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CPRClimateInitiative WorkingPaper2012/1(November)

ThePoliticsOfClimateChangeInIndia:NarrativesOfEquityAndCoBenefits

NavrozK.Dubash

Indiaoccupies an intriguingdualposition in global climatepolitics.As adeveloping economywith a

substantialpovertyproblemandlowlevelsofhistoricalandpercapitaemissions,Indiaisbothlikelyto

faceconsiderableimpactsandhaslimitedcapacitytoaddresstheproblem.Asalargecountryandone

that has transitioned into a rapidly growing economy, India gets called on to participate actively in

addressingtheglobalclimatechallenge.Indianclimatepoliticshassubstantiallybeenshapedaroundthe

first perspective, and increasingly, under international pressure, is being forced to grapplewith the

second.

Inmakingthistransition,discussionofclimatechangehasalsoshiftedfrombeinganarrowsubsetof

Indian foreignanddiplomaticpolicy,one thatwasalmostexclusively thepreserveofnegotiatorsand

diplomats, to a broader debate on whether and how development trajectories should internalize

climatemitigation and adaptation goals. In the course ofmaking this shift, a far broader swathe of

Indias society business, media, state bureaucrats, environmentalists have been drawn into the

climatedebate.Whilethedebatehasbeenjoined,therearebynomeansclearanswers.Theresultisa

sprawlingapparatusofdomesticclimatepolicywhichhasyettofullybeputinplace,letaloneassessed.

ThisreviewofIndianclimatepoliticsfirstexaminesthe initialcrystallizationofIndianclimatepositions

and itsroots innationalclimatepolitics. Itthen turnstoanexaminationoftheways inwhichclimate

politicshavebeenrevisitedindomesticdebatessinceabout2007.Centralthemesaretheconsistencyof

anequityframeforIndianclimatepolitics,andtherecentemergenceoftheideaofcobenefitsbased

actions that deliver both development and climate gains. While this latter formulation is driving

domestic policies, it is not, as yet, providing a basis for rethinking Indias international negotiating

position. A third section discusses new directions for Indian climate policy and their moorings in

domesticclimatepolitics.


TRACINGTHEARCOFINDIANCLIMATEPOLITICS:THECENTRALITYOFEQUITYNARRATIVES

Indianclimatepoliticsis,inlargepart,astoryofremarkablecontinuity.Theframeofclimateequity

understood predominantly in a NorthSouth context around dividing up a global commons was

establishedrelativelyearlyasthedominantframe.Thisframehasalsohadtheeffectofshapingclimate

politics around engagement with the international negotiation context, insulating Indian domestic

political and policy spaces from engagement with climate concerns. This section examines the

crystallizationoftheequityandclimatechangenarrative,thereasonsfor itscontinuityovertime,and

thepartialwaysinwhichthatnarrativehasbeenmodifiedandquestionedinrecentyears.

EstablishingtheFrame

From its opening line, the Centre for Science and Environments (CSE) evocatively titled Global

Warming in anUnequalWorld sets the stage for and foreshadows the first two decades of Indian

climate politics: The idea that India and Chinamust share the blame for heating up the earth and

destabilising itsclimate isanexcellentexampleofenvironmentalcolonialism.1Reactingtoareport

fromtheWashingtonDCbasedWorldResourcesInstitute,AgarwalandNarainmakethreepointsthat

remaincentraltocontemporary Indianunderstandingoftheclimatedebate:contributiontostocksof

greenhousegasemissions,ratherthanannualflowsofemissions,constitutetheappropriatemetricfor

assessing responsibility for causing climate change; aper capita allocationof global sinks is theonly

morally defensible metric, and that a distinction should appropriately be made between survival

emissionsofthepoorandluxuryemissionsoftherich.

VoicessuchasCSEs'wereparticularlyimportantintheearlydaysoftheclimatenegotiations,whenthe

GovernmentofIndia,andtheMinistryofEnvironmentandForestsinparticular,wererelativelynewto

the issue.2Anearly scholarly treatmentof Indiasnegotiatingposition suggests thatwhileper capita

based formulations of equity were part of the governments thinking at the time, the CSE report

encouragedthegovernmenttoadopttheidea3.Oneimportantreasonthisperspectivewasadopted

was that itwasbroadly shared amongothers active in thedebate. For example, anothermajor and

influential thinktank, the (then)TataEnergyResearch Institute (TERI),whileadopting a less strident

andmore behind the scenes approach, also undertook a critique of theWRI report.4 Among those

engaged in thedebatewithin India, therewasbroadagreementon thepossiblenegative impactsof

climatechangeon India,thepossibleconstrainingeffectofaclimatetreaty,andtheneedfor Indiato

insistthatindustrializedcountriesmustbeheldresponsiblefortheiremissions.2


The substantive agreement between these two nongovernmental heavyweights contributed to a

broadernationalconsensus.Thus,attheoutsetofsubstantivenegotiationsin1991,Indiasdelegation

leader had stated: The problem is caused not by emissions of greenhouse gases as such but by

excessivelevelsofpercapitaemissionsofthosegasesItfollows,therefore,thatdevelopedcountries

withhighpercapitaemission levelsare responsible for incrementalglobalwarming theprincipleof

equityshouldbethetouchstoneforjudginganyproposal.5

Bytheconclusionoftheprocess,Indiahadplayedasubstantialroleinshapingapositionoftheglobal

Southalongtheselinesthroughcoalitiondiplomacyandcarefultextualwork.Forexample,buildingon

the ideasarticulatedabove, Indiamodified the IPCCs formulationof common responsibilitiesacross

countries to common but differentiated responsibilities reflecting the importance India placed on

appropriatelyallocating responsibilityacrosscountries forcausing theproblemandhence foraction.6

Indiaalsoplayedaleadingroleincallingfornewandadditionalfundingandforcreationofaseparate

institutionalmechanismforclimatefunding.2

It is important to locate these positions in the contextwithinwhich theywere forged.7 In the early

1990s,therewasagroundswellofoptimismregardingglobalcooperationonenvironmentalproblems,

fuelled largely by the success of the Montreal Protocol. At the same time, perspectives on global

environmental issues were not innocent of two decades of tension over economic cooperation,

heightened by a decade of structural adjustment in the 1980s. Developing countries made little

headway in shaping mechanisms for global economic cooperation during this period, and with

consequent diminished faith in the global system. As a consensus building device, sustainable

developmentatbestpaperedoverthesecracks;thereremainedconcern indevelopingcountriesthat

environmentalobjectiveswouldlimitgrowth.Afirewallbuiltarounddifferentiationbetweennorthand

south,with a corresponding setof financialobligationswas seenas theminimumnecessary toallay

developingcountryconcerns.

HalfaToeintheWater:TheCleanDevelopmentMechanism

Indias engagement with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) represents a relatively minor

modificationfromtheestablishedframeofIndianclimatepolitics.ButitalsoshowshowIndianclimate

politicsisformedincontinualdialoguewithglobaldiscussions.InkeepingwithIndiasavowedposition

ofkeepingthepressureonindustrializedcountriesformitigationaction,IndiasinitialreactiontoCDM


(thenActivitiesImplementedJointly)wasoneofscepticism,informedbyaviewthatCDMwouldbea

wayfordevelopedcountriestogetdevelopingcountriestogettheworkdoneonthecheap.6

Within a few years, however, the perspective changed, driven by new actors who crafted a new

understandingofthemechanism.TheConfederationofIndianIndustries,aleadingindustryassociation

advocatedIndianparticipationintheCDMandinitsinstitutionaldesign.6ThisadvocacybyCIIwasalso

given heft by academic research on the subject undertaken by influential nongovernmental

organizations such as TERI.2 An acceptance and even embrace of CDM was made possible by re

interpretingCDMas consistentwitha contractual frame foraction that Indiahadbeenadvocating

Indiawouldtakeonmitigationcommitmentsonlywhentheywerefinanciallysupportedtodoso.6

India rapidlybecamea leader ingeneratingCDMprojects,accounting for53%ofprojectsgenerated

globally in 2005, although more recently India has been substantially outpaced by China.8 CDM

therefore created an important constituency for direct engagement with one aspect of the global

climateregime Indianbusinesswithpotential implications fordomesticpoliticsofclimatechange.

However,itisimportantnottooverstatethecaseIndianbusinessremainssurprisinglydisengagedand

fragmentedinitsengagementwithclimatepolitics.

RevisitingtheFrame

TheearlyframingofIndianclimatepoliticshasprovedtoberemarkablydurable,leadingtoaconsistent

negotiatingpositionovertwodecades.Thisinternationalstancealsoinformeddomesticclimatepolitics:

climatechangeisanissueofnorthsouthglobalcontestation;Indiashouldusetheinternationalprocess

tohold industrialized countries toaccount;and the issueof climate change is relatively irrelevant to

domestic politics. Atteridge attributes this consistency in part to personalities the role of a small

numberofseniorbureaucratsoperating incomparative isolationfromotherforeignpolicy influence

andtothedominanceoftheequityframe.9However,theseexplanationsbythemselvesareinsufficient

toexplainconsistency in Indianclimatepolitics. It isalsonecessarytoexplorethecontinuedbasis for

publicsupportfortheequityframe(oratleasttheabsenceofactivedisagreement).

AcceptanceoftheequityframehasbeenwidespreadduringthetwodecadesoftheUNFCCCprocess.

Significantly, this consensus included technical and professional participants in the global climate

debate,whocouldhavebeenexpectedtobemoreawareofclimate impacts. Indeed, interviewswith

such experts reported that they found participation in international assessments a waste of time

becausepoliticalactionisseenasindustrializedcountriesresponsibility.10KandlikarandSagar11note


thatthedominantframingoftheproblemasacollectiveglobalprobleminnocentofpastresponsibility

further alienates southern researchers who view the problem through an equity lens. Beyond

researchers, Indianenvironmentalactivistshavealsohistoricallyapproached theclimateagendawith

scepticismandasadistractionfromlocalenvironmentalproblems12.

Thisrelativelymonolithicpoliticalstancehasdevelopedmultipleandcontendingstrandsinrecentyears

foravarietyofreasons.Mostsignificant,theglobalnegotiatingcontexthaschanged.Inthebuildupto

theconclusionofthe firstcommitmentperiodoftheKyotoProtocol, largedevelopingcountrieswere

placedundergrowingpressureatasuccessionofConferenceOfParties(COPs)fromBali(2007)onwards

to articulate formulations for and the conditionsunderwhich theywould accept climatemitigation

responsibilities.13,14,15Thevariousformulationsdebatedovertime,suchas sustainabledevelopment

policiesandmeasures,nationallyappropriatemitigationactionsandgreenhousegasintensitytargets

all force engagement with what countries are willing to do within their borders. India has had to

perforceengagethisquestion.

Inaddition,theglobalgeopoliticalcontexthaschangedconsiderablysincetheearly1990sinwaysthat

arehighlyrelevanttoIndia.6AlongwithotherrapidlyindustrializingcountriesIndiahasbenefitedfrom

several years of high economic growth despite a period of global economic slowdown, and ismore

assertivelyclaimingaseatattheglobalhightable.Intheclimatetalks,thisassertionhasbeenfacilitated

by formationof the BASICblocof countries (Brazil, India, SouthAfrica andChina). Significantly, in

termsofper capita indicatorsof economicprogressor greenhouse gas emissions, Indiahasmore in

commonwith leastdevelopedcountriesthanwiththeemergingrapidly industrializingeconomies,but

through itsownnegotiationstrategiesandexternalperceptiontendstobe increasingly identifiedwith

thelatterratherthanwiththeformer,16apointthathasarousedcriticismfromlongstandingalliesin

theG77suchasBangladesh.17Indiasownforeignpolicycompulsions,suchasnegotiationoftheIndo

USNucleardeal,have led topressures for climate changepositions tobemore closely alignedwith

broaderforeignpolicy.18

INDIANCLIMATEPOLITICSREVISITED

IntheperiodsurroundingtheCopenhagenCOPin2009,theGovernmenthadissuedseveralstatements

andpronouncements,includingacommitmenttolimitIndiasemissionspercapitatotheaveragelevels

of industrialized countries, a Copenhagen emission intensity pledge, and a National Action Plan on

ClimateChange(whicharediscussedlaterinthisreview).Severalcommentatorshavenotedand


applaudedthesemeasures,andsoughttointerpretthemaspartofalargershiftinIndiasclimatepolicy

andpolitics.19,20Thisperceptionofashift isbasedonachange in languageattheglobal levelandthe

institution of various national climate programmes. While there have undoubtedly been interesting

developments, toa substantialextent theperceptionofa seachange isoverdrawn.While Indiahas

indeedkeptpacewithdeclarationsof intentfromotherdevelopingcountriesnotablytheCopenhagen

pledges and institutedsome farreachingdomesticprogrammes, itwouldbe incorrect toread from

thisa fundamental shift indomesticpoliticsof climate change in India. Inpart, the change inglobal

messagingwasdrivenbypersonalitypoliticsintheformofthethenincumbentMinisterofEnvironment

andForests,JairamRamesh.6Beyondthis,however,thedomesticpoliticalstoryisasubtle,incomplete

andcontestedshiftinemphasisandframing.Here,Iexplorethisshiftasitismanifestedfirstindebates

amongvarioussectorsofIndianpoliticalsociety,andthenwithreferencetoparticularkeythemesthat

haveemergedintheIndianclimatedebate.

DomesticConstituencies

Climatechangehashistoricallybeenanonissue in Indianorganizedpoliticsgivenpressingshortterm

domestic concerns of poverty, provision of basic services and economic management. This seems

unlikelytochange.AsaformerMinisterofEnvironmentandForestsputsit:Climatechangeasanissue

isnot a constituencymover.21At the same time, the issueof climate changehas received growing

attentionwithintheorganizedpoliticalsystem,albeitwithintheexistingframing.Highlyinstructiveare

twodebatesinParliamentheldbeforeandaftertheCopenhagenCOP.TheLokSabhaorlowerhouse

debatesignalledanacceptanceoftheseriousnessofclimatechangeasaproblem,somediscussionof

local impacts,andaclearandrepeatedarticulationofdevelopedcountryresponsibilityforaction.The

postCopenhagendebateintheRajyaSabha(upperhouse)focusedalmostexclusivelyonclimatechange

asanissueofforeignpolicy,andspecificallyonwhetherthegovernmenthadadheredsufficientlyfirmly

to itsred lines,theobjectiveofwhichweretoensurethatIndiadoesnotsubject itselftoobligations

thatlimitgrowthanddevelopment.Notably,therewasnotasinglespeakerwhoexploredwhetherthe

Copenhagen Accord sufficiently addressed the challenge of climate change. Indias interests were

entirely constructed in terms of national space for development and not around an effective global

climateagreement.However,someattentiontolocalimpactsbyelectedParliamentariansprovidesan

indication,howevermild,ofatrendtowardengagementwiththeissueinwaysdirectlyrelevanttolocal

constituents.


Inanotherbarometerofnationalpolitics,coverageofclimatechange in themediahasbeen steadily

increasing,althoughexistingstudiesarelimitedtotheEnglishlanguageprintmediaalone.22,23Inastudy

ofEnglishnewspapers fromSeptember2009toMarch2010, Jogesh foundthatglobalclimatepolitics

dominatedthecoverage(57%)whiledomesticpoliticsandpolicies(whichalso included intrigueabout

the composition of Indias negotiating team) accounted for 21% of coverage. Climate science and

businessstoriesaccountedfor10%and5%respectively.Thesedatasuggestthecontinueddominance

oftheinternationalnegotiatingprocessinclimatecoverage.However,thereweresomeopinionpieces

that noted emerging economy emissions can no longer be entirely ignored in a global negotiation

process, although these were outnumbered by opinion pieces that argued the problem is caused

entirelybyindustrializedcountries.Acommonperspectivewasthatemergingeconomiesshouldindeed

domore,but in thecontextof leadership foraction from industrializedcountriesandwhen theyare

supported to do so through finance and capacity. Taken collectively, the media trends suggest a

continueddominanceoftheinternationalprocessandaconvictionintheresponsibilityofindustrialized

countriestoleadaction,alongwithsomeindicationsofconditionalconsiderationtodomesticpolicyand

action.

Indian environmentalists would appear to be a natural constituency for robust support of national

mitigation action. However, Indian environmentalists perspectives have been largely shaped by a

broaderideaofSouthernenvironmentalismasinextricablytiedtoconcernsofequity.12Thisleadsthem

toalignwith,indeedforgeasinthecaseofCentreforScienceandEnvironment,thedominantnational

narrative on industrialized country responsibility and per capita based allocations of carbon space.

Moreover, environmentalists have been concerned that domestic environmental agendas risk being

subvertedby the climate agendawithproblematic consequences, such as a climatedrivenpolicy tilt

towardnuclearpowerorplantation forestry,both issuesofcontention in Indianenvironmentalism .24

Morerecently,therehasbeenaslowprogressionfromthisperspectivetowardonethatseesvalue in

integrating climate change into a broader environmentalism in a manner that simultaneously takes

seriouslyjustice, localenvironmentanddevelopmentagendas,andclimatescience.12,24Achievingthis

synthesisis,however,stillaworkinprogress.

Recent work suggests that there is a broadening and deepening of crosssectoral networks around

climate change, for example networks of municipalities, of national and international NGOs and of

regional NGOs.25 These networks typically operate by attaching their favoured solution to climate

change,inanefforttoderivebenefitfromthegrowingrelevanceoftheclimateproblem.However,in


an illustrationofthecontinuedholdofthecentralframingofclimatechange in India,thesenetworks

constrain themselves tomaintain consistencywith thedominantnational frame,andoftenbumpup

against the insistence on a continued divide between national and international policy on climate

change.Forexample,duringasetofregionalhearingsonclimate impacts,aregionalnetworksteered

clearofdirectcritiqueoftheGovernmentofIndia,infavourofmaintainingalargerSouthernsolidarity

fortheinternationalprocess.

TheIndianbusinesscommunityhasonlyrecentlywokenuptotheissueofclimatechange,butinpartial

and fragmentedways. In1998,oneobserverdescribed industry as unmobilized anduninvited.2As

described above, the business community then took a limited interest in the CDM process. More

recently, a section of organized business, the Confederation of Indian Industry, hasweighed inwith

public positions in support of Indias Copenhagen voluntary emissionsintensity target, and has also

engagedwith voluntary emissions disclosure initiatives.6However, another segment of business, the

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, issued a denouncement of the target,

arguingthatanyactionby Indiaand Indian industryshouldbe linkedtoprovisionoffinance.7Notably

both these views are extremely partial, and exclude the entire range of small and medium sized

enterprisesinIndia.

DomesticDebatesNewDirections

AsthediscussionofvarioussectorsoftheIndianpolicysuggests,theclimatedebateinIndiahasbecome

morecomplexandmultiplestranded in recentyears.Here, Idiscuss threeaspectsof thedebate that

havebeenparticularly salient to shaping Indian climatepolitics: the hidingbehind thepoordebate,

perspectivesonclimateadaptation,andthe importanceofenergysecurityasadominantnarrativefor

Indianenergy.

In 2007,GreenpeaceIndia issued a report examining disparities in emissions levels across economic

classesinIndia,andaccusingIndianelitesofhidingbehindthepoor.Thereportselfdeclaredlysought

toprovokeadebateon climate justicewithin Indiabyhighlightinghigh levelsofdisparitiesbetween

emissionlevelsacrossthetopandbottomclassesandbetweenruralandurbanIndia,apointvalidated

byother,morerobuststudieswithlargerdatasets.26However,comingasitdidshortlybeforetheBali

COP and a drum roll of calls for India to take on emission limitation obligations due to growing

consumption by its middle classes, the report also aroused intense criticism within India as under

cuttingIndiasnegotiationstance.Counterreportsshowedemissionsatequivalentincomeclasseswere

muchhigherintheUSthaninIndia,suggestingthatthesalientframeforclimatejusticeremained


crosscountrycomparisons.Forexample, in2004 theemissionsof the top10%ofurban Indiawere7

tonsCO2/yrcomparedtoaverageconsumptionlevelsof20tonsCO2/yrintheUS,andjustover10tons

CO2/yrinGermany.27

WhilesomewithinIndiahavesuggestedthe internaldisparitiescall intoquestionthe legitimacyofthe

Indianpercapitaposition,atleasttotheextentitisnottiedtoattentiontorectifyinginternaldisparities28otherssuggestthatthedevelopedworld ishidingbehind Indiasrichasmuchasthe Indianrichare

hidingbehind thepoor.29Onbalance, thehidingbehind thepoordebatehasbynomeansdislodged

broadacceptanceofthepercapitanormasawayofaddressingclimatejustice,butithasnuancedthe

debate by highlighting Indias domestic distributive challenges. By so doing, it has, to some limited

extent,forcedtheclimatespotlightinward,andnotonlyonexternalNorthSouthdisparities.

A second important theme is growing awarenessof climate damages and an attendant attention to

climate adaptation, in rhetoric and reality.A growingnumberof studies are emerging that carefully

documentandpublicizeclimateimpactsandcosts.Forexample,onestudyconclusivelyfindscultivation

ofapples intheHimalayanbelt isshiftingtohigheraltitudes,afindingconfirmedbybothquantitative

data and farmer perceptions.30Another examines and decomposes the cost of sea level rise to one

coastal state.31 The Government of India has also taken concrete measures to systematize data

gathering on climate impacts32 as well as encouraging states to undertake systematic efforts to

mainstream climate concerns into sectoral planning.33 These efforts are backed by large scale and

comprehensivemappingof resourcesand theeffectsof climate changeon them, forexample in the

watersector.34

However, it would be a mistake to assume that growing attention to and concern over climate

adaptation necessarily translates into growing commitment to climate mitigation. As even Indias

environmentalists argue, unilateralmitigation by Indiawill do little, given that Indias emissions are

aboutonetwentiethoftheglobaltotal.12Indianmitigationactiononlyhelpstotheextentthatitcould

leveragemoreaggressiveglobalactionbyothers,notablydevelopedcountries.18Concernwithclimate

impactsandadaptation,therefore,reinforcesratherthanunderminesconcernswithequitablesharing

ofthemitigationburden.

Perhapsthesinglemost importantsourceofactionsthathavetheeffectofclimatemitigation in India

aredrivenbyanotherobjectiveentirelyenergysecurity.35Bycontrasttoclimatemitigation,pursuitof

energysecurityenjoysconsiderablepoliticalsupport, inacontextwhere Indiasdomesticsuppliesare

increasinglyhardtoaccessandorofuncertainquantity,globalenergydemandsandthereforepricesare


rising, and geopolitical conditions in the Middle East and elsewhere raise growing concerns about

predictabilityof supply.Manymeasures taken toaddressclimatechange,notablypromotingenduse

energyefficiency,andpursuingrenewableenergysupply,areconsistentwithdecreasedgreenhousegas

emissions. In thewordsof Indias financeMinister, It isbecausewe recognize the linkagesbetween

climatechangeandenergysecuritythatwehaveadoptedaNationalActionPlanonClimateChange.36

The explicit linkage between development objectives and climate objectives has been facilitated by

Indiasstatedapproachtoclimateactionbasedonthepursuitofcobenefitsmeasuresthatpromote

developmentobjectiveswhilealsoyielding cobenefits foraddressingclimatechangeeffectively 37

This

is not simply a matter of terminology or classification; the articulation of cobenefits reduces a

potentiallyimportantsourceofdissonanceinIndiasenergypolicy.Priortoarticulationofthisapproach,

therewasaperceivedriskamongpolicycirclesthatpromotingcleanenergyandenergyefficiencycould

bestrategicallyharmful,as itcouldbe interpretedasevidence that Indiacouldandshouldundertake

climatemitigationusingitsownresources,andalsothatIndiacoulddevelopwithalowerallotmentof

carbonspace.35Thepoliticalprioritygiventoactionstoaddressenergysecurity,andthealignmentof

climatemitigationasapotentialcobenefitofsuchaction,hascreatedtheimpetusforpoliciesthathave

theeffectofclimatemitigation,althoughtheymaynotbeprimarilylabelledassuch.

ThreeContendingNarratives

Takencollectively,theevidenceacrosssectorsoftheIndianpolityandtheemergenceofnewareasof

discussion suggests that debate on climate change has moved beyond an exclusive focus on the

international negotiations context, to also ask questions about Indias role and domestic policy. But

thereislittleagreementonwhatIndiasdomesticpositionshouldbewithregardtoclimatechangeand

whetherandhowthispositionshouldbeembedded inthe internationalclimateregime.Therangeof

possiblepoliticalpositionscanusefullybesummarizedalongthreeperspectives.38

Thefirstperspectivemightbecalledthegrowthfirstrealiststance,whichviewsclimatechangemoreas

ageopoliticalthreatthananenvironmentalone.Consequently,thefocusisonachievingrapidgrowth,

andstavingoffanyinternationalcommitmentsthatmightthreatengrowth.Equityinclimateoutcomes

islimitedtoacrosscountryconcern,arisingfromamixofprincipledandstrategicconcerns.

Asecondposition,sustainabledevelopmentrealistisfocusedonpursuingacobenefitsbasedapproach

tosustainabledevelopmentathome.However,apersistentscepticismoftheinternationalnegotiation

processrootedinthelowprobabilityoftheprocessdeliveringafairoutcomeleadstocallstodelink


domestic policy from the global process. While commitment to equity, including to domestic

distributionalquestions,islikelytobegenuine,thisisframedasadomesticdebatealone.Thisposition

can lead to a somewhat schizophrenic stance contesting growth first realists at home andmaking

commoncauseoverseas.

A third stance, sustainable development internationalists, differs from the second only in greater

emphasisontheneedandurgencyforaninternationallyeffectiveclimateregime,andthereforegreater

willingness to link Indias cobenefits based actions but only cobenefits based actions that are

justified fromadevelopmentalperspective toaglobal regime.Whilenaturalallieswith thesecond

category,basedonasharedcommitmenttosustainabledevelopmentoutcomesandequity,inpractice

thisalliancehas failed tomaterialize,with realistsofbothstripesdismissing internationalistsasnave

abouttheglobalpoliticsofclimatechange.

ThecentreofgravityofIndianclimatepoliticsrestswiththesecondpositionsustainabledevelopment

realists. Interpretationsofa swing toward the thirdperspective39,19weredrivenquite stronglyby the

personalitypoliticsofanoutspokenMinisterofEnvironmentandForests,ratherthananunderlyingshift

in Indian climate politics, and did not outlast thatMinisters tenure. Indian climate politics supports

domestic measures toward adaptation, and mitigation measures that are consistent with domestic

developmentobjectives.Itdoesnot,however,sofar,supportactiveutilisationofdomesticpolicyasan

instrument throughwhich toengageand shape the internationalprocess.This isnot to suggest that

domesticandinternationalclimatepolicyoccupyseparatespheres,farfromit.Indeed,Indiandomestic

policyhasundoubtedlybeen influencedbyglobalpressures todemonstrateacommitment toaction.

TheresulthasbeenaflurryofpolicyactivityintheyearssincetheBaliCOPof2007.

NEWDIRECTIONSININDIANCLIMATEPOLICY

Consistentwith the emergenceof a cobenefits frame as thedefining construct for Indianpolicyon

climate change, theGovernmentof Indiahas embarkedon a seriesofplan andpolicy development

processesdrivenbythisapproach.Thisprocessdefieseasysummary,becauseitisofrecentvintage,is

workinprogress,andrelativelylittleanalysisisavailable.Moreover,thefullassemblageofpolicyefforts

issprawlingand includes internationalpledges,nationalplansandpolicy formulationsandstatelevel

plans,allofwhichdonotcohereneatly.

ArguablythehubofthisarrayofpolicymakingeffortsistheNationalActionPlanonClimateChange.37

TheNAPCCwasbuiltaroundtheestablishmentofeightnationalmissionsaimedatintegrating


mitigation and adaptation aspectsof climate change intonationalpolicies across a rangeof sectors.

Someofthesemissionshavespecificfocusandtargets,suchasaSolarMissionaimedatenabling20,000

MWofsolarpowerby2022.40Others,suchasaNationalWaterMission,havebroaderandmorediffuse

objectivesincludingwaterconservation,creationofadatabase,andpromotionofbasinlevelintegrated

watermanagement. 41Othermissions focusonenergyefficiency,agriculture,Himalayanecosystems,

sustainableagriculture,sustainablehabitat,a green Indiamissionfocusedontheforestsector,anda

strategicknowledgemission.

As this list suggests, the scopeof thePlan is sprawling,which itselfhasaroused some criticism.One

critiquedubs itneither a visionnor aplan.42Anothernotes that there isno commitment to equity,

although this position informs Indias international stance.43 Moreover, other than the cobenefits

approach,thereisnocoherentstrategy,eitherconceptualorintermsofoverarchingtargetsetting,that

ties together the missions. Some of these lacunae are made up in individual missions, but the

performanceacrossmissionsalsovariesconsiderably.Moretightlydefinedmissions,suchasthoseon

energy efficiency and solar, have come up with their plans first and begun implementation. Other

missions, that involve large areas of development policy such aswater and agriculture, have taken

longertobeapprovedandimplemented.

Nonetheless, individual missions, notably the solar and energy efficiency mission, are likely to

substantiallyshapetheIndianpolicyandenergylandscape.Usinganinnovativereverseauctionmethod

allowingcompaniestobidfortheminimumsubsidytheywouldaccepttoprovidesolarpower,theprice

ofsolarpowerhasdroppedbyoverhalfoverthecourseofthethreeyearprogram.44Whileitisunclear

whether this isasustainable trend, there is littledoubt that themissionhas reshaped incentives for

renewableenergydevelopmentinIndia.Similarly,theenergyefficiencymissionhasintroducedtargets

forenergyefficiency improvementsacrossawide rangeof industries,accompaniedbya scheme for

tradingenergyefficiencycertificatesasawayofbringingdownthecostofthoseimprovements.45Both

missionshavehad their shareof critics.The solarmissionhasbeen criticized forunderplaying rural

electrification, and for not adequately considering the sustainability of the subsidy.46 The energy

efficiencymissionhasbeencriticizedfornotadequatelyconsideringsimplerregulatorymeasuresrather

thantherelativelycomplexmarketbasedenergysavingscertificateapproach.43Nonetheless,fewwould

doubt thatat least inthesetwocases,themissionshavestimulatedbothactionanddebate inaway

thatwouldnothaveoccurred intheirabsence. Similarconclusionscannotbedrawn,asofend2012,

aboutmanyoftheothermissions,whicharelarger,morediffuse,andhaveyettomovetosubstantial


implementation.Since2010,thecentralgovernmenthasalsorequestedstatestodevelopStateAction

PlansonClimateChange(SAPCC).TheSAPCCsareintendedtoachievesomecoherenceacrossstatesin

design and implementationof climatemeasures, andhave alsobeen created in recognitionof state

jurisdiction over several areas within the NAPCC, particularly those related to adaptation. 33 Initial

indications from these SAPCCs,which are awork inprogress suggest that therewillbe considerable

conceptualand implementationchallengestotheseplans.As inothercountries,theplanswillhaveto

addresstheinterlinkagebetweendevelopmentissuesandtheirclimateaspects,afamiliarchallengeof

mainstreamingclimatechange intodevelopmentpractice.Pragmatically, issues tied to Indias federal

structure and to practical questions of provision of financing are likely to pose implementation

challenges.Forexample,urbanhabitatsareunderthecontrolofstatesandlocalauthorities,butthereis

alreadyafarreachingcentralgovernmentschemeintendedtosteerfutureurbandevelopment.Climate

changewillhavetobeintegratedasanobjectivewithinanalreadylitteredinstitutionallandscape.

Atamacro level, inthebuilduptoCopenhagen,theGovernmentof Indiaalso introducedapledgeto

reducetheemissionintensityofitseconomyby2025%from2005levelsby2020.47Notably,thispledge

follows bymore than a year the establishment of theNAPCC. In order to design a process toward

meetingthatpledge,theGovernmenthasalsoestablishedan ExpertGrouponLowCarbonStrategies

for Inclusive Growth under the auspices of its Planning Commission. The group was tasked with

providing recommendations for inclusion in Indias12th fiveyearplan toward lowcarbongrowth that

meetstheCopenhagenpledge.Notably,thegroupisalsoexplicitlytaskedwithconsideringhowgrowth

can bemademore inclusive.While the final report is awaited, the group has submitted an interim

report that summarizesbroad futuredirections forvariousemissions sectorsunder determinedand

aggressive scenarios.48 While this effort clearly needs to build on the NAPCC and the subsequent

missions,thereisnoexplicitlinkbetweentheseprocesses.

While it is preliminary to comment on the effectiveness of all these approaches, it is increasingly

apparent that translating low carbon development into action in India will pose a considerable

governance challenge. The trend so far has been a largely topdown policy effort, albeit with a

progressivedecentralizationofpolicymaking from thenational to thestate.Therearealso,however,

separatestateinitiatives,suchasthatofthestateofGujaratwhichestablishedaDepartmentofClimate

Changepriortoformulationofstateactionplans25andwhichhaslaunchedinitiativesonsolarpower17,

49, 50 In addition, theproliferationofpolicyprocesses suggests theneed for coordination atmultiple

levelsofgovernment.


CONCLUSION

Indianclimatepoliticsisastoryofremarkableconsistency.Indiawasinstrumentalinshapingtheequity

frame in global climate negotiations, and this, in turn, was developed through a critique of global

thinking ledbynongovernmentalorganizations.Fornearlytwodecades,thisconstructionhas ledtoa

reductionofIndianclimatepoliticstoaquestionofgeopoliticalpositioningandstrategyalone;climate

policyhasbeendivorcedfromdevelopmentpolicy.

As the perspectives of different sectors of Indian society reported here suggest, this frame has

considerablecontinuedcurrency.WhilethereareincreasinglyvoicesthatcallforIndiatotakeonamore

proactive role in global climate negotiations and tomore aggressively pursue domestic actions, the

equityframecontinuestobethelargerconceptualumbrellatowhichthesepositionshavereference.

In a substantial shift, however, the articulation of a cobenefits led approach to climate change has

unlockedapathtodeeperengagementwithclimatemitigationinamannerthatdoesnotchallengethe

equity frame. Pursuitof energy securityhasproved tobe aparticularlypowerfuldriverofdomestic

action, leading to policy measures around energy efficiency and renewable energy, with associated

climate mitigation cobenefits. So far, however, cobenefits remains an articulation that governs

domesticpolicy,whiletheequityframecontinuestoguideIndiasinternationalnegotiationsstance.

Theemergenceofa fieldofdomesticclimatepolicy is likely to introducesignificantcoordinationand

governance challenges to Indian climate policy. India has begun grappling with how to mainstream

climate adaptation into sectoral policies such as water and agriculture. Approaches that were long

dormant, such as energy efficiency, have got a stimulus through the potent combination of energy

security and climate mitigation. However, this embryonic integration also introduces institutional

complexityandnewpolitics. Institutionally,climatepolicymustnowbe interwoven into thecomplex

governanceapparatusofIndiasfederalsystem.Politically,climatechangehasbegunbeingharnessedas

arhetoricaltooltootherlongstandingpolitical issuessuchasconstructionofnuclearpowerandlarge

dams.Nonetheless, thegrowingcomplexity isunavoidableand, indeed, tobewelcomed,as itsignals

deeperengagementwiththefullrangeandimplicationofclimatechangeconcernsinIndia.

Acknowledgements

Thiswork is supportedbyagrant from theOakFoundation,which supports theworkof theClimate

InitiativeattheCentreforPolicyResearch.


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