes and pursuing artificial insemination in a deeplyreligious and conservative community could have been avoided.

Organization

4.2 The project was organized along the then current Turkish administrative practice witheach agency responsible for the execution of its relevant com-ponent. For example, TCZB wasresponsible for agricultural credit; the Land and Water Development Agency (TOPRAKSU) andthe General Directorate of Rural Infra-structure (YSE) were responsible for the ruralinfrastructure aspects; while the respective Directorates of MAFRA were responsible for theagricultural and livestock activities of the project. To ensure co-ordination, an Erzurum Steeringand Co-ordination Committee (ESC) consisting of central level representatives of participatingagencies and the Ministry of Finance was set up in Ankara while a counterpart outfit in the formof a Provincial Coordinating Committee (PCC) was set up in Erzurum. Project execution wasput directly under the authority of the Governor. A small Project Management Unit (PMU) wasset up in Erzurum to assist the Governor in the day-to-day management of the project. Thisdecentralization of project management was perhaps the most innovative aspect of the projectand helped a lot towards its success. The management would however have been strengthenedif the project manager had been given more line authority over the people and resources forwhich he was responsible. However, for the longer term sustainability of project improvementsand extension to other areas, it was decided to maintain responsibility within the line agencieswho would be in charge of provision of services after project completion.

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5. Project Implementation

General

5.1 The loan became effective in November 1982 after a five-month delay to enableGovernment to comply with all the conditions for loan effectiveness particularly those relatingto subsidiary loan agreements, inter-agency protocols, the staffing of the PMU and the cross-effectiveness conditions relating to the IFAD loan.

5.2 The early period of project implementation was slowed by lack of a full-time projectmanager (the first two project managers quit shortly after appointment) for about two years. Thesituation was aggravated by a severe earthquake which hit the project area in autumn 1983,disrupting activities for more than one year. In reality, therefore, project activities did not takeoff till sometime in 1984. After that, project implementation went smoothly except for the 1985ministerial restructuring which merged the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and theMinistry of Village Affairs (MVA) to form MAFRA. This resulted in staff and institutionalchanges affecting the project. Many of the project's infrastructural targets were attained by theend of 1986. Within the limits imposed by mobility constraints, extension visits were carriedout to most parts of the province and both farmer and staff training were intensified. After adisappointing start, credit targets were met and far exceeded by the end of the project.

5.3 As shown in Table 5(a), actual project costs are estimated at US$ 94 million or 69% ofSAR estimate of which the World Bank and IFAD contributed US$ 31 million and US$ 15.5million respectively or 49% of total costs while Government, TCZB and the sub-borrowerscontributed US$ 47.5 million or 51 % of total costs. Because of the over-estimation of projectcosts, the low rate of disbursements in the first few years of the project, and the sharpdevaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL) vis-a-vis the major world currencies, US$ 9 million of theWorld Bank loan and US$ 4.5 million of the IFAD loan were unutilized and therefore cancelled.

5.4 The key project implementation indicators are set out in Table 4. The implementationof individual components is briefly evaluated in the following paragraphs.

Agricultural Services

5.5 Although statistical data regarding field crop demonstrations at the end of the project isnot readily available, the project did intensify extension services through visits anddemonstrations to farmers. A recently completed baseline survey carried out in Erzurum byMAFRA shows that Village Group Technicians (VGT) visited and delivered extension servicesto 74% of the villages by the end of the project compared with 48% of the villages visitedbefore the project started. The survey also shows that more than 50% of the villages were

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visited more than 3 times a year by the extension agents. It is most likely that more extensionvisits would have been carried out had it not been for the perennial mobility problem caused bylack of adequate numbers of drivers. The technical quality, number and frequency of visits byVGTs to the farmers were further constrained by lack of adequate numbers of properly trainedand competent subject matter specialists willing to spend more time in the field transferringknowledge to the VGTs and the farmers. Furthermore, at the end of the project, many VGTsvacated their postings or got transferred to other parts of the country with the result thatcurrently most villages have only half the number of VGTs they need.

Animal Health and Breeding

5.6 The planned program for vaccinations of animals went smoothly with appraisal targetsbeing exceeded substantially. For example, vaccinations against enterotoxemia exceeded theSAR target by 23% while that against foot-and-mouth disease exceeded the appraisal target by62%. On average about 50% of the villages vaccinated their livestock under the project ascompared to just over 19% without the project. The parasite control program went very wellwith the appraisal targets being exceeded by 225% in the case of sheep and 160% in the caseof cattle. However, the artificial insemination (Al) activity had a mixed reception. Whereasthe SAR target of Al for cattle was met and slightly exceeded, that for sheep, which is by farthe locally preferred type of meat was a total failure and had to be abandoned after 1986. Thelocal farmers are very conservative and did not favor the Al method of improving animalbreeds. Because of constraints already alluded to in the preceding paragraph, only 1,510 farmshad animal husbandry demonstrations vis-a-vis the appraisal target of 3,900.

Investment and Production Credit

5.7 In the early years of the project, credit delivery was hampered by disputes betweenMAFRA and TCZB over their respective roles. In particular they disagreed as to who shouldassist the intending borrower to prepare farm plans and estimations of their credit requirements.Credit disbursements were also constrained by the project concept which restricted credit accessto nucleus groups only. Therefore, at the end of 1984 only US$2.7 million had been disbursedas against a target of US$4.3 million by that date. However, the above bottlenecks wereresolved by the end of 1984. MAFRA and TCZB worked out an agreeable system to processproject credits and the World Bank agreed to lift the restrictions on target beneficiaries, so thatall the farmers in the province became eligible for credit under the project. The above improvedcredit demand and disbursements substantially to the extent that by the end of 1986, all creditallocated under the project had been utilized and funds had to be re-allocated from other projectcategories so as to meet credit requirements for the period 1987 to 1989.

5.8 Cumulative credit disbursements by the project amounted to about US$61 million whichis 76% more than the appraisal estimate. Over 56,000 sub-loans were made which is 56%

higher than the SAR target. The bulk of the loans (87% of total) went to short-term productionrequirements. Although interest rates were negative in real terms, they were sufficiently highto discourage farmers from taldng medium and long term loans. Overall, the credit programwas beset by a high rate of defaulters, particularly in the livestock sector where at the end of1989 the default rate was as high as 38%. However, TCZB says the situation is now improving.

Rural Infrastructure

5.9 Construction progress was initially held up due to the difficulty of mobilizing sufficientstaff to serve in Erzurum, the 1983 earthquake, and the diversion of construction equipment toprojects in other provinces.

5.10 In spite of the early problems, by 1986 the greater part of the Rural Infrastructureprogram had been completed. In fact, cost savings were such that the targets were exceeded andthe opportunity was taken to repair the low standard of workmanship that had occurred on someschemes. By the end of 1989, when the project was completed, all the SAR targets, with thenotable exception of construction of box culverts, had been exceeded by far.

Project Management

5.11 A PMU consisting of 13 people headed by a Project Manager (PM) was set up inErzurum under the office of the Governor. There were however problems in attracting qualifiedstaff to Erzurum from the other more prosperous and more attractive duty stations. The PMUtherefore did not have a full time PM for the first 2 years of the project and it took aconsiderable length of time to find translators. In spite of not having adequate authority toexecute their duties and occasional shortfalls of operating funds, the PMU did a commendablejob in supervising and coordinating project activities. At the end of the project, the PMU wasdissolved and project activities left entirely in the hands of the respective line agencies.

Training

5.12 The project carried out three types of training: in-service training within Turkey;overseas training on short-term tours and long-term courses; and farmers training mainly at thevillage centers constructed by the project. In-service training totalling 15,600 staff-days wasoffered to professional and technician staff at Ataturk University and at other training centersof MAFRA all over the country. Overseas training was carried out using loan fundsadministered under a contract with FAO. Staff involving 379 man-months (SAR target 300 man-months) attended various short and long term courses in the fields of irrigation, agronomy,animal husbandry, credit and monitoring and evaluation. Although many participants found thecourses useful, lack of adequate knowledge of the foreign languages in which the courses wereconducted was a considerable handicap to most. Statistics are not readily available, but manyfarmers repeatedly received training from VGTs and subject matter specialists. Project fundswere also used to take a group of 10 people from the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture and

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Rural Affairs to Pakistan on a study tour on Water Users Associations in a Bank-financedirrigation project.

6. Proiect Results and Impact

General

6.1 In 1990, MAFRA commissioned a consultant to carry out an ex-post survey of ERDPto help determine the project achievements and impact. Collection and preliminary analysis ofthe data was undertaken by June 1991 by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Directorateof Externally Funded Projects (TDPI) in MAFRA with the assistance of the same consultant.However, final analysis of the data including ERR calculation was not completed because theconsultant's contract expired before the work could be completed. It was therefore difficult tomeasure accurately the farm impact of the project at the time when this report was prepared.The data collected in the household survey on key project aspects like production yields, inputuse, prices, farm sizes, family incomes, number of jobs created, etc, were not sufficientlyanalyzed to permit a ERR calculation. The Bank has expressed its disappointment to theGovemment about this state of affairs and accordingly MAFRA has rehired in May 1992 theoriginal consultant to complete the survey analysis and to calculate the project ERR. The resultsare expected to be available by the end of 1992. However, judging from other sources, it isgenerally agreed that ERDP was a worthwhile intervention which has helped substantially touplift the quality of rural life in Erzurum province. The discernible results and impact arediscussed below.

Agricultural Production

6.2 The project improved and expanded extension services and made commendable effortsto strengthen research/extension linkages. These, along with improved irrigation facilities andeasier access to farm credit, led to a noticeable improvement in farming practices particularlyin the use of inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides and fallow reduction. However, based onofficial provincial statistics, these improvements do not appear to have resulted in a sustainedincrease in crop yields. For example, excluding 1989 which was a drought year, the yields ofwheat and barley increased from 1.2 and 1.5 tons respectively in 1982 to 1.5 and 2.1 tons perhectare in 1986 but have since declined to 1.4 tons and 1.8 tons respectively in 1990 (see PartIII, Annex I). The variety of wheat introduced by the project was not readily adapted becauseit did not suit local tastes. The yields of alfalfa were below their 1982 levels throughout theproject period declining from 7.6 tons per hectare to 7.4 tons per hectare in 1990. The yieldsof sugar beat also declined during the project period. Among the important crops in the area,it is only the potatoes, which, thanks to improved seed varieties, showed sustained yieldincreases, rising from 17.3 tons per ha in 1982 to 21.0 tons in 1990. Again, the final analysis

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of the household survey data will provide more precise information on crop yields of projectbeneficiaries.

Livestock Production

6.3 About 35% of all farm families benefitted from the project's livestock activities. Theproject demonstrated to the farmers the benefits of using vaccines and parasite control chemicals.Although the ex-post baseline survey carried out by MAFRA does not have any definitivestatistics on animal population, it shows an improvement in animal health. For example themortality rate among animals dying because of disease has decreased from 8.5 % in 1982 to only1.8% in 1990 for bovines and from 9.8% to 3.4% for ovines. However, average carcass weightwhich had been estimated to increase by 54 % and 42 % for cattle and sheep respectively, did notmaterialize and remained at about the same levels as before the project. Efforts to improveanimal breeds were less successful because of conservative beliefs by the farmers. Most did notaccept the artificial insemination breeding method. But a change of mind is slowly coming.According to the MAFRA survey, the average number of households (per village) practicingartificial insemination for their animals almost doubled from 3 before the project to about 6 atthe end of the project.

Rural Infrastructure

6.4 The project constructed or rehabilitated 197 irrigation schemes covering an area of13,315 hectares; undertook soil conservation works over an area of 1,775 hectares; constructed519 km of new road; stabilized 814 km of existing roads and put in place 218 village watersupply schemes. The above results exceeded appraisal targets by 33% in the case of theirrigated area; 37% in the case of soil conservation; 452% in the case of new road construction;5 % in the case of roads stabilized; and 54 % in the case of water supply schemes. Four villageswith populations in excess of 750 which had access to central ground water and electricity wereable to receive individual metered house water connections. The project also constructed 1,341bridges or 95% in excess of SAR estimate and built culverts. Additionally, office and livingquarters for VGTS were built. It also availed facilities which assisted in clearing an average2,320 km of snow-covered roads per year.

6.5 As can be seen from the above, the project significantly transformed the infrastructurallandscape of Erzurum. The quality of village life was improved. Better roads improvedaccessibility to both social services and markets while improved irrigation facilities have laid afoundation for increased farm incomes. Increased and improved water supply facilities havegiven a significant portion of the population easier access to potable water essential to goodhealth while office and residential accommodation built by the project have greatly improved theliving and working environment of the Government officials concerned.

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Investment and Production Credit

6.6 The project facilitated easier access to farm credit to a wider population. This in turnmade it possible for the farmers to acquire the necessary implements and inputs to improve andexpand their crop and livestock activities. About 50,000 farmers benefitted vis-a-vis theappraisal estimate of 30,000.

Institutional Support

6.7 The project contributed to the strengthening of PDA and other co-operating agenciesthrough the provision of office buildings and living quarters, vehicles, and improvement of skillsthrough training. However, many people trained by the project did not always stay with theproject after completing their courses. They transferred to more attractive and less remote partsof the country leaving the project and Erzurum province short of skills which ERDP had funded.

6.8 The project failed in attaining one of its important aims, namely to help farmers inirrigated areas to form themselves into Water Users Associations (WUA) so that they, and notthe Government, would be responsible for the management and maintenance of the completedirrigation schemes. After several fruitless starts, only a small number of WUAs had beenformed by the time the project ended. No WUA in the hill villages had passed beyond the basicstage of initial establishment and farmers closer to the source of water are still using it in aprofligate fashion to the detriment of those in the lower expansion areas. The reasons for thisunsatisfactory performance are not well understood. It appears to have been important,however, that the system introduced by TOPRAKSU for establishing waters users associationswas not adequately pursued when the responsibility for establishing such associations wastransferred to GDRA but most of the staff experienced in such matters chose to stay withTOPRAKSU.

Economic Rate of Return

6.9 The SAR estimated Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was 14.2%. In view of the datashortcomings (para 6.1), it has not yet been possible to estimate the ERR which the project isnow expected to achieve. However, given the substantial cost-savings particularly in theinfrastructure component, the higher than anticipated number of roads built and stabilized andof water supply schemes constructed, and the absolute increments in crop and livestockproduction (the increase in crop production mainly achieved through fallow reduction), it isreasonable to expect that the project has attained or exceeded the SAR economic rate of return.In addition, the project had considerable non-quantifiable benefits, particularly in theinfrastructure component, where the construction of roads and water facilities improvedaccessibility. No reliable data is available to show the project impact on employment and farm

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incomes. However, it is generally agreed that the quality of rural life has significantly improvedand the migration of young people to cities has reportedly declined.

7. Sustainability

7.1 During the project, commendable efforts were made to stimulate crop and livestockproduction through intensive extension efforts and farm credit. However, in the long ru! ,thesurvival and sustainability of the extension efforts started under the project are threatened by l.ackof adequate numbers of VGTs, many having vacated their postings since the project ended.Regarding farm credit, TCZB has continued, after the end of the project, to lend to the farmersfrom its own internal resources and from funds of the on-going Bank-assisted Third AgriculturalCredit project. However, the expansion and sustainability of the credit program could in thelong run be undermined by the high level of defaults if not brought under control.

7.2 Although the project attained and in some cases exceeded its targets for infrastructuredevelopment, the facilities constructed were not of the high quality that would have been desired.Where contractors have failed to meet adequate construction standards, the life of canal liningwill be short and maintenance will be a continuous drain on scarce funds. The intakes servingthose canals are also likely to suffer more frequent damage than would have occurred ifconstruction standards had been higher. Some are already in need of repair and may not be ableto serve their optimum economic life.

7.3 Perhaps the most crucial key in the sustainability of the activities and programs startedby the project will be the continuity of adequate budget allocations from Government. ERDPinitiated activities with a substantial recurrent expenditure requirement. Now that the projectfunding is over, Government has taken on the full burden of financing all recurrent expenditures.Given Government's financial constraints, and competing demands, it will be important that itmaintains firm commitment and adequate financial allocations to the relevant line agencies towhich the ERDP activities have been handed. To ease the financial burden on Government,efforts should be continued to design ways and means by which the resource users, such as thoseusing the irrigation schemes, are given the responsibility for the management and maintenance.Government would then only give them logistical and technical support. This was the systemexpected at project appraisal. However, with the merger of the former implementing agency(TOPRAKSU) into MAFRA, the staff who formerly organized such water users associationswere transferred to other responsibilities and little progress was made in forming suchassociations. GOT has now agreed to renew its efforts to establish more water users associationsin the framework of the forthcoming Eastern Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Project. TheIrrigation Investment Review undertaken by the Bank on request of GOT will also contain therecommendation to put more emphasis on the formation of water users associations. With regardto extension service operations and demonstrations, the Government budgeted funds for suchoperations under the investment budget (even though they were entirely funded by theGovernment and not from the loans). As a result, there was a sharp drop in funding upon

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project completion. The following year, funding for such services was restored throughMAFRA introduction of a new investment project under which such funding could be included.While this was a pragmatic short term solution, ways must be found to gradually obtain requiredrecurrent funding for improved extension operations into the regular budget.

8. Bank Performance

8.1 The Bank's decision to support ERDP was appropriate given the Bank's target group andBank's commitment to assist in poverty alleviation wherever possible. Although the project asappraised had more components than would now normally be desirable, it fitted into the"integrated rural development" philosophy espoused at the time. Bank intervention during thepreparation and pre-appraisal stages helped in appropriately focusing project design. Perhapsone drawback was the timing of the initial project preparation process which appeared to havebeen premature. Almost 6 years elapsed between project identification (October 1976) andappraisal (May 1982). During that period, far-reaching social, political and economic changeswere taking place necessitating constant revision of the project concept and design. Inretrospect, the Bank could have shortened the project preparation process by providing firmerand more consistent guidance as to the types of components likely to be acceptable and shouldhave resisted political pressures during project processing to include that many components.

8.2 As shown in Table 8, ten supervision missions visited Turkey during project life tomonitor implementation progress. Their input was found useful by the implementing agenciesand contributed substantially to the successful implementation of the project by highlightingoperational weakness and suggesting possible remedies. However, there should have been moreuse of livestock specialists in the supervision missions to monitor the animal health and breedingcomponent. The final supervision mission should have reviewed the terms of reference for theconsultants engaged to do the post-project baseline survey to ensure that the data gathered wouldbe useful in assessing the project impact.

9. Borrower Performance

9.1 In the early steps of project preparation, Government's proposals were largely dictatedby the political considerations of the individual key players. Naturally, these shifted as theplayers changed thus necessitating constant revision of project design. In the end this resultedin a very lengthy and expensive project preparation. Things moved quickly only afterresponsibility for project preparation was handed to SPO at the end of 1979. SPO, with WorldBank assistance, duly prepared a project document which was suitable as a basis for appraisalin early 1981.

9.2 When the project started, there were lengthy delays in staffing and equipping the ProjectManagement Unit. But delays in recruitment of staff were largely due to reluctance of people

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to transfer to work in Erzurum rather than ineffectiveness of Government. However, once thePMU was well staffed, they did a very commendable work in supervising and coordinatingproject activities. The only major lapse was in project monitoring and evaluation, where, partlydue the staff constraints in Ankara, little appears to have been done.

9.3 The borrower generally showed continuous commitment to the project throughout theimplementation period. The borrower ensured that the required protocols between the variouscooperating agencies were executed, coordination committees set up, and usually adequatebudget allocation was made to the project. As shown in Table 7, the Borrower complied withmost covenants of the Loan and Project Agreements. However, there were frequent delays inmeeting reporting, deadlines and no semi-annual reports were submitted after 1987.

10. Lessons

10.1 The project demonstrated several important lessons in rural development:

(i) Even in comparatively less developed areas like Erzurum, farmers readily respond toa well-mixed development package. In ERDP, a package which brought togetherextension services, credit and improved infrastructure facilitated the farmers' favorableresponse and participation in the project.

(ii) At project preparation, the beneficiaries and the key people in the project area suchas the Imam (Religious Head) and the Muhtar (Village Head) should be consulted sothat they and the people over whom they have influence can identify themselves betterwith the project.

(iii) Local cultures and preferences (religious beliefs, diet biases, etc.) should be taken intoaccount. For example, the introduction of a new variety of wheat by the project failedbecause it was unsuitable to local taste and the artificial insemination of sheep wasabandoned when it met stiff cultural opposition.

(iv) Although decentralization of project management to the Provincial Governorate wasa positive decision and minimized coordination problems, the Project Manager shouldhave been given adequate decision-making authority over the people and resources hewas responsible to manage as long as this did not undermine the authority of the lineagencies implementing the project.

(v) In difficult project areas like Erzurum, where the terrain is difficult, farming activitiesdispersed and the weather inhospitable, 5 years is too short to implement a complexrural development project. 7 years seems more optimal.

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(vi) To attract and maintain qualified and competent staff in a comparatively disadvantagedregion like Erzurum, it may be necessary to give staff adequate extra job-relatedincentives and benefits so as to attract them to work in the area.

(vii) Government needs to maintain firm commitment and adequate financial allocations tothe line agencies. The resource users should be given the responsibility for themanagement and maintenance of project works.

11. Project Relationships

11.1 The Bank and the borrower as well as the cooperating agencies had good relationships.Although the borrower was unhappy that the Bank refused to extend the project for a fourthtime, both sides were otherwise willing to accommodate each other's wishes when projectrevisions and reallocation of project funds became necessary.

12. Consulting Services

12.1 The recruitment of consultants, planning and over-seeing their work was sub-contractedto FAO by Government. Originally it was planned that 87 man-months would be required butlater the scope of consulting services was widened both in terms of professional content andduration. By the end of the project 125 man-months was used involving 14 disciplines as against7 envisaged at appraisal. Major fields covered included range management agriculturalextension, animal husbandry, irrigation, and project management.

12.2 Although lack of knowledge of Turkish posed some problems, the consultants'contribution to the success of the project was invaluable. Besides day-to-day transfer ofknowledge to their respective counterparts, they generated useful reports including the widelyacclaimed FAO-funded study of plants of the East Anatolian Meadows which has been publishedinto a book.

13. Project Documentation and Data

13.1 Although no conventional preparation report was compiled, the SAR was of a goodquality and a useful tool to project management. The Loan and Project agreements were well-understood by all parties concerned while the various subsidiary agreements and protocolsbetween the cooperating institutions adequately set out relationships and responsibilities underthe project. At the PMU or MAFRA, however, systems were not put in place to document,monitor and evaluate project progress at all stages in order to gauge the financial and economicimpact of the project.

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PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE"'

1. World Bank's Performance

1.01 Increase in US dollar value during the preparation and implementation periods of theproject has been very high. While the dollar was equivalent to TL 100 at the time ofpreparation, it was TL 2,310 to US$ 1 on December 31, 1989 which was the completion dateof the project. Such an enormous increase could not be estimated at any phase of the project.

1.02 Prior to 1980, 75 % of the farmers' income was realized from livestock. This rateremained constant in 1989-90 which was the completion date of the project. Of 87 m/mconsultancy services under the project, 33 m/m services (38%) were allocated for livestockactivities. As regards the overseas training, of 300 m/m total program, 87 m/m (29%) wereallocated for livestock. With some changes made at the end of the project, foreign specialistemployment was increased to 125.1 m/m. Of this amount, 66 m/m were used for livestock(veterinary, meadow-grassland, artificial insemination and animal feeding). In this way, theshare of livestock has been 52%. The share of livestock for both training and consultantemployment should have been higher than the said amount.

1.03 At the beginning, no consultant employment was planned for potato seed, but 1.9 m/mof employment was realized. However, the studies for the employment of foreign specialistscould have recognized this need.

1.04 The project envisaged employment of a foreign specialist for a period of two years formarketing activities, but without the provision of necessary investment. The World Bank didnot sympathize with the proposals for construction of marketing places where the producers andconsumers would meet directly. The project targets for milk collecting centers and honeypacking facilities did not work due to wrong design. The Agricultural Bank of Turkey (TCZB)which received the money at 7-8% interest wanted to provide it with high interest rates (20-30%)for these activities. If TCZB had provided TSEK with the credit in accordance with the interestrates given to TCZB, the component of establishing milk collecting centers could have worked.On the other hand, if .the TKV (Turkish Development Foundation) had been considered forhoney packing and marketing facilities, positive work could have been done under the project.

The Government of Turkey has prepared its own assessment of the project in this section.

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1.05 The danger of confining access to credit to nucleus groups and leaving other farmersoutside the project had been seen in a short time and the World Bank agreed to make thenecessary changes. This caused a great explosion in credit distribution.

1.06 After reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs, theproject coordination responsibility of SPO was stopped. However, it had been envisaged (at thetime of loan signature) that the Department of Less Developed Regions of SPO would contributeto the project management in all its activities. This had never been possible and the World Bankmissions did not recognize this.

1.07 Some changes were made in the departments of the World Bank responsible for ErzurumRural Development Project during the implementation period of the project. The staff membersof the World Bank who contributed to the preparation of the project were absent at controlsduring the project implementation and at the completion of the project. This caused a little bitof difficulty in communication.

1.08 Very good dialogues were established when there were technicians (who were familiarwith Turkey) in the World Bank missions, especially the World Bank missions whose memberknow the project from the beginning made successful studies and contributed a lot to the project.

1.09 The project management was not established with an effective, authorized andindependent budget. The role of the World Bank and missions in this matter was of greatimportance since they did not make the necessary efforts. If the World Bank wanted, moreeffective project management could have been established.

1.10 The World Bank was open for any views and took quick decisions for procurementprocedures. However, the changes proposed in the project components were not accepted andthis created disappointment. It is not possible every time to have a well-planned project file andan ideal project. There could be some mistakes due to various reasons but these mistakes couldbe minimized by the amendments to be made later. If some amendments had been made in 1985for the construction of production roads, for establishment of marketing places where theconsumers congregated, for the encouragement of feeding and health activities and courses forincreasing sldlls of village girls, more successful results could have been obtained.

2. IFAD's Performance

2.01 The authorities from IFAD, which was the other organization financing the projectexternally, had attended most of the missions visiting the project and the evaluation symposiumin 1987. Through the experiences gained from this they started to undertake the financing of

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a lot of projects and arranged a comprehensive international evaluation meeting in Turkey inAutumn of 1989 and staff from IFAD-financed projects in Middle East and Africa attended thismeeting.

3. Borrower's Performance - GDPI of MAFRA

3.01 Since the Project and Implementation General Directorate of MAFRA took over thecoordination of project from SPO in 1985, three General Directors have changed during theproject implementation period. The activities have been carried out by the Externally FinancedProjects Department and Erzurum Rural Development Project Coordination Unit in the body ofthe said General Directorate. Since a lot of projects financed externally have been implementedby the same General Directorate and thus the number of staff members for translation workswere not sufficient, some delays have occurred in translation works.

3.02 Procurement activities of the project have been carried out by the Externally FinancedProjects Department. In 1984-1985, procurement activities were realized very rapidly. All toolsand equipment required for rural infrastructure and also purchase of vehicles for livestockservices have been completed. But, during 1986-1989, purchases could not be realized.Purchases of extension and information materials, agricultural tools and equipment andlaboratory materials were realized in 1989-1990 with considerable delays.

3.03 Semi-annual reports could not be written and published after 1987.

3.04 The necessary budget allocations for the project have been reduced from time to timeand sent with some delays. It is natural to take savings measures in a developing country andthis should be accepted as a normal procedure. However, the project activities were hinderedby these procedures.

3.05 Because of the reorganizations made in MAFRA in 1985, the project directorate couldnot be established with an effective and authorized budget and full staff members. AlthoughProject and Implementation General Directorate has used all their possibilities for solving thesebottleneck problems, a sound and active project directorate could not be established in the fielddue to the hindrance of regulations. After 1987, Project Directorate has acted as a unit fororganizing the activities for the foreign specialists and coordination of meetings and it has beena unit which can only receive information about the project activities but cannot take anyinitiative.

3.06 Overseas and local training programs have been planned and applied carefully and theyhave reached their targets. However, specialization training could not be realized in the desiredway.

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3.07 Good coordination with the Treasury & Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, GeneralDirectorate of Rural Services, and Agricultural Bank of Turkey has been ensured. Also, theactivities have been carried out, establishing good dialogue with the main units of the Ministryviz. General Directorate of Protection and Control and General Directorate of Organization andSupport.

3.08 The staff of the General Directorate of Project and Implementation visited frequently theProject area at General Director, Department Head and Project Coordinator levels and paid verymuch attention to supervising the project activities on the spot.

4. Borrower's Performance - Organizations in Project Area

Provincial Directorate of Agriculture

4.01 Agricultural and Livestock component of the Project was carried out by this organization.Three Provincial Directors changed during the project implementation period. All the ProvincialDirectors were Veterinarians. Although the project terminated at the end of 1989, purchase ofmaterials and the training component continued in 1990 and in the mean time the third directorwas changed. This director was an Agricultural Engineer. Section Directors of the ProvincialDirectorate, especially the farmer training section director who carried out main services of theproject, were not changed frequently during the project implementation period. Animal Healthand Project and Statistics Directors were changed only once.

4.02 The number of technicians in the Province Center was great. They could not be sent tothe counties because they were university students. As regards the counties, the number of staffmembers was very high in the county centers and staff members could not be sent to the villagegroups. Even, there were no staff members in some village groups from time to time.

4.03 VGT offices could never be provided with a vehicle. Also VGT buildings could not beequipped at the desired level.

4.04 Both farmer training and in-service training activities were applied in accordance withthe programs prepared according to the climate conditions.

4.05 Desired dialogue for credit distribution could not be established between TCZB andProvincial Directorate of Agriculture. The Bank did not accept the preparation of the projectsby the Provincial Directorate as they had their own engineering posts.

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4.06 Sending and utilization of vehicles for agricultural and livestock services were realizedwith difficulty.

4.07 Provincial Directorate of Agriculture carries out its services in four different places.These units could not be arranged as a collective campus. This in turn caused some difficultiesin coordination between the units.

4.08 Provincial Directorate of Agriculture established good dialogues with the AgriculturalFaculty during the project implementation period and also it carried out the services in closecooperation with the research institutions.

Research Institutes

4.09 Rural Services Research Institute attached to the General Directorate of Rural Servicesand Eastern Anatolia Research Institute of the Ministry worked in Erzurum Rural DevelopmentProject and they completed their establishment during the project implementation period. Theseinstitutions which had very bad conditions at the beginning of the project reached a very goodlevel in all respects.

4.10 Three directors were changed in Agricultural Research Institute during the projectimplementation period while no director was changed in Rural Services Research Institute.

4.11 Qualified technical staff members' insufficiency was minimized in 1989. Very muchattention was paid to the doctorate studies of the staff members. Staff members attended thelong-term overseas training programs within the bounds of possibility.

4.12 Research Institutions made great contributions to the training of technical staff membersworking in Extension Units.

4.13 Although the relations with the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture were not at thedesired level, the research institutes have tried to strengthen these relations.

Agricultural Faculty of Ataturk University

4.14 Agricultural Faculty of Ataturk University carried out its duties in the best way fortraining of technical staff members under the in-service training component of the project.

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Lecturers of the Faculty took part in the training programs arranged in Erzurum and outsideErzurum by our Ministry.

4.15 Considerable investments were made for zootechnology services in the body of theFaculty under the project but these services could not be improved as much as desired.

4.16 Also, Agricultural Faculty played an active role in bee keeping, meadow-grassland,forage crops and animal feeding demonstrations carried out by the Provincial Directorate ofAgriculture.

Agricultural Bank of Turkey

4.17 The policies applied for the lending component of the project are Government policies.High interest, low official prices for land and not having registration for most of the landscreated important problems during the project implementation period. However, branchdirectorates of TCZB which was executing agency in the project area could not do anythingabout these problems.

4.18 Also, establishment of honey packaging and marketing units and milk collecting centerscould not be realized but this was no fault of the units of the bank.

4.19 Most of the directors of the bank were from Erzurum and this caused some problems.

4.20 Inadequacy of vehicles had been a hindrance for meeting the credit requirements andcarrying out of control services.

Rural Services Provincial Directorate

4.21 It was a great achievement to reach the targets envisaged for infrastructure servicesduring normal implementation period of the project.

4.22 At the beginning of the project some of the machinery and equipment purchasedinternationally for infrastructure services were not sent to the project area. With the insistenceof the World Bank and Project Directorate, all of the machines and equipment were brought tothe project area in 1986. There had been a spare parts bottleneck, especially for large machinesand equipment, after 1986. The efforts made for solving these problems had been insufficientand 2 million dollars of allocation was not used and it was cancelled.

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4.23 Laboratory materials purchased for Rural Services Research Institute under the projectwere transferred to the areas outside the project. After the facilities of the said institute werecompleted in 1987, all laboratory equipment could be realized again.

4.24 Constructions of irrigation canals and industrial manufacturing constructions on the roadsdid not have the required quality due to the severe winter conditions and lack of qualifiedcontractors and lack of foreman employment and these constructions were renovated in 1989-90.This matter was accepted as a reason for the extension of the project Closing Date for the secondtime.

4.25 Employment of workers for greasing of heavy machines and foremen for theconstructions was not ensured adequately. But this could have been realized through creationof permanent posts.

4.26 Efforts were not made for enumeration of vehicles on the road envisaged in the project.There had been some delays in realization of training and studies for pump drinking waterprojects.

4.27 Starting coating of the stabilized roads before completion of art manufactures hinderedthe construction of good quality road coating. Lack of qualified contractors and lack of demandsfor art manufacturing works caused the delays in constructions.

4.28 Mixing the concrete directly on the floor caused low quality in concrete constructions.However, later on, mixing processes were done on iron plate. As it is known quality of concretedepends on mixing process.

4.29 During the first years of reorganization, payments were made late and sometimes withtreasury bonds and this in turn caused the delays.

Project OffleS

4.30 The project office could not be established with full authority and deficiency of this wasfelt from the beginning of the project. Bureaucracy and relevant organizations did not show therequired interest and consequently an unauthorized and unequipped project office tried to carryout the activities.

4.31 All requirements of the project office were met by the executing agencies particularlyby the Governor's office. Therefore, the necessary authority for supervision of the relevantorganizations could not be established.

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4.32 The activities were carried out only by good dialogues and achievement was obtained.After 1987, the project office was informed of the events only for information and the GeneralDirectorate of Project and Implementation carried out the project, directly contacting theexecuting organizations.

4.33 Project office played active role in the symposium arranged under the Project onNutrition and Health and Evaluation of Rural Development Project as well as in the studies madeon health and nutrition jointly by the Hacetepe University and Erzurum Governor's Office andin herb studies for meadow and grassland plants.

4.34 Training activities oriented to the women and young girls in villages were madefrequently by the project directorate under the coordination of Erzurum Governor's Office.Female doctors, dentists, veterinarians and zoo- technicians took part in these studies. Theresults obtained from these studies were presented for the information of World Bank missionsas well as the ministries.

4.35 The project director worked without any change between July 1, 1984-August 5, 1990.Also two Agricultural Engineers and five translators worked in the project during theimplementation period of the project. However, they did not work together at the same time.

5. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

5.01 In general, the Erzurum Rural Development Project was successful. Targets in theproject were achieved or at least high realization percentages were obtained. Maybe, an idealapplication could not be done but it was done as best it could be done.

5.02 It was understood from this project that a five-year implementation period was notsufficient for East Anatolia Region. Minimum of seven years implementation period is requiredfor this kind or project. The project could be completed in seven years. Foreign exchange of14 million dollars could not be utilized. If the third Closing Date extension proposal had beenaccepted by the World Bank, the amount of the cancellation could have been reduced. At least,the spare parts for the equipment and machines used for infrastructure activities could have beenpurchased.

5.03 As of the end of September, foreign exchange utilization was realized as 77% of the loanamount according to the agreement between the Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretariatand our Ministry. Amount of foreign exchange cancelled is over 14 million dollars. The reasonfor this was that the project was designed when the dollar was TL 100 and at the completiondate of the project it was TL 2,310. Also, in 1989 when the dollar rate was very high,

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considerable amount of purchases had been realized. In addition, savings measures of thegovernment affected these utilizations. As is known, unless the local sources are used, the dollartransfer is not possible.

5.04 The proposals of government for increasing physical targets of the project were notaccepted by the World Bank during the project implementation period.

5.05 Also, the proposals of the government for adding new components to the project werenot accepted by the World Bank. It was felt that it was a great deficiency not including thefollowing activities into the project: nutrition and health, establishment of marketing places,carpet making and weaving courses on the basis of villages, afforestation works in forest areasand weed control with herbicides in sugar beet areas.

5.06 Executing agencies were strengthened under the project in respect of building, vehicles,tools and equipment, workshops and laboratories.

5.07 Knowledge, experiences and viewpoints of a lot of staff members changed through theoverseas training.

5.08 Employment of foreign specialists made a great contribution to the training of technicalstaff members and accelerated the technological information exchange.

5.09 The Agricultural Bank and also technical personnel had been familiar with the projectstudies through the 'Project Credit System Applied for the Agricultural credits.

5.10 The farmers could make comparisons through the demonstrations and the ones who hadthe resources started to apply personally the things they learned from demonstrations.

5.11 Animal Health Services were carried out according to the program and successful resultswere obtained.

5.12 Since the land registration and ownership studies were not sufficient, government valuesfor the lands were low, and the interest rates were very high and changed frequently, the creditcomponent could not work soundly and in conformity with its purpose.

Lessons Learned

5.13 Application of Rural Development Projects will continue especially in the less developedregions. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has experienced technical staff members.

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In order to develop the less developed regions and raise the living standards, this kind ofprojects are necessary. The following suggestions can be made for the applications of futureRural Development Projects in the light of experiences gained from Corum-Cankiri and ErzurumRural Development Projects:

(i) At preparation phases of the projects, a detailed survey and research should be made.The design of the project should be made in implementation area. Local techniciansshould be given duties in the projects.

(ii) Integrated projects will be very beneficial. However, it will be very difficult to carryout such an application through the present organization.

(a) The project directorate should be established with full authority, independentbudget and all required posts at the beginning of the project.

(b) The Governors in the implementation area should be given full authority.

(c) Monitoring and evaluation of the project should be done in time, continuously,in coordination both in headquarters and the implementation area.

(d) Nutrition and health, marketing skill courses and forestry activities should beincluded in the project.

(iii) Specialization studies should be given importance in overseas training programs andit should be ensured that the technical staff members who attended short term and longterm overseas training programs be required to remain for obligatory services in theproject area.

(iv) The budget allocation should be sent on time and without deduction.

(v) In the less developed areas, the yield and living standards are low. New methodsshould be used for procurement of agricultural inputs and interest rates to be appliedin these areas.

(vi) The procurement of tools and equipment and materials envisaged in the project shouldbe made on time without delay. In procurement, tools and equipment and materialswhich are popular and have spare parts and service units in the country should bepreferred. Also, these goods should be present in large scale in the machinery andmaterial park of the implementing agencies.

(vii) Extension units should be established for irrigation in Rural Services Organizations.

(viii) The annual programs and budget should be made by the executing units in project areaand the project management and revised by the headquarters later on.

(ix) In-service training programs should be given importance in order to benefit from homeeconomists in training of village women.

- 25 -

(x) Animal health technicians should be employed in VGT offices established inaccordance with the Training and Visit system.

(xi) Rural Services Organization should give importance to the employment of foremen inthe construction and control of buildings and ensure the establishment of IrrigationUnions or Cooperatives.

(xii) Great efforts should be made for adoption of artificial insemination by the villages.If this is not possible, attention should be paid to natural breeding.

- 26 -

Table 1PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Related Bank Loans

Project Loan/Credit Amount StatusNo. (US$M)

Grain Silos Loan 270-TU 3.9 Completed

Seyhan Irrigation I Loan 63-TU 25.2 Completed

Seyhan Irrigation I Credit 38-TU 20.0 Completed

Seyhan Irrigation III Credit 143-TU 12.0 Completed

Seyhan irrigation II Loan 587-TU 12.0 Completed

Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Loan 762-TU 10.0 Completed

Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Credit 257-TU 15.0 Completed

Intensive Dairy Production (Livestock I) Credit 236-TU 4.5 Completed

Irrigation Rehabilitation Completion Credit 281-TU 18.0 Completed

Second Livestock Development Credit 330-TU 16.0 Completed

Ceyhan Aslantas Multipurpose Loan 883-TU 44.0 Completed

Ceyhan Aslantas Multipurpose Credit 360-TU 30.0 Completed

Corum-Cankiri Rural Development Loan 1130-TU 75.0 Completed

Agricultural Credit and Agro-Industries Loan 1248-TU 63.0 Completed

Third Livestock Development Loan 1265-TU 21.5 Completed

Fourth Livestock Development Loan 1586-TU 24.0 Completed

Grain Storage Loan 1742-TU 85.0 Completed

Fifth Livestock Development Loan 1862-TU 51.0 Completed

Second Fruit and Vegetables Loan 1967-TU 40.0 Completed

Second Agricultural Credit Loan 2318-TU 150.4 Completed

Extension and Applied Research Loan 2405-TU 72.2 On-going

Third Agricultural Credit Loan 3090-TU 250.0 On-going

- 27 -

Table 2

Project Timetable

Activity Date Planned Revised Date | Actual Date

Identification October 1976 October 1976

Preparation (Interim) January 1977 January 1977

Preparation (Final) September 1978 September 1978

Pre-Appraisal March 1981 March 1981

Appraisal May 1981 May 1981

Negotiations January 1982 January 1982

Board Approval February 1982 February 1982

Loan Signature March 1982 March 1982

Loan Effectiveness July 1982 September 1982 November 1982

Project Completion December 1986 December 1987December 1988December 1989 December 1989

Loan Closing June 1987 June 1988June 1989December 1989 December 1989

Source: World Bank Project Files.

- 28 -

Table

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements

IBRD I IFAD | TOTAL

Appraisal Estimate (US$ million)l' 40.0 20.0 60.0

Actual Disbursements (US$ million)Z 31.0 15.5 46.5

Actual as % of Appraisal Estimate 78 78 78

Date of Final Disbursement 04/20/90 N/A

Comment:

Because of over-estimation of project costs, the sharp devaluation of the Turkish Liraagainst other currencies and the slow rate of disbursements in the early years of the project,US$9.0 million of the IBRD Loan and US$4.5 of the IFAD Loan were cancelled.

!' Per SAR and Loan Agreements.

v' Per WB disbursement records.

- 29 -

Table 4Project Implementation

Appraisal Actual or PCR Actual as %Indicator Estimate EstimateZ of SAR

I/ 1986 | 1989 Estimate

Field Crop Demonstrations (No. of Farms)

- Wheat 8,500 3,468 N/A N/A

- Pastures 87 41 N/A N/A

Animal Husbandry Demonstrations (No. of Farms) 3,900 N/A 1,510 39

Livestock Vaccination & Parasite Control (000'annually)

- Enterotoxemia 950 805 1,172 123

- Foot and Mouth 200 228 324 162

Artificial Insemination (No. of Animals)

- Cattle 8,370 5,593 8,666 104

- Sheep 38,000 1,345 1,345 4

Investment & Production Credit

- Borrowers (Number) 30,000 36,000 50,000 167

- Loans (Number) 36,000 N/A 56,300 156

Infiastructure

- Roads (Km) 898 750 1,360 151

- Water Supply Schemes (Number) 142 135 218 154

- Small Scale Irrigation Schemes (Number) 56 N/A 197 352

- Small Scale Irrigation (Ha) 10,000 9,189 13,315 133

- Soil Conservation Schemes (Number) 8 N/A N/A N/A

- Soil Conservation (Ha) 1,300 1,528 1,775 137

Technical Assistance (man-months) 87 N/A 125 143

Overseas Trining (man-months) 300 134 379 126

1' Per SAR.

Per DPA, GDRA Erzurum and Government PCR.

- 30 -

Table 5 A & B

Project Costs and Financing

A. Project Costs(US$M equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual

Local I Forex I Total Local Forex TotalCosts Costs Costsv Costs

Agricultural Servicca 21.7 5.0 26.7 N/A

Animal Health and Breeding 3.3 2.4 5.7 N/A

Investment and Production Credit 12.3 22.2 34.5 39.0 21.6

Rural Infrastructure 38.7 29.4 68.1 N/A 17.4

Project Management 0.7 0.6 1.3 N/A 1.2

Trmining 0.3 0.4 0.7 N/A 1.9

Total 77.0 60.0 137.0 47.5 46.5 94.0

B. Project F rancing(US$M equivalent)

[3RD ErADTTOTAL [I3RD [PFAD TOTAL

A.IBRD and [FAD

1. (a) Coaaructo & Maintennce Equipment 10.95 5.47 16.42 7.51 3.75 11.26

(b) Equipment, Mateials & Agrcultaral Inputs 2.33 1.42 4.25 2.93 1.47 4.40

2. Overam Traing 0.15 0.07 0.22 1.27 0.63 1.90

3. Civi Works 5.92 2.96 S.S8 4.09 2.05 6.14

4. Consulat Services 0.35 0.17 052 0.79 0.39 1.18

5. SublJoaus 7.95 3.98 11.93 2.68 134 4.02

6. Sub-os 2.20 1.10 330 11.44 5.72 17.16

7. Subloans 1.65 0.33 2.48 0.27 0.14 0.41

3. UnaBocated 3.00 4.00 12.00 - - -

SUDTOTAL 40AI 20.00 "SM 31 15A9 46.47

B. Govern t 64.70 3.S0

C. TCZB 7.40 23.00

D. Sub-borrower. 4.90 11.00

TOTAL 137.0 937

Sounuc SAR, World Bank disburseent records; PDA Erzurum; andGovernmet PCR.

1 Breakdown by component not available.

- 31 -

Table 6 A&B

Nred R_

ir DizPct uA

I _ 1 4 - j?CRffAmdS

Total Number of Benefciares (People) 2S3,400 353,000

Incremental Employment (Jobs) 1,500 N/A

B. Eemamic Lupac

Ad I I MR Ei1aActd

Economic Rate of Retum (ERR) 14.2% N/A

NB:

Because of substantial gaps in the data collected by MAFRA's ex-post survey, and the inadequacy of the data available to the PCRmission, it is not possible to estimate the economic rate of return which the project is now expected to achieve. However, given thesubstantial cost-savings particularly in the infrastructure component and the absolute increments in crop and lvestock production it isreasonable to assume that the project has attained or even exceeded the SAR economic rate of return. In addition, the project hadconsiderable intangible benefits particularty in the infrastructure component. MAFRA intends to review the impact analysis.

- 32 -

Table 7Page 1 of 2

Sats or Coyemaus

Subject S lt

A. Leam Auaimnt~

C.-

1. Section 4.01 (a) The Borrower to maintain ESC, PCC and the Complied but project office not givenProject Ofrice as administrative entities with adequate line authority.powers and functions sufficient to carry out theirrespective responsibilities under the Project.

2. Section 4.01 (c) The Borrower to allocate in its budget each fiscal Complied on budgetary Covenant butyear until completion of the Project al funds only partial compliance with reportingrequired to meet operating and capital Covenant.expenditures under Parts B through F of theProject; and provide the Bank before thebeginning of each such fiscal year with anestimate of such expenditures.

3. Section 4.02 The Borrower to ensure coordination for carrying Complied.out of aDl parts of the Project by causing theimplementing agencies to enter into protocols witheach other.

4. Section 4.03 The Borrower to implement a staffing plan for the Complied although a permanent projectProject acceptable to the Bank including the manager was appointed almost two yearsappointment of a project manager and late.appropriate staff, all with qualifications and termsof reference satisfactory to the Bank.

5. Section 4.04 In order to assist the Borrower in implementation Complied.of the Project, the Borrower shall employ, notlater than September 15, 1982, or such other dateas the Bank may agree, such consultants as shallbe agreed with the Bank.

6. Section 4.08 The Borrower will take appropriate steps to pass Complied as regards agricultural inputs.on the ful costs of agricultural inputs provided to The other parts of the covenant were notend users in the Project area once demonstration fulfilled.relating to such inputs is completed, including:(a) rangeland management services; (b) seedtreatment, chemicals and equipment for cropspraying; (c) materials and services for parasitecontrol and artificial insemination; and(d) irrigation, other than capital improvements.

7. Section 4.10 Prior to commencing construction on each new Not complied with.water system under the Project, the Borrowershall obtain assurances from the village waterusers of such system that such users shal beresponsible for operating and maintaining suchsystem, including payment of pumping energycharges.

8. Section 4.11 (d) Each semester, the borrower to prepare progress Partial compliance.and evaluation reports dealing with ali Parts ofthe Project and furnish such reports the Bank andthe Fund within two months after the end of eachsemester.

9. Section 4.11 (e) Promptly after completion of the Project, but in Complied. Government prepared a goodany event not later than six months after the quality PCR.Closing Date the Borrower to prepare and submitto the Bank a Project Completion Report.

- 33 -

Table 7Page 2 of 2

Sct~ed SbWu

10. Section 5.02 The Borrower shall maintain or cause to be Reports were submitted late most of themaintained records adequate to reflect in time.accordance with consistently maintained soundaccounting practices the operations, resources andexpenditures, in respect of the Project. Theaccounts of the Project for each fiscal year shouldbe audited, in accordance with appropriateauditing principles consistently applied, byindependent auditors and a certified copy of theauditors' report should be submitted to the Bankand IFAD not later than six months after the endof the respective fiscal year.

B. Proet 4tme_t

Section 2.01 (c) TCZB to enter into arrangements with GDMA, to Complied.define in detail the responsibilities, functions andadministrative procedures of TCZB and GDAA forthe carrying out of Part A of the Project.

Section 4.01 (d) TCZB to submit to the Bank and the Fund, on a Complied.semestral basis a summary of project accountswithin a two-month period after the end of thesemester.

Section 4.01 (e) TCZB to furnish to the Bank and the Fund with Complied with although reportsannual audited project accounts in the English sometimes submitted late.language, as soon as available, but in any case notlater than six months after the end of TCZB'sfiscal year.

Section 4.02 TCZB to deposit in a revolving fund amounts Not complied with.received by TCZB on account of repayment ofunder Part A of the Project.

Source: Loan Agreements, Supervision Reports and GDPI.

- 34 -

Table 8A

Use of Bank Resources: A. Staff Inputs

PREP. &PREAPPR. APPR. NEGOT. SUPERV. PCR. TOTAL

FY75 0.3 0.3

FY76 0.0

FY77 59.6 59.6

FY78 38.8 38.8

FY79 90.0 5.7 = 95.7

FY80 7.8 7.8

FY81 21.8 41.5 63.3

FY82 88.5 8.4 1.3 98.2

FY83 10.4 10.4

FY84 21.1 21.1

FY85 10.1 10.1

FY86 28.9 28.9

FY87 27.1 27.1

FY88 22.0 22.0

FY89 16.9 16.9

FY90 4.5 4.5

FY91 0.1 0.7 0.8

FY92 I _ 11.6 11.6

TOTAL 224.0 130.0 8.4 142.4 12.3 517.1

Use of Bank Resources: B. Missions

Stage of Projet Cycle Sent by MoonthlYear No. of Persons Period in Field Specilizatiom Perform-ace Types of(weeks) Represeted' Rating 2 problals'

Identification FAO/CP 10/1976 4 3 L,P,E.A - -

Interim Preparation FAO/CP 01/1977 2 2 L,X - -

Interim Prepartion FAO/CP 05/1977 3 2 A,L,IE - -

Fuil Peparation FAO/CP 09/1978 4 4 A,IE,RE,E - -

Pro-Appraisal World Bank 03/1981 3 3

Appraial World Bank 05/1081 6 4 A.E,L,C,IE,PA - -

Supervision 1 World Bank 12/1982 3 2 A,E,IE 2 M,O

Supcrvision 2 World Bank 04/1984 3 3 A,IE,L 2 M,O

Supervision 3 World Bank 10/1984 1 0.5 A 2 M,Ttfn

Supervision 4 World Bank 06/1985 2 2 A,IE 2 M,T

Supervision S World Bank 11/1985 3 3 E,RE,L -

Supervision 6 World Bank 0611986 2 1.5 A - -

Supervision 7 World Bank 10/1986 1 1 A - -

Supervision 8 World Bank 06/1987 4 2 A,IE,E,L - -

Supervision 9 World Bank 05/1988 2 2 A,E - -

Supervision 10 World Bank 05/1989 2 3 A,IE - -

PCR Prparation FAO/CP 07/1991 2 2 E.TE - -

Source: World Ioject File.

1/ A - Agriculture; C - Credit; E - Economi-t/Financial; IE - Irrigation Engineer; L - Livestock; P - Project Analyst; PA Poultry and Apiculture;RE - Roads Engineer; X - Extansian Specialist.

I I - Minor Problms; 2 - Mod-rate Problems; 3 - Major Problems. No comparative rating is available after June 1985

because the World Bank changed tho supervision reporting format.

M - Manasarial; 0 - Others; T - Technicel. No comparative rating is available after Jun. 1985 becauso the World Bank cbanged th, supervision

reportina format.

Crop and Livestock Activities in Erzuruin Province

1982 1983 198 18 1 |6 1987 1988 1989A. Tletds of Major Crops (Ton/h1a)'

Uheat 1.19 1.15 1.18 1.27 1.51 1.11 1.37 0.69- larley 1.52 1.52 1.S1 1.55 2.07 1.59 1.76 0.53- Aifalfa 7.60 4.76 3.92 4.11 5.70 6.25 6.64 3.68- sugar beet 28.40 26.22 26.95 26.33 23.96 23.40 27.38 19.29- potmtoea 17.26 18.04 18.94 20.87 21.76 18.39 22.20 12.68- eans 0.a9 1.00 1.11 1.29 0.98 1.09 1.09 0.80

8. Livestock Activities ' without Uith SARproject Project Estimate

Number of vitlages visited by 81 85 N/AVeterinerlans/Anilel Health Techniclans(X)

Production

w Uool (Tons) 2.2 12.1 N/AHides (NM) N/A 1,544 N/A

. Eggs (N-) N/A 120,400 M/A.Horey (Tons) N/A 11.4 N/ACheese (Tons) N/A 65.7 N/AButter (Tons) N/A 44.7 N/ACow and sheep m11k (Tons) 199.8 N/A 201.9Beef (Carcass) (Tons) 10.8 N/A 4.9Hutton (Tons) 8.2 N/A 9.4

CdAM.d fierri topmduction UgWae, in Gev*wnr PCR.

MOA [-postf Bos.IIr. Survey and BAR.

_____ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IBRD 15986R

1<-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0

-. ~~~~~~~~~TUPKEY ~~~~~~ ~~URE

~~~~~~AkAh i. / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~Potc oet,t...5** REP n ' / ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rietcnenrto aes.t

/ S.-'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eetdvlaegrusfritnW

* ~~ "-... --- - ---- DiPrijct cnentersto raProvime cacetratlnaes,t

District boundaries

ow - - ~~~~~~Province boundary

Rivers

a ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- zrmA, I, center

CSflees AA subcenters to be improved

r. 7- 2, ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__~A...ol health teamns lo be established

A Agricultural extersiion distrct centersKarayozi ~~~~~~~~to be constructed

Koras'ozi ~~~~~~~~Es.sting facilities:A Agr.culurol e.tension distr.ct centers

* M.lk plant

/ Meat packing plant and slaughterhosk X ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Regionol agricultural research center

YOI ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Reg.onol so.[ and eater researh center

~J Agricultural secondary schoolO&SU.~~~~~~ ~~"11* Sugar beet foctory

Agr.cultural machinery factoryA Atoturk University

MILES 0 0 20

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