Work in progress, No. 16

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Alternative title Work In Progress

Author/Creator University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)

Publisher University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)

Date 1981-02

Resource type Journals (Periodicals)

Language English

Subject

Coverage (spatial) South Africa

Coverage (temporal) 1981

Source Digital Imaging South Africa (DISA)

Rights By kind permission of Hein Marais, Julian May, andthe Southern Africa Report.

Format extent(length/size)

80 page(s)

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WORK IN PROGRESS 16 FEBRUARY 1981HEALTH CARE for profit

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SUPPLEMENT TO WIP 16February 1981

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THE ARTICLE that follows as a supplement to thisWork In Progress represents a departure fromprevious editorialpolicy. It had beendecided not to include contributions in WIPwhich, because of terminology used, were notfairlyeasily accessible to those without aspecific training in the area being discussed.The contribution which follows makesuse ofcertain complex concepts, and the terminologyused and ideas explored are difficult readingfor thenon-expert.The editors nonetheless felt that thearticle was an important one, making acontribution of contemporaryvalue, and havingdefinite strategic implications. The editorswere unwilling to deprive WIP readership ofthe ideas andinformation contained in thearticle because of their complexity, and itwas accordingly decided to include it asasupplement to this issue of WIP. There arevery few, if any avenues for the publication ofthis sort of work in SouthAfrica, and thiswas an added factor in deciding to includethis article in WIP.The contribution is an exploratory one,enddoes not aim to be definitive or complete.It certainly falls into the category of workin progress. One of the reasons forpresentingit in VIP is to elicit comment and response,and the author, David Kaplan, has specificallyrequested criticalcomment on the article.This will assist in the development andfurthering of a debate which touches on thestructure ofthe South African economy, thelikely form of future capitalist development,and the implications of both structureanddevelopment.Comment can be sent to the editors, ordirectly toDavid Kaplan,Department of EconomicHistory,University of Cape Town,7700 Rondebosch,CAPS TOWN.The editors will consider runningsimilarsupplements to WIP if readership feels thatthese are a worthwhile addition to the Work InProgress project.Readers are asked to letthe editorial collective know of their attitudeas far as this is concerned..Contributorssubmitting material forinclusion in future supplements shouldinclude a non-technical, easily accessiblesummary oftheir article for inclusion in themain body of WIP.

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SCHOOLSBOYCOTT INKIMBERLEYON SEPTEMBER 8, last year, 112 african scholarswere arrested in theKimberley suburb of westEnd and charged with public violence. Theeducation crisis in Galeshewe, Kimberley'saticantownship, which had been simmering formore than a month, suddenly burst into thenational media which for the nextfew daysfocused on what it saw as yet another 'trouble-spot'.This article is a brief first-hand accountwhich attempts toshow at the same time how the .events of last year were distorted both by thepress, who sensationalised the visibletip ofthe iceberg, and the state which, armed with amythology of 'disturbances' which (for instance)blames everythingan agitators, sought to disguisetheir role in the conflict.The most remarkable aspect of the Galesheweboycott was thefact that - because ofKimberley's isolation from the main centres(it had been left untouched by the events of1976), theabsence of anything resembling euniversity and the lack of relevant readingmateriel - the level of politicalsophisticationof the pupils was not high. Yet againstparental and less subtle state pressure theywere able to unitevery effectively.And after a few weeks of involvement inan act of defiance against the state the initialnaivety gave wayto a more thorough-goingcritique of the system. Where at the beginningthe only perceived issue was the educationalone,after the boycott, pupils began to relate theirgrievances with the educational system to thegeneral condition oftheir community. Thus, whilethe boycott caused much misery end hardship tothe community of Galeshewe it did havethe positiveeffect of helping to create awareness among theyounger generation of their situation 1n life.Theboycottbegan et two schools - the onlygovernment senior secondary school, Tshireleco,end the Catholic SaintBonifnce senior secondary- on July 29. The aims of the pupils, subsequentlymisread and criticised as beingunrealistic,were not to demand the immediate abolition of'Bantu' education. The pupils explained theywere boycottingin pretest against that system,in solidarity with detained and boycottingpupils in other centres end to drew attentiontothe depernte need for more and better educationalfacilities in Geleshewe.While the national issue of injustice inSouthAfrica's educational system has bean dealtwith in length elsewhere it is pertinent tomention here that Galeshewe, withan officialcensus population of 66 000, has no technicalcollege or any other institution of post-schoollearning. The twoabove-mentioned schools arethe only ones offering metric courses, end at6t Boniface a pupil foiling standard nine ortenis not given another thence and has to leave theschool. At Tshireleca, as et most other schools,there is a shortageof dust about everything- from qualified teachers to classroom apace.The response of the state to the challengeof theboycott (which surprised them - said oneofficial: 'Things like that don't happen inKimberley') was at first insensitivityend.later severity. This reaction pushed the pupilsinto a total confrontation which they had notdeliberately sought endwhich led ultimately toviolence and collapse of african education 1AKimberley. However, the impression thatstateofficials tried to create of these events weethat they were due to the intransigence of theboycotters who hadsought violence and anarchy.The immediate response of the state to theboycott was to tell the pupils to go becktoschool. But the children, faced with the stonyattitude of the authorities, end fired by whatthey sew as the justice oftheir cause, masseddaily in their thousands and marched jubilantlythrough the streets of Galeshews singingfreedomsongs. They were gradually coined byfirst the lower secondary schools and later theprimary schools until bymid-August, every singleeducational institution in the township - involvingmore then 16 000 children - was dormant.Itis important to note that in all theirdaily meetings and earthing there was noinstance of violence. Even the chiefexecutiveofficer of Gnleshewe, PJ Roodt, is on record ashaving made the ironic comment that thedemonstrationswere conducted in a 'healthyspirit'.The Department of Education end Training triedevery method short of negotiatingwith the pupilsto break the impasse. Their most consistenttactic was to use the school committees to tryarid urge thechildren to return. The rounds ofmeetings all ended in deadlock with the pupils soonrealising that the object of themeetings wasnot to listen to their grievances but to convincethem of the wisdom of returning.Other methods were:literally trying towhip them back into line by cane-charging thepupils, with daps for backup (the first instanceofviolence - 1n lets August); detaining studentsregarded as leaders, though they were all releasedsoon afterwards;suspension threats which proved

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THE CURRENT 'UPSWING' IN THE SOUTH AFRICANECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONALCAPITALISTCRISIS: A REINTERPRETATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN'DEVELOPMENT'1. INTRODUCTION.THISPAPER attempts to situate the currenteconomic 'upswing' in the South African economyin the context of the ongoingeconomic crisiswhich is plaguing the international capitalisteconomy. I will argue that the two phenomenon'areintegrally linked. The principal featuresof the international capitalist crisis and, evenmore centrally, the measureshitherto taken toresolve this crisis, are the principalfactors contributing to the present 'upswing'in the South Africaneconomy.The first section of this paper outlinesthe major features of the internationalcapitalist crisis and the measurestaken tocounteract it. The second section examinessome aspects of the current 'uawing' in theSouth Africaneconomy. In the final section,in the form of a critique of soave writings onthe subject. some implications of thefuturetrajectory of capitalist development in SouthAfrica are drawn.Clearly, there are highly complex issuesinvolved,and a short article can only hope toprovide same fruitful points for departure.2. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THECONTEMPORARYINTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS.I WOULD suggest that the following are thecentralspecific features of the current crisis:a) This is indeed an international andcapitalist crisis. The downswings and (toalesser extent) the upswings in the economiesof all the advanced capitalist countries areclosely synchronised.b) Therecession of 1974-75 was preceded byalong period in which the rate of profitwas tending to fall in the advancedcapitalistcountries. In the post-recession period,rates of profit were increased somewhat,but not dramatically.c) Theupswing following the severe recessionof 1974-75 has been weak, hesitant and ofshort duration.d) Inflationarypressures are internationaland endemic. They are only somewhat moderatedwhen recession deepens.e) The crisis isassociated with a changingconfiguration of imperialist forces. This isoften summarised as 'a decline in thehegemonyof the United States'.These features are all closely inter-related. However, for ease of exposition, Iwill dealwith each in turn.a) Capitalism is an international system andsevere recessions - 1929 for example -havealways beenexperienced simultaneously invirtually all capitalist countries. l In themore minor recessions however, contractionsinone country were frequently offset by expansionin other countries. The expansion of exportsserved to limit therecession in the former.But the 1974-75 recession was felt everywherein the,,capitalist world, if not in thesamemagnitude. Of the OECD countries, the declinein industrial production iron peak to troughwas greatest inSwitzerland and Japan (about20%) and least in Sweden (49i), Canada (7%) andSpain (10 %).Z However, the degreeofsynchronisation was very marked. 3The capitalist character of the crisisis revealed moat starkly by the fact thatnoneof the principal planned economies suffered adecline,in industrial production in 1974-76.While their rate ofgrowth certainly declined,it was still distinctly positive. 4 Theuniversality and synchronisation of therecession amongstthe developed capitalistcountries is a testimony to the growinginternationalisation of the capitalist system.Thisinternationalisation has acquired a wholenew dimension with the spectacular rise of theMultinational Corporations(MNCs), particularlypost-1960, and the contemporaneous developmentof the international capital and money markets-notably the Eurodollar market. 5 One majorconsequence of these developments, significantfor the analysis here, isthat national monetarypolicies are likely to be rendered far lesseffective. s The Eurodollar market allows forthe rapidand unregulated switching ofcurrencies, while national credit controlscan be circumvented by companiesborrowingabroad. Similarly, MNCa are able, usinginternal accounting changes, to transfermoneys into anticipatedstrong currencies.?At the same time, and for the same reasons,as nationally based monetary regulation hasbecomeincreasingly ineffective, thepossibilities for private 'speculation'in currencies has much increased. 8b) Themeasurement of profit rates is difficultand there is no universal agreement of profittrends. However, moat studies ofthe rate ofprofit have revealed a general tendency for therate of profit to fall from circa the early1950s. This isparticularly true for therate of profit in the principal capitalistcountry - the United States. 9The 'recovery' of the rate ofprofit inthe 1974-75 recession and the subsequent periodwas real, but by no means restored profitrates to their poetWorld War Two peaks.Again, this is particularly true of the

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hollow when no-one turned up for registration.The one method they never tried was to accede:o the most fundamentalof the pupils demands:that somebody of importance from the Departmentsit down at a table with then, listen totheirgrievances and at least start to do somethingabout them.Understandably, therefore, the visit of theMinister ofEducation and Training, Dr FerdieHartzenberg, to Kimberley proved the catalystthat brought the conflict situation to aheed.The pupils were furious when they heard that theMinister was to visit Kimberley without meeLL,-Gwith them. Hewas to, talk with the communitycouncil, the parents, even leaders of the whitecoomunity, but his visit - an opportunityforsome arrangement co be worked out - was acontinuation of the policy of ignoring thepupils, seeing them as errantchildren ratherthan regarding their stand as legitimate.iIt was at this ,juncture that the pressantetbd the picture.Dn themorning of 8 September, hours beforethe community council was due to meet the Minister,students beganassembling outside the Abanto BathoCentre in Galeshew_e., piling up their books andsinging. The pupils werewarned to move onby the security police which they did, dispersingand regrouping at Si: 8oniface school(theMinister's meeting was rescheduled for a'safer' venue in. the contra of town).At St Boniface they were given tenminutes todisperse by the police who then moved in withbatons, dogs end tear8as. The students fled inone direction -away from the police, into thewhite suburb of west End which borders anGnleshewe (St Boniface is detreen thetwo).Residents of West End interviewed laterail agraed.that the children were fleeing inpanic wbon they entered, thewhile area,,pursued .by the police. But what was important to thenews roadie end the state authorities was thatbladerioters had entered a white arse andcaused damage to property.That evening the police issued a statementallegingthat several thousand africen childrenhad run wild in a white suburb, entering homesand smashing furniture. Thepress took this up,and the following morning it wade the headlinesof most national dailies. The worst was theheadlinein the Citizen: 'Black Students RunAmok in White Suburb'. Never was there anyattempt to canvass the opinions of thepupilsor to provide sane background to the eventsthat had been happening for same time before the ,'riot' or even toindicate that the policestatement was only a claim by a party whichactually formed one side in the conflict.Onlyseveral days later did investigationsshow that the 'damage' was minimal, consintiivjof a few broken windows wherestudents, trappedinside a house they had hid in by the police,broke through the rindoi~s in terror to escape.Forseveral days thqreefter violencebillowed in Geleshewe as beerhells, policemen'shouses, schools and commercialvehicles fromwhite-owned firms were hit by arson attacks.Police blamed the pupils for the violenceeven though it'resnever proved who did it.About 12 children rare charged with arson andattempted arson but the state was unabletoconvict anybody except one man rte had threatenedto burn down the home of a policemen. He wasfined R30p for'obstructing n policeman in thecourse of his duties'.By the end of the reek the disturbances were.ell over. The presshad already~lost interestin the sporadic instances Of arson and as thechildren did not oblige by invading anotherchitssuburb Kimberley slipped beds into obscurity.The press had finished its role of collectinginformation for thebenefit of the readingpublic. It had in that time got whet it wanted- several columns of the commodity news.But thecommunity at Galeshere was left tolive through its trauma. A few reeks laterthe Minister closed ell of the schoolsinGaleshewe and sacked 13 temporary teacherswith 24 hours notice. Every pupil had lost ayears schooling end somewould never return.It was herd to tell how deep the schism betweenparents end children, created by theeducationdepartment's politicking where it used the parents(in the form of schools' committees) as a meansof gettingthrough to the pupils, wen. Theboycott had obviously created mistrust on bothsides.But the fact that the childrenbegan toinclude among their demands that: they returnto school this year (which they have done inreasonablenumbers), the authorities start to dosomething about the appalling housing situation,the lack of drainage and theabsence of ahospital in Geleshere, shored that theirscope of interest had broadened. In addition,discussions with thepupils have revealed thatthe boycott has created a nor radicalisedgeneration of youths in the isolated cityofKimberley.

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United States. 10The explanation for the movement in therate of profit, which is indeed the capitalistcrisis, cannot beattempted here. But itdoes seem to provide a striking verificationof the Marxian thesis of a tendency for therate ofprofit to fall in capitalism. Thistendency occurs, in .terms of Marx's analysis,as a consequence of a rising organiccompositionof capital unless offset by an equal increasein the rate of surplus value. 11 Economiccrises can functionso as to restore the rateof profit in three primary ways. First, bythe 'devalorisation' or indeed open destructionof capital- bankruptcies, plant closings, etc.Second, through raising the rate of surplusvalue - growing unemployment allowingfor alimiting of wage increases, reduction in strikeactivity, etc. Third, through a reduction inthe prices of raw materials,purchased mainlyfrom the Third World.All three occurred as a consequence ofthe 1974-75 recession, but to alimitedextent. A number of raw material pricedecreases were recorded, but 'energy-related'commodities rosesubstantially in price. 12Unemployment expanded significantly, and evenin the 'recovery' period stood athistoricallyhigh levels in the OECD countries. 13 This didallow for a tightening of labour disciplineand real wagedeductions in a number of cases 14- but labour organisation was such as to ensurethat this was not of a sufficientmagnitude torestore the rate of profit to its formerlevels.The key issue is that of capitaldevalorisation - and here liesthe explanationfor the post 1974-75 period. The devalorisationof capital was distinctly limited. There werea fewlarge-scale bankruptcies. 15 but theeffects were largely limited to the smallercapitals. The 'corporate structure',monopolycapital of the large trusts, was littleaffected.The underlying reason for the limitedeffect of the recession interms of capitaldevalorisation must rest with governmentalcounter-cyclical economic policies. 16 Variousforma ofmonetary 'pump-priming' and deficitfinancing served to ensure that the level ofoutput for the economy as a whole didnotfall too catastrophically, while the harder hitmonopoly corporations were, in addition,accorded forma of directsubsidy. 17 Thesesubsidies allowed then to continue inproduction.With the capital stock largely intact,excesscapacity, which had characterisedproduction prior to the 1974-75 recession, .continued in the 'recovery'. 18 Thesubsidisedsurvival of Chrysler and many of the Europeancar firms, for example, meant that the moatefficientcorporations were unable to operateat full capacity. The continuance of excesscapacity therefore limited the extent towhichthe rate of profit rose in the 'recovery'period.c) The limited recovery of the rate of profitin the post-recessionperiod was the principalfactor underlying the weakness of the .international capitalist economy.As was outlined above,this limitedrecovery in the rate of profit is to belocated in limited reductions in primarycommodity prices, limitedincreases in therate of surplus value and, in particular, in aseverely 'retarded' devalorieation of capital.The net effectwas to ensure that reinvestmentin productive activities was severely curtailed.This further encouraged investments ofa morespeculative character.d) Inflation is a complex phenomenon, and noattempt is made to provide an explanationhere.But it does seem that .inflation, which onceagain is a phenomenon of internationalcapitalism, is linked to twoprincipal factors.First, the economic dominance of monopolycorporations, end second, to expansionistmonetarypolicies pursued by capitalistgovernments. 19Firstly, the absence of competition hasallowed the larger firmsconsiderable leewayto utilise their power to unilaterally raiseprices without fear of retaliation. 20 Thus,even in arecession, larger corporations willtend to reduce their output, but increase theirmark-up in order to maintainprofitabilitylevels. 21 A recession will moderate priceincreases, principally via the effect of adeclining demand on thecompetitive sector andreductions in the prices of raw materials asdemand falls. 22 Generally, only when therecessionreally deepens, and the largercorporations collectively have massive excesscapacity, will this tend to provokemajorprice reductions in the monopoly sector.Secondly, the expansionist monetary andfiscal policies of the advancedcapitalistcountries have led to a massive expansion ofthe money supply - both nationally andinternationally - and thisis particularly trueof the United States post 1958 (see below).There is indeed a relation between the expansionof themoney supply and the persistence ofinflation. The development of international'monetary and capital.marketa haveprovided anadditional impetus, particularly by allowingavenues for the circumvention of tight moneypolicies. 23 Tiremassive budget deficits ofthe advanced capitalist countries in 1975-76

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TRE-%", TRIAL.DURIIMji the second half of 1980, 9 ANC guerillafighters stood trial for their lives !n thePretoriaSupreme Court. The charges they facedincluded one of high treason, and 2 of murder,end on any of these counts thedeath sentenceran be imposed. Unfortunately, the commercialpress chose to label the trial the 'Silvertontrial', implyingthat the vein issue at stakewas the siege of a bank in Silverton in January1960, and the resultant death of ? womenand 3guerilla fighters, as well as the injuring ofa number of the hostages held in the siege. Ase summary of the trialshows, this was onlyone of a mwber of issues involved, and atthe conclusion of proceedings, all the accusedwereexonerated from any involvement in theSilverton siege.The accused in the trial were1. Nciabithi Johnson Lubisi(2B),2. Peters 7sepo Mashigo (20),3. Nephtali Mensna (24),4. Ikenyeng Moses Molebetsi (27),5. Hlolile Benjamin Tau(24),6. Phumalani Grant Shezi (24),7. Jeremiah Radebe (26).8. Boyce Johannes Bogele (26),9. Thomas Mngadi(29).In addition to the charge of High Treason,the accused also faced 2 counts of iurder, 23counts of attemptedmurder, 1 count of robberywith aggravating circumstances, and 4 alternatecharges of participating in terroristicactivities(as defined in the Terrorism Act). The chargeof High Treason related to a general ANCconspiracy. the sic ofwhich was to overthrowthe South African state. The 2 counts of murderend 21 of the cants of attempted warderrelatedto the siege at the'Silvertan branch of theVolkskse boric on January 25, 1960, where 3guerilla fighters heldhostages while occupyingthe bank. In the ensuing polices laid on thebank the 3 guerillas were killed, 2 hostageswerekilled, and a number of hostages were wounded.It was rot alleged by the state that any of theaccused wereinvolved in the siege; however,accused ember 5 (Tau) was charged with planningthe attack, while the other accusedwere allegedto have criminal liability in that they wereadherents to a general ANC conspiracy. Thestate failed to proveits case either as faras the Std accused's involvement was concerned,or on the liability of the other accused as farasthe events et . the boric were concerned. Onthis basis, all accused were found not guiltyan the 2 murder era 21attempted murder charges.The further two counts of attempted murder,and the charge of robbery withaggravatingLcircumstances, related to the attack an a policestation et Saekwekeer early in January 1980.The 4alternate counts of Terrorism relatedto specific acts undertaken by each of theaccused.The first 3 accused, (Lubisi,Vashigo endMonona) were charged and found guilty of thefollowing pots: During 1976-77 the joined theAID, endsubsequently underwent military trainingin Angola. At the and of 1979 they returned toSouth Africa, era set up a basein the Tzaneendistrict from where attacks an targets wereplanned. On January 4, 1980, the accused togetherwith acertain Lunpile robbed a wen of his pick-up truck to use it in an attack an the Soak-wekeer police station. At about20h30 thatevening the 3 accused with Lungils attackedthe police station, firing shots era throwingbend grenades.During January 1990 the accusedwere in possession of a number.of AK47 sub-machineguns, ammunition,hendprenedes anddetonators.Lubisi, Veshlgo and Vernne did not attemptto deny that they bed been involved intheactivities listed above. They did howeverdispute that their intention was to warderwhen attacking the Soekwakaerpolice station,claiming that the aim of their mission was'arced propaganda'. According to Monona, thisinvolved 'theuse of weapons for the promotion'of propaganda. A certain target, for example apolice station, bed to be sought outwar whichthere existed a difference of opinion. Theseplaces are attacked to show the people we orethere'. TheSoekwekear police station waschosen because it was in a region where therebed been resistance to enforcedremovals. Thestate had been involved in trying to resettlethe people of Vekgeto, and the attack anSoekm*eer wasdesigned to show those resistingthat the Ate supported them in their struggle.A police witness admitted in evidencethatpolice fray Soekmekear bed been armed during theresettlement of the Vakgeto, but claimed thatthis was merelyto prevent 'crime end violence'during the operation. He also acknowledged thatthe people resettled bed lived in theease formany years and bed 'felt bed' about being wooed.On the basis of the acts the first 3 accusedwere found tohave committed, they were foundguilty of High Treason, 2 counts of attemptedmurder and a count of robbery withaggravatingcircumstances.Volabatai end Tau, accused numbers 4 and 5respectively, were alleged to have joinedtheANC in 1976.-77, end thereafter undergonemilitary training in various ANC temps inAngola. They did not deny this,era wars

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were the real reason for the subsequent'recovery'. But they added further impetus toinflation.Apart from the state'sgeneral monetarypump--priming, in order to maintain the levelof total demand, the other principalmechanismsdesigned to limit the recession by reinstatingthe rate of profit are also clearly inflationary.Directsubsidisation of inefficient firms, taxreductions on coed profits, assuming moreof the costs of private capital eg bysubsidisingor taking over scientific research. and variousunproductive state expenditures which allow anoutlet forcapitalist production eg defence,all contribute to inflation. The persistenceof a condition of stagflation (if notslump-flation) - the coexistence of stagnant productionand rising prices - reflects the contradictorycharacter ofcapitalism in its monopoly phase,viz a tendency for the rate of profit to fallwhich produces stagnation, and anopposing set ofcounter-tendencies, primarily initiated by thestate, which produce inflation.These are structural, andhence endemicfeatures of advanced capitalism. If inflationpersists in the advanced capitalist countries -the continuingdevalutaion of paper currencies -this will clearly have major long-ternrepercussions for South Africa, theworld'sprincipal producer of gold. 24e) But the value of the key official currency,the international currency, the USdollar, isof particular importance. The declining valueof the dollar is-one reflection of the limitationsof US imperialisthegemony.The agreement reached at Bretton Woods in1944 had as its bedrock the convertibility ofthe US dollar intogold at the fixed price of$35 per ounce. This price had in fact been setas early as 1934 when the RooseveltAdministration,in the context of the US holding massive goldstocks, had raised the price of gold. It hadarbitrarilystopped at $35 per ounce. 25The strict convertibility of the dollarinto gold depended on two basic factors.First,maintaining a continuing supply of newly-ained gold, which could be purchased at that fixedprice, ie a regulation of thegold marketsuch that newly-mined gold would be offered tothe Central Hanks at $35 per ounce. Second, andcloselyinterrelated, that the supply of dollarswas restricted. 'the latter was the crucialcondition - an over-supply of dollarswould leadto a swapping of dollars for gold and a drainupon the US gold reserves.The US, in particular, sought tocontrol themarket for newly-mined gold by attempting toenforce sale through the Central Banks or theIMF at the fixedprice of $35 an ounce - apolicy which was strongly opposed by SouthAfrica. 26Hut the crucial factor whichfinallydestroyed the Bretton Woods Agreement was thepersistence of massive US Balance of Paymentsdeficits.Whereas in the first decade or soafter the War there was a severe dollar shortageinternationally, this gave way to everlargerdollar surpluses. 27 The key turn-around datewas 1958. In that year, US gold reserves fellbelow the level of itsofficial liabilitiesdenominated in dollars. At the same time theUS Balance of Payments produced a very largedeficit.From this date, large outflows ofgold from the US continued unabated, asdollar holders sought to exercise their righttoacquire gold.The US responded by progressively andunilaterally cutting the links between thedollar and gold. Thisoccurred in three majorsteps. In 1961 the 'Gold Pool' was createdwhereby several European countries madeacommitment to sell sane of their gold stocksin order to maintain the dollar price for gold.In 1968 the US ended itscommitments to privateholders of dollars who now could no longeracquire gold for their dollars. In 1971 the'goldwindow' was closed to official purchasersas well.In very broad terms, both the persistenceof the US Balance ofPayments deficit, and themeasures taken as a consequence by the US tocut links between the dollar and gold, are tobeunderstood in the context of US imperialisthegemony. At the same time, it points to someof the limitations iq`,^^entin this hegemonicposition.The Balance of Payments deficit must beunderstood, in part, as a consequence ofUSmilitary expenditures. Such expenditures,particularly during the Vietnam War, led to amassive drain of dollarsabroad directly, whileindirectly funnelling much of the R and D,skilled personnel etc away from the productionofmarketed commodities. 28 US 'aid', specialtrade relations with 'strategic' countries likeSouth Korea and Taiwan, andother factors linkedto the US imperialist presence made furthercontributions to the deficit. The challengesto UShegemony - the direct resistance of Cubaand Vietnam for example, and the challenges posedby its economic rivals,the other developedcountries, were severe threats to that hegemonicposition and inter alia contributedverysignificantly to the deficit.Hut the US response reveals that, whilechallenged and circumscribed, itshegemonicposition within the international capitalistsystem has, in essence, been maintained. 29Instead of abiding bythe rules of BrettonWoods and exercising expenditure reductions in

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accordingly found guilty of these acts.The state further claimed that during Novemberend December 1979, theyestablished guerillabases in Ga-Rankuwa, BophutheTawenn, togetherwith the 3 guerillas who attacked the bankatSilverton. Molebatsi end Tau admitted this,except that they claimed that the bases werenot formed with the 3guerillas involved in thebank siege, but only one of them, Mefoko.Molebetai end Tau also admitted that theyhad beeninvolved in preparations to attack thefuel storage tanks at Waltloo, outside Pretoria,but that this attack had not takenplace.Molebatsi wee further charged with beingin control of large anus caches et KwaThema,near Springs, nod inGaRankuwa. He admittedthe latter, but denied control of the KweThemacache, and the trial judge acceptedthis.Molebatsi also denied, and was acquitted of,planning attacks on the Pretoria West andVillierie police stations. Taudenied, endwee acquitted of, planning the siege at theSilverton Bank, together with the 3 guerillaswho attacked thebank.On the basis of the acts proved againstthem, these accused were found guilty of thecharge of High Treason.Thesixth and seventh accused, Shezi andRadebe, operated as guerillas in Natal. Theywere charged with, and foundguilty of joiningthe ANC, undergoing military training inAngola, and returning to South Africa to engagein armedstruggle against the state. DuringDecember 1979-January 1980 they planned enattack on the offices of the PortNatalBantu Affairs Administration Board, end were inpossession of various arms, explosives endammunition. Theywere found guilty of HighTreason.Accused 8 and 9, Bagels and Mngedi, werecharged, and found guilty of joining theANCend undergoing military training in Angola and,in Magndi's case, in Russia. On their returnto South Africa, inabout February 1980, theyplanned the establishment of a base in theVryheid district. When arrested in the townshipofMondlo, they were each in possession of eMekerov pistol. On this basis, they were bothalso convicted of HighTreason.Evidence for the state falls into 3 majorcategories:e the attack on the Sodcmekeer police station;the siege atthe Silverton bank;e the specific acts end involvements of eachof the accused.In addition to this, the state also ledsanegeneral evidence on the nature of the ANC. Theirmajor witness in this regard was Lieut-ColHermenus Stadler ofthe security police, whotestified that he could be considered somethingof en expert on the ANC. After being formedin1912 the ANC, according to Stadler, formed ayouth league in 1944-under the leadership ofpeople like NelsonMandela, Welter Sisulu endOliver Tembo. The Youth League introduced emore militant atmosphere into ANCprogrammesend policies, end during the 1950s demonstrationsend passive resistance campaigns occurred.In themid-1960s the Congress Alliancewas formed, involving an alliance between 5orgeriisetions - the ANC, Congress ofDemocrats,Coloured Peoples' Congress, South AfricanIndian Congress, and the South African Congressof TradeUnions (SACTU). The Freedom Charterwas adopted as the policy of these organisationsafter it was drawn up et theCongress of thePeople et Kliptown.After the ANC was declared unlawful in1960, a military wing - Umkonto we Sizwe-was famed (MK or Spear of the Nation), whichinvolved itself in acts of sabotage. A blueprintfor guerilla warfare wasdrawn up. Under crossexamination Stadler conceded that for the ANCto have existed ell these years it mustbeaccepted by a large number of block people inSouth Africa. He referred to the intenserivalry between the ANC endthe PAC, butadded that 'we (the security police) don't paymuch attention to the PAC because it is such nsmellfaction'.Another major state witness, who may notbe identified in terms of a court order,testified that after completingANC training inAngola, he was appointed heed of the ANC'sSouthern Natal Region. His duties includedthe arrangingof attacks on political,economic and military targets of significance.aDuring Merck 1979 he carried out a missiontosabotage the buildings of the Port Natal BantuAffairs Administration Board, but this failedwhen a detonator did notgo off as planned.On December 27, 1979, the witness gave himselfup to the police. In court, he identified moatof theaccused as having undergone ANC trainingin Angola-based camps.Of interest is the fact that none of theaccuseddisputed their involvement in variousmilitary activities of the ANC. The natureof the evidence given by the 6 accusedtotestify revolved around the following points:en explanation for the reasons for the attack onthe Soekmekaer policestation; the circumstancesin which they came to leave South Africa and .loin the ANC; and a denial that the ANCwould beinvolved in attacking n target like a bank,or taking hostages. In addition to thisgeneral defence evidence, thefirst 3 accusedexplained in detail how they planned theirattack et Soekmekenr, end how their plansaimed at avoidingkilling police nod civilians

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order to limit its payments deficits, so stemmingthe outflow of dollars - a policy which wouldhave entailed economicrestraint at home and/orcurtailment of US 'activities' abroad - the UShas essentially adopted what became known as'apassive strategy' for the Balance of Payments.In essence, this strategy - given elaboratetheoretical justification by theeconomic'establishment' 30 - was that the US shouldcontinue to run its economy at an 'optimal'level. The resultantoutflow of dollarsabroad would have to be 'absorbed' by othercountries. The 'pressure' on other countries,notably theadvanced capitaiist country rivalsof the US, arises in two rays. First, they wouldbe forced to buy dollars in order tomaintainthe value of the dollar because the dollarrepresented much of the backing for their owncurrencies. Second,an effective devaluationof the dollar or revaluation of their owncurrency would severely jeopardise their tradingpositionvie-a-vie the US. Finally, a severemonetary crisis, brought on by a major declineof the dollar, would jeopardise thewholeinternational economy.The economic rivals of the US have thusbeen forced to accept a situation whereby theUSrune persistent deficits, and to absorb theresultant dollar surpluses. 31 But the fact thatthe major capitalist countryoperates outsidethe monetary rules, in order to ensure itscontinued hegemony, 32 has injected a tremendousnote ofuncertainty into monetary relations andthe stability of the system. There clearly arelimitations to the process of dollarabsorptionand the spectre of a monetary collapse isconsequently a real one. In addition theoutflow of dollars hasadded tremendously tointernational liquidity, and is the principalfactor in the rapid growth of the Eurodollarmarket. Toreiterate, these developments havewade a significant contribution to fuellinginternational inflation. Monetaryinflation,end the threat of a monetary collapse, are theprincipal factors. encouraging 'alternative' formsof wealthholding.The major conclusions to be drawn from theabove analysis are awrmariaed here:Inflation, the devaluation ofmonetaryassets. is a persistent and a structuralfeature of advanced capitalism. It has its rootsin the very structures ofcapitalism. Firstly,as a consequence of monopoly control of markets;secondly, as h result of_governwentalpoliciesdesigned to ensure the maintenance of demand;thirdly, at en international level, as theconsequence of amassive increase ininternational liquidity which must be groundedin an analysis of US imperialist hegemony. 33At the'national level', it represents theoutcome of forces, principally directed by thestate, designed to counteract thetendency ofprofit rates to tall. At the 'internationallevel', it reflects the persistence of, butat the same ties growingthreat to, USimperialist hegemony.One consequence of the latter feature hasbeen the instability and devaluation ofthedollar - the international reserve currency.There la an analogy here with the situation ofthe early 1930s. In 1931 thedevaluation ofthe key reserve currency, the pound sterling,led to the first substantial price increase forgold. 34 WhileBritish hegemony in the imperialistsystem was uncontested, a strong currency couldensure a fixed relation between itand gold.Devaluation of the pound sterling reflected thedecline in British imperialist hegemony. WithAmericanimperialist hegemony undisputed and thedollar strong, a similar period of a fixed pricefor gold could be maintained.The challengesto US imperialist hegemony in the contemporaryperiod have once again lifted the ceiling on.gold.At thesave time as monetary assets havebeen subject to devaluation, the rate of profitin direct productive investment hasbeen for anddeclining. This decline was only partiallyreversed by the major recession on 1974-75,end the fact that thereversal vas only partialwas due primarily to the limited valorisation ofcapital. As a consequence, capital issearchingdesperately for profitable avenues for 'investment'in order to ensure an adequate return.Since neitherproductive investment, normonetary assets yield adequate returns, thesearch has been directed elsewhere. 35 Awiderange of possibilities exist - property, antiques,certain raw materials, etc, end even worecrucially, gold andsilver.The US has nor cut all effective linksbetween the dollar end a fixed quantity of gold.The controlled market forgold gave ray to atwo-tier market, and now effectively a free-market for gold. The price of gold is not norsubject to anymajor manipulation designed tolimit its exchange price. Thus, so long asthese features of advanced,capitaliam whichIhave analysed as structural, persist, theinternational exchange price for gold, itsoverall purchasing power in terms ofnationalcurrencies will tend to remain strong. Whilelarge fluctuations are indeed very likely,since this is nor aspeculative market andsubject to many determinations, 36 theunderlying trend for the gold price is likelyto remainstrong.That this increase in the price of gold isnot likely to be a passing phenomenon, since itis linked to structuralfeatures of contemporary

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present in the ares; the fourth accused (Nolebetsi),specifically denied control over the KwnThemaarms cache, end theplanning of attacks anthe Villierie end Pretoria west police stations,while the fifth accused (Tae) explained thenatureof his involvement with the 3 who attacked thebank, and denied any involvement iniike'planningof thatattack.The defence evidence on the ANC's attitudeto civilian targets end the taking of hostagessowed to beconfirnned when, shortly after thetrial concluded, ANC president Tambo signed nprotocol of the Geneva Conventiondealing withthis issue. The protocol binds the ANC torefrain from directing its war effort againstcivilian targets, ara"&the 'humanitarianconduct of war'.Defence evidence also dealt with thecircumstances in which the accused came toleavethe country end join the ANC. Accused numbers 2and 3 (Yeshigo and Monona) dealt with the eventsof Soweto1976, end explained how that contextled to their fleeing the country, end joiningthe AMC. Yolebetsi described theimpact thatthe resettlement of his grandparents had onhim as a youth, end how that experiencepoliticised him. Healso explained how theeffect of the Saw to 1976-77 events had adisruptive effect an daily life, and how itbecame verydifficult to continue anything likee normal existence in that context. And Tautestified how his girl friend had been shotdeadon June 17, 1976, end he had found her bodycovered with newspapers, lying in the street.After conviction, thedefence calledProfessor Frans Moritz of the UNISA sociologydepartment, in mitigation of sentence. Moritzexplainedhow the actions of the accused madesense within the cnntext of their world view,and hem their activities wereunderstandable.'My argument is simply that they (the accused)acted within a certain situation and thatwithin thissituation their actions made sense.Without condoning their actions, they arenevertheless understandable', Moritz toldthecourt. Moritz also noted that the activitiesof the accused were linked to basic historicaldynamics relating torebellion and charge.People try to overthrow governments, and theperson who site in jail today may tomorrow sitingoverrreent.In passing sentence, trial judge de Villiersseemed to accept the evidence given by Moritz,which was notchallenged by the state in itscross examination. Judge de Villiers agreed thatin many cases the rebdl of todaybecomes theleader of tomorrow. He then went an to pose thequestion of whet the court did with the rebel whoiscaught.Dealing with the attack on the Soekmekenrpolice station, he categorised this as anextreme act of treason. Thefact that it was apolice station seemed to be an aggravating factorfor de Villiers, who stated that the policekeep lawand order in South Africa, which is ecountry with civilised values. 'If I did notregard their (the Soekmekear attackers')conductin a very serious light, I would not be doing myduty towards the citizens of South Africa, endSouth Africa is acivilised country', said thejudge.With these factors in mind, Judge de Villiershanded down the following sentences:"Lubisi, Neahigo end Monona: 'to be hanged by theneck until deed'.Yolabetsi end Tau: 20 years imprisonment. -Sheziand Redabe: 1S years imprisonment.Bogele and Mngadi: 10 years imprisonment.On application by the defence,leave toappeal was granted in the case of the first-threfaccused. It was refused in the canes of Yolebatai,Tau endShezi. Leave to appeal in the remainingthree cases was not applied for.TERRORISM ACT TRIALS._Nota: The dateswhich appear at thB end of richcompleted trial refer to the date of sentence'or acquittal in the trial. IM appealproceedings,the date refers to date of ,judgement, while inthe case of pert-heard matters, it refers to thelast courthearing before edjourrwent.Ylunpiai Elliot Sawangambe (24), Monde DuamoreJohnson (24) end Tombs SamuelYtselu (26).Charge: The accused ore charged withattempting to leave South Africa with theintention of undergoingmilitary training.Soeangeabe and Johnson pleaded guilty to thecharge, while Ntsalu pleaded not guilty.Ytsalu wasseparated from the other 2 accused,to be tried on his own.The 3~aecuB,ed were arrested in the'independent'bentuaten of BophuthaTarana,allegedly on route to Botswana. It ispresumed that BophuthaTswananauthoritieshanded the 3 over to the South African police.Verdict: In Finding Samengembe end Johnsonguilty, thepresiding magistrate praisedthem for their 'co-operative attitude', andamid that if it wee in his power he wouldsentencethan leniently. The Terrorism Actcarries n minimum mandatory sentence of 5 years.Sentence: 5 years imprisonmenteach.(Part Elizabeth Regional Court, 30.09.90).When Ntaslu appeared in court, also chargedunder the Terrarium Act,Soasngeaiba testifiedagainst him as a state witness. Mtsalu's trialhad not been concluded et the time of writing.

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p 5capitalism, has major implications for thetrajectory of future capitalist development inSouth Africa.3. PRINCIPALFEATURES OF THE CURRENT UPSWINGIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY.THE FIRST fruits of the increasein the price ofgold are to be seen in the current upswing inthe South African economy.Two features of the upswingstand out.Firstly, the high rate of economic growth, whichhas accelerated lately. Real GDP rose by3,75% in 1979, andin the first half of 1980real GDP was 8,5% higher than the correspondingperiod of 1979.37 Industrial production inJune1980 was fully 13% higher than a year earlier.This is in marked contrast with the steepdeclines for the sameperiod registered for mostof the developed capitalist countries. 38 The .second outstanding feature of the upswing isitsduration. Three years of uninterrupted expansionmade it one of the lengthiest upswings of thepost-World War IIperiod - exceeded only by theupswing lasting from September 1961 to April 1965.There are some signs of the rate ofgrowthmoderating in the short term. Capacity utilisationin. manufacturing is at high levels,39 skilledlabour is inever-shorter supply, exportindustries are likely to perform poorly as a resultof the weak economic position of theadvancedcapitalist countries and finally, interestrates are likely to rise. However, at presentthere is little danger of amajor economicdownturn.The key impetus to the upswing and thereason for its long duration and likelycontinuance is,of course, provided by the highergold price. It is worth charting, albeitbriefly, the principal ways in which the goldpricehas acted as a stimulus to the economy.First, it has added substantially togovernment revenue. In 1971 governmentrevenuefrom gold mining (tax and share of profits) wasabout 8120-m.40 By 1975 this had risen toR745-m, but itdeclined to R320-m in 1977.In 1978 the state's share rose dramaticallyto 8937,3-m.41 In 1979 state revenue rose82%to R1 703-n (state assistance to marginalminds declined 70% to a mere R8-m),42 and inthe first 6 months of1980 the amount paid wasR2 006-m - an increase of 222,5% over the sameperiod in 1979.43This has allowed foreasier taxationpolicies in .regard to the rest of the economy,and provides much leeway for future tax concessionsinthe event of an economic downturn.Second, as a direct contribution to GDP,gold's share rose from 5,7% in 1970, to8,7% in1978 and 9,7% in 1979.44 Further increases areanticipated for 1980. Total mineral earningsrose from R1563-m in 1970, to an estimatedR14 000-m to R15 000-m in 1980.45Third, the indirect contribution gold mininghasmade to the rest of the economy by providinga source of final demand. 46 The multiplier issaid to be large, and thedomestic value addedcomponent of gold mining production is as highas 93,7% - with the import leakage thus verylow.47 The domestic value added is likely tohave risen as the mines employ a higher proportionof local labour and asmore intermediate andcapital goods are produced locally. There isalso some indication that foreign shareholdinghasdeclined marginally. 48Finally, and most critically, the increasedprice of gold has had a profound effect on theBalanceoi' Payments. Soutn Airlca-n tradesurplus was approximately R3 786-m in thefirst 7 months of 1980 - or 26% higherthan inthe same period in 1979.....this year's surplus (1980) is entirelyattributable to buoyant gold export earnings'.49The gold price has more than kept up withinternational inflation and comparing gold andoil prices over a 10 yearperiod,from 1970,gold has increased more. 50 The terms of tradeincluding gold stand at 138 - as compared to .1 000for 1972.51 Moreover, the market value ofSouth Africa's official gold stocks alsoincreased substantially..In the past,economic upswings have beenlimited in their duration and extent byemerging 'foreign exchange bottlenecks'. Astheeconomy has expanded so has the propensityto import, while to a lesser extent exports haveincreasingly beendiverted to the home market.Abstracting from gold, this phenomenon is alreadyvery evident. 52 The non-gold currentaccountis significantly adverse, and has been since thebeginning of 1979.53 But the high price for goldhas produceda substantial surplus, and officialcalculations show that a gold price of $570 perounce will be sufficient to sustain agrowthrate of 5,5%.But the higher gold price has even moresignificant implications which go beyond itsimmediateimpact. The medium to long termimplications for capitalist development inSouth Africa are equally profound.Thehigher gold price has occasioned verysignificant gold mining reinvestment. Thecapital expenditure of the gold minesrosefrom R448,31n in 1978 to R689-m in 1979 -an increase of 53,7%.54 In the first 6 monthsof 1980 capitalexpenditure has been estimatedas increasing by a further 21%.55 While thesurge in gold mining investment has beenmostdramatic., increased investment is also verysignificant in other mining - particularly coal.Capital expenditure bythe mining industry as a

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Thabo Makunyane (24) and Ephraim Mogale (23).Charge: The accused faced 2 counts under theTerrorism Act, and 4further counts of possessionor distribution of banned publications.According to the charge sheet, the firstcount ofTerrorism related to a series of actswhich the accused committed with the intentionof endangering the maintenance oflaw end orderin South Africa. These acts were listed asfollows:1. During October - November 1977, at GiyaneandPotchefstroom, the accused distributedpamphlets "Being black in South Africa today",and "Declaration of war".2.During 1977, at Nylstroom, the accusedtaught LD Ketumele and J Monannee) that white men oppressed blacks;b) thehistory of the ANC and PAC, and thatthey are the only organisations able to freeblacks;c) these organisations recruitpeople formilitary training and that they will fight tofree the blacks. That they should be helpedto free blacks;d) thehistory and aims of communism and thatthe aims of communism should be furthered.3. During 1979, in Nylstroom,the accusedformed an organisation celled the CommunistAdvance Movement (CAM). The aims of thisorganisationwere to propagate the principles,promote the spread of, andfurther the objects of communism;J. During the period1977 - 1979, at Nylstroom,Mshwelereng end other places, the accusedencouraged the forming of youth clubstoproTcte unrest end uprising end to instructthe youth in acts of sabotage, and the aims ofthe ANC and to recruit theyouth for militarytraining end as supporters of the ANC;5. Between April end June 1978 the accusedencouraged BMMChoabi to ,join the ANC;6. During September 1979, in Pietersburg, theaccused taught CM Nang the history andaimsof the ANC, and requested her to further theaims;7. During October 1979, in Vendnlend, theaccused producedand possessed a stencil"Come let, us unite end defeat our oppressors"for the production. and distribution ofpamphlets.In the second count of Terrorism, theaccused were charged with recruiting 13 peoplefor military trainingduring the period 1977to 1979. Those allegedly recruited werelisted asLD KutumeleJL ManamaSC OhlodhleAMMeshishiMV MoruduJ11 LekelakeleJ AlekibeloOM NangJO SetshediR RemelepeJ Se,jengK Lehodi0 Lebelo.Count 3dealt with the distribution ofMeyibuye, an ANC publication; counts 4, 5 end 6alleged possession of "ANC speaks","South Africano middle road" and "The road to South Africanfreedom".At the time of his detention Mogalewaspresident of the Congress of South AfricanStudents (COSAS); Alekunyene was n student atTurfloopUniversity.When the trial began, the accused pleadedguilty to the first count of Terrorism, end tothe counts relating tounlawful possession/distribution of publications. The charge ofrecruiting people to undgrgo military trainingwaswithdrawn.Verdict: In finding the accused guilty on thebasis of their plea of guilty, the presidingmagistrate found thatthe aim of the accusedwas to galvanise the black youth so that theywould identify with unrest.,pS!d uprisingswhenthey occurred. Mogale encouraged the formationof youth clubs in Nylstroom, Mahwelereng andPotgietersrus toprovide social facilities andcommunal services; but his ulterior aim was toprovide a forum to train and politiciseblackyouths in the aims of the ANC.4ogele told LD Kutumele and J Monenathat the ANC end PAC ware the onlyorganisationswhich. could provide the black man with politicalrights and military training, and that theiraims should befurthered. To this end the 3of them formed the Communist Advance Movementwith Monena as president, lilogele asorganiserand Kutumela as secretary.Sentence: B years each.(Pietersburg Regional Court, 17.10.80).N,jegabantuSithole (21), Mandl& James Sibisi (20),Rnmetlotlo Moses (21), Christopher Sitembiso,Alzuze (20), Stanley ThembaMthembu (19), and2 youths aged 16 end 17.Charge: All 7 accused faced a charge under theTerrorism Act. It wasalleged that, betweep .nJuly 1978 and August 1979 they conspired toleave South Africa to undergo militarytraining,and incited others to do the same. Sithclefaced n further Terrorism charge, where he wasalleged to haveincited 4 youths to leave thecountry to undergo military training. Thisincitement allegedly took place betweenFebruaryand December 1977. Mzuza also faceda charge ,of; dueling in degga.Prior to the trial beginning, one of theyouthscharged brought an urgent applicationbefore the Supreme Court. As n minor he wasnot permitted to instruct a legalrepresentativeto appear in his trial without the assistance

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whole rose from R693-m in 1978 to R1 013-m in 1979,56and according to the President of the Chamber ofMM.57ines could top R3 OOO-m in 1981. The valueof new mining ventures already announced andscheduled tocommence production on or before1985, is well in excess of R6 000-m atcurrent prices. 58The effects of this massivecapitalexpenditure will be felt after a number of years.It will provide impetus to accelerated growththroughout theeconomy and ameliorate any downturnthat might occur. The boom in South Africa post-:962 was the outcome of boththe crushing ofpopular resistance and the removal of anyimmediate political threat, but also the increasein mininginvestment which occurred during themid-1950x.59 There is a significant laggedrelationship between increases inmining andnon-mining investment.Increased capital investment has been farmore significant in gold mining thaninmanufacturing. For the year ended June 1979,gross domestic fixed investment in gold miningrose 23%, and for theyear ended June 1980, itrose 39% - a massive increase caning on top of amajor increase the year before. Inmanufacturing,gross domestic fixed investment declined by9% in the year ending June 1979. By June 1980,it hadincreased by 27% - but this is lesssignificant: given the declines in 1976 and 1977.60One of the features of thepresent upswing wasthe initial slow rate. of growth of fixedinvestment in manufacturing. While this rateof increase haspicked up very markedly recently,this has been after years of decline, and forthe metal and engineeering industries,forexample, projected capital investment for 1980is still below the figures for 1974-76.61Whatever the final outcome ofthe differentsectoral investments, it seems clear that mining,and gold mining in particular, has an increasingrelativerole to play in the future - both interms of contribution to GDP, and even moreespecially as an earner of foreignexchange.This broad conclusion is further underlinedby the increasing concentration of gold mining onthe lower gradeores. Grams per ton milleddeclined steadily from 13,28 in 1970, to 10,03in 1974, 8,19 in 1979 and 7,45 grams inthefirst 6 months of 1980. This has had the effectof firstly very substantially increasingtotal mineable reserves, andsecondly ofsubstantially extending the working lives ofthe existent gold mines. As a consequence, allpreviouspredictions about future output andthe exhaustion of gold deposits have had to besubstantially revised. 62 Theperrenial predictionof the coming exhaustion of the gold miningindustry, so often made in the past and uponwhichmuch of South Africa's economic policieshave historically been partially based, againproves to be a mere chimera.4.CONCLUSION.THE EXPANDED role for gold mining, and miningin general, in the South African economy willcriticallyaffect the whole pattern of socialrelations in a wide variety of ways. I want hereto only broadly sketch out someimplications forthe overall process of capitalist development.In particular, I want to examine critically someof thosewritings which have seen South Africandevelopment as necessarily bound up with theexpansion of manufacturing.Inthe early 1970s, while the US was finallyclosing the 'gold window' and before anysubstantial increase in the gold pricehadoccurred, the influential Reynders Commissionreported on South Africa's export trade. Throughthe 1960s. themanufacturing industry which wasa substantial net importer, had grown fasterthan the primary industries of agricultureandmining, both substantial net exporters. Thishad produced a 'structural imbalance in theBalance of Payments'. 63The dynamic sector inthe economy, manufacturing industry, was thuslikely to be severely curtailed in its futuregrowth,in the absence of greater export earnings.The solution was seen to lie in the rapid growthof manufactured exports.64The Commission's analysis and conclusionsin this regard were readily accepted by a numberof writers operatingwithin a Marxist framework.Writing in 1978, by which time the price of goldhad already risen very substantially,SimonClarke reiterated the Commision's view: 65If South Africa is not to rely on acontinuing run of unlikely accidentstor'ustain accumulation, it is necessary tosolve the basic problem of the South Africaneconomy: the problem of theuncompetitivenature of South African manufacturingindustry on world markets.'For Clarke, as for the ReyndersCommission,the expansion of manufacturing exports was thecrucial sine qua non of further South Africancapitalistdevelopment. Increases in the priceof gold were, in Clarke's analysis, simplyrelegated to the never-never land of'unlikelyaccident' and given no further consideration, whilethe Reynders Commission reached its conclusionswithreference to a forecast of an increase inthe gold price to $80 per ounce - a forecastconsidered optimistic. 66But theiranalysis of the immanent crucial'barrier' to further capitalist development inSouth Africa was not simply inadequate asaconsequence of a refusal to consider thepossibility of a substantial rise in the priceof gold. Both Clarke and theReynders Commissionpresent an analysis of the manufacturing sectorand its export propensities that is highly

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of his father. His father, however, refusedto allow his son to be defended, saying that!the bay must take hispunishment if provedguilty'. In papers before the Supreme Courtthe youth sought, and was granted permissiontoinstruct a legal representative.At the beginning of the trial, thepresiding magistrate held that the proceedingswould beheard in camera because two of theaccused were juveniles.Verdict: Sibisi end the 16 year old youth werefound guiltyof attempting to leave the countryfor military training, and inciting others todo the same. Mzuza was convicted ofdaggedealing. The remaining accused ware acquitted.Sentence: Sibisi and the ii year old: 5 years.Mzuze: 2 years,suspended.(Durban Regional Court, 14.10.60).Ruth Thandi Modiss (21), Moses Khowi Nkosi (24),and Aaron SlimMogale (21).Via: Modise was charged with undergoingmilitary training in ANC camps based in Angolaand Tanzania.During 1978 she returned toSouth Africa; in March of that year, accordingto the state, she set fire to piles of clothinginJohannesburg branches of Edgers and theOK Bazaars. She was also charged with unlawfulpossession of arms,explosives and ammunition,end of reconnoitering police stations and aKnrgersdorp Bantu Affairs AdministrationBoardoffice with the em of sabotaging them.Nkosi, the father of Modise's child, andMoguls (who is a cousin ofModise), were allegedto have harboured her, knowing that she was e.trained guerilla fighter. They ware alsochargedwith storing a firearm and explosivesbelonging to Modise. ,Much of the trial revolved round theadmissibility ofstatements made by two ofthe accused while in police custody. Modisa.clamed that she had bean assaulted bypolicewho forced her to melee a confession; Nkosisaidthat he wads a statement to ovoid being tortured:'I thought thatwhat had been done to otherswould be done to me too. I had not heard ofsomeone who had been to John MonsterSquarewho had not been asseultetl', he told thecourt.Or Norman Jacobson, a senior JohannesburgDistrict Surgeon,testified that in hisopinion 'lengthy periods of interrogation...could constitute an assault. I believe, andI have seen, thatthe Security Police subjectdetainees to strenuous interrogation'.Questioned by defence counsel an howpeople cameto be injured at John VorsterSquare, security police witness Edward JamesTierney explained that 'the floss issoslippery that a person can fall and injurehimself or even fell while sitting an a their'.The two statements wereaccepted by thepresiding magistrate as having been made freelyand voluntarily, end therefore admissibleagainstVodise and Nkosi.Verdict: Modise end Nkosi guilty of Terrorism;Mogale guilty of unlawful possessionoffirearms.Sentence: Vodlae - 8 years.Nkosi - 5 years.Vogale --21 years, suspended.Notice of an appeal againstconviction wasgiven by Nkoai, who was released on R2 000bail pending the outcome of the appeal.(Kemptan ParkRegional court, 07.11.eo).Archibald Monty Vzinyathi (24) end BingoBentley (Vbojani) (46).Charge: Vzinynthi wasalleged by the stateto have joined the ANC in 1975 end undergonemilitary training in the Soviet Union during1977.The state further claimed that, on hisreturn to South Africa, ha was harboured byBentley (his stepfather) who knewthat he wasa trained guerilla.Both accused contested the admissibilityof statements they made while in policecustodyat John Monster Square, claiming assault andother pressures as the reasons for makingconfessions.The'waexi<amer' (truthroan) again featuredprominently in this trial, with Mcirryathiclaming that ha had been tortured insuch a roomat John Vorster Square, and security policedenying its existence. Allegations of torturein such a roomhave become common in politicaltrials involving John Vorater Square securitypolice; denials of its existence areequallyas frequent from the side of security police.Vzinyathi raised an alibi in his defence,claiming that et the time thestate claimed hewas in Russia,. he was in reality in a Lesothohospital as a result of a car smash. He appliedto court tobe allowed to gather evidence oncommission, which would establish that he wasindeed in hospital during the relevantperiod.This would have involved the hearing of evidencein Lesotho, and the application was turneddown by thepresiding magistrate.Verdict: Vzinyathi was found guilty as charged.Bentley was acquitted an the grounds thathemight possibly not have known that his stepsonhad undergone military training.Sentence: Vzinyathi was sentencedto 7 yamsimprisonment. M appeal against conviction weenoted.(Johannesburg Regional Court, 09.10.80).

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questionable.Clarke's anslyeis of why the South Africanmanufacturing sectorhad not up to 1978, andrill not in theforseeable future. be able toincrease its export earnings, nests an a .viewof the labour force as Undisciplined':67....the weakness of South Africanmanufacturing was never a technologicalweakness but always hoe been aweaknessin the social relations of production. ThusSouth Africa has been technologicallybackward because capitalhas not installedmodern technology (sict). This is certainlyin part because labour in the past wascheap, Industry wasprotected, and thelabour force was not highly skilled.However modern technology also requires a'disciplined''responsible' work force,and this South Africa did not have.Faced with this, Clarks states that capital andthe SouthAfrican state will be forced to under-take a process of 'resttucturing'. 'Thisrestructuring involves primarily the,intensification of labour and the tightening ofwork discipline in the manufacturingsector'The crisis is therefore one ofproduction,particularly production in the manufacturingsector, which finds its expression an an acutemonetary andbalance of payments crisis, 69In their attempts to resolve this crisis,' capital and the state in South Africa haveto takethe initiative in intensifying theclass struggle, tightening labour controlat the point of production and increasingthereserve army by the creation of a relativesurplus population. At this level there isno possibility of compromise, nobasis anwhich concessions can be made to defusethe.growing political crisis.Each of these suppositions ishighlydubious. By what standards is South Africanindustry technologically backwards? Mostcentrally, what is meantby a 'disciplined'and 'responsible' labour force? Surely,throughout the 1960s and up until at least theDurban strikes of1973, the period that Clarksis concerned with in respect of the developmentof manufacturing, South Africa had,fromcapital's viewpoint, an extremely 'disciplined'and 'responsible' rock force? This can bemeasured in terse of strikeactivity, tradeunite regulation, the functioning of labourallocation mechanism, etc. 70The Reyndera Commission'sanalysis of thebarriers to exporting on the pert of themanufacturing sector stipulated a number offactors - a lack ofexport consciousness, thesoap size of firms, lade of knowledge,activities geared to import replacement and arapidrise in domestic demand: 71...the Commission has concluded that theindustrial philosophy of a fairlysignificantnumber of local businessman is not adjusted/attuned to exporting, and they are notequipped mentally,psychologically orphysically (plant, equipment etc) to enterthis market.When the Commission wade reference tothelabour force, it tended to stress the shortage ofskilled labour, the inadequate training of blacks;statutory barriers to'Black advancement' andthe gap between earnings and productivity.Labour 'indiscipline' or its equivalent didnotfeature in its analysis. 72One very central feature ... .,outh Africanmanufacturing, namely the presence ofextensiveforeign ownership and control, nowhere featuresin Clarke's analysis of the barriers toincreasedmanufacturing exports. This is not at allsurprising. Clarke's analysis of the 'Crisis' inSouth Africa 73concludes an article designedto decay the validity of a so-called 'fractionalistanalysis of South African capitalism', theso-called fractionall.sts having put particularemphasis on the divisions existent betweenforeign and local/nationalcapital in SouthAfrica's historical development. 74 Clarksstrongly denied the validity of this distinction,and substitutedan analysis based on 'capital ingeneral' in which no distinction is sods betweensuch fractions.75The ReynderaCommission, working within aNeo-Classical theoretical framework, -also has noconcept of foreign capital central to itsanalysisof the operations of South African manufacturingindustry. But, at a significant number of pointsin its report, theCommission records empiricallythe Importance of this division.Thus, in respect of the automobile industry,theCommission noted that 76Apart from cost disadvantages, localwerwfacturera/asseablers are all tied tooverseasprincipals who are generallyunwilling to allow the local firms toexport. ?his state of affairs moat beregarded asdisadvantageous .... especiallyas regards exports.In regard to the factors impeding South Africancapital goodsexports to less developed countries,the Commission again noted the importance offoreign ownership end control:77There is also the fact that a notinsignificant proportion of themanufacturing sector is controlled byinternationalconcerns; which naturally(sic) give first priority to internaloperations. The result of this practice isthat South Africansubsidiaries of someinternational concerns do not export at all,although it is also true that others,because of theirinternational character,are exporters of save significance.In respect of firms which utilised importedresearch anddevelopment in the form of franchisesetc, these were frequently accocpanied byrestrictive clauses: 78Marketrestricting clauses ...limited theability of local users to benefit frogeconomies of scale by exporting; this wasparticularlyvalid in those cases where theuser had achieved some success in thedomestic market - the restrictingclauseprecluded him (sic)-from expanding hisoperations and achieving greater success...It was furthermore submittedthat SouthAfrica was at times looked upon as an

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Arthur Elliot Phalatse (22), Thabo SimonNdlovu (19), Jannitjie Malaya Chiloane (24),William Mtwante Mampuru (18),Tshepo AlbertMatlana (23), Ezekiel Oupa Masuku (23) andMatone Joseph Masuku (24).Charge: The accused all facea charge ofattempting to leave the country for thepurposes of undergoing military training.They were apprehendednear Houtkop on theSwaziland - South African border in earlyJuly 1980.In addition to this charge, Cups Mdsukufacesadditional charges of inciting others toundergo military training, and arrangingtransport to leave the country.The trial isdue to begin at the and ofJanuary in the Pretoria Regional Court.Ettiene Pillay (18), a 17 year old student,PindaManamela (34), Jonas Mataung (36), andNicadamus Motapo (35).Charge: Terrorism. Details of the chargeshad notyet been formulated at the time ofwriting.Oscar Mpetha (71), Lawrence Lerotholi (18),Morgan Makubala (19), AaronTshangama (28),Peter Kubr (18), Alton Sabuwa (18),Fumanekile Booi (18), Vuyisile Kzaza (19),Johannes Nhlapo(20), Jeffrey Boardman (20),Vuyisile Diba (21), Richard Amapondo (19),Welile Mazothana (21) and 4 youths.Charge:The accused face a charge of Terrorism,and 2 counts of murder. The state allegesthat between August B and August12, 1980, nearthe Crossroads squatter camp, the accusedincited people to damage motor vehicles bythrowing stonesand petrol bombs, and settingslight the vehicles.They are charged with assaulting andinuring 6 people, 2 of whomsubsequently died.The accused are further alleged to havebarricaded Klipfantein Road by placing stones,tree stumpsand tyres in the street; of marchingin 'singing groups armed with sticks, stones andother weapons; of ordering theclosure ofblack schools; and of congregating in variouschurches to encourage people to take part interroristicactivities.The first accused, Oscar Mpetha, is asenior leader in the Western Cape, beingorganiser of the African Foodand CanningWorkers Union, and chairman of the NyangaRAsidents Association.Mpetha was detained by policeshortlyafter accusing police-of provoking theviolence which broke out at Crossroads andNyanga in August 1980.Thetrial is due to begin in the CapeTown Supreme Court an March 3, 1981. When,the accused first appeared in court,theproceedings were held in a specially convenedcourt in Pollsmoor Prison.Or Fabian Defu Ribeiro (48), JanCaiphusMashilo (19) and a 16-year old youth.Charge: Five charGes under the Terrorism Act.Ribeiro is alleged tohave incited a number ofyouths to leave the country to undergo militarytraining, and supplying same of thoseallegedlyincited with money for train tickets to leave SouthAfrica. The other 2 accused are alleged to havemadeattempts to leave South Africa with theintention of undergoing military training.At the time of writing, the case hadbeenadjourned for the passing of judgement.(Pretoria Regional Court, 16.01.81).NAMIBIAN TERRORISMTRIAL.Markus Kuteka (40) and Henri Kariseb (45).Charge: The accused were alleged to haveassisted a group ofSWAPO guerillas byproviding them with food and accommodation,and a plan of the buildings of a farmnearGrootfontein, where they were employed. Thefarmhouse involved was subsequently attacked byguerillas onFebruary 17, 1979. .The farm owner, JFL Louw, told the courtthat the 2 accused had been among his mosttrustedfarmworkers, and both were foremen.Prior to the attack, one of his workers hadwarned him to be careful becauseKariseb was'SWAPO oriented'. On the day bf the attack, hehad instructed Kariseb ~,o run to a nearbyfarm to warn thefamily there that 'terrorists'were in the area. Kariseb refused to do this,telling Louw to 'save your breath'.Verdict: Thepresiding judge found that, onthe night before the attack, Kuteke had fedand accommodated two armed guerillas; thenextday he and Kariseb assembled other farm workafsin a bush clearing, where they met a group ofabout 9 guerillafighters.The accused were accordingly convictedof Terrorism.Sentence: In passing sentence, Justice Strydamsaidthat farmworkers had to be made torealise that it was their duty to report thepresence of armed insurgents, and notgetinvolved with SWAPO. There had been at least15 armed attacks on isolated farms in thepast few years, andfarmers had to be able totrust tneir workers.Although the accused were unsophisticatedfarm workers, no thinkingperson could beunaware of the aims of SWAPO, said the judge.Everyone knew that SWAPO had no goodintentionsfor Namibia and its people.

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outlet for relatively obsolescent products,techniques and processes which would have inany case have left littleleeway for localusers to compete in the international marketeven if there were no restrictive arrangement.Lastly, it wasstated that where the productwas composed of a number of components, theuser was allowed to manufacture alimitedrange only and then required to import fromthe supplier at high prices certain vitalcomponents which wererelatively easy andlucrative to manufacture.Foreign subsidiaries were often reluctant toexport: 79Witnesses alsoallegOd that the actions ofmany of these subsidiaries were determinedby the interests of the parent companyegshould the local subsidiary wish to exportit might be precluded therefrom by the factthat the parent companyalready had a plantin the territory concerned.And, in respect of foreign subsidiaries overall: soIn regard to subsidiariesof foreign concerns,the Commission was told that only a smallnumber of these participated actively inexports, and thatin these cases only arelatively small percentage were positiveexporters, is exported more than theyimported...Moreover, very few of them whichmanufacture intermediate goods hadinvestigated the exporting of their productstothe parent company ...A large numberappear to be restricted to the localmarket or are restricted to export tocertaincountries only. No statisticalevidence is available to substantiate thesetendencies, but the Commission is satisfiedthaton the whole, they do present a fairlyvalid picture of the situation.In a world in which almost half of all tradeisconducted by MNCs, and with about 40% ofinternational trade by capitalist countriesaccounted for by intro-firm tradeor tradewith related parties, 81 it is clear that theoperations of MNCs play a critical role in theregulation end limitationsconfronting countries'capacities to expand their export earnings. Itwould seem clear that, in the case of SouthAfricanmanufactured exports, and the ReyndersCommission findings support this albeit thatspecific micro studies arelacking, 82 exportersare constrained by a range of technologicalagreements that prohibit/inhibit export, bythe'unwillingness' of subsidiaries to export tomarkets where another subsidiary is already inexistence, and the generalglobel_profitabilityconsiderations of the MNCs which regulate inter-affiliate trade. The other side of the coin isthat thehigh import propensity of themanufacturing sector, just as its low exportpropensity, cannot be seen apart fromextensiveforeign ownership and control which tiesubsidiaries to import from Head Office, or otherrelated subsidiaries,even where such productsare locally available. 83Foreign control -whether exercised viaa majority or minorityownership or via formaof licensing agreements - is particularlyprevalent in the South African manufacturingindustry. Inagriculture foreign participationis very small, while in mining, although foreignfarms are not insignificant, the sector isin thecontemporary period predominantly owned andcontrolled by South African capital. 84 Apart fromdividendpayments, the earnings of the mininghouses are not subject to significant remissionabroad.Backward end forwardlinkages are likely tobe effected with domestic producers and notsubject to transfer pricing. 85 At the level ofresearch,development and technical contracting,the South African mining industry is itselfpioneering much new innovation. TheChamber ofMines is at present directing a major 10-yearprogramme of collaborative research which hasalreadyyielded many significant innovations. 86Technological 'independence' is thus far morepronounced in this sector thanin manufacturingand the subsequent remissions abroad in theform of technology payments will be far lessthan inmanufacturing. 87The expansion of exports from the miningsector, gold mining in particular but notexcluding othermineral products such as coal.in the situation of higher 'energy' prices,is thus not only likely to continue, giventhecontext of the continuing international capitalistcrisis, but is indeed, from the standpoint ofcapital, likely to containconsiderably greater'benefits' than an expansion based on manufacturedproducts. Moreover, in a world inwhichinternational trade amongst capitalist nationsis dominated by the MNCs, it is by no meanscertain (contrary towhat Clerks argues) thatany amount of 'restructuring' performed at anational level can yield a significant expansioninmanufactured exports.Eurocentric models prescribe a single pathto capitalist development - that of industrial-isation.Hut, precisely because suchindustrialisation can today only occur at the'periphery', under the domination of theMNCe,is what is frequently termed 'dependentindustrialisation', 88 the development ofmanufacturing tends toaccentuate rather thanmitigate the Balance of Payments crises thataccompany high rates of growth. 88 As theworld'sprincipal producer of gold and with a miningsector which is domestically owned and controlled,the trajectory ofcapitalist development inSouth Africa is 13kely,to follow a significantlydifferent path. 90David KaplanFOOTNOTES.1.But even in 1929 a few countries, eg Sweden,did not experience major decline in output.2. DECD: 'PerspectivesEconimiques' No. 19,July 1976.

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Kuteke was sentenced to death.Kariseb was sentenced to 10 years.(Windhoek Supreme Court,13.10.80).CONTRAVENTIONS OF BANNING ORDERS.(Internal Security Act).Aubrey Vdcoena (31).Charge: Theaccused was alleged to havecontrmvenad the banning order imposed on himin 1978 an 5 occasions. The chargesemergedPram a series of conflicts within the AfricanMethodist Episcopal Church (AME), in whichAlokoene appears tohave played a role. Theseconflicts seem to revolve around the role ofthe American Bishop of the A41E Church,BishopMing, the administration of church finances,and the transfer of priests between perishes.Mokoene was involvedin a series of altercationswith Bishop Ming over the administration offunds, and SSTAPO members of the churchinNamibia who had been detained.Verdict: Guilty on 2 counts, in that duringMay 1980 Mokoene attended two AMEChurchmeetings. At one meeting, he made a series ofintroductory remarks, while at the other heasked questionsabout church financialreports. The presiding magistrate held thatattendance at these two meetings constitutedecontravention of Mdcosna's banning order.Sentence: Sentence was postponed for 3 years.This means that nosentence will be passedunless Mokosra is found guilty of a similaroffence during the next 3 years.(JohannesburgRegional Court, 09.12.80).Hlaku Kenneth Reohidi end Aubrey Mokoena.Game: The accused wars chargedwithcontravening their respective banning ordersby communicating with each other. The chargesarose from anincident an November 14, 19&0,when they were both arrested et Ibkosnn'a3oweto house.Charges were droppedagainst both accusedwhen they appeared in the JohannesburgMagistrates' Court (25.11.80).Judy Favish(29).Charge: The accused was alleged to havecontravened the teems of her banning orderby being at KirstenboschGardens, which fellsout of the area she is restricted to.Evidence before the court was that, onreceiving news that heruncle had died, Fevishwant to walk among the flowers et Kiratanbaach.She was arrested by police as she got outofher car.Verdict: Guilty. Fevish admitted a previousconviction for breaking her restriction order,when she left her areaof restriction to buyChinese take-away food.Sentence: 6 months imprisonment. conditionallysuspended for 3years.("erg Regional Court, 06.11.80).David Russell (40) - appeal.As reported in 1IP 12 (pegs 47), Rev DavidRussellwee sentenced to 4J years laprisorwient,31 years being conditionally suspended, forvarious contraventions of hisbanning order.The majority of the contraventions relatedto Russell's attendance of an AnglicanSynod meeting inGrahamstown.Russell appealed against the sentenceimposed, end this was partially successfulwhen all but 14 daysof the sentence wassuspended. He has maw served this sentence.(Cape Town Supreme Court, 05.12.80).FatimaMeer and Baptists Marie - appeal.As reported in wIP 9 (pegs 3) the appellants1n this wetter ware convicted ofcontraveningtheir banning orders by attending a socialgathering. They'wsrs each sentenced to 3monthsimprisonment, suspended for 3 years.They appealed against conviction, end inan important judgement the Natal.SupremeCourt upheld their appeal. In essence, thepresiding judges found that the terms of thebanning orderswere-too a6scure to have anylapel meaning. This related especially tothe notice of 'social gathering's' endtheprohibition on then in farms of banningorders.The attorney-ganerel of Natal has appliedfor, and been granted,leave to appeal againstthe ruling of the Natal Supreme Court.(Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, 11.11.80).ZubeidaJuby Meyet (43).(, e: The accused is alleged Vo have contravenedher banning order 6y attending a servicetocommemorate the banning of various blackconsciousness orpnnisations on October 19,1977. The seating whichYeyet allegedlyattended was held et the Jlswn Centre,Lerasia, on October 19, 1980.-(Jahanneebury Regional court,12.01.81).Lawrence Molethlegi Ntldcaa (22).Chorpe: The accused, at the time of hisrestriction the youngest person tobe banned inSouth Africa, is charged with contravening his'banning order by attending a commemoration service1nKegiac on October 19, 1980.

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3. With the exception of the UK, which had itslowest industrial production in the 4thquarter of 1974, all the OECDcountries had their .lowest industrial production within the first3 quarters of 1975.4. United Nations: 'Economic Surveyof Europein 1976', New York. Quoted in Mandel,1978:147.5. For a simple account of the development oftheEurodollar market, see Tow, 1977, chapter 136. 'National nonetary'nanagement has been mademore difficult mainlybecause of the increasedopportunities (and profitability) opened up byEurodollar dealing for arbitrage operations.Inthis way it has increased the internalconstraint on the use of monetary policy as aweapon for internal economicstabilisation...'Strange, 1976:186.7. Murray, 1980:76-77. In 1973, the GermanBundesbank calculated that changes inmethodsof payment by MNCs had been responsible for avery significant movement in the Balance ofPayments.8. Ofcourse, Central Hanks too can and havebeen involved in speculation.9. See in particular Nordhaus, W: 'TheFallingShare of Profit'. Brookings Papers onEconomic Activity No. 1, 1974. For the UK seeGlyn and Sutcliffe, 197 2,and The Economist,September 6, 1975. For references to studiesinter alia on Vest Germany, Italy and France,seeMandel, 1978:24-26.10. See Business Week for Quarterly tables onthe profitability of US corporations.11. In Marx'sanalysis the rate of profit ris given by the following formula:r = s/c+v.Dividing through by v,r = s /vc /v + 1. 'le the rateof profit varies proportionatelywith the rate of.exploitation and inversely withthe organic composition of capital.12. Theincrease in oil prices was not theprincipal cause of the onset of capitalistcrisis in the developed countries. Itdidcontribute to it, but the falling rate ofprofit, the root cause of the recession, wasalready evident well before 1973.Withsubstantial investments in energy projectswhich are only viable at a high price forenergy, many advancedcapitalist countries,and particularly the important 'energy',companies within them, are not likely to ,welcome a fall in oilprices.13. Mandel, 1978:88.14. Eg in the US real wages for workers tendedto fall.15. Eg the WT Grant company in theUS or theKoh,jin company in Japers.16. Also with the banks according credit veryliberally to their largercustomers.Castello 1980:116.17. Governmental support for 'lame ducks' resultsnot pre-eminently from 'politicalfactors',but from the fact that their survival is often asine qua 'non of maintaining an integrated nationaleconomy. Theloss of British Leyland, forexample, would have manifold effects upon allof British capital, increasing Britain's degreeofintegration into the world economy.18. Mandel, 1978:94.19. The power of organised labour !s ofteninvoked as afurther, if not principalfactor, causing inflation. With wage increaseslagging well behind price increases forseveralyears now in many of the advanced capitalistcountries, this explanation is hardly adequate.Demands for wageincreases are often defensive -a reaction to, rather than a cause of pricerises. However, the power of organisedlabourhas acted as a break on capital's power toreduce the level of real wages and so raise therate of profit via costcutting. Castello putsit this ray: 'Because markets are controlledlargely by monopoly capital, corporations areable toimpose the prices they want. Theincreasing cost of living triggers workers',demands for more wages at the level ofproduction.The rages obtained through struggle and bargain-ing will be added by monopoly capital to thepricescharged for commodities. This does notmean that workers' depends are the cause ofinflation, as capitalistpropaganda argues.What it does mean is that one of the causes ofinflation is that corporations find itincreasinglydifficult to raise their-profitsthrough direct exploitation and therefore raiseprices for the whole 'society in ordertopreserve their privileges'. Castello. 1980:64.20. ibid:62.22. In the 1974-75 recession, prices of rawmaterials tendedto decline and somoderated inflation.23. See Strange, 1976:186.24. 'The major factor causing the exceptionalrise ingold price has been the world demandfor_gold as a hedge against economic uncertaintyand, in particular, currencyweakness, with theprice of gold accelerating in terms of all major.currencies'. Chamber of Mines, PresidentialAddress,1979. At the same time, industrialdemand for gold has been price inelastic.25. Strange, 1976:67.26. ibid:69.27. Totalofficial dollar balances were $3-bin 1949, 010-b in 1960, and $51-b in 1971.28. This point was made as early as 1963,by theso-called Fairleigh-Dickinson study -Fatemi, NS, T de Saint Phalle and GM Keefe:The Dollar Crisis.Fairleigh-DickinsonUniversity Press, 1963. ,29. For an analysis of US monetary policy whichclearly examines this asan aspect of USimperialism, see Block, 1978.30. Economists associated with this strategy .include Kindelberger,Krause and Salant.31. This absorption is not 'complete' sincemuch of the dollars were required tofinance expansion inworld trade.32. There are some signs that this 'monetaryhegemony' may eventually be challenged by aEuropeancurrency, the European Monetary Unit.See Fitt, Fair and Vigier, 1980:poetscript topart 2.33. The distinction betweennational andinternational is not clear cut.34. Between 1884 Then significant gold productionin South Africa began until1932, with theexception of the years 1919-24 when gold earneda fluctuating premium, the money price of goldvasfixed. '35. One manifestation of this has been the massiverise of loans to the LDCs.

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INDEXSCHOOLS BOYCOTT IN KIMBERLEY pageCOURTS: Treason Trial pageTerrorism Act trials pageNamibianTerrorism trial pageContraventions of banningand house arrest orders page9.......... page 10Same Some.Transkeitrials page 10Appeal proc-.1ings page 1iInternal Security Act trials page 12Trials of general interest page 13HEALTHCARE FOR PROFIT page 16CHOLERA - A TROPICAL DISEASE? page 21CASH CROPPING IN KANGWANE .page 34LABOUR ACTION page 39INDUSTRIAL HEALTH page 58SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION -Acomment . ..... ...... page 63SUPPLEMENT: THE CURRENT 'UPSWING' INTHE SOUTHAFRICAN ECONOMY AND THEINTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS: ARE-INTERPRETATION OF SOUTHAFRICAN'DEVELOPMENT'.Sabotage trials ......This issue of Work In Progress edited andpublished by an editorialcollective of40 ,jorissenstreet, 2001 breemfontain,and printed by sacked, 54 simmonds street,2001 Johannesburg.Thenature of Work In Progress, which is tostimulate debate end present controversialviews on a wide range of subjects,ensuresthat the opinions expressed do not necessarilyreflect the views of the editorial collective.EDITORIALADDRESS:PO Sax X3174, .2143 YeovilleSOUTH AFRICA.Thanks to ell contributors for articlessubmitted, to Kevinfor assistants, end toPaul for cover.RATESRates in Southern AfricaIndividuals: 85,00 per 5 issues.Organisations:810,00 per 5 issues.Group distribution: 80c per copy.Reduced rotes end/or n certain number ofcomplimentary copiescan be arrangedon request.Rates elsewhere (second class airmail)Western Europe and United Kingdom:Individuals:820,00 per 5 issues.Orgenisntiona: 828,00 per 5 issues.USA and Canada:Individuals: 825,00 per 5issues.Organisations: 835,00 per 5 issues.Important. If payment is made 1n foreign (non-Rend)currency, please addbank charges.Surface mail rotes outside of SouthernAfrican available an request.Cheques end postal orders payabletoWork In Progress.n Rates outside of Southern Africa have beenincreased to cover costs ofincreasedpostage.EDITORIALIF THERE is one unifying theme running throughthis issue of Work In Progress, it is thefocuson health, medical care end their relationshipto the various classes in society. This themewas unplanned by theeditors, end the submissionof 3 articles dealing with the arse was largelyco-incidental.The contributions on health ellpoint tothe impossibility of restructuring healthcare without a democratic restructuring ofother relations in society.Neither thepaternalistic efforts of a ruling classdominated Health Department, nor theisolated programmes of'concerned' membersof the medical profession eon make much headwayin dealing with the two mayor areas ofpoorhealth: in the rural arses where thosemarginalised from capitalist production and`reproduction struggle for dailysurvival, endon the factory floor where the direct producers.of capitalist wealth are subject to a range ofhazardousconditions and situations. The 'state of health of all classes in society cannotbe reduced to a simple,_,Vdical question,butis directly raleted~fo access to political endeconomic power, and struggles to maintain oralter that access. Theimprovement of thequality of health la accordingly tied tochanges in the balance of power betweenclasses: struggleswar health intersectwith and relate to broader struggles insociety.The editors of WIP ere vary willing topublish furthermaterial around the 'healthdebate', but at the same time would like torefer interested readers to thq Critical Health

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SABOTAGE TRIALS.(General Law Amendment Act of 1962).Joseph Mevi, Philip Dlamini end GatsbyMazwai.Charge: The 3 accused, president and executivemembers of the Black Municipal Workers' Union(BMWU)were charged with Sabotage after theJohannesburg municipal strike. The chargesheet alleged that they had beeninvolved inthe disruption of 'essential services'through organisation of the strike. TheSabotage Act carries a minimumpenaltyof 5 years, end a maximum death sentence.The Sabotage Act charges have now beenwithdrawn by the state,and the accused nowface charges under the Riotous AssembliesAct - probably in connection with 'inciting'or'participating' in an illegal strike.The trial has been set down to begin onFebruary 16, 1981, in theJohannesburgRegional Court.A 16 year old youth.Charge:. Sabotage, attempted murder and arson.The accused, nwhite Pretoria school boy, wasinvolved in throwing a bomb into theBrooklyn Police Station on June 15, 1980.At histrial, he pleaded guilty to2 counts of attempted murder and one of arson.,The more serious sabotage charge wasdroppedby the state.In mitigation, the youth claimed that hisan:i-government~feelings had been developedby a historyteacher et his school.~erd:_c: 3ui_lty on 2 counts of attempted?under and one of arson.aSerte^ze: 5 lashes, and 5years imprisonment,=arditio~a::y suspended for 5 years.(Pretoria Regional Court, 30.09.80).SOME TRANSKEITRIALS.Thembile Megingxn (22).Charge: The accused faced charges framedunder the Transkei Security Act andtheTranskei Constitution Act. _ _The trial was held 3n camera, althoughpress were given access to a summarisedchargesheet, and certain other documents.The trial appears to have revolved aroundthe preparation end distributionof 3 sets ofpamphlets which, according to the presidingmagistrate, expressed hatred of the Transkeiregime.Accordingto the charge sheet, one of thesets of pamphlets implied that President KaiserMatenzime,Prima Minister GeorgeMntenzime, andpolice chief Martin Ngcebe were stooges ofthe South African government.Verdict: Guilty of two countsunder theTranskei Security Act, end one under the .Transkei Constitution Act.Sentence: 5 years imprisonment, 2yearsconditionally suspended.(Umtata Regional Court, 08.10.80).William Neleni and Handsome Mngingxe(21).Charge: Transkei Public Security Act andTranskei Constitution Act.Nelani is former chief counsellor todeposedParamount Chief Sebeta Dalindyebo,who has fled the Transkei bantusten andjoined the ANC.Verdict: Guilty ascharged.Sentence: 7I years imprisonment each.(Umtata Supreme Court, 06.11.80).2 youths, end Leslie Gums(20).Charge: Arson. The accused allegedly burntdown 5 classrooms et the Nyange High Schoolnear Engcobo. Gumndied before the trial began,as a result of wounds received in a shootingincident after the burning of theclassrooms.Verdict: Guilty.Sentence: 8 lashes each.(Umtata Regional Court, 15.09.80).Florence Mnncotywa(4B).Charge: 3 counts under the Transkei PublicSecurity Act. As reported in WIP 14 (page 42),the accused waspublicity secretary of theopposition Democratic Progressive Party in theTranskei region; she was alsoparliamentaryrepresentative of Paramount Chief SebnteDelindyebo prior to his flight from theTranskei.During 1979she was detained by TranskeiSecurity Police when hundreds of &abetesupporters gathered in front of theTranskeiSupreme Court to demand the release of thethen-detained Sebete. After 119 days indetention she waseventually charged. InAugust 1980 she appeared in court for thesixth tine, where the prosecutor againrequested apostponement of the trial.During August 1980 she was reported tohave fled from the Transkei, end wassubsequentlyconfirmed to be in Lesotho.In an interview she explained thatI was tired. I have been in and out ofnil for my politicalconvictions. Iwas in from 1976 to 1977 for sevenmonths, 1978 to 1979 for another fivemonths. And I knew I would bearrestedagain when news of a planned coup broke.Mencotywn, like Dnlindyebo, places herselfin the camp of theANC. 'I am fightingapartheid' she says, 'end I cannot fightalone. And I em a democrat. I can't say wewent South Africapurely for blacks'.

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SABOTAGE TRIALS.(General Law Amendment Act of 1962).Joseph Mevi, Philip Dlamini end GatsbyMazwai.Charge: The 3 accused, president and executivemembers of the Black Municipal Workers' Union(BMWU)were charged with Sabotage after theJohannesburg municipal strike. The chargesheet alleged that they had beeninvolved inthe disruption of 'essential services'through organisation of the strike. TheSabotage Act carries a minimumpenaltyof 5 years, end a maximum death sentence.The Sabotage Act charges have now beenwithdrawn by the state,and the accused nowface charges under the Riotous AssembliesAct - probably in connection with 'inciting'or'participating' in an illegal strike.The trial has been set down to begin onFebruary 16, 1981, in theJohannesburgRegional Court.A 16 year old youth.Charge:. Sabotage, attempted murder and arson.The accused, nwhite Pretoria school boy, wasinvolved in throwing a bomb into theBrooklyn Police Station on June 15, 1980.At histrial, he pleaded guilty to2 counts of attempted murder and one of arson.,The more serious sabotage charge wasdroppedby the state.In mitigation, the youth claimed that hisan:i-government~feelings had been developedby a historyteacher et his school.~erd:_c: 3ui_lty on 2 counts of attempted?under and one of arson.aSerte^ze: 5 lashes, and 5years imprisonment,=arditio~a::y suspended for 5 years.(Pretoria Regional Court, 30.09.80).SOME TRANSKEITRIALS.Thembile Megingxn (22).Charge: The accused faced charges framedunder the Transkei Security Act andtheTranskei Constitution Act. _ _The trial was held 3n camera, althoughpress were given access to a summarisedchargesheet, and certain other documents.The trial appears to have revolved aroundthe preparation end distributionof 3 sets ofpamphlets which, according to the presidingmagistrate, expressed hatred of the Transkeiregime.Accordingto the charge sheet, one of thesets of pamphlets implied that President KaiserMatenzime,Prima Minister GeorgeMntenzime, andpolice chief Martin Ngcebe were stooges ofthe South African government.Verdict: Guilty of two countsunder theTranskei Security Act, end one under the .Transkei Constitution Act.Sentence: 5 years imprisonment, 2yearsconditionally suspended.(Umtata Regional Court, 08.10.80).William Neleni and Handsome Mngingxe(21).Charge: Transkei Public Security Act andTranskei Constitution Act.Nelani is former chief counsellor todeposedParamount Chief Sebeta Dalindyebo,who has fled the Transkei bantusten andjoined the ANC.Verdict: Guilty ascharged.Sentence: 7I years imprisonment each.(Umtata Supreme Court, 06.11.80).2 youths, end Leslie Gums(20).Charge: Arson. The accused allegedly burntdown 5 classrooms et the Nyange High Schoolnear Engcobo. Gumndied before the trial began,as a result of wounds received in a shootingincident after the burning of theclassrooms.Verdict: Guilty.Sentence: 8 lashes each.(Umtata Regional Court, 15.09.80).Florence Mnncotywa(4B).Charge: 3 counts under the Transkei PublicSecurity Act. As reported in WIP 14 (page 42),the accused waspublicity secretary of theopposition Democratic Progressive Party in theTranskei region; she was alsoparliamentaryrepresentative of Paramount Chief SebnteDelindyebo prior to his flight from theTranskei.During 1979she was detained by TranskeiSecurity Police when hundreds of &abetesupporters gathered in front of theTranskeiSupreme Court to demand the release of thethen-detained Sebete. After 119 days indetention she waseventually charged. InAugust 1980 she appeared in court for thesixth tine, where the prosecutor againrequested apostponement of the trial.During August 1980 she was reported tohave fled from the Transkei, end wassubsequentlyconfirmed to be in Lesotho.In an interview she explained thatI was tired. I have been in and out ofnil for my politicalconvictions. Iwas in from 1976 to 1977 for sevenmonths, 1978 to 1979 for another fivemonths. And I knew I would bearrestedagain when news of a planned coup broke.Mencotywn, like Dnlindyebo, places herselfin the camp of theANC. 'I am fightingapartheid' she says, 'end I cannot fightalone. And I em a democrat. I can't say wewent South Africapurely for blacks'.

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36. Especially in respect of changing interestrates, which affect the opportunity cost ofholding gold in the form ofinterest paymentsforegone.37. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,September 1980:6.38. For the sameperiod, the US decline was 7,3%,the UK 6,4% and West Germany 1,5%. BarclaysBank: Business Brief. September1980:7.39. ibid:2.40. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis:'The Gold Price Bonanza', No. 25, March 1980.41.Chamber of Mines. Annual Report, 1978:8.42. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2,March 25,1980:4.43.Chamber of Mines: Newsletter. Vol 3, no 6,September 22, 1980:3.44. Bureau for Economic Policy andAnalysis(BEPA), op cit.45. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7,page 1.46. BEPA op cit.47. Chamber of Mines.Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7,page 5.48. Chamber of Mines. March Report, 1979:1.49. Standard,Henk Reviei, September,1980;4.50. BEPA op cit.51. SARH, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1980:table 9.1.52. 'The sustained current accountsurplus .during a period of cyclical upswing did notconform to the historical cyclical pattern,according to whichsurpluses emerge during theadvanced stages of cyclical downturns and disappearrelatively early during thesubsequent upswings...The progressively larger surpluses up to thefirst quarter of 1980 were predominantly theresultof an'exceptionally strong rise in theprice of gold'. South African Reserve Hank:Annual Economic Report, 1980:19.53.'When gold is excluded, the balance oncurrent account has deteriorated significantlysince early 1979'. Standard Hank:Review.September 1980:2.54. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2,page 4.55. ibid. Vol 3, no 6, page 3.56.South African Reserve Hank. QuarterlyBulletin. September 1980: table 5.32.57. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3,no 7,page 1.58. ibid.59. For which the decisive precondition was thedefeat of the corking class in thepoet-carperiod.60. Standard Bank Review, September 1980:4.61. Stets, September 1980:141. Figures derivedfromSEIFSA: Survey of Now Capital Investmentin the Metal and Engineering Industries in 1979and Protections for1980.62. ?he Chamber nor estimates that gold productionrill be steady at approx. 700 tone per annumuntil 1987. Itwill then decline to 350 tone bythe end of the century. But this is based ongold prices which are fairlyconservative.Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 1,1980:2.63. Reyndera Commission (RC): 15.64. '...even amaximum exploitation of SouthAfrica's mineral wealth will not adequatelyprovide in (sic) the foreign exchange needsofthe country, so that the extent of manufacturedgoods will have to be increased as rapidly aspossible'. RC:19.65.Clarks, S. Capital, Fractions of Capital andthe State: Neo-Marxist Analysis of the SouthAfrican State. Capital andClass, Summer 1978:69. (SC). In the accompanying footnote, Clarksquotes Reyndera with unreserved appruval.66.eg see RC:246.67. SC:70.68. ibid.69. ibid:71.70. Further points could be made about Clarke'spolitical conclusions anda reductionism 1nrespect of the class struggle.71. RC:273.72. ibid.73. ibid.74. eg see Davies. R, Kaplan, D, O'Meara.Dand Morris, M: Class Struggle and thePeriodiantion of the State in South Africa.RAPE no 7, 1977.75. Absence ofthis distinction, I believe,leads Clarks to ultimately ignore imperialismaltogether - both hi6torically.and inthecontemporary period.76. RC: 232.77. RC: 219.78. RC:610.79. RC:611.80. RC:609. is it affects not only thepropensityto export, but also raises their propensityto import.81. Murray, 1980:chapter 2.82. ibid. A related party isone in which a firehas anything above 5% shareholding.83. Thus, the 'foreign connection' is just asvital in theexplanation of the high importpropensity of the manufacturing sector (somethingthat Clarks, and to a lesser extent theReynderaCommission simply accept as.intrinaic) as anexplanation of its for export propensity.84. Particularly with therise of Anglo-American~to dominance.85. For reference to low import propensitysee footnote 47.86. eg see Chamberof Mines: Annual Report, 1979:13.87. See RC here, chapter 14.88, eg N Poulantzas.89. As has moat clearlyhappened in the caseof Brazil.90. But 'development' should be understood not

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10 students of the St Johns College, Umteta.Charge: Holding unlawful meetings incontravention of the Transkei'semergencyregulations.Verdict: Not guilty.(Umtata Regional Court, 30.09.60).Patrick Dnlindyebo (21) end TheaphilusVa (24).Charge: The accused faced charges under theTranskei Constitution Act end the TranskeiPublic Safety Act.onlindyabo !s a son ofparamount chief Sebata Onlindyebo.The charges related to the distributionof pamphlets inUmtata end Engcobo during 1979.The pamphlets, which related to the detentionof Sebeta oslindyebo, called for aboycott ofschools, and referred to Prealdent KaiserN,etenzimeas a 'poisonous ... serpent'.Verdict: Guilty of injuring thedignity ofthe Transkei state president.Sentence: R3D0 or 12 months imprisonment, halfof which was conditionallysuspended forthree years.(uetnte Regional court, 23.09.90).APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.Jeremiah Kgdconp lisjatlad!(23), Them!Gerald 1lcwenezl (36), Ronald EphraimYewoepa (16), Lebapanp Christy Mdcone (18),Petrua Karol8enabe (22), Andrew MwtiPhale (16), Deacon Sikibela Moths (22),Cornelius Ilphet! Lasuw (18), end a 18 yearoldyouth.As reported !n 1IP 12 (pp 413), theappellants were convicted under the TerrorismAct and sentenced to ? yearsimprisonment(Vnjatladi and Vkwenez!),end 5 years (theremaining 7 attuned). In the trial proceedings,the presidingmagistrate found that Yejetlediand likwnnez! conspired to waist others toleave the country for military training;theother accused were found guilty of either,recruiting far military training, or preparingto undergo trainingthemselves.The appellants argued thirstthe sole and only interest of Mcnnzi!n the other men accused with him wastowrite a story about them in Postnewspaper and also to further hlacareer as a journalist.Ikwazan! claimed that !t wasnot his intentionto assist others to leave the country formilitary training.The other accused appealed on thegroundsthatThe court should have found that theversion of the accused that they wantedtheir photographs taken sothat thesecould be publicised in the newspapersin.the event of their being detainedwas reasonable end possiblytrue.The state, an the other bend, arguedthat the photographs were taken so that theycould be published after themen bed left thecountry for military training.The appeal was successful !n respect ofonly one accused, namelyDeacon Moths, whohas now been released from Robbers Island wherehe wee serving his sentence.(PretoriaSupreme Court, 28.10.80).2welakhe Siaulu, banned president of GIwA6A.As reported in wIP 10 (pegs 4B), 9leuluwassummonsed before a magistrate to make estatement regarding a telephone conversationhe had with ThamiVcwennzi, who was et thattime in security polies detention. (Vcwernziwee subsequently charged end convictedunderthe Terrorism Act, end santpnced to 7 yearsimprisonment. For details of his appeal, aes-above).Sisulu refusedto answer questions putto him, end was sentenced to 9 monthsimprisonment.He appealed against this, end inthePretoria Supreme Court it was ruled that theinvestigating magistrate had not fullyprobed Sleulu's claim that heshould not haveto answer questions as they might incriminatehim. The matter was referred beck tothemagistrate.After re-hearing the matter, the magistrateruled that Sisulu need not answer questions,and cancelledthe subpoena.(Pretoria Magistrates' Court, 14.17.80).Godfrey Khumalo.The appellant in this matter was found guiltyof3 counts of Terrorism, conspiracy to commitmurder, end conspiracy to.commit malicious ,injury to property. He weesentenced to20 years imprisonment.Khumelo applied to the trial judge forleave to appeal, end although theapplicationwee late, leave to appeal against convictionend sentence on all counts was granted.(Pietermaritzburgsupreme Court, 13.11.80).Vuaenz! Vconpo (19), Mncedis! Siswnne (22);Tensenqs Klass (22), Khuelelele Nnikinn(29)and FezSle Uvula (20).As reported in wIP s (pages 4-5), the 5appellants listed above ere currentlyservingsentences on RaDben Island. During1979 they wars charged end convicted ofpublic violence; the charges arose outof anincident !n Robbers Island prison where certainprisoners allegedly attacked prison officials.The 5 appellants wareconvicted in etrial held on Robbers Island, end sentarxedto further terms of imprisonment rangingfrom 4J to 21years.They appealed against sentence end

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10 students of the St Johns College, Umteta.Charge: Holding unlawful meetings incontravention of the Transkei'semergencyregulations.Verdict: Not guilty.(Umtata Regional Court, 30.09.60).Patrick Dnlindyebo (21) end TheaphilusVa (24).Charge: The accused faced charges under theTranskei Constitution Act end the TranskeiPublic Safety Act.onlindyabo !s a son ofparamount chief Sebata Onlindyebo.The charges related to the distributionof pamphlets inUmtata end Engcobo during 1979.The pamphlets, which related to the detentionof Sebeta oslindyebo, called for aboycott ofschools, and referred to Prealdent KaiserN,etenzimeas a 'poisonous ... serpent'.Verdict: Guilty of injuring thedignity ofthe Transkei state president.Sentence: R3D0 or 12 months imprisonment, halfof which was conditionallysuspended forthree years.(uetnte Regional court, 23.09.90).APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.Jeremiah Kgdconp lisjatlad!(23), Them!Gerald 1lcwenezl (36), Ronald EphraimYewoepa (16), Lebapanp Christy Mdcone (18),Petrua Karol8enabe (22), Andrew MwtiPhale (16), Deacon Sikibela Moths (22),Cornelius Ilphet! Lasuw (18), end a 18 yearoldyouth.As reported !n 1IP 12 (pp 413), theappellants were convicted under the TerrorismAct and sentenced to ? yearsimprisonment(Vnjatladi and Vkwenez!),end 5 years (theremaining 7 attuned). In the trial proceedings,the presidingmagistrate found that Yejetlediand likwnnez! conspired to waist others toleave the country for military training;theother accused were found guilty of either,recruiting far military training, or preparingto undergo trainingthemselves.The appellants argued thirstthe sole and only interest of Mcnnzi!n the other men accused with him wastowrite a story about them in Postnewspaper and also to further hlacareer as a journalist.Ikwazan! claimed that !t wasnot his intentionto assist others to leave the country formilitary training.The other accused appealed on thegroundsthatThe court should have found that theversion of the accused that they wantedtheir photographs taken sothat thesecould be publicised in the newspapersin.the event of their being detainedwas reasonable end possiblytrue.The state, an the other bend, arguedthat the photographs were taken so that theycould be published after themen bed left thecountry for military training.The appeal was successful !n respect ofonly one accused, namelyDeacon Moths, whohas now been released from Robbers Island wherehe wee serving his sentence.(PretoriaSupreme Court, 28.10.80).2welakhe Siaulu, banned president of GIwA6A.As reported in wIP 10 (pegs 4B), 9leuluwassummonsed before a magistrate to make estatement regarding a telephone conversationhe had with ThamiVcwennzi, who was et thattime in security polies detention. (Vcwernziwee subsequently charged end convictedunderthe Terrorism Act, end santpnced to 7 yearsimprisonment. For details of his appeal, aes-above).Sisulu refusedto answer questions putto him, end was sentenced to 9 monthsimprisonment.He appealed against this, end inthePretoria Supreme Court it was ruled that theinvestigating magistrate had not fullyprobed Sleulu's claim that heshould not haveto answer questions as they might incriminatehim. The matter was referred beck tothemagistrate.After re-hearing the matter, the magistrateruled that Sisulu need not answer questions,and cancelledthe subpoena.(Pretoria Magistrates' Court, 14.17.80).Godfrey Khumalo.The appellant in this matter was found guiltyof3 counts of Terrorism, conspiracy to commitmurder, end conspiracy to.commit malicious ,injury to property. He weesentenced to20 years imprisonment.Khumelo applied to the trial judge forleave to appeal, end although theapplicationwee late, leave to appeal against convictionend sentence on all counts was granted.(Pietermaritzburgsupreme Court, 13.11.80).Vuaenz! Vconpo (19), Mncedis! Siswnne (22);Tensenqs Klass (22), Khuelelele Nnikinn(29)and FezSle Uvula (20).As reported in wIP s (pages 4-5), the 5appellants listed above ere currentlyservingsentences on RaDben Island. During1979 they wars charged end convicted ofpublic violence; the charges arose outof anincident !n Robbers Island prison where certainprisoners allegedly attacked prison officials.The 5 appellants wareconvicted in etrial held on Robbers Island, end sentarxedto further terms of imprisonment rangingfrom 4J to 21years.They appealed against sentence end

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as-development for all, but as capitalistdevelopment. For example, even with the currentupswing. employment isgrwing at less than halfof the rate of population increase. Sanlam_Sconoaic Survey, quoted in the FinancialMail,31.10.80:505.BIBLIOGRAPHY.(These references are to works not cited infull in the footnotes).Bloc, FL - TheOrigins of the InternationalDisorder: a study of US internationalmonetary policy from WW II to thepresent (Universityof CaliforniaPress).'Ca stells, M - The Economic Crisis and American1980 Society (Princeton University Press).Fitt, Y,A Fair and J-P Vigier - The World1980 Economic Crisis: US imperialism atby (Zed Press).Glyn. A and B Sutcliffe-British Capitalise,1972 Yorkers and the Profit SqueezePenguin).Mandel, E - The Second Slump (NLB).1978Murray,R - Transfer Pricing, Multinationals and1980 the State (unpublished manuscript,publication forthcoming).Report of theCommission of Inquiry into theExport Trade of the Republic of SouthAfrica (2 vols, RP 69/72; theReyndersCommission).Strange. S - International Monetary Relations1976 (in a series, Shonfield, A (ed) -InternationalEconomic Relations ofthe Western World, 1955-71)1977Ter, H - The Evolution of the International1977 MonetarySystem (Hutchinson).

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conviction, and in the Cape Town Supremecourt it was found that the trial magistratehad misdirected himself incertain respects.Conviction and sentence were accordinglyset aside.s Town Supreme Court, 20.10.80).FrederickPhillips (27) and Roger Schroeder (27).As reported in wIP 12 (pages 44-45) the twoappellants were charged withTerrorism, butfound guilty on an alternative count ofarson, and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.The chargesrelated to the setting fire to a-hall in which a member of the ColouredRepresentative Council (CRC) was duetodiscuss Constitutional proposals.An appeal against conviction was noted,and this wee upheld. Conviction endsentencewere accordingly set aside.(Cape Town Supssiws Court, 27.10.80).Churchill Luvono (22).Appellant in thismatter wee chargedand convicted of Terrorism and perjuryduring 1979. He had given evidence for thedefence in theBethal PAC trial (S va Mothopengand 17 others), and was immediately arrestedand charged with perjury.Subsequently hewas detained, and eventually charged withTerrorism. The state claimed that he leftSouth Africa andunderwent PAC directedmilitary training in Swaziland. On hisreturn to South Africa, it was alleged thathe establishedan organisation called'Triangle Battle Organisation' which was a .PAC call.Luvono appealed against conviction,andwas successful an the Terrorism Act charge(but not the perjury count). He has accordinglybeen released fromRobben Island where he weeserving his sentence.INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS.wimpie de Klerlc, in hiscapacity as editor ofDie Txensvnler.Charge: Die Trnnsvaler published an article inwhich Thebo Itbaki, a listed person(and evice chairman of the ANC) wee extensivelyquoted. The article in question appearedan the front page of thenewapeper'a..,edition an June 21, 1960. The state thencharged that by doing this, the provisions ofthe InternalSecurity Act ware being contravened.Before the case ease to court, do Klerkpaid an admission-of-guilt fine ofR75.Guy Berger (24) and Devendire Plllny (21).Charge: After being held in detention undersection 6 of the Terrorismget for between 3end 5 months, Bar-gar and Pillory appeared incourt with Yendle Gxnnyann (26) towards theend ofNovember 1980. The charge sheet suppliedby the state deals only with Berger err! Pillory,and 1t is assumedthet.Gxenyane will be triadseparately.Berger feces 4 counts freawd under theInternal Security Act, while Pilley ischargedwith 3 Internal Security counts. In additionto those charges, both accused face a further 3counts relating tothe distribution end possessionof banned publications.The first Internal Security Act chargealleges that both accusedbecame members ofthe banned African National Congress.The second Internal Security Act chargealleges that theaccused participated in ANCactivities through the carrying out of enumber of acts. The acts allegedly performedbyBerger in this regard are listed as followsby the stets:1. During January 1975 he arranged with LynnDanzig to be acourier between himself and 2senior ANC members in Botswana, namely PeterRicher erid,,Leuren Vlotmen. A secretcodewas arranged iilaereby Berger could relay informationto Richer end V1_otm_en.2. During 1978 end 1979 Borgercontacted certainofficials of the Federation of South AfricanTrade Unions (FOBATU) in the Eastern Ceps,endobtained information from than about FOSATU andblade trade union activity in the Eastern Ceps..Berger hadbeen asked to obtain this informationby Richer, who was a member of the ANC's InternalReconstruction endDevelopment CommitteeThe information supplied was to be used by theIRDC to bring FO&ATU or individual tradeunionsinto the sphere of influence of BACTU (theSouth African Congress of Trades Unions),.alternatively to discreditFOBATU as 1possible competition to &ACTU in trade union 'activities in South Africa.3. On a number of occasionsduring 1978 end 1979-Berger visited Richer in Botswana, to supply hiswith information, and with the names ofpeoplewhom Richer could attempt to recruit for ANCactivity.4. During June 1979 he rode Christopher wattsraendRobin Ross to Botswana to mast Richer endother ANC members.5. During 1978 ha arranged for a hiding placeforhimself et the hags of Solve Skorge, whereif necessary he could hide to avoid arrest ordetention. If this hiding placewas used, ecoded message would be sent to Richer who wouldorganise Berger's escape.6. Hs organised end weeinvolved in a aeries ofdiscussion groups whets he attempted to influenceparticipants to accept the principles andpoliciesof the ANC, and to became members, supporters orsympathisers of the ANC.

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conviction, and in the Cape Town Supremecourt it was found that the trial magistratehad misdirected himself incertain respects.Conviction and sentence were accordinglyset aside.s Town Supreme Court, 20.10.80).FrederickPhillips (27) and Roger Schroeder (27).As reported in wIP 12 (pages 44-45) the twoappellants were charged withTerrorism, butfound guilty on an alternative count ofarson, and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.The chargesrelated to the setting fire to a-hall in which a member of the ColouredRepresentative Council (CRC) was duetodiscuss Constitutional proposals.An appeal against conviction was noted,and this wee upheld. Conviction endsentencewere accordingly set aside.(Cape Town Supssiws Court, 27.10.80).Churchill Luvono (22).Appellant in thismatter wee chargedand convicted of Terrorism and perjuryduring 1979. He had given evidence for thedefence in theBethal PAC trial (S va Mothopengand 17 others), and was immediately arrestedand charged with perjury.Subsequently hewas detained, and eventually charged withTerrorism. The state claimed that he leftSouth Africa andunderwent PAC directedmilitary training in Swaziland. On hisreturn to South Africa, it was alleged thathe establishedan organisation called'Triangle Battle Organisation' which was a .PAC call.Luvono appealed against conviction,andwas successful an the Terrorism Act charge(but not the perjury count). He has accordinglybeen released fromRobben Island where he weeserving his sentence.INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS.wimpie de Klerlc, in hiscapacity as editor ofDie Txensvnler.Charge: Die Trnnsvaler published an article inwhich Thebo Itbaki, a listed person(and evice chairman of the ANC) wee extensivelyquoted. The article in question appearedan the front page of thenewapeper'a..,edition an June 21, 1960. The state thencharged that by doing this, the provisions ofthe InternalSecurity Act ware being contravened.Before the case ease to court, do Klerkpaid an admission-of-guilt fine ofR75.Guy Berger (24) and Devendire Plllny (21).Charge: After being held in detention undersection 6 of the Terrorismget for between 3end 5 months, Bar-gar and Pillory appeared incourt with Yendle Gxnnyann (26) towards theend ofNovember 1980. The charge sheet suppliedby the state deals only with Berger err! Pillory,and 1t is assumedthet.Gxenyane will be triadseparately.Berger feces 4 counts freawd under theInternal Security Act, while Pilley ischargedwith 3 Internal Security counts. In additionto those charges, both accused face a further 3counts relating tothe distribution end possessionof banned publications.The first Internal Security Act chargealleges that both accusedbecame members ofthe banned African National Congress.The second Internal Security Act chargealleges that theaccused participated in ANCactivities through the carrying out of enumber of acts. The acts allegedly performedbyBerger in this regard are listed as followsby the stets:1. During January 1975 he arranged with LynnDanzig to be acourier between himself and 2senior ANC members in Botswana, namely PeterRicher erid,,Leuren Vlotmen. A secretcodewas arranged iilaereby Berger could relay informationto Richer end V1_otm_en.2. During 1978 end 1979 Borgercontacted certainofficials of the Federation of South AfricanTrade Unions (FOBATU) in the Eastern Ceps,endobtained information from than about FOSATU andblade trade union activity in the Eastern Ceps..Berger hadbeen asked to obtain this informationby Richer, who was a member of the ANC's InternalReconstruction endDevelopment CommitteeThe information supplied was to be used by theIRDC to bring FO&ATU or individual tradeunionsinto the sphere of influence of BACTU (theSouth African Congress of Trades Unions),.alternatively to discreditFOBATU as 1possible competition to &ACTU in trade union 'activities in South Africa.3. On a number of occasionsduring 1978 end 1979-Berger visited Richer in Botswana, to supply hiswith information, and with the names ofpeoplewhom Richer could attempt to recruit for ANCactivity.4. During June 1979 he rode Christopher wattsraendRobin Ross to Botswana to mast Richer endother ANC members.5. During 1978 ha arranged for a hiding placeforhimself et the hags of Solve Skorge, whereif necessary he could hide to avoid arrest ordetention. If this hiding placewas used, ecoded message would be sent to Richer who wouldorganise Berger's escape.6. Hs organised end weeinvolved in a aeries ofdiscussion groups whets he attempted to influenceparticipants to accept the principles andpoliciesof the ANC, and to became members, supporters orsympathisers of the ANC.

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7. During 1979 he requested Christopher Watters,(like Kenyon and Devon Pillay (accused number 2)to set updiscussion groups in East London toinfluence the participants to become members,supporters or sympathisers of theANC.B. Barger made available to various people certaindocuments and material to influence them tobecomemembers, supporters or sympathisers ofthe ANC. The materiel included photocopies from'ANC Speaks', Sechabe,Ilayibuye, 'The story ofSimon end Jane', end n tape recorded New Yearmessage from Oliver Tembo.The actsallegedly performed by Pilley interms of this charge are listed as follows:1. Between 1979 end 1980 he recruited anumberof people to constitute a discussion group, theaim of which was to influence the members tobecomesupporters, sympethisers or members ofthe ANC.2. During 1979 and 1980 he introduced KarthigesanSingerham (alsoknown as Lingham or Raj) to enumber of people in East London with the intentionof influencing those people tobecome members,supporters or sympathisers of the ANC. Singerhemis an active member of the ANC usuallyresidentoutside of South Africa.3. During 1980 he arranged a secret code withSingerhem whereby information on theANC and itsactivities could be relayed from the UK toEast London. He further arranged with (likeKenyon to takereceipt of these coded messagesand pass them on:to him, or to.decode them if heEPilley) was not in a position totake receiptof the messages.4. Pillny made available to various people booksand other materiel with the intention of.influencing them to accept the ANC policy,. andbecame active supporters, sympathisers or:members of theorganisation. This materielincluded writings of Lenin, African Communist,extracts from Ileyibuye, the ANCconstitution,Secheba, the New Year message of Oliver Tambo,and other materiel..In this count, it is also alleged thatBorgerend Pilley initiated end conducted a discussiongroup of a number of people in Grahamstown, againwith the aimof influencing them in favour ofthe ANC.The third count under the Internal SecurityAct relates to furthering the objectsofcommunism, as defined in the Act. To this endthe accused are alleged to have set up variousdiscussion groupswhich propagated the doctrinesof communism, and attempted to influence thosepresent to accept the principles anddoctrinesof communism. To this end, they are also allegedto have distributed certain books and materialamongstmembers of the discussion grates, includingSechnba, the ANC constitution and the TembaNow Year messagereferred to above.Counts 4, 5 and 6 are ell framed under thePublications Act, end relate to the distributionand/orpossession of certain material declaredundesirable by the Publications Committees.The final charge, under theInternal SecurityAct, is against Barger only. It is claimed thatduring 1978 and 1979 he wrongfully endunlawfullyobtained information about FOSATU end other blacktrade union activity in the Eastern Cape fromFrederickSouls, Daniel Cornelius Leon end VeeFodc Aschene. It is further alleged that thisinformation could be of use infurthering theachievement of any of the aims of the ANC.People who appear to have been detainedin connection withthis trial, and who are stillin detention, are Chris Vntters, (like Kenyon,Alan Zinn, and Lynn Danzig.The trial is due tobegin on February 16,1981; probably in the Port Elizabeth RegionalCourt.Themba Shongwe (26), Norman Vonyepote(39),Vuyisile Mdleleni (28), PatrickGeboetloeloe (49), Sipho Nhlepo (18), endJohn' 1lotenn (24).Charge; The accusedface a -number of countsalleging that they furthered the aims of theANC or PAC, and ere members of thoseorganisations.Allegations of assaults on the accused whilein security police custody are prising in thetrial, anddefence counsel George Bizoo hasalleged that police and state were blockingthe defence in the trial. The state-failedtomake available to the defence statements allegedlymade by the accused while fn detention, whilepolice had notmade available various documentsdespite subpoenas being served on them.After initially ruling that the defencewerenot entitled to relevant statements, the presidingmagistrate altered this ruling, and policesubsequently madeavailable to the defencecertain documentation.(Johannesburg Regional Court).TRIALS OF GENERALINTEREST.Simon IAehlelehlela (21), Irvin Bakwn (21)end Brian Bdcwn (19).Charge: The accused were charged withpublicviolence and arson, in that they allegedlyattacked n house belonging to a black policeconstable in BochebeleTownship on May 14, 1980.Verdict: Guilty.Sentence: 3 years imprisonment each.(Bloemfontein Regional,Court,22.10.80).Vusumzi Speelmen (18).Charge: The accused was one of over 30 peoplewho appeared in court duringOctober 1980 inconnection with the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhageschools boycott. He was charged under the

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7. During 1979 he requested Christopher Watters,(like Kenyon and Devon Pillay (accused number 2)to set updiscussion groups in East London toinfluence the participants to become members,supporters or sympathisers of theANC.B. Barger made available to various people certaindocuments and material to influence them tobecomemembers, supporters or sympathisers ofthe ANC. The materiel included photocopies from'ANC Speaks', Sechabe,Ilayibuye, 'The story ofSimon end Jane', end n tape recorded New Yearmessage from Oliver Tembo.The actsallegedly performed by Pilley interms of this charge are listed as follows:1. Between 1979 end 1980 he recruited anumberof people to constitute a discussion group, theaim of which was to influence the members tobecomesupporters, sympethisers or members ofthe ANC.2. During 1979 and 1980 he introduced KarthigesanSingerham (alsoknown as Lingham or Raj) to enumber of people in East London with the intentionof influencing those people tobecome members,supporters or sympathisers of the ANC. Singerhemis an active member of the ANC usuallyresidentoutside of South Africa.3. During 1980 he arranged a secret code withSingerhem whereby information on theANC and itsactivities could be relayed from the UK toEast London. He further arranged with (likeKenyon to takereceipt of these coded messagesand pass them on:to him, or to.decode them if heEPilley) was not in a position totake receiptof the messages.4. Pillny made available to various people booksand other materiel with the intention of.influencing them to accept the ANC policy,. andbecame active supporters, sympathisers or:members of theorganisation. This materielincluded writings of Lenin, African Communist,extracts from Ileyibuye, the ANCconstitution,Secheba, the New Year message of Oliver Tambo,and other materiel..In this count, it is also alleged thatBorgerend Pilley initiated end conducted a discussiongroup of a number of people in Grahamstown, againwith the aimof influencing them in favour ofthe ANC.The third count under the Internal SecurityAct relates to furthering the objectsofcommunism, as defined in the Act. To this endthe accused are alleged to have set up variousdiscussion groupswhich propagated the doctrinesof communism, and attempted to influence thosepresent to accept the principles anddoctrinesof communism. To this end, they are also allegedto have distributed certain books and materialamongstmembers of the discussion grates, includingSechnba, the ANC constitution and the TembaNow Year messagereferred to above.Counts 4, 5 and 6 are ell framed under thePublications Act, end relate to the distributionand/orpossession of certain material declaredundesirable by the Publications Committees.The final charge, under theInternal SecurityAct, is against Barger only. It is claimed thatduring 1978 and 1979 he wrongfully endunlawfullyobtained information about FOSATU end other blacktrade union activity in the Eastern Cape fromFrederickSouls, Daniel Cornelius Leon end VeeFodc Aschene. It is further alleged that thisinformation could be of use infurthering theachievement of any of the aims of the ANC.People who appear to have been detainedin connection withthis trial, and who are stillin detention, are Chris Vntters, (like Kenyon,Alan Zinn, and Lynn Danzig.The trial is due tobegin on February 16,1981; probably in the Port Elizabeth RegionalCourt.Themba Shongwe (26), Norman Vonyepote(39),Vuyisile Mdleleni (28), PatrickGeboetloeloe (49), Sipho Nhlepo (18), endJohn' 1lotenn (24).Charge; The accusedface a -number of countsalleging that they furthered the aims of theANC or PAC, and ere members of thoseorganisations.Allegations of assaults on the accused whilein security police custody are prising in thetrial, anddefence counsel George Bizoo hasalleged that police and state were blockingthe defence in the trial. The state-failedtomake available to the defence statements allegedlymade by the accused while fn detention, whilepolice had notmade available various documentsdespite subpoenas being served on them.After initially ruling that the defencewerenot entitled to relevant statements, the presidingmagistrate altered this ruling, and policesubsequently madeavailable to the defencecertain documentation.(Johannesburg Regional Court).TRIALS OF GENERALINTEREST.Simon IAehlelehlela (21), Irvin Bakwn (21)end Brian Bdcwn (19).Charge: The accused were charged withpublicviolence and arson, in that they allegedlyattacked n house belonging to a black policeconstable in BochebeleTownship on May 14, 1980.Verdict: Guilty.Sentence: 3 years imprisonment each.(Bloemfontein Regional,Court,22.10.80).Vusumzi Speelmen (18).Charge: The accused was one of over 30 peoplewho appeared in court duringOctober 1980 inconnection with the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhageschools boycott. He was charged under the

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Riotous Assemblies Act, with the state claiming charge wee a sequel to a meeting at theThumbs' Sentence: 7 lasheseach, in addition tothat an October 10, 1980, he had been leader Labantu High School an September 12, 1950,whichsuspended jail sentences.of a group which recruited people to go to commemorated the death in detention ofSteve(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 09.12.80).schools, forcing lower primary school children Biko 3 years earlier.to leaveschool premises in support of the All accused ware perwiitted to pay admission BenjaminModiae Metaing(24).boycott. .of guilt fines of between R30 and R50. Charge: The accused, who la secretary ofVerdict: Guilty. theCongress of South African Students (cow)Sentence: 4 years, 1 of which was conditionally 262 students. was cherpadwith malicious injuryto property.suspended. Charge: Riotous Assemblies Act. All the Vetoing, a student at the SowstoTeachers'(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 23.10.80). accused were students at the Ngeslwans TrainingCollege, tarsup his mid-yearHigh School, Vdanteane. examination paper. Students had been boycotting14 Grahamstown youths.Defence attorney H Siwiss was unable to classes, and when the principaldecided toCharge: Public Violence Theywere char-gad represent the accused as he wee detained by go aheadwith examinations, students felt thatas s resultof an incident on July 10, 1980, Ciskeian police shortly before the hearing. theyshould have been consulted beforetakingwham police used birdshot to disperse boycotting (Vdantsana Magistrates' Court, 23.09.80). thedecision. Otherstudents demanded theschool children. examination papers from a teacher and destroyedAndries Phokoja (37). them,and the accused did the same.Thembiao Lombo (36), Mbulalo Geelbooi (28), Charge: Public Violence. The accusedwas Verdict:Guilty.Vuyieile Ndaba (32), Mzwendile Featjie (19), charged with building a road block an Sentence:18months, 6 months being suspended.Mtuzsli Mcekane (31), Vuysile Mehota (35), a public road an June 2, 1980, andwith others Mappeal has been lodged against the severityOonisi Beta (40), Thobili Kili (27), and stoned passing busesand cars. of the sentence.Thobile Ntsengwana (18). Verdict: Guilty. (Orlando Magistrates' Court, 22.09.80).Charge:Public Violence. The accused were Sentence: 3 years imprisonment.alleged to have been part of a crowd of about(Bloemfontein Regional Court, 28.10.80). 21 Natalpupils.300 which stoned police and police vehicles in ., Charge:Malicious damage to property. TheGrahamstown an July 26, 1980, and prevented Asmf Tayob (19) and BninahanRewasbanker(18). accused were alleged to hava.demaged windows,police from removing a corpse lying in theCharge: Public Violence. The accused were washbasinsand drainpipes et a Phoenix highstreet. alleged to have beenpart of a crowd involved school an May 8, 1980.Verdict: Not guilty. in a clash with police an the University of Verdict: Saccused were foundguilty.(Port Alfred Regional Court, 19.11.80). Durban-Westville campus on June 18, 1980.Sentence:Sentence was postponed for 4 years.During December 1980 the charges were (Durban Juvenile Court,17.09.80).26 youths, moat of them under 18.withdrawn.Charge: Public Violence. The appearance (Durban RegionalCourt, 10.12.80). 33 Grehemstown peopleaged between 14 end 36.in court of the accused, 25 of whom arescholarsCharges: All the charges were related toin schools in Mahwelereng near Potgietersrus, 5 youths, agedbetween 13 and 15. the urban'unrest' in Grahamstown duringwas a sequel to an outbreak of violence inChar-go: Theaccused allegedly set fire July and August 1980.Mahwelereng late in September 1980.welmer lower primary schoolan 5 occasions Four men end n woman were charged with thebetween February and October 1980. murder of a shopowner, Nikele Mjekula, who252 students aged between 12 and 20.Verdict: 2 of the accused were acquitted. wasstoned to death an July 26.Charge: Attending an illegal gathering. The 3 were found guilty of arson. Two youths aged15 end16 were charged with

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Riotous Assemblies Act, with the state claiming charge wee a sequel to a meeting at theThumbs' Sentence: 7 lasheseach, in addition tothat an October 10, 1980, he had been leader Labantu High School an September 12, 1950,whichsuspended jail sentences.of a group which recruited people to go to commemorated the death in detention ofSteve(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 09.12.80).schools, forcing lower primary school children Biko 3 years earlier.to leaveschool premises in support of the All accused ware perwiitted to pay admission BenjaminModiae Metaing(24).boycott. .of guilt fines of between R30 and R50. Charge: The accused, who la secretary ofVerdict: Guilty. theCongress of South African Students (cow)Sentence: 4 years, 1 of which was conditionally 262 students. was cherpadwith malicious injuryto property.suspended. Charge: Riotous Assemblies Act. All the Vetoing, a student at the SowstoTeachers'(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 23.10.80). accused were students at the Ngeslwans TrainingCollege, tarsup his mid-yearHigh School, Vdanteane. examination paper. Students had been boycotting14 Grahamstown youths.Defence attorney H Siwiss was unable to classes, and when the principaldecided toCharge: Public Violence Theywere char-gad represent the accused as he wee detained by go aheadwith examinations, students felt thatas s resultof an incident on July 10, 1980, Ciskeian police shortly before the hearing. theyshould have been consulted beforetakingwham police used birdshot to disperse boycotting (Vdantsana Magistrates' Court, 23.09.80). thedecision. Otherstudents demanded theschool children. examination papers from a teacher and destroyedAndries Phokoja (37). them,and the accused did the same.Thembiao Lombo (36), Mbulalo Geelbooi (28), Charge: Public Violence. The accusedwas Verdict:Guilty.Vuyieile Ndaba (32), Mzwendile Featjie (19), charged with building a road block an Sentence:18months, 6 months being suspended.Mtuzsli Mcekane (31), Vuysile Mehota (35), a public road an June 2, 1980, andwith others Mappeal has been lodged against the severityOonisi Beta (40), Thobili Kili (27), and stoned passing busesand cars. of the sentence.Thobile Ntsengwana (18). Verdict: Guilty. (Orlando Magistrates' Court, 22.09.80).Charge:Public Violence. The accused were Sentence: 3 years imprisonment.alleged to have been part of a crowd of about(Bloemfontein Regional Court, 28.10.80). 21 Natalpupils.300 which stoned police and police vehicles in ., Charge:Malicious damage to property. TheGrahamstown an July 26, 1980, and prevented Asmf Tayob (19) and BninahanRewasbanker(18). accused were alleged to hava.demaged windows,police from removing a corpse lying in theCharge: Public Violence. The accused were washbasinsand drainpipes et a Phoenix highstreet. alleged to have beenpart of a crowd involved school an May 8, 1980.Verdict: Not guilty. in a clash with police an the University of Verdict: Saccused were foundguilty.(Port Alfred Regional Court, 19.11.80). Durban-Westville campus on June 18, 1980.Sentence:Sentence was postponed for 4 years.During December 1980 the charges were (Durban Juvenile Court,17.09.80).26 youths, moat of them under 18.withdrawn.Charge: Public Violence. The appearance (Durban RegionalCourt, 10.12.80). 33 Grehemstown peopleaged between 14 end 36.in court of the accused, 25 of whom arescholarsCharges: All the charges were related toin schools in Mahwelereng near Potgietersrus, 5 youths, agedbetween 13 and 15. the urban'unrest' in Grahamstown duringwas a sequel to an outbreak of violence inChar-go: Theaccused allegedly set fire July and August 1980.Mahwelereng late in September 1980.welmer lower primary schoolan 5 occasions Four men end n woman were charged with thebetween February and October 1980. murder of a shopowner, Nikele Mjekula, who252 students aged between 12 and 20.Verdict: 2 of the accused were acquitted. wasstoned to death an July 26.Charge: Attending an illegal gathering. The 3 were found guilty of arson. Two youths aged15 end16 were charged with

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Page 15malicious damage to property arising from the wwTa the nearest weapons at hand. intent inhisactions.atoning of a bottle store. Verdict: One accused guilty of assault. (Durban Regional Court,19.11.80).M toyear old youth was charged with Eight guilty of public violence. owesarson in connection with the burning of the Threenot guilty of all charges.Samuel Ntsika Lower Primary School. Sentence: The accused guilty of assault wasSix menand a woman were charged with sentenced to 5 years, half suspended;setting fire to the home of a leader of the Twoguilty of public violence were sentencedPeacemakers vigilante group. to 4years, half suspended.A 23 year old menand two young women A 16 year old received 3 years for publicwere charged with public violence end theft, violence,2 years being suspended;while nine men aged between 17 and 36 were five others received suspended 3 yearsentences;charged with public violence arising from the (Grahamstown Supreme court, 04.12.80).atoning of a policevehicle. The question of the role of the PeacemakersOther people were charged with public and other vigilante groupsneeds to be detailedviolence and malicious damage to property. and analysed in n general assessment ofthe(Grahamstown Magistrates' Court, 12.08.80). intense conflict in the Eastern Cape. Readersfrom that area areinvited to submit information12 teenage school pupils. on this question, and anyone in a position toCharge: Murder,and public violence. The do an article is asked to contact the editors.murder charge arises out of the death of erD7SMG/(kSARS,_mmmber of the Peacemakers vigilante group, George Sewpersedh.Alfred Soya, on May 14, 1980.The public Charge: Two counts under the Publications INFORMATIONviolence charge arises out of an incident atAct. The accused, who is the president of thethe Andrew Moyeke school where n group of Natal Indian Congress,was charged withhaving PUBLICATIONSPeacemakers were stoned when they tried to produced and distributedcopies of the Freedomdrive boycotting scholars back to their Charter.classrooms. , In evidence, Sewpersadhexplained that The Southern African Research Service (SAWS)In 'cross examination of the leader of he had producedcopies of the Charter for a and theDevelopment Studies Group (DSG) arecontinuing with their series ofINFORMATIONthe Peacemakers, Richard Mncongo, defence conference where he wanted to set out thePUBLICATIONS.counsel put it to him that since the Peacemakers policies of the Natal Indain Congress, andurge xPOPULATION REMOVALS (already published -had been formed in 1979, more than 100 charges people not to votein the South AfricanIndian 81,00 incl postage)of assault had been brought against its members, Council elections. Themeeting was disrupted, aDEBATE ON HOUSING (of a more theoreticalnature; already published -and more than B4members of the organisation and he had not actually distributed theCharter. 81,00 incl postage)were currentlycharged with criminal offences. He was not aware that the Freedom Charterhad a POLITICS IN SPORT (price notavailable yet)In argument, defence counsel also suggested been listed as undesirable. a POLITICAL TRIALS(pricenot available yet)that it was in fact the violent Peacemakers Verdict: Not guilty. In acquitting theaccused, Copiesavailable from DSG/SARSwho were the agressors in clashes with boycotting the presiding magistrate said thattheFreedom PO Box 931742143 Yeoville, South Africascholars. When Peacemakers had arrived at a Charter was notof such a nature that a Phone:725-2835 (Jhb code 011-)school and attacked scholars there, the scholars reasonableman reading it might think thatit (postage rates are those for southern Africa;had defended themselves with stones,which was banned. Sewpersadh had not had a guilty rateselsewhere available on request)

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Page 15malicious damage to property arising from the wwTa the nearest weapons at hand. intent inhisactions.atoning of a bottle store. Verdict: One accused guilty of assault. (Durban Regional Court,19.11.80).M toyear old youth was charged with Eight guilty of public violence. owesarson in connection with the burning of the Threenot guilty of all charges.Samuel Ntsika Lower Primary School. Sentence: The accused guilty of assault wasSix menand a woman were charged with sentenced to 5 years, half suspended;setting fire to the home of a leader of the Twoguilty of public violence were sentencedPeacemakers vigilante group. to 4years, half suspended.A 23 year old menand two young women A 16 year old received 3 years for publicwere charged with public violence end theft, violence,2 years being suspended;while nine men aged between 17 and 36 were five others received suspended 3 yearsentences;charged with public violence arising from the (Grahamstown Supreme court, 04.12.80).atoning of a policevehicle. The question of the role of the PeacemakersOther people were charged with public and other vigilante groupsneeds to be detailedviolence and malicious damage to property. and analysed in n general assessment ofthe(Grahamstown Magistrates' Court, 12.08.80). intense conflict in the Eastern Cape. Readersfrom that area areinvited to submit information12 teenage school pupils. on this question, and anyone in a position toCharge: Murder,and public violence. The do an article is asked to contact the editors.murder charge arises out of the death of erD7SMG/(kSARS,_mmmber of the Peacemakers vigilante group, George Sewpersedh.Alfred Soya, on May 14, 1980.The public Charge: Two counts under the Publications INFORMATIONviolence charge arises out of an incident atAct. The accused, who is the president of thethe Andrew Moyeke school where n group of Natal Indian Congress,was charged withhaving PUBLICATIONSPeacemakers were stoned when they tried to produced and distributedcopies of the Freedomdrive boycotting scholars back to their Charter.classrooms. , In evidence, Sewpersadhexplained that The Southern African Research Service (SAWS)In 'cross examination of the leader of he had producedcopies of the Charter for a and theDevelopment Studies Group (DSG) arecontinuing with their series ofINFORMATIONthe Peacemakers, Richard Mncongo, defence conference where he wanted to set out thePUBLICATIONS.counsel put it to him that since the Peacemakers policies of the Natal Indain Congress, andurge xPOPULATION REMOVALS (already published -had been formed in 1979, more than 100 charges people not to votein the South AfricanIndian 81,00 incl postage)of assault had been brought against its members, Council elections. Themeeting was disrupted, aDEBATE ON HOUSING (of a more theoreticalnature; already published -and more than B4members of the organisation and he had not actually distributed theCharter. 81,00 incl postage)were currentlycharged with criminal offences. He was not aware that the Freedom Charterhad a POLITICS IN SPORT (price notavailable yet)In argument, defence counsel also suggested been listed as undesirable. a POLITICAL TRIALS(pricenot available yet)that it was in fact the violent Peacemakers Verdict: Not guilty. In acquitting theaccused, Copiesavailable from DSG/SARSwho were the agressors in clashes with boycotting the presiding magistrate said thattheFreedom PO Box 931742143 Yeoville, South Africascholars. When Peacemakers had arrived at a Charter was notof such a nature that a Phone:725-2835 (Jhb code 011-)school and attacked scholars there, the scholars reasonableman reading it might think thatit (postage rates are those for southern Africa;had defended themselves with stones,which was banned. Sewpersadh had not had a guilty rateselsewhere available on request)

Page 38 of 171

HEALTH CAREFOR PROFITINTROOLICTION.THIS ARTICLE is adapted from a talk given inAugust 1980. The talkwee intended to show theway in which the delivery of health care isshaped by the privailing economic structures.Inorder to make this point, the articleprobably places too much stress on the way thecommodity form has structured thehealth carssystem. It is not that anything is wrong inthe article as such. It la rather that thearticle lacks balance it it isseen as ananalysis of health care services as part of acomplex of social relations.The concrete understanding of anyparticularhealth care service requires more than generalisedstatements derived from an analysis of capitalismas aneconomic system. In order to analyse thehealth service of any one country it is necessaryto look at those services inthe context of thespecific political, ideological, as well aseconomic processes to be found there.So, for example, theNational Health Servicein Britain can only be understood as the outcomeof decades of struggle by British workerstoforce the state to improve their socialconditions of existence. Similarly the healthservices available to urban nfricansin SouthAfrica should be understood as resulting fromthe need to keep the black woelcing classsufficiently healthy todo the woric requiredof them, and' to control various epidemic diseasesthat might threaten to spill over intowhitearses.The article that follows highlights and 'explores one of the determining features ofhealth services undercapitalism, namely theircommodity nature and the impact that this has.In time, n much fuller examination needs tobemade of the position of-health services in thefull complex of political end economic forceset work in oursociety.WHAT FOLLOwS !a written by a medical 'outsider'who is neither medically trained nor !n theprocess ofreceiving such training. But thewriter la nonetheless concerned about healthend about disease. This extends to aconcernabout South Africa as a whole, which undoubtedlycontains an enormous amount of sickness - inboth thebroad and the narrow sense of theword. A concern with sickness in societynecessitates finding both explanationsendsolutions - for society as a whole as well asfor disease.It !e seldom challenged that medicine, as nscience, endmedical care as a practice, holdwithin their grasp the power to overcomesickness end disease. If you ere sick, go toedoctor who will cure you. This is amongstthe conventional wisdoms of our time. It isfor thin reason that anyoneconcerned withhealth and disease must examine and understandthe position end function of the medicalprofession.Perhaps the outsider, looking in,may see and understand things which are not aseasily perceived by those within.Forstructures (end undoubtedly the medicalworld is a structure) tend to have their owninternal logic. If this were not thecase theywould simply collapse. But this logic tends totrap those who live end work within thestructures. Because thestructure is internallyrational, it comes to be seen as inevitable, asnatural, as the only possible structure.This is thecase with the medical professionand with the system of health care. Bath hovee purpose end a function: to providemedicalcare to those who need it. To this end, enumber of things must and do happen. Theactual care is provided bydoctors, nurses andothers trained for specific tasks. In orderto prepare thaw for their fobs, them la esystem of medicaleducation, where medicalpractitioners ere taught whet they and toknow. There !s a cods of ethics to ensurethatdoctors and others behave !n a waywhich la consistent with the interests oftheir pedants. There !a a professionalbodyto make aura that doctors behaveaccording to the ethics prescribed end tolook after their interests. There aregeneralpractitioners for general complaints,and there are highly trained specialists formart complicated matters. There aremedicinesto prescribe for same diseases, and there eresurgical procedures far coping with others.And there ismedical research to ensure thatthe level of competence end knowledge continuallyimproves.The whole structure 1sneat, tidy andwell-ordered. Everything has its place endeverybody knows their place. There may beminordisagreements and dissatisfactions,but these era seen end dealt with in thelogic of the structure as a whole. It maybethat some feel that there is a need for moredoctors, or far more money to be allocatedto health care in rural areas,or that thepay far black doctors should be the same asthat for whites; sane may even feel that theconduct of thedoctors in the Biko case shouldbe subject to scrutiny by the Medical Council.But basically, seen from the inside, the

Page 39 of 171

HEALTH CAREFOR PROFITINTROOLICTION.THIS ARTICLE is adapted from a talk given inAugust 1980. The talkwee intended to show theway in which the delivery of health care isshaped by the privailing economic structures.Inorder to make this point, the articleprobably places too much stress on the way thecommodity form has structured thehealth carssystem. It is not that anything is wrong inthe article as such. It la rather that thearticle lacks balance it it isseen as ananalysis of health care services as part of acomplex of social relations.The concrete understanding of anyparticularhealth care service requires more than generalisedstatements derived from an analysis of capitalismas aneconomic system. In order to analyse thehealth service of any one country it is necessaryto look at those services inthe context of thespecific political, ideological, as well aseconomic processes to be found there.So, for example, theNational Health Servicein Britain can only be understood as the outcomeof decades of struggle by British workerstoforce the state to improve their socialconditions of existence. Similarly the healthservices available to urban nfricansin SouthAfrica should be understood as resulting fromthe need to keep the black woelcing classsufficiently healthy todo the woric requiredof them, and' to control various epidemic diseasesthat might threaten to spill over intowhitearses.The article that follows highlights and 'explores one of the determining features ofhealth services undercapitalism, namely theircommodity nature and the impact that this has.In time, n much fuller examination needs tobemade of the position of-health services in thefull complex of political end economic forceset work in oursociety.WHAT FOLLOwS !a written by a medical 'outsider'who is neither medically trained nor !n theprocess ofreceiving such training. But thewriter la nonetheless concerned about healthend about disease. This extends to aconcernabout South Africa as a whole, which undoubtedlycontains an enormous amount of sickness - inboth thebroad and the narrow sense of theword. A concern with sickness in societynecessitates finding both explanationsendsolutions - for society as a whole as well asfor disease.It !e seldom challenged that medicine, as nscience, endmedical care as a practice, holdwithin their grasp the power to overcomesickness end disease. If you ere sick, go toedoctor who will cure you. This is amongstthe conventional wisdoms of our time. It isfor thin reason that anyoneconcerned withhealth and disease must examine and understandthe position end function of the medicalprofession.Perhaps the outsider, looking in,may see and understand things which are not aseasily perceived by those within.Forstructures (end undoubtedly the medicalworld is a structure) tend to have their owninternal logic. If this were not thecase theywould simply collapse. But this logic tends totrap those who live end work within thestructures. Because thestructure is internallyrational, it comes to be seen as inevitable, asnatural, as the only possible structure.This is thecase with the medical professionand with the system of health care. Bath hovee purpose end a function: to providemedicalcare to those who need it. To this end, enumber of things must and do happen. Theactual care is provided bydoctors, nurses andothers trained for specific tasks. In orderto prepare thaw for their fobs, them la esystem of medicaleducation, where medicalpractitioners ere taught whet they and toknow. There !s a cods of ethics to ensurethatdoctors and others behave !n a waywhich la consistent with the interests oftheir pedants. There !a a professionalbodyto make aura that doctors behaveaccording to the ethics prescribed end tolook after their interests. There aregeneralpractitioners for general complaints,and there are highly trained specialists formart complicated matters. There aremedicinesto prescribe for same diseases, and there eresurgical procedures far coping with others.And there ismedical research to ensure thatthe level of competence end knowledge continuallyimproves.The whole structure 1sneat, tidy andwell-ordered. Everything has its place endeverybody knows their place. There may beminordisagreements and dissatisfactions,but these era seen end dealt with in thelogic of the structure as a whole. It maybethat some feel that there is a need for moredoctors, or far more money to be allocatedto health care in rural areas,or that thepay far black doctors should be the same asthat for whites; sane may even feel that theconduct of thedoctors in the Biko case shouldbe subject to scrutiny by the Medical Council.But basically, seen from the inside, the

Page 40 of 171

System is sound end rational. It is the waythings are done. It represents the 'natural'order of medicine. The outsiderlooking in,however, may sea the world of medicine somewhatdifferently. The outsider may see a world ofapparentlycrazy contradictions.CONTRADICTIONS IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE.THE outsider may see a system inwhich,despite all evidence to the contrary, boththe population at large and the medicalprofession believe that doctorsand dxvgs cansuccessfully curs disease, and that diseasesare primarily caused by gerwa. This is, ofcourse,sometimes true. The eradication ofsmallpox is one of the wonders of the modernworld, and medical science did it. Butwhetof the TB epidemic that is ravaging the africanpopulation in South Africa, especially in therural areas? There maybe a scientificexplanation for the disease, and drugs maycure individual cases, but theepidemiccontinues. Much thesame is true ofmeasles, gastro-enteritis end otherinfectious and contagious diseases whichinflict such a toll on, theoppressed andexploited in South Africa.While it is trije that medical science cancure individual cases, it is clearthatsolutions on a broader level lie elsewhere.For example, in England from 1850 onwards,there was a continual endsubstantial decreasein the child death rate from infectiousdiseases. It is now generally accepted thatmost of theseimprovements arose from improvedstandarae of living, and it has been arguedthat ninety percent of theseimprovementscame about before the introduction of anti- .biotics and immunisation. Yet many of the1underdevelopedcountries spend a largeproportion of their annual budgets on drugpurchases in the hope of ease technologicalmiraclethat will rid them of disease.The other side of this coin looks verysimilar. White South Africans, generally averyaffluent group, have the dubious honourof ranking with the highest as victims ofdegenerative diseases. It hasbeen.said thatthe wealthy dig their own graves with theirteeth: This is only a partial truth. Itis riot only what they eat,but also what isdrunk, smoked and breathed that sends theaffluent to premature graves. Again, thereseems to be littlethat medical science can doto combat this.There is as yet no convincing evidencethat hospitalisation increases one'schancesof surviving a heart attack. Yet vast sums ofmoney are spent on expensive cardiac units, andin the UnitedStates it was estimated thatby 1980 one tenth of that country's nurses wereemployed in staffing those cardiacunits.This paradox, involving both rich end poor,stems from the same contradiction. The greatillnesses of our time aresocial in nature.For the poor, sickness derives primarily fromtheir poverty, and the living conditionsthat this povertytend powerlessness) imposes.For the wealthy, the process of degenerationis built into the lifestyles that are learntfroman early age. It,is a strong personindeed who can resist all the pressures frompears end from advertising to consumethejunk that is on sale - to smoke, drink endcompete in such a way that it is onlysurprising that the wealthy do not.dieearlier than they in fact do. And it must,be remembered that patterns of consumption areultimately deterwined bythe nature of theproduction of goods - which is production forprofit, not health. The whole vast weight ofaconsumer-oriented society drives members ofthe ruling and middle classes to a fate ofobesity, physical decay, lungcancer andcardiac arrest.Rapid industrial growth for profits ratherthen human progress takes its own toll onhealthin.the form of pollution which deformsthe world and breeds a variety of environmentaldiseases which are, as yet, onlyvaguelyunderstood. Workers in factories are exposedto special hazards of noise, rsdiation andpoisonous chemicaldust which affect not onlythem, but also their families end unborngenerations.The great epidemics of our time arecausedmore by sickness in the social fabric than byviruses and bacteria, and it is in socialrestructuring and changethat solutions are tobe sought. Yet the world of medicine attemptsto stem the tide of disease by treating itsvictims oneby one, and then sending them backto be re-infected by the social plague.MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AHD THEDRUG INDUSTRY.THE ATTEMPT to entice us into believing thatmedicine can cure ailments is bolstered bythemassive growth of medical technology,a kind of modern witchcraft, the function ofwhich is perhaps to reassure us thatthewitchdoctor is throwing the bones as skillfullyas possible. But the actual impact ofmedical technology an illness islimited inthe extreme.A closer look at drugs and the drugindustry is also necessary. Clearly, drugs arean importantweapon in the battle againstdisease. But clearly also, as the Thalidomidecase shows, unless they are carefullycontrolleddrugs can be positively harmful. With this in

Page 41 of 171

System is sound end rational. It is the waythings are done. It represents the 'natural'order of medicine. The outsiderlooking in,however, may sea the world of medicine somewhatdifferently. The outsider may see a world ofapparentlycrazy contradictions.CONTRADICTIONS IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE.THE outsider may see a system inwhich,despite all evidence to the contrary, boththe population at large and the medicalprofession believe that doctorsand dxvgs cansuccessfully curs disease, and that diseasesare primarily caused by gerwa. This is, ofcourse,sometimes true. The eradication ofsmallpox is one of the wonders of the modernworld, and medical science did it. Butwhetof the TB epidemic that is ravaging the africanpopulation in South Africa, especially in therural areas? There maybe a scientificexplanation for the disease, and drugs maycure individual cases, but theepidemiccontinues. Much thesame is true ofmeasles, gastro-enteritis end otherinfectious and contagious diseases whichinflict such a toll on, theoppressed andexploited in South Africa.While it is trije that medical science cancure individual cases, it is clearthatsolutions on a broader level lie elsewhere.For example, in England from 1850 onwards,there was a continual endsubstantial decreasein the child death rate from infectiousdiseases. It is now generally accepted thatmost of theseimprovements arose from improvedstandarae of living, and it has been arguedthat ninety percent of theseimprovementscame about before the introduction of anti- .biotics and immunisation. Yet many of the1underdevelopedcountries spend a largeproportion of their annual budgets on drugpurchases in the hope of ease technologicalmiraclethat will rid them of disease.The other side of this coin looks verysimilar. White South Africans, generally averyaffluent group, have the dubious honourof ranking with the highest as victims ofdegenerative diseases. It hasbeen.said thatthe wealthy dig their own graves with theirteeth: This is only a partial truth. Itis riot only what they eat,but also what isdrunk, smoked and breathed that sends theaffluent to premature graves. Again, thereseems to be littlethat medical science can doto combat this.There is as yet no convincing evidencethat hospitalisation increases one'schancesof surviving a heart attack. Yet vast sums ofmoney are spent on expensive cardiac units, andin the UnitedStates it was estimated thatby 1980 one tenth of that country's nurses wereemployed in staffing those cardiacunits.This paradox, involving both rich end poor,stems from the same contradiction. The greatillnesses of our time aresocial in nature.For the poor, sickness derives primarily fromtheir poverty, and the living conditionsthat this povertytend powerlessness) imposes.For the wealthy, the process of degenerationis built into the lifestyles that are learntfroman early age. It,is a strong personindeed who can resist all the pressures frompears end from advertising to consumethejunk that is on sale - to smoke, drink endcompete in such a way that it is onlysurprising that the wealthy do not.dieearlier than they in fact do. And it must,be remembered that patterns of consumption areultimately deterwined bythe nature of theproduction of goods - which is production forprofit, not health. The whole vast weight ofaconsumer-oriented society drives members ofthe ruling and middle classes to a fate ofobesity, physical decay, lungcancer andcardiac arrest.Rapid industrial growth for profits ratherthen human progress takes its own toll onhealthin.the form of pollution which deformsthe world and breeds a variety of environmentaldiseases which are, as yet, onlyvaguelyunderstood. Workers in factories are exposedto special hazards of noise, rsdiation andpoisonous chemicaldust which affect not onlythem, but also their families end unborngenerations.The great epidemics of our time arecausedmore by sickness in the social fabric than byviruses and bacteria, and it is in socialrestructuring and changethat solutions are tobe sought. Yet the world of medicine attemptsto stem the tide of disease by treating itsvictims oneby one, and then sending them backto be re-infected by the social plague.MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AHD THEDRUG INDUSTRY.THE ATTEMPT to entice us into believing thatmedicine can cure ailments is bolstered bythemassive growth of medical technology,a kind of modern witchcraft, the function ofwhich is perhaps to reassure us thatthewitchdoctor is throwing the bones as skillfullyas possible. But the actual impact ofmedical technology an illness islimited inthe extreme.A closer look at drugs and the drugindustry is also necessary. Clearly, drugs arean importantweapon in the battle againstdisease. But clearly also, as the Thalidomidecase shows, unless they are carefullycontrolleddrugs can be positively harmful. With this in

Page 42 of 171

page 18mind, one would expect to find a carefullycontrolled process of research, production endprescription of drugs.In fact, whet existsis little short of anarchy.At most only a few hundred drugs arerequired for all circumstances, andmajordrug innovations are few and far between. Avery smell handful of really new drugs comeonto the market eachyear. Yet there are35 000 brand names currently on sale in theUSA, and something like 60 000 in Mexico.Many ofthese are undoubtedly useless,positively dangerous, or just pointlessduplications of other, almostidenticalcompounds. Furthermore, the only major sourceof information about ell these drugs is thedrug industry itself.Manufacturers can hardlybe expected to provide the most objectiveinformation about their products: In thissituation,rational decision-making aboutwhich is the appropriate product to prescribefor any particular illness, iswell-nighimpossible. In this context, it is notsurprising to learn that in the UnitedStates the drug industry spendstheequivalent of 3 000 dollars per physicianper year on promoting its products through amixture of sophisticated,subtle and hardsell techniques.Again, we are met with a contradiction.Drugs are potentially useful, yet the manneroftheir production and distribution is such asto lessen the benefits that they offer.There is another importantcontradictionin the world of drugs: Those who can leastafford them are those who pay the most forthem. The drugcompanies, as a rule, get areturn on their investment that is one hundredpercent higher in the 'third world' than it isinthe developed capitalist countries.There is, as a bizarre example of thisprofiteering, a now infamous casefromColombia in South America. Here it wasfound that the active ingredient of thedrug Diazepam was overpriced by 6478percent as compered to its cost on theopen market. This is not a freak example,but simply the extreme case of avery commonpractice.This reveals another massive contradiction.If medical care is the correct response toill-healthand disease. then one would expectto find that most resources are directed towhere theta is most disease. Yet thisisnot the case, either in South Africa orelsewhere. For it is the poor who suffer mostfrom preventable and treatablediseases, yetit is also the poor who have least access tohealth care. By far the majority of doctorsin private practicework in the wealthy,white urban areas. The annual expenditure onthe monstrous new Johannesburg Hospital isnotmuch different from the combined healthbudget of all.the.bantustans: Yet there :is noevidence to suggest that the newJohannesburgGeneral makes any significant impact on thehealth of the population that it serves.MEDICALTRAINING.THERE are other strange contradictions thatemerge from the way in which resources forhealth care areallocated. One of theserelates to the type of medical training thatexists. There are a whole range of tasksandoperations currently undertaken by doctorswhich could be more than adequately carriedout by people with muchless,'and thereforecheaper, training. Yet on the pretext of'maintaining professional standards at thehighest level',these tasks are restricted tothe medical profession. A double wastage o'fresources occurs: doctors spend much oftheirtime on work that could be done by others,while people who with very little extratraining would be more thencompetent to carryout these tasks are actually preventedfrom doing so.A SUMMARY THUSFAR.ONE COULD go onlisting the contradictionsbetween the apparent function of the world ofmedicine, and the actual practice that isfound.But the point has been made, end it is necessaryto move beyond description. Firstly, however,e,sunmery of thepoints covered may be useful.It has been argued that the science endpractice of medicine, althoughinternallycoherent, is actually riddled with contradictionswhen examined from the point of view of oneconcerned withhealth rather than medicine, andwith the place of medicine within society etlarge. Amongst these contradictions ere1.that medicine is believed to be the curefor illness, yet illness is social in its 'origin, end medical care is primarilyconcernedwith treating the individual;2. that there is n vast expansion in medicaltechnology, yet little clear proof thatthishas any major impact on disease. The drugindustry provides a classic example ofmedically-related technology thatis organisedin such a way as to undermine the concretebenefits it could offer;3. that medical practice end medicaleducationare both irrationally organised if the aim isto make the best use of existing resources toprovide adequatehealth care to the populationet large;4. that those who are sickest, whichco-ineides with those who are poorest and

Page 43 of 171

page 18mind, one would expect to find a carefullycontrolled process of research, production endprescription of drugs.In fact, whet existsis little short of anarchy.At most only a few hundred drugs arerequired for all circumstances, andmajordrug innovations are few and far between. Avery smell handful of really new drugs comeonto the market eachyear. Yet there are35 000 brand names currently on sale in theUSA, and something like 60 000 in Mexico.Many ofthese are undoubtedly useless,positively dangerous, or just pointlessduplications of other, almostidenticalcompounds. Furthermore, the only major sourceof information about ell these drugs is thedrug industry itself.Manufacturers can hardlybe expected to provide the most objectiveinformation about their products: In thissituation,rational decision-making aboutwhich is the appropriate product to prescribefor any particular illness, iswell-nighimpossible. In this context, it is notsurprising to learn that in the UnitedStates the drug industry spendstheequivalent of 3 000 dollars per physicianper year on promoting its products through amixture of sophisticated,subtle and hardsell techniques.Again, we are met with a contradiction.Drugs are potentially useful, yet the manneroftheir production and distribution is such asto lessen the benefits that they offer.There is another importantcontradictionin the world of drugs: Those who can leastafford them are those who pay the most forthem. The drugcompanies, as a rule, get areturn on their investment that is one hundredpercent higher in the 'third world' than it isinthe developed capitalist countries.There is, as a bizarre example of thisprofiteering, a now infamous casefromColombia in South America. Here it wasfound that the active ingredient of thedrug Diazepam was overpriced by 6478percent as compered to its cost on theopen market. This is not a freak example,but simply the extreme case of avery commonpractice.This reveals another massive contradiction.If medical care is the correct response toill-healthand disease. then one would expectto find that most resources are directed towhere theta is most disease. Yet thisisnot the case, either in South Africa orelsewhere. For it is the poor who suffer mostfrom preventable and treatablediseases, yetit is also the poor who have least access tohealth care. By far the majority of doctorsin private practicework in the wealthy,white urban areas. The annual expenditure onthe monstrous new Johannesburg Hospital isnotmuch different from the combined healthbudget of all.the.bantustans: Yet there :is noevidence to suggest that the newJohannesburgGeneral makes any significant impact on thehealth of the population that it serves.MEDICALTRAINING.THERE are other strange contradictions thatemerge from the way in which resources forhealth care areallocated. One of theserelates to the type of medical training thatexists. There are a whole range of tasksandoperations currently undertaken by doctorswhich could be more than adequately carriedout by people with muchless,'and thereforecheaper, training. Yet on the pretext of'maintaining professional standards at thehighest level',these tasks are restricted tothe medical profession. A double wastage o'fresources occurs: doctors spend much oftheirtime on work that could be done by others,while people who with very little extratraining would be more thencompetent to carryout these tasks are actually preventedfrom doing so.A SUMMARY THUSFAR.ONE COULD go onlisting the contradictionsbetween the apparent function of the world ofmedicine, and the actual practice that isfound.But the point has been made, end it is necessaryto move beyond description. Firstly, however,e,sunmery of thepoints covered may be useful.It has been argued that the science endpractice of medicine, althoughinternallycoherent, is actually riddled with contradictionswhen examined from the point of view of oneconcerned withhealth rather than medicine, andwith the place of medicine within society etlarge. Amongst these contradictions ere1.that medicine is believed to be the curefor illness, yet illness is social in its 'origin, end medical care is primarilyconcernedwith treating the individual;2. that there is n vast expansion in medicaltechnology, yet little clear proof thatthishas any major impact on disease. The drugindustry provides a classic example ofmedically-related technology thatis organisedin such a way as to undermine the concretebenefits it could offer;3. that medical practice end medicaleducationare both irrationally organised if the aim isto make the best use of existing resources toprovide adequatehealth care to the populationet large;4. that those who are sickest, whichco-ineides with those who are poorest and

Page 44 of 171

without power, have the least access to medicalcare of either a public or private nature.TOIARDS ANEXPLANATION.THE REST of this paper attempts to explainthe contradictions described above. Theirresolution (aswith their explanation) iscomplicated, but perhaps a step down thatroad is to understand rather than just todescribe.There are no simple solutions,such as those proposed by Ivan Illich, one ofthe more famous critics*ofcontemporarymedicine and medical practice.Illich starts from a presupposition thattechnology itself is oppressive. Hisanalysisof various aspects of society have led him toa simplistic and flawed equation. He believesthat technologyleads to industrialisation,which inevitably gives rise to bureaucracyand bureaucratic control of the consumer. ForIllich,medicine is ,lust another bureaucracy,in which the doctors use and manipulate theconsumer - in this case the patient -fortheir own ends. Thus he believes thathealth care systems actually cause illness,through damage done by doctorsand medicines.(This is referred to as iatrogenesis, prdoctor-induced disease).Damage is caused by creating adependenceon the health system, so that people losetheir ability to look after themselves. Thus,far Illich, health caresystems become self-perpetuating bureaucracies, creating moreillness than they cure, ensuring that peoplewill cometo rely on them more and more.For Illich, the solution is simple:destroy the technology, destroy the healthcaresystems, de-doctor society, and peoplewill regain their autonomy and learn to caretar themselves.But, contrary towhat Illich argues,technology is not 'bad' - or for that matter'good' - in any abstract sense. The waytechnology is used,and the nature of thesociety it is used in, deteneines its nature.Health care systems do not of themselvescreate illnessand dependency - but theyoften do not fulfil their stated aims. Itis not that medicine has no contribution tomake increating a healthy world - only thatit can neither do so by itself, nor lead thestruggle to restricture society.How thendoes one explain the contradictionsdescribed above? There is no one single.simple explanation, but there is one setoffactors which so dominate health care as itexists that these factors are a basis forexplanation.HEALTH CARE ANDTHE COMMODITY FOR11.IN BRIEF, the nature of health care, aswith almost every other aspect of capitalistsociety,is shaped by its commodity nature.This means that health care is something to beproduced, to be bought and sold, tobe exchangedet a profit.A commodity has a number of basicproperties. 3 of these are that1. it is produced by humanendeavour and labour;2. it is sold for a certain price through themechanism of the market;3. it must have a use, aswell as an exchangeprice. Consumers must feel that the commodityhas a use, that they need it, or else it wouldnot bebought and sold.Most simply stated, the entire economicsystem in which we live is based on theproduction anddistribution of commodities.,Almost everyone who same a living is involvedin the process of producing commoditiesorselling them. The commodity form affectsthe nature of things that are produced and sold;but at the same time,professional services(like legal assistance and medicine) are alsoshaped by the commodity form whichdominatescapitalist society.A number of factors flow from thiscommodity form which dominates society. Firstly,if youneed something you have to be able topay for it. Secondly, if you are involved inproducing or selling commodities ofcommodity- 'imprinted services, your target group is thosewho can afford to pay for what is offered.Thirdly, if you canconvince a group that theyneed something - be it Coca-Cole or a type oftranquiliser - then you have a market foryourcommodity. This market will exist even if thecommodity is not strictly necessary, or even ifit is positively harmful.Certainly it cannotbe denied that daily life is filled withattempts toCONTRADICTIONS IN HEALTH CARE ANDTHECOMMODITY FORM.TO RETURN to the world of medicine - andinvestigate whether the strangeparadoxesdescribed earlier cannot be explained bystarting from the premise that health care isdominated by thecommodity form:health care is produced for sale to individuals(who else would buy it?). Equally important,it isproduced for sale to individuals whocan afford to buy it. This in~itself is enoughto explain why medical practice isorientedto individual patient rare. Further, itexplains why the medical profession concentrateson curative rather thenpreventive medicine.The consumer (in other words the patient) doesnot want to buy medical care when he/she iswell:the patient simply wants to buy health

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without power, have the least access to medicalcare of either a public or private nature.TOIARDS ANEXPLANATION.THE REST of this paper attempts to explainthe contradictions described above. Theirresolution (aswith their explanation) iscomplicated, but perhaps a step down thatroad is to understand rather than just todescribe.There are no simple solutions,such as those proposed by Ivan Illich, one ofthe more famous critics*ofcontemporarymedicine and medical practice.Illich starts from a presupposition thattechnology itself is oppressive. Hisanalysisof various aspects of society have led him toa simplistic and flawed equation. He believesthat technologyleads to industrialisation,which inevitably gives rise to bureaucracyand bureaucratic control of the consumer. ForIllich,medicine is ,lust another bureaucracy,in which the doctors use and manipulate theconsumer - in this case the patient -fortheir own ends. Thus he believes thathealth care systems actually cause illness,through damage done by doctorsand medicines.(This is referred to as iatrogenesis, prdoctor-induced disease).Damage is caused by creating adependenceon the health system, so that people losetheir ability to look after themselves. Thus,far Illich, health caresystems become self-perpetuating bureaucracies, creating moreillness than they cure, ensuring that peoplewill cometo rely on them more and more.For Illich, the solution is simple:destroy the technology, destroy the healthcaresystems, de-doctor society, and peoplewill regain their autonomy and learn to caretar themselves.But, contrary towhat Illich argues,technology is not 'bad' - or for that matter'good' - in any abstract sense. The waytechnology is used,and the nature of thesociety it is used in, deteneines its nature.Health care systems do not of themselvescreate illnessand dependency - but theyoften do not fulfil their stated aims. Itis not that medicine has no contribution tomake increating a healthy world - only thatit can neither do so by itself, nor lead thestruggle to restricture society.How thendoes one explain the contradictionsdescribed above? There is no one single.simple explanation, but there is one setoffactors which so dominate health care as itexists that these factors are a basis forexplanation.HEALTH CARE ANDTHE COMMODITY FOR11.IN BRIEF, the nature of health care, aswith almost every other aspect of capitalistsociety,is shaped by its commodity nature.This means that health care is something to beproduced, to be bought and sold, tobe exchangedet a profit.A commodity has a number of basicproperties. 3 of these are that1. it is produced by humanendeavour and labour;2. it is sold for a certain price through themechanism of the market;3. it must have a use, aswell as an exchangeprice. Consumers must feel that the commodityhas a use, that they need it, or else it wouldnot bebought and sold.Most simply stated, the entire economicsystem in which we live is based on theproduction anddistribution of commodities.,Almost everyone who same a living is involvedin the process of producing commoditiesorselling them. The commodity form affectsthe nature of things that are produced and sold;but at the same time,professional services(like legal assistance and medicine) are alsoshaped by the commodity form whichdominatescapitalist society.A number of factors flow from thiscommodity form which dominates society. Firstly,if youneed something you have to be able topay for it. Secondly, if you are involved inproducing or selling commodities ofcommodity- 'imprinted services, your target group is thosewho can afford to pay for what is offered.Thirdly, if you canconvince a group that theyneed something - be it Coca-Cole or a type oftranquiliser - then you have a market foryourcommodity. This market will exist even if thecommodity is not strictly necessary, or even ifit is positively harmful.Certainly it cannotbe denied that daily life is filled withattempts toCONTRADICTIONS IN HEALTH CARE ANDTHECOMMODITY FORM.TO RETURN to the world of medicine - andinvestigate whether the strangeparadoxesdescribed earlier cannot be explained bystarting from the premise that health care isdominated by thecommodity form:health care is produced for sale to individuals(who else would buy it?). Equally important,it isproduced for sale to individuals whocan afford to buy it. This in~itself is enoughto explain why medical practice isorientedto individual patient rare. Further, itexplains why the medical profession concentrateson curative rather thenpreventive medicine.The consumer (in other words the patient) doesnot want to buy medical care when he/she iswell:the patient simply wants to buy health

Page 46 of 171

page 20from a doctor when sick. Many of those typesof preventive care which exist, such as cancerscreening, papsmears, and the general checkup, ere also compatible with the individualpatient-care model which derives fromthecommodity form.From this basic premise we can alsounderstand why health care services anddoctors areconcentrated in the rich urbanareas. This is where the market is greatest.It is where people can most afford to payformedical services.It is here too that we discover why suchn high proportion of resources are directedto complextechnology, while vast numbers ofpeople do not have access to even n basicminimum of health care. It is the typeofconsumer which, to some extent, determines thetype of product or service which will beoffered. The wealthy, whocan afford to payfor health care, have their basic health needsmet by the adequate nutrition and hygiene thatgoesalong with a higher standard of living.As such, their medical requirements are mainlyfor specialist treatment, and thesophisticatedtechnology that goes along with specialist care.The contradiction between the generallysimple skills thatare required to providebasic health care to the masses, and thehighly specialised nature of medical training,is alsoexplained by the commodity form. Theextensive training which doctors receive - bothin terms of time and moneyspent - confers onthem the right to charge high rates for theirservice. Furthermore, it is in the interestsof theprofession to see that other people,who would be equally capable of doing some ofthe work that doctors do, areprevented fromundertaking such work. Been in this light,the organised arm of the medical profession,far fromprotecting the public by ensuring thehighest standards, is little better than emedieval guild, operating a closed shoptolook after the interests of its members andto protect them from competition.The contradictions, the apparentcrazinessdescribed above, can also be viewed as theresult of a conflict between the potential useof medical scienceand medical care, end itsactual practice. The potential use is that itcan explain illness end its physical causes,endpoint the way to n successful battleagainst disease -although much of thisbattle must be fought outside the reelsofmedicine. It can relieve the pain ofindividual sufferers, end it can care for,end sometimes heal those who aresuffering fromdisease or injury. This is its potential use,end as such 1t has s greet contribution tomake. For no-onecan deny that the need isthere.On the other bend, the practice of healthcare has came to be dominated by quiteanotherset of factors. It is determined 6y the factthat in our society it has been structured bythe commodity farm, aservice to be sold et aprofit. Medical science has taught us tosee illness as nothing more than thetechnicalmalfunction of a machine, which is our body.The cure is therefore sought in a visit to thedoctor, who is thebody mechanic. He or shefiddles with a few parts, and maybe takes ecouple out. .The cure is seen as resultingfrom atechnical intervention et the levelof the individual patient.But if sickness is diagnosed and treateden en individualmatter, the social causeswill never be understood. If cure rests withdoctors, the social restructuring necessaryforbuilding a healthy society will be obscured.It must be understood that health isnot simply a problem for doctors, or ofone'sown personal lifestyle. When it is understoodthat health cannot be bought, that no-oneshould be allowed tomake n profit fromdisease or create disease from making profit;when it is understood that the struggle for ehealthysociety involves ell progressiveindividuals - both personally end as a socialcommitment, then it will also beunderstoodthat the medical profession cannot be leftwith the impassible and misleading task ofsolving the problems ofdisease.Cedric de Beer.WKWAFRAWMME11cEl1EE11TJEsWOOELYOETlEtNtJEE

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page 20from a doctor when sick. Many of those typesof preventive care which exist, such as cancerscreening, papsmears, and the general checkup, ere also compatible with the individualpatient-care model which derives fromthecommodity form.From this basic premise we can alsounderstand why health care services anddoctors areconcentrated in the rich urbanareas. This is where the market is greatest.It is where people can most afford to payformedical services.It is here too that we discover why suchn high proportion of resources are directedto complextechnology, while vast numbers ofpeople do not have access to even n basicminimum of health care. It is the typeofconsumer which, to some extent, determines thetype of product or service which will beoffered. The wealthy, whocan afford to payfor health care, have their basic health needsmet by the adequate nutrition and hygiene thatgoesalong with a higher standard of living.As such, their medical requirements are mainlyfor specialist treatment, and thesophisticatedtechnology that goes along with specialist care.The contradiction between the generallysimple skills thatare required to providebasic health care to the masses, and thehighly specialised nature of medical training,is alsoexplained by the commodity form. Theextensive training which doctors receive - bothin terms of time and moneyspent - confers onthem the right to charge high rates for theirservice. Furthermore, it is in the interestsof theprofession to see that other people,who would be equally capable of doing some ofthe work that doctors do, areprevented fromundertaking such work. Been in this light,the organised arm of the medical profession,far fromprotecting the public by ensuring thehighest standards, is little better than emedieval guild, operating a closed shoptolook after the interests of its members andto protect them from competition.The contradictions, the apparentcrazinessdescribed above, can also be viewed as theresult of a conflict between the potential useof medical scienceand medical care, end itsactual practice. The potential use is that itcan explain illness end its physical causes,endpoint the way to n successful battleagainst disease -although much of thisbattle must be fought outside the reelsofmedicine. It can relieve the pain ofindividual sufferers, end it can care for,end sometimes heal those who aresuffering fromdisease or injury. This is its potential use,end as such 1t has s greet contribution tomake. For no-onecan deny that the need isthere.On the other bend, the practice of healthcare has came to be dominated by quiteanotherset of factors. It is determined 6y the factthat in our society it has been structured bythe commodity farm, aservice to be sold et aprofit. Medical science has taught us tosee illness as nothing more than thetechnicalmalfunction of a machine, which is our body.The cure is therefore sought in a visit to thedoctor, who is thebody mechanic. He or shefiddles with a few parts, and maybe takes ecouple out. .The cure is seen as resultingfrom atechnical intervention et the levelof the individual patient.But if sickness is diagnosed and treateden en individualmatter, the social causeswill never be understood. If cure rests withdoctors, the social restructuring necessaryforbuilding a healthy society will be obscured.It must be understood that health isnot simply a problem for doctors, or ofone'sown personal lifestyle. When it is understoodthat health cannot be bought, that no-oneshould be allowed tomake n profit fromdisease or create disease from making profit;when it is understood that the struggle for ehealthysociety involves ell progressiveindividuals - both personally end as a socialcommitment, then it will also beunderstoodthat the medical profession cannot be leftwith the impassible and misleading task ofsolving the problems ofdisease.Cedric de Beer.WKWAFRAWMME11cEl1EE11TJEsWOOELYOETlEtNtJEE

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CHOLERA-A TROPICALDISEASE?THE YEAR 1980 sew the outbreak and spread 'inSouth Africa of an infectiousdisease that hasbeen virtually absent for at least ten years.Cholera, a disease primarily related to inadequatewatersupplies, recently struck this country. Inthe lest decade there have been only fivereported cases~, end these acquiredthe diseaseoutside the country. Lest year, however, therewere 940 reported cases end 17 deaths withinSouth Africa.To date, wore than 23 people havedied and there have been aver t 300 cases sincethe epidemic began in October1980.2The epidemic first hit the overcrowdedSwazi 'homeland' known as KeNgwene, end foamthere has spread toother parts of the easternTransvaal, erects of Lebawa, Gezenkulu, Eikanhof,Brits, Soweto, parts of Natal and theOrange Freestate.The current outbreak of this disease isreported to have originated in Mozambique, andis said tohave been aggravated by the fact thatafricens in rural erects 'know no politicalboundaries and wove freely from SouthAfrica toMozambique and beck'. 3 It has also been blamedion the 'neglect and breakdown' of health servicesinneighbouring countries, end on the ignoranceof the people who have been affected.4In this article the author hopes todescribewhet cholera is, discuss why it has affectedthe areas that have bean struck by the diseaseby using oneparticular arse as an exempla,describe the response of the Department ofHealth, the reasons for this response anditsinadequacies, and finally to put the whole matterin perspective. This will be done by brieflydiscussing ill health andunderdevelopment,and also by discussing the origins of publichealth in Europe end the similarity to presentmeasuresbeing taken in South Africa.' Finallythe author wishes to show that the solutions tothe diseases of underdevelopment,such as cholera,lie neither in the provision of medical care,nor of an adequate water supply, but must ofnecessityentail the overcoming end preventionof the very social, enviranmantel, political andeconomic factors that haveresulted in poorhealth.UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH,IT IS well known end accepted that poverty-strickenpeople suffer from a wide range ofpreventable diseases. These diseases ofpoverty include malnutrition,tuberculosis,typhoid fever, end more reqently cholera.Proponents of community medicine often arguethat good healthwill follow foam the provisionof basic services such as adequate sanitationand a clean water supply, adequatehousing,a reasonable level of nutrition, education andbasic health services. It has been shown thatthe mayordecreases in the death rates endinfections suffered by poor people and the workingclass have resulted fromenvironmentalimprovements. sThe conventional proponents of communitymedicine, however, still sea poverty asinevitableand, therefore, concentrate on improving theconditions in which the poor subsist. Povertyis seen as theproblem of the poor, from whichthey must be taught to escape. The answer is seenin terws of self-help projects with'communityinvolvement'.The solution proposed, however, does nottake into account the causes of poverty itself,andthe need for overcoming those. It thuscondones poverty as inevitable and concentrateson assisting the poor to copewith their problems.The majority of conventional community healthworkers follow this line of reasoning.A more radicalanalysis of poverty in SouthAfrica is enlightening. The poverty presentlyfound in rural areas yes not present whenwhitesfirst arrived in this country. Rather, 1t hasarisen from the 'progressive underdevelopmentwhich has resultedfrom the interaction of anindigenous economy in which the surplus producedwas redistributed to the community, endanintruding colonial cash economy, backed in thefinal instance by the guns of the settlers'.6The aPricen people in therural areas wereprogressively driven of the lend and forced intoa meagre 13'jS of the land. Large proportions ofthemale population were forced into the citiesto work an the mines end later the factories:this was achieved bycompelling africans inrural areas to pay cash.taxes, such as poll,but and dog taxes, for which money wasrequired.The indigenous economies degenerated under thepressure of overcrowding, erosion, end the lossofable-bodied men. The reserves became areservoir from which migrant labourers were drawnwhen needed for theSouth African economy.They also becdme dumping grounds for the old,the infirm, and the unemployed.Thedevelopment of the powerful SouthAfrican capitalist economy has taken place at theexpense of the destruction andunderdevelopmentof the rural areas. 7 Only by appreciating thehistorical context in which illness and deathin theseareas has became so common, can onebegin to tackle the real causes of 111 health

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CHOLERA-A TROPICALDISEASE?THE YEAR 1980 sew the outbreak and spread 'inSouth Africa of an infectiousdisease that hasbeen virtually absent for at least ten years.Cholera, a disease primarily related to inadequatewatersupplies, recently struck this country. Inthe lest decade there have been only fivereported cases~, end these acquiredthe diseaseoutside the country. Lest year, however, therewere 940 reported cases end 17 deaths withinSouth Africa.To date, wore than 23 people havedied and there have been aver t 300 cases sincethe epidemic began in October1980.2The epidemic first hit the overcrowdedSwazi 'homeland' known as KeNgwene, end foamthere has spread toother parts of the easternTransvaal, erects of Lebawa, Gezenkulu, Eikanhof,Brits, Soweto, parts of Natal and theOrange Freestate.The current outbreak of this disease isreported to have originated in Mozambique, andis said tohave been aggravated by the fact thatafricens in rural erects 'know no politicalboundaries and wove freely from SouthAfrica toMozambique and beck'. 3 It has also been blamedion the 'neglect and breakdown' of health servicesinneighbouring countries, end on the ignoranceof the people who have been affected.4In this article the author hopes todescribewhet cholera is, discuss why it has affectedthe areas that have bean struck by the diseaseby using oneparticular arse as an exempla,describe the response of the Department ofHealth, the reasons for this response anditsinadequacies, and finally to put the whole matterin perspective. This will be done by brieflydiscussing ill health andunderdevelopment,and also by discussing the origins of publichealth in Europe end the similarity to presentmeasuresbeing taken in South Africa.' Finallythe author wishes to show that the solutions tothe diseases of underdevelopment,such as cholera,lie neither in the provision of medical care,nor of an adequate water supply, but must ofnecessityentail the overcoming end preventionof the very social, enviranmantel, political andeconomic factors that haveresulted in poorhealth.UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH,IT IS well known end accepted that poverty-strickenpeople suffer from a wide range ofpreventable diseases. These diseases ofpoverty include malnutrition,tuberculosis,typhoid fever, end more reqently cholera.Proponents of community medicine often arguethat good healthwill follow foam the provisionof basic services such as adequate sanitationand a clean water supply, adequatehousing,a reasonable level of nutrition, education andbasic health services. It has been shown thatthe mayordecreases in the death rates endinfections suffered by poor people and the workingclass have resulted fromenvironmentalimprovements. sThe conventional proponents of communitymedicine, however, still sea poverty asinevitableand, therefore, concentrate on improving theconditions in which the poor subsist. Povertyis seen as theproblem of the poor, from whichthey must be taught to escape. The answer is seenin terws of self-help projects with'communityinvolvement'.The solution proposed, however, does nottake into account the causes of poverty itself,andthe need for overcoming those. It thuscondones poverty as inevitable and concentrateson assisting the poor to copewith their problems.The majority of conventional community healthworkers follow this line of reasoning.A more radicalanalysis of poverty in SouthAfrica is enlightening. The poverty presentlyfound in rural areas yes not present whenwhitesfirst arrived in this country. Rather, 1t hasarisen from the 'progressive underdevelopmentwhich has resultedfrom the interaction of anindigenous economy in which the surplus producedwas redistributed to the community, endanintruding colonial cash economy, backed in thefinal instance by the guns of the settlers'.6The aPricen people in therural areas wereprogressively driven of the lend and forced intoa meagre 13'jS of the land. Large proportions ofthemale population were forced into the citiesto work an the mines end later the factories:this was achieved bycompelling africans inrural areas to pay cash.taxes, such as poll,but and dog taxes, for which money wasrequired.The indigenous economies degenerated under thepressure of overcrowding, erosion, end the lossofable-bodied men. The reserves became areservoir from which migrant labourers were drawnwhen needed for theSouth African economy.They also becdme dumping grounds for the old,the infirm, and the unemployed.Thedevelopment of the powerful SouthAfrican capitalist economy has taken place at theexpense of the destruction andunderdevelopmentof the rural areas. 7 Only by appreciating thehistorical context in which illness and deathin theseareas has became so common, can onebegin to tackle the real causes of 111 health

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in South Africa.CHOLERA - THE DISEASETHE CHOLERA organism, known as Vibrio cholerae,only infectshumankind. The infection is acquiredthrough the use of water that has been contaminatedwith the organism by thefaeces of an infectedperson. The polluted water can infect peoplewhen it is drunk, when it is used to preparefood, oreven if raw vegetables have been washedwith it. Direct spread from one person to anotheris very rare.There are .twomain types of the organism -that causing the current epidemic is known as theE1 Tor biotype. Infection with this typeofthe organism may be very mild, and as many as50 to 75% of the people infected with the organism.may feel onlyslightly ill, or not ill at all.These people, however, may still excrete theorganism and infect others. They are thusknownas 'carriers' of the disease.A few hours to five days after swallowingthe organism, the symptoms (feelings ofillness)of the disease begin. This usually starts withsudden severe diarrhoea without pain or blood,and may befollowed by a bout of vomiting. Thecharacteristic stools, initially brown, becomeclear with mucous and are describedas 'rice-waterstools'. The hands and feet of the infectedperson may become cold, and, the eyes may becomesunkendue to the loss of salt and water.A tremendous amount of fluid is lost,and if not replaced rapidly, the sick personmaydie from shock. If, however, the water can be,replaced, then death should not occur. It isthus very important togive these people lots ofwater, which should contain specified amountsof salt and sugar: one litre of water shouldbemixed with eight level teaspoons of sugar andone level teaspoon of salt. This solution shouldbe given to thosesuffering from the diseaseeven before they get taken to the hospitalor clinic. At the clinic the person must befurtherrehydrated and treated with an antibiotic.Measures to control the spread of thedisease are important and should beintroducedrapidly. Information about the disease, how torecognise it, how to deal with it, and how toprevent it, shouldbe made available. Emphasisshould be laid on the fact that it is due topoor water supply and political factors suchasforced population relocation and overcrowding.Only by overcoming these will the diseasebe eradicated. As shownin the rest of thearticle, this particular aspect of the controlof cholera in South Africa has been neglectedfor reasonswhich will be made clear.In the short term, the washing of handsand food in uncontaminated water isnecessary.Water for drinking should be boiled and watersupplies should be disinfected with certainchemicals. Stoolsand vomit should be disposedof far away from any water source, and pit toiletsshould be dug if not alreadypresent.Although a vaccine is available againstcholera, it is largely ineffective as it lastsfor less than six months and isonly successfulin 50 to 609 of the people vaccinated. It isthus considered to be unwise to vaccinate vastnumbers ofpeople as it gives them a falsesense of security and may inadvertently influencepeople to relax their precautionsagainst eatingor drinking unsafe foods.8Cholera is thus essentially a mild disease:few people who become infectedactually getseriously ill from it. In addition it is afar lass important cause of death and illnessin South Africa's ruralareas than many otherdiseases - such as malnutrition, measles,and tuberculosis. It is thus of interest thatso muchattention has been devoted to thisdisease recently, while numerous others continueunabated.CHOLERA - THEBACKGROUNDCHOLERA is not a new disease, although it hasonly recently affected South Africa. As longago as40OBC writers described epidemics withsymptoms typical of cholera. Vasco da Game'sexpedition was probablystruck with cholerain 1490, and British colonial forces in Indialost thousands of soldiers from the disease inthe 18thand 19th centuries. 9 Cholera has longbeen common in West Bengal and Bangladesh,and there have been numerousoutbreaks of thedisease throughout south and southeast Asia.The disease has also spread to other parts ofthe worldsuch as Europe, the United States,and Africa.During the colonial period, choleraspread through east Africa along thetraderoutes, leaving hundreds of thousands dead- another disastrous consequence of imperialism.Cholera epidemicsoccurred in the United Kingdomin the 1830s and 1840s. In the 1850s, duringthe period of rapid urbanisationandindustrialisation in Europe, over 140 000 people-died in France, 24 000 in Italy and 20 O00 inBritain because ofcholera. y The last majorcholera epidemic in the West occurred in 1866-7.The disease has thus not been limitedto'tropical' countries, but has struck whereverthe prevailing conditions are suitable for itsspread.In 1961 a wave ofcholera epidemics spreadacross the world. It started in Asia and spreadwestwards. The massive populationshiftsresulting from the Pakistani-Indian war in 1971led to thousands of deaths and continued thefurther spread of thedisease. The organism

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in South Africa.CHOLERA - THE DISEASETHE CHOLERA organism, known as Vibrio cholerae,only infectshumankind. The infection is acquiredthrough the use of water that has been contaminatedwith the organism by thefaeces of an infectedperson. The polluted water can infect peoplewhen it is drunk, when it is used to preparefood, oreven if raw vegetables have been washedwith it. Direct spread from one person to anotheris very rare.There are .twomain types of the organism -that causing the current epidemic is known as theE1 Tor biotype. Infection with this typeofthe organism may be very mild, and as many as50 to 75% of the people infected with the organism.may feel onlyslightly ill, or not ill at all.These people, however, may still excrete theorganism and infect others. They are thusknownas 'carriers' of the disease.A few hours to five days after swallowingthe organism, the symptoms (feelings ofillness)of the disease begin. This usually starts withsudden severe diarrhoea without pain or blood,and may befollowed by a bout of vomiting. Thecharacteristic stools, initially brown, becomeclear with mucous and are describedas 'rice-waterstools'. The hands and feet of the infectedperson may become cold, and, the eyes may becomesunkendue to the loss of salt and water.A tremendous amount of fluid is lost,and if not replaced rapidly, the sick personmaydie from shock. If, however, the water can be,replaced, then death should not occur. It isthus very important togive these people lots ofwater, which should contain specified amountsof salt and sugar: one litre of water shouldbemixed with eight level teaspoons of sugar andone level teaspoon of salt. This solution shouldbe given to thosesuffering from the diseaseeven before they get taken to the hospitalor clinic. At the clinic the person must befurtherrehydrated and treated with an antibiotic.Measures to control the spread of thedisease are important and should beintroducedrapidly. Information about the disease, how torecognise it, how to deal with it, and how toprevent it, shouldbe made available. Emphasisshould be laid on the fact that it is due topoor water supply and political factors suchasforced population relocation and overcrowding.Only by overcoming these will the diseasebe eradicated. As shownin the rest of thearticle, this particular aspect of the controlof cholera in South Africa has been neglectedfor reasonswhich will be made clear.In the short term, the washing of handsand food in uncontaminated water isnecessary.Water for drinking should be boiled and watersupplies should be disinfected with certainchemicals. Stoolsand vomit should be disposedof far away from any water source, and pit toiletsshould be dug if not alreadypresent.Although a vaccine is available againstcholera, it is largely ineffective as it lastsfor less than six months and isonly successfulin 50 to 609 of the people vaccinated. It isthus considered to be unwise to vaccinate vastnumbers ofpeople as it gives them a falsesense of security and may inadvertently influencepeople to relax their precautionsagainst eatingor drinking unsafe foods.8Cholera is thus essentially a mild disease:few people who become infectedactually getseriously ill from it. In addition it is afar lass important cause of death and illnessin South Africa's ruralareas than many otherdiseases - such as malnutrition, measles,and tuberculosis. It is thus of interest thatso muchattention has been devoted to thisdisease recently, while numerous others continueunabated.CHOLERA - THEBACKGROUNDCHOLERA is not a new disease, although it hasonly recently affected South Africa. As longago as40OBC writers described epidemics withsymptoms typical of cholera. Vasco da Game'sexpedition was probablystruck with cholerain 1490, and British colonial forces in Indialost thousands of soldiers from the disease inthe 18thand 19th centuries. 9 Cholera has longbeen common in West Bengal and Bangladesh,and there have been numerousoutbreaks of thedisease throughout south and southeast Asia.The disease has also spread to other parts ofthe worldsuch as Europe, the United States,and Africa.During the colonial period, choleraspread through east Africa along thetraderoutes, leaving hundreds of thousands dead- another disastrous consequence of imperialism.Cholera epidemicsoccurred in the United Kingdomin the 1830s and 1840s. In the 1850s, duringthe period of rapid urbanisationandindustrialisation in Europe, over 140 000 people-died in France, 24 000 in Italy and 20 O00 inBritain because ofcholera. y The last majorcholera epidemic in the West occurred in 1866-7.The disease has thus not been limitedto'tropical' countries, but has struck whereverthe prevailing conditions are suitable for itsspread.In 1961 a wave ofcholera epidemics spreadacross the world. It started in Asia and spreadwestwards. The massive populationshiftsresulting from the Pakistani-Indian war in 1971led to thousands of deaths and continued thefurther spread of thedisease. The organism

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spread to Africa et about this time end sincethen the disease has spread rapidly across thecontinent. Angola, Malawi,Zambia and Zimbabwehave all had major cholera problems in the pastdecade, and it is not surprising that thediseasehas now reached South Africa.Cholera is one of the many diseases labelledas 'tropical'. However, as hasbeen shown'tropical' diseases have frequently strucknon-tropical areas such as Europe and the UnitedStates. Bytelling a disease 'tropical' theauthorities can claim it is natural in a givenarse, and thus deflect the responsibilityforactually creating the circumstances in whichdiseases, such as cholera, can flourish.Doyel states that 10 Contrary tocommon belief, (these) diseasesof underdevelopment ere not necessarilybound up with the tropical conditions inthegeographic or climatic sense. Cholera,plague, leprosy, smallpox, end many intestinalparasites have ell thrived inWesternEurope in the pest. Indeed, there is nstriking similarity between disease patternsin underdeveloped countriestoday and theexperience of the industrialised capitalistcountries in the nineteenth century. Inthe third world, infantmortality rates,child wastage rates (deaths before 15 years),life expectancy end the incidence of majorcommunicablediseases ell show a clearparallel with nineteenth century Britain.Yet those diseases now associatedwithunderdevelopment have long since disappearedin the metropolitan countries- primarily because many of theconditionspredisposing to these diseases of underdevelopment .have been improved substantially.CHOLERA ANDWATERTHE RELATIONSHIP between cholera end water hasbeen long known. John Snow, the 'fatherofepidemiology', studied cholera and water supplyin the mid-19th century. During the choleraepidemic in London in1853 he proved that thedisease was being spread by a water companywhich did not purify the water itsupplied(because it was cheaper), and which had becomeinfected with human waste matter. Snow provedhis theoryqrnohicellv by breaking the ommosupplying the contaminated water - resultingin a massive decrease in the number ofcasesof cholera. 11Chninra is a 'wetPr-~^^^^' rliceese. 1e. . e .~preao of ~iIer .South_A..r.ica 1 0----------- ----- ---------------- ---- --------------------- --------- ------------ -- -------ION vM-AWA-a N.3Q~- ~' --.c-ree 'i~l~Lang of30ct12*E.-arberlo *~' hEikunhof 11 Oct_ -:11 Nor-% lji,ii,1.This map and the one on the next page from Department of Health,EpidemiologicalComments, November, 1980.

Page 53 of 171

spread to Africa et about this time end sincethen the disease has spread rapidly across thecontinent. Angola, Malawi,Zambia and Zimbabwehave all had major cholera problems in the pastdecade, and it is not surprising that thediseasehas now reached South Africa.Cholera is one of the many diseases labelledas 'tropical'. However, as hasbeen shown'tropical' diseases have frequently strucknon-tropical areas such as Europe and the UnitedStates. Bytelling a disease 'tropical' theauthorities can claim it is natural in a givenarse, and thus deflect the responsibilityforactually creating the circumstances in whichdiseases, such as cholera, can flourish.Doyel states that 10 Contrary tocommon belief, (these) diseasesof underdevelopment ere not necessarilybound up with the tropical conditions inthegeographic or climatic sense. Cholera,plague, leprosy, smallpox, end many intestinalparasites have ell thrived inWesternEurope in the pest. Indeed, there is nstriking similarity between disease patternsin underdeveloped countriestoday and theexperience of the industrialised capitalistcountries in the nineteenth century. Inthe third world, infantmortality rates,child wastage rates (deaths before 15 years),life expectancy end the incidence of majorcommunicablediseases ell show a clearparallel with nineteenth century Britain.Yet those diseases now associatedwithunderdevelopment have long since disappearedin the metropolitan countries- primarily because many of theconditionspredisposing to these diseases of underdevelopment .have been improved substantially.CHOLERA ANDWATERTHE RELATIONSHIP between cholera end water hasbeen long known. John Snow, the 'fatherofepidemiology', studied cholera and water supplyin the mid-19th century. During the choleraepidemic in London in1853 he proved that thedisease was being spread by a water companywhich did not purify the water itsupplied(because it was cheaper), and which had becomeinfected with human waste matter. Snow provedhis theoryqrnohicellv by breaking the ommosupplying the contaminated water - resultingin a massive decrease in the number ofcasesof cholera. 11Chninra is a 'wetPr-~^^^^' rliceese. 1e. . e .~preao of ~iIer .South_A..r.ica 1 0----------- ----- ---------------- ---- --------------------- --------- ------------ -- -------ION vM-AWA-a N.3Q~- ~' --.c-ree 'i~l~Lang of30ct12*E.-arberlo *~' hEikunhof 11 Oct_ -:11 Nor-% lji,ii,1.This map and the one on the next page from Department of Health,EpidemiologicalComments, November, 1980.

Page 54 of 171

page 24tROeooms t.Legaendo Routine effluent eurveill~ce,* Open water sourcese Towna,villagosthe infectingorganism is found in the wateritself. It is, therefore, found in areaswith podr water supply and sewage removal.Thevalue of sanitation is demonstrated bytwo examples. First of all, cholera has beentransported to Japan end variousEuropean countrieson a number of occasions, but the disease hasnot spread because of the relatively highstandardof sanitation in these countries. 12 Similarly,YJAM SURVEILLANCE:Kingdom of Swaziland.Kruger NationalParkthe conditions under which the vest majorityof South Afrtcnn whites live will prevent theirsuccumbing to thedisease. Secondly, carefullyevaluated studies 1n the Phillipines have shownthat the only way to overcome cholera isthroughthe provision of clean water. 12Thus it can be shown that 'the very existenceof cholera end its spread is enindicator ofthe inadequacy of sanitation'. 12 Although e'..OC?'.1b) 10~pure water supply will not guarantee goodhealth,an inadequate water supply will ensure poorhealth.CHOLERA AND KANGWANECHOLERA has occurred inthe last few months inmany areas of the country. It originated,however, in the eastern Transvaal, and this arsedepictsvery clearly tha types of conditions

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page 24tROeooms t.Legaendo Routine effluent eurveill~ce,* Open water sourcese Towna,villagosthe infectingorganism is found in the wateritself. It is, therefore, found in areaswith podr water supply and sewage removal.Thevalue of sanitation is demonstrated bytwo examples. First of all, cholera has beentransported to Japan end variousEuropean countrieson a number of occasions, but the disease hasnot spread because of the relatively highstandardof sanitation in these countries. 12 Similarly,YJAM SURVEILLANCE:Kingdom of Swaziland.Kruger NationalParkthe conditions under which the vest majorityof South Afrtcnn whites live will prevent theirsuccumbing to thedisease. Secondly, carefullyevaluated studies 1n the Phillipines have shownthat the only way to overcome cholera isthroughthe provision of clean water. 12Thus it can be shown that 'the very existenceof cholera end its spread is enindicator ofthe inadequacy of sanitation'. 12 Although e'..OC?'.1b) 10~pure water supply will not guarantee goodhealth,an inadequate water supply will ensure poorhealth.CHOLERA AND KANGWANECHOLERA has occurred inthe last few months inmany areas of the country. It originated,however, in the eastern Transvaal, and this arsedepictsvery clearly tha types of conditions

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necessary for the spread of the disease. Therelatiurship between underdevelopment and poorhealth is shown byexamining cholera and thearea in which it stnrted.The eastern Transvaal region, the focus ofthe present choleraepidemic, was described ina recent Department of Health publication oncholera a . 'picturesque, mountainous areawhichnestles a very fertile valley abounding in estatesend farms of various sizes. Crops grown consistof vegetables(cabbages, tomatoes, and tropicalfruit and citrus) but there are also vast sugarplantations'. 13In the same publication,KaNgwane, the Swazireserve, is mentioned in passing, but little detailis given to this part of the eastern Transvaalinwhich the disease has flourished.KaNgwene presently consists of threeseparate areas in the easternTransvaal,strategically located on the borders af.Swezilandend Mozambique. The three areas are known asNkomazi,Nsikazi, and a 'new area'. 14 The totalarea of land in KaNgwane was 20 301ha in 1973,and with the consolidationproposals for the'homeland' the land mass is to be increased to391 OO0ha.15 The population density in 1977wasestimated at 57,5 per square km. 16 Othersources estimated the population density as144 people per square mile in1970.176 In therest of South Africa the average populationdensity was 35 people per square mile. l7nThequasi-government BENSO report states thatthe present density is 'indeed high for epredominantly rural population' 16end with theforced relocation of people into KaNgwnne itwill increase substantially.The number of people inKaNgwnne was 117 890in 1970 and it was estimated that there wouldbe 213 90O people in KaNgwane by 1977.16Atthe same time the Swazi population outsideof the reserve was estimated et 390 600 4n 1970and 439 200 in 1977.16Clearly the populationin KaNgwene is being dramatically increased bythe government policies of forciblyrelocatingpeople into the reserves.The BENSO report describesthis populationrelocation programme as being 'theresettlementin KeNgwane of Swazi from badly situated Blackareas or other Black states'. 17b It continuesby sayingthat 'since a start was made with thebuying of farms in the newly added area, theresettlement of Swazis has started inearnest' 17b(author's emphasis).This massive influx of people has led tothe formation of numerous ,squatter towns.Manyof the squatters were labour-tenants who wereforcibly removed from white-owned farms inadjacent areas. Manyof the people ere extremelypoor end have no access to land. 18The most common employment in the area isto workas farm labourers or forestry workers,who together maice up 41,396 of the economicallyactive population. 19 TheBENSO publicationstates that 'the men especially apparentlyprefer to work as migrant workers outside thecountrywhen their own farms cannot satisfy theirrequirements'. 20 Interestingly the seinepublication states that the Nkomaziarea ofKaNgwene is mainly a stock grazing region butthat dry-land crop production is possible'but is severelyrestricted by population pressure' 21(author's emphasis). In addition, the Nsikaziregion is fairly densely populated endverylittle agricultural land is available foragricultural planning. 22 It is thus notsurprising that even those who havesome lendin KaNgwane 'cannot satisfy. their requirements'.The considerable increase in populationhas led to majorproblems in providing housingand services. BENSO mentions that the twoproclaimed towns of Ekulindeni endEerstehoek'could not nearly keep pace with resettlement'.23In addition squatter towns have developedaroundKabokwani, Metsulu, Kanysmezane and in areas wherenew towns are being planned. 24It is against thisbackground of papulstionrelocation and the resultant population pressurethat the spread of cholera in KaNgwaneshouldbe seen. The massive increase in populationwith totally inadequate facilities is clearlya major factor in thespread of the disease.Officially opening the second session ofKaNgwane's legislative assembly, Dr WillieVosloo,Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Develop-ment, acknowledged that the provision of serviceswas underconsiderable strain. 'The Swazi people,who ere clearly experiencing a national awakening,ere still flocking to theterritory in theirthousands', 25 (sic) he said. He stated furtherthat because so many people had moved into thearea,services became inadequate, end the highestdegree of administrative skill was needed toprevent a collapse. In itsturn, this wouldcreate still greater inadequacies in the servicesavailable to the area's residents.26'AS far as we ereconcerned resettlement isa political bomb', said EJ Mebuze, the chiefminister of the Swazi 'homeland'. He claimsthatKeNgwene has absorbed 150 000 people in thelost few years, and adds that 'some resettlementareas have noamenities whatsoever, no runningwater, no sewerage system, no schools end noclinics. Many of the people hove no,jobs. Somepeople have to drink dirty water. They thinkwe are responsible. There is no message wecan get across tothem until their problems havebeen attended to'. 27It appears that the administrative collapseVosloo had warned of,had occurred, but asPretoria desires, the inadequacies are blamed on

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necessary for the spread of the disease. Therelatiurship between underdevelopment and poorhealth is shown byexamining cholera and thearea in which it stnrted.The eastern Transvaal region, the focus ofthe present choleraepidemic, was described ina recent Department of Health publication oncholera a . 'picturesque, mountainous areawhichnestles a very fertile valley abounding in estatesend farms of various sizes. Crops grown consistof vegetables(cabbages, tomatoes, and tropicalfruit and citrus) but there are also vast sugarplantations'. 13In the same publication,KaNgwane, the Swazireserve, is mentioned in passing, but little detailis given to this part of the eastern Transvaalinwhich the disease has flourished.KaNgwene presently consists of threeseparate areas in the easternTransvaal,strategically located on the borders af.Swezilandend Mozambique. The three areas are known asNkomazi,Nsikazi, and a 'new area'. 14 The totalarea of land in KaNgwane was 20 301ha in 1973,and with the consolidationproposals for the'homeland' the land mass is to be increased to391 OO0ha.15 The population density in 1977wasestimated at 57,5 per square km. 16 Othersources estimated the population density as144 people per square mile in1970.176 In therest of South Africa the average populationdensity was 35 people per square mile. l7nThequasi-government BENSO report states thatthe present density is 'indeed high for epredominantly rural population' 16end with theforced relocation of people into KaNgwnne itwill increase substantially.The number of people inKaNgwnne was 117 890in 1970 and it was estimated that there wouldbe 213 90O people in KaNgwane by 1977.16Atthe same time the Swazi population outsideof the reserve was estimated et 390 600 4n 1970and 439 200 in 1977.16Clearly the populationin KaNgwene is being dramatically increased bythe government policies of forciblyrelocatingpeople into the reserves.The BENSO report describesthis populationrelocation programme as being 'theresettlementin KeNgwane of Swazi from badly situated Blackareas or other Black states'. 17b It continuesby sayingthat 'since a start was made with thebuying of farms in the newly added area, theresettlement of Swazis has started inearnest' 17b(author's emphasis).This massive influx of people has led tothe formation of numerous ,squatter towns.Manyof the squatters were labour-tenants who wereforcibly removed from white-owned farms inadjacent areas. Manyof the people ere extremelypoor end have no access to land. 18The most common employment in the area isto workas farm labourers or forestry workers,who together maice up 41,396 of the economicallyactive population. 19 TheBENSO publicationstates that 'the men especially apparentlyprefer to work as migrant workers outside thecountrywhen their own farms cannot satisfy theirrequirements'. 20 Interestingly the seinepublication states that the Nkomaziarea ofKaNgwene is mainly a stock grazing region butthat dry-land crop production is possible'but is severelyrestricted by population pressure' 21(author's emphasis). In addition, the Nsikaziregion is fairly densely populated endverylittle agricultural land is available foragricultural planning. 22 It is thus notsurprising that even those who havesome lendin KaNgwane 'cannot satisfy. their requirements'.The considerable increase in populationhas led to majorproblems in providing housingand services. BENSO mentions that the twoproclaimed towns of Ekulindeni endEerstehoek'could not nearly keep pace with resettlement'.23In addition squatter towns have developedaroundKabokwani, Metsulu, Kanysmezane and in areas wherenew towns are being planned. 24It is against thisbackground of papulstionrelocation and the resultant population pressurethat the spread of cholera in KaNgwaneshouldbe seen. The massive increase in populationwith totally inadequate facilities is clearlya major factor in thespread of the disease.Officially opening the second session ofKaNgwane's legislative assembly, Dr WillieVosloo,Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Develop-ment, acknowledged that the provision of serviceswas underconsiderable strain. 'The Swazi people,who ere clearly experiencing a national awakening,ere still flocking to theterritory in theirthousands', 25 (sic) he said. He stated furtherthat because so many people had moved into thearea,services became inadequate, end the highestdegree of administrative skill was needed toprevent a collapse. In itsturn, this wouldcreate still greater inadequacies in the servicesavailable to the area's residents.26'AS far as we ereconcerned resettlement isa political bomb', said EJ Mebuze, the chiefminister of the Swazi 'homeland'. He claimsthatKeNgwene has absorbed 150 000 people in thelost few years, and adds that 'some resettlementareas have noamenities whatsoever, no runningwater, no sewerage system, no schools end noclinics. Many of the people hove no,jobs. Somepeople have to drink dirty water. They thinkwe are responsible. There is no message wecan get across tothem until their problems havebeen attended to'. 27It appears that the administrative collapseVosloo had warned of,had occurred, but asPretoria desires, the inadequacies are blamed on

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the KaNgwane authorities and not on the centralgovernment.It is ironic that some of the people who havebeen movedto KaNgwane have ostensibly been movedin order to promote their health. Residentsof Doornkop in the easternTransvaal were movedto KaNgwane because it was said that they did nothave proper water and sewerage facilitiesandthat the place was a health hazard. 2? It seemsapparent that present conditions are far worse,but the healthhazard is now possible further awayfrom the white residents of Doornkop.One of the two areas of KaNgwane thathasbeen particularly affected by cholera has beenthe township of Matsulu. This township is locatedat the southwestcorner of the Kruger NationalPark, between the Crocodile and Nsikazi Rivers.The township is partly administered bytheKaNgwane authorities, and has been described asa 'disaster', with houses containing 10 to 15people in each,packed closely together. 28 Thereare at least 11 000 squatters near Matsulutownship, some of them having beenrecentlymoved off white-owned farms throughout theeastern Transvaal. Other squatters have beenthere for months.28The township of Matsulu obtains its waterfrom reservoirs containing water piped from anirrigation canal known asthe Malelane-CrocodilePoort irrigation canal. It is this particulararea of the Crocodile River that was initiallyinfectedwith the cholera organism and wasresponsible for the outbreak of the disease. 29The Department of Health wasactually warnedmonths ago by one of its own officials thatepidemics were a grave danger in the squattersettlementsof the KaNgwane 'homeland' - however,the warning was not heeded and a pure watersource was not provided in thearea. 28It is not clear who in particular isresponsible for the water supply in the area:9.2. !Water AuthorittesHere muchthe same applied as far as sheer numbs= of authortteswere concerned. In all there must be also about fivedifferentwater authorities ,or levels~of authority, dealing with thecanal and the rivers in the area. These include LocalIrrigationBoards, the Kangwane Department of Vorks, the Zocal AdministrationBoard, the Department of Hater Affairs,the Department of Health,Welfare and Pensions.Under the circumstances it was sometimes difficult toestablishexactly WHO is responsible for WHAT:UHERE.So, for example, the canal was sometimes closed (abut off)torepair a leak in the system. The warning that this would occurdid not always reach the estimated-10 - 12 000 peoplelivingat Matsulu in time. Under normal circumstances this can bevery unpleasant. During a cholera outbreak it can bedisastrous.In the presence of an empty reservoir the inhabitants areobliged to seek other water sources - and theclosest alternativeis the open river. The canal water was out off on two known30occasions , first on 10 October andagain on 17 October.Clearly adequate water supply and sewagedisposal is not available to the people in thetownship.Many of the other sufferers of thedisease in the early stage of the epidemic wereworkers on farms and mines in thearea. At leastone inmate at a prison farm also suffered fromthe disease. 31The cholera outbreak has beenexacerbatedby climatic conditions. In the hot summer monthspeople require more water to drink and this hasbeenaggravated by the rains which have washedhuman waste matter into the rivers and canalsfrom which water isdrawn.In addition to the bureaucratic backwardnessin providing proper water, the authorities havelaid the blame onthe individuals involved,. andnot or, the state's inability or lack of willing-ness to provide these basic facilities.Justbefore the cholera outbreak there had beenproblems with the water purification in Matsulu,and in addition manypeople preferred to drawwater from the river which was nearer and wastedless time waiting in queues at the waterpoints.28The Chief Director of the eastern TransvaalAdministration Board felt the blame could beshifted sway fromthe state by saying: 28

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the KaNgwane authorities and not on the centralgovernment.It is ironic that some of the people who havebeen movedto KaNgwane have ostensibly been movedin order to promote their health. Residentsof Doornkop in the easternTransvaal were movedto KaNgwane because it was said that they did nothave proper water and sewerage facilitiesandthat the place was a health hazard. 2? It seemsapparent that present conditions are far worse,but the healthhazard is now possible further awayfrom the white residents of Doornkop.One of the two areas of KaNgwane thathasbeen particularly affected by cholera has beenthe township of Matsulu. This township is locatedat the southwestcorner of the Kruger NationalPark, between the Crocodile and Nsikazi Rivers.The township is partly administered bytheKaNgwane authorities, and has been described asa 'disaster', with houses containing 10 to 15people in each,packed closely together. 28 Thereare at least 11 000 squatters near Matsulutownship, some of them having beenrecentlymoved off white-owned farms throughout theeastern Transvaal. Other squatters have beenthere for months.28The township of Matsulu obtains its waterfrom reservoirs containing water piped from anirrigation canal known asthe Malelane-CrocodilePoort irrigation canal. It is this particulararea of the Crocodile River that was initiallyinfectedwith the cholera organism and wasresponsible for the outbreak of the disease. 29The Department of Health wasactually warnedmonths ago by one of its own officials thatepidemics were a grave danger in the squattersettlementsof the KaNgwane 'homeland' - however,the warning was not heeded and a pure watersource was not provided in thearea. 28It is not clear who in particular isresponsible for the water supply in the area:9.2. !Water AuthorittesHere muchthe same applied as far as sheer numbs= of authortteswere concerned. In all there must be also about fivedifferentwater authorities ,or levels~of authority, dealing with thecanal and the rivers in the area. These include LocalIrrigationBoards, the Kangwane Department of Vorks, the Zocal AdministrationBoard, the Department of Hater Affairs,the Department of Health,Welfare and Pensions.Under the circumstances it was sometimes difficult toestablishexactly WHO is responsible for WHAT:UHERE.So, for example, the canal was sometimes closed (abut off)torepair a leak in the system. The warning that this would occurdid not always reach the estimated-10 - 12 000 peoplelivingat Matsulu in time. Under normal circumstances this can bevery unpleasant. During a cholera outbreak it can bedisastrous.In the presence of an empty reservoir the inhabitants areobliged to seek other water sources - and theclosest alternativeis the open river. The canal water was out off on two known30occasions , first on 10 October andagain on 17 October.Clearly adequate water supply and sewagedisposal is not available to the people in thetownship.Many of the other sufferers of thedisease in the early stage of the epidemic wereworkers on farms and mines in thearea. At leastone inmate at a prison farm also suffered fromthe disease. 31The cholera outbreak has beenexacerbatedby climatic conditions. In the hot summer monthspeople require more water to drink and this hasbeenaggravated by the rains which have washedhuman waste matter into the rivers and canalsfrom which water isdrawn.In addition to the bureaucratic backwardnessin providing proper water, the authorities havelaid the blame onthe individuals involved,. andnot or, the state's inability or lack of willing-ness to provide these basic facilities.Justbefore the cholera outbreak there had beenproblems with the water purification in Matsulu,and in addition manypeople preferred to drawwater from the river which was nearer and wastedless time waiting in queues at the waterpoints.28The Chief Director of the eastern TransvaalAdministration Board felt the blame could beshifted sway fromthe state by saying: 28

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It is a wetter of education - thesepeople have been drawing water fromrivers all their lives. 'THE RESPONSE OF THESTATETHE RED of the state, thmugh the Departmentof Health and the Department of later Affairs,has beeninteresting. Plans were made over sevenyearn ago by the South African Institute ofMedical Research for thepossibility of acholera outbreak in South Africe.9 More than ayear ago, Department of Health officials preparedanin-depth report on how to deal with cholerashould it spray to South Africa. 32 The statethus acknowledged thatconditions in certainarses of South Africa were so poor as to easilyfacilitate the outbreak enQ spread of cholera.Yetnothing wan done to alter those conditionswhich hove now led to the.epideaiic.when asked why nothing had beendone toprovide clean water for squatters in Vetauluarid other nearby arena, Dr John Hoyland said,'the squatters areaproblem of the KeNpwenegovernment - I cannot speak about them'. 28Or Hoylnrd is the regional representative oftheDepartment of Health, and advises the rg%Ngw oneauthorities an health matters. He also mid that'as far as thesquatters era concerned there eraotherfactora involved which have nothing to dowith us'. 28The response of tireDepartment of InterAffairs hen been notable, in that few, if any,statements have boon weds on the issue ofmotorsupply in KeNgwane end elsewhere. The Departmentalso did not seize this opportunity to 'win thehearts and theminds of the people' by providinga pure water source to KaNgwane, a relativelysmall area. It seems that the demandsby othercommunities end squatter settlenwnts for properwater supply and sewage removal, which wouldfollow theinstallation in select areas, wouldbe too greet fort the state to meet.It seems that no authority is willing to,acceptresponsibility for the poor conditions, yetthe blame must lie with successive generationsof goverment in South Africathat have forciblyremoved people frow their lend, disrupted theindigenous subsistence economies, depleted theruralareas of able-bodied people, and taken themto work on the mines end in industry, and forciblyrelocated people intoovercrowded and unproductivepieces of land.Ooyal states that 10both the extent of contemporary healthproblems (inthe underdeveloped world)and also the evident failure to combat them,aunt be seen not as a 'natural' andunavoidablepert of life in the thirdworld, but as a consequence of a particularforty of capitalist expansion.The applicability of thispoint to theunderdeveloped rural arses of South Africa needslittle further discussion.THE DEPARTMENT-OFHEALTHTHE DEPARTMENT of health initially attempted toconceal aspects of the cholera outbreak, 33andDepartment officials agreed to discuss only'cholera in general', end not particularly inthe eastern Transvaal. Theyalso would notidentify the specific arses of the lawvald thatwere Involved. 34 The Department of Health alsoinstructedhospital officials in Hectorspruit,KeNgwena, Nslaprvit end Barberton, not to talk tothe press. 34 The ProgressiveFederal Partyspokesperson on health wee avid to have statedthat the epidemic was far note serious then theofficialdisclosures led to believe, end thatthe government should 'caws claen'.on cholerafigures. 35 More recently the stateHealthDepartment has been accused of covering up newsof the spread of cholera to Natal and arvsa.of theOrangeFree State.The Department denied that they had hiddenanything from the. public end said that they had,in fact, 'wadethe public over-anxious about the35Issue' by its revelations of every notified case.The Department considered theoutbreak ine serious light because it was a 'strange disease'which killed end 'deprived people of their boy oflife', ittaxed the time and services of thelimited number of health personnel, and it was e36pointer to defects inenvironmental health.The citizens of Nelsprvit were annoyed byreports that cholera had reached epidemicproportionsin the lowveld, as tourism in thearse wee eufferinQ.37 The town cleric accused .the Department of Health ofspreading panicwith reports of cholera. Even one or two veldschools which normally function in the areaweretemporarily closed. The Department ofHealth stepped up its public statements andencouraged tourists not to avoidthe eastern"Transvaal as long as they took basicprecautions to avoid contracting the disease.The Department. ofHealth vaguely threatenedto talks legal action against anyone who did nothelp it with its medical hygiene endeducationprogrammes to combat the disease. 38 The Departmentalso advised against employing africansfromsurrounding territories end stated that theymight take ouch action as preventing visitorsto a house where therehad been a case of choleraor preventing communal beer-drinking. 39 Thesemeasures were aimed et ensuring thatthe disusedid not spread from the arena in which itoriginated, to the surrounding white arses.The Department ofHealth became particularlyinvolved in investigating the source of theoutbreak end attempted to limit the spread Jthedisease. One of the constraints indealing with the problem was the duplicationof administrative responsibility in thearea: 40

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It is a wetter of education - thesepeople have been drawing water fromrivers all their lives. 'THE RESPONSE OF THESTATETHE RED of the state, thmugh the Departmentof Health and the Department of later Affairs,has beeninteresting. Plans were made over sevenyearn ago by the South African Institute ofMedical Research for thepossibility of acholera outbreak in South Africe.9 More than ayear ago, Department of Health officials preparedanin-depth report on how to deal with cholerashould it spray to South Africa. 32 The statethus acknowledged thatconditions in certainarses of South Africa were so poor as to easilyfacilitate the outbreak enQ spread of cholera.Yetnothing wan done to alter those conditionswhich hove now led to the.epideaiic.when asked why nothing had beendone toprovide clean water for squatters in Vetauluarid other nearby arena, Dr John Hoyland said,'the squatters areaproblem of the KeNpwenegovernment - I cannot speak about them'. 28Or Hoylnrd is the regional representative oftheDepartment of Health, and advises the rg%Ngw oneauthorities an health matters. He also mid that'as far as thesquatters era concerned there eraotherfactora involved which have nothing to dowith us'. 28The response of tireDepartment of InterAffairs hen been notable, in that few, if any,statements have boon weds on the issue ofmotorsupply in KeNgwane end elsewhere. The Departmentalso did not seize this opportunity to 'win thehearts and theminds of the people' by providinga pure water source to KaNgwane, a relativelysmall area. It seems that the demandsby othercommunities end squatter settlenwnts for properwater supply and sewage removal, which wouldfollow theinstallation in select areas, wouldbe too greet fort the state to meet.It seems that no authority is willing to,acceptresponsibility for the poor conditions, yetthe blame must lie with successive generationsof goverment in South Africathat have forciblyremoved people frow their lend, disrupted theindigenous subsistence economies, depleted theruralareas of able-bodied people, and taken themto work on the mines end in industry, and forciblyrelocated people intoovercrowded and unproductivepieces of land.Ooyal states that 10both the extent of contemporary healthproblems (inthe underdeveloped world)and also the evident failure to combat them,aunt be seen not as a 'natural' andunavoidablepert of life in the thirdworld, but as a consequence of a particularforty of capitalist expansion.The applicability of thispoint to theunderdeveloped rural arses of South Africa needslittle further discussion.THE DEPARTMENT-OFHEALTHTHE DEPARTMENT of health initially attempted toconceal aspects of the cholera outbreak, 33andDepartment officials agreed to discuss only'cholera in general', end not particularly inthe eastern Transvaal. Theyalso would notidentify the specific arses of the lawvald thatwere Involved. 34 The Department of Health alsoinstructedhospital officials in Hectorspruit,KeNgwena, Nslaprvit end Barberton, not to talk tothe press. 34 The ProgressiveFederal Partyspokesperson on health wee avid to have statedthat the epidemic was far note serious then theofficialdisclosures led to believe, end thatthe government should 'caws claen'.on cholerafigures. 35 More recently the stateHealthDepartment has been accused of covering up newsof the spread of cholera to Natal and arvsa.of theOrangeFree State.The Department denied that they had hiddenanything from the. public end said that they had,in fact, 'wadethe public over-anxious about the35Issue' by its revelations of every notified case.The Department considered theoutbreak ine serious light because it was a 'strange disease'which killed end 'deprived people of their boy oflife', ittaxed the time and services of thelimited number of health personnel, and it was e36pointer to defects inenvironmental health.The citizens of Nelsprvit were annoyed byreports that cholera had reached epidemicproportionsin the lowveld, as tourism in thearse wee eufferinQ.37 The town cleric accused .the Department of Health ofspreading panicwith reports of cholera. Even one or two veldschools which normally function in the areaweretemporarily closed. The Department ofHealth stepped up its public statements andencouraged tourists not to avoidthe eastern"Transvaal as long as they took basicprecautions to avoid contracting the disease.The Department. ofHealth vaguely threatenedto talks legal action against anyone who did nothelp it with its medical hygiene endeducationprogrammes to combat the disease. 38 The Departmentalso advised against employing africansfromsurrounding territories end stated that theymight take ouch action as preventing visitorsto a house where therehad been a case of choleraor preventing communal beer-drinking. 39 Thesemeasures were aimed et ensuring thatthe disusedid not spread from the arena in which itoriginated, to the surrounding white arses.The Department ofHealth became particularlyinvolved in investigating the source of theoutbreak end attempted to limit the spread Jthedisease. One of the constraints indealing with the problem was the duplicationof administrative responsibility in thearea: 40

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page 28Co-ordinated action requires co-ordinatedauthority. This was not always easy toensure in the face of at leastfive health BEWARE OF CHOLERA VIMBELA (CHOLERAauthorities operative in the afflicted PREVENTCHOLERMISS: HLOKOMELA LEFU LA CHOLERA TNOGOMELANI DWADZE LA CHOLERA- The Department ofHealth, Welfare andPensions of the RSA THIBELA LEFU LA CHOLERA~THIVNELANI MAKE LA CHOLERA- TheTransvaal Board for the Developmentof Pari-Urban Areas r. uw soar s.s.& Iralwe 01001 lar.w kwwslws sow.- The KaNwane Department of Health and Drinking water le the main also w w.sw 0146 ~~wetawolwwllls Item-rlLg source ofCholera iMeatbn. rwew. ,.w.w.,.~~welfare The terms respaalble for I.s.rmwls 1 1. 'x' .9"MAM m- The TransvaalProvincialAdministration 1^ the .00 a b.06- ~`Tbapsom hulinylvas Wee I'"'r- certain local authorities. ~ lsof lack ofhygiene ;I.r;'.Iwar.~.'theBesides attempting to isolate the source of f drinkh4w.Voll' Into.tthe infected water, aDepartment devoted its After drinking or handlingthis water. the patientenergy to a programme of public education.dewbve a lance number ofIiqukf stools. seosess ofPeople were advised to wash their hands before severe fit" lose Mpalso death con occur.Bating and after going to the toilet, to washfruit and vegetables with treated tap water, to TOPRE~ Cue= s ~r"'Iww, s sws as ease tr~wlwwtills bwdNft a 1M,hlb (web IV aealr t.llr ,.,wr . trrboil water before.drinking, and to build pit a.s~ t. .latrines. 4f Over 500 000 pamphlets invarious Motel eaow~1~ b someMelVe.slswlssrews.resafa.languages were distributed through alo $age$. solo segarages ^g tshwsetso Ys . Oiko42kwslle-hloko tee j e r e n Oroutes to the northern and eastern Trenavael. eholen dl flanenwe meat- 0" adwal ' s's'pe"a's're .ssk~Isle s betho. Ke belts Is wslwls.On investigation by the author it was found that tp,eksho to bophelobMweld" dlkokwale-Moke aw alsaw, no was Mw lws mss e stoad di Items rllebhlo a tus. s tool Ire e s %below& ppw*,ael in ninny cases these were notgiven out by garage, _ ROWhe ethrewsasas,lesswemwiweessswUA Mw /Ms,00-000l1rrIW1.1M1114111P.de11a-attendents as they were not told what to do with Ke,nors hors e nwe ew1wastelsl~ r VMkh them. Inaddition, the pamphlets were sometimes tolmons mow ans' iawwswis w o be Is mantle amotel snot in local languages - for exeslple, near list*"*). Re bake b heItdllshelwa ho behelo. In 01""m"e w'etIMM4IIUIA""f've . , wlrsww.Pietersburg the pamphlet appeared in Xhosa, Swazi,' teskedlkedl mtnelenO.nwkudi a it*thdws in heVends and Tsonga, but not in Northern Botho, whichis the predominant language spoken in the area. MOTHISNA CHOLERA: .47 aw.t~These pamphlets stated: r 11..L.r. f ar r,Drinking water is the vein source oft'1M.sew*,ssn`ndw.a rs,'rr'I'.~rL."rr"'cholera infection. The germs responsible s.lur.lwa-4.01for cholera are found in thestools of ;w'e~'.`s.l.human beings. Because of lack of hygiene w,~, these germs get into the drinking water.Theimpression given is that people aredeliberately unhygienic. As with much healtheducation, individuals ere accused ofignorance between South Africa and the healthdepartments Africa', end secondly that it is the responsibilityand littleattention is given to the social end of the national states are being separated and ofthe 'Black rational states' and theirhealtheconomic realities that leads to diseases of therefore totals an cholera patients cannotbe departments to dealwith this end other healththis nature. given'. 43 By -eking this separation government problesu. This categorisationofstatisticsThe Department of Health also issued a authorities firstly cAn claim that the vest according toarea of originis being applied tostatement that 'epidemiological information majority of cases have occurred 'outside South ellothernotifiable health conditions as well .

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page 28Co-ordinated action requires co-ordinatedauthority. This was not always easy toensure in the face of at leastfive health BEWARE OF CHOLERA VIMBELA (CHOLERAauthorities operative in the afflicted PREVENTCHOLERMISS: HLOKOMELA LEFU LA CHOLERA TNOGOMELANI DWADZE LA CHOLERA- The Department ofHealth, Welfare andPensions of the RSA THIBELA LEFU LA CHOLERA~THIVNELANI MAKE LA CHOLERA- TheTransvaal Board for the Developmentof Pari-Urban Areas r. uw soar s.s.& Iralwe 01001 lar.w kwwslws sow.- The KaNwane Department of Health and Drinking water le the main also w w.sw 0146 ~~wetawolwwllls Item-rlLg source ofCholera iMeatbn. rwew. ,.w.w.,.~~welfare The terms respaalble for I.s.rmwls 1 1. 'x' .9"MAM m- The TransvaalProvincialAdministration 1^ the .00 a b.06- ~`Tbapsom hulinylvas Wee I'"'r- certain local authorities. ~ lsof lack ofhygiene ;I.r;'.Iwar.~.'theBesides attempting to isolate the source of f drinkh4w.Voll' Into.tthe infected water, aDepartment devoted its After drinking or handlingthis water. the patientenergy to a programme of public education.dewbve a lance number ofIiqukf stools. seosess ofPeople were advised to wash their hands before severe fit" lose Mpalso death con occur.Bating and after going to the toilet, to washfruit and vegetables with treated tap water, to TOPRE~ Cue= s ~r"'Iww, s sws as ease tr~wlwwtills bwdNft a 1M,hlb (web IV aealr t.llr ,.,wr . trrboil water before.drinking, and to build pit a.s~ t. .latrines. 4f Over 500 000 pamphlets invarious Motel eaow~1~ b someMelVe.slswlssrews.resafa.languages were distributed through alo $age$. solo segarages ^g tshwsetso Ys . Oiko42kwslle-hloko tee j e r e n Oroutes to the northern and eastern Trenavael. eholen dl flanenwe meat- 0" adwal ' s's'pe"a's're .ssk~Isle s betho. Ke belts Is wslwls.On investigation by the author it was found that tp,eksho to bophelobMweld" dlkokwale-Moke aw alsaw, no was Mw lws mss e stoad di Items rllebhlo a tus. s tool Ire e s %below& ppw*,ael in ninny cases these were notgiven out by garage, _ ROWhe ethrewsasas,lesswemwiweessswUA Mw /Ms,00-000l1rrIW1.1M1114111P.de11a-attendents as they were not told what to do with Ke,nors hors e nwe ew1wastelsl~ r VMkh them. Inaddition, the pamphlets were sometimes tolmons mow ans' iawwswis w o be Is mantle amotel snot in local languages - for exeslple, near list*"*). Re bake b heItdllshelwa ho behelo. In 01""m"e w'etIMM4IIUIA""f've . , wlrsww.Pietersburg the pamphlet appeared in Xhosa, Swazi,' teskedlkedl mtnelenO.nwkudi a it*thdws in heVends and Tsonga, but not in Northern Botho, whichis the predominant language spoken in the area. MOTHISNA CHOLERA: .47 aw.t~These pamphlets stated: r 11..L.r. f ar r,Drinking water is the vein source oft'1M.sew*,ssn`ndw.a rs,'rr'I'.~rL."rr"'cholera infection. The germs responsible s.lur.lwa-4.01for cholera are found in thestools of ;w'e~'.`s.l.human beings. Because of lack of hygiene w,~, these germs get into the drinking water.Theimpression given is that people aredeliberately unhygienic. As with much healtheducation, individuals ere accused ofignorance between South Africa and the healthdepartments Africa', end secondly that it is the responsibilityand littleattention is given to the social end of the national states are being separated and ofthe 'Black rational states' and theirhealtheconomic realities that leads to diseases of therefore totals an cholera patients cannotbe departments to dealwith this end other healththis nature. given'. 43 By -eking this separation government problesu. This categorisationofstatisticsThe Department of Health also issued a authorities firstly cAn claim that the vest according toarea of originis being applied tostatement that 'epidemiological information majority of cases have occurred 'outside South ellothernotifiable health conditions as well .

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(see table below).This table, and tables 1, 2 and 3 reproduced from Epidemiological Comments,Dec, 1980.TABLE 1.KU10ER OP NOTIFICATIONS 81 CONDITION AND REGION / BLACK NATIONAL STATES. REPORTING PERIODJANUARY TO NOVEMBER 1980CONDITION REGIONS BLACK NATIONAL STATES tIflNIPI~UENDANT IIZALT19REGION OP BSA SELF - GOVERNINGCAPE CAPE CAPE TVL TVL CIS GAZAR EWA .LEAD QUA KAN THAI IRANI:N.\\UCODE WANE EAST WEST WORTH NATAL OPS SOUTH NORTH TOTAL LEI SULU ZULU WA QUA GYANE_YANA SKEI VLNDATOTAL TI)TAL.0020 TTPMOID 49, S6 IS 312 054 201 643 1330 36 165 456 427 0 675 39 10259 1959 327'1632 DITIA.-" T" d 8- 7 --0 31 D 16 0 ~~ - 0 - ' 0 0 e 41030 LEPwST 3 2 3 14 6 36 2 6 1 0 7 4 0 3 0 1 017 83064 MALARIA 2 3 2 281 1 59 1175 1523 0 131 661 13 0 i54 0 0 86 1468 2991oi5 MEASLES 2134 1162 3981760 793 3169 564 10000 ;58 77 2214 1369 0 215 631 S41 128 s5s3 15 S3 :036 MERitIGOCOCCAL INFECTION 31661 31 32 Id 110 12 895 6 0 Id 11 0 7 13 3 .3 74 96,045 PDLIDKTRLITIS to 9 2 11 1 12 4 49 6 2 13 4 0 3 1 20 0 499037 MAKES 10 2 10 38 6 30 13 109 3 7 st 27 0 18 2 11 1 120 :z~1Ott Ts P641021RT 5137 6527 16 ii 2977 223311306 897 30728 1914 202 2982 9" 0 558 1331 2545 117 10623 41351013 TD OP MmIRm 37 33 92 33 7 S5 2 IS919 0 It 2 0 1 6 27 1 67 izo010-8 TD TQM_ 2 6811 1695 3060 2256 UJ65 og 3 11443 19505 202 30SJ . 913 0__ 57+_._1354.-2614 X88 1095342246117111 TIRAL OFF TTPR A 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 O 3 1117113 VIRAI. IIEP TYPE-R 6 3O 1 11 11 1 11 11 U .m 11 0 9 1 11 11 111 210705 VIRAL REP TYPE 11011 A 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1) 1, 11 11 .i1 ,1 20709 VIRAL 11EP DRDPRC 136 153 55 266 43 485 44 1232 24 3 66 23 0 36 053 IS 5 2:05 1:117.070 VIRALULF TOTAL 144 262 55 267 43 485 45 1301 24 3 66 23 0 48 i4 15 5 236 1539TOTAL 7636 5975 2211 5102 317815566 3360 4675- 2392 447 6589 2801 0 2094 20.13 ;313 170 2033967091IAI.L SIAMirICS ARE JIILIRCT TOUPDATING AND RirI.ECT AVAILABLE FSYORMAT101 A5 Ar Key DATE(02/12/40)In summary then, the role of theDepartment PLSLIC HEALTH AND DID the country in 1980 occurred inKaNgwane, inhas been to attempt to suppressinforwation about THE DEPARTMENT of Health has also takenthis which fewer than 1% of the total population ofthedisease, to atteRpt to prevent the spread opportunity to publicise itsprimary health care South Africa live. 45of thedisease to white areas, to shift the programmes and to boast that SouthAfrican Tuberculosis is rife in KaNgwane, thenumberresponsibility for dealing with the disease and services are better than many elsewhere. This ofcasesoccurring there being more than doubleits causes firstly onto the individual and emphasis on primary health careandpreventative the rate for the rest of South Africa, and highersecondly onto the 'Black national states' and medicinegives the impression that theDepartment than in any of the other 'homelands'. 45 Althoughaway from Pretoria. At thesame time the has the correct approach and is doing all it can figuresof officially reported cases of anydiseaseDepartment has neglected to do anything about the to promote health for all people in SouthAfrica. must beviewed with caution, it is clear thatmare common and dangerous preventable diseases As we have already sgen, thisis not thecase. KaNgwane is susceptible to many diseases.found in rural arses In fact, it is notable that theDepartment has However, little, if anything,has been done toClearly, however, the -Departmentof Health shown littleinterest in other preventablediseases overcome the basic factors leading to the highcannot possibly eradicate thedisease and it 'is which occur commonly in KaNgwane:4 rates of thediseases of underdevelopment in that,likely to bepresent for a long time yet - KaNgwane is susceptible to most of the and other,areas.quiescent at times, only to breakout and spread diseases commonly occurring in developingcountries. Those most prevalent are Why then has therebean such a flurry ofwith renewed intensity'. The Department cannot venereal disease, bilharzia,tuberculosis, activityrelating to cholera? It seems thatovercam the diseases of underdevelopment, such malaria, other infectious andparssiticaldiseases and typhoid fever: The last the fear of cholera, which has connotations of 1as cholera, because itdoes not tackle the causes mentioned and infectious hepatitis result arapidly spreading fetal disease, has becometheof diseases such as this. In fact, to tackle them from poor standards of sanitation and waterwould be to tackle theSouth African state end supply in Ktwane authors emphasis).prime influence in all this activity. Fear ofA startling factis that more than 209 of the disease spreading to 'white' areas is thethe political and economic factors whichpreservethe cases of typhoid fever reported from throughout major factor in the massive press publicityandthe statusquo. attention that the disease has achieved. In pointIsm

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(see table below).This table, and tables 1, 2 and 3 reproduced from Epidemiological Comments,Dec, 1980.TABLE 1.KU10ER OP NOTIFICATIONS 81 CONDITION AND REGION / BLACK NATIONAL STATES. REPORTING PERIODJANUARY TO NOVEMBER 1980CONDITION REGIONS BLACK NATIONAL STATES tIflNIPI~UENDANT IIZALT19REGION OP BSA SELF - GOVERNINGCAPE CAPE CAPE TVL TVL CIS GAZAR EWA .LEAD QUA KAN THAI IRANI:N.\\UCODE WANE EAST WEST WORTH NATAL OPS SOUTH NORTH TOTAL LEI SULU ZULU WA QUA GYANE_YANA SKEI VLNDATOTAL TI)TAL.0020 TTPMOID 49, S6 IS 312 054 201 643 1330 36 165 456 427 0 675 39 10259 1959 327'1632 DITIA.-" T" d 8- 7 --0 31 D 16 0 ~~ - 0 - ' 0 0 e 41030 LEPwST 3 2 3 14 6 36 2 6 1 0 7 4 0 3 0 1 017 83064 MALARIA 2 3 2 281 1 59 1175 1523 0 131 661 13 0 i54 0 0 86 1468 2991oi5 MEASLES 2134 1162 3981760 793 3169 564 10000 ;58 77 2214 1369 0 215 631 S41 128 s5s3 15 S3 :036 MERitIGOCOCCAL INFECTION 31661 31 32 Id 110 12 895 6 0 Id 11 0 7 13 3 .3 74 96,045 PDLIDKTRLITIS to 9 2 11 1 12 4 49 6 2 13 4 0 3 1 20 0 499037 MAKES 10 2 10 38 6 30 13 109 3 7 st 27 0 18 2 11 1 120 :z~1Ott Ts P641021RT 5137 6527 16 ii 2977 223311306 897 30728 1914 202 2982 9" 0 558 1331 2545 117 10623 41351013 TD OP MmIRm 37 33 92 33 7 S5 2 IS919 0 It 2 0 1 6 27 1 67 izo010-8 TD TQM_ 2 6811 1695 3060 2256 UJ65 og 3 11443 19505 202 30SJ . 913 0__ 57+_._1354.-2614 X88 1095342246117111 TIRAL OFF TTPR A 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 O 3 1117113 VIRAI. IIEP TYPE-R 6 3O 1 11 11 1 11 11 U .m 11 0 9 1 11 11 111 210705 VIRAL REP TYPE 11011 A 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1) 1, 11 11 .i1 ,1 20709 VIRAL 11EP DRDPRC 136 153 55 266 43 485 44 1232 24 3 66 23 0 36 053 IS 5 2:05 1:117.070 VIRALULF TOTAL 144 262 55 267 43 485 45 1301 24 3 66 23 0 48 i4 15 5 236 1539TOTAL 7636 5975 2211 5102 317815566 3360 4675- 2392 447 6589 2801 0 2094 20.13 ;313 170 2033967091IAI.L SIAMirICS ARE JIILIRCT TOUPDATING AND RirI.ECT AVAILABLE FSYORMAT101 A5 Ar Key DATE(02/12/40)In summary then, the role of theDepartment PLSLIC HEALTH AND DID the country in 1980 occurred inKaNgwane, inhas been to attempt to suppressinforwation about THE DEPARTMENT of Health has also takenthis which fewer than 1% of the total population ofthedisease, to atteRpt to prevent the spread opportunity to publicise itsprimary health care South Africa live. 45of thedisease to white areas, to shift the programmes and to boast that SouthAfrican Tuberculosis is rife in KaNgwane, thenumberresponsibility for dealing with the disease and services are better than many elsewhere. This ofcasesoccurring there being more than doubleits causes firstly onto the individual and emphasis on primary health careandpreventative the rate for the rest of South Africa, and highersecondly onto the 'Black national states' and medicinegives the impression that theDepartment than in any of the other 'homelands'. 45 Althoughaway from Pretoria. At thesame time the has the correct approach and is doing all it can figuresof officially reported cases of anydiseaseDepartment has neglected to do anything about the to promote health for all people in SouthAfrica. must beviewed with caution, it is clear thatmare common and dangerous preventable diseases As we have already sgen, thisis not thecase. KaNgwane is susceptible to many diseases.found in rural arses In fact, it is notable that theDepartment has However, little, if anything,has been done toClearly, however, the -Departmentof Health shown littleinterest in other preventablediseases overcome the basic factors leading to the highcannot possibly eradicate thedisease and it 'is which occur commonly in KaNgwane:4 rates of thediseases of underdevelopment in that,likely to bepresent for a long time yet - KaNgwane is susceptible to most of the and other,areas.quiescent at times, only to breakout and spread diseases commonly occurring in developingcountries. Those most prevalent are Why then has therebean such a flurry ofwith renewed intensity'. The Department cannot venereal disease, bilharzia,tuberculosis, activityrelating to cholera? It seems thatovercam the diseases of underdevelopment, such malaria, other infectious andparssiticaldiseases and typhoid fever: The last the fear of cholera, which has connotations of 1as cholera, because itdoes not tackle the causes mentioned and infectious hepatitis result arapidly spreading fetal disease, has becometheof diseases such as this. In fact, to tackle them from poor standards of sanitation and waterwould be to tackle theSouth African state end supply in Ktwane authors emphasis).prime influence in all this activity. Fear ofA startling factis that more than 209 of the disease spreading to 'white' areas is thethe political and economic factors whichpreservethe cases of typhoid fever reported from throughout major factor in the massive press publicityandthe statusquo. attention that the disease has achieved. In pointIsm

Page 66 of 171

page 30of fact, cholera is a relatively minor disease, Table 1. POPAILATION ESTIMATES B HEALTH REGION.1970- 1980. (x 1 000and far less important as a cause of death and -illness than numerous other diseases. There were,forexample, over 40 000 cases of tuberculosis YCAR N E A L T N R E G I 0 Nin South Africa in 198045 but this diseasehas SAM Los- . "a! VateL 0F.S ana s w. TOTALnot received even a fraction of the publicity given East . West NorthSouth No 1 i0to cholera. Infantile gastro-enteritis, a major 'killer of infants in rural areas, has received 1970 1 56,2 2184,7 588,6 2 191,6 1 689,0 5 611,2 .901,3 14 760,8little, if any, attention from the health 1971 1 583,6 2 211,9 595,92 223,7 1 702,9 5 754,0 919,3 1991,3authorities because it poses no threat to the 1972 1603,3 2 239,4 603,3 2 256,2. 1 716,9 586990 937,7 15 225,8white population of South Africa.1973 1 623,3 2 267,2 610,1 2 289,2 1731,0 S 986,3956, 15 164,2The origins of pubiic health in Europe,as well as the origins of the colonial health 1974 1 613,4 2295,4618,4 2 322,7 1 7453 6 116,1 975,5 15706,7services, offer much to explain the current ^1975 1 663,9 2 323,9 626,1 2356,7 1 759,6 6 228,0 995,8 15953,2focus of activity on cholera. 1976 1 684,6 2 352,8 633,8 2 391,2 1 774,1 6 352,51 014,9 16 203,9Public health services in Europe began in anattempt to prevent the privileged classes from 19171705,5 2 382,1 611,7 2 426,2 1 781,7 6 479,5 1135,216 58,9succumbing to the diseases of the poor: 46 1978 1 726,72 411,7 649,7 2 161,6 1 803, 6 609,1 1 055,9 16718,0The 'condition of the working class' was 1979 1 748,2 2 11,6657,7 2 497,7 1 811,2 6 71,1 1 077,0 16981,5a topic of considerable concern in Britainthroughout the nineteenthcentury. The 1960 1 769,9 2 472,0 665,9 2531,2 ! 133,2 6 875,9 1 098,5 1729,6ill health of the urban proletariatposedan immediate threat of infection to theinhabitants of the wealthier parts of town,while at the same timeepitomising the danger 1 A T I 0 N A L S T A T E Sof the slums as a breeding ground for awide range of socialproblems... Attemptsby the expanding central and local stateapparatus to solve these problems were ~NR'r8'A'concentrated on public health measures- the control of disease through the 1 353,6 27,3 2 156,1 1 113,2 25,121,1. 1470,6 18 181,2provision of clean water, sewerage disposal, 1m 375,0 290,0 2 22,1 1 169,1 31,7 12,4 14991,3 19224,3and some slum clearance.Thus, the factor which led to the starting 1972 397,6 306,5 2 331,5 1229,33996 128,1 15 225,1 19 658,3of public health programmes was not concern for .1973 21,6 324,0 2 424,5 1 29191 9,131,6 15 461,2 20107,1the poor exploited masses who suffered from thediseases, but rather fear of catching these1971 147,1 312,5 2521,2 1 357,5 61,6 135,3 15 716,7 70 571,1infectious diseases from the poor, and also 1975474,1 362,1 2 621,8 1 426,6 76,8 139,1 15 953,2 21 053,7concern that the working class would become 19'6 502,7382,7 2 726,3 1 491,1 95,9 13,1 16 203,9 21 553j7sick and, therefore, far less productive.1977 533,1 401,6 2835,1 1575,4 119,7 17,1 16 51,9 22 073,9With regard to cholera in particular Doyalcontinues by saying that 57 1978 565,327,7 2 918,1 1655,5 19,3 151,3 16 718,1 22 615,2it was fear of infectious disease in general ig* 599,4 182,1 3 065,71739,7 186,3 155,6 16 911,5 23 180,3and - after the epidemics of the 1830s and_ 1910 635,6 477,9 3 118,0 1 821,2232,5 160,1 17 29,6 23 771,1

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page 30of fact, cholera is a relatively minor disease, Table 1. POPAILATION ESTIMATES B HEALTH REGION.1970- 1980. (x 1 000and far less important as a cause of death and -illness than numerous other diseases. There were,forexample, over 40 000 cases of tuberculosis YCAR N E A L T N R E G I 0 Nin South Africa in 198045 but this diseasehas SAM Los- . "a! VateL 0F.S ana s w. TOTALnot received even a fraction of the publicity given East . West NorthSouth No 1 i0to cholera. Infantile gastro-enteritis, a major 'killer of infants in rural areas, has received 1970 1 56,2 2184,7 588,6 2 191,6 1 689,0 5 611,2 .901,3 14 760,8little, if any, attention from the health 1971 1 583,6 2 211,9 595,92 223,7 1 702,9 5 754,0 919,3 1991,3authorities because it poses no threat to the 1972 1603,3 2 239,4 603,3 2 256,2. 1 716,9 586990 937,7 15 225,8white population of South Africa.1973 1 623,3 2 267,2 610,1 2 289,2 1731,0 S 986,3956, 15 164,2The origins of pubiic health in Europe,as well as the origins of the colonial health 1974 1 613,4 2295,4618,4 2 322,7 1 7453 6 116,1 975,5 15706,7services, offer much to explain the current ^1975 1 663,9 2 323,9 626,1 2356,7 1 759,6 6 228,0 995,8 15953,2focus of activity on cholera. 1976 1 684,6 2 352,8 633,8 2 391,2 1 774,1 6 352,51 014,9 16 203,9Public health services in Europe began in anattempt to prevent the privileged classes from 19171705,5 2 382,1 611,7 2 426,2 1 781,7 6 479,5 1135,216 58,9succumbing to the diseases of the poor: 46 1978 1 726,72 411,7 649,7 2 161,6 1 803, 6 609,1 1 055,9 16718,0The 'condition of the working class' was 1979 1 748,2 2 11,6657,7 2 497,7 1 811,2 6 71,1 1 077,0 16981,5a topic of considerable concern in Britainthroughout the nineteenthcentury. The 1960 1 769,9 2 472,0 665,9 2531,2 ! 133,2 6 875,9 1 098,5 1729,6ill health of the urban proletariatposedan immediate threat of infection to theinhabitants of the wealthier parts of town,while at the same timeepitomising the danger 1 A T I 0 N A L S T A T E Sof the slums as a breeding ground for awide range of socialproblems... Attemptsby the expanding central and local stateapparatus to solve these problems were ~NR'r8'A'concentrated on public health measures- the control of disease through the 1 353,6 27,3 2 156,1 1 113,2 25,121,1. 1470,6 18 181,2provision of clean water, sewerage disposal, 1m 375,0 290,0 2 22,1 1 169,1 31,7 12,4 14991,3 19224,3and some slum clearance.Thus, the factor which led to the starting 1972 397,6 306,5 2 331,5 1229,33996 128,1 15 225,1 19 658,3of public health programmes was not concern for .1973 21,6 324,0 2 424,5 1 29191 9,131,6 15 461,2 20107,1the poor exploited masses who suffered from thediseases, but rather fear of catching these1971 147,1 312,5 2521,2 1 357,5 61,6 135,3 15 716,7 70 571,1infectious diseases from the poor, and also 1975474,1 362,1 2 621,8 1 426,6 76,8 139,1 15 953,2 21 053,7concern that the working class would become 19'6 502,7382,7 2 726,3 1 491,1 95,9 13,1 16 203,9 21 553j7sick and, therefore, far less productive.1977 533,1 401,6 2835,1 1575,4 119,7 17,1 16 51,9 22 073,9With regard to cholera in particular Doyalcontinues by saying that 57 1978 565,327,7 2 918,1 1655,5 19,3 151,3 16 718,1 22 615,2it was fear of infectious disease in general ig* 599,4 182,1 3 065,71739,7 186,3 155,6 16 911,5 23 180,3and - after the epidemics of the 1830s and_ 1910 635,6 477,9 3 118,0 1 821,2232,5 160,1 17 29,6 23 771,1

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page 311840s - of cholera in particular, whichmotivated middle-class support for publiclablc E. health legislation.Cholera was noCAL SBEB OF UOTIFICATIOUS OF ALL FORM 0f TUBERCULHSIS PER KAM ofamr respecter ofthe socialstatus of indivi-duals. It attacked the poor and theApo IATIOIAL STATIC. 1971 10 1979. 901tTM AFRICA.respectable middle-class indiscrimantly(Author's note - in those timesR E A L T H B E 6 I 0 1 . parts of working classand middle classareas were supplied with the same water.~~l U-F-S~ ~_ ~w ~T~ Thus, for the middle-cress inVictoriancities, public health reform was animportant form of self-defence againstcontagion spreading outwards fromthe slums.1971. 7 $13 5 875 1956 6731 1 841 12 M 3 131 41 901 It was also felt in Victorian England that1972 a 1656 074 2 170 7671 1 609 14 376 2927 43 192disease end ill health-made people poor, end that1973 7 495 6 610 1713 7 599 1 779 13 512 1 116 40 704 disease therefore increased the number of peoplerequiring poor relief. This isan additional1974 9 163 7 521 2 014 7 3B3 2 135 13 624 1121 43 564 reason for public health legislation.4?.1975 10B11 7 511 1627 1 173 1933 13 167 1,129 45 795 The origins of colonial health policyreflected similar priorities:481976 1 111 7 217 1 469 7 411' 2 A11 13 917 1 624 42 55BThe East African medical department was1977 . 6 1017236 1 716 6 611 2 429 13 626 1 441 39 173 instructed firstly to 'preserve the health'of the European community,secondly to keep1971 & 212 7 511 2 159 6313 2561 13055 1137 39 731 the African and Asian labour force in1979 5933 B 61s 2 113 4690 2718 1s 111 1 361 40 507 reasonable working condition and lastlyprevent the spread ofepidemics.190 Similar reasons have been put forward toA T I 0 II A L S T A T E S explain thepublic health approachto dealingwith cholera in South Africa. It is interestingCiakel Cozaakalm Kwazulu I Total TOTAL that privatecompanies haveprinted, at theirR-S-A ~ own cost health educational material on1971 859 - - 0 911 U 161 cholera, 42so as to prevent the loss of work91 - 1 resulting from workers contracting the disease.1977 120 105 1 162 45 - - 43192 45_3241973 362. 312 3327 1 421 - 6 40 701 46 132 CONCLUSION1974 4" 332 2929 157 - - 13 561 18 887IT ISclear from the article that cholera cannotbe viewed merely as a tropical disease, but must197-9 1 291 499 3 153 1778 - - 45 795 52 B19 be seen within the context of a web of migrant1976 1551 513 3 242 1 552 - - 2 551 49 441labour, forced resettlement, overcrowding and1977 1 093 442 2 216 1 451 - - 39 173 45 074 poor communityservices. These factors must be1978 1 267 467 2 007 1 07 - 123 39 731 45 199 seen as resulting from thedevelopment ofcapitalism and the apartheid policy in South1979 1 563 373 3 013 1511 169 671 40 SB7 47 966Africa.1910 The article has attempted to discuss theorigins of the cholera outbreak in South Africa,

Page 69 of 171

page 311840s - of cholera in particular, whichmotivated middle-class support for publiclablc E. health legislation.Cholera was noCAL SBEB OF UOTIFICATIOUS OF ALL FORM 0f TUBERCULHSIS PER KAM ofamr respecter ofthe socialstatus of indivi-duals. It attacked the poor and theApo IATIOIAL STATIC. 1971 10 1979. 901tTM AFRICA.respectable middle-class indiscrimantly(Author's note - in those timesR E A L T H B E 6 I 0 1 . parts of working classand middle classareas were supplied with the same water.~~l U-F-S~ ~_ ~w ~T~ Thus, for the middle-cress inVictoriancities, public health reform was animportant form of self-defence againstcontagion spreading outwards fromthe slums.1971. 7 $13 5 875 1956 6731 1 841 12 M 3 131 41 901 It was also felt in Victorian England that1972 a 1656 074 2 170 7671 1 609 14 376 2927 43 192disease end ill health-made people poor, end that1973 7 495 6 610 1713 7 599 1 779 13 512 1 116 40 704 disease therefore increased the number of peoplerequiring poor relief. This isan additional1974 9 163 7 521 2 014 7 3B3 2 135 13 624 1121 43 564 reason for public health legislation.4?.1975 10B11 7 511 1627 1 173 1933 13 167 1,129 45 795 The origins of colonial health policyreflected similar priorities:481976 1 111 7 217 1 469 7 411' 2 A11 13 917 1 624 42 55BThe East African medical department was1977 . 6 1017236 1 716 6 611 2 429 13 626 1 441 39 173 instructed firstly to 'preserve the health'of the European community,secondly to keep1971 & 212 7 511 2 159 6313 2561 13055 1137 39 731 the African and Asian labour force in1979 5933 B 61s 2 113 4690 2718 1s 111 1 361 40 507 reasonable working condition and lastlyprevent the spread ofepidemics.190 Similar reasons have been put forward toA T I 0 II A L S T A T E S explain thepublic health approachto dealingwith cholera in South Africa. It is interestingCiakel Cozaakalm Kwazulu I Total TOTAL that privatecompanies haveprinted, at theirR-S-A ~ own cost health educational material on1971 859 - - 0 911 U 161 cholera, 42so as to prevent the loss of work91 - 1 resulting from workers contracting the disease.1977 120 105 1 162 45 - - 43192 45_3241973 362. 312 3327 1 421 - 6 40 701 46 132 CONCLUSION1974 4" 332 2929 157 - - 13 561 18 887IT ISclear from the article that cholera cannotbe viewed merely as a tropical disease, but must197-9 1 291 499 3 153 1778 - - 45 795 52 B19 be seen within the context of a web of migrant1976 1551 513 3 242 1 552 - - 2 551 49 441labour, forced resettlement, overcrowding and1977 1 093 442 2 216 1 451 - - 39 173 45 074 poor communityservices. These factors must be1978 1 267 467 2 007 1 07 - 123 39 731 45 199 seen as resulting from thedevelopment ofcapitalism and the apartheid policy in South1979 1 563 373 3 013 1511 169 671 40 SB7 47 966Africa.1910 The article has attempted to discuss theorigins of the cholera outbreak in South Africa,

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page 32the. nature of the disease itself, the major areain wnich it has occurred, and the activities of Tabl! 3.theDepartment of Health in dealing with the THE ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE RATE OF ALL FORMS OFT1ERCU515PER HEALTH RF-0100epidemic. Historical factors relating to cholera A80 wATTpyA, STATE. 1971 TO 1979. 71MAFRICA=PER ESTDOATED 100 000 L0MTI0R=were looked at in order to show that this is iiTlargely a diseaserelated to underdevelopmentN E A L T 11 R E C I 8 1and has not been limited to so-called 'tropicalcountries'. A focuson the origins of public TIORM T"-W Totalhealth was given in order to demonstrate some Eat West North J2gM MA0422ionaof the factors influencing the state in dealing1971 493 266 321 303 108 223 417 273with the presentepidemic.Finally, it is hoped that through this paper 1972 Sag 271 360 318 105 215 312 284people will gain anunderstanding of the 1973 474 298 181 328 103 226 1!0 263relationship between underdevelopment and poor 1974551 328 326 318 122 223 187 277health, and will realise that cholera is butone example of many diseases related to1M &SO 325 2" 347 110 223 181 287underdevelopment. It thus becomes apparent that 1976 491 307 232 310 158219 168 263the solution to cholera lies neither in the 1977 3" 3M 267 273 136 210 141 242provision of healthservices, nor merely in the1971 364 313 332 266 142 198 174 238development of sanitary living conditions,butimplies the eradication of the unequal access 1979 339 313 721 118 137 223 126 239to wealth, resources, andpolitical power which 190are present in the country. Only when the majorityof the people control the resources whichinfluencehealth will health for all be promoted. 1 A T I, 0 11A L~ 2 T A T E SAnthony Zwi 1971 Roo# 13 223It is hopedthat an article of this nature provides 12 ROG*. Roo* 80 move. 231information that can be used by communities and1~y moo* !6 137 111 - 229other groups to understand the relationshipbetween ill health and socio-political factors1974 Roe. 91 116 118 231in our society. Through this understandingissues related to health may serve to provide 1MM 131 132 121 251a starting point for community action.1976 309 142 119 184 - 279Any committee or group wishingto obtain furtherinformation on cholera or other prevalent 1977 205 109 n n .. 204diseases, may contact the editorswho willput them in touch with resource people. 1978 224 109 i6 97 ROG* 210REFERENCES 1979 261 85 98 91 91431 2061. Epidemiological Comments,Department of Health,Welfare and Pensions, October 1960. 1990

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page 32the. nature of the disease itself, the major areain wnich it has occurred, and the activities of Tabl! 3.theDepartment of Health in dealing with the THE ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE RATE OF ALL FORMS OFT1ERCU515PER HEALTH RF-0100epidemic. Historical factors relating to cholera A80 wATTpyA, STATE. 1971 TO 1979. 71MAFRICA=PER ESTDOATED 100 000 L0MTI0R=were looked at in order to show that this is iiTlargely a diseaserelated to underdevelopmentN E A L T 11 R E C I 8 1and has not been limited to so-called 'tropicalcountries'. A focuson the origins of public TIORM T"-W Totalhealth was given in order to demonstrate some Eat West North J2gM MA0422ionaof the factors influencing the state in dealing1971 493 266 321 303 108 223 417 273with the presentepidemic.Finally, it is hoped that through this paper 1972 Sag 271 360 318 105 215 312 284people will gain anunderstanding of the 1973 474 298 181 328 103 226 1!0 263relationship between underdevelopment and poor 1974551 328 326 318 122 223 187 277health, and will realise that cholera is butone example of many diseases related to1M &SO 325 2" 347 110 223 181 287underdevelopment. It thus becomes apparent that 1976 491 307 232 310 158219 168 263the solution to cholera lies neither in the 1977 3" 3M 267 273 136 210 141 242provision of healthservices, nor merely in the1971 364 313 332 266 142 198 174 238development of sanitary living conditions,butimplies the eradication of the unequal access 1979 339 313 721 118 137 223 126 239to wealth, resources, andpolitical power which 190are present in the country. Only when the majorityof the people control the resources whichinfluencehealth will health for all be promoted. 1 A T I, 0 11A L~ 2 T A T E SAnthony Zwi 1971 Roo# 13 223It is hopedthat an article of this nature provides 12 ROG*. Roo* 80 move. 231information that can be used by communities and1~y moo* !6 137 111 - 229other groups to understand the relationshipbetween ill health and socio-political factors1974 Roe. 91 116 118 231in our society. Through this understandingissues related to health may serve to provide 1MM 131 132 121 251a starting point for community action.1976 309 142 119 184 - 279Any committee or group wishingto obtain furtherinformation on cholera or other prevalent 1977 205 109 n n .. 204diseases, may contact the editorswho willput them in touch with resource people. 1978 224 109 i6 97 ROG* 210REFERENCES 1979 261 85 98 91 91431 2061. Epidemiological Comments,Department of Health,Welfare and Pensions, October 1960. 1990

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psgc 332. ROM, 23.01.81.3. Dr C Mackenzie, Medical Officer of Health,Durban, Sunday Tribune, 02.10.80.4. PG vanSchalkwyk, Chief Director of theeastern Transvaal Administration Board,Sunday Express, 09.11.60.5. Waitzkin,H - 'AMarxist View of Medical Care'in Annals of Internal Medicine, vol 89,pp 264-78, 1978.6. 'Beyond Community Medicine:The exploitationof Disease and the Disease of Exploitation' inCritical li-~alth, 1, January 1980.7. 'Development andUnderdevelopment' inCritical Health, 2, April, 1980.8. Department of Health Document, 'Cholera',17.10.80.9. Bacteria,Newsletter of the SA Institute ofMedical Research, 6, 1980.10. Dayal - The Political Economy of Health (PlutoPress,London, 1979:101)11. Backer and Rose - Epidemiology in MedicalPractice (Churchill Livingstone,Edinburgh,1976).12. Hobson (ed) - Theory and Practice of PublicHealth (5th edition, OUP, Oxford, 1979).13.Epidemiological Comments, Department of Health,October, 1980, p5.14. KaNgwane Economic Revue, BENSO,Pretoria,1978:5.15. Population Removals (DSG/SARS InformationPublication 3, 1980':5).16. BENSO, 1978:20.17aHarrell, M - The African Homelands of SouthAfrica (SAIRR, 1973:39).17b Harrell, 1973:26.18. Afrika, November,1980.19. BENSO, 1978:23.20. Ihi[j, p36.21. Ibid, p33.Ibid, p19.Ibid, p26.Ibid, p1D.ROM, 16..75.79.Survey of RaceRelations, 1979:318-9.ROM, 29.07.80.Sunday Express, 09.11.80.Epidemiological Comments, Department ofHealth,October, 1980.Ibid, p14.Ibid, p19.Ibid, p2.Sunday Express, 26.10.80.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34. ADM,03.11.80.35. ROM, 01.12.60.36. Star, 03.12.80.37. Star, 04.11.60.38. Star, 30.10.80.39. Department of Health, memoon choleracontrol.40. Epidemiological Comments, Department of Health,October, 1980:13.41. 'Prevent Cholera',Department of Healthpamphlet, 1980.42. Salvo, Department of Health, Welfare andPensions, vol 4,9, January,1981.43. RDM, 09.01.81.44. BENSO, 1978:52.45. Epidemiological` Comments, Department ofHealth, December,1980.46. Ooyal, p141.47. Ibid, p142.46. Ibid, p241.cwwa ON* MOZAMBIQUE.

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psgc 332. ROM, 23.01.81.3. Dr C Mackenzie, Medical Officer of Health,Durban, Sunday Tribune, 02.10.80.4. PG vanSchalkwyk, Chief Director of theeastern Transvaal Administration Board,Sunday Express, 09.11.60.5. Waitzkin,H - 'AMarxist View of Medical Care'in Annals of Internal Medicine, vol 89,pp 264-78, 1978.6. 'Beyond Community Medicine:The exploitationof Disease and the Disease of Exploitation' inCritical li-~alth, 1, January 1980.7. 'Development andUnderdevelopment' inCritical Health, 2, April, 1980.8. Department of Health Document, 'Cholera',17.10.80.9. Bacteria,Newsletter of the SA Institute ofMedical Research, 6, 1980.10. Dayal - The Political Economy of Health (PlutoPress,London, 1979:101)11. Backer and Rose - Epidemiology in MedicalPractice (Churchill Livingstone,Edinburgh,1976).12. Hobson (ed) - Theory and Practice of PublicHealth (5th edition, OUP, Oxford, 1979).13.Epidemiological Comments, Department of Health,October, 1980, p5.14. KaNgwane Economic Revue, BENSO,Pretoria,1978:5.15. Population Removals (DSG/SARS InformationPublication 3, 1980':5).16. BENSO, 1978:20.17aHarrell, M - The African Homelands of SouthAfrica (SAIRR, 1973:39).17b Harrell, 1973:26.18. Afrika, November,1980.19. BENSO, 1978:23.20. Ihi[j, p36.21. Ibid, p33.Ibid, p19.Ibid, p26.Ibid, p1D.ROM, 16..75.79.Survey of RaceRelations, 1979:318-9.ROM, 29.07.80.Sunday Express, 09.11.80.Epidemiological Comments, Department ofHealth,October, 1980.Ibid, p14.Ibid, p19.Ibid, p2.Sunday Express, 26.10.80.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34. ADM,03.11.80.35. ROM, 01.12.60.36. Star, 03.12.80.37. Star, 04.11.60.38. Star, 30.10.80.39. Department of Health, memoon choleracontrol.40. Epidemiological Comments, Department of Health,October, 1980:13.41. 'Prevent Cholera',Department of Healthpamphlet, 1980.42. Salvo, Department of Health, Welfare andPensions, vol 4,9, January,1981.43. RDM, 09.01.81.44. BENSO, 1978:52.45. Epidemiological` Comments, Department ofHealth, December,1980.46. Ooyal, p141.47. Ibid, p142.46. Ibid, p241.cwwa ON* MOZAMBIQUE.

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CRITICAL HEALTH- 1cc::1Ibl:.Io:.1l et30 nts r cybetween health and society 1n South Africa.CRITICAL HEALTHattempts to shot that betterhealth can only be achieved in a democraticSouth Africa.CRITICAL HEALTH lookscritically et thestate of health In South Africa.CRITICAL HEALTH pristnts the view thathealth Is the concern ofall.CRITICAL HEALTH provides a progressiveperspective an current health Issues.CRITICAL HEALTH explodescommon myths abouthealth and acts as a forum for the exchange01 health ideas.If you rant to subscribe to the next1editions of CRITICAL HEALTH, send 81.20(plus postage if outside Southern Africato:CRITICAL HEALTHc/oMEDICAL STUDENTS COUNCILPITS MEDICAL SCHOOLESSELER STREETJOHANNESBURGtool.1117011!>BSY70lIB.subwnSe to... AFRIa quarterly journal.started is 1974. attlsyLl to rai11 the11.11 of discussion 1a African,partioalarly(I !>~j'~6oathera African 1twt1, through articlethat art both theoretical and factual, bolkhistorical andcurrent. 601 ofofivs.PERSPEGTIV~YAITE 20t1W BOX 322s1. 7"1!01"l1. JOB111~16R0, 2017..ladlabourunderdev,slopment.1,ndustrial conflict.bbeen about resettlemen won state andtaltrial conflict. ~ U_`` : ;the ro 1 of thereserves In 6...looalpolitical bodiesand the growcapitalist agriculture.African countries which have been looked atareMosaabique,Utaada,iaasania alola,ladbla,aad1Sairl.Iesn11 planned rill fooul on the socialconsequences or the u11or machinery In S.A.indnatry,and on the South*= African states.LOC1L SUBSCRIPTIONS-13 So 70R 4 1380315.P062GB IIKANGWANETHE CREATION of the new KaNgwene bantustan isa prime example of the process of'ethnification'of the South African population that the SouthAfrican stets has undertaken in the service ofthe apartheidpolicy. It is an artificial creationthat is meant to be on a path to 'nationhood'and 'independence'. The KaNgwene regionwasformerly known as the 'homeland for the Swazi',end lies on the borders of Swaziland andMozambique.BENSOcalls it the 'youngest of the self-gaverning Black states in South Africa'. Thebantusten has already had a stormyhistory ofconstitutional and political infighting endbackstabbing that led, with the inevitability of'divine' (central state)intervention, to theinstitution of a KaNgwane Legislative Assemblyin October, 1977.BENSO has the rare directness toadmit 1ntheir KaNgwane Revue (sic) that even compared toother bentustans 'kaNgwene, .. , is still abackwardarea'.The KaNgwane region is,es is inevitable withthe process of ethnificatian and consolidation,a vast relocationarea, characterised by thephysical and mental misery that accompaniesremovals. In 1970 the population (de facto-living within the region itself) was said to be117 890, with another 390 600 Swazi livingoutside the region.,BENSOestimates for 1977were respectively 213 900 (!) and 439 200.The farce of South African statistics can begauged byBENSO's later calculations, givinga de facto population of only 159 882 for1980 (see Table 6 in the article onPensions,in this issue).CASH CROPPINGIN KANGWANE~In this issue two articles deal with aspectsof life inKaNgwane - the one below on agriculture,and the article on cholera.INTRODUCTIONCERTAIN contradictory trendsare apparent inthe agricultural development policies/directionsbeing followed in the bantustans.On the one hand thereis en attempt tofoster the development of a class of pettyfarmers and peasants, who would have a vestedinterest inthe 'homeland' system. Controlover this section of the bantusten populationwould be possible through control overthemeans, of production, in this case the allocaticnof lend.On the other hand, a contradictory trendof theestablishment of large-scale, profit-ariented estates growing cash crops, is visible.This direction would directlyundermine thatof the small farmers.The establishment of the estates turns therural bantustan population into wagelabourersrather than subsistence agriculturalists andpeasants involved in a market economy to someextent. The latterdirection (of estates)would mean that peasant controlled land,unable to compete viably with these estates,could havetheir role as food producers doneaway with and have their land acquired forcash crops. More cheaply produced foodcanthen be 'imported' from capital intensive,mechanised and large-scale white-ownedagriculture in the rest of SouthAfrica.

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CRITICAL HEALTH- 1cc::1Ibl:.Io:.1l et30 nts r cybetween health and society 1n South Africa.CRITICAL HEALTHattempts to shot that betterhealth can only be achieved in a democraticSouth Africa.CRITICAL HEALTH lookscritically et thestate of health In South Africa.CRITICAL HEALTH pristnts the view thathealth Is the concern ofall.CRITICAL HEALTH provides a progressiveperspective an current health Issues.CRITICAL HEALTH explodescommon myths abouthealth and acts as a forum for the exchange01 health ideas.If you rant to subscribe to the next1editions of CRITICAL HEALTH, send 81.20(plus postage if outside Southern Africato:CRITICAL HEALTHc/oMEDICAL STUDENTS COUNCILPITS MEDICAL SCHOOLESSELER STREETJOHANNESBURGtool.1117011!>BSY70lIB.subwnSe to... AFRIa quarterly journal.started is 1974. attlsyLl to rai11 the11.11 of discussion 1a African,partioalarly(I !>~j'~6oathera African 1twt1, through articlethat art both theoretical and factual, bolkhistorical andcurrent. 601 ofofivs.PERSPEGTIV~YAITE 20t1W BOX 322s1. 7"1!01"l1. JOB111~16R0, 2017..ladlabourunderdev,slopment.1,ndustrial conflict.bbeen about resettlemen won state andtaltrial conflict. ~ U_`` : ;the ro 1 of thereserves In 6...looalpolitical bodiesand the growcapitalist agriculture.African countries which have been looked atareMosaabique,Utaada,iaasania alola,ladbla,aad1Sairl.Iesn11 planned rill fooul on the socialconsequences or the u11or machinery In S.A.indnatry,and on the South*= African states.LOC1L SUBSCRIPTIONS-13 So 70R 4 1380315.P062GB IIKANGWANETHE CREATION of the new KaNgwene bantustan isa prime example of the process of'ethnification'of the South African population that the SouthAfrican stets has undertaken in the service ofthe apartheidpolicy. It is an artificial creationthat is meant to be on a path to 'nationhood'and 'independence'. The KaNgwene regionwasformerly known as the 'homeland for the Swazi',end lies on the borders of Swaziland andMozambique.BENSOcalls it the 'youngest of the self-gaverning Black states in South Africa'. Thebantusten has already had a stormyhistory ofconstitutional and political infighting endbackstabbing that led, with the inevitability of'divine' (central state)intervention, to theinstitution of a KaNgwane Legislative Assemblyin October, 1977.BENSO has the rare directness toadmit 1ntheir KaNgwane Revue (sic) that even compared toother bentustans 'kaNgwene, .. , is still abackwardarea'.The KaNgwane region is,es is inevitable withthe process of ethnificatian and consolidation,a vast relocationarea, characterised by thephysical and mental misery that accompaniesremovals. In 1970 the population (de facto-living within the region itself) was said to be117 890, with another 390 600 Swazi livingoutside the region.,BENSOestimates for 1977were respectively 213 900 (!) and 439 200.The farce of South African statistics can begauged byBENSO's later calculations, givinga de facto population of only 159 882 for1980 (see Table 6 in the article onPensions,in this issue).CASH CROPPINGIN KANGWANE~In this issue two articles deal with aspectsof life inKaNgwane - the one below on agriculture,and the article on cholera.INTRODUCTIONCERTAIN contradictory trendsare apparent inthe agricultural development policies/directionsbeing followed in the bantustans.On the one hand thereis en attempt tofoster the development of a class of pettyfarmers and peasants, who would have a vestedinterest inthe 'homeland' system. Controlover this section of the bantusten populationwould be possible through control overthemeans, of production, in this case the allocaticnof lend.On the other hand, a contradictory trendof theestablishment of large-scale, profit-ariented estates growing cash crops, is visible.This direction would directlyundermine thatof the small farmers.The establishment of the estates turns therural bantustan population into wagelabourersrather than subsistence agriculturalists andpeasants involved in a market economy to someextent. The latterdirection (of estates)would mean that peasant controlled land,unable to compete viably with these estates,could havetheir role as food producers doneaway with and have their land acquired forcash crops. More cheaply produced foodcanthen be 'imported' from capital intensive,mechanised and large-scale white-ownedagriculture in the rest of SouthAfrica.

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page 35Also, as more and more land gets usedfor cash crops in the reserves, so more andmore people are deprivedeven of whatevermeagre subsistence they were eking out, andare turned into rural wage labourers. Thus,theconditions that have created structuralunemployment in white-owned agriculturewith the abolition of the labourtenantsystem, are being repeated in the rural .areas of the bantustans themselves.Structural unemployment hadmade areasof control (the bantustans) necessary, areaswhere the unemployed could be 'kept' awayfrom the urbanareas. Now the slim chance ofthat control succeeding through creation of adory*14.Ppk11ILegend5uVIt1R1 R._8aaerton.* Open water sources !1 Towns,villagea(1) Lameti Sugar Project(z) Tonga Sisal Company(3) Figtree cottonproject(4) Progressive farmers(6) Labour Bureeu/Magistrates Dffice, Tonga(6) Proposed new sisal scheme - 2 000haKAPP ft.Kingdom of Swaziland(5), iii. . lil (4). i~3)Kruger National. Park( 0c70wMocembiqueii(6)

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page 35Also, as more and more land gets usedfor cash crops in the reserves, so more andmore people are deprivedeven of whatevermeagre subsistence they were eking out, andare turned into rural wage labourers. Thus,theconditions that have created structuralunemployment in white-owned agriculturewith the abolition of the labourtenantsystem, are being repeated in the rural .areas of the bantustans themselves.Structural unemployment hadmade areasof control (the bantustans) necessary, areaswhere the unemployed could be 'kept' awayfrom the urbanareas. Now the slim chance ofthat control succeeding through creation of adory*14.Ppk11ILegend5uVIt1R1 R._8aaerton.* Open water sources !1 Towns,villagea(1) Lameti Sugar Project(z) Tonga Sisal Company(3) Figtree cottonproject(4) Progressive farmers(6) Labour Bureeu/Magistrates Dffice, Tonga(6) Proposed new sisal scheme - 2 000haKAPP ft.Kingdom of Swaziland(5), iii. . lil (4). i~3)Kruger National. Park( 0c70wMocembiqueii(6)

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page 36stable class of subsistence and peasant farmers,is being eroded.The material presented here deals onlywiththe agricultural aspect. Although itis still too early to see the full effects ofsuch a contradiction as that indicated above,Iwould suggest that there is at least atendency such as that sketched out.I have concentrated specifically on oneregionof KoNgwane (the 'homeland' for theSwazi people of the eastern Transvaal) -the Nkomazi region, just north of theSwazilandborder and adjoining Mozambique.CASH CROPPING.THERE ARE three major cash crops grown intheNkomazi region of KaNgwene: sisal, cotton andsugar. Land is also being cleared for a futurecoffee project.Allthese crops are labour intensive intheir cultivation, and require large numbersof unskilled labourers. Most of thislabouris provided by women.Another feature is that all these cropsare centrally managed on an estate basis.Therehas been no division of land under thesecrops into small, individually-owned plots.The exception is the cotton projectwherethere are individual farmers, and theta areplans to ultimately divide the main estateinto smaller farms. Whetherthis will, infact, take place remains to be seen.SISALSISAL, at present, covers an area of some1 600ha. This projectwas started in 1964by the Department of Agriculture, and was runby this Department until September, 1980.Prior tothat date, the scheme employed420 people of whom about 79% were women. Thewages paid were 82,09 per day.InSeptember last year, the sisal schemewas taken over by the local developmentcorporation and a private companycalledMeasured Farming (Pty) Ltd. They formed anew company called the Tonga Sisal Company.Tonga Sisal isowned jointly by the KaNgwaneAgricultural Company (KLM) and MeasuredFarming (MF), each with 50'%shareholding.The KLM, in turn, is jointly owned bythe Corporation for Economic Development*(CED, previously theBantu InvestmentCorporation) and the local developmentcorporation (KEDC - KanGwane Economic Develop-mentCorporation), and has its office in WhiteRiver.This takeover had severe consequences forthe labour force. They wereall dismissed.This dismissal created quite a furore and theworkers complained to their chief who took thematter upwith the KaNgwane government. As aresult, the KaNgwane 'cabinet' requested thatthe woricera at least be given amonths notice.This was granted. It was envisaged in Septemberthat they would rehire, from the same peoplewho hadbeen dismissed, only 217. Wages, too,were to be slashed down to 81,40 per day(minimum) - a cut of some 50%. Saidanofficial of MF: 'It is not fair on MF' to expectthem to pay people starting employment with themthe same rate it hadtaken the Department ofAgriculture 15 years to achieve (I). One maywell wonder if it will take MF 15 years beforetheyreach 82,09 a day. The Department ofAgriculture manager, incidentally, has beenretained by MF.For the past sixyears there has existedthe practice of doing the cutting and transport-ation of sisal leaves to the local shredderthroughsub-contractors. There are five suchsub-contractors. They are paid for the amountof leaf they deliver, and from thissum theymust pay whatever labour they employ. Thewages paid to such labourers are substantiallyless even thanthose paid in the employ ofthe Department. An example: one contractor,who employs 56 people (28 men and 28women),pays the man 81,64 a day and the women 81,13a day. Making use of such sub-contractors, Iwas told, 'getsrid of surplus labour'. Sub-contractors will continue to be used after theKLM- takeover.I would' suggest that the reasonfor using-sub-contractors specifically for cutting mayalso be due to the fact that this labour is 'notrequired every day ofthe year. Because thereare times when the cutting is done, it is easierto rely on sub-contractors rather than hireandretrench labour according to the season.In any event, it cuts the labour costssubstantially.There are also plans toexpand the areaunder sisal. This included expanding theexisting crop, as well as opening up a newarea ofapproximately 2 OOOhe on the Swazilandborder. This is a particularly sensitivetopic as it involves the moving ofpeopleto accommodate the scheme. The land for thisproposed scheme is also very fertile.Accoding to the KaNgweneAgriculturalDepartment this scheme and removals would onlybe undertaken with the consent of the peopleconcerned('The people' usually refers tothe chief, and presumably he can be persuadedto consent). Measured Farming wassaid tobe 'working very closely with the director'(of agriculture) on this new scheme, butMF has reiterated that it wouldbe done onlywith the consent of the people: (What wouldprobably happen is that the state would

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page 36stable class of subsistence and peasant farmers,is being eroded.The material presented here deals onlywiththe agricultural aspect. Although itis still too early to see the full effects ofsuch a contradiction as that indicated above,Iwould suggest that there is at least atendency such as that sketched out.I have concentrated specifically on oneregionof KoNgwane (the 'homeland' for theSwazi people of the eastern Transvaal) -the Nkomazi region, just north of theSwazilandborder and adjoining Mozambique.CASH CROPPING.THERE ARE three major cash crops grown intheNkomazi region of KaNgwene: sisal, cotton andsugar. Land is also being cleared for a futurecoffee project.Allthese crops are labour intensive intheir cultivation, and require large numbersof unskilled labourers. Most of thislabouris provided by women.Another feature is that all these cropsare centrally managed on an estate basis.Therehas been no division of land under thesecrops into small, individually-owned plots.The exception is the cotton projectwherethere are individual farmers, and theta areplans to ultimately divide the main estateinto smaller farms. Whetherthis will, infact, take place remains to be seen.SISALSISAL, at present, covers an area of some1 600ha. This projectwas started in 1964by the Department of Agriculture, and was runby this Department until September, 1980.Prior tothat date, the scheme employed420 people of whom about 79% were women. Thewages paid were 82,09 per day.InSeptember last year, the sisal schemewas taken over by the local developmentcorporation and a private companycalledMeasured Farming (Pty) Ltd. They formed anew company called the Tonga Sisal Company.Tonga Sisal isowned jointly by the KaNgwaneAgricultural Company (KLM) and MeasuredFarming (MF), each with 50'%shareholding.The KLM, in turn, is jointly owned bythe Corporation for Economic Development*(CED, previously theBantu InvestmentCorporation) and the local developmentcorporation (KEDC - KanGwane Economic Develop-mentCorporation), and has its office in WhiteRiver.This takeover had severe consequences forthe labour force. They wereall dismissed.This dismissal created quite a furore and theworkers complained to their chief who took thematter upwith the KaNgwane government. As aresult, the KaNgwane 'cabinet' requested thatthe woricera at least be given amonths notice.This was granted. It was envisaged in Septemberthat they would rehire, from the same peoplewho hadbeen dismissed, only 217. Wages, too,were to be slashed down to 81,40 per day(minimum) - a cut of some 50%. Saidanofficial of MF: 'It is not fair on MF' to expectthem to pay people starting employment with themthe same rate it hadtaken the Department ofAgriculture 15 years to achieve (I). One maywell wonder if it will take MF 15 years beforetheyreach 82,09 a day. The Department ofAgriculture manager, incidentally, has beenretained by MF.For the past sixyears there has existedthe practice of doing the cutting and transport-ation of sisal leaves to the local shredderthroughsub-contractors. There are five suchsub-contractors. They are paid for the amountof leaf they deliver, and from thissum theymust pay whatever labour they employ. Thewages paid to such labourers are substantiallyless even thanthose paid in the employ ofthe Department. An example: one contractor,who employs 56 people (28 men and 28women),pays the man 81,64 a day and the women 81,13a day. Making use of such sub-contractors, Iwas told, 'getsrid of surplus labour'. Sub-contractors will continue to be used after theKLM- takeover.I would' suggest that the reasonfor using-sub-contractors specifically for cutting mayalso be due to the fact that this labour is 'notrequired every day ofthe year. Because thereare times when the cutting is done, it is easierto rely on sub-contractors rather than hireandretrench labour according to the season.In any event, it cuts the labour costssubstantially.There are also plans toexpand the areaunder sisal. This included expanding theexisting crop, as well as opening up a newarea ofapproximately 2 OOOhe on the Swazilandborder. This is a particularly sensitivetopic as it involves the moving ofpeopleto accommodate the scheme. The land for thisproposed scheme is also very fertile.Accoding to the KaNgweneAgriculturalDepartment this scheme and removals would onlybe undertaken with the consent of the peopleconcerned('The people' usually refers tothe chief, and presumably he can be persuadedto consent). Measured Farming wassaid tobe 'working very closely with the director'(of agriculture) on this new scheme, butMF has reiterated that it wouldbe done onlywith the consent of the people: (What wouldprobably happen is that the state would

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initiate the new scheme - clear ground, movepeople, etc - and then hand over to MF whowould make money an theventure).SOAK MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATIONMEASURED FARMING have their head office inMeritzburg. Theyalso control the marketingof sisal in South Africa through their agencythe National Sisal Marketing Committee.Thisbody(NSMC) sets the quota for all sisalgrowers and determines where the fibre willbe sent. For example, atTonga, once theleaves have bean shredded and the fibrepacked and graded according to its length,the NSMC tellsthem to which factory thefibre must be sent. In this case it is usuallyto Pietersburg, but they have in the past sentfibreto Johannesburg, Durban end even CapeTown. The main consideration is the distance,so that ell sisal growersshould pay more orless the same on reilage.MF has justified their takeover end costcutting measures, saying that ifthis had notbeen done the alternative would have been toclose down completely -then no-one wouldhave any jobs atall. MF are very reluctantto acknowledge that they have any ownershipstakes, and claim that that' are only doingthemanagement, and are being paid managementfees. This is not true.If 's Transvaal operations ere handled byasubsidiary in Heidelberg called Floracadie(Pty) Ltd.Most of the locally marketed sisal isbought by Haggi Rend andAmalgamated PackagingIndustries (API).Last year Tonga Sisal produced 770 tonsof fibre and it is hoped to increasethis to1 200 tons within the next five years.COTTONTHIS CROP covers en area of about 200he. Thecotton schemewas started by the KEOC in October,7977. The lend here is leased far a periodof 12 years iron the local chief at a rateofR2 000 par annum. The money goes to thelocal tribal authority. After the 12 yearshave expired it is envisaged thatthis projectwill be split up and handed over to individualfarmers, who would each get a plot of 20ha.Apart iron thisproject, there are etpresent 7 'progressive farmers' with plots of20ha each, adjoining the cotton project lands.Thesefarmers have been given massive loansby the KEDC to grow cotton. Their land is notincluded in that leased by theproject, but isalso allocated by the chief. Only one of thesefarmers actually grew cotton last year.The labour forcefluctuates widely.The picking season lasts from about Aprilthrough to August/September. During this timeabout 400people are employed, but this can riseto 900 during school holidays, as school childrenere employed. For example,1n July, 1980, tnerewere 386 labourers, of wham only 46 were men.During the holidays, there were about 900.Wagesfor picking cotton are paid on aquote basis - 5c for each kilogram of cottonpicked. A fairly good days work canyield40kg, which means 82,00 a day, but that is heavygoing. The cotton project does struggle to findenough labour,particularly during the heightof the picking season. People in the nearbyvillage (Figtrea) seem to be reluctant toworkon the cotton fields and management is highlycritical of 'the laziness of these people'.As a result they have to hirea 7-tan truckfrom Rent-a-Bekkie to fetch labour from as faras 30cm away.THE 'PROGRESSIVEFARMERS'ALTHOUGH theoretically independent of the projectthey are effectively controlled by it. Onlyonefarmer'actually grew cotton last year.He was given a loan of 821 000 by theKEDC. This included the cost ofinstallingan overhead irrigation system, clearing bush,ploughing, building a store room. The labourhe employs is alsopaid for out of his loan.He has ten years in which ta.repay this loan.The ploughing, crap spraying end transportationtothe gin (where the cotton is separated fromthe seeds), is all handled by the main project.For all these benefits,however, thisfarmer is very disgruntled as he does not knavewhat the state of his finances are. All thebookkeeping isdone by the project. Money fromhis cotton sales is held by the project, andthe project makes deductions from thisamountfor overheads incurred, which is calculated bythe project. For example, if the project didtwo hours ploughingon his land, he has no wayof knowing whether he was being charged for thator whether they were overcharging him.He alsoclaimed that he had not been allowed to seewhat the exact costs of his overheads were, andfeels that thecotton manager is trying to plothis downfall. He is only given an allowance of850,00 a month by the project. They keeptherest, presumably to pay off his loan. Thd KEDCsay that money iron the 'progressive' farmers'cotton sales are paiddirect to the farmer.This same farmer who did not know the stateof his finances had reportedly made a nett profitof R4000 last year.This 'progressive' farmer employs, duringthe picking season, some 30 to 40 labourersas well as about30 school children overweekends, depending on their availability. He

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initiate the new scheme - clear ground, movepeople, etc - and then hand over to MF whowould make money an theventure).SOAK MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATIONMEASURED FARMING have their head office inMeritzburg. Theyalso control the marketingof sisal in South Africa through their agencythe National Sisal Marketing Committee.Thisbody(NSMC) sets the quota for all sisalgrowers and determines where the fibre willbe sent. For example, atTonga, once theleaves have bean shredded and the fibrepacked and graded according to its length,the NSMC tellsthem to which factory thefibre must be sent. In this case it is usuallyto Pietersburg, but they have in the past sentfibreto Johannesburg, Durban end even CapeTown. The main consideration is the distance,so that ell sisal growersshould pay more orless the same on reilage.MF has justified their takeover end costcutting measures, saying that ifthis had notbeen done the alternative would have been toclose down completely -then no-one wouldhave any jobs atall. MF are very reluctantto acknowledge that they have any ownershipstakes, and claim that that' are only doingthemanagement, and are being paid managementfees. This is not true.If 's Transvaal operations ere handled byasubsidiary in Heidelberg called Floracadie(Pty) Ltd.Most of the locally marketed sisal isbought by Haggi Rend andAmalgamated PackagingIndustries (API).Last year Tonga Sisal produced 770 tonsof fibre and it is hoped to increasethis to1 200 tons within the next five years.COTTONTHIS CROP covers en area of about 200he. Thecotton schemewas started by the KEOC in October,7977. The lend here is leased far a periodof 12 years iron the local chief at a rateofR2 000 par annum. The money goes to thelocal tribal authority. After the 12 yearshave expired it is envisaged thatthis projectwill be split up and handed over to individualfarmers, who would each get a plot of 20ha.Apart iron thisproject, there are etpresent 7 'progressive farmers' with plots of20ha each, adjoining the cotton project lands.Thesefarmers have been given massive loansby the KEDC to grow cotton. Their land is notincluded in that leased by theproject, but isalso allocated by the chief. Only one of thesefarmers actually grew cotton last year.The labour forcefluctuates widely.The picking season lasts from about Aprilthrough to August/September. During this timeabout 400people are employed, but this can riseto 900 during school holidays, as school childrenere employed. For example,1n July, 1980, tnerewere 386 labourers, of wham only 46 were men.During the holidays, there were about 900.Wagesfor picking cotton are paid on aquote basis - 5c for each kilogram of cottonpicked. A fairly good days work canyield40kg, which means 82,00 a day, but that is heavygoing. The cotton project does struggle to findenough labour,particularly during the heightof the picking season. People in the nearbyvillage (Figtrea) seem to be reluctant toworkon the cotton fields and management is highlycritical of 'the laziness of these people'.As a result they have to hirea 7-tan truckfrom Rent-a-Bekkie to fetch labour from as faras 30cm away.THE 'PROGRESSIVEFARMERS'ALTHOUGH theoretically independent of the projectthey are effectively controlled by it. Onlyonefarmer'actually grew cotton last year.He was given a loan of 821 000 by theKEDC. This included the cost ofinstallingan overhead irrigation system, clearing bush,ploughing, building a store room. The labourhe employs is alsopaid for out of his loan.He has ten years in which ta.repay this loan.The ploughing, crap spraying end transportationtothe gin (where the cotton is separated fromthe seeds), is all handled by the main project.For all these benefits,however, thisfarmer is very disgruntled as he does not knavewhat the state of his finances are. All thebookkeeping isdone by the project. Money fromhis cotton sales is held by the project, andthe project makes deductions from thisamountfor overheads incurred, which is calculated bythe project. For example, if the project didtwo hours ploughingon his land, he has no wayof knowing whether he was being charged for thator whether they were overcharging him.He alsoclaimed that he had not been allowed to seewhat the exact costs of his overheads were, andfeels that thecotton manager is trying to plothis downfall. He is only given an allowance of850,00 a month by the project. They keeptherest, presumably to pay off his loan. Thd KEDCsay that money iron the 'progressive' farmers'cotton sales are paiddirect to the farmer.This same farmer who did not know the stateof his finances had reportedly made a nett profitof R4000 last year.This 'progressive' farmer employs, duringthe picking season, some 30 to 40 labourersas well as about30 school children overweekends, depending on their availability. He

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pays 5c a kilogram as well. The money to paythis labour was included in the, loan, and he hasto draw money from themain project in order topay his labour. Presumably after the firstyear this is deducted from his cotton sales.The pointis, though, he does not control thatmoney at ell. In fact, he is allowed no initiativeas far as his cotton isconcerned.While 16ha from his 20ha farm is devotedto cotton, the remaining 4ha are set aside forhis private use.Here he grows vegetables,which are marketed locally and does very wellindeed. He has the added advantage ofbeing ableto use the sophisticated irrigation system setup for the cotton.MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATIONTHISFARMER produced some 250 bales of cottonlast year. Each bale weighs between 160kg and18Dkg. Cotton is railedto the gin in Barbertonabout 150km away.SUGARTHE LOMATI sugar project was started in 1966with the opening ofthe sugar mill in Malelane.The intention was to convert the land use, whichwas at the time being used forsubsistencefarming, eg growing maize, into sugar farms,managed by small farmers. The land was ploughedwithoutthe consent of the existing 'owners'and caused much resentment. As none of theseprevious owners show any interestin growingsugar, the estate remained in the hands of theDepartment of Bantu Affairs, and was then handedover to theKaNgwane government in 1978.This project covers an area of 219ha andemploys about 200 people, most of whomare women.The lowest wage, which is the scale which mostpeople are on, is 81,40 a day for women and 81,50a dayfor men. The workers must also providetheir own rations and bring their own implements,eg hoes, panges, sickles,etc. The working daylasts from 07hOO-O9hOO to M00 with an hour forlunch, in a five day week.Cane cutters are paidslightly more, and aredrawn from the ranks of the existing labour force.They are paid 81,88 for women and 82,04 formen.Wages increase slightly depending on the lengthof service. Men are always'paid more then women.WageIncreases over the Years1977 1978 1979 1980Maintenance:malefemaleCutters:male 81,50female 81,4481,20 1,261,45 1,5681,08, 1,13 1,30 1,401,64 1,90 2,041,51 1,75 1,88Maintenance workers deal mainly withirrigation, iecontrolling the flow of waterthrough the furrows from the main canal.GENERAL INFORMATIONALTHOUGH difficult tomeasure, unemployment ishigh in this region of KaNgwane. There is elabour bureau at Tonga - next to themagistrate'soffice and recruiting is done about twice a.week.Most times people gather at the bureau only tobe toldthat no-one is recruiting. 8y September,1980, only about SOD workers had been recruitedalthough 1 988 had by thattime registered as.workseekers since January, 1980 (2 145 in 1979).On each recruiting day there are crowds ofatleast 500 people hoping to get jobs.KeNgwene - Nkomezi region anyway -suppliesthe eastern highveld areas. Thisincludes powerstations (eg Kriel) and industries. ISCOR(Vanderbijlpark) also recruits from this area.In spite of thishigh unemployment, mostmen refuse to work on the local agricultural 'projects because the pay is so bad. This factissomewhat disparagingly referred to in the 1978SENSO report:The KaNgwane government finds it difficultto recruitworkers for the agriculturalprojects. The men especially apparentlyprefer to work as migrant workers outsidethecountry when their own farms cannotsatisfy their requirements (1978:36).The figures supplied above refute thispieceof racial stereotyping and bias.THE DSG/SARSRESOURCE CENTRE.The Southern African Research Service,inconjunction with the Development Studies Group,has recently set up a resource centre dealingwith information oncurrent Southern Africanaffairs. The resource centre consists mainly ofnewspaper clippings which are gathered fromanumber of national and local newspapers. Thecentre has a contemporary focus, and is keptas up to date aspossible.The areas in which information is gathered arebroadly categorised as follows:SOUTH AFRICAN STATEAND STATE RESTRUCTURING.ARMED RESISTANCE AND POLITICAL TRIALS.EDUCATION AND URBANREVOLT.BANTUSTANS.URBAN ADMINISTRATION AND HOUSING.LABOUR AND ECONOMY.RENTS ANDTRANSPORT.SPORT.COAL AND GOLD MINING.SOUTHERN AFRICA.HEALTH.POLICE, ARMY,BOSS.RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE.AGRICULTURE.INSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAW.PRISONS ANDPRISONERS.DETENTIONS AND BANNINGS.Within each major category, there are a largenumber of sub-categoriescontaining more specificinformation.The resource centre is available for use bycommunity groups, researchers,students and scholars,as well as other interested individuals andorganisations.People wishing to work in the resourcecentre,or obtain more information about it, should contactthe resource centre staff member at9 South Court,40Jorissen Street,Braamfontein,Johannesburg.Telephone: (011)725-2835or write toPO Box 93174,2143Yeoville,Johannesburg.

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pays 5c a kilogram as well. The money to paythis labour was included in the, loan, and he hasto draw money from themain project in order topay his labour. Presumably after the firstyear this is deducted from his cotton sales.The pointis, though, he does not control thatmoney at ell. In fact, he is allowed no initiativeas far as his cotton isconcerned.While 16ha from his 20ha farm is devotedto cotton, the remaining 4ha are set aside forhis private use.Here he grows vegetables,which are marketed locally and does very wellindeed. He has the added advantage ofbeing ableto use the sophisticated irrigation system setup for the cotton.MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATIONTHISFARMER produced some 250 bales of cottonlast year. Each bale weighs between 160kg and18Dkg. Cotton is railedto the gin in Barbertonabout 150km away.SUGARTHE LOMATI sugar project was started in 1966with the opening ofthe sugar mill in Malelane.The intention was to convert the land use, whichwas at the time being used forsubsistencefarming, eg growing maize, into sugar farms,managed by small farmers. The land was ploughedwithoutthe consent of the existing 'owners'and caused much resentment. As none of theseprevious owners show any interestin growingsugar, the estate remained in the hands of theDepartment of Bantu Affairs, and was then handedover to theKaNgwane government in 1978.This project covers an area of 219ha andemploys about 200 people, most of whomare women.The lowest wage, which is the scale which mostpeople are on, is 81,40 a day for women and 81,50a dayfor men. The workers must also providetheir own rations and bring their own implements,eg hoes, panges, sickles,etc. The working daylasts from 07hOO-O9hOO to M00 with an hour forlunch, in a five day week.Cane cutters are paidslightly more, and aredrawn from the ranks of the existing labour force.They are paid 81,88 for women and 82,04 formen.Wages increase slightly depending on the lengthof service. Men are always'paid more then women.WageIncreases over the Years1977 1978 1979 1980Maintenance:malefemaleCutters:male 81,50female 81,4481,20 1,261,45 1,5681,08, 1,13 1,30 1,401,64 1,90 2,041,51 1,75 1,88Maintenance workers deal mainly withirrigation, iecontrolling the flow of waterthrough the furrows from the main canal.GENERAL INFORMATIONALTHOUGH difficult tomeasure, unemployment ishigh in this region of KaNgwane. There is elabour bureau at Tonga - next to themagistrate'soffice and recruiting is done about twice a.week.Most times people gather at the bureau only tobe toldthat no-one is recruiting. 8y September,1980, only about SOD workers had been recruitedalthough 1 988 had by thattime registered as.workseekers since January, 1980 (2 145 in 1979).On each recruiting day there are crowds ofatleast 500 people hoping to get jobs.KeNgwene - Nkomezi region anyway -suppliesthe eastern highveld areas. Thisincludes powerstations (eg Kriel) and industries. ISCOR(Vanderbijlpark) also recruits from this area.In spite of thishigh unemployment, mostmen refuse to work on the local agricultural 'projects because the pay is so bad. This factissomewhat disparagingly referred to in the 1978SENSO report:The KaNgwane government finds it difficultto recruitworkers for the agriculturalprojects. The men especially apparentlyprefer to work as migrant workers outsidethecountry when their own farms cannotsatisfy their requirements (1978:36).The figures supplied above refute thispieceof racial stereotyping and bias.THE DSG/SARSRESOURCE CENTRE.The Southern African Research Service,inconjunction with the Development Studies Group,has recently set up a resource centre dealingwith information oncurrent Southern Africanaffairs. The resource centre consists mainly ofnewspaper clippings which are gathered fromanumber of national and local newspapers. Thecentre has a contemporary focus, and is keptas up to date aspossible.The areas in which information is gathered arebroadly categorised as follows:SOUTH AFRICAN STATEAND STATE RESTRUCTURING.ARMED RESISTANCE AND POLITICAL TRIALS.EDUCATION AND URBANREVOLT.BANTUSTANS.URBAN ADMINISTRATION AND HOUSING.LABOUR AND ECONOMY.RENTS ANDTRANSPORT.SPORT.COAL AND GOLD MINING.SOUTHERN AFRICA.HEALTH.POLICE, ARMY,BOSS.RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE.AGRICULTURE.INSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAW.PRISONS ANDPRISONERS.DETENTIONS AND BANNINGS.Within each major category, there are a largenumber of sub-categoriescontaining more specificinformation.The resource centre is available for use bycommunity groups, researchers,students and scholars,as well as other interested individuals andorganisations.People wishing to work in the resourcecentre,or obtain more information about it, should contactthe resource centre staff member at9 South Court,40Jorissen Street,Braamfontein,Johannesburg.Telephone: (011)725-2835or write toPO Box 93174,2143Yeoville,Johannesburg.

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page 3~LABOUR ACTIONAfrican Telephone Cables (Brits): About 700african workers went on strike in support ofademand for a pay increase of 81,00 an hour,on 6 January, 1981. They also demanded thereinstatment of a Mr Tinta,who was allegedlyfired because he was suspected of being behindthe strike.The next day police were called inandteargas used to disperse the strikers. Eighteenstrikers were arrested for allegedly intimidatingworkers who wantedto return to work. MosesMayekiso, secretary of the Metal and AlliedWorkers Union (MAWU, a FOSATU affiliatedtradeunion), denied this charge.Management sent a letter to the strikingworkers, stating that they had voluntarilyresignedby walking out, but that those whowished to, could re-apply far their jobs on8 January.A spokesperson for the workerstold areporter from the RDM that they would notre-apply unless their demands were met(08.01.81). However, by 9January the managingdirector of ATC reported that 300 people'(85% of the morning shift) had re-applied fortheir postsand been accepted - the samemanaging director had denied the day before thatthere was in fact a strike takingplace.Lion Match (Pretoria): 220 workers went onstrike on 5 January after demanding a 7096 wageincrease by 13h00that day. The managingdirector said that management had been taken bysurprise by the walkout, but were willingtonegotiate should the workers return to workand appoint 10 representatives. By 7 January,however, 'negotiationshad broken down.' (RDM,09.01.81), and all 220 workers were dismissed.The MD said that the workers had'dismissedthemselves by their own actions' in notreturning to work in time for the management'sultimatum of 14h00, 7January.All 220 returned to work, however, on12 January, after an agreement with managementon a wageadjustment (ROM, 13.01.81). The12th January had been a new ultimatum date setby management; workers returningon that daywould be accepted without broken service. Thosenot would be dismissed. Management would notrevealthe amount of the wage adjustment.Meanwhile, a report in the RDM (13.01.81)indicates that the Lion MatchCompany's economicgrowth is going well. Sales went up in 1980by 25'%, and profits went up by between 4296and5096. Who is getting the bulk of that increase,we wonder?Toyota Marketing (Sandton/Wynberg,Johannesburg):The entire workforce (more than 20O workers)struck against a management instruction thatworkerswho failed to complete a particularwork quota would face disciplinary action, andcould ultimately be fired. This tookplace inOctober, 1980.The instruction to meet quotas causedstrong reaction amongst workers, but negotiationwithmanagement led the company's liaisoncommittee to tell the workers that the quotasystem still stood, and those notmeeting itfaced dismissal.It was then that the workers went onstrike, demanding that the liaison committeereturn tomanagement and negotiate a change inthe instructions. They were all summarilydismissed, and told that they couldreapplyfor their jobs an 3 November.Management told a Star reporter that thequota system had been introduced inreactionto what had appeared to be a go-slow strikeamongst workers for the previous two weeks.A spokesperson forthe Metal and AlliedWorkers Union (MAWU) denied this, saying thatmanagement always pushed workers too hardatthat time of year, in order to catch up withproduction. A similar strike had occurred inOctober, 1979, for the samereason (see WIP 10).Management stuck by its story, saying thatonly 95 workers had been sacked, all membersof agroup who had been on the 'go-slow strike'.Adcock, the managing director, claimed thatthe quota system had beennegotiated through theliaison committee some months before, and hadbeen approved by the workers. The 95 whowerenot meeting it were dismissed. The workers,however, saw this as a deliberate attempt to getrid of some of them,many of whom were activemembers of MAWU. They cited evidence thatindicated management had for some whilebeenemploying outside workers and telling them to'wait at home until they were needed' (Star,31.10.80).This actionhas been seen as a continuationof Toyota Marketing's long history of disagree-ment with the MAWU, which it refusedtorecognise because the union is not 'registered'.Workers feared the management's offer to re-employ people on 3November would result inunion members being weeded out, as had apparentlyhappened in October, 1979.In asignificant reversal of companypolicy, management met with MAWU and FOSATUrepresentatives on 31 October.They agreed toreinstate all workers and to recognise MAWU.Negotiations between MAWU andmanagementcontinued into December.From 13 to 16 December eight workers

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page 3~LABOUR ACTIONAfrican Telephone Cables (Brits): About 700african workers went on strike in support ofademand for a pay increase of 81,00 an hour,on 6 January, 1981. They also demanded thereinstatment of a Mr Tinta,who was allegedlyfired because he was suspected of being behindthe strike.The next day police were called inandteargas used to disperse the strikers. Eighteenstrikers were arrested for allegedly intimidatingworkers who wantedto return to work. MosesMayekiso, secretary of the Metal and AlliedWorkers Union (MAWU, a FOSATU affiliatedtradeunion), denied this charge.Management sent a letter to the strikingworkers, stating that they had voluntarilyresignedby walking out, but that those whowished to, could re-apply far their jobs on8 January.A spokesperson for the workerstold areporter from the RDM that they would notre-apply unless their demands were met(08.01.81). However, by 9January the managingdirector of ATC reported that 300 people'(85% of the morning shift) had re-applied fortheir postsand been accepted - the samemanaging director had denied the day before thatthere was in fact a strike takingplace.Lion Match (Pretoria): 220 workers went onstrike on 5 January after demanding a 7096 wageincrease by 13h00that day. The managingdirector said that management had been taken bysurprise by the walkout, but were willingtonegotiate should the workers return to workand appoint 10 representatives. By 7 January,however, 'negotiationshad broken down.' (RDM,09.01.81), and all 220 workers were dismissed.The MD said that the workers had'dismissedthemselves by their own actions' in notreturning to work in time for the management'sultimatum of 14h00, 7January.All 220 returned to work, however, on12 January, after an agreement with managementon a wageadjustment (ROM, 13.01.81). The12th January had been a new ultimatum date setby management; workers returningon that daywould be accepted without broken service. Thosenot would be dismissed. Management would notrevealthe amount of the wage adjustment.Meanwhile, a report in the RDM (13.01.81)indicates that the Lion MatchCompany's economicgrowth is going well. Sales went up in 1980by 25'%, and profits went up by between 4296and5096. Who is getting the bulk of that increase,we wonder?Toyota Marketing (Sandton/Wynberg,Johannesburg):The entire workforce (more than 20O workers)struck against a management instruction thatworkerswho failed to complete a particularwork quota would face disciplinary action, andcould ultimately be fired. This tookplace inOctober, 1980.The instruction to meet quotas causedstrong reaction amongst workers, but negotiationwithmanagement led the company's liaisoncommittee to tell the workers that the quotasystem still stood, and those notmeeting itfaced dismissal.It was then that the workers went onstrike, demanding that the liaison committeereturn tomanagement and negotiate a change inthe instructions. They were all summarilydismissed, and told that they couldreapplyfor their jobs an 3 November.Management told a Star reporter that thequota system had been introduced inreactionto what had appeared to be a go-slow strikeamongst workers for the previous two weeks.A spokesperson forthe Metal and AlliedWorkers Union (MAWU) denied this, saying thatmanagement always pushed workers too hardatthat time of year, in order to catch up withproduction. A similar strike had occurred inOctober, 1979, for the samereason (see WIP 10).Management stuck by its story, saying thatonly 95 workers had been sacked, all membersof agroup who had been on the 'go-slow strike'.Adcock, the managing director, claimed thatthe quota system had beennegotiated through theliaison committee some months before, and hadbeen approved by the workers. The 95 whowerenot meeting it were dismissed. The workers,however, saw this as a deliberate attempt to getrid of some of them,many of whom were activemembers of MAWU. They cited evidence thatindicated management had for some whilebeenemploying outside workers and telling them to'wait at home until they were needed' (Star,31.10.80).This actionhas been seen as a continuationof Toyota Marketing's long history of disagree-ment with the MAWU, which it refusedtorecognise because the union is not 'registered'.Workers feared the management's offer to re-employ people on 3November would result inunion members being weeded out, as had apparentlyhappened in October, 1979.In asignificant reversal of companypolicy, management met with MAWU and FOSATUrepresentatives on 31 October.They agreed toreinstate all workers and to recognise MAWU.Negotiations between MAWU andmanagementcontinued into December.From 13 to 16 December eight workers

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page 40allegedly did not came in to work overtime.Adcock was away so the manager of the departmentsuspendedthem with full pay until Adcock'sreturn on January 5. When they tried to returnto work they were refused entrance. Allthewarehouse workers then stopped work in protest.Adcock later met with MAVU and FOSATUrepresentatives,explained the company'sposition, and said the eight would be dismissed.The strike continued in support, with theeightdemanding that overtime be voluntary and notcompulsory (7 January).. 8y 9 January the entire workforcehadjoined the strike. Adcock complained that theyhad been 'intimidated' into striking. MANUdismissed this complaint,pointing out thatthe frequency of strikes in the plant indicatedsomething seriously wrong between managementandworkers at Toyota.A report on 10 January indicates thatMAWU's demand for all woricer-s to be reinstated,includingthe 'Toyota eight', was beingrejected by management. The Star report on15 January has it that Adcock is firm inhisresolve not to rehire the eight, and that 132workers striking in protest against the dismiss-als would not return untilthe eight wererehired. The conflict continues.(Latest: Moses Meyekiso of the Metal andAllied Workers Union(secretary), said that theunion's Shop Steward Committee for the Kew andlynberg industrial area, representing about1500 workers, had cage out in support of the132 dismissed workers. He appealed to otherworkers not to take the jobsof those dismissed(RDM, 17.01.81). A few days later two MAWUshop stewards were detained by the securitypolice.They were released after two days in detentionfor questioning. The two men, Sidney Zulu and>rilfred Sihlangu,are amongst the 132 dismissedworkers).BMW Votorplent (Rosalyn, Pretoria): About1 000 workers stopped work anNovember 27, 1980,in support of a demand for a wage increase of50c an hour. This follows an extended sixweekperiod when the company's 'employee'scouncil' had been negotiating an increase.Workers had lost faith in its abilitytoadequately negotiate their demands. TheNational Union of Motor Assembly and Rubberworkers had beenorganising at the plant butdoes not represent a majority of the workers,so could not negotiate on their behalf.Theworkers returned to work, however, on 1 Decemberhaving been given a 35c an hour increase.CDA:Mercedes-Benz (East London): loricersdowned tools in protest over the firing of afellow worker (in December, 1980).This followsa long period of tension over wage demands, aspokesperson for the unregistered SA AlliedWorkers Union(SAANU) said. The majority ofthe workforce at CDA belong to the registeredNational Union of Motor Assembly andRubberWorkers (NUWWWOSA), although SAAWU is alsoactive there. SAAYU committed itself to'appropriate action'in the new year an the wageissue.More information needed.Raleigh Cycles (Springs): Two men were dismissedforallegedly fighting, on 27 November, end 800workers went out an strike in protest over thedismissals. The day before,two other -kerswere also said to have been fighting and hadmerely been warned against doing it again. Thetwo whowere dismissed for the same behaviourwere less skilled than the other two, and it wasbelieved among workers thatdiscriminationagainst less skilled workers had taken place.The 800 were then dismissed.By 3 December about 300 ofthese workershad been rehired. The remaining 500 werethreatening to bring an urgent applicationto court, throughtheir union (the Engineeringand Allied Workers Union), against the companyfor locking them out end thus preventingthemfrom returning to work. Steve Friedman ofthe ROY noted that this would be an importanttest case of an aspect ofindustrial law(03.12.80).The lock-out continued on 12 January whenthe workers returned after the break overthe'festive' season, expecting to be rehired.They were told that they had been dismissed.About 20 police with dogswere there toreinforce the message. Security police werealso called in to 'help'.(Star, 13.01.?1).A later report by theStar again refersto threatened court action by union represent-atives (15.01.81).(Latest: Eon previous coverage ofthisfirm and its labour policies, see wIP10:32.The Engineering and Allied Workers Union -FDSATUaffiliated - hastaken the case beforethe industrial court, only the second caseto be heard by the court. The EAU claim thatRaleighhad broken an agreement to rehire allthe dismissed workers in the new year and thatthe management is effectivelylocking the workersout. On the 23rd January it was reported that thecourt was reserving judgement in the case.Thecourt was also asked to grant the workers interimprotection against replacement until their finaldecision. 'Thecourt decided it could not makea ruling on this application befcre deciding onthe questic.n of its jurisdiction, sotheinterim protection could not be granted' (RDM,24.01.81)).

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page 40allegedly did not came in to work overtime.Adcock was away so the manager of the departmentsuspendedthem with full pay until Adcock'sreturn on January 5. When they tried to returnto work they were refused entrance. Allthewarehouse workers then stopped work in protest.Adcock later met with MAVU and FOSATUrepresentatives,explained the company'sposition, and said the eight would be dismissed.The strike continued in support, with theeightdemanding that overtime be voluntary and notcompulsory (7 January).. 8y 9 January the entire workforcehadjoined the strike. Adcock complained that theyhad been 'intimidated' into striking. MANUdismissed this complaint,pointing out thatthe frequency of strikes in the plant indicatedsomething seriously wrong between managementandworkers at Toyota.A report on 10 January indicates thatMAWU's demand for all woricer-s to be reinstated,includingthe 'Toyota eight', was beingrejected by management. The Star report on15 January has it that Adcock is firm inhisresolve not to rehire the eight, and that 132workers striking in protest against the dismiss-als would not return untilthe eight wererehired. The conflict continues.(Latest: Moses Meyekiso of the Metal andAllied Workers Union(secretary), said that theunion's Shop Steward Committee for the Kew andlynberg industrial area, representing about1500 workers, had cage out in support of the132 dismissed workers. He appealed to otherworkers not to take the jobsof those dismissed(RDM, 17.01.81). A few days later two MAWUshop stewards were detained by the securitypolice.They were released after two days in detentionfor questioning. The two men, Sidney Zulu and>rilfred Sihlangu,are amongst the 132 dismissedworkers).BMW Votorplent (Rosalyn, Pretoria): About1 000 workers stopped work anNovember 27, 1980,in support of a demand for a wage increase of50c an hour. This follows an extended sixweekperiod when the company's 'employee'scouncil' had been negotiating an increase.Workers had lost faith in its abilitytoadequately negotiate their demands. TheNational Union of Motor Assembly and Rubberworkers had beenorganising at the plant butdoes not represent a majority of the workers,so could not negotiate on their behalf.Theworkers returned to work, however, on 1 Decemberhaving been given a 35c an hour increase.CDA:Mercedes-Benz (East London): loricersdowned tools in protest over the firing of afellow worker (in December, 1980).This followsa long period of tension over wage demands, aspokesperson for the unregistered SA AlliedWorkers Union(SAANU) said. The majority ofthe workforce at CDA belong to the registeredNational Union of Motor Assembly andRubberWorkers (NUWWWOSA), although SAAWU is alsoactive there. SAAYU committed itself to'appropriate action'in the new year an the wageissue.More information needed.Raleigh Cycles (Springs): Two men were dismissedforallegedly fighting, on 27 November, end 800workers went out an strike in protest over thedismissals. The day before,two other -kerswere also said to have been fighting and hadmerely been warned against doing it again. Thetwo whowere dismissed for the same behaviourwere less skilled than the other two, and it wasbelieved among workers thatdiscriminationagainst less skilled workers had taken place.The 800 were then dismissed.By 3 December about 300 ofthese workershad been rehired. The remaining 500 werethreatening to bring an urgent applicationto court, throughtheir union (the Engineeringand Allied Workers Union), against the companyfor locking them out end thus preventingthemfrom returning to work. Steve Friedman ofthe ROY noted that this would be an importanttest case of an aspect ofindustrial law(03.12.80).The lock-out continued on 12 January whenthe workers returned after the break overthe'festive' season, expecting to be rehired.They were told that they had been dismissed.About 20 police with dogswere there toreinforce the message. Security police werealso called in to 'help'.(Star, 13.01.?1).A later report by theStar again refersto threatened court action by union represent-atives (15.01.81).(Latest: Eon previous coverage ofthisfirm and its labour policies, see wIP10:32.The Engineering and Allied Workers Union -FDSATUaffiliated - hastaken the case beforethe industrial court, only the second caseto be heard by the court. The EAU claim thatRaleighhad broken an agreement to rehire allthe dismissed workers in the new year and thatthe management is effectivelylocking the workersout. On the 23rd January it was reported that thecourt was reserving judgement in the case.Thecourt was also asked to grant the workers interimprotection against replacement until their finaldecision. 'Thecourt decided it could not makea ruling on this application befcre deciding onthe questic.n of its jurisdiction, sotheinterim protection could not be granted' (RDM,24.01.81)).

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fr'su'r .overna-n"' iP.ay5'r"dDatsun-Nissan (Rosslyn, Pretoria): 3 500afrioan workers struck on 6 November, 1980,overa pay dispute and in protest against theny.company's liaison system, and also over theofissue of payment of theirannual savings.i.--- nti paymentThe entire factory was closed down for the dayitnd F-hite workers were told to gohome. Police.are ., Iwere called in.BBy 10y 10 November they were all back at theirjobs after a two day shutdown ofthe factory.The NUMARNOSA had recently begun organisinget the plant. A spokesperson said thatthe workers hadbeen dissatisfied with theirwages for some time, and that this was thereal cause of the strike. This dissatisfactionhadbecome more apparent and marked once theeastern Cape motor workers had received''substantial rises' after strikingin Uitenhage(ROM, 11.11.80). The differential that nowexisted between them and Rosslyn workerswas cause forcomplaint.The demands for wage increases were likelyto resurface again.Metal Box (Rosalyn, Pretoria): On 23December,from 500 to 1 000 workers went on strike aftera pay dispute with management. They were notsatisfied withpay increases that were to comeinto effect from 1 January, 1981.They were also not satisfied with theirworkscommittee, which they rejected as'toothless' when it came to negotiating withmanagement.They were also striking insolidarity withworkers in the press department who had beensacked.The strike continued until the Christmasbreak,but most workers had returned to theirjobs by 7 January, 1981. Negotiations forhigher wages were taking place withmanagementat the factory, through four representatives,three of whom were from the workers' council.Moreinformation needed.Kumek West Hand Dairy (Roodepoort): 230 milkdelivery men went on strike on 29November,1980, because of a wage dispute. Posthumus,the managing director, said negotiations werealready underway.More information needed.Creamline Dairy (Florida): 90 milk deliverymen went on strike early in December, 1980,ina demand for higher wages. Managementreinstated only 3D of them, saying that therest were 'troublemakers' whohad intimidatedthe others, and who had 'discharged themselves'by_thair own actions.The general secretary of theFood, Beverageand Allied Workers Union, operative in thatcompany, attempted to negotiate with managementaboutthe reinstatement of the workers, butwithout any success. Management had refusedany discussion. They immediatelystartedemploying new workers in place of those fired.The union said that they would be seekinglegal advice.Moreinformation needed.Anglo American Corporation (Head Office,Johannesburg): About 30 cleaners boycottedthe newlydesegregated canteen in December,1980, on the grounds of racial discrimination.They have been told to change outof theirwork clothes before entering the canteen 'inthe interests of the majority of diners'(Star, 30.12.80).Managementhas refused to revise thepolicy.

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fr'su'r .overna-n"' iP.ay5'r"dDatsun-Nissan (Rosslyn, Pretoria): 3 500afrioan workers struck on 6 November, 1980,overa pay dispute and in protest against theny.company's liaison system, and also over theofissue of payment of theirannual savings.i.--- nti paymentThe entire factory was closed down for the dayitnd F-hite workers were told to gohome. Police.are ., Iwere called in.BBy 10y 10 November they were all back at theirjobs after a two day shutdown ofthe factory.The NUMARNOSA had recently begun organisinget the plant. A spokesperson said thatthe workers hadbeen dissatisfied with theirwages for some time, and that this was thereal cause of the strike. This dissatisfactionhadbecome more apparent and marked once theeastern Cape motor workers had received''substantial rises' after strikingin Uitenhage(ROM, 11.11.80). The differential that nowexisted between them and Rosslyn workerswas cause forcomplaint.The demands for wage increases were likelyto resurface again.Metal Box (Rosalyn, Pretoria): On 23December,from 500 to 1 000 workers went on strike aftera pay dispute with management. They were notsatisfied withpay increases that were to comeinto effect from 1 January, 1981.They were also not satisfied with theirworkscommittee, which they rejected as'toothless' when it came to negotiating withmanagement.They were also striking insolidarity withworkers in the press department who had beensacked.The strike continued until the Christmasbreak,but most workers had returned to theirjobs by 7 January, 1981. Negotiations forhigher wages were taking place withmanagementat the factory, through four representatives,three of whom were from the workers' council.Moreinformation needed.Kumek West Hand Dairy (Roodepoort): 230 milkdelivery men went on strike on 29November,1980, because of a wage dispute. Posthumus,the managing director, said negotiations werealready underway.More information needed.Creamline Dairy (Florida): 90 milk deliverymen went on strike early in December, 1980,ina demand for higher wages. Managementreinstated only 3D of them, saying that therest were 'troublemakers' whohad intimidatedthe others, and who had 'discharged themselves'by_thair own actions.The general secretary of theFood, Beverageand Allied Workers Union, operative in thatcompany, attempted to negotiate with managementaboutthe reinstatement of the workers, butwithout any success. Management had refusedany discussion. They immediatelystartedemploying new workers in place of those fired.The union said that they would be seekinglegal advice.Moreinformation needed.Anglo American Corporation (Head Office,Johannesburg): About 30 cleaners boycottedthe newlydesegregated canteen in December,1980, on the grounds of racial discrimination.They have been told to change outof theirwork clothes before entering the canteen 'inthe interests of the majority of diners'(Star, 30.12.80).Managementhas refused to revise thepolicy.

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German Club (Pretoria): On 28 December, 1980,workers held a sitdown strike over wozkingcondition3. Twelve errs ofstaff werethen dismissed, end police celled in to'prevent (than)... from allegedly incitingothers to strike' (ROM,30.12.80).'The whole thing is being settledamicably', a spokesperson for the club toldthe ROY. 'We are gettingofficials from theDepartment of Labour to came in to discuss thematter' (sic).Natal Boa Manufacturers(Pletsrwaritzburp):The National Textile Workers Union has reportedon cpnditions in this factory to the DepartmentofLebow (October, 1980).Women work for 52 hours per week forsometimes as little as 169 per hour. If theycame lateon Saturdays a full day's pay isdeducted:They are given no protective clothingto wear, no soap, no canteenfacilities,and only half an hour for lunch.Pay increases followed the union inquiry- pushing the wages up to R16 perweak forwoman, and R21 for am. Workers sea theseincreases as still being very unjust, and seethat the company issimply cashing in on thehigh unemployment rate in Msritzburg.SMB Timber (Verasniging): A staff of 300 arebecomingincreasingly dissatisfied with wageand working conditions according to a spokes-person for the Paper, Wood andAllied WorkersUnion, and conflict could break out into theopen (ROM, 30.09.813). Already there had beennumerousmeetings and work stoppages.Grievances are that wages are well belowthe minimum accepted under the Wage Act;thatprotective clothing is not provided; thatsafety measures en not enforced end worrywarkeraare involved in! seriousaccidents;that no workman's compensation is allowedthaw; and that management has been antagonisticto unionactivities.Van Zyl, the manager, denied that anygrievances existed among the workers, sayingthey were 'extremelyhappy', end that women didnot need higher pay as they ere 'not thebreadwinners anyway'.&A Ceramics (Baksburg): Ashop steward mssfired on 11 July, 1978 for being 'negligentin her work and influencing others' (Star,,21.10.80).9Mtook Bailey, .the Msnsper, to court for'alleged.vietiwiaation,pleading that she hadbeen fired after he had discoveredthat sheores a member of the Building Constructionand Allied Workers Union, and that she hadborn organisingmembers.Nothing further hem been reported on thiscase. ,SAR6H (Johannesburg): 1. The 22 000 strongRailwayArtisans Staff Association lodged aclaim for a 12 1/2x wage incrseve with theMinister of Transport m 17 September,1980.We have no further information on this.2. Train drivers stagedago-slow strike on 2 and 3 October,causing'congestion and confusion' on about 20Witwatersrand trains. SAR management had beanin touch with the SAFootplete Staff Association,who represent the drivers. Dissatisfactionwas about pay adjustments, and about restperiods.A spokesperson for the SAR expected thesedissatisfactions to be sorted out.Vora information new.FedicaFood Services (University of the North):.The catering staff et the University of theNorth (Turfloop), employed by FsdicsFoodServices, went out on strike on 30 September,1980, in an attempt to get eon reasonablewages. They are paidR50 a month for a 7 dayweek, according to a spokesperson.The hungry students started helpingthemselves frog theearn kitchen, and areestimated to have caused damage and loam ofabout R30 000.The staff returned to work thefollowingday after an assurance that their grievancesworld be considered.Mom information needed.Pick end Par(Randburp): 70 workers wererequired to pay a fine of R1 each towards afine of 8240 imposed by health inspectorsonthe store after finding it unclean (October,1980). Two workers refused to pay the fins, .end were threatened withdismissal, and notallowed to use the toilet facilities (Z). .The store manager avid .that the fine hadbean reposedbecause the workers were notkeeping toilets clean after 'repeated requests'.Workers countered that they could notbeexpected to 'deal with food. and customers andclean toilets as well', end that managementshould appoint a secondcleaner for the toiletsas the single cleaner could not cape (SundayExpress, 02.11.80).On 31 October the Commercial,Cateringand Allied Workers Union of &A_sent a strongdemand for the refund of the money to theworkers, citing thefact that fining of workersis illegal in terns of the Wage Act and carriesa possible 8200 fine.Ilarwipement then agreedto refund ell themoney, and to take no further action against

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German Club (Pretoria): On 28 December, 1980,workers held a sitdown strike over wozkingcondition3. Twelve errs ofstaff werethen dismissed, end police celled in to'prevent (than)... from allegedly incitingothers to strike' (ROM,30.12.80).'The whole thing is being settledamicably', a spokesperson for the club toldthe ROY. 'We are gettingofficials from theDepartment of Labour to came in to discuss thematter' (sic).Natal Boa Manufacturers(Pletsrwaritzburp):The National Textile Workers Union has reportedon cpnditions in this factory to the DepartmentofLebow (October, 1980).Women work for 52 hours per week forsometimes as little as 169 per hour. If theycame lateon Saturdays a full day's pay isdeducted:They are given no protective clothingto wear, no soap, no canteenfacilities,and only half an hour for lunch.Pay increases followed the union inquiry- pushing the wages up to R16 perweak forwoman, and R21 for am. Workers sea theseincreases as still being very unjust, and seethat the company issimply cashing in on thehigh unemployment rate in Msritzburg.SMB Timber (Verasniging): A staff of 300 arebecomingincreasingly dissatisfied with wageand working conditions according to a spokes-person for the Paper, Wood andAllied WorkersUnion, and conflict could break out into theopen (ROM, 30.09.813). Already there had beennumerousmeetings and work stoppages.Grievances are that wages are well belowthe minimum accepted under the Wage Act;thatprotective clothing is not provided; thatsafety measures en not enforced end worrywarkeraare involved in! seriousaccidents;that no workman's compensation is allowedthaw; and that management has been antagonisticto unionactivities.Van Zyl, the manager, denied that anygrievances existed among the workers, sayingthey were 'extremelyhappy', end that women didnot need higher pay as they ere 'not thebreadwinners anyway'.&A Ceramics (Baksburg): Ashop steward mssfired on 11 July, 1978 for being 'negligentin her work and influencing others' (Star,,21.10.80).9Mtook Bailey, .the Msnsper, to court for'alleged.vietiwiaation,pleading that she hadbeen fired after he had discoveredthat sheores a member of the Building Constructionand Allied Workers Union, and that she hadborn organisingmembers.Nothing further hem been reported on thiscase. ,SAR6H (Johannesburg): 1. The 22 000 strongRailwayArtisans Staff Association lodged aclaim for a 12 1/2x wage incrseve with theMinister of Transport m 17 September,1980.We have no further information on this.2. Train drivers stagedago-slow strike on 2 and 3 October,causing'congestion and confusion' on about 20Witwatersrand trains. SAR management had beanin touch with the SAFootplete Staff Association,who represent the drivers. Dissatisfactionwas about pay adjustments, and about restperiods.A spokesperson for the SAR expected thesedissatisfactions to be sorted out.Vora information new.FedicaFood Services (University of the North):.The catering staff et the University of theNorth (Turfloop), employed by FsdicsFoodServices, went out on strike on 30 September,1980, in an attempt to get eon reasonablewages. They are paidR50 a month for a 7 dayweek, according to a spokesperson.The hungry students started helpingthemselves frog theearn kitchen, and areestimated to have caused damage and loam ofabout R30 000.The staff returned to work thefollowingday after an assurance that their grievancesworld be considered.Mom information needed.Pick end Par(Randburp): 70 workers wererequired to pay a fine of R1 each towards afine of 8240 imposed by health inspectorsonthe store after finding it unclean (October,1980). Two workers refused to pay the fins, .end were threatened withdismissal, and notallowed to use the toilet facilities (Z). .The store manager avid .that the fine hadbean reposedbecause the workers were notkeeping toilets clean after 'repeated requests'.Workers countered that they could notbeexpected to 'deal with food. and customers andclean toilets as well', end that managementshould appoint a secondcleaner for the toiletsas the single cleaner could not cape (SundayExpress, 02.11.80).On 31 October the Commercial,Cateringand Allied Workers Union of &A_sent a strongdemand for the refund of the money to theworkers, citing thefact that fining of workersis illegal in terns of the Wage Act and carriesa possible 8200 fine.Ilarwipement then agreedto refund ell themoney, and to take no further action against

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the two who had refused to pay in the firstplace.OTH Bav;.r (Bayer): Long-standing grievancesabout -.arking hoursand overtime pay came toa head wren a group of workers assaulted awan they claimed was a 'company spy'. lateinNovember, 1980.Management then selected a particulardepartment at the plant and asked the 18workers in it toidentify the attackers. Theyhad refused to do this, saying that they didnot know, and had all been fired.SAAWU wasrepresenting the workers and wasto start negotiations with management on 26November.More informationneeded.South African Airways: 1. Cabin crew planneda stay-away over Christmas, 1980, in order tobring attention totheir grievances - longhours because of staff shortages, theunsympathetic attitude of superiors, and nocompensationfor extra-long shifts. They hadbeen complaining for months, but nothing hadbeen done to alleviate the situation.On 19November, the SAA Staff Associationasked them to air their grievances throughofficial channels so that they mightreceiveattention.On 5 December, staff were still dissatisfied,saying that the SAA management was not movingfastenough in looking into their grievances,nor taking cognisance of all of them. The massstay-away had collapsedbecause of lack oforganisation, and alleged threats of dismissal.Further information needed.2. Cargo workers atJanSmuts complained bitterly about workingconditions that had not been changed for threeyears despite their temporer^iand 'disgusting'condition (RDM, 22.11.80).A SAA spokesperson would not comment. Moreinformation needed.CatoRidge Abattoir (Cato Ridge): 18 workersallegedly resigned on 11 December, 1980,following allegations of theft of acarcass,and the assault of one worker by a securityofficer.The manager, de Kock, denied 'all thisfuss'. He stressedthat the resignations had_not led to any slow down at the abattoir (andhence did not need to be taken seriously? -ads).Pellew and Go (Selby, Johannesburg): 15 whitemachine workers laid down tools on 1 December,1980 in protestagainst 'being forced to teachblacks to take over from us' (Star, 02.12.80).More information needed.Unico Chemicals(Johannesburg): Between 20 anq140 of the total BO african workers went onstrike on 19 November over pay.By 20November most were back at work. TheDepartment of Manpower Utilisation had advisedthe company to take thestrikers back.A spokesperson for the company admittedthat this was the second time members of itsworkforce haddowned tools over higher pay,but denied that it was important. 'Theincidents have been caused by one or two oftheboys (sic) who have been inciting the othersagainst the company' (RDM, 20.11.80).Palmyra Tsiris Line (Durbanharbour): A strikeoccurred on the Antigoni Tsiris, the third onships in the Palmyra Tsiris Line in less thanthree weeks(September, 1990).Fourteen crew members alleged that thehull of the 24-year old Antigoni Tsiris.wasleaking; that itwas infested with rats andcockroaches; that the drinking water wascontaminated; and that water rationingwasimposed. They succeeded in gaining a courtorder to get the ship attached.They also claimed that they had notbeenpaid for the last 3 1/2 months and are suingtheir employers for wages and overtime paytotalling 8185 000.Thematter will be taken up in court inSouth Africa. -More information needed.Siemens (Rosslyn, Pretoria): About 300workersdowned tools on 15 December in support ofan across-the-board wage increase.They returned to work on the17 Decemberwhile their union, the Electrical and AlliedWorkers Union of South Africa, conductednegotiations withmanagement.The general secretary of the union,Nicholson, saw the strike as being the resultof comparisons of paywith increases accordedthe eastern Cape workers.; of comparisonswith pay of other workers employed bymotorcompanies in the area; and of 'the generalmood in Rosslyn at the moment' (ROM, 18.12.80)(Rosslyn has beenhit by at least four strikesin the space of a few months).More information on the outcome of thenegotiationsneeded.Siemens workers had previously been onstrike in July, 1980, also on the wage issue(see WTP 14, page49).SASOL I Natref Refinery (Sasolburg): 1. Afurther incident has occurred in SASOL'sstormy labour histury - referback to _WIP14, pages 51 and 52 for past events.A police constable was stoned and battered

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the two who had refused to pay in the firstplace.OTH Bav;.r (Bayer): Long-standing grievancesabout -.arking hoursand overtime pay came toa head wren a group of workers assaulted awan they claimed was a 'company spy'. lateinNovember, 1980.Management then selected a particulardepartment at the plant and asked the 18workers in it toidentify the attackers. Theyhad refused to do this, saying that they didnot know, and had all been fired.SAAWU wasrepresenting the workers and wasto start negotiations with management on 26November.More informationneeded.South African Airways: 1. Cabin crew planneda stay-away over Christmas, 1980, in order tobring attention totheir grievances - longhours because of staff shortages, theunsympathetic attitude of superiors, and nocompensationfor extra-long shifts. They hadbeen complaining for months, but nothing hadbeen done to alleviate the situation.On 19November, the SAA Staff Associationasked them to air their grievances throughofficial channels so that they mightreceiveattention.On 5 December, staff were still dissatisfied,saying that the SAA management was not movingfastenough in looking into their grievances,nor taking cognisance of all of them. The massstay-away had collapsedbecause of lack oforganisation, and alleged threats of dismissal.Further information needed.2. Cargo workers atJanSmuts complained bitterly about workingconditions that had not been changed for threeyears despite their temporer^iand 'disgusting'condition (RDM, 22.11.80).A SAA spokesperson would not comment. Moreinformation needed.CatoRidge Abattoir (Cato Ridge): 18 workersallegedly resigned on 11 December, 1980,following allegations of theft of acarcass,and the assault of one worker by a securityofficer.The manager, de Kock, denied 'all thisfuss'. He stressedthat the resignations had_not led to any slow down at the abattoir (andhence did not need to be taken seriously? -ads).Pellew and Go (Selby, Johannesburg): 15 whitemachine workers laid down tools on 1 December,1980 in protestagainst 'being forced to teachblacks to take over from us' (Star, 02.12.80).More information needed.Unico Chemicals(Johannesburg): Between 20 anq140 of the total BO african workers went onstrike on 19 November over pay.By 20November most were back at work. TheDepartment of Manpower Utilisation had advisedthe company to take thestrikers back.A spokesperson for the company admittedthat this was the second time members of itsworkforce haddowned tools over higher pay,but denied that it was important. 'Theincidents have been caused by one or two oftheboys (sic) who have been inciting the othersagainst the company' (RDM, 20.11.80).Palmyra Tsiris Line (Durbanharbour): A strikeoccurred on the Antigoni Tsiris, the third onships in the Palmyra Tsiris Line in less thanthree weeks(September, 1990).Fourteen crew members alleged that thehull of the 24-year old Antigoni Tsiris.wasleaking; that itwas infested with rats andcockroaches; that the drinking water wascontaminated; and that water rationingwasimposed. They succeeded in gaining a courtorder to get the ship attached.They also claimed that they had notbeenpaid for the last 3 1/2 months and are suingtheir employers for wages and overtime paytotalling 8185 000.Thematter will be taken up in court inSouth Africa. -More information needed.Siemens (Rosslyn, Pretoria): About 300workersdowned tools on 15 December in support ofan across-the-board wage increase.They returned to work on the17 Decemberwhile their union, the Electrical and AlliedWorkers Union of South Africa, conductednegotiations withmanagement.The general secretary of the union,Nicholson, saw the strike as being the resultof comparisons of paywith increases accordedthe eastern Cape workers.; of comparisonswith pay of other workers employed bymotorcompanies in the area; and of 'the generalmood in Rosslyn at the moment' (ROM, 18.12.80)(Rosslyn has beenhit by at least four strikesin the space of a few months).More information on the outcome of thenegotiationsneeded.Siemens workers had previously been onstrike in July, 1980, also on the wage issue(see WTP 14, page49).SASOL I Natref Refinery (Sasolburg): 1. Afurther incident has occurred in SASOL'sstormy labour histury - referback to _WIP14, pages 51 and 52 for past events.A police constable was stoned and battered

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to death by more than 200 angry.worker.s on24 October, when he tried to arrest severalito death by more than 200angry.worker.s on24 October, when he tried to arrest several1 jd0pcatTha ttw.gal.hbT ralybrTyhpspects on charges ofpossession of dagge.hree men were arrested, two with bulletwounds. The dead man had fired two shots fromillegallypossessed firearms before dying.Further investigation revealed that thefear"'. airearms had been stolen property.irAfourth man was arrested for stealing asecond constable's service revolver.2. Eighteenwelders who had been offeredwork at SASOL,were turned away upon arrival because theywere 'Coloured', and SASOL has no accommodationforcoloured workers (ROM, 30.10.80).Krom River Apple Co-operative (Grebouw):This strike was reported on in depth inWIP13, pages 23-5.15 young men were arrested and chargedwith incidents related to the strike (incidentsof stonethrowing and damage to property) forhigher wages during April, 1980. They originallypleaded guilty to the charges,but itwas later alleged that the admissions had beenmade under duress. A doctor testified thatmarks on the accusedindicated electric shockburns and torture. The accused had pleadedguilty for fear of further abuse.The doctor hadbeen called by the Foodand Canning Workers Union (FCWU) (Star,28.10.80). A doctor called as witness by thepublicprosecutor contested these findings.The trial was then postponed to December18.The magistrate accepted thefindings ofthe defence doctor. A plea of not guilty was`entered for the workers, and 13 of them wereacquitted of thecharge. The remaining twowere convicted of public violence and sentencedto 18 months imprisonment, suspendedforS years (Star, 19.12.8D).Diamond Cutting Industry: White artisans inthis industry ere putting on pressurethroughtheir Diamond Workers Union to keep blacks outof the skilled areas. They fear being phasedout of their fobsend undercut by incomingblack workers.A first attempt by employers to increasethe range of work done by africen,Sndien andcoloured workers led to en 11 week strike bywhite artisans in 1976. This was only resolvedwhenrestrictions were formalised, allowingblack workers to handle only rough diamondsup to 1,69 carets in weight, andsewn diamondsof up to 0,85 carets.Recent attempts by employers to adjustthese restrictions end allow blackworkersto handle larger diamonds have again beenstrongly opposed by the white union (ROM,02.10.80). Pressurefrom the employers comesbecause the industry is running short ofskilled labour (end to cut costs, no doubt),whilepressure from the union continuesbecause of the fear of being phased out.The present restrictions will now extendto31 October, 1981, in response to unionnegotiations. The conflict in the industrycontinues.See WIP 7, page 5;i forearlier informationon the diamond industry.Kleenem Brushworks (Newclare, Johannesburg):An earlier incident wasreported on in WIP 12,page B.On 6 November, 1980, more than 300 workerswent on strike. At the centre of thedisputewas a wage clerk who, it was said, subjectedthe workers to persistent racial insults andarbitrety wagedeductions. They also demandeda wage increase over the present R20 a weekfor men end R15 forwomen.Management agreed to transfer the wagecleric, but workers were angry that no concessionhad been made ontheir wage demand.A Star reporter was forcibly removed fromthe factory premises.Mani's end Fetti's (Bellville andIsendo):A further item of interest can be addedto WIP's in-depth report of the Fetti's endMom 's labour unrest (WIP10, pages 33-4;WIP 11, page 2B).Management has signed a non-racialrecognition agreement with twounregisteredunions - the Food and Canning Workers Union(FCWU) and the African FCWU. This agreementgoes sofar as to lay down working conditionsend wages, rather then simply recording recogni-tion of the unions.The twounions view this move as being of'significance for progressive employers andthe trade union movement' (ROM,15.11.80).The recognition stands ' for an indefiniteduration'.Bull Brand Foods (Krugersdorp): About 400workersstopped work on 11 December, 1900, inprotest,egeinst the 'retrenchment' of five oftheir union shop stewards. Theyalleged thatthis amounted to victimisation against theFood, Beverage and Allied WorkersUnion(FBAWU).Management denied the victimisation claim,saying that 100 workers had had to beretrenchedbecause of the rising cost of meat; that thecompany had been 'compelled' to take this actionrather thenraise product prices; and that theyhad been unaware of the appointment of the five

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to death by more than 200 angry.worker.s on24 October, when he tried to arrest severalito death by more than 200angry.worker.s on24 October, when he tried to arrest several1 jd0pcatTha ttw.gal.hbT ralybrTyhpspects on charges ofpossession of dagge.hree men were arrested, two with bulletwounds. The dead man had fired two shots fromillegallypossessed firearms before dying.Further investigation revealed that thefear"'. airearms had been stolen property.irAfourth man was arrested for stealing asecond constable's service revolver.2. Eighteenwelders who had been offeredwork at SASOL,were turned away upon arrival because theywere 'Coloured', and SASOL has no accommodationforcoloured workers (ROM, 30.10.80).Krom River Apple Co-operative (Grebouw):This strike was reported on in depth inWIP13, pages 23-5.15 young men were arrested and chargedwith incidents related to the strike (incidentsof stonethrowing and damage to property) forhigher wages during April, 1980. They originallypleaded guilty to the charges,but itwas later alleged that the admissions had beenmade under duress. A doctor testified thatmarks on the accusedindicated electric shockburns and torture. The accused had pleadedguilty for fear of further abuse.The doctor hadbeen called by the Foodand Canning Workers Union (FCWU) (Star,28.10.80). A doctor called as witness by thepublicprosecutor contested these findings.The trial was then postponed to December18.The magistrate accepted thefindings ofthe defence doctor. A plea of not guilty was`entered for the workers, and 13 of them wereacquitted of thecharge. The remaining twowere convicted of public violence and sentencedto 18 months imprisonment, suspendedforS years (Star, 19.12.8D).Diamond Cutting Industry: White artisans inthis industry ere putting on pressurethroughtheir Diamond Workers Union to keep blacks outof the skilled areas. They fear being phasedout of their fobsend undercut by incomingblack workers.A first attempt by employers to increasethe range of work done by africen,Sndien andcoloured workers led to en 11 week strike bywhite artisans in 1976. This was only resolvedwhenrestrictions were formalised, allowingblack workers to handle only rough diamondsup to 1,69 carets in weight, andsewn diamondsof up to 0,85 carets.Recent attempts by employers to adjustthese restrictions end allow blackworkersto handle larger diamonds have again beenstrongly opposed by the white union (ROM,02.10.80). Pressurefrom the employers comesbecause the industry is running short ofskilled labour (end to cut costs, no doubt),whilepressure from the union continuesbecause of the fear of being phased out.The present restrictions will now extendto31 October, 1981, in response to unionnegotiations. The conflict in the industrycontinues.See WIP 7, page 5;i forearlier informationon the diamond industry.Kleenem Brushworks (Newclare, Johannesburg):An earlier incident wasreported on in WIP 12,page B.On 6 November, 1980, more than 300 workerswent on strike. At the centre of thedisputewas a wage clerk who, it was said, subjectedthe workers to persistent racial insults andarbitrety wagedeductions. They also demandeda wage increase over the present R20 a weekfor men end R15 forwomen.Management agreed to transfer the wagecleric, but workers were angry that no concessionhad been made ontheir wage demand.A Star reporter was forcibly removed fromthe factory premises.Mani's end Fetti's (Bellville andIsendo):A further item of interest can be addedto WIP's in-depth report of the Fetti's endMom 's labour unrest (WIP10, pages 33-4;WIP 11, page 2B).Management has signed a non-racialrecognition agreement with twounregisteredunions - the Food and Canning Workers Union(FCWU) and the African FCWU. This agreementgoes sofar as to lay down working conditionsend wages, rather then simply recording recogni-tion of the unions.The twounions view this move as being of'significance for progressive employers andthe trade union movement' (ROM,15.11.80).The recognition stands ' for an indefiniteduration'.Bull Brand Foods (Krugersdorp): About 400workersstopped work on 11 December, 1900, inprotest,egeinst the 'retrenchment' of five oftheir union shop stewards. Theyalleged thatthis amounted to victimisation against theFood, Beverage and Allied WorkersUnion(FBAWU).Management denied the victimisation claim,saying that 100 workers had had to beretrenchedbecause of the rising cost of meat; that thecompany had been 'compelled' to take this actionrather thenraise product prices; and that theyhad been unaware of the appointment of the five

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as.-shop stewards by union members.-More~informetion needed.Meet Boycotts: The managing director ofRumevite,a major stock feeding company,Dr Gerrit Louw, has accused meat boycotters of'committing sabotage' (according to aStarreport, 20.09.80). 'People who support themeet boycott in whatever form ere committingsabotage against farmersand the country',he is reported to have said.He also celled for restrictions on presscoverage which 'encouraged' theboycotters'activities.Not only had boycott calls been made insupport of the striking meat workers inCape town, butalso by various consumers'groups in protest against the very high meatprice in South Africa, and apparentmis-management of the meat industry.Union Steam Bakery (Kroonsted): The strike ofabout 80 workers in July, 1980,was reportedon in WIP 14, page 48. They struck initially fora wage increase, but struck again after theirleader, DennisBloem,.hed been fired and detainedDennis Bloem has been found guilty (earlyin September) of allegedly intimidatinghisco-workers and for stopping them from doingtheir duties, and of threatening to kill orinure those defying him. Afellow workerwho had been detained with Bloem, JekoboLephuting, was found not guilty and discharged.Bloem wassentenced to 250 days or a 8250 fine.Bus Company Workers1`. Putco Bus Company (Johannesburg): Forpreviouscoverage of events, see WIP73:34-5;WIP14:53-4. Since this coverage two majordevelopments have occurred.Firstly,in November, 1980, Putco managementexpressed its willingness to recognise theunregistered trade union, theTransport and AlliedWorkers Union (TAWU), to which the majority ofPutco workers belong. On 19 November, afterfourmonths of attempts et recognition, an agreementwas signed between TAIYU and management. Aspokespersonfor TAWU described this as e'procedural' agreement - and said that a furtheraccord was to be negotiated 'at a laterstage'.A ADM reporter viewed this as e,significentbreakthrough for Putco, citing the fact thatduring the June/Julystrike, Carleo, the managingdirector, had refused to talk to the strikingworkers, despite demands from them that hedoso.Secondly, in December, 1980, 780 workers- the full workforce - went on strike for thesecond time that year. Itappears thatmanagement's 'recognition' of TAWU had at thatstage done nothing to alter the working conditionsetPutco. Grievances included the following:e. anger at the slow pace of government machineryto settle wage disputes(as all passengertransport is defined as 'essential service', itis not possible for drivers to strike 'legally'.Firstgrievances have to be taken up by theDepartment of Manpower Utilisation, and then, ifno satisfactory resolution isfound, they erepassed on to the Wags Board for a hearing);b. anger that the 1556 wage increase by theWage Boardin December (in laying down newminimum scales) would scarcely cover inflationcosts, let alone allow for a change inthestandard of living of those workers;c. frustration at the company's 'indabe' method,of resolving conflict, involving aliaisoncommittee;d. job insecurity as many drivers were befired; andinge. anger and frustration at the fact thatVorster,the Putcoton depot manager, responsible foralleged arbitrary hiring and firing, and forallegedly insultingtreatment of workers, had notbeen removed from his post, despite an undertakingby management during theJune/July strike toinvestigate ell complaints against him.The men went out on strike on 17 December.All were fired.On 19 December newspapers carriedreports of police presence; Putco officialsapparently emphasised that they hadnot askedpolice to take any action. However, 12 driverswere taken by police, and released on 23December.TAWUmet with management and presented workerdemands that all 780 workers be reinstated.Despite this not beingallowed, roughly 700workers had returned to work by 23 December.27 of the remaining workers, who hadre-appliedfor their fobs, ware refused re-employment.These included members of the Drivers' ActionCommittee,which has close ties with TAIYU.A union spokesperson said that management wastrying to 'pick off worker loaders'and also'dividing workers by setting those who hove gottheir ,jobs buck against those who haven't'(ADM,24.12.80).The 27 workers were allowed to appealagainst the company refusal of re-employment,firstly through theliaison committee (at whicha TAWU representative was allowed to be present),and thereafter through management.We have noinformation as to how many, if any, of the 27were re-employed.A company spokesperson told a Starreporterthat the two strikes had cost the companyhundreds of thousands of rends. 'The final figurehad not yet beencalculated, and when it had itwould not be released to the Press... it couldrun into six figures' (Star, 02.01.81). There

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as.-shop stewards by union members.-More~informetion needed.Meet Boycotts: The managing director ofRumevite,a major stock feeding company,Dr Gerrit Louw, has accused meat boycotters of'committing sabotage' (according to aStarreport, 20.09.80). 'People who support themeet boycott in whatever form ere committingsabotage against farmersand the country',he is reported to have said.He also celled for restrictions on presscoverage which 'encouraged' theboycotters'activities.Not only had boycott calls been made insupport of the striking meat workers inCape town, butalso by various consumers'groups in protest against the very high meatprice in South Africa, and apparentmis-management of the meat industry.Union Steam Bakery (Kroonsted): The strike ofabout 80 workers in July, 1980,was reportedon in WIP 14, page 48. They struck initially fora wage increase, but struck again after theirleader, DennisBloem,.hed been fired and detainedDennis Bloem has been found guilty (earlyin September) of allegedly intimidatinghisco-workers and for stopping them from doingtheir duties, and of threatening to kill orinure those defying him. Afellow workerwho had been detained with Bloem, JekoboLephuting, was found not guilty and discharged.Bloem wassentenced to 250 days or a 8250 fine.Bus Company Workers1`. Putco Bus Company (Johannesburg): Forpreviouscoverage of events, see WIP73:34-5;WIP14:53-4. Since this coverage two majordevelopments have occurred.Firstly,in November, 1980, Putco managementexpressed its willingness to recognise theunregistered trade union, theTransport and AlliedWorkers Union (TAWU), to which the majority ofPutco workers belong. On 19 November, afterfourmonths of attempts et recognition, an agreementwas signed between TAIYU and management. Aspokespersonfor TAWU described this as e'procedural' agreement - and said that a furtheraccord was to be negotiated 'at a laterstage'.A ADM reporter viewed this as e,significentbreakthrough for Putco, citing the fact thatduring the June/Julystrike, Carleo, the managingdirector, had refused to talk to the strikingworkers, despite demands from them that hedoso.Secondly, in December, 1980, 780 workers- the full workforce - went on strike for thesecond time that year. Itappears thatmanagement's 'recognition' of TAWU had at thatstage done nothing to alter the working conditionsetPutco. Grievances included the following:e. anger at the slow pace of government machineryto settle wage disputes(as all passengertransport is defined as 'essential service', itis not possible for drivers to strike 'legally'.Firstgrievances have to be taken up by theDepartment of Manpower Utilisation, and then, ifno satisfactory resolution isfound, they erepassed on to the Wags Board for a hearing);b. anger that the 1556 wage increase by theWage Boardin December (in laying down newminimum scales) would scarcely cover inflationcosts, let alone allow for a change inthestandard of living of those workers;c. frustration at the company's 'indabe' method,of resolving conflict, involving aliaisoncommittee;d. job insecurity as many drivers were befired; andinge. anger and frustration at the fact thatVorster,the Putcoton depot manager, responsible foralleged arbitrary hiring and firing, and forallegedly insultingtreatment of workers, had notbeen removed from his post, despite an undertakingby management during theJune/July strike toinvestigate ell complaints against him.The men went out on strike on 17 December.All were fired.On 19 December newspapers carriedreports of police presence; Putco officialsapparently emphasised that they hadnot askedpolice to take any action. However, 12 driverswere taken by police, and released on 23December.TAWUmet with management and presented workerdemands that all 780 workers be reinstated.Despite this not beingallowed, roughly 700workers had returned to work by 23 December.27 of the remaining workers, who hadre-appliedfor their fobs, ware refused re-employment.These included members of the Drivers' ActionCommittee,which has close ties with TAIYU.A union spokesperson said that management wastrying to 'pick off worker loaders'and also'dividing workers by setting those who hove gottheir ,jobs buck against those who haven't'(ADM,24.12.80).The 27 workers were allowed to appealagainst the company refusal of re-employment,firstly through theliaison committee (at whicha TAWU representative was allowed to be present),and thereafter through management.We have noinformation as to how many, if any, of the 27were re-employed.A company spokesperson told a Starreporterthat the two strikes had cost the companyhundreds of thousands of rends. 'The final figurehad not yet beencalculated, and when it had itwould not be released to the Press... it couldrun into six figures' (Star, 02.01.81). There

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Was also a rumour from management that theincreased drivers' wages would result inincreased bus fares forcormuters (January, 1961).2.. Daveyton Bus Drivers: Bus drivers on theeast Rand threatened to go on strike on17October, 1980. Demands included permission tojoin a union, overtime pay for Sundays end publicholidays, end asix-day week.A meeting amongst members of the DeveytanBus Drivers' Committee, the East Rend Administra-tionBoard, and the Daveyton Community Council,solved must of their grievances, and the strikewas averted.The busdrivers have ,joined the Transport andGeneral Workers Union, but this will not berecognised by the ERAS until it is'registered'.3. KwaZulu Bus Service: 55 bus drivers went anstrike on 22 January, 1981. They were demandingthedismissal of a certain inspector who haddismissed one of their colleagues.A police spokesmen. said that the driverhadassaulted a child and hence had been dismissed.Later during the same day the drivers wentback to work. It is notknown what happened tothe inspector:4. Bloemfontein Municipality: 75 bus driverswent on strike early in November,1980, for a7596 wage increase. As workers providing e'utility service' they were then arrested underthe RiotousAssemblies Act. BloemfonteinMunicipality refused to take any strikers backinto employment. By 7 November thetransportmanager, Chris Naude, was already recruiting newstaff.On 22 November strikers were told that theycouldre-apply for their ,jobs. Re-employment,however, was selective, and an angry crowd inMnngeung township stoned thebus driven by oneof the re-employed drivers, allegedly shouting'let's kill that driver', 'where is that sell-out'(Star,13.11.&1).On 20 November a memorandum was presented tothe Bloemfontein City Council by residents ofMengnungtownship, demanding the reinstatementof all 75 workers. This demand was not met.On 28 November residents againdemonstratedsolidarity with the fired strikers by boycottingthe bus service end walking to work. Police werepresent,end a number of 'suspects' were reportedlydetained.The police said that the BloemfonteinCity Council could be 'in hotwater' for notwarning the drivers about section 14 of theRiotous Assemblies Act which prohibits strikesin 'essentialservices' (see the report below).5. Mpumelange Transport (Hammarsdale, Natal):On 30 October, 1980, 44 bus driverswent onstrike in protest against the dismissal of oneof their fellow drivers the day before. Theywere arrested anddetained - far not carrying out'essential services', end for not negotiatingthrough the 'proper channels'.Many busescould not be used that daybecause their ignition systems had been tamperedwith, according to a companyspokesperson.Additional charges of malicious damage to propertywere added to those, the drivers already faced.By14 November 25 of the 44 workers had beenre-employed.The court case was heard for the first timeon 28 November.The defence lawyer maintainedthat the Mpumalanga Transport Company (the KwaZuluTransport Company (Pty) Ltd)was liable to a fineof more then R10 000 for failing for the pastthree years to display a notice stipulated undertheRiotous Assemblies Act, outlining theemployees' rights and duties. The magistrateargued that this was irrelevant tothe case.More information needed.Tubatse Ferrochrome (Steelpoort, Transvaal):A strike by the entire labour force of400 tookplace on 16-7 September, 1980, on the question ofchanges in the law governing pension schemes.Theworkers reacted to the possibility that thesechanges might 'prevent them from withdrawing theirpensions onpremature termination of service'.WH McGruder of Union Carbide (,joint ownerswith General Mining of T~jbptse)denied that thestrike had been over the non-re-employemnt by thecompany of ten workers who had resigned inorderto claim their pensions.McGruder said that workers viewed the pensionscheme as a savings scheme, and aslegislationon this matter is likely to be retrospective,'workers who had ,joined pension schemesexpecting to recovertheir contributions mightbe denied this' (Star, 16.10.80). This would'lead to considerable worker unrest'.Some unionsare also believed to be opposedto these suggested changes relating to companycontributory pension schemes, asthey feel thatwith mass unemployment workers need pensioncontributions while they are unemployed and notto havetheir contributions frozen until retire-ment date. The state, on the other hand, couldsee such frozen privatecontributions to belikely to lessen the load on state-providedold age pensions (see the article on theold age pensionsin this issue).Firestone (Port Elizabeth): Some 1 500 workersat this plant downed tools in protest at theproposedgovernment legislation 'to stop employeeswithdrawing pension contributions when theychange ,jobs' (Star, 26.01.81).See the report

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Was also a rumour from management that theincreased drivers' wages would result inincreased bus fares forcormuters (January, 1961).2.. Daveyton Bus Drivers: Bus drivers on theeast Rand threatened to go on strike on17October, 1980. Demands included permission tojoin a union, overtime pay for Sundays end publicholidays, end asix-day week.A meeting amongst members of the DeveytanBus Drivers' Committee, the East Rend Administra-tionBoard, and the Daveyton Community Council,solved must of their grievances, and the strikewas averted.The busdrivers have ,joined the Transport andGeneral Workers Union, but this will not berecognised by the ERAS until it is'registered'.3. KwaZulu Bus Service: 55 bus drivers went anstrike on 22 January, 1981. They were demandingthedismissal of a certain inspector who haddismissed one of their colleagues.A police spokesmen. said that the driverhadassaulted a child and hence had been dismissed.Later during the same day the drivers wentback to work. It is notknown what happened tothe inspector:4. Bloemfontein Municipality: 75 bus driverswent on strike early in November,1980, for a7596 wage increase. As workers providing e'utility service' they were then arrested underthe RiotousAssemblies Act. BloemfonteinMunicipality refused to take any strikers backinto employment. By 7 November thetransportmanager, Chris Naude, was already recruiting newstaff.On 22 November strikers were told that theycouldre-apply for their ,jobs. Re-employment,however, was selective, and an angry crowd inMnngeung township stoned thebus driven by oneof the re-employed drivers, allegedly shouting'let's kill that driver', 'where is that sell-out'(Star,13.11.&1).On 20 November a memorandum was presented tothe Bloemfontein City Council by residents ofMengnungtownship, demanding the reinstatementof all 75 workers. This demand was not met.On 28 November residents againdemonstratedsolidarity with the fired strikers by boycottingthe bus service end walking to work. Police werepresent,end a number of 'suspects' were reportedlydetained.The police said that the BloemfonteinCity Council could be 'in hotwater' for notwarning the drivers about section 14 of theRiotous Assemblies Act which prohibits strikesin 'essentialservices' (see the report below).5. Mpumelange Transport (Hammarsdale, Natal):On 30 October, 1980, 44 bus driverswent onstrike in protest against the dismissal of oneof their fellow drivers the day before. Theywere arrested anddetained - far not carrying out'essential services', end for not negotiatingthrough the 'proper channels'.Many busescould not be used that daybecause their ignition systems had been tamperedwith, according to a companyspokesperson.Additional charges of malicious damage to propertywere added to those, the drivers already faced.By14 November 25 of the 44 workers had beenre-employed.The court case was heard for the first timeon 28 November.The defence lawyer maintainedthat the Mpumalanga Transport Company (the KwaZuluTransport Company (Pty) Ltd)was liable to a fineof more then R10 000 for failing for the pastthree years to display a notice stipulated undertheRiotous Assemblies Act, outlining theemployees' rights and duties. The magistrateargued that this was irrelevant tothe case.More information needed.Tubatse Ferrochrome (Steelpoort, Transvaal):A strike by the entire labour force of400 tookplace on 16-7 September, 1980, on the question ofchanges in the law governing pension schemes.Theworkers reacted to the possibility that thesechanges might 'prevent them from withdrawing theirpensions onpremature termination of service'.WH McGruder of Union Carbide (,joint ownerswith General Mining of T~jbptse)denied that thestrike had been over the non-re-employemnt by thecompany of ten workers who had resigned inorderto claim their pensions.McGruder said that workers viewed the pensionscheme as a savings scheme, and aslegislationon this matter is likely to be retrospective,'workers who had ,joined pension schemesexpecting to recovertheir contributions mightbe denied this' (Star, 16.10.80). This would'lead to considerable worker unrest'.Some unionsare also believed to be opposedto these suggested changes relating to companycontributory pension schemes, asthey feel thatwith mass unemployment workers need pensioncontributions while they are unemployed and notto havetheir contributions frozen until retire-ment date. The state, on the other hand, couldsee such frozen privatecontributions to belikely to lessen the load on state-providedold age pensions (see the article on theold age pensionsin this issue).Firestone (Port Elizabeth): Some 1 500 workersat this plant downed tools in protest at theproposedgovernment legislation 'to stop employeeswithdrawing pension contributions when theychange ,jobs' (Star, 26.01.81).See the report

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above .The first shift to stop work did so onSunday night apparently. They were joined bylater shifts.Furthercomplaints related to the allegeddetention of a fellow worker on Saturday, 24January, by the security police; arejection ofthe liaison committee system.Management said that they would be willingto pay out pension contributions,but the workerswould first have to resign, seek re-employment, andwork for a further year before they could re-jointhepension scheme operative in the firm. 'We arethe ham in the sandwich - it's not really acompany thing', said managingdirector GP Morum(ROM, 27.01.81).Carlton Hotel (Johannesburg): On Monday, 19January, the entire housekeepingstaff at theCarlton Hotel (in which the Anglo AmericanCompany has a large stake) went on strike fora few hours overthe dismissal of two fellowworkers. Workers believed that the dismissalshad been part of a campaign against theCommercialCatering and Allied Workers Union (CCAWUSA members)at the hotel. CCAWUSA is anon-registeredunion.Pat Burton, general manager, said that thedismissals had been over theft, and thatmanagementwould not negotiate with the union over thismatter.Workers said that they returned to work aftertheweek's notice that had originally been giventhe fired workers was changed to a month's wages.On Tuesday, 20January, 500 workers (250according to Burton).went on strike for threehours over reinstatement of dismissedworkers,union recognition (the Hotel, Liquor and CateringTrade Employees Union - 'part of the CCAWUSA').Burtonsaid that white employees had 'done thestrikers' work' (more commonly known as thepractice of 'scabbing').Later inthe week it was reported that unionexecutive members, led by IiCTEU chairperson,Hamilton Makadama, had met withCarlton management,and that the union may be recognised (ROM, 24.01.81).Angus-slewken Fluid SealingEngineering (Rosslyn,Pretoria): The workers (about 400) at this plantwent on strike on Friday, 16 January,demandingwage increases of 35c to 65c an hour (probably to81,25 an hour, and not of 81,25 an hour as onereportwould have it).Management agreed to 81,00 a week increase,refused by the workers. It seems that the workerswerepaid off on Tuesday, and then told tore-apply for their ,jobs.A report on Monday, 26 January, said thatnot only was thestrike over (settled over theweekpnd), but the number of workers who hadbeen involved had decreased to 150(!).Noexplanation is given of this enormous discrepancy.Sappi Fine Papers (Enstra, Springs): !Yorkers sayabout 1 000employees et Sappi were involved ina strike over minimum wages (management say about300 workers went onstrike). Sappi employsabout 2 300 workers at the Enscra.mill. The strikestarted on Wednesday, 21 January, andended onMonday, 26 January, after management had agreedto negotiate new wages with theFOSATU-affiliatedPaper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU). Theworkers had also complained about hostelrantsand short meal hours.Tension over representation and wages hadbeen building up over time, and one PWAWUmeetinghad been broken up by the security police.On Tuesday 27th January, it was reported(RDM) that managementhad turned down theunion request for a 200', increase (initially30096). The union thereupon withdrew fromthenegotiations saying that they were there asintermediaries, and that management would have toannounce therejection to the workers.Management said that the lowest paid workerat Ensue earna 8246 a month (includingcashbenefits, and 'normal overtime'), while theaverage wage for hourly paid workers was soldto be 8330 a month.Management added that theworkers would not be paid for the time they hadbeen on strike.Montana Hypercellars(Durban): Some 30 workerswent on strike aver the reinstatement of fellowworkers and recognition of their union,theNational Federation of (Black?) Workers. Theunion's Matthews Oliphant said that the firm hadbeen firing unionmembers at the rate of two aday. The strike resumed on 19 January afterIsrael Khuzwayo, chairperson of the'newlyrecognised' workers committee was fired.Management refused to comment.A later report (ROM, 22.01.81) saidthatnegotiations had reached stalemate, but that halfthe 22 striking workers had been re-employed.Pretoria PrecisionCastings (Pty) Ltd (Waltloo,Pretoria): On Thursday, 22 January, between 150and 250 workers walked out, demandingan extra35c to 65c on the B3c c. hour they were earning(this was claimed to G=_ the highest wage). Theworkerswere initially sacked, and then reinstatedwith management promising to look into wages.Same of the workers are saidto be representedby the United African Motor Workers Union.Feltex Foam and Automotive Products (Pty)Ltd(Rasslyn, Pretoria): Workers went on strikebriefly over a demand that their annual wageincrease be broughtforward. Management had

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above .The first shift to stop work did so onSunday night apparently. They were joined bylater shifts.Furthercomplaints related to the allegeddetention of a fellow worker on Saturday, 24January, by the security police; arejection ofthe liaison committee system.Management said that they would be willingto pay out pension contributions,but the workerswould first have to resign, seek re-employment, andwork for a further year before they could re-jointhepension scheme operative in the firm. 'We arethe ham in the sandwich - it's not really acompany thing', said managingdirector GP Morum(ROM, 27.01.81).Carlton Hotel (Johannesburg): On Monday, 19January, the entire housekeepingstaff at theCarlton Hotel (in which the Anglo AmericanCompany has a large stake) went on strike fora few hours overthe dismissal of two fellowworkers. Workers believed that the dismissalshad been part of a campaign against theCommercialCatering and Allied Workers Union (CCAWUSA members)at the hotel. CCAWUSA is anon-registeredunion.Pat Burton, general manager, said that thedismissals had been over theft, and thatmanagementwould not negotiate with the union over thismatter.Workers said that they returned to work aftertheweek's notice that had originally been giventhe fired workers was changed to a month's wages.On Tuesday, 20January, 500 workers (250according to Burton).went on strike for threehours over reinstatement of dismissedworkers,union recognition (the Hotel, Liquor and CateringTrade Employees Union - 'part of the CCAWUSA').Burtonsaid that white employees had 'done thestrikers' work' (more commonly known as thepractice of 'scabbing').Later inthe week it was reported that unionexecutive members, led by IiCTEU chairperson,Hamilton Makadama, had met withCarlton management,and that the union may be recognised (ROM, 24.01.81).Angus-slewken Fluid SealingEngineering (Rosslyn,Pretoria): The workers (about 400) at this plantwent on strike on Friday, 16 January,demandingwage increases of 35c to 65c an hour (probably to81,25 an hour, and not of 81,25 an hour as onereportwould have it).Management agreed to 81,00 a week increase,refused by the workers. It seems that the workerswerepaid off on Tuesday, and then told tore-apply for their ,jobs.A report on Monday, 26 January, said thatnot only was thestrike over (settled over theweekpnd), but the number of workers who hadbeen involved had decreased to 150(!).Noexplanation is given of this enormous discrepancy.Sappi Fine Papers (Enstra, Springs): !Yorkers sayabout 1 000employees et Sappi were involved ina strike over minimum wages (management say about300 workers went onstrike). Sappi employsabout 2 300 workers at the Enscra.mill. The strikestarted on Wednesday, 21 January, andended onMonday, 26 January, after management had agreedto negotiate new wages with theFOSATU-affiliatedPaper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU). Theworkers had also complained about hostelrantsand short meal hours.Tension over representation and wages hadbeen building up over time, and one PWAWUmeetinghad been broken up by the security police.On Tuesday 27th January, it was reported(RDM) that managementhad turned down theunion request for a 200', increase (initially30096). The union thereupon withdrew fromthenegotiations saying that they were there asintermediaries, and that management would have toannounce therejection to the workers.Management said that the lowest paid workerat Ensue earna 8246 a month (includingcashbenefits, and 'normal overtime'), while theaverage wage for hourly paid workers was soldto be 8330 a month.Management added that theworkers would not be paid for the time they hadbeen on strike.Montana Hypercellars(Durban): Some 30 workerswent on strike aver the reinstatement of fellowworkers and recognition of their union,theNational Federation of (Black?) Workers. Theunion's Matthews Oliphant said that the firm hadbeen firing unionmembers at the rate of two aday. The strike resumed on 19 January afterIsrael Khuzwayo, chairperson of the'newlyrecognised' workers committee was fired.Management refused to comment.A later report (ROM, 22.01.81) saidthatnegotiations had reached stalemate, but that halfthe 22 striking workers had been re-employed.Pretoria PrecisionCastings (Pty) Ltd (Waltloo,Pretoria): On Thursday, 22 January, between 150and 250 workers walked out, demandingan extra35c to 65c on the B3c c. hour they were earning(this was claimed to G=_ the highest wage). Theworkerswere initially sacked, and then reinstatedwith management promising to look into wages.Same of the workers are saidto be representedby the United African Motor Workers Union.Feltex Foam and Automotive Products (Pty)Ltd(Rasslyn, Pretoria): Workers went on strikebriefly over a demand that their annual wageincrease be broughtforward. Management had

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page 48~e ~u allure :'mi erru Mmwe- MI em Mae_. A.mw -1~n .,~'; rie ra.r.~.Mlli y..~o ~reeyj.- yW j '!.:.111ml( ~_a1o<e-jrIr rotmmr 11mLILILA Noticeboard displaying the names of companies with factories at Rosslyn,near Pretoria,GaRankuwe, Memelodi, and Winterveld. This industrial area,home of many of the multinational companies investingin South Africa, hasbeen the scene of many of the recent strikes in South Africa.agreed to this, and workers returnedto work onThursday, 22 January.SA Fabrics (Rossburgh, Natal): 600 workers ofthe SA Fabrics factory went on.strikeover wages.They had been on strike for three days on 21January.Most workers earn RSO, and had rejectedanoffered increase of 5%. Despite a National Unionof Textile Workers recommendation that theyreturn to work whilenegotiations are in progressthe workers have said they will remain on strikeuntil their.wege demands had beenmet.More information needed.:wsu a ~sr~mo y i w1iGURCoates Brothers (Durban): Management refusedto negotiatewith the union representing theworkers at this firm making printing ink. Theunion involved is SAAWU. Workers wenton strikedemanding the reinstatement of a fellow worker andthe recognition of the union.Members of the rivalTUCSA-affiliatedtypographical union also had to stop work asa result of the walkout.More information is needed onthis strikethat apparently took place (or started) on26 January.Eastern Cape: Strikes in this politically andeconomicallyvolatile part of the country havebeen cover_d in several beck issues of _WIP(see, for example, WIP7:22-9;WIP11:11-21;WIP13:25-31; and individual items in the'labour action' sections; also see the SouthAfrican LabourBulletin 6, 263, 'Working forFord?'). Once again there have been so many strikesthat we will present a chronology ofsome eventssince the last issue of WIP appeared, ratherthen covering individual strikes.This period has seen thedecline fromprominence of the community-based Pebcoorganisation, while the focus has shifted tothis umbrellaorganisation's constituent parts

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page 48~e ~u allure :'mi erru Mmwe- MI em Mae_. A.mw -1~n .,~'; rie ra.r.~.Mlli y..~o ~reeyj.- yW j '!.:.111ml( ~_a1o<e-jrIr rotmmr 11mLILILA Noticeboard displaying the names of companies with factories at Rosslyn,near Pretoria,GaRankuwe, Memelodi, and Winterveld. This industrial area,home of many of the multinational companies investingin South Africa, hasbeen the scene of many of the recent strikes in South Africa.agreed to this, and workers returnedto work onThursday, 22 January.SA Fabrics (Rossburgh, Natal): 600 workers ofthe SA Fabrics factory went on.strikeover wages.They had been on strike for three days on 21January.Most workers earn RSO, and had rejectedanoffered increase of 5%. Despite a National Unionof Textile Workers recommendation that theyreturn to work whilenegotiations are in progressthe workers have said they will remain on strikeuntil their.wege demands had beenmet.More information needed.:wsu a ~sr~mo y i w1iGURCoates Brothers (Durban): Management refusedto negotiatewith the union representing theworkers at this firm making printing ink. Theunion involved is SAAWU. Workers wenton strikedemanding the reinstatement of a fellow worker andthe recognition of the union.Members of the rivalTUCSA-affiliatedtypographical union also had to stop work asa result of the walkout.More information is needed onthis strikethat apparently took place (or started) on26 January.Eastern Cape: Strikes in this politically andeconomicallyvolatile part of the country havebeen cover_d in several beck issues of _WIP(see, for example, WIP7:22-9;WIP11:11-21;WIP13:25-31; and individual items in the'labour action' sections; also see the SouthAfrican LabourBulletin 6, 263, 'Working forFord?'). Once again there have been so many strikesthat we will present a chronology ofsome eventssince the last issue of WIP appeared, ratherthen covering individual strikes.This period has seen thedecline fromprominence of the community-based Pebcoorganisation, while the focus has shifted tothis umbrellaorganisation's constituent parts

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(mainly the Residents' Associations), and otherorganisations (eg, the Port Elizabeth StudentsCouncil, Pesco). InUitenhage the equivalentcivic body (to Pebco), the Ubco, has been moreactive, with its greater workerparticipation(which, in Pebco's case, had turned on the figureof Thozamile Botha, now banned and living inexile,supporting the ANC).The schools boycott in the eastern Capehas only this year, 1981, shown signs of a lull.Thisaction by school students has kept thepolitical climate tense, with buses being stonedand burnt, security police beingthreatened andmobbed, and community councils caning underattackIn the trade union field conflict hascontinuedbetween FOSATU-affiliated unions andother unions, primarily the South African AlliedWorkers Union (SAAWU). Thelatter (SAAWU) hasapparently experienced phenomenal growth in thisregion of South Africa, despite the repeatedandprolonged detention of its leadership,organisers and members by the central stateand by the local branch, the Ciskeisecuritypolice (the CIS). It has not been possibleto provide all the details of the inter-unionconflict.September13-20:The UAW (the FOSATU-affiliated UnitedAutomobile and Rubber Workers Union) accused thePebco-linked FordWorkers Committee (FWC) of being .'elitist and middle-class'. This followed movesby the FWC to form a rival union tothe UAW (whichimmediately had a newspaper label of 'blackconsciousness' attached to it), to be called theMotorAssemblies and Components Workers Union(MACWUSA). During the week many workers cancelledtheir shop ordersfor the UAW. The MACWUSA interimleader was Dumile Makhanda.21-30: Bus workers from Uitenhage andPortElizabeth rejected the in-company (managementformed) unions, the Bay Busworkers Union (BBU)and PETramway and Busworkers Union (PETBU -for coloureds). These workers were mainlymembers of the Transport andAllied Workers Union(TAWU - affiliated to the Confederation of.Unions of South Africa, CUSA).October1-11:MACWUSA was said to be planning to askfor company recognition at Ford. The unionsaid that it also hadmembership at GeneralMotors and was to establish a branch at VW inVitenhage.Manpower Utilisation Minister,FanieBotha, flew to East London for meetings ont_.ide unions and strikes, with management.Thozemile Bothaformally linked himself tothe ANC, and started a speaking tour of the USAby addressing the United Nations on the dayofsolidarity with South African political prisoners,10 October.12-18: MACWUSA officially launched and stateditself tobe committed to 'a union role in thecommunity as well as in the factory'. Althoughpredominantly african in membershipMACWUSA isnon-racial in constitution, and againstregistration.Tho UAW said that MACWUSA's support wasmainly inthe Cortina plant of Ford, where about500 of their (UAW) members had joined the newunion. The UAW repeated its'white collar'accusation, while MACWUSA said that only four outof 23 executive members werewhite-collarworkers.Full-time union elected, but company paid,shop stewards were elected at VW, following onFord'sannouncement that they would institutesuch a scheme with the two FOSATU-affiliatedunions recognised by them(UAW and the NationalUnion of Motor Assemblies and Rubber Workers,NUMARWOSA, of Freddie Sauls). Thedanger withthis system being that shop stewards may becomeidentified with management who pays them. Saulssaidthat he had asked for such a scheme in1974.19-25: Rumours that VW had been hit by sit-downstrikes regularly sincethe major unrest at theplant and in the eastern Cape generally, wasdenied by management who did, however, admitonedepartmental strike. FOSATU unions claimed rapidgrowth in the Uitenhage area.SAAWU, claiming to representhalf the 3 000workers at the Frame Group's Consolidated FineSpinners and Weavers (at East London), saidthroughnational organiser Thozamile Gqweta, that manycomplaints had been received from the workers.Theserelated to hours and wages; assaults;insufficient medical attention; dismissals; anddiscrimination against women.OnFriday, 24 October, workers in thechocolate-moulding section of the Wilson-Rowntreefactory went on strike, to bejoined by thefull workforce of more than 1 500. Managementclaimed intimidation of some workers, while theworkerssaid that many grievances existed (suchas discrimination against africans in favour ofcoloured workers).On Saturdaythe entire workforce wasdismissed and told to re-apply for jobs onMonday, without loss of pensionbenefits.Management did add that not all workers wouldbe re-employed.26-31: Monday (27th) saw the return ofabout1 000 workers, and a reported 2 000 work seekers(once more underlining the difficulty of worker

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(mainly the Residents' Associations), and otherorganisations (eg, the Port Elizabeth StudentsCouncil, Pesco). InUitenhage the equivalentcivic body (to Pebco), the Ubco, has been moreactive, with its greater workerparticipation(which, in Pebco's case, had turned on the figureof Thozamile Botha, now banned and living inexile,supporting the ANC).The schools boycott in the eastern Capehas only this year, 1981, shown signs of a lull.Thisaction by school students has kept thepolitical climate tense, with buses being stonedand burnt, security police beingthreatened andmobbed, and community councils caning underattackIn the trade union field conflict hascontinuedbetween FOSATU-affiliated unions andother unions, primarily the South African AlliedWorkers Union (SAAWU). Thelatter (SAAWU) hasapparently experienced phenomenal growth in thisregion of South Africa, despite the repeatedandprolonged detention of its leadership,organisers and members by the central stateand by the local branch, the Ciskeisecuritypolice (the CIS). It has not been possibleto provide all the details of the inter-unionconflict.September13-20:The UAW (the FOSATU-affiliated UnitedAutomobile and Rubber Workers Union) accused thePebco-linked FordWorkers Committee (FWC) of being .'elitist and middle-class'. This followed movesby the FWC to form a rival union tothe UAW (whichimmediately had a newspaper label of 'blackconsciousness' attached to it), to be called theMotorAssemblies and Components Workers Union(MACWUSA). During the week many workers cancelledtheir shop ordersfor the UAW. The MACWUSA interimleader was Dumile Makhanda.21-30: Bus workers from Uitenhage andPortElizabeth rejected the in-company (managementformed) unions, the Bay Busworkers Union (BBU)and PETramway and Busworkers Union (PETBU -for coloureds). These workers were mainlymembers of the Transport andAllied Workers Union(TAWU - affiliated to the Confederation of.Unions of South Africa, CUSA).October1-11:MACWUSA was said to be planning to askfor company recognition at Ford. The unionsaid that it also hadmembership at GeneralMotors and was to establish a branch at VW inVitenhage.Manpower Utilisation Minister,FanieBotha, flew to East London for meetings ont_.ide unions and strikes, with management.Thozemile Bothaformally linked himself tothe ANC, and started a speaking tour of the USAby addressing the United Nations on the dayofsolidarity with South African political prisoners,10 October.12-18: MACWUSA officially launched and stateditself tobe committed to 'a union role in thecommunity as well as in the factory'. Althoughpredominantly african in membershipMACWUSA isnon-racial in constitution, and againstregistration.Tho UAW said that MACWUSA's support wasmainly inthe Cortina plant of Ford, where about500 of their (UAW) members had joined the newunion. The UAW repeated its'white collar'accusation, while MACWUSA said that only four outof 23 executive members werewhite-collarworkers.Full-time union elected, but company paid,shop stewards were elected at VW, following onFord'sannouncement that they would institutesuch a scheme with the two FOSATU-affiliatedunions recognised by them(UAW and the NationalUnion of Motor Assemblies and Rubber Workers,NUMARWOSA, of Freddie Sauls). Thedanger withthis system being that shop stewards may becomeidentified with management who pays them. Saulssaidthat he had asked for such a scheme in1974.19-25: Rumours that VW had been hit by sit-downstrikes regularly sincethe major unrest at theplant and in the eastern Cape generally, wasdenied by management who did, however, admitonedepartmental strike. FOSATU unions claimed rapidgrowth in the Uitenhage area.SAAWU, claiming to representhalf the 3 000workers at the Frame Group's Consolidated FineSpinners and Weavers (at East London), saidthroughnational organiser Thozamile Gqweta, that manycomplaints had been received from the workers.Theserelated to hours and wages; assaults;insufficient medical attention; dismissals; anddiscrimination against women.OnFriday, 24 October, workers in thechocolate-moulding section of the Wilson-Rowntreefactory went on strike, to bejoined by thefull workforce of more than 1 500. Managementclaimed intimidation of some workers, while theworkerssaid that many grievances existed (suchas discrimination against africans in favour ofcoloured workers).On Saturdaythe entire workforce wasdismissed and told to re-apply for jobs onMonday, without loss of pensionbenefits.Management did add that not all workers wouldbe re-employed.26-31: Monday (27th) saw the return ofabout1 000 workers, and a reported 2 000 work seekers(once more underlining the difficulty of worker

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action and organisation in a mass unemploymentsituation).Msnegament denied dismissals (workers had'dismissedthemselves', a phrase heard so oftenin the lest year that it cannot but be a centraldirective), and also denied thatselectivere-employment would take place. $AAWU said thatmanagement had signed on unemployed people abouttwoweeks before the events as stand-by labour,and that striking workers would not return untilthe entire workforce wasreinstated. Managementwas to meet with SAAWU.About 3 000 workers had attended the BAAWU-called meeting inthe East London city hall overthe weekend to discuss workers reinstatement at.Wilson-Rowntras, but also at Ray-LiteBatteries,National Converter Industries, and Border Boxes.Trade union meetings in Mdantsana, within theCiskeibantustan and just outside East London,had been banned byithe township council.Subsequently BAAWU heldmeetings in Duncan Villagewhich falls outside the Ciskei, but these wenalso stopped.Management etWilson-Aowntree accused BAAWUof 'inciting' workers not to return to work.This BAAWU denied, pointing out thatworkershad taken .their own decisions. The union hadbeen told by Wilson-Rowntree that they wouldnot re-employ allthe workers.On Wednesday, 30 October, all workersreturned. Gqwata of SAAWU said that Wilson-Rowntreemanagement would look at grievancesin the chocolate-moulding section, where thestrike had started.At the end ofOctober it was announced thatthree FOSATU unions in the motor industry were tomerge - the NUMARW08A, UAW,and the Western ProvinceMotor Assembly Workers Union. This followed statepermission for NUMARWOSA to enrolworkers on a'fully non-racial basis'. Members of the unionsendorsed the decision early in November.November1-8:On Sunday, 7 November, Thozamile Gqweta wasdetained by the Ciskeian security police (thesecond time that he hadbeen detained by thisbody). Brigadier Charles Sobs, secretary of thenotorious Ciskei Intelligence Service (CIS)andbrother to the Ciskei's chief minister, saidthat the detention was in connection with'disturbances at schools' (thefirst of manystrange statements from this man). Thedetention came shortly before Gqwete was to haveaddressedwouzkere at SA Chloride, after an inprinciple decision by management at this foreign-owned company to recogniseSAAWU, if they hadthe support of the workers.Employers said, after a meeting of the EastLondon Chamber ofCommerce, that they would dealwith unregistered unions (referring to the AfricanFood and Canning Workers Union,AFCWU, and SAAWU,the most active unions in the city). R Alisonof the Chamber of Commerce said that earlierpolicyof non-negotiation had. been laid down byManpower Utilisation Minister, Fanis Bathe.Sim NJikelana (SAAWU) wasdetained by theSaba Brothers' CIS, on 5 November. He was alsodue to address Chloride (SA) workers if SAAWUwonthe referendum being conducted there.SAAWU won the referendum overwhelmingly,polling 95,2%6 of votes castat the firm.A Joint statement by the AFCWU, SAAWU endthe Western Province General Workers Union(WPGWU)condemned the detentions of unionists. BothBonisile Norushe and Oscar Mpetha of the AFCWUwere still indetention, as well as the SAAWUunionists. The unions were joined in the protestby the National Federation of BladeWorkers(NFBW), another breakaway group from the BladeAllied Workers Union (BAWU).Brigadier Sobs ravedon:Their arrest has nothing to do with tradeunionism. They are involved in studentprotest in the Ciskei. We are up toournecks with student protest in the Ciskei.. On Friday night, 7 November, 19 (six women)trade unionists wendetained as they crossedthe 'border' of the Ciskei into Mdentsanetownship. Brigadier Saba described as'purelycoincidental' that South African security policeshould arrive in Mdantsens soon after thedetentions (thedistinction between the branchesof the state in question would seem to be morein fore than in content). SaidBrigadierSobs:I strongly resent the suggestion that wewere being used by the South AfricanGovernment to do a jobfor them.Having picked up the officials at eroadblock we took them to Mdantsanecharge office,-and were met thereby(SA) security policemen who were on theirnoraal rounds.Sobs said that these people, too, were detainedinconnection with 'schools unrest'.The unionists detained were from the AFCWU,the Food and Canning Workers Union(FCWU),SAAWU and the WPGWU. The six women were releasedand told to report to the police on Monday,10November.9-15: The women unionists were interrogated andthen released. Brigadier Saba said that chargesagainstthe unionists were being framed (sic).They were being held under the Ciskei'sProclamation 8252.Five days after theirdetention the 13 tradeunionists were released. Four unionistsremained in detention, thres of them in theeastern Cape,and Oscar Mpetha in Cape Town.On 14 November grievances at East LondonFurniture Industries reached a head.Workers

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action and organisation in a mass unemploymentsituation).Msnegament denied dismissals (workers had'dismissedthemselves', a phrase heard so oftenin the lest year that it cannot but be a centraldirective), and also denied thatselectivere-employment would take place. $AAWU said thatmanagement had signed on unemployed people abouttwoweeks before the events as stand-by labour,and that striking workers would not return untilthe entire workforce wasreinstated. Managementwas to meet with SAAWU.About 3 000 workers had attended the BAAWU-called meeting inthe East London city hall overthe weekend to discuss workers reinstatement at.Wilson-Rowntras, but also at Ray-LiteBatteries,National Converter Industries, and Border Boxes.Trade union meetings in Mdantsana, within theCiskeibantustan and just outside East London,had been banned byithe township council.Subsequently BAAWU heldmeetings in Duncan Villagewhich falls outside the Ciskei, but these wenalso stopped.Management etWilson-Aowntree accused BAAWUof 'inciting' workers not to return to work.This BAAWU denied, pointing out thatworkershad taken .their own decisions. The union hadbeen told by Wilson-Rowntree that they wouldnot re-employ allthe workers.On Wednesday, 30 October, all workersreturned. Gqwata of SAAWU said that Wilson-Rowntreemanagement would look at grievancesin the chocolate-moulding section, where thestrike had started.At the end ofOctober it was announced thatthree FOSATU unions in the motor industry were tomerge - the NUMARW08A, UAW,and the Western ProvinceMotor Assembly Workers Union. This followed statepermission for NUMARWOSA to enrolworkers on a'fully non-racial basis'. Members of the unionsendorsed the decision early in November.November1-8:On Sunday, 7 November, Thozamile Gqweta wasdetained by the Ciskeian security police (thesecond time that he hadbeen detained by thisbody). Brigadier Charles Sobs, secretary of thenotorious Ciskei Intelligence Service (CIS)andbrother to the Ciskei's chief minister, saidthat the detention was in connection with'disturbances at schools' (thefirst of manystrange statements from this man). Thedetention came shortly before Gqwete was to haveaddressedwouzkere at SA Chloride, after an inprinciple decision by management at this foreign-owned company to recogniseSAAWU, if they hadthe support of the workers.Employers said, after a meeting of the EastLondon Chamber ofCommerce, that they would dealwith unregistered unions (referring to the AfricanFood and Canning Workers Union,AFCWU, and SAAWU,the most active unions in the city). R Alisonof the Chamber of Commerce said that earlierpolicyof non-negotiation had. been laid down byManpower Utilisation Minister, Fanis Bathe.Sim NJikelana (SAAWU) wasdetained by theSaba Brothers' CIS, on 5 November. He was alsodue to address Chloride (SA) workers if SAAWUwonthe referendum being conducted there.SAAWU won the referendum overwhelmingly,polling 95,2%6 of votes castat the firm.A Joint statement by the AFCWU, SAAWU endthe Western Province General Workers Union(WPGWU)condemned the detentions of unionists. BothBonisile Norushe and Oscar Mpetha of the AFCWUwere still indetention, as well as the SAAWUunionists. The unions were joined in the protestby the National Federation of BladeWorkers(NFBW), another breakaway group from the BladeAllied Workers Union (BAWU).Brigadier Sobs ravedon:Their arrest has nothing to do with tradeunionism. They are involved in studentprotest in the Ciskei. We are up toournecks with student protest in the Ciskei.. On Friday night, 7 November, 19 (six women)trade unionists wendetained as they crossedthe 'border' of the Ciskei into Mdentsanetownship. Brigadier Saba described as'purelycoincidental' that South African security policeshould arrive in Mdantsens soon after thedetentions (thedistinction between the branchesof the state in question would seem to be morein fore than in content). SaidBrigadierSobs:I strongly resent the suggestion that wewere being used by the South AfricanGovernment to do a jobfor them.Having picked up the officials at eroadblock we took them to Mdantsanecharge office,-and were met thereby(SA) security policemen who were on theirnoraal rounds.Sobs said that these people, too, were detainedinconnection with 'schools unrest'.The unionists detained were from the AFCWU,the Food and Canning Workers Union(FCWU),SAAWU and the WPGWU. The six women were releasedand told to report to the police on Monday,10November.9-15: The women unionists were interrogated andthen released. Brigadier Saba said that chargesagainstthe unionists were being framed (sic).They were being held under the Ciskei'sProclamation 8252.Five days after theirdetention the 13 tradeunionists were released. Four unionistsremained in detention, thres of them in theeastern Cape,and Oscar Mpetha in Cape Town.On 14 November grievances at East LondonFurniture Industries reached a head.Workers

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(about 170) demanded recognition of theirdemocratically elected SAAWU sponsored workers'committee, instead ofthe liaison committeeor a company approved parallel union. They calledmanagement to a meeting at lunchtime tohear theirgrievances. These related to health precautions,protective clothing, wages, working hours, etc.TheDepartment of Manpower Utilisation wascalled in by the firm and asked for a list ofgrievances, and for representativesto beelected. The workers responded by telling theDepartment officials to get the list of grievancesfrom managementas they had told them of theircomplaints. The Department officials were alsosaid to have threatened the workers withthreeyears imprisonment or 81 000 for striking illegally.Management then ordered the workers fromthe premises,telling them to collect their payand to return to work on Monday, 17 November, for'selective rehiring'. Workers say thatfivesecurity policemen were inside the East LondonFurniture Industries factory when they were paidoff:15-22; OnNovember 18, four SAAWU membersemployed by Border Passenger Transport weredetained by the CIS.On thesame day workers at East LondonFurniture Industries refused to collect their payas they 'still regarded themselves ascompanyemployees'. SAAWU general secretary, SamuelKikine, said that management refused to negotiate,referringthe matter to the industrial councilfor the industry. Workers had returned to workon the previous day, on the deadlineset, buthad been locked out with selective re-employmenttaking place.SAAWU threatened a boycott of furnituresoldby the firm during Christmas. Much of thefurniture manufactured by the firm is exportedto Zimbabwe. It also cameto light that theparallel union involved is the registeredNational Union of Furniture end Allied Workers(NUFAW),whose assistant. general secretary,AJM Groenewald, said that they (the union)had a closed shop agreement and thatSAAWU 'hasno legal right to approach any employee in thefurniture industry to discuss terms with them'.BrigadierSebe finally came straight endadmitted that unionists had been, and ware beingdetained for their union activities. Itwas saidthat six members of SAAWU were in detention under8252 at the time (19.11.80), four of themworkers fromthe Border Passenger Transport.Thozamile Gqwete was unable to appear in courtin East London on 'incitement tostrike' chargesbecause of his Ciskeien detention.MACWUSA expressed solidarity with SAAWU overthedetentions.23-30: Xoleni Kota, acting secretary of SAAWU inEast London, announced that a nation-widepetitionwould be launched, calling for the releaseof the unionists.On Thursday, 27 November, Collondale Cannery(EastLandari) workers, who had refused to collecttheir pay, made an attempt to get their ,jobs back.Manager CordnerTilney said that replacementshad already been hired. He had spoken to theworkers (AFCWU members) in thecompany ofsecurity police. Lordner N,jozele, a dismissedemployee from the firm, was briefly detainedand questionedby the security police. (Formore details on this.dispute, see WIP15:44-5).December1-6: East London chairperson ofthe AFCWU,Welile Mzozonyana, was detained by the CIS forthe second time.FOSATU issued a statementcondemning thedetentions and telling for the release of theunionists.7-13: An Unemployed Workers Relief Fundwasreported to have been launched by SAAWU, specifi-cally for members of SAAWU and members of non-registeredunions working closely with SAAWU, whohad been dismissed from the various strike hitfirms. SAAWU also stated thatthey would beworking closely with the newly formed unionsfor form end domestic workers.The Collondale workersonce again refusedto collect their wages, now same four months afterthe strike started. The National UnionofDistributive Workers (NUDW) offered theirsupport to the AFCWU and the FCWU in theirstruggle at Collondale.Itwas reported that Thozamile Gqweta andSisa N,jikelane had been admitted to hospitalafter going on a hunger strikewhile in detention.They had celled it off but threatened anotherhunger strike if they wens not released.Four SAAWUmembers et Wilson-Rowntraewere detained by the CIS, under 8252, for'furthering the aims and objects of abannedorganisation, the African National Congress'(said Brigadier Sebe).Workers at Wilson-Rowntree staged abriefstoppage in protest at the detention of theirfellow workers, and SAAWU blamed the company andthe SouthAfrican authorities for the detentions.A day later, 12 December, after the solidaritystoppage, another Wilson-Rowntreeworker wasdetained.14-20: All the detained unionists werereleased, without being charged. Their detentionhadprobably been part of attack on union(specifically SAAWU) activity in the easternCape, as well as being linked to theCiskeien

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(about 170) demanded recognition of theirdemocratically elected SAAWU sponsored workers'committee, instead ofthe liaison committeeor a company approved parallel union. They calledmanagement to a meeting at lunchtime tohear theirgrievances. These related to health precautions,protective clothing, wages, working hours, etc.TheDepartment of Manpower Utilisation wascalled in by the firm and asked for a list ofgrievances, and for representativesto beelected. The workers responded by telling theDepartment officials to get the list of grievancesfrom managementas they had told them of theircomplaints. The Department officials were alsosaid to have threatened the workers withthreeyears imprisonment or 81 000 for striking illegally.Management then ordered the workers fromthe premises,telling them to collect their payand to return to work on Monday, 17 November, for'selective rehiring'. Workers say thatfivesecurity policemen were inside the East LondonFurniture Industries factory when they were paidoff:15-22; OnNovember 18, four SAAWU membersemployed by Border Passenger Transport weredetained by the CIS.On thesame day workers at East LondonFurniture Industries refused to collect their payas they 'still regarded themselves ascompanyemployees'. SAAWU general secretary, SamuelKikine, said that management refused to negotiate,referringthe matter to the industrial councilfor the industry. Workers had returned to workon the previous day, on the deadlineset, buthad been locked out with selective re-employmenttaking place.SAAWU threatened a boycott of furnituresoldby the firm during Christmas. Much of thefurniture manufactured by the firm is exportedto Zimbabwe. It also cameto light that theparallel union involved is the registeredNational Union of Furniture end Allied Workers(NUFAW),whose assistant. general secretary,AJM Groenewald, said that they (the union)had a closed shop agreement and thatSAAWU 'hasno legal right to approach any employee in thefurniture industry to discuss terms with them'.BrigadierSebe finally came straight endadmitted that unionists had been, and ware beingdetained for their union activities. Itwas saidthat six members of SAAWU were in detention under8252 at the time (19.11.80), four of themworkers fromthe Border Passenger Transport.Thozamile Gqwete was unable to appear in courtin East London on 'incitement tostrike' chargesbecause of his Ciskeien detention.MACWUSA expressed solidarity with SAAWU overthedetentions.23-30: Xoleni Kota, acting secretary of SAAWU inEast London, announced that a nation-widepetitionwould be launched, calling for the releaseof the unionists.On Thursday, 27 November, Collondale Cannery(EastLandari) workers, who had refused to collecttheir pay, made an attempt to get their ,jobs back.Manager CordnerTilney said that replacementshad already been hired. He had spoken to theworkers (AFCWU members) in thecompany ofsecurity police. Lordner N,jozele, a dismissedemployee from the firm, was briefly detainedand questionedby the security police. (Formore details on this.dispute, see WIP15:44-5).December1-6: East London chairperson ofthe AFCWU,Welile Mzozonyana, was detained by the CIS forthe second time.FOSATU issued a statementcondemning thedetentions and telling for the release of theunionists.7-13: An Unemployed Workers Relief Fundwasreported to have been launched by SAAWU, specifi-cally for members of SAAWU and members of non-registeredunions working closely with SAAWU, whohad been dismissed from the various strike hitfirms. SAAWU also stated thatthey would beworking closely with the newly formed unionsfor form end domestic workers.The Collondale workersonce again refusedto collect their wages, now same four months afterthe strike started. The National UnionofDistributive Workers (NUDW) offered theirsupport to the AFCWU and the FCWU in theirstruggle at Collondale.Itwas reported that Thozamile Gqweta andSisa N,jikelane had been admitted to hospitalafter going on a hunger strikewhile in detention.They had celled it off but threatened anotherhunger strike if they wens not released.Four SAAWUmembers et Wilson-Rowntraewere detained by the CIS, under 8252, for'furthering the aims and objects of abannedorganisation, the African National Congress'(said Brigadier Sebe).Workers at Wilson-Rowntree staged abriefstoppage in protest at the detention of theirfellow workers, and SAAWU blamed the company andthe SouthAfrican authorities for the detentions.A day later, 12 December, after the solidaritystoppage, another Wilson-Rowntreeworker wasdetained.14-20: All the detained unionists werereleased, without being charged. Their detentionhadprobably been part of attack on union(specifically SAAWU) activity in the easternCape, as well as being linked to theCiskeien

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'referendum an independence' - the detentionswould have both prevented possible unionmobilisation against thereferendum and servedas a warning to anyone who contemplatedabstaining or voting 'no'.January, 1981It appearsthat the various strikes havecontinued into the new year, although nothinghas been reported an them in theTransvaal.SAAWU is reported to be maintaining therapid growth of lest year.Readers in the eastern Cape shouldpleasesend us materiel on the labour situation in thatregion.For information on the charges againstOscar Mpethe, theveteran Cape trade unionist,see the Courts section in this publication.Some trade unionists who have been detainedinthe eastern Cape during the past months:Bonisile Norushe AFCWU) - RSAThozemile Gqwete (SAAWU) - Ciskei(twice), RSASise Njikelana (SAAWU) - Ciskei, RSAXoleni Kota (SAAWU) - CiskeiWilson Sidine (WPGWU) -CiskeiRobert Gqwete (SAAWU - CiskeiLawrence Tulumn (SAAWU) - CiskeiBamgunzi Sisingo (SAAWU) -CiskeiHumphrey Maxgwanga (SAAWU) - CiskeiSeptember Mpekati (SAAWU) - CiskeiOria Ndingayi (SAAWU) -CiskeiM van Green (FCWU) - CiskeiKarel Schippers (FCWU) - CiskeiAlfred Noko (AFCWU) - CiskeiWelileMzozonyama (AFCWU) - Ciskei (twice)9wesha (AFCWU) - CiskeiThis list is incomplete. It does, for example,notinclude the names of the many factory workers whohave been detained because of their unionactivities.NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY - BACKGROUND.THE PAST year has seen considerable unionactivity amongworkers employed in varioussections of the newspaper industry. Activityhas revolved around 3 trade unions -theSouth African Society of Journalists (SASJ),a predominantly white Journalist society,the recently constituted MediaWorkers'Association of South Africa (MWASA), end theCommercial, Catering and Allied Workers Unionof SouthAfrica (CCAWUSA).The issues and intensity of action have notfollowed any cohesive pattern or been drawnfrom anysingle cause. They have stemmedlargely from growing dissatisfaction overhow the Acgus/SAAN corporations runtheirnewspapers, and demands have ranged fromunprecedented wage increases by the SASJ, toMWASA demandsquestioning the control endfunction of newspapers in current SouthAfrica.The root of the problem appears to liein thefact that SAAN end Argue, which hove evirtual monopoly over the english-languagepress, are essentially asexploitative endconservative as the companies they scold intheir pages. (SAAN end Argue are interlockingcompanies,with Argue owning 4096 of SAAN).The unions referred to above representnewspaper ,journalists enddistributors(drivers end street sellers). Print workersfall under the South African TypographicalUnion (SATU). BathSASJ and SATU have accessto long-established negotiating channels. SATU ise party to the National IndustrialCouncil(NIC) covering the entire print industry, whileSASJ end newspaper managements have formed econciliationboard of which individual newspapersare members end signatories._SATU.SATU IS ONE of the oldest South Africantradeunions. Originally formed by immigrant Englishprinters, the union has retained its basiccraft nature and is ahighly bureaucratic,benefit-oriented organisation.It was the first union to form an industrialcouncil with management,end negotiates wages,working conditions and benefits 'on behalf ofall print workers. It is a TUCSA affiliatewith nparallel coloured union, and received.permission in February 1980 to organiseefricen workers and extend benefits tothem.An africen branch of the union had existed for10 years but was disbanded in 1956. UntilFebruary, workers paida nominal fee to theNIC and had a medical scheme and funeralbenefit scheme set up far them.The union hasattempted to organise aswidely as possible, while management has beenso keen for workers to loin the union thatithas filled forms in for them, claiming thatemployers 'know all the information and sane ofthem (the workers) don'twrite'.It is this group of workers that MWASA isattempting to incorporate into its organisation.SASJ.THE SASJ WASfornied in the late 1920s. Itsconciliation board with management wasconstituted in the mid-1940s. Until 1977it wasbasically passive, accepting n wage steleconsiderably lower then that found in commerceand even teaching. Theunion registered in ternsof the Industrial Conciliation Act in the early1970s.In 1977, following a change inleadership,the SASJ deregistered, and reconstituted itselfas a non-racial body. It currently has a blackmembership ofabout 60.MWASA.BLACK ,journalists; reacting against theirexclusion from the SASJ, end prompted by a needtoestablish their own negotiating channels to

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'referendum an independence' - the detentionswould have both prevented possible unionmobilisation against thereferendum and servedas a warning to anyone who contemplatedabstaining or voting 'no'.January, 1981It appearsthat the various strikes havecontinued into the new year, although nothinghas been reported an them in theTransvaal.SAAWU is reported to be maintaining therapid growth of lest year.Readers in the eastern Cape shouldpleasesend us materiel on the labour situation in thatregion.For information on the charges againstOscar Mpethe, theveteran Cape trade unionist,see the Courts section in this publication.Some trade unionists who have been detainedinthe eastern Cape during the past months:Bonisile Norushe AFCWU) - RSAThozemile Gqwete (SAAWU) - Ciskei(twice), RSASise Njikelana (SAAWU) - Ciskei, RSAXoleni Kota (SAAWU) - CiskeiWilson Sidine (WPGWU) -CiskeiRobert Gqwete (SAAWU - CiskeiLawrence Tulumn (SAAWU) - CiskeiBamgunzi Sisingo (SAAWU) -CiskeiHumphrey Maxgwanga (SAAWU) - CiskeiSeptember Mpekati (SAAWU) - CiskeiOria Ndingayi (SAAWU) -CiskeiM van Green (FCWU) - CiskeiKarel Schippers (FCWU) - CiskeiAlfred Noko (AFCWU) - CiskeiWelileMzozonyama (AFCWU) - Ciskei (twice)9wesha (AFCWU) - CiskeiThis list is incomplete. It does, for example,notinclude the names of the many factory workers whohave been detained because of their unionactivities.NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY - BACKGROUND.THE PAST year has seen considerable unionactivity amongworkers employed in varioussections of the newspaper industry. Activityhas revolved around 3 trade unions -theSouth African Society of Journalists (SASJ),a predominantly white Journalist society,the recently constituted MediaWorkers'Association of South Africa (MWASA), end theCommercial, Catering and Allied Workers Unionof SouthAfrica (CCAWUSA).The issues and intensity of action have notfollowed any cohesive pattern or been drawnfrom anysingle cause. They have stemmedlargely from growing dissatisfaction overhow the Acgus/SAAN corporations runtheirnewspapers, and demands have ranged fromunprecedented wage increases by the SASJ, toMWASA demandsquestioning the control endfunction of newspapers in current SouthAfrica.The root of the problem appears to liein thefact that SAAN end Argue, which hove evirtual monopoly over the english-languagepress, are essentially asexploitative endconservative as the companies they scold intheir pages. (SAAN end Argue are interlockingcompanies,with Argue owning 4096 of SAAN).The unions referred to above representnewspaper ,journalists enddistributors(drivers end street sellers). Print workersfall under the South African TypographicalUnion (SATU). BathSASJ and SATU have accessto long-established negotiating channels. SATU ise party to the National IndustrialCouncil(NIC) covering the entire print industry, whileSASJ end newspaper managements have formed econciliationboard of which individual newspapersare members end signatories._SATU.SATU IS ONE of the oldest South Africantradeunions. Originally formed by immigrant Englishprinters, the union has retained its basiccraft nature and is ahighly bureaucratic,benefit-oriented organisation.It was the first union to form an industrialcouncil with management,end negotiates wages,working conditions and benefits 'on behalf ofall print workers. It is a TUCSA affiliatewith nparallel coloured union, and received.permission in February 1980 to organiseefricen workers and extend benefits tothem.An africen branch of the union had existed for10 years but was disbanded in 1956. UntilFebruary, workers paida nominal fee to theNIC and had a medical scheme and funeralbenefit scheme set up far them.The union hasattempted to organise aswidely as possible, while management has beenso keen for workers to loin the union thatithas filled forms in for them, claiming thatemployers 'know all the information and sane ofthem (the workers) don'twrite'.It is this group of workers that MWASA isattempting to incorporate into its organisation.SASJ.THE SASJ WASfornied in the late 1920s. Itsconciliation board with management wasconstituted in the mid-1940s. Until 1977it wasbasically passive, accepting n wage steleconsiderably lower then that found in commerceand even teaching. Theunion registered in ternsof the Industrial Conciliation Act in the early1970s.In 1977, following a change inleadership,the SASJ deregistered, and reconstituted itselfas a non-racial body. It currently has a blackmembership ofabout 60.MWASA.BLACK ,journalists; reacting against theirexclusion from the SASJ, end prompted by a needtoestablish their own negotiating channels to

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page 53cover their interests, formed the Union ofBlack Journalists in the early 1970s, stronglymotivateli by theideology of black consciousness.It refused to ,join the SABJ on the basisthat co-operation was useless since theSASJ haddone nothing for black journalists, who had theirown specific problems. It was banned inOctober, 1977.In1977 the Writers Association of SouthAfrica was formed, and in October, 1980, followinga highly successful strike atthe Post newspaper,it reformed as 11ASA, with the aim of incorpora-ting all black workers in the newspaperindustryinto its organization. A determination to dealwith management in the newspaper industry as anindependentbody on its own terms is one of thecohesive elements of its history.In 1977 WASA applied to ,join theconciliationboard set up between management and the SASJ.&ASJ offered half its seats (despite the factthat itsrepresentation was around 700, andWASA's 200). Management encouraged the groupsto for" a common front.WASH eventuallyrefused to join the board an the grounds thatto do so would dilute its stand, and that itrequired itsown negotiating channels to serveits interests. Venegeeent refused to deal withtwo bodies, as it failed to recognisethedifferent needs of the two groups. Management'srefusal to comply with the WASH demand, despiteclaims of anunofficial recognition of theorganisation, lies at the root of the disputeduring the recent strike over strike pay.MWASAclaimed that management's refusal to establishnegotiating channels had led to the strike,and that it was,therefore, its responsibilityto pay for it. Management contested this onthe grounds that it would set adangerousprecedent end violated fundamental principles.of industrial relations. Nevertheless, thePost strike ofAugust, 1980, forced managementto deal directly with the union, although itclaimed that it was dealing only with staffandtheir demands.UNION ACTIONTHE STRIKE had considerable implications andreperoueaions. Wages at thenewspaper were lowerthen on other newspapers. This wee because itwas not a signatory to the SASJconciliationboard agreement, and negotiated directly withmanagement. The strike came after a four southertitrationhearing in which the SASJ tookmanagement to a hearing in which the SASJcontented too management claim that itcould notafford thM ,.across-the-board end 22,9total salary increase that it was demanding.Although the union did notwin its demandsit did win a 10~ across-the-board increase forall editorial workers who had been with thesomeonployer for one year, and a further 4% to bedistributed at the discretion of the editors.Although the journalists'materiel victorywas not total, the arbitration decision didmuch to reinforce the herd line approach the&ASJ weebeginning to take. It also broughtemberassing information over entrencheddiscriminatory practices to light.Chiefamong these was information concerning the,journalist category of Cadet B. This categoryreferred to people,predominantly black, withoutmatriculation certificates, recruited asjournalists et a lower wage stele thenothers.Noneelly cadets are recruited and trainedand a conciliation board agreement governs thefirst five years of theiremployment. They thenprogress on the basis of merit. This, in itself,is a contentious issue for NASA. Initialschoolingfor whites end blocks createsinequalities reinforced by the fact thatEnglish is a second language for manyblackjournalists, who, therefore, remain an-lowerlevels because they do not meet the standards setby n whitemanagement aiming et white audiences.One of NASA's demands is for specifictraining programmes end institutionsto be setup to eradicate the effects of Bantu Education.Mother is for a far larger say 1n the types ofdecisionsconcerning standards, terminologyend other editorial decisions affecting blackwriters fundamentally, but over whichthey haveno control. As a result of arbitration Cadet 8was done away with. The practice was especiallyrife an swellpapers like the Cape Herald.The Post strike placed wages on a pr withSASJ steles, end reinforced the commitmenttoconfrontation being felt by ,journalists invarious sectors of the profession.The moat important feature of thestrikewee that it included a variety of workersbesides journalists. Telex operators, librarians,joined the strike whilecleaners, typists endtelex operators ell received increases. Thedispute obviously emphasised the~needfororganisation among other cetaao:des workers anthe paper, governed by Industrial ~~cyv.,agreements but whollyunrepresented. The CapeHerald strike that began some three months laterand also included a variety of workers,againdemonstrated-the growing-spirit of dissatisfactionamong media workers as a whole.The two month long MWASAstrike startedin sympathy with the Cape Herald workers andended after severe confrontation threatenedboth the unityof the SASJ and the existence ofthe chief 'black-' newspapers (since bannedthrough state action).This was becauseof the strike actionitself, but mare a result of the conflict itbrought to the surface, end of the fundamental

Page 113 of 171

page 53cover their interests, formed the Union ofBlack Journalists in the early 1970s, stronglymotivateli by theideology of black consciousness.It refused to ,join the SABJ on the basisthat co-operation was useless since theSASJ haddone nothing for black journalists, who had theirown specific problems. It was banned inOctober, 1977.In1977 the Writers Association of SouthAfrica was formed, and in October, 1980, followinga highly successful strike atthe Post newspaper,it reformed as 11ASA, with the aim of incorpora-ting all black workers in the newspaperindustryinto its organization. A determination to dealwith management in the newspaper industry as anindependentbody on its own terms is one of thecohesive elements of its history.In 1977 WASA applied to ,join theconciliationboard set up between management and the SASJ.&ASJ offered half its seats (despite the factthat itsrepresentation was around 700, andWASA's 200). Management encouraged the groupsto for" a common front.WASH eventuallyrefused to join the board an the grounds thatto do so would dilute its stand, and that itrequired itsown negotiating channels to serveits interests. Venegeeent refused to deal withtwo bodies, as it failed to recognisethedifferent needs of the two groups. Management'srefusal to comply with the WASH demand, despiteclaims of anunofficial recognition of theorganisation, lies at the root of the disputeduring the recent strike over strike pay.MWASAclaimed that management's refusal to establishnegotiating channels had led to the strike,and that it was,therefore, its responsibilityto pay for it. Management contested this onthe grounds that it would set adangerousprecedent end violated fundamental principles.of industrial relations. Nevertheless, thePost strike ofAugust, 1980, forced managementto deal directly with the union, although itclaimed that it was dealing only with staffandtheir demands.UNION ACTIONTHE STRIKE had considerable implications andreperoueaions. Wages at thenewspaper were lowerthen on other newspapers. This wee because itwas not a signatory to the SASJconciliationboard agreement, and negotiated directly withmanagement. The strike came after a four southertitrationhearing in which the SASJ tookmanagement to a hearing in which the SASJcontented too management claim that itcould notafford thM ,.across-the-board end 22,9total salary increase that it was demanding.Although the union did notwin its demandsit did win a 10~ across-the-board increase forall editorial workers who had been with thesomeonployer for one year, and a further 4% to bedistributed at the discretion of the editors.Although the journalists'materiel victorywas not total, the arbitration decision didmuch to reinforce the herd line approach the&ASJ weebeginning to take. It also broughtemberassing information over entrencheddiscriminatory practices to light.Chiefamong these was information concerning the,journalist category of Cadet B. This categoryreferred to people,predominantly black, withoutmatriculation certificates, recruited asjournalists et a lower wage stele thenothers.Noneelly cadets are recruited and trainedand a conciliation board agreement governs thefirst five years of theiremployment. They thenprogress on the basis of merit. This, in itself,is a contentious issue for NASA. Initialschoolingfor whites end blocks createsinequalities reinforced by the fact thatEnglish is a second language for manyblackjournalists, who, therefore, remain an-lowerlevels because they do not meet the standards setby n whitemanagement aiming et white audiences.One of NASA's demands is for specifictraining programmes end institutionsto be setup to eradicate the effects of Bantu Education.Mother is for a far larger say 1n the types ofdecisionsconcerning standards, terminologyend other editorial decisions affecting blackwriters fundamentally, but over whichthey haveno control. As a result of arbitration Cadet 8was done away with. The practice was especiallyrife an swellpapers like the Cape Herald.The Post strike placed wages on a pr withSASJ steles, end reinforced the commitmenttoconfrontation being felt by ,journalists invarious sectors of the profession.The moat important feature of thestrikewee that it included a variety of workersbesides journalists. Telex operators, librarians,joined the strike whilecleaners, typists endtelex operators ell received increases. Thedispute obviously emphasised the~needfororganisation among other cetaao:des workers anthe paper, governed by Industrial ~~cyv.,agreements but whollyunrepresented. The CapeHerald strike that began some three months laterand also included a variety of workers,againdemonstrated-the growing-spirit of dissatisfactionamong media workers as a whole.The two month long MWASAstrike startedin sympathy with the Cape Herald workers andended after severe confrontation threatenedboth the unityof the SASJ and the existence ofthe chief 'black-' newspapers (since bannedthrough state action).This was becauseof the strike actionitself, but mare a result of the conflict itbrought to the surface, end of the fundamental

Page 114 of 171

threat newspaper managements felt when confrontedby an articulate end powerful organisation,questioning its veryright to manage. In thewords of one journalist: 'Argus must be throwingparties now that Post end Sunday Post arebanned.They can publish the Sowetan and retrench thepeople who are too vocal and dangerous'.The strike itselffocussed on two areas ofconflict: the more direct one over recognitionand strike pay, and the more complexconflictover actual control of the press. Consideringthat S% of the english-language newspaperreadership is black,and that management viewsits potential future market as being predominantlyblack, MWASA is implicitly demanding afargreater say over editorial policy in drawingattention to this fact and to the discrepancythat exists between whocontrols the papers andwho reads them.The strike pay issue was one that MWASAlost. It held out for two monthsover theprinciple that management had caused the strikeby refusing to IT cognise the organisation;although the factthat SAAN, Argus and MWASAdid sit down and negotiate, was a victory forMWASA. V4~'%_The conflict in SASJ (seebelow fordetails) were apparent in the inconsistent anddisunited activities of the ,journalist membersduring the 6trike.Initial support was clear:the SASJ supported the strikers and refused to dotheir work. As the strike went onfinancialsupport was also given. When the Post,journalists were fired, major tensions .erupted.Thirteen ROM,journalists stayed away from workfor a day in protest against the sackings.Fifty others picketed the.Star building, butthesupport for the MWASA ,journalists was by nomeans clear or unanimous.By that stage the strike seemed to bestuck ,on the insoluble issue of strike pay, which manyfelt was fairly destructive as it would winnothing concrete forfuture generations, andthe extended strike was damaging in that'township news' was not being widely reportedandthe flow of information was being inhibited.The strike may be over, but the issues areby no means resolved; theconflicts which haveerupted within and between organisationsand against management, are, under thepresentnewspaper structure, apparently unresolvable.CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTSOctober24: 22 of the 24-membereditorial staff on theweekly Argus-owned Cape Herald newspaper went onstrike after a breakdown in talks betweentheStaff Action Committee and management. TheCape Herald chapel is an affiliate of MWASA.The demands by theeditorial staff, which werealso made on behalf of the classified advertisingand messenger staff, included increasessimilarto those won by the Post (Transvaal) staff aftertheir 8 day strike in August, 1980 (see WIP14:51).27: The entireCape Herald staff, includingmessengers, drivers and typists, went on strikedemanding the automatic implementationofincreased salary scales.Hal Miller, managing director of the.ArgusGroup, refused to discuss the staff'scomplaintsuntil they returned to work. MWASA issued astatement supporting their Cape Herald colleagues.For thefirst time in its 15 year history,the Cape Herald failed to appear.28: The striking Cape Herald workers .receivedtheirpay cheques which excluded payment for thedays they were on strike (a total of R2 174 wasdeducted from the pay of28 workers in theirOctober pay packets). Strikers once marerefused to return to work until their paydemands hadbeen met.Against the background of picketing andtalks of strikes in the newspaper industry,theSASJ (which openedits doors oficially to blacksin 1977, and represents the majority of white,journalists on the english-languagenewspapers)negotiated a 1696 pay increase with Argus endSAAN managements.Approximately 1 100 editorialemployees wereawarded a 1296 increase (across-the-board), enda 496 increase on the wage bill for merit.Theincreases were to be implemented from January,1981.The Cape Herald workers rejected the SASJ'snegotiatedsalary scales and continued theirstrike (in demand for higher salaries and wagesto be implemented immediately for ellcategoriesof workers).Various MWASA chapels (branches) heldmeetings to consider supportive action to betakenunless the demands of the striking workerswere met.29: The Star chapel of the SASJ resolved thatif members ofMWASA went on strike they wouldexpress solidarity with them by not doing theirwork.The Western Gape Traders'Association saidthat it would recommend to its 2 000 members notto sell the Cape Herald and to refuse toplaceadvertisements if the paper was produced beforea settlement was reached.Members of the Post chapel ofMWASA metArgus management end demanded that Cape Heraldworkers' pay demands be met immediately, andthatthey be paid full salaries while on strike.30: Editorial and other staff members of Post

Page 115 of 171

threat newspaper managements felt when confrontedby an articulate end powerful organisation,questioning its veryright to manage. In thewords of one journalist: 'Argus must be throwingparties now that Post end Sunday Post arebanned.They can publish the Sowetan and retrench thepeople who are too vocal and dangerous'.The strike itselffocussed on two areas ofconflict: the more direct one over recognitionand strike pay, and the more complexconflictover actual control of the press. Consideringthat S% of the english-language newspaperreadership is black,and that management viewsits potential future market as being predominantlyblack, MWASA is implicitly demanding afargreater say over editorial policy in drawingattention to this fact and to the discrepancythat exists between whocontrols the papers andwho reads them.The strike pay issue was one that MWASAlost. It held out for two monthsover theprinciple that management had caused the strikeby refusing to IT cognise the organisation;although the factthat SAAN, Argus and MWASAdid sit down and negotiate, was a victory forMWASA. V4~'%_The conflict in SASJ (seebelow fordetails) were apparent in the inconsistent anddisunited activities of the ,journalist membersduring the 6trike.Initial support was clear:the SASJ supported the strikers and refused to dotheir work. As the strike went onfinancialsupport was also given. When the Post,journalists were fired, major tensions .erupted.Thirteen ROM,journalists stayed away from workfor a day in protest against the sackings.Fifty others picketed the.Star building, butthesupport for the MWASA ,journalists was by nomeans clear or unanimous.By that stage the strike seemed to bestuck ,on the insoluble issue of strike pay, which manyfelt was fairly destructive as it would winnothing concrete forfuture generations, andthe extended strike was damaging in that'township news' was not being widely reportedandthe flow of information was being inhibited.The strike may be over, but the issues areby no means resolved; theconflicts which haveerupted within and between organisationsand against management, are, under thepresentnewspaper structure, apparently unresolvable.CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTSOctober24: 22 of the 24-membereditorial staff on theweekly Argus-owned Cape Herald newspaper went onstrike after a breakdown in talks betweentheStaff Action Committee and management. TheCape Herald chapel is an affiliate of MWASA.The demands by theeditorial staff, which werealso made on behalf of the classified advertisingand messenger staff, included increasessimilarto those won by the Post (Transvaal) staff aftertheir 8 day strike in August, 1980 (see WIP14:51).27: The entireCape Herald staff, includingmessengers, drivers and typists, went on strikedemanding the automatic implementationofincreased salary scales.Hal Miller, managing director of the.ArgusGroup, refused to discuss the staff'scomplaintsuntil they returned to work. MWASA issued astatement supporting their Cape Herald colleagues.For thefirst time in its 15 year history,the Cape Herald failed to appear.28: The striking Cape Herald workers .receivedtheirpay cheques which excluded payment for thedays they were on strike (a total of R2 174 wasdeducted from the pay of28 workers in theirOctober pay packets). Strikers once marerefused to return to work until their paydemands hadbeen met.Against the background of picketing andtalks of strikes in the newspaper industry,theSASJ (which openedits doors oficially to blacksin 1977, and represents the majority of white,journalists on the english-languagenewspapers)negotiated a 1696 pay increase with Argus endSAAN managements.Approximately 1 100 editorialemployees wereawarded a 1296 increase (across-the-board), enda 496 increase on the wage bill for merit.Theincreases were to be implemented from January,1981.The Cape Herald workers rejected the SASJ'snegotiatedsalary scales and continued theirstrike (in demand for higher salaries and wagesto be implemented immediately for ellcategoriesof workers).Various MWASA chapels (branches) heldmeetings to consider supportive action to betakenunless the demands of the striking workerswere met.29: The Star chapel of the SASJ resolved thatif members ofMWASA went on strike they wouldexpress solidarity with them by not doing theirwork.The Western Gape Traders'Association saidthat it would recommend to its 2 000 members notto sell the Cape Herald and to refuse toplaceadvertisements if the paper was produced beforea settlement was reached.Members of the Post chapel ofMWASA metArgus management end demanded that Cape Heraldworkers' pay demands be met immediately, andthatthey be paid full salaries while on strike.30: Editorial and other staff members of Post

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page(Transvaal) and black journalists on the Starwont on strike in solidarity with strikers anthe Cape Herald. Argusmanagement stillrefused to meet the Cape Herald strikers'demands.Telegrams of support were sent to theCapeHerald strikers by the International Federationof Journalists, the MWASA branches at the CapeArg,:s, Post(Tvl),Post (Natal) and the ditorialchapels of the Band Daily Mail, the SundayTribune end the Star.SAAN chapels of MWASAasked SAAN managementto influence the Argus Printing and PublishingCompany to promote a settlement betweentheparties.Hal Miller argued that the Cape Herald,a signatory to the SA Newspaper Press EditorialConciliation Board,was bound by the terms ofthe Conciliation Board (C8) agreement forsalary increases to be implemented fromJanuary,1981. He said Post (Tvl), as opposed to allother Argue newspapers, had never been asignatory to the C8,and no formal agreement hadever governed the salaries and working conditionsof its editorial employees.31: Theconvenor of the Action Committee ofthe Cape Herald Staff Association, A Belie,responded to Miller's statement,stating thatclerks, telephonists and advertising personnelwere also on strike, and these workers were notrepresentedon the CB (only journalists were ,represented on the CB, and hence the recentarbitration award to all SASJ journalistswasnot applicable to all the Cape Herald newspaperstrikers).November01: Thousands of pamphlets were distributedinSowato urging a community boycott of Argue Groupnewspapers.02: Executive members of MWASA met a:dcalledfor a national strike of all its members. Itwas emphasised that all Cape Herald journalistshad switchedmembership from the SASJ to MWASAand that non-editorial staff on strike were notrepresented on the CB. MWASAdemanded that- the situation on the Cape Herald be resolved;- all the workers be paid for the time theyhad been onstrike because of management'sresponsibility for the present situation;- management talks to MWASA electedrepresenta-tives.Star editorial staff decided against any strikeaction in support of striking black journalists.03: Thestrike spread to black journalistson the SAAN-owned ROM and Financial Mail, andto two Natal papers, the DailyNews and theSunday Tribune, bringing the number of papers'affected to seven and the number of press staffto about100.04: One Daily News reporter and one member ofthe Tribune Herald staff joined the strike calledfor byMWASA.The Sunday Tribune SASJ chapel affirmed itssupport for its colleagues in MWASA, and decidedthat-reporters would disassociate themselves fromassisting in the production of the TribuneHerald;- sub editors wouldwork to rule on Tribune Heraldcopy, until black journalists are back onthe payroll and paid in full for the periodthey hadbeen on strike.The Sunday Tribune and the Daily News staff formeda strike relief fund.Black journalists from theSouth AfricanPress Agency (SAPA) joined the strike by colleaguesfrom 12 newspapers. These wereArgue-owned:Post (Tvl); Sunday Post; Star; CapeHerald; Sunday Tribune; Daily News; he Sowetan.SAAN-owned: Hand Daily Mail;Financial Mail;Sunday Times; Sunday Express; Soweto News.The SAAN chapel of the SASJ decided not to fillin onjobs normally done by their MWASAcolleagues.OS: MWASA representatives and the Argue and SAANgroups met fortalks and failed to reachagreement. Management still refused to payworkers for time they had been on strike.TheNational Council of the SASJ warned that thestrike could jeopardise the future of newspapersaimed at blackreaders, disrupt relations betweenall black newspaper employees and employers, andpermanently damage relationsbetween blackjournalists and the established english-languagecommercial press in South Africa. Their statementsaidthat the nationwide strike was largely dueto a lack of real management responsiveness tothe needs and wishes ofblack journalists overa long period of time. The SASJ requested ameeting of the CB to discuss the strike.06: whitejournalists at SAAN defied a warningfrom SAAN management that they would be dismissingthemselves if theyrefused to do the work oftheir striking black colleagues. They resolvedto continue with their refusal to do worknormallyperformed by the striking blackjournalists until the strike was settled.A resolution passed by the SAAN chapelblamedthe crisis in the newspaper industry on thefailure of management to recognise the needs andaspirations ofblack journalists and to createavenues for black advancement.10: Daily Dispatch black journalists went on

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page(Transvaal) and black journalists on the Starwont on strike in solidarity with strikers anthe Cape Herald. Argusmanagement stillrefused to meet the Cape Herald strikers'demands.Telegrams of support were sent to theCapeHerald strikers by the International Federationof Journalists, the MWASA branches at the CapeArg,:s, Post(Tvl),Post (Natal) and the ditorialchapels of the Band Daily Mail, the SundayTribune end the Star.SAAN chapels of MWASAasked SAAN managementto influence the Argus Printing and PublishingCompany to promote a settlement betweentheparties.Hal Miller argued that the Cape Herald,a signatory to the SA Newspaper Press EditorialConciliation Board,was bound by the terms ofthe Conciliation Board (C8) agreement forsalary increases to be implemented fromJanuary,1981. He said Post (Tvl), as opposed to allother Argue newspapers, had never been asignatory to the C8,and no formal agreement hadever governed the salaries and working conditionsof its editorial employees.31: Theconvenor of the Action Committee ofthe Cape Herald Staff Association, A Belie,responded to Miller's statement,stating thatclerks, telephonists and advertising personnelwere also on strike, and these workers were notrepresentedon the CB (only journalists were ,represented on the CB, and hence the recentarbitration award to all SASJ journalistswasnot applicable to all the Cape Herald newspaperstrikers).November01: Thousands of pamphlets were distributedinSowato urging a community boycott of Argue Groupnewspapers.02: Executive members of MWASA met a:dcalledfor a national strike of all its members. Itwas emphasised that all Cape Herald journalistshad switchedmembership from the SASJ to MWASAand that non-editorial staff on strike were notrepresented on the CB. MWASAdemanded that- the situation on the Cape Herald be resolved;- all the workers be paid for the time theyhad been onstrike because of management'sresponsibility for the present situation;- management talks to MWASA electedrepresenta-tives.Star editorial staff decided against any strikeaction in support of striking black journalists.03: Thestrike spread to black journalistson the SAAN-owned ROM and Financial Mail, andto two Natal papers, the DailyNews and theSunday Tribune, bringing the number of papers'affected to seven and the number of press staffto about100.04: One Daily News reporter and one member ofthe Tribune Herald staff joined the strike calledfor byMWASA.The Sunday Tribune SASJ chapel affirmed itssupport for its colleagues in MWASA, and decidedthat-reporters would disassociate themselves fromassisting in the production of the TribuneHerald;- sub editors wouldwork to rule on Tribune Heraldcopy, until black journalists are back onthe payroll and paid in full for the periodthey hadbeen on strike.The Sunday Tribune and the Daily News staff formeda strike relief fund.Black journalists from theSouth AfricanPress Agency (SAPA) joined the strike by colleaguesfrom 12 newspapers. These wereArgue-owned:Post (Tvl); Sunday Post; Star; CapeHerald; Sunday Tribune; Daily News; he Sowetan.SAAN-owned: Hand Daily Mail;Financial Mail;Sunday Times; Sunday Express; Soweto News.The SAAN chapel of the SASJ decided not to fillin onjobs normally done by their MWASAcolleagues.OS: MWASA representatives and the Argue and SAANgroups met fortalks and failed to reachagreement. Management still refused to payworkers for time they had been on strike.TheNational Council of the SASJ warned that thestrike could jeopardise the future of newspapersaimed at blackreaders, disrupt relations betweenall black newspaper employees and employers, andpermanently damage relationsbetween blackjournalists and the established english-languagecommercial press in South Africa. Their statementsaidthat the nationwide strike was largely dueto a lack of real management responsiveness tothe needs and wishes ofblack journalists overa long period of time. The SASJ requested ameeting of the CB to discuss the strike.06: whitejournalists at SAAN defied a warningfrom SAAN management that they would be dismissingthemselves if theyrefused to do the work oftheir striking black colleagues. They resolvedto continue with their refusal to do worknormallyperformed by the striking blackjournalists until the strike was settled.A resolution passed by the SAAN chapelblamedthe crisis in the newspaper industry on thefailure of management to recognise the needs andaspirations ofblack journalists and to createavenues for black advancement.10: Daily Dispatch black journalists went on

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strike until the Cape Herald grievances weresettled.In Natal 13 black organisations expressedsupport for MWASA andformed a Media WorkersSupport Committee.11: 6 Cape Herald strikers returned to work- 14 remained on strike.TheStaff Action Committee of the CapeHerald met with management who refused toaccede to the committee's demandsforemployees to be paid for the period of thestrike and for the new pay scales to applyfrom November 1. Managementwas only preparedto regard the strikers' period of absenceas leave, and to put the negotiated increasesinto practicefrom January 1.13: Joint statements issued to foreigncorrespondents in South Africa by COSAS,NUSAS, theUniversity of Witwatersrand'sBlack Student Society and the South AfricanStudents' Press Union (SASPU) declaredsupportfor MWASA's demands. MWASA decided to exemptthe Voice newspaper from the cell for a newspaperboycottbecause it is wholly owned end controlledby black people. As such, MWASA claimed it wasnot effected by the strikeagainst english-langunge newspapers.17: Daily Dispatch journalists returned to work.18: 2 of the 3 striking reporterson the DailyNews went beck to work. MWASA received supportfrom 4 student organisations et the UniversityeFWitwatersrand, the president of SACDS, theIslamic Council of South Africa, the AthloneBusiness and ProfessionalAssociation in CapeTown and the National Union of Journalists(NUJ) in Britain.20: End of the 3 week strike at theCape Heraldnewspaper. Management did not accede to thedemand for strike pay and the implementationof salarysteles from November 1. An agreementwas reached on pay scales for messengers. Blackjournalists on other paperscontinued theirstrike.21: 1 700 to 1 800 workers (drivers, deliverymen end street sellers) from Allied Publishingwenton strike following a dispute over abusivetreatment mated out by Johannesburg's areamanager. The chief complaintwas that the areamanager had fired 3 workers and assaulted oneof them in the process. Their demands were1. thereinstatement of the 3 dismissed workers;2. the removal by demotion or transfer of thearea manager to n positionwhere he could nolonger hove contact with, or authority over,Allied workers;3. the recognition of the grievanceprocedurewhich had recently been signed by the parties.Following a meeting at which the shopstewards wereadressed by MWASA representatives,the shop stewards added to their demands that theywere in sympathy with theMWASA strikers, endthat their grievances should be settledspeedily.A series of talks between shop stewardsandmanagement did not lead to resolution of thedispute. Management agreed to only one demand -recognition of thegrievance procedure.They agreed to reinvestigate the dismissalsend the conduct of the area manager.Managementstated that they had no stranding in the AAWASAdispute - despite the fact that some directorsof SAANand Axgus ere also directors of AlliedPublishing.Workers were handed letters from managementsaying that theywould be dismissed if theydid not return to work. A small group ofrepresentatives went to managing directorMitchellwho refused to talk to them. He saidthat the dispute was now in the hands of theBoard of Directors andcommunication was to behandled through the Transvaal Provincialmanager, Mr Miller (director of Argue).Millerrefused to consider unconditionalreinstatement of the 3 dismissed workers, andthe removal of the area manager.Assuranceswere given that on the ending of the strikeinvestigations into these issues would occur.Following anultimatum from management,the workers returned to work on 24.11.80.26: Post (Transvaal) workers were givenanultimatum that they would lose their jobs ifthey did not return to work the following day.70 Past workers out of a totalstaff of 260were on strike.27: 2 Post journalists returned to work. 68Post strikers were dismissed for not returning.3members of Durban's Sunday Tribune lost theirjobs after ignoring management's ultimatum.A meeting of SAAN'seditorial chapel of SASJvoted 55 - 20 against a motion proposing a one-day strike in sympathy with fired journalists.Amotion was passed condemning Argue forprovocative action and welcoming SAAN'smore conciliatory attitude.TheStar's chapel of SASJ passed a resolutionregretting the dismissal of 66 Post strikers and3 Sunday Tribune strikers.28:50 journalists employed by SAAN staged a6 hour picket of Argus in Johannesburg insupport of the 68 sacked fromPost. 13 SAANjournalists stayed away from work and weresuspended as a result of this one day strike.

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strike until the Cape Herald grievances weresettled.In Natal 13 black organisations expressedsupport for MWASA andformed a Media WorkersSupport Committee.11: 6 Cape Herald strikers returned to work- 14 remained on strike.TheStaff Action Committee of the CapeHerald met with management who refused toaccede to the committee's demandsforemployees to be paid for the period of thestrike and for the new pay scales to applyfrom November 1. Managementwas only preparedto regard the strikers' period of absenceas leave, and to put the negotiated increasesinto practicefrom January 1.13: Joint statements issued to foreigncorrespondents in South Africa by COSAS,NUSAS, theUniversity of Witwatersrand'sBlack Student Society and the South AfricanStudents' Press Union (SASPU) declaredsupportfor MWASA's demands. MWASA decided to exemptthe Voice newspaper from the cell for a newspaperboycottbecause it is wholly owned end controlledby black people. As such, MWASA claimed it wasnot effected by the strikeagainst english-langunge newspapers.17: Daily Dispatch journalists returned to work.18: 2 of the 3 striking reporterson the DailyNews went beck to work. MWASA received supportfrom 4 student organisations et the UniversityeFWitwatersrand, the president of SACDS, theIslamic Council of South Africa, the AthloneBusiness and ProfessionalAssociation in CapeTown and the National Union of Journalists(NUJ) in Britain.20: End of the 3 week strike at theCape Heraldnewspaper. Management did not accede to thedemand for strike pay and the implementationof salarysteles from November 1. An agreementwas reached on pay scales for messengers. Blackjournalists on other paperscontinued theirstrike.21: 1 700 to 1 800 workers (drivers, deliverymen end street sellers) from Allied Publishingwenton strike following a dispute over abusivetreatment mated out by Johannesburg's areamanager. The chief complaintwas that the areamanager had fired 3 workers and assaulted oneof them in the process. Their demands were1. thereinstatement of the 3 dismissed workers;2. the removal by demotion or transfer of thearea manager to n positionwhere he could nolonger hove contact with, or authority over,Allied workers;3. the recognition of the grievanceprocedurewhich had recently been signed by the parties.Following a meeting at which the shopstewards wereadressed by MWASA representatives,the shop stewards added to their demands that theywere in sympathy with theMWASA strikers, endthat their grievances should be settledspeedily.A series of talks between shop stewardsandmanagement did not lead to resolution of thedispute. Management agreed to only one demand -recognition of thegrievance procedure.They agreed to reinvestigate the dismissalsend the conduct of the area manager.Managementstated that they had no stranding in the AAWASAdispute - despite the fact that some directorsof SAANand Axgus ere also directors of AlliedPublishing.Workers were handed letters from managementsaying that theywould be dismissed if theydid not return to work. A small group ofrepresentatives went to managing directorMitchellwho refused to talk to them. He saidthat the dispute was now in the hands of theBoard of Directors andcommunication was to behandled through the Transvaal Provincialmanager, Mr Miller (director of Argue).Millerrefused to consider unconditionalreinstatement of the 3 dismissed workers, andthe removal of the area manager.Assuranceswere given that on the ending of the strikeinvestigations into these issues would occur.Following anultimatum from management,the workers returned to work on 24.11.80.26: Post (Transvaal) workers were givenanultimatum that they would lose their jobs ifthey did not return to work the following day.70 Past workers out of a totalstaff of 260were on strike.27: 2 Post journalists returned to work. 68Post strikers were dismissed for not returning.3members of Durban's Sunday Tribune lost theirjobs after ignoring management's ultimatum.A meeting of SAAN'seditorial chapel of SASJvoted 55 - 20 against a motion proposing a one-day strike in sympathy with fired journalists.Amotion was passed condemning Argue forprovocative action and welcoming SAAN'smore conciliatory attitude.TheStar's chapel of SASJ passed a resolutionregretting the dismissal of 66 Post strikers and3 Sunday Tribune strikers.28:50 journalists employed by SAAN staged a6 hour picket of Argus in Johannesburg insupport of the 68 sacked fromPost. 13 SAANjournalists stayed away from work and weresuspended as a result of this one day strike.

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This strike was followed by 2 days of internalhearings at SMN, involving a number of seniorstaff members.29: ThePost management stated that they wereprepared to re-employ all the striking staffwith no loss of service benefits, butwouldnot concede to paying strikers for the periodof the strike.December02: About 22 bheck ,journalists at theCapeTimes, the Ceps Herald end the Argue began a 2-de y strike in sympathy with the sacked Postemployees.05:Journalists on the Argue and Cape Timesdecided to compensate their 22 black colleagueswho rare suspendedwithout pay for going onstrike for 2 days. The Argue and SAIW chapelsof the SAW both made 8200 available fromtheirfunds far the black ,journalists suspended fromthe Argue and Cape Times.The South'Africen Allied workers'Union(SAAw1J) issued a statement supporting striking,journalists at SAIW end Argue-omed newspapers,anddemanded reinstatement of the 71 sackedPost and Sunday Times employees. Sam Kikine,general secretary of &M1Usnid'thetthis did not necessarily entail support forWASA. SMIU is a non-racial organisationend will not supportorganisations whichace closed to same races.18: At a ,joint meeting of the Natal IndianCongress (NIC) and IA&A,officials of the NICstrongly opposed a proposal (supported bySisulu) that the white-owned newspapers shouldbeboycotted. The proposal was finally withdrawn.IIJ Naidoo, vice president of NIC, undertook tolook into the matter ofNIC sharing a platformwith NASA. NIC shuns end abhors all forms ofracism, while IIIASA is a racially exclusivebodywith a clause in its constitution excludingwhites from membership.The NIC opposition to a boycott ofnewspaperswen contrary to that of the Natal Council onSport (NAILS) which directed its affiliatesnot to talk tojournalists who rare not membersof 1NrASA. However, several NACOS officialsare also officials or ordinary membersof NIC,end affiliates of NACOS still spoke to ell,journalists. The president of SACOS, Hassan Howe,decided thatSACOS would continue talking toall journalists.23: The Argue Company was advised by thedirector general of theDepartment of Interiorthat the validity of the registration certificateof Post (Transvaal), Saturday Post, Sunday Postandthe Soreten had lapsed because they hadnot been printed and published for over n .month. This occurredsimultaneously with theending of the dispute between INrASA end the&NW/Argus management.24: Black ,journalistsstarted work. It wasagreed that returned strikers would not be paidfar the period they had been on strike.29: ArgueCompany applied to the Department ofInterior to re-register Post, Sunday Post endthe Sawetnn after it had lost acourt applicationto declare the certificates of registration valid.In this context, NASA president ZwelekheSisulu endNatal regional secretary Subremoneyrang both placed under house arrest -and issuedwith 3-year banning orders interms ur theInternal Security Act.Subsequently Nothern Transvaal WASAexecutive member Martha Tsedu wasbanned for3 years, as rare acting president Phil Altimkuluand fellow executive member Joe Thloloe.Arguemanagement was informed by theDepartment of Interior that should they go aheadand apply for the re-registration ofthesuspended papers (excluding the Sowetan), theycould be banned in terms of the Internal SecurityAct. Arguemanagement accepted this as stateclosure of the papers involved, end did notpursue with the epplicetijons tore-registerPost and Sunday Post.

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This strike was followed by 2 days of internalhearings at SMN, involving a number of seniorstaff members.29: ThePost management stated that they wereprepared to re-employ all the striking staffwith no loss of service benefits, butwouldnot concede to paying strikers for the periodof the strike.December02: About 22 bheck ,journalists at theCapeTimes, the Ceps Herald end the Argue began a 2-de y strike in sympathy with the sacked Postemployees.05:Journalists on the Argue and Cape Timesdecided to compensate their 22 black colleagueswho rare suspendedwithout pay for going onstrike for 2 days. The Argue and SAIW chapelsof the SAW both made 8200 available fromtheirfunds far the black ,journalists suspended fromthe Argue and Cape Times.The South'Africen Allied workers'Union(SAAw1J) issued a statement supporting striking,journalists at SAIW end Argue-omed newspapers,anddemanded reinstatement of the 71 sackedPost and Sunday Times employees. Sam Kikine,general secretary of &M1Usnid'thetthis did not necessarily entail support forWASA. SMIU is a non-racial organisationend will not supportorganisations whichace closed to same races.18: At a ,joint meeting of the Natal IndianCongress (NIC) and IA&A,officials of the NICstrongly opposed a proposal (supported bySisulu) that the white-owned newspapers shouldbeboycotted. The proposal was finally withdrawn.IIJ Naidoo, vice president of NIC, undertook tolook into the matter ofNIC sharing a platformwith NASA. NIC shuns end abhors all forms ofracism, while IIIASA is a racially exclusivebodywith a clause in its constitution excludingwhites from membership.The NIC opposition to a boycott ofnewspaperswen contrary to that of the Natal Council onSport (NAILS) which directed its affiliatesnot to talk tojournalists who rare not membersof 1NrASA. However, several NACOS officialsare also officials or ordinary membersof NIC,end affiliates of NACOS still spoke to ell,journalists. The president of SACOS, Hassan Howe,decided thatSACOS would continue talking toall journalists.23: The Argue Company was advised by thedirector general of theDepartment of Interiorthat the validity of the registration certificateof Post (Transvaal), Saturday Post, Sunday Postandthe Soreten had lapsed because they hadnot been printed and published for over n .month. This occurredsimultaneously with theending of the dispute between INrASA end the&NW/Argus management.24: Black ,journalistsstarted work. It wasagreed that returned strikers would not be paidfar the period they had been on strike.29: ArgueCompany applied to the Department ofInterior to re-register Post, Sunday Post endthe Sawetnn after it had lost acourt applicationto declare the certificates of registration valid.In this context, NASA president ZwelekheSisulu endNatal regional secretary Subremoneyrang both placed under house arrest -and issuedwith 3-year banning orders interms ur theInternal Security Act.Subsequently Nothern Transvaal WASAexecutive member Martha Tsedu wasbanned for3 years, as rare acting president Phil Altimkuluand fellow executive member Joe Thloloe.Arguemanagement was informed by theDepartment of Interior that should they go aheadand apply for the re-registration ofthesuspended papers (excluding the Sowetan), theycould be banned in terms of the Internal SecurityAct. Arguemanagement accepted this as stateclosure of the papers involved, end did notpursue with the epplicetijons tore-registerPost and Sunday Post.

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INDUSTRIALHEALTHINDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND THE STATEIN IE176, the Erasmus Commission of InquiryintoOccupational Health found that 'industrialistsspend very little money on and do not devotemuch time to theprevention of occupationaldiseases'.Since then, the picture does not appear tohave changed very much. 'Lest year,Dr E Bougas,former Transvaal chairperson of the SA Societyfor Occupational Health, estimated that of SouthAfrica's30 000 factories, fewer than 1 000 hadbasic industrial health facilities. Prof IanWebster, director of the National CentreforOccupational Health, added, 'I wouldn't say thatregular monitoring (of industrial health hazards)has increased verymuch since the Erasmusreport' (Star, 21.08.80).Because monitoring is so scanty, not eventhe experts in the fieldwould venture n guessas to the true incidence of occupational diseasein South Africa. But a series of pressexposslest year provided alarming evidence aboutconditions in n number of industries. For instance,13 of a group of18 lead-using firms failed tomeet standards accepted overseas, end many oftheir workers had blood lead levels highenoughto cause annemia, nerve damage, and kidneydisease. Likewise, 40 000 asbestos workers werereported to beworking in environments sufficientlydusty to pose substantial risks of lung scars, orasbestosis. Studies of severalmercury-usingfactories found that one-fifth of their workersappeared to have absorbed potentially disablingquantitiesof the heavy metal. These findingsechoed those of the Erasmus Commission Report fouryears earlier, which haddocumented shockingconditions in industry after industry. Despitethe limitations of the evidence, it seemsfairly clearthat a sizable proportion of SouthAfrica's workforce is working in hazardousenvironments, and that many workersneedlesslysuffer disease or death as a result.This state of affairs is not simply theoutcome of ignorance or apathy onthe part ofemployers. It is the consequence of apartheidcapitalism end minority rule, which togetherencourageemployers to neglect workers' health .and deny the workers a means of redress. Theincreasing attention being giventhe issuereflects the changing labour needs of industry,no longer so compatible with pitchforking illworkers onto thescrnpheep. While the presentbalance of economic and political power remainsin place, however, workers are unlikelyto receivethe full measure of protection they deserve.INDUSTRIAL. HEALTH AND EMPLOYERS INTERESTSINPRACTISE, action on industrial health in SouthAfrica has reflected the interests of employers,collectively if not alwaysindividually. Despitethe broadly unsatisfactory picture, it is a factthat there have bean improvements in industrialhealthwar the decades pest. However, thesehave generally occurred at a pace end in a mannerwhich suited employers.The interests ofemployees would have dictated much mare vigorousaction, but when these clashed with thoseofcapital, the latter prevailed.A number of examples can be cited toillustrate how the needs of business havebeenlinked both to the promotion and neglect ofindustrial health. Here we will examine three:the situation in themines, the legislativeexclusion of faxmwarkers, and the regulationsgoverning noise.1. Mining: In the early years of thecentury,South Africa's mines were fearsomely hazardousplaces in which to work. Burrowed into the earthat a franticpuce, with little or no regulation,they were full of dust from rock-breaking andfrequently with noxious gases fromblasting endmachinery. At one stage, the average workinglife of gold miners was seven years, by which timetheirlungs were too scarred by pneumoconiosis tocontinue work. The loss of unskilled black minerswas bearable, becausethere were plenty morewhere they came from, but the loss of the scarceimported white artisans was far costlier, andtheycould not be segregated away from the hazards.The consequence was a large-scale effort toreduce dust levels,with ventilation machinery andextensive research, and major improvementsfollowed.Yet even today, autopsies onlong-servingminers show three-Fourths to be suffering fromcompenseble occupational diseases, though inmanycases mildly enough that they were not aware ofthe symptoms. This suggests the mines haveimprovedconditions to the point where most ofthe work force is able to carry on for a fullworking life, the optimal condition fromtheirpoint of view. What happens to workers afterwardsis not their concern.2. Farm workers: The manner inwhichlegislation is moulded so as not to disturbinfluential employers is seen in the statutoryexemption of farm workersfrom the protectionof existing industrial health law. Faxmworkersface particular hazards from zaonoses (enimal-barneillnesses), pesticides, and farm machinery,yet they enjoy no statutory safeguards at allin either the 1941 Factories,Machinery andBuilding Work Act, or in its 1967 industrialhealth amendments.

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INDUSTRIALHEALTHINDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND THE STATEIN IE176, the Erasmus Commission of InquiryintoOccupational Health found that 'industrialistsspend very little money on and do not devotemuch time to theprevention of occupationaldiseases'.Since then, the picture does not appear tohave changed very much. 'Lest year,Dr E Bougas,former Transvaal chairperson of the SA Societyfor Occupational Health, estimated that of SouthAfrica's30 000 factories, fewer than 1 000 hadbasic industrial health facilities. Prof IanWebster, director of the National CentreforOccupational Health, added, 'I wouldn't say thatregular monitoring (of industrial health hazards)has increased verymuch since the Erasmusreport' (Star, 21.08.80).Because monitoring is so scanty, not eventhe experts in the fieldwould venture n guessas to the true incidence of occupational diseasein South Africa. But a series of pressexposslest year provided alarming evidence aboutconditions in n number of industries. For instance,13 of a group of18 lead-using firms failed tomeet standards accepted overseas, end many oftheir workers had blood lead levels highenoughto cause annemia, nerve damage, and kidneydisease. Likewise, 40 000 asbestos workers werereported to beworking in environments sufficientlydusty to pose substantial risks of lung scars, orasbestosis. Studies of severalmercury-usingfactories found that one-fifth of their workersappeared to have absorbed potentially disablingquantitiesof the heavy metal. These findingsechoed those of the Erasmus Commission Report fouryears earlier, which haddocumented shockingconditions in industry after industry. Despitethe limitations of the evidence, it seemsfairly clearthat a sizable proportion of SouthAfrica's workforce is working in hazardousenvironments, and that many workersneedlesslysuffer disease or death as a result.This state of affairs is not simply theoutcome of ignorance or apathy onthe part ofemployers. It is the consequence of apartheidcapitalism end minority rule, which togetherencourageemployers to neglect workers' health .and deny the workers a means of redress. Theincreasing attention being giventhe issuereflects the changing labour needs of industry,no longer so compatible with pitchforking illworkers onto thescrnpheep. While the presentbalance of economic and political power remainsin place, however, workers are unlikelyto receivethe full measure of protection they deserve.INDUSTRIAL. HEALTH AND EMPLOYERS INTERESTSINPRACTISE, action on industrial health in SouthAfrica has reflected the interests of employers,collectively if not alwaysindividually. Despitethe broadly unsatisfactory picture, it is a factthat there have bean improvements in industrialhealthwar the decades pest. However, thesehave generally occurred at a pace end in a mannerwhich suited employers.The interests ofemployees would have dictated much mare vigorousaction, but when these clashed with thoseofcapital, the latter prevailed.A number of examples can be cited toillustrate how the needs of business havebeenlinked both to the promotion and neglect ofindustrial health. Here we will examine three:the situation in themines, the legislativeexclusion of faxmwarkers, and the regulationsgoverning noise.1. Mining: In the early years of thecentury,South Africa's mines were fearsomely hazardousplaces in which to work. Burrowed into the earthat a franticpuce, with little or no regulation,they were full of dust from rock-breaking andfrequently with noxious gases fromblasting endmachinery. At one stage, the average workinglife of gold miners was seven years, by which timetheirlungs were too scarred by pneumoconiosis tocontinue work. The loss of unskilled black minerswas bearable, becausethere were plenty morewhere they came from, but the loss of the scarceimported white artisans was far costlier, andtheycould not be segregated away from the hazards.The consequence was a large-scale effort toreduce dust levels,with ventilation machinery andextensive research, and major improvementsfollowed.Yet even today, autopsies onlong-servingminers show three-Fourths to be suffering fromcompenseble occupational diseases, though inmanycases mildly enough that they were not aware ofthe symptoms. This suggests the mines haveimprovedconditions to the point where most ofthe work force is able to carry on for a fullworking life, the optimal condition fromtheirpoint of view. What happens to workers afterwardsis not their concern.2. Farm workers: The manner inwhichlegislation is moulded so as not to disturbinfluential employers is seen in the statutoryexemption of farm workersfrom the protectionof existing industrial health law. Faxmworkersface particular hazards from zaonoses (enimal-barneillnesses), pesticides, and farm machinery,yet they enjoy no statutory safeguards at allin either the 1941 Factories,Machinery andBuilding Work Act, or in its 1967 industrialhealth amendments.

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When those Acts were passed, farmers wereutterly dependent on cheap migrant labour orlabour tenants. They hadlittle interest inprotecting their workers' health, since theytWa'e so easily replaced, and a positive incentiveto neglect it,due to the cost of the necessarysanitary facilities, safety devices, training,etc. The white farmers and boss-boys werelessvulnerable to the ailments, since they had less-contact with the hazards and better livingconditions. Thus the lawcould ignore ordinaryFero hands, avoiding provoking an importantpolitical group in the process.3. Noise regulations:The clearest linkbetween industrial pressure and the softeningof legislation can be seen in the case ofindustrial noise.Though they are not oftenenforced, noise is one of the few areas whereSouth Africa's industrial health regulationsarerelatively strict. Thanks largely to theefforts of one dedicated official, the allowablenoise limit has been fixed at 85decibels, thelevel most medical authorities regard as necessaryto protect hearing. (In normal circumstances,noiseabove 80 db causes pain).However, industry has protested theserestrictions vociferously, claiming theywereimpossible to meet at a reasonable cost.Consequently, the 'B' regulations unveiled lastyear by the Department ofManpower Utilisation seta new noise limit of 90 db. That may not appearmuch more, but in fact it allows aroundthreetimes as much noise (the decibel scale islogarithmic, and an increase of just 3 dbrepresents twice the quantity ofnoise). Onhearing of the proposed relaxation, one industrialhygienist commented, 'If it goes through, therewill be a lotof deaf workers walking around'.ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMAS THE above examples suggest, the roots oftheproblem lie in the labour patterns which haveprevailed under apartheid capitalism. To beginwith, the migrant laboursystem helps sake iteasy to ignore industrial health questions. Agenerous supply of unskilled labour is echaracteristicfeature of underdevelopedcapitalist economies, but the, extremely low wagesend the pattern of oscillation betweencityend 'homeland' found in South Africa make itparticularly cheap to shuffle grey and replaceworkers who fell ill. AsAdler notedIt is cheaper for management to replaceinjured workers then to improve theprotection for them. This is ofcoursetruer for those workers who are employedin unskilled and seal-skilled positions,there the migrant labour systemand theabsence of formal collective bargainingrights allot workers to be available inlarge numbers et a for price (Adler,1979).A striking example supporting this view was citedin the Star's industrial health series, whichreported the case ofa facto-manganese producerwho failed to reduce his rockers' exposure tothe alloy despite four years of findings bytheNational Centre for Occupational Health that manyof its workers had too much of it in their bloodfor safety (Star.21.OB.80).Migration aisa tends to hide the true extentof occupational diseases because many of themdevelop slowlyand many do not appear until aworker has been repatriated to his or her reserve.'If blacks die of tuberculosis inLesotho andTranskei, nobody gets very worried here becausethey don't see the deaths', commented labourlawyerHalton Cheadle (Star, 20.08.80). In thecase of asbestosis, for instance, the vast.majority of cases reported are white,while thevast majority of the industry's workers areblack, suggesting many cases go undiagnosed.This view wasconfirmed by analyses of autopsyrecords on black asbestos miners, which foundsome degree of asbestosis in 70% ofthem between1959 and 1964, and in more than one third from1975 to 1977 (Star, 22.08.80).Moreover, the prevalericeof cheap migrantlabour and consequent colour-bar restrictionshave helped to minimise the role playedbyharder-to-replace skilled workers in SouthAfrican industry. As Wilson showed, pressuresto minimise costs in thisenvironment led toa capital-intensive pattern of developmentand efforts to keep down the number of skilledwhitesemployed at apartheid-bloated wages(.Wilson, 1969:181). As a result, South Africahas a substantially smallerproportion of skilledworkers in its labour force then do other countriesat similar stages of industrial development(ICS,1979).The tendency to neglect workers' healthis compounded by the abysmal ignorance of healthhazards an the partof many employers, and theirdesire to cut corners. Soon after the Star'sindustrial health articles appeared, abatterymaker phoned the paper to say that he had notrealised the lead in his plant's air imperilledthe 280 workers offthe production line as wellas those on it! While this wasan extreme example, many other employers alsoshot astartling ignorance of the hazards theirworkers face, and try to minimise the sumsthey spend on them, according tothe makers ofsafety equipment. 'They want the minimumprotection allowed by law', says one, 'They'renot consciousof protecting the workers'. Of course, such short-cutting becomesunderstandable in view of the costs involvedinpreventing industrial diseases. Despite theinadequacy of their programmes, some lead-usingfirms put the share ofrecent capital spendingon industrial health at 35 to 50,x, while at

Page 125 of 171

When those Acts were passed, farmers wereutterly dependent on cheap migrant labour orlabour tenants. They hadlittle interest inprotecting their workers' health, since theytWa'e so easily replaced, and a positive incentiveto neglect it,due to the cost of the necessarysanitary facilities, safety devices, training,etc. The white farmers and boss-boys werelessvulnerable to the ailments, since they had less-contact with the hazards and better livingconditions. Thus the lawcould ignore ordinaryFero hands, avoiding provoking an importantpolitical group in the process.3. Noise regulations:The clearest linkbetween industrial pressure and the softeningof legislation can be seen in the case ofindustrial noise.Though they are not oftenenforced, noise is one of the few areas whereSouth Africa's industrial health regulationsarerelatively strict. Thanks largely to theefforts of one dedicated official, the allowablenoise limit has been fixed at 85decibels, thelevel most medical authorities regard as necessaryto protect hearing. (In normal circumstances,noiseabove 80 db causes pain).However, industry has protested theserestrictions vociferously, claiming theywereimpossible to meet at a reasonable cost.Consequently, the 'B' regulations unveiled lastyear by the Department ofManpower Utilisation seta new noise limit of 90 db. That may not appearmuch more, but in fact it allows aroundthreetimes as much noise (the decibel scale islogarithmic, and an increase of just 3 dbrepresents twice the quantity ofnoise). Onhearing of the proposed relaxation, one industrialhygienist commented, 'If it goes through, therewill be a lotof deaf workers walking around'.ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMAS THE above examples suggest, the roots oftheproblem lie in the labour patterns which haveprevailed under apartheid capitalism. To beginwith, the migrant laboursystem helps sake iteasy to ignore industrial health questions. Agenerous supply of unskilled labour is echaracteristicfeature of underdevelopedcapitalist economies, but the, extremely low wagesend the pattern of oscillation betweencityend 'homeland' found in South Africa make itparticularly cheap to shuffle grey and replaceworkers who fell ill. AsAdler notedIt is cheaper for management to replaceinjured workers then to improve theprotection for them. This is ofcoursetruer for those workers who are employedin unskilled and seal-skilled positions,there the migrant labour systemand theabsence of formal collective bargainingrights allot workers to be available inlarge numbers et a for price (Adler,1979).A striking example supporting this view was citedin the Star's industrial health series, whichreported the case ofa facto-manganese producerwho failed to reduce his rockers' exposure tothe alloy despite four years of findings bytheNational Centre for Occupational Health that manyof its workers had too much of it in their bloodfor safety (Star.21.OB.80).Migration aisa tends to hide the true extentof occupational diseases because many of themdevelop slowlyand many do not appear until aworker has been repatriated to his or her reserve.'If blacks die of tuberculosis inLesotho andTranskei, nobody gets very worried here becausethey don't see the deaths', commented labourlawyerHalton Cheadle (Star, 20.08.80). In thecase of asbestosis, for instance, the vast.majority of cases reported are white,while thevast majority of the industry's workers areblack, suggesting many cases go undiagnosed.This view wasconfirmed by analyses of autopsyrecords on black asbestos miners, which foundsome degree of asbestosis in 70% ofthem between1959 and 1964, and in more than one third from1975 to 1977 (Star, 22.08.80).Moreover, the prevalericeof cheap migrantlabour and consequent colour-bar restrictionshave helped to minimise the role playedbyharder-to-replace skilled workers in SouthAfrican industry. As Wilson showed, pressuresto minimise costs in thisenvironment led toa capital-intensive pattern of developmentand efforts to keep down the number of skilledwhitesemployed at apartheid-bloated wages(.Wilson, 1969:181). As a result, South Africahas a substantially smallerproportion of skilledworkers in its labour force then do other countriesat similar stages of industrial development(ICS,1979).The tendency to neglect workers' healthis compounded by the abysmal ignorance of healthhazards an the partof many employers, and theirdesire to cut corners. Soon after the Star'sindustrial health articles appeared, abatterymaker phoned the paper to say that he had notrealised the lead in his plant's air imperilledthe 280 workers offthe production line as wellas those on it! While this wasan extreme example, many other employers alsoshot astartling ignorance of the hazards theirworkers face, and try to minimise the sumsthey spend on them, according tothe makers ofsafety equipment. 'They want the minimumprotection allowed by law', says one, 'They'renot consciousof protecting the workers'. Of course, such short-cutting becomesunderstandable in view of the costs involvedinpreventing industrial diseases. Despite theinadequacy of their programmes, some lead-usingfirms put the share ofrecent capital spendingon industrial health at 35 to 50,x, while at

Page 126 of 171

Rand Mines' newest asbestos factory, 81,6-m wasspent on ventilation equipment. These sumsshould be kept inperspective, as they partlyreflect efforts to make up for a history ofneglect, but they nevertheless give someindicationof the effect industrial healthspending could have on a firm's profits.Besides the economic element, acontributingfactor to the problem is the neglect of industrialhealth by the medical profession. This is areflection ofmedicine's traditional orientationtowards curative rather then preventativepractice (Savage, 1979). 'Wits, Pretoriaand.Stellenbosch have only recently added industrialhealth sections into their undergraduate medicinecurricula. SouthAfrica's four other medicalschools appear to have no industrial healthexperts on their. staffs. As a result ofthesedeficiencies in training, experts agree, mostdoctors are not equipped to diagnose industrialdiseases,' whether infamily practice or hiredby n factory.The general pattern of neglect which hasdeveloped has been permitted by anotherkeyfailure: that of trade unions. Abroad, unionshave been powerful forces for industrial healthlegislation andimprovements, but in South Africathe white trade unions which dominate the movementhave long since been boughtoff.militancy with ashare in apartheid's profits. They have become,in the words of several observers, little morethan'glorified benefit societies'. On industrialhealth matters, 'trade unions in South Africahave tended to abdicate theirresponsibilityto their membership by leaving prevention withinthe four corners of the Factories Act' (SouthAfricanLabour Bulletin, 1980:1).No counter-balancing influence has beenavailable to the black majority of the workforce.Until1979, they were excluded from the officialindustrial relations system, and they remainlargely unorganised. Of course,they ere alsoexcluded from the political system altogether.RESTRAINTS ON THE STATE.IT SEEMS fairly clear thatthe balance ofinfluences goes a long way to explain thepattern of action on industrial health by thestate. However, inthe absence of case studiesbased on archival records, it is difficult tocite positive evidence of this. Instead, weshallhave to settle for tracing the associationbetween the interests of employers on particularissues and the politicaloutcomes.The clearest association is the wholesaleexemption from industrial health legislation ofmany of the worstendangered workers. Thoseexcluded ere generally in categories of employmenttraditionally dependent on high ratesofnigxnncy, rapid labour turnover and low wages.Farming, cited above is one; domestic workanother. Altogether, theErasmus Commissionestimated that 5,75 million of South Africa's9 million workers were not protected by lawagainsthealth hazards on the job.A web of subtler connections betweenindustrial interests and state action appearsto exist aswall. The Erasmus Report itselfrepresented an offensive in a 15-year bottlebetween the Departments of Health andLabour(now Manpower Utilisation) for responsibilityover industrial health. Contrary to normalprocedure, however, nowhite paper was everpublished by the government in response to theCommission report, end its recommendationswereshelved for four years.The inaction was a result of bureaucraticguerilla warfare by the Department ofLabouragainst the Erasmus recommendation that Healthtake over industrial health control. Labourforced the issue upto Cabinet, which pushedit back to the bureaucrats and the Public ServiceCommission. The battle was not just oneofbureaucrats, however, but should be amen es unewhere they acted as surrogates for theirrespective constituencies.The Health Departmentrepresents doctors and health professionals likeindustrial hygienists, who have a naturalinterest i~greater demand for their services. Labour, onthe other bend, traditionally maintained closelinks with industryend white unions, which asnoted above bed been indifferent to health issues.In this struggle the Labour menconsistentlyargued that the Health Department would proveover-zealous in standard setting, end that thiswouldimpose excessive costs on individual finesand generally slow economic growth.Perhaps the most evident indicationofsensitivity to industrial interests is thelack of priority accorded industrial health bythe government. Despite thewide-rangingexclusions, the legislative framework governingindustrial health grants sufficient regulatorypower toenforce affective standards. Yet thishas never been done, for a variety of reasonswhich seem to suggest a lack of reelurgency.First of all, sufficient manpower has neverbeen allocated to enforce existing regulations.Some 65 factoryinspector positions have beenauthorised within the Department of Labour, butonly 30 have been filled. While thefullcomplement would probably prove sadly inadequate -the UK maintains 4 ODD factory inspectors -the numberactually available appears farcicalThere is only 1 inspector for every 1 000factories. In consequence, present andpastofficials of the Labour Department have statedthat many factories are visited only everyother year, and when theinspectors do arrive,they often have time for only a cursory

Page 127 of 171

Rand Mines' newest asbestos factory, 81,6-m wasspent on ventilation equipment. These sumsshould be kept inperspective, as they partlyreflect efforts to make up for a history ofneglect, but they nevertheless give someindicationof the effect industrial healthspending could have on a firm's profits.Besides the economic element, acontributingfactor to the problem is the neglect of industrialhealth by the medical profession. This is areflection ofmedicine's traditional orientationtowards curative rather then preventativepractice (Savage, 1979). 'Wits, Pretoriaand.Stellenbosch have only recently added industrialhealth sections into their undergraduate medicinecurricula. SouthAfrica's four other medicalschools appear to have no industrial healthexperts on their. staffs. As a result ofthesedeficiencies in training, experts agree, mostdoctors are not equipped to diagnose industrialdiseases,' whether infamily practice or hiredby n factory.The general pattern of neglect which hasdeveloped has been permitted by anotherkeyfailure: that of trade unions. Abroad, unionshave been powerful forces for industrial healthlegislation andimprovements, but in South Africathe white trade unions which dominate the movementhave long since been boughtoff.militancy with ashare in apartheid's profits. They have become,in the words of several observers, little morethan'glorified benefit societies'. On industrialhealth matters, 'trade unions in South Africahave tended to abdicate theirresponsibilityto their membership by leaving prevention withinthe four corners of the Factories Act' (SouthAfricanLabour Bulletin, 1980:1).No counter-balancing influence has beenavailable to the black majority of the workforce.Until1979, they were excluded from the officialindustrial relations system, and they remainlargely unorganised. Of course,they ere alsoexcluded from the political system altogether.RESTRAINTS ON THE STATE.IT SEEMS fairly clear thatthe balance ofinfluences goes a long way to explain thepattern of action on industrial health by thestate. However, inthe absence of case studiesbased on archival records, it is difficult tocite positive evidence of this. Instead, weshallhave to settle for tracing the associationbetween the interests of employers on particularissues and the politicaloutcomes.The clearest association is the wholesaleexemption from industrial health legislation ofmany of the worstendangered workers. Thoseexcluded ere generally in categories of employmenttraditionally dependent on high ratesofnigxnncy, rapid labour turnover and low wages.Farming, cited above is one; domestic workanother. Altogether, theErasmus Commissionestimated that 5,75 million of South Africa's9 million workers were not protected by lawagainsthealth hazards on the job.A web of subtler connections betweenindustrial interests and state action appearsto exist aswall. The Erasmus Report itselfrepresented an offensive in a 15-year bottlebetween the Departments of Health andLabour(now Manpower Utilisation) for responsibilityover industrial health. Contrary to normalprocedure, however, nowhite paper was everpublished by the government in response to theCommission report, end its recommendationswereshelved for four years.The inaction was a result of bureaucraticguerilla warfare by the Department ofLabouragainst the Erasmus recommendation that Healthtake over industrial health control. Labourforced the issue upto Cabinet, which pushedit back to the bureaucrats and the Public ServiceCommission. The battle was not just oneofbureaucrats, however, but should be amen es unewhere they acted as surrogates for theirrespective constituencies.The Health Departmentrepresents doctors and health professionals likeindustrial hygienists, who have a naturalinterest i~greater demand for their services. Labour, onthe other bend, traditionally maintained closelinks with industryend white unions, which asnoted above bed been indifferent to health issues.In this struggle the Labour menconsistentlyargued that the Health Department would proveover-zealous in standard setting, end that thiswouldimpose excessive costs on individual finesand generally slow economic growth.Perhaps the most evident indicationofsensitivity to industrial interests is thelack of priority accorded industrial health bythe government. Despite thewide-rangingexclusions, the legislative framework governingindustrial health grants sufficient regulatorypower toenforce affective standards. Yet thishas never been done, for a variety of reasonswhich seem to suggest a lack of reelurgency.First of all, sufficient manpower has neverbeen allocated to enforce existing regulations.Some 65 factoryinspector positions have beenauthorised within the Department of Labour, butonly 30 have been filled. While thefullcomplement would probably prove sadly inadequate -the UK maintains 4 ODD factory inspectors -the numberactually available appears farcicalThere is only 1 inspector for every 1 000factories. In consequence, present andpastofficials of the Labour Department have statedthat many factories are visited only everyother year, and when theinspectors do arrive,they often have time for only a cursory

Page 128 of 171

page 61inspection. (Star, 20.08.80).Secondly, the responsible Department hasrepeatedly displayed hostility toworkerinitiatives to improve industrial healthconditions. The Metal end Allied Workers'Union has several times haddifficulty infinding out fns inspectors the standards usedin its members' factories. In a case where itactually requestedan investigation by egwernsent inspector into whether some membershandling fibreglass sight develop dermatitis,theofficial refused to divulge the result.His reply to the union summed up the Department'spaternalistic approach toindustrial health:'It was strictly a matter between the employerend the Government'. (Star, 20.08.80).Third, thestandards employed by theGovernment have generally been rather permissive.The lead standard, for instance, isthree timesthat allowed in LIS plants, end one-end-a-halftimes that permitted in West Germany. Generally,the LabourDepartment has adopted the 'ThresholdLimit Values' adopted by the US Conference ofIntergovernmental IndustrialHygienists sameyears beck. In many instances, particularly inthe health-conscious US, these have beensupersededan the basis of subsequent research.REASONS FOR STATE ACTION.IN VIEW of the factors militating againstaction,it may seem surprising that there is anyindustrial health legislation an the books atall, or that improvements inworking conditionshave taken place. Despite the absence oforganised working class pressure for action,however, thecollective interest of employershas provided a rationale both for state action andfor gradual improvements in healthstandards.The importance of the issue appears to havegrown with the role played by the skilledmocker in theeconomy, as has been the caseelsewhere. 'Lode at the history of the FactoriesActs in the UK,' says Mr Cheadle.'When you'relosing skilled labour in ghastly accidents, youget attention to factory safety'. The reasonsare not hard tofind when am examines thedifferences in replacement costs betweenskilled aril unskilled mockers. A study byP-EConsulting found that it costs a firm 8150 toreplace an unskilled worker, but R2 000 in searchcosts, administrativecosts and loweredproductivity to replace a school leaver, ifereplecement can be found et all.(Star,20.08.80).Anotherfactor which way have loweredresistance to industrial health improvements _has been the steady oligopolisetion ofSouthAfrican industry. Smell figs tend to find itparticularly difficult to afford the expensiveequipment needed to meethealth regulations.Larger, oligopolistic ones can better afford it,and have the market power needed to pass anthecosts to the consumer. Traditionally, smellfines hove been seen as the laggards an industrialhealth, whileauthorities have generally ratedlarge firm; as doing much core.Clearly it is not in the interest of anyfirm to be the onlyone in its industry toincrease its costs through industrial healthmeasures, when its competitors do not do so andthusgain a market advantage. The position isdifferent, however, if the state regulationsaim et forcing all to do so, thusenabling themto protect their skilled labour without sufferingrelative disadvantage.THE LATEST PROPOSALSTHEMOTIVES for state action can be glimpsed inpractise in the latest proposal for legislationon industrial health. The bill,which would givethe Department of Health power to draft andenforce industrial health regulations, wascirculating inthe bureaucracy late in 1980 andwas leaked to the press in January, 1981.The legislation was precipitated bytherevision of industrial relations law under way, inline with the state's new strategy far economicgrowth. The strategyreflects an awareness thatthere is now a shortage of skilled workers sosevere that many technical positions eregoingbegging. To fill the gap, and to attempt to allayblack discontent, the state and business ,jointlyaim to create anelite of skilled black workers,significantly expending the skilled proportion ofthe labour force. Since it pays toconserverather than replace skilled markers, especiallywhen they are in short supply, the protectionof their health hasassumed a higher place anthe agenda.This was recognised by the_body whichdetailed the new industrial strategy,theWiehahn Commission. The Commission, which wasclose to the Labour Department, recommended inPart Three ofits report that an enlargedIndustrial Health and Safety Division beestablished in the Manpower endUtilisationDepartment. However, in further bureaucraticskirmishing after the report, Manpower Utilisationceded theresponsibility to the Department ofHealth, which immediately began to brush up itslong-prepared post-Ernsewslegislative plans.These cells for anew Occupational HealthAct, which transfers the Factory Act'sauthority for grantingcompanies industrial healthfrom tabour to. the Health Department and localauthorities. Inspectors of all three oftheseagencies will enforce the Act, requiring the 'bestavailable method' of meeting health standards.The draft Act alsosets up a National AdvisoryCommittee to advise the Minister of Health about

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page 61inspection. (Star, 20.08.80).Secondly, the responsible Department hasrepeatedly displayed hostility toworkerinitiatives to improve industrial healthconditions. The Metal end Allied Workers'Union has several times haddifficulty infinding out fns inspectors the standards usedin its members' factories. In a case where itactually requestedan investigation by egwernsent inspector into whether some membershandling fibreglass sight develop dermatitis,theofficial refused to divulge the result.His reply to the union summed up the Department'spaternalistic approach toindustrial health:'It was strictly a matter between the employerend the Government'. (Star, 20.08.80).Third, thestandards employed by theGovernment have generally been rather permissive.The lead standard, for instance, isthree timesthat allowed in LIS plants, end one-end-a-halftimes that permitted in West Germany. Generally,the LabourDepartment has adopted the 'ThresholdLimit Values' adopted by the US Conference ofIntergovernmental IndustrialHygienists sameyears beck. In many instances, particularly inthe health-conscious US, these have beensupersededan the basis of subsequent research.REASONS FOR STATE ACTION.IN VIEW of the factors militating againstaction,it may seem surprising that there is anyindustrial health legislation an the books atall, or that improvements inworking conditionshave taken place. Despite the absence oforganised working class pressure for action,however, thecollective interest of employershas provided a rationale both for state action andfor gradual improvements in healthstandards.The importance of the issue appears to havegrown with the role played by the skilledmocker in theeconomy, as has been the caseelsewhere. 'Lode at the history of the FactoriesActs in the UK,' says Mr Cheadle.'When you'relosing skilled labour in ghastly accidents, youget attention to factory safety'. The reasonsare not hard tofind when am examines thedifferences in replacement costs betweenskilled aril unskilled mockers. A study byP-EConsulting found that it costs a firm 8150 toreplace an unskilled worker, but R2 000 in searchcosts, administrativecosts and loweredproductivity to replace a school leaver, ifereplecement can be found et all.(Star,20.08.80).Anotherfactor which way have loweredresistance to industrial health improvements _has been the steady oligopolisetion ofSouthAfrican industry. Smell figs tend to find itparticularly difficult to afford the expensiveequipment needed to meethealth regulations.Larger, oligopolistic ones can better afford it,and have the market power needed to pass anthecosts to the consumer. Traditionally, smellfines hove been seen as the laggards an industrialhealth, whileauthorities have generally ratedlarge firm; as doing much core.Clearly it is not in the interest of anyfirm to be the onlyone in its industry toincrease its costs through industrial healthmeasures, when its competitors do not do so andthusgain a market advantage. The position isdifferent, however, if the state regulationsaim et forcing all to do so, thusenabling themto protect their skilled labour without sufferingrelative disadvantage.THE LATEST PROPOSALSTHEMOTIVES for state action can be glimpsed inpractise in the latest proposal for legislationon industrial health. The bill,which would givethe Department of Health power to draft andenforce industrial health regulations, wascirculating inthe bureaucracy late in 1980 andwas leaked to the press in January, 1981.The legislation was precipitated bytherevision of industrial relations law under way, inline with the state's new strategy far economicgrowth. The strategyreflects an awareness thatthere is now a shortage of skilled workers sosevere that many technical positions eregoingbegging. To fill the gap, and to attempt to allayblack discontent, the state and business ,jointlyaim to create anelite of skilled black workers,significantly expending the skilled proportion ofthe labour force. Since it pays toconserverather than replace skilled markers, especiallywhen they are in short supply, the protectionof their health hasassumed a higher place anthe agenda.This was recognised by the_body whichdetailed the new industrial strategy,theWiehahn Commission. The Commission, which wasclose to the Labour Department, recommended inPart Three ofits report that an enlargedIndustrial Health and Safety Division beestablished in the Manpower endUtilisationDepartment. However, in further bureaucraticskirmishing after the report, Manpower Utilisationceded theresponsibility to the Department ofHealth, which immediately began to brush up itslong-prepared post-Ernsewslegislative plans.These cells for anew Occupational HealthAct, which transfers the Factory Act'sauthority for grantingcompanies industrial healthfrom tabour to. the Health Department and localauthorities. Inspectors of all three oftheseagencies will enforce the Act, requiring the 'bestavailable method' of meeting health standards.The draft Act alsosets up a National AdvisoryCommittee to advise the Minister of Health about

Page 130 of 171

standards, and industrial health works committeesin individual factories. The bill represents an improvement onthepresent setup in a number of respects. It is muchmore specific in its prescription of employer dutiesand ministerialpower. Furthermore, it coversall workers, including fern and domestic workers.Most important, the transfer ofresponsibility toa health-oriented department from an industry-oriented one should mean a greeter degree ofexpertiseand a lesser degree of permissiveness..(Certainly this has concerned disgruntled LabourDepartment staffers whoestimate that the billwill cost industry R130-m in the first year ofoperation and R250-m annually thereafter).Yet the Billdoes not alter, and in oneimportant respect worsens, the basic defect ofthe status quo. It retains apaternalisticapproach, in which responsibility for industrialhealth rests with the government, not workers.It even takesaway the right of workers topetition the courts for a review of inspectors'decisions, by declaring the officialconclusionsfinal unless they are shown to be in bed faith.While the National Advisory Council and plantcouncils makesome provision for workerrepresentation, the workers ere to be appointed.The National Board members will bechosen bythe Minister of Health -the same man who clampeda fundraising ban on one trede'union federationto raiseindustrial health questions, FOSATU -while the plant councils will be named by theowners. These arrangementshardly suggest thatworker representatives likely to press for actionwill be chosen.While it is true that for theforeseeablefuture the majority of the workforce is likelyto be unorganised and thus reliant on the statefor healthprotection, the enforcement arrangementsunder the new Bill also provide cause forconcern. They ere even moredrawn out than underthe Factories Act, with no less than sixadministrative proceedings possible before anemployerlends in court. There he will face nmaximum penalty even lower than the present oneof 8600. Health Departmentofficials say theiraim is persuasion, not litigation, but the weaknessof the threats they make will not enhancetheirpersuasive power.Moreover, carrying out the provisions of theBill will impose a vast administrative burden ontheHealth Department. While their use of localauthority and Labour Department inspectors willease the manpower crisissomewhat, the Departmentwill still be charged with visiting the 30 000factories regularly, as well as approvingtheextension of old plants end the building of newones. It will also have to draw up regulationsfor the myriad ofindustrial health hazardsknown.Fulfilling these discretionary roleseffectively will require an enormous commitmentofmanpower and funds. It is unlikely thatthese will be forthcoming in the necessary measure.The likely consequence isthat Health will provetougher than Manpower in a minority of moreurgent cases, while in the majority thesheerpressure of work will force it to rubberstampconditions and regulations, much as ManpowerUtilisation does atpresent. This underlines theimportance of allowing, as much as possible of theresponsibility for occupational health torestwith the workers; the people with the strongestinterest in it, and the only ones who are in theplant everyday.CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR MORE RESEARCHTHE NEWEST proposals are only the latest in aseries oflaws touching on occupational health.One of the first laws passed by the UnionParliament was the Factories Act of1911. Thiswas followed by the Factories, Machinery endBuilding Works Act of 1941, amendments to thatAct in 1967,and the Occupational Diseases inMines and Works Act of 1973.It world be useful to investigate thebackground endinfluences behind these Acts.Some hypotheses suggest themselves - such as thatthe 1941 Act might have beenpranpted by war-induced labour shortages - but many more couldprobably be culled from the record. Allpapersrelating to the 1911 end 1941 Acts, includingCabinet papers and Departmental correspondence,should now beopen under the 30-year mule.While those an the 1967 and 1973 legislationremain closed, many of the individualsinvolvedare still around end happy to talk. It mightalso be worthwhile to consult the records of theOccupational SafetyDivision of the Departmentof Labour on its never-ending battles withindustry for more action and within governmentformore personnel. An understanding of the'origins end implementation of industrial healthlegislation would deepen ourknowledge of thecomplex relationship which exists betweencapital and the state in SouthAfrica.BIBLIOGRAPHY.Adler, T -The prevention of occupational disease1979 in South Africa. South AfricanLabourBulletin, 1979.Annual reports of the NCOH, 1975-79.Institute of Commonwealth Studies TICS), Southern1979African seminar. Paper on Wiehahn.Kooy, A - Pneumoconiosis in the gold-mining1979 industry of theWitwatersrand.South African Labour Bulletin, 1979.Savage, M - The political economy of health in1979 South Africa.SALDRU conference onthe economics of health care.

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standards, and industrial health works committeesin individual factories. The bill represents an improvement onthepresent setup in a number of respects. It is muchmore specific in its prescription of employer dutiesand ministerialpower. Furthermore, it coversall workers, including fern and domestic workers.Most important, the transfer ofresponsibility toa health-oriented department from an industry-oriented one should mean a greeter degree ofexpertiseand a lesser degree of permissiveness..(Certainly this has concerned disgruntled LabourDepartment staffers whoestimate that the billwill cost industry R130-m in the first year ofoperation and R250-m annually thereafter).Yet the Billdoes not alter, and in oneimportant respect worsens, the basic defect ofthe status quo. It retains apaternalisticapproach, in which responsibility for industrialhealth rests with the government, not workers.It even takesaway the right of workers topetition the courts for a review of inspectors'decisions, by declaring the officialconclusionsfinal unless they are shown to be in bed faith.While the National Advisory Council and plantcouncils makesome provision for workerrepresentation, the workers ere to be appointed.The National Board members will bechosen bythe Minister of Health -the same man who clampeda fundraising ban on one trede'union federationto raiseindustrial health questions, FOSATU -while the plant councils will be named by theowners. These arrangementshardly suggest thatworker representatives likely to press for actionwill be chosen.While it is true that for theforeseeablefuture the majority of the workforce is likelyto be unorganised and thus reliant on the statefor healthprotection, the enforcement arrangementsunder the new Bill also provide cause forconcern. They ere even moredrawn out than underthe Factories Act, with no less than sixadministrative proceedings possible before anemployerlends in court. There he will face nmaximum penalty even lower than the present oneof 8600. Health Departmentofficials say theiraim is persuasion, not litigation, but the weaknessof the threats they make will not enhancetheirpersuasive power.Moreover, carrying out the provisions of theBill will impose a vast administrative burden ontheHealth Department. While their use of localauthority and Labour Department inspectors willease the manpower crisissomewhat, the Departmentwill still be charged with visiting the 30 000factories regularly, as well as approvingtheextension of old plants end the building of newones. It will also have to draw up regulationsfor the myriad ofindustrial health hazardsknown.Fulfilling these discretionary roleseffectively will require an enormous commitmentofmanpower and funds. It is unlikely thatthese will be forthcoming in the necessary measure.The likely consequence isthat Health will provetougher than Manpower in a minority of moreurgent cases, while in the majority thesheerpressure of work will force it to rubberstampconditions and regulations, much as ManpowerUtilisation does atpresent. This underlines theimportance of allowing, as much as possible of theresponsibility for occupational health torestwith the workers; the people with the strongestinterest in it, and the only ones who are in theplant everyday.CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR MORE RESEARCHTHE NEWEST proposals are only the latest in aseries oflaws touching on occupational health.One of the first laws passed by the UnionParliament was the Factories Act of1911. Thiswas followed by the Factories, Machinery endBuilding Works Act of 1941, amendments to thatAct in 1967,and the Occupational Diseases inMines and Works Act of 1973.It world be useful to investigate thebackground endinfluences behind these Acts.Some hypotheses suggest themselves - such as thatthe 1941 Act might have beenpranpted by war-induced labour shortages - but many more couldprobably be culled from the record. Allpapersrelating to the 1911 end 1941 Acts, includingCabinet papers and Departmental correspondence,should now beopen under the 30-year mule.While those an the 1967 and 1973 legislationremain closed, many of the individualsinvolvedare still around end happy to talk. It mightalso be worthwhile to consult the records of theOccupational SafetyDivision of the Departmentof Labour on its never-ending battles withindustry for more action and within governmentformore personnel. An understanding of the'origins end implementation of industrial healthlegislation would deepen ourknowledge of thecomplex relationship which exists betweencapital and the state in SouthAfrica.BIBLIOGRAPHY.Adler, T -The prevention of occupational disease1979 in South Africa. South AfricanLabourBulletin, 1979.Annual reports of the NCOH, 1975-79.Institute of Commonwealth Studies TICS), Southern1979African seminar. Paper on Wiehahn.Kooy, A - Pneumoconiosis in the gold-mining1979 industry of theWitwatersrand.South African Labour Bulletin, 1979.Savage, M - The political economy of health in1979 South Africa.SALDRU conference onthe economics of health care.

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Star newspaper - Series on industrial health,1980 August 20 - 24, 1980.Wilson, F - Labour in the South Africangold1972 mines. Cambridge University Press.NB The editors apologise for the incompletenature of bibliographicalinformation. Fulldetails of pources referred to in the articlecould not be obtained before going to print.People wantingfuller references should writeto the editors.Small Business'Development_ Corporation- commentTHE WALLBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONTHE Small Business Development Corporation(the SBDC) waslaunched at a meeting on 27November, 1980. This meeting was attended byrepresentatives of state andlarge-scalecapital. For example, in attendence,were:Dr Gerhard de Kock (senior Deputy Governor ofthe ReserveBank and Co-ordinator ofConstellation Affairs);Or Anton Rupert (prime mover of the SBOC, andhand of theRembrandt Group);Or Conrad Strauss (MO of Standard Bank, SA); 'Or Wim de Villiers (GeneralMining/FederaleMynbou);Tony Bloom (Premier Milling);Hurray Hofmeyr (Anglo American);Primes Minister PWBoth&;Or Piet Koo rnhof (Minister of Co-operation andDevelopment).Prime Minister Botha placed the SBDCwithin the'constellation of states' strategy,and the &BOC was said to have arisen out ofconsultation between the state'sSpecialConstellation Committee, Dr Rupert,the Industrial Development Corporation,(IDC),and financialinstitutions.The BBOC was planned to have authorisedcapital of R50-w (from the state through theIDC), and R50-mfrom private capital. To datepledges of more than R57-n have been receivedfrom the private sector (for example, ithasbeen reported that the Tongaat Group is toinvest R1-m, while it is believed that AngloAmerican, Gold Fields,Senlam and the RembrandtGroup are each to invest RS-m), and latestestimates put the total amount to be investedbythe state and private capital at 8150-n.The Development and Finance Corporation(fornierly the ColouredDevelopment Corporation)and the Indian Industrial Corporation andactivities of the IOC related to smallbusinesseswill be taken over by the SBOC.Rupert's own Small Business Development Corpo-ration was to change its name toSmallEntrepeneurs Ltd.The formation of the SBDC is no new movein either state or private action tostimulatecapitalist business ventures for all the blackgroups. Dr Anton Rupert, to whose initiativethe SBDC has beenattributed, places it withinthe context of the Bantu Investment Corporation(SIC, 1959), the 'Agency System' (1969)whichallowed 'white' capital into the bantustansan an agency basis to the BIC over a long periodbefore beingtransferred to africans, theTripartite Agreement System (1974) which wassupposed to allow bantustan citizenstoparticipate in ventures set up by whitebusiness through the local DevelopmentCorporation, and the latest'regionaldevelopment' moves across bantustenborders.There are, however, a few aspects ofthe creation of the SBDCthat need to becommented on:Firstly, it has been placed squarely within thepolicy of separate development(apartheid) anduncritically accepts the seperationism of thatpolicy. So, for example, Rupert talks of the'nationalaspirations of .the black peoples',end holds that 'economic reasons broughthim (sic) (the africans - SARS) from-hisownareas and only economic reasons can keep himthere';Secondly, as has been the case with,previousmoves in thesame direction, the SBDC is beingset up by large-scale (monopoly) capital inSouth Africa. (Previous undertakingsincludeaid to small-scale sugar growers in Natal 0.agricultural projects in KaNgwane, and theactivities of the UrbanFoundation, to mentiononly a few). Why it is being undertaken hasbeen partly stated by Dr Rupert - e. ,fobcreation:mid h. 'the expansion of the freeenterprise system'. While much has been made ofthe low returns on the moneyinvested in theSBDC, one should add that c. economic necessityhas been behind et least some such schemes(forexample, the sugar farming scheme in Natal*).While Dr Rupert correctly notes that*This project undertaken byagricultural capitalin Natal, including the Tongeat Group'sinvolvement through the SukumeniDevelopmentCorporation, seems to have been forced on thembecause of the shortage of land suitable forcanegrading in the hands of large-scale capital.It involves finacial, technical, transport,milling and marketing assistance(and a consequentdependent relationship) to small-scale africansugar cane growers, primarily in the Ndwedwedistrictof KwaZulu.

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Star newspaper - Series on industrial health,1980 August 20 - 24, 1980.Wilson, F - Labour in the South Africangold1972 mines. Cambridge University Press.NB The editors apologise for the incompletenature of bibliographicalinformation. Fulldetails of pources referred to in the articlecould not be obtained before going to print.People wantingfuller references should writeto the editors.Small Business'Development_ Corporation- commentTHE WALLBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONTHE Small Business Development Corporation(the SBDC) waslaunched at a meeting on 27November, 1980. This meeting was attended byrepresentatives of state andlarge-scalecapital. For example, in attendence,were:Dr Gerhard de Kock (senior Deputy Governor ofthe ReserveBank and Co-ordinator ofConstellation Affairs);Or Anton Rupert (prime mover of the SBOC, andhand of theRembrandt Group);Or Conrad Strauss (MO of Standard Bank, SA); 'Or Wim de Villiers (GeneralMining/FederaleMynbou);Tony Bloom (Premier Milling);Hurray Hofmeyr (Anglo American);Primes Minister PWBoth&;Or Piet Koo rnhof (Minister of Co-operation andDevelopment).Prime Minister Botha placed the SBDCwithin the'constellation of states' strategy,and the &BOC was said to have arisen out ofconsultation between the state'sSpecialConstellation Committee, Dr Rupert,the Industrial Development Corporation,(IDC),and financialinstitutions.The BBOC was planned to have authorisedcapital of R50-w (from the state through theIDC), and R50-mfrom private capital. To datepledges of more than R57-n have been receivedfrom the private sector (for example, ithasbeen reported that the Tongaat Group is toinvest R1-m, while it is believed that AngloAmerican, Gold Fields,Senlam and the RembrandtGroup are each to invest RS-m), and latestestimates put the total amount to be investedbythe state and private capital at 8150-n.The Development and Finance Corporation(fornierly the ColouredDevelopment Corporation)and the Indian Industrial Corporation andactivities of the IOC related to smallbusinesseswill be taken over by the SBOC.Rupert's own Small Business Development Corpo-ration was to change its name toSmallEntrepeneurs Ltd.The formation of the SBDC is no new movein either state or private action tostimulatecapitalist business ventures for all the blackgroups. Dr Anton Rupert, to whose initiativethe SBDC has beenattributed, places it withinthe context of the Bantu Investment Corporation(SIC, 1959), the 'Agency System' (1969)whichallowed 'white' capital into the bantustansan an agency basis to the BIC over a long periodbefore beingtransferred to africans, theTripartite Agreement System (1974) which wassupposed to allow bantustan citizenstoparticipate in ventures set up by whitebusiness through the local DevelopmentCorporation, and the latest'regionaldevelopment' moves across bantustenborders.There are, however, a few aspects ofthe creation of the SBDCthat need to becommented on:Firstly, it has been placed squarely within thepolicy of separate development(apartheid) anduncritically accepts the seperationism of thatpolicy. So, for example, Rupert talks of the'nationalaspirations of .the black peoples',end holds that 'economic reasons broughthim (sic) (the africans - SARS) from-hisownareas and only economic reasons can keep himthere';Secondly, as has been the case with,previousmoves in thesame direction, the SBDC is beingset up by large-scale (monopoly) capital inSouth Africa. (Previous undertakingsincludeaid to small-scale sugar growers in Natal 0.agricultural projects in KaNgwane, and theactivities of the UrbanFoundation, to mentiononly a few). Why it is being undertaken hasbeen partly stated by Dr Rupert - e. ,fobcreation:mid h. 'the expansion of the freeenterprise system'. While much has been made ofthe low returns on the moneyinvested in theSBDC, one should add that c. economic necessityhas been behind et least some such schemes(forexample, the sugar farming scheme in Natal*).While Dr Rupert correctly notes that*This project undertaken byagricultural capitalin Natal, including the Tongeat Group'sinvolvement through the SukumeniDevelopmentCorporation, seems to have been forced on thembecause of the shortage of land suitable forcanegrading in the hands of large-scale capital.It involves finacial, technical, transport,milling and marketing assistance(and a consequentdependent relationship) to small-scale africansugar cane growers, primarily in the Ndwedwedistrictof KwaZulu.

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'large companies do not create jobs (hardly asurprising statement, considering the mass ofempirical and theoreticalmaterial on thesubject), he neglects to point out the very reasonwhy small businesses have not been able to'absorb'those incapable of finding employment inthe dominant, large-scale (monopoly) sector ofthe economy. That reason isto be found inthe precariousness of small-scale capitalistactivity, where markets, tastes and demands,and costs (forexample) are completely dominatedby the few largest companies in each economicsector.It is, therefore, hardly likelythat thistrend will be reversed in South Africa (out ofphilanthropic motivation). Where small-scalecapitalists are likelyto have a measure ofsuccess will be in situations of completedomination by end dependence on the 'patrons'of theiractivities - domination throughfinancing, marketing, transport, choice of goodsproduced, and how they are produced(technology).In other words, these small-scale capitalistswhose existence is profitable to monopoly interestsare likeyto survive.The other important motivation advanced byDr Rupert is that of creating or maintaining abelief in theadvantages (seen by and benefitinga mere handful of black people) of the 'freeenterprise' system. This strategy hasbeencalled 'investment by the private sector ...as an insurance policy for South Africa'sstability... How this is to beachieved when the'free enterprise' system is one in which a smallnumber of people are employers of labourand,hence, enjoyers of wealth, rather then workersand creators of wealth, is not clear. Coupledwith this is theprecariousness of the positionof even the few who will benefit from such ascheme. In other words, conversion to'freeenterprise' will be limited to the few whofind it profitable, and while they find 1tprofitable;Thirdly, it is not clearwhether the SSDC 1sgoing to fit what is known as the 'informalsector' into their project. (The'informal sector' refers tothat groupof economic activities that ere either illegalor not recognised formally, such as backyardmechanics,shebeen managers, pavement sellers,etc). If they do not recognise this sector ofthe economy, it leaves out probablythe vastmajority of smell businesses, and if they dothis sector represents the most precariousset of economicactivities with least chance ofsteady and noticeable job-creation for the millionsof unemployed and under-employed inSouth Africa.The 'informal sector' is not only dependent onexpansion and contraction of 'formal' economicactivity, butis open to prosecution by the stateand local authorities.Finally, the SBDC will consolidate the'man-racial' aspect ofSouth African capitalism,attempting to incorporate a few black peopleas very junior partners, but leaving intactthemajor arenas of conflict and oppression in SouthAfrica (primarily the system of labour exploitationthrough themigrant labour system).-Southern African Research Service.

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'large companies do not create jobs (hardly asurprising statement, considering the mass ofempirical and theoreticalmaterial on thesubject), he neglects to point out the very reasonwhy small businesses have not been able to'absorb'those incapable of finding employment inthe dominant, large-scale (monopoly) sector ofthe economy. That reason isto be found inthe precariousness of small-scale capitalistactivity, where markets, tastes and demands,and costs (forexample) are completely dominatedby the few largest companies in each economicsector.It is, therefore, hardly likelythat thistrend will be reversed in South Africa (out ofphilanthropic motivation). Where small-scalecapitalists are likelyto have a measure ofsuccess will be in situations of completedomination by end dependence on the 'patrons'of theiractivities - domination throughfinancing, marketing, transport, choice of goodsproduced, and how they are produced(technology).In other words, these small-scale capitalistswhose existence is profitable to monopoly interestsare likeyto survive.The other important motivation advanced byDr Rupert is that of creating or maintaining abelief in theadvantages (seen by and benefitinga mere handful of black people) of the 'freeenterprise' system. This strategy hasbeencalled 'investment by the private sector ...as an insurance policy for South Africa'sstability... How this is to beachieved when the'free enterprise' system is one in which a smallnumber of people are employers of labourand,hence, enjoyers of wealth, rather then workersand creators of wealth, is not clear. Coupledwith this is theprecariousness of the positionof even the few who will benefit from such ascheme. In other words, conversion to'freeenterprise' will be limited to the few whofind it profitable, and while they find 1tprofitable;Thirdly, it is not clearwhether the SSDC 1sgoing to fit what is known as the 'informalsector' into their project. (The'informal sector' refers tothat groupof economic activities that ere either illegalor not recognised formally, such as backyardmechanics,shebeen managers, pavement sellers,etc). If they do not recognise this sector ofthe economy, it leaves out probablythe vastmajority of smell businesses, and if they dothis sector represents the most precariousset of economicactivities with least chance ofsteady and noticeable job-creation for the millionsof unemployed and under-employed inSouth Africa.The 'informal sector' is not only dependent onexpansion and contraction of 'formal' economicactivity, butis open to prosecution by the stateand local authorities.Finally, the SBDC will consolidate the'man-racial' aspect ofSouth African capitalism,attempting to incorporate a few black peopleas very junior partners, but leaving intactthemajor arenas of conflict and oppression in SouthAfrica (primarily the system of labour exploitationthrough themigrant labour system).-Southern African Research Service.

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page iimagazine, which is involved in these quesxionsan an ongoing basis. Details of Critical Healthappear in anadvertisement on page 34 ofthis IIP.Because of the gap in time since the lastissue of IIP, the regular features onlabouraction and courts are somewhat longer thanusual. Both of these sections remain descriptiverather thanexplanatory or analytical, end whilecertain conclusions can be drawn from thenumber of strikes end wmic stoppages,aswell as the nature of trials taking place,the editors ere aware of the need for a moredetailed evaluation of theseareas of conflictand struggle. This is a gep.in IIP coveragewhich will be hopefully rectified in thefuture.This tIPintroduces a new feature, inthe forty of a supplement. Details of the natureof the supplement, and the reasons foritsintroduction, occur in the publication.The article involved in this supplementtakes an exploratory look at thecurrentstructure of the South African economy, and itsrelationship to the world capitalist system.From this perspective,certain suggestionsere made about future paths of developmentSouth African capitalises likely to follow.The article isparticoncerned tounderstand why, in the context of aninternational capitalist crisis, the SouthAfrican economy isshowing signs of growth.The author, David Kaplan. argues that measuresundertaken to deal with the-internationalcrisisare the principal cause of the currant 'upswing'in the South African economy. In particular,Kaplan locks etmechanisms used to offset afall in the :ate of capitalist profit, andindicates some of the effects involved indwaling witha falling rate of profit. Thesearguments ere then related to the position ofgold as a monetary standard in theinternationalcapitalist economy, and hence to the significanceof gold mining within South Africa.Concluding that goldmining rill play anexpended role in the South African economy,compared to the manufacturing sector, Kaplancriticisesthose authors who argue thatrestructuring of the South African economy rillnecessarily revolve around manufacturing.Hegoes on to suggest that in a situation wheremanufacturing is dominated by wulti-nationalcorporations, it is doubtfulwhether SouthAfrica could significantly increase its exportof manufactured goods.A number of recent arguments havesuggestedthat restructuring of both state and economyin South Africa have been related to the needsof an expendingmanufacturing sector - involvinga reliance on seW-skilled stabilised labourrather then unskilled migrants, and anincreasedinternal market for consumer goods. It iswith this in wind that certain assessments ofthe Ilehshn era Riekertproposals, era therestructuring associated with PI Botha'sgovernment, have been mderteken. The importanceofKaplan's article is that it points out thatit is by ro weans certain that South Africa rillfollow the path of expending itsmanufacturingsector at the expanse of wining. As Kaplanconcludes:Eurocentric models (is models derived fromthehistory of capitalism in Europe)prescribe a single path to capitalistdevelopment - that of industrialisation ....As theworld's principal producer of goldand with a mining nectar which isdawastirally owned era controlled, thetzaJactary(path) of capitalist developmentin South Africa is likely to follow esignificantly different path.Overseas subscribers rillnote an increasein IIP subscription rates. This is unavoidabledue to very large increases in the cost ofinternationalpostage from South Africa,introduced from January t, 1981. The subscriptionincreases do no core than absorb therise inpostal costs, while the cost of the publicationitself remains the saws. The editors regretthis Increase, but it isnecessary if IIP isto remain financially self-sufficient in termsof production end distribution costs. Moption for thosewho find it hard to afford thenew rates is to find a group wishing to readIIP, and to order one or two copies forthewhole group.As far as South African subscribers enddistributors are concerned, we are able tohold 11P et its oldsates, despite increasesin printing and paper costs. But this isdependent on the prompt payment ofoutstandingmonism. As previously explained, money receivedan one edition pays for production enddistribution of thenext, and it is accordinglymost important for distributors and subscribersto submit collected or awed amounts as soonaspossible.-THE EDITORS.

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page iimagazine, which is involved in these quesxionsan an ongoing basis. Details of Critical Healthappear in anadvertisement on page 34 ofthis IIP.Because of the gap in time since the lastissue of IIP, the regular features onlabouraction and courts are somewhat longer thanusual. Both of these sections remain descriptiverather thanexplanatory or analytical, end whilecertain conclusions can be drawn from thenumber of strikes end wmic stoppages,aswell as the nature of trials taking place,the editors ere aware of the need for a moredetailed evaluation of theseareas of conflictand struggle. This is a gep.in IIP coveragewhich will be hopefully rectified in thefuture.This tIPintroduces a new feature, inthe forty of a supplement. Details of the natureof the supplement, and the reasons foritsintroduction, occur in the publication.The article involved in this supplementtakes an exploratory look at thecurrentstructure of the South African economy, and itsrelationship to the world capitalist system.From this perspective,certain suggestionsere made about future paths of developmentSouth African capitalises likely to follow.The article isparticoncerned tounderstand why, in the context of aninternational capitalist crisis, the SouthAfrican economy isshowing signs of growth.The author, David Kaplan. argues that measuresundertaken to deal with the-internationalcrisisare the principal cause of the currant 'upswing'in the South African economy. In particular,Kaplan locks etmechanisms used to offset afall in the :ate of capitalist profit, andindicates some of the effects involved indwaling witha falling rate of profit. Thesearguments ere then related to the position ofgold as a monetary standard in theinternationalcapitalist economy, and hence to the significanceof gold mining within South Africa.Concluding that goldmining rill play anexpended role in the South African economy,compared to the manufacturing sector, Kaplancriticisesthose authors who argue thatrestructuring of the South African economy rillnecessarily revolve around manufacturing.Hegoes on to suggest that in a situation wheremanufacturing is dominated by wulti-nationalcorporations, it is doubtfulwhether SouthAfrica could significantly increase its exportof manufactured goods.A number of recent arguments havesuggestedthat restructuring of both state and economyin South Africa have been related to the needsof an expendingmanufacturing sector - involvinga reliance on seW-skilled stabilised labourrather then unskilled migrants, and anincreasedinternal market for consumer goods. It iswith this in wind that certain assessments ofthe Ilehshn era Riekertproposals, era therestructuring associated with PI Botha'sgovernment, have been mderteken. The importanceofKaplan's article is that it points out thatit is by ro weans certain that South Africa rillfollow the path of expending itsmanufacturingsector at the expanse of wining. As Kaplanconcludes:Eurocentric models (is models derived fromthehistory of capitalism in Europe)prescribe a single path to capitalistdevelopment - that of industrialisation ....As theworld's principal producer of goldand with a mining nectar which isdawastirally owned era controlled, thetzaJactary(path) of capitalist developmentin South Africa is likely to follow esignificantly different path.Overseas subscribers rillnote an increasein IIP subscription rates. This is unavoidabledue to very large increases in the cost ofinternationalpostage from South Africa,introduced from January t, 1981. The subscriptionincreases do no core than absorb therise inpostal costs, while the cost of the publicationitself remains the saws. The editors regretthis Increase, but it isnecessary if IIP isto remain financially self-sufficient in termsof production end distribution costs. Moption for thosewho find it hard to afford thenew rates is to find a group wishing to readIIP, and to order one or two copies forthewhole group.As far as South African subscribers enddistributors are concerned, we are able tohold 11P et its oldsates, despite increasesin printing and paper costs. But this isdependent on the prompt payment ofoutstandingmonism. As previously explained, money receivedan one edition pays for production enddistribution of thenext, and it is accordinglymost important for distributors and subscribersto submit collected or awed amounts as soonaspossible.-THE EDITORS.

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SCHOOLSBOYCOTT INKIMBERLEYON SEPTEMBER 8, last year, 112 african scholarswere arrested in theKimberley suburb of westEnd and charged with public violence. Theeducation crisis in Galeshewe, Kimberley'saticantownship, which had been simmering formore than a month, suddenly burst into thenational media which for the nextfew daysfocused on what it saw as yet another 'trouble-spot'.This article is a brief first-hand accountwhich attempts toshow at the same time how the .events of last year were distorted both by thepress, who sensationalised the visibletip ofthe iceberg, and the state which, armed with amythology of 'disturbances' which (for instance)blames everythingan agitators, sought to disguisetheir role in the conflict.The most remarkable aspect of the Galesheweboycott was thefact that - because ofKimberley's isolation from the main centres(it had been left untouched by the events of1976), theabsence of anything resembling euniversity and the lack of relevant readingmateriel - the level of politicalsophisticationof the pupils was not high. Yet againstparental and less subtle state pressure theywere able to unitevery effectively.And after a few weeks of involvement inan act of defiance against the state the initialnaivety gave wayto a more thorough-goingcritique of the system. Where at the beginningthe only perceived issue was the educationalone,after the boycott, pupils began to relate theirgrievances with the educational system to thegeneral condition oftheir community. Thus, whilethe boycott caused much misery end hardship tothe community of Galeshewe it did havethe positiveeffect of helping to create awareness among theyounger generation of their situation 1n life.Theboycottbegan et two schools - the onlygovernment senior secondary school, Tshireleco,end the Catholic SaintBonifnce senior secondary- on July 29. The aims of the pupils, subsequentlymisread and criticised as beingunrealistic,were not to demand the immediate abolition of'Bantu' education. The pupils explained theywere boycottingin pretest against that system,in solidarity with detained and boycottingpupils in other centres end to drew attentiontothe depernte need for more and better educationalfacilities in Geleshewe.While the national issue of injustice inSouthAfrica's educational system has bean dealtwith in length elsewhere it is pertinent tomention here that Galeshewe, withan officialcensus population of 66 000, has no technicalcollege or any other institution of post-schoollearning. The twoabove-mentioned schools arethe only ones offering metric courses, end at6t Boniface a pupil foiling standard nine ortenis not given another thence and has to leave theschool. At Tshireleca, as et most other schools,there is a shortageof dust about everything- from qualified teachers to classroom apace.The response of the state to the challengeof theboycott (which surprised them - said oneofficial: 'Things like that don't happen inKimberley') was at first insensitivityend.later severity. This reaction pushed the pupilsinto a total confrontation which they had notdeliberately sought endwhich led ultimately toviolence and collapse of african education 1AKimberley. However, the impression thatstateofficials tried to create of these events weethat they were due to the intransigence of theboycotters who hadsought violence and anarchy.The immediate response of the state to theboycott was to tell the pupils to go becktoschool. But the children, faced with the stonyattitude of the authorities, end fired by whatthey sew as the justice oftheir cause, masseddaily in their thousands and marched jubilantlythrough the streets of Galeshews singingfreedomsongs. They were gradually coined byfirst the lower secondary schools and later theprimary schools until bymid-August, every singleeducational institution in the township - involvingmore then 16 000 children - was dormant.Itis important to note that in all theirdaily meetings and earthing there was noinstance of violence. Even the chiefexecutiveofficer of Gnleshewe, PJ Roodt, is on record ashaving made the ironic comment that thedemonstrationswere conducted in a 'healthyspirit'.The Department of Education end Training triedevery method short of negotiatingwith the pupilsto break the impasse. Their most consistenttactic was to use the school committees to tryarid urge thechildren to return. The rounds ofmeetings all ended in deadlock with the pupils soonrealising that the object of themeetings wasnot to listen to their grievances but to convincethem of the wisdom of returning.Other methods were:literally trying towhip them back into line by cane-charging thepupils, with daps for backup (the first instanceofviolence - 1n lets August); detaining studentsregarded as leaders, though they were all releasedsoon afterwards;suspension threats which proved

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hollow when no-one turned up for registration.The one method they never tried was to accede:o the most fundamentalof the pupils demands:that somebody of importance from the Departmentsit down at a table with then, listen totheirgrievances and at least start to do somethingabout them.Understandably, therefore, the visit of theMinister ofEducation and Training, Dr FerdieHartzenberg, to Kimberley proved the catalystthat brought the conflict situation to aheed.The pupils were furious when they heard that theMinister was to visit Kimberley without meeLL,-Gwith them. Hewas to, talk with the communitycouncil, the parents, even leaders of the whitecoomunity, but his visit - an opportunityforsome arrangement co be worked out - was acontinuation of the policy of ignoring thepupils, seeing them as errantchildren ratherthan regarding their stand as legitimate.iIt was at this ,juncture that the pressantetbd the picture.Dn themorning of 8 September, hours beforethe community council was due to meet the Minister,students beganassembling outside the Abanto BathoCentre in Galeshew_e., piling up their books andsinging. The pupils werewarned to move onby the security police which they did, dispersingand regrouping at Si: 8oniface school(theMinister's meeting was rescheduled for a'safer' venue in. the contra of town).At St Boniface they were given tenminutes todisperse by the police who then moved in withbatons, dogs end tear8as. The students fled inone direction -away from the police, into thewhite suburb of west End which borders anGnleshewe (St Boniface is detreen thetwo).Residents of West End interviewed laterail agraed.that the children were fleeing inpanic wbon they entered, thewhile area,,pursued .by the police. But what was important to thenews roadie end the state authorities was thatbladerioters had entered a white arse andcaused damage to property.That evening the police issued a statementallegingthat several thousand africen childrenhad run wild in a white suburb, entering homesand smashing furniture. Thepress took this up,and the following morning it wade the headlinesof most national dailies. The worst was theheadlinein the Citizen: 'Black Students RunAmok in White Suburb'. Never was there anyattempt to canvass the opinions of thepupilsor to provide sane background to the eventsthat had been happening for same time before the ,'riot' or even toindicate that the policestatement was only a claim by a party whichactually formed one side in the conflict.Onlyseveral days later did investigationsshow that the 'damage' was minimal, consintiivjof a few broken windows wherestudents, trappedinside a house they had hid in by the police,broke through the rindoi~s in terror to escape.Forseveral days thqreefter violencebillowed in Geleshewe as beerhells, policemen'shouses, schools and commercialvehicles fromwhite-owned firms were hit by arson attacks.Police blamed the pupils for the violenceeven though it'resnever proved who did it.About 12 children rare charged with arson andattempted arson but the state was unabletoconvict anybody except one man rte had threatenedto burn down the home of a policemen. He wasfined R30p for'obstructing n policeman in thecourse of his duties'.By the end of the reek the disturbances were.ell over. The presshad already~lost interestin the sporadic instances Of arson and as thechildren did not oblige by invading anotherchitssuburb Kimberley slipped beds into obscurity.The press had finished its role of collectinginformation for thebenefit of the readingpublic. It had in that time got whet it wanted- several columns of the commodity news.But thecommunity at Galeshere was left tolive through its trauma. A few reeks laterthe Minister closed ell of the schoolsinGaleshewe and sacked 13 temporary teacherswith 24 hours notice. Every pupil had lost ayears schooling end somewould never return.It was herd to tell how deep the schism betweenparents end children, created by theeducationdepartment's politicking where it used the parents(in the form of schools' committees) as a meansof gettingthrough to the pupils, wen. Theboycott had obviously created mistrust on bothsides.But the fact that the childrenbegan toinclude among their demands that: they returnto school this year (which they have done inreasonablenumbers), the authorities start to dosomething about the appalling housing situation,the lack of drainage and theabsence of ahospital in Geleshere, shored that theirscope of interest had broadened. In addition,discussions with thepupils have revealed thatthe boycott has created a nor radicalisedgeneration of youths in the isolated cityofKimberley.

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TRE-%", TRIAL.DURIIMji the second half of 1980, 9 ANC guerillafighters stood trial for their lives !n thePretoriaSupreme Court. The charges they facedincluded one of high treason, and 2 of murder,end on any of these counts thedeath sentenceran be imposed. Unfortunately, the commercialpress chose to label the trial the 'Silvertontrial', implyingthat the vein issue at stakewas the siege of a bank in Silverton in January1960, and the resultant death of ? womenand 3guerilla fighters, as well as the injuring ofa number of the hostages held in the siege. Ase summary of the trialshows, this was onlyone of a mwber of issues involved, and atthe conclusion of proceedings, all the accusedwereexonerated from any involvement in theSilverton siege.The accused in the trial were1. Nciabithi Johnson Lubisi(2B),2. Peters 7sepo Mashigo (20),3. Nephtali Mensna (24),4. Ikenyeng Moses Molebetsi (27),5. Hlolile Benjamin Tau(24),6. Phumalani Grant Shezi (24),7. Jeremiah Radebe (26).8. Boyce Johannes Bogele (26),9. Thomas Mngadi(29).In addition to the charge of High Treason,the accused also faced 2 counts of iurder, 23counts of attemptedmurder, 1 count of robberywith aggravating circumstances, and 4 alternatecharges of participating in terroristicactivities(as defined in the Terrorism Act). The chargeof High Treason related to a general ANCconspiracy. the sic ofwhich was to overthrowthe South African state. The 2 counts of murderend 21 of the cants of attempted warderrelatedto the siege at the'Silvertan branch of theVolkskse boric on January 25, 1960, where 3guerilla fighters heldhostages while occupyingthe bank. In the ensuing polices laid on thebank the 3 guerillas were killed, 2 hostageswerekilled, and a number of hostages were wounded.It was rot alleged by the state that any of theaccused wereinvolved in the siege; however,accused ember 5 (Tau) was charged with planningthe attack, while the other accusedwere allegedto have criminal liability in that they wereadherents to a general ANC conspiracy. Thestate failed to proveits case either as faras the Std accused's involvement was concerned,or on the liability of the other accused as farasthe events et . the boric were concerned. Onthis basis, all accused were found not guiltyan the 2 murder era 21attempted murder charges.The further two counts of attempted murder,and the charge of robbery withaggravatingLcircumstances, related to the attack an a policestation et Saekwekeer early in January 1980.The 4alternate counts of Terrorism relatedto specific acts undertaken by each of theaccused.The first 3 accused, (Lubisi,Vashigo endMonona) were charged and found guilty of thefollowing pots: During 1976-77 the joined theAID, endsubsequently underwent military trainingin Angola. At the and of 1979 they returned toSouth Africa, era set up a basein the Tzaneendistrict from where attacks an targets wereplanned. On January 4, 1980, the accused togetherwith acertain Lunpile robbed a wen of his pick-up truck to use it in an attack an the Soak-wekeer police station. At about20h30 thatevening the 3 accused with Lungils attackedthe police station, firing shots era throwingbend grenades.During January 1990 the accusedwere in possession of a number.of AK47 sub-machineguns, ammunition,hendprenedes anddetonators.Lubisi, Veshlgo and Vernne did not attemptto deny that they bed been involved intheactivities listed above. They did howeverdispute that their intention was to warderwhen attacking the Soekwakaerpolice station,claiming that the aim of their mission was'arced propaganda'. According to Monona, thisinvolved 'theuse of weapons for the promotion'of propaganda. A certain target, for example apolice station, bed to be sought outwar whichthere existed a difference of opinion. Theseplaces are attacked to show the people we orethere'. TheSoekwekear police station waschosen because it was in a region where therebed been resistance to enforcedremovals. Thestate had been involved in trying to resettlethe people of Vekgeto, and the attack anSoekm*eer wasdesigned to show those resistingthat the Ate supported them in their struggle.A police witness admitted in evidencethatpolice fray Soekmekear bed been armed during theresettlement of the Vakgeto, but claimed thatthis was merelyto prevent 'crime end violence'during the operation. He also acknowledged thatthe people resettled bed lived in theease formany years and bed 'felt bed' about being wooed.On the basis of the acts the first 3 accusedwere found tohave committed, they were foundguilty of High Treason, 2 counts of attemptedmurder and a count of robbery withaggravatingcircumstances.Volabatai end Tau, accused numbers 4 and 5respectively, were alleged to have joinedtheANC in 1976.-77, end thereafter undergonemilitary training in various ANC temps inAngola. They did not deny this,era wars

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accordingly found guilty of these acts.The state further claimed that during Novemberend December 1979, theyestablished guerillabases in Ga-Rankuwa, BophutheTawenn, togetherwith the 3 guerillas who attacked the bankatSilverton. Molebatsi end Tau admitted this,except that they claimed that the bases werenot formed with the 3guerillas involved in thebank siege, but only one of them, Mefoko.Molebetai end Tau also admitted that theyhad beeninvolved in preparations to attack thefuel storage tanks at Waltloo, outside Pretoria,but that this attack had not takenplace.Molebatsi wee further charged with beingin control of large anus caches et KwaThema,near Springs, nod inGaRankuwa. He admittedthe latter, but denied control of the KweThemacache, and the trial judge acceptedthis.Molebatsi also denied, and was acquitted of,planning attacks on the Pretoria West andVillierie police stations. Taudenied, endwee acquitted of, planning the siege at theSilverton Bank, together with the 3 guerillaswho attacked thebank.On the basis of the acts proved againstthem, these accused were found guilty of thecharge of High Treason.Thesixth and seventh accused, Shezi andRadebe, operated as guerillas in Natal. Theywere charged with, and foundguilty of joiningthe ANC, undergoing military training inAngola, and returning to South Africa to engagein armedstruggle against the state. DuringDecember 1979-January 1980 they planned enattack on the offices of the PortNatalBantu Affairs Administration Board, end were inpossession of various arms, explosives endammunition. Theywere found guilty of HighTreason.Accused 8 and 9, Bagels and Mngedi, werecharged, and found guilty of joining theANCend undergoing military training in Angola and,in Magndi's case, in Russia. On their returnto South Africa, inabout February 1980, theyplanned the establishment of a base in theVryheid district. When arrested in the townshipofMondlo, they were each in possession of eMekerov pistol. On this basis, they were bothalso convicted of HighTreason.Evidence for the state falls into 3 majorcategories:e the attack on the Sodcmekeer police station;the siege atthe Silverton bank;e the specific acts end involvements of eachof the accused.In addition to this, the state also ledsanegeneral evidence on the nature of the ANC. Theirmajor witness in this regard was Lieut-ColHermenus Stadler ofthe security police, whotestified that he could be considered somethingof en expert on the ANC. After being formedin1912 the ANC, according to Stadler, formed ayouth league in 1944-under the leadership ofpeople like NelsonMandela, Welter Sisulu endOliver Tembo. The Youth League introduced emore militant atmosphere into ANCprogrammesend policies, end during the 1950s demonstrationsend passive resistance campaigns occurred.In themid-1960s the Congress Alliancewas formed, involving an alliance between 5orgeriisetions - the ANC, Congress ofDemocrats,Coloured Peoples' Congress, South AfricanIndian Congress, and the South African Congressof TradeUnions (SACTU). The Freedom Charterwas adopted as the policy of these organisationsafter it was drawn up et theCongress of thePeople et Kliptown.After the ANC was declared unlawful in1960, a military wing - Umkonto we Sizwe-was famed (MK or Spear of the Nation), whichinvolved itself in acts of sabotage. A blueprintfor guerilla warfare wasdrawn up. Under crossexamination Stadler conceded that for the ANCto have existed ell these years it mustbeaccepted by a large number of block people inSouth Africa. He referred to the intenserivalry between the ANC endthe PAC, butadded that 'we (the security police) don't paymuch attention to the PAC because it is such nsmellfaction'.Another major state witness, who may notbe identified in terms of a court order,testified that after completingANC training inAngola, he was appointed heed of the ANC'sSouthern Natal Region. His duties includedthe arrangingof attacks on political,economic and military targets of significance.aDuring Merck 1979 he carried out a missiontosabotage the buildings of the Port Natal BantuAffairs Administration Board, but this failedwhen a detonator did notgo off as planned.On December 27, 1979, the witness gave himselfup to the police. In court, he identified moatof theaccused as having undergone ANC trainingin Angola-based camps.Of interest is the fact that none of theaccuseddisputed their involvement in variousmilitary activities of the ANC. The natureof the evidence given by the 6 accusedtotestify revolved around the following points:en explanation for the reasons for the attack onthe Soekmekaer policestation; the circumstancesin which they came to leave South Africa and .loin the ANC; and a denial that the ANCwould beinvolved in attacking n target like a bank,or taking hostages. In addition to thisgeneral defence evidence, thefirst 3 accusedexplained in detail how they planned theirattack et Soekmekenr, end how their plansaimed at avoidingkilling police nod civilians

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present in the ares; the fourth accused (Nolebetsi),specifically denied control over the KwnThemaarms cache, end theplanning of attacks anthe Villierie end Pretoria west police stations,while the fifth accused (Tae) explained thenatureof his involvement with the 3 who attacked thebank, and denied any involvement iniike'planningof thatattack.The defence evidence on the ANC's attitudeto civilian targets end the taking of hostagessowed to beconfirnned when, shortly after thetrial concluded, ANC president Tambo signed nprotocol of the Geneva Conventiondealing withthis issue. The protocol binds the ANC torefrain from directing its war effort againstcivilian targets, ara"&the 'humanitarianconduct of war'.Defence evidence also dealt with thecircumstances in which the accused came toleavethe country end join the ANC. Accused numbers 2and 3 (Yeshigo and Monona) dealt with the eventsof Soweto1976, end explained how that contextled to their fleeing the country, end joiningthe AMC. Yolebetsi described theimpact thatthe resettlement of his grandparents had onhim as a youth, end how that experiencepoliticised him. Healso explained how theeffect of the Saw to 1976-77 events had adisruptive effect an daily life, and how itbecame verydifficult to continue anything likee normal existence in that context. And Tautestified how his girl friend had been shotdeadon June 17, 1976, end he had found her bodycovered with newspapers, lying in the street.After conviction, thedefence calledProfessor Frans Moritz of the UNISA sociologydepartment, in mitigation of sentence. Moritzexplainedhow the actions of the accused madesense within the cnntext of their world view,and hem their activities wereunderstandable.'My argument is simply that they (the accused)acted within a certain situation and thatwithin thissituation their actions made sense.Without condoning their actions, they arenevertheless understandable', Moritz toldthecourt. Moritz also noted that the activitiesof the accused were linked to basic historicaldynamics relating torebellion and charge.People try to overthrow governments, and theperson who site in jail today may tomorrow sitingoverrreent.In passing sentence, trial judge de Villiersseemed to accept the evidence given by Moritz,which was notchallenged by the state in itscross examination. Judge de Villiers agreed thatin many cases the rebdl of todaybecomes theleader of tomorrow. He then went an to pose thequestion of whet the court did with the rebel whoiscaught.Dealing with the attack on the Soekmekenrpolice station, he categorised this as anextreme act of treason. Thefact that it was apolice station seemed to be an aggravating factorfor de Villiers, who stated that the policekeep lawand order in South Africa, which is ecountry with civilised values. 'If I did notregard their (the Soekmekear attackers')conductin a very serious light, I would not be doing myduty towards the citizens of South Africa, endSouth Africa is acivilised country', said thejudge.With these factors in mind, Judge de Villiershanded down the following sentences:"Lubisi, Neahigo end Monona: 'to be hanged by theneck until deed'.Yolabetsi end Tau: 20 years imprisonment. -Sheziand Redabe: 1S years imprisonment.Bogele and Mngadi: 10 years imprisonment.On application by the defence,leave toappeal was granted in the case of the first-threfaccused. It was refused in the canes of Yolebatai,Tau endShezi. Leave to appeal in the remainingthree cases was not applied for.TERRORISM ACT TRIALS._Nota: The dateswhich appear at thB end of richcompleted trial refer to the date of sentence'or acquittal in the trial. IM appealproceedings,the date refers to date of ,judgement, while inthe case of pert-heard matters, it refers to thelast courthearing before edjourrwent.Ylunpiai Elliot Sawangambe (24), Monde DuamoreJohnson (24) end Tombs SamuelYtselu (26).Charge: The accused ore charged withattempting to leave South Africa with theintention of undergoingmilitary training.Soeangeabe and Johnson pleaded guilty to thecharge, while Ntsalu pleaded not guilty.Ytsalu wasseparated from the other 2 accused,to be tried on his own.The 3~aecuB,ed were arrested in the'independent'bentuaten of BophuthaTarana,allegedly on route to Botswana. It ispresumed that BophuthaTswananauthoritieshanded the 3 over to the South African police.Verdict: In Finding Samengembe end Johnsonguilty, thepresiding magistrate praisedthem for their 'co-operative attitude', andamid that if it wee in his power he wouldsentencethan leniently. The Terrorism Actcarries n minimum mandatory sentence of 5 years.Sentence: 5 years imprisonmenteach.(Part Elizabeth Regional Court, 30.09.90).When Ntaslu appeared in court, also chargedunder the Terrarium Act,Soasngeaiba testifiedagainst him as a state witness. Mtsalu's trialhad not been concluded et the time of writing.

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Thabo Makunyane (24) and Ephraim Mogale (23).Charge: The accused faced 2 counts under theTerrorism Act, and 4further counts of possessionor distribution of banned publications.According to the charge sheet, the firstcount ofTerrorism related to a series of actswhich the accused committed with the intentionof endangering the maintenance oflaw end orderin South Africa. These acts were listed asfollows:1. During October - November 1977, at GiyaneandPotchefstroom, the accused distributedpamphlets "Being black in South Africa today",and "Declaration of war".2.During 1977, at Nylstroom, the accusedtaught LD Ketumele and J Monannee) that white men oppressed blacks;b) thehistory of the ANC and PAC, and thatthey are the only organisations able to freeblacks;c) these organisations recruitpeople formilitary training and that they will fight tofree the blacks. That they should be helpedto free blacks;d) thehistory and aims of communism and thatthe aims of communism should be furthered.3. During 1979, in Nylstroom,the accusedformed an organisation celled the CommunistAdvance Movement (CAM). The aims of thisorganisationwere to propagate the principles,promote the spread of, andfurther the objects of communism;J. During the period1977 - 1979, at Nylstroom,Mshwelereng end other places, the accusedencouraged the forming of youth clubstoproTcte unrest end uprising end to instructthe youth in acts of sabotage, and the aims ofthe ANC and to recruit theyouth for militarytraining end as supporters of the ANC;5. Between April end June 1978 the accusedencouraged BMMChoabi to ,join the ANC;6. During September 1979, in Pietersburg, theaccused taught CM Nang the history andaimsof the ANC, and requested her to further theaims;7. During October 1979, in Vendnlend, theaccused producedand possessed a stencil"Come let, us unite end defeat our oppressors"for the production. and distribution ofpamphlets.In the second count of Terrorism, theaccused were charged with recruiting 13 peoplefor military trainingduring the period 1977to 1979. Those allegedly recruited werelisted asLD KutumeleJL ManamaSC OhlodhleAMMeshishiMV MoruduJ11 LekelakeleJ AlekibeloOM NangJO SetshediR RemelepeJ Se,jengK Lehodi0 Lebelo.Count 3dealt with the distribution ofMeyibuye, an ANC publication; counts 4, 5 end 6alleged possession of "ANC speaks","South Africano middle road" and "The road to South Africanfreedom".At the time of his detention Mogalewaspresident of the Congress of South AfricanStudents (COSAS); Alekunyene was n student atTurfloopUniversity.When the trial began, the accused pleadedguilty to the first count of Terrorism, end tothe counts relating tounlawful possession/distribution of publications. The charge ofrecruiting people to undgrgo military trainingwaswithdrawn.Verdict: In finding the accused guilty on thebasis of their plea of guilty, the presidingmagistrate found thatthe aim of the accusedwas to galvanise the black youth so that theywould identify with unrest.,pS!d uprisingswhenthey occurred. Mogale encouraged the formationof youth clubs in Nylstroom, Mahwelereng andPotgietersrus toprovide social facilities andcommunal services; but his ulterior aim was toprovide a forum to train and politiciseblackyouths in the aims of the ANC.4ogele told LD Kutumele and J Monenathat the ANC end PAC ware the onlyorganisationswhich. could provide the black man with politicalrights and military training, and that theiraims should befurthered. To this end the 3of them formed the Communist Advance Movementwith Monena as president, lilogele asorganiserand Kutumela as secretary.Sentence: B years each.(Pietersburg Regional Court, 17.10.80).N,jegabantuSithole (21), Mandl& James Sibisi (20),Rnmetlotlo Moses (21), Christopher Sitembiso,Alzuze (20), Stanley ThembaMthembu (19), and2 youths aged 16 end 17.Charge: All 7 accused faced a charge under theTerrorism Act. It wasalleged that, betweep .nJuly 1978 and August 1979 they conspired toleave South Africa to undergo militarytraining,and incited others to do the same. Sithclefaced n further Terrorism charge, where he wasalleged to haveincited 4 youths to leave thecountry to undergo military training. Thisincitement allegedly took place betweenFebruaryand December 1977. Mzuza also faceda charge ,of; dueling in degga.Prior to the trial beginning, one of theyouthscharged brought an urgent applicationbefore the Supreme Court. As n minor he wasnot permitted to instruct a legalrepresentativeto appear in his trial without the assistance

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of his father. His father, however, refusedto allow his son to be defended, saying that!the bay must take hispunishment if provedguilty'. In papers before the Supreme Courtthe youth sought, and was granted permissiontoinstruct a legal representative.At the beginning of the trial, thepresiding magistrate held that the proceedingswould beheard in camera because two of theaccused were juveniles.Verdict: Sibisi end the 16 year old youth werefound guiltyof attempting to leave the countryfor military training, and inciting others todo the same. Mzuza was convicted ofdaggedealing. The remaining accused ware acquitted.Sentence: Sibisi and the ii year old: 5 years.Mzuze: 2 years,suspended.(Durban Regional Court, 14.10.60).Ruth Thandi Modiss (21), Moses Khowi Nkosi (24),and Aaron SlimMogale (21).Via: Modise was charged with undergoingmilitary training in ANC camps based in Angolaand Tanzania.During 1978 she returned toSouth Africa; in March of that year, accordingto the state, she set fire to piles of clothinginJohannesburg branches of Edgers and theOK Bazaars. She was also charged with unlawfulpossession of arms,explosives and ammunition,end of reconnoitering police stations and aKnrgersdorp Bantu Affairs AdministrationBoardoffice with the em of sabotaging them.Nkosi, the father of Modise's child, andMoguls (who is a cousin ofModise), were allegedto have harboured her, knowing that she was e.trained guerilla fighter. They ware alsochargedwith storing a firearm and explosivesbelonging to Modise. ,Much of the trial revolved round theadmissibility ofstatements made by two ofthe accused while in police custody. Modisa.clamed that she had bean assaulted bypolicewho forced her to melee a confession; Nkosisaidthat he wads a statement to ovoid being tortured:'I thought thatwhat had been done to otherswould be done to me too. I had not heard ofsomeone who had been to John MonsterSquarewho had not been asseultetl', he told thecourt.Or Norman Jacobson, a senior JohannesburgDistrict Surgeon,testified that in hisopinion 'lengthy periods of interrogation...could constitute an assault. I believe, andI have seen, thatthe Security Police subjectdetainees to strenuous interrogation'.Questioned by defence counsel an howpeople cameto be injured at John VorsterSquare, security police witness Edward JamesTierney explained that 'the floss issoslippery that a person can fall and injurehimself or even fell while sitting an a their'.The two statements wereaccepted by thepresiding magistrate as having been made freelyand voluntarily, end therefore admissibleagainstVodise and Nkosi.Verdict: Modise end Nkosi guilty of Terrorism;Mogale guilty of unlawful possessionoffirearms.Sentence: Vodlae - 8 years.Nkosi - 5 years.Vogale --21 years, suspended.Notice of an appeal againstconviction wasgiven by Nkoai, who was released on R2 000bail pending the outcome of the appeal.(Kemptan ParkRegional court, 07.11.eo).Archibald Monty Vzinyathi (24) end BingoBentley (Vbojani) (46).Charge: Vzinynthi wasalleged by the stateto have joined the ANC in 1975 end undergonemilitary training in the Soviet Union during1977.The state further claimed that, on hisreturn to South Africa, ha was harboured byBentley (his stepfather) who knewthat he wasa trained guerilla.Both accused contested the admissibilityof statements they made while in policecustodyat John Monster Square, claiming assault andother pressures as the reasons for makingconfessions.The'waexi<amer' (truthroan) again featuredprominently in this trial, with Mcirryathiclaming that ha had been tortured insuch a roomat John Vorster Square, and security policedenying its existence. Allegations of torturein such a roomhave become common in politicaltrials involving John Vorater Square securitypolice; denials of its existence areequallyas frequent from the side of security police.Vzinyathi raised an alibi in his defence,claiming that et the time thestate claimed hewas in Russia,. he was in reality in a Lesothohospital as a result of a car smash. He appliedto court tobe allowed to gather evidence oncommission, which would establish that he wasindeed in hospital during the relevantperiod.This would have involved the hearing of evidencein Lesotho, and the application was turneddown by thepresiding magistrate.Verdict: Vzinyathi was found guilty as charged.Bentley was acquitted an the grounds thathemight possibly not have known that his stepsonhad undergone military training.Sentence: Vzinyathi was sentencedto 7 yamsimprisonment. M appeal against conviction weenoted.(Johannesburg Regional Court, 09.10.80).

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Arthur Elliot Phalatse (22), Thabo SimonNdlovu (19), Jannitjie Malaya Chiloane (24),William Mtwante Mampuru (18),Tshepo AlbertMatlana (23), Ezekiel Oupa Masuku (23) andMatone Joseph Masuku (24).Charge: The accused all facea charge ofattempting to leave the country for thepurposes of undergoing military training.They were apprehendednear Houtkop on theSwaziland - South African border in earlyJuly 1980.In addition to this charge, Cups Mdsukufacesadditional charges of inciting others toundergo military training, and arrangingtransport to leave the country.The trial isdue to begin at the and ofJanuary in the Pretoria Regional Court.Ettiene Pillay (18), a 17 year old student,PindaManamela (34), Jonas Mataung (36), andNicadamus Motapo (35).Charge: Terrorism. Details of the chargeshad notyet been formulated at the time ofwriting.Oscar Mpetha (71), Lawrence Lerotholi (18),Morgan Makubala (19), AaronTshangama (28),Peter Kubr (18), Alton Sabuwa (18),Fumanekile Booi (18), Vuyisile Kzaza (19),Johannes Nhlapo(20), Jeffrey Boardman (20),Vuyisile Diba (21), Richard Amapondo (19),Welile Mazothana (21) and 4 youths.Charge:The accused face a charge of Terrorism,and 2 counts of murder. The state allegesthat between August B and August12, 1980, nearthe Crossroads squatter camp, the accusedincited people to damage motor vehicles bythrowing stonesand petrol bombs, and settingslight the vehicles.They are charged with assaulting andinuring 6 people, 2 of whomsubsequently died.The accused are further alleged to havebarricaded Klipfantein Road by placing stones,tree stumpsand tyres in the street; of marchingin 'singing groups armed with sticks, stones andother weapons; of ordering theclosure ofblack schools; and of congregating in variouschurches to encourage people to take part interroristicactivities.The first accused, Oscar Mpetha, is asenior leader in the Western Cape, beingorganiser of the African Foodand CanningWorkers Union, and chairman of the NyangaRAsidents Association.Mpetha was detained by policeshortlyafter accusing police-of provoking theviolence which broke out at Crossroads andNyanga in August 1980.Thetrial is due to begin in the CapeTown Supreme Court an March 3, 1981. When,the accused first appeared in court,theproceedings were held in a specially convenedcourt in Pollsmoor Prison.Or Fabian Defu Ribeiro (48), JanCaiphusMashilo (19) and a 16-year old youth.Charge: Five charGes under the Terrorism Act.Ribeiro is alleged tohave incited a number ofyouths to leave the country to undergo militarytraining, and supplying same of thoseallegedlyincited with money for train tickets to leave SouthAfrica. The other 2 accused are alleged to havemadeattempts to leave South Africa with theintention of undergoing military training.At the time of writing, the case hadbeenadjourned for the passing of judgement.(Pretoria Regional Court, 16.01.81).NAMIBIAN TERRORISMTRIAL.Markus Kuteka (40) and Henri Kariseb (45).Charge: The accused were alleged to haveassisted a group ofSWAPO guerillas byproviding them with food and accommodation,and a plan of the buildings of a farmnearGrootfontein, where they were employed. Thefarmhouse involved was subsequently attacked byguerillas onFebruary 17, 1979. .The farm owner, JFL Louw, told the courtthat the 2 accused had been among his mosttrustedfarmworkers, and both were foremen.Prior to the attack, one of his workers hadwarned him to be careful becauseKariseb was'SWAPO oriented'. On the day bf the attack, hehad instructed Kariseb ~,o run to a nearbyfarm to warn thefamily there that 'terrorists'were in the area. Kariseb refused to do this,telling Louw to 'save your breath'.Verdict: Thepresiding judge found that, onthe night before the attack, Kuteke had fedand accommodated two armed guerillas; thenextday he and Kariseb assembled other farm workafsin a bush clearing, where they met a group ofabout 9 guerillafighters.The accused were accordingly convictedof Terrorism.Sentence: In passing sentence, Justice Strydamsaidthat farmworkers had to be made torealise that it was their duty to report thepresence of armed insurgents, and notgetinvolved with SWAPO. There had been at least15 armed attacks on isolated farms in thepast few years, andfarmers had to be able totrust tneir workers.Although the accused were unsophisticatedfarm workers, no thinkingperson could beunaware of the aims of SWAPO, said the judge.Everyone knew that SWAPO had no goodintentionsfor Namibia and its people.

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Kuteke was sentenced to death.Kariseb was sentenced to 10 years.(Windhoek Supreme Court,13.10.80).CONTRAVENTIONS OF BANNING ORDERS.(Internal Security Act).Aubrey Vdcoena (31).Charge: Theaccused was alleged to havecontrmvenad the banning order imposed on himin 1978 an 5 occasions. The chargesemergedPram a series of conflicts within the AfricanMethodist Episcopal Church (AME), in whichAlokoene appears tohave played a role. Theseconflicts seem to revolve around the role ofthe American Bishop of the A41E Church,BishopMing, the administration of church finances,and the transfer of priests between perishes.Mokoene was involvedin a series of altercationswith Bishop Ming over the administration offunds, and SSTAPO members of the churchinNamibia who had been detained.Verdict: Guilty on 2 counts, in that duringMay 1980 Mokoene attended two AMEChurchmeetings. At one meeting, he made a series ofintroductory remarks, while at the other heasked questionsabout church financialreports. The presiding magistrate held thatattendance at these two meetings constitutedecontravention of Mdcosna's banning order.Sentence: Sentence was postponed for 3 years.This means that nosentence will be passedunless Mokosra is found guilty of a similaroffence during the next 3 years.(JohannesburgRegional Court, 09.12.80).Hlaku Kenneth Reohidi end Aubrey Mokoena.Game: The accused wars chargedwithcontravening their respective banning ordersby communicating with each other. The chargesarose from anincident an November 14, 19&0,when they were both arrested et Ibkosnn'a3oweto house.Charges were droppedagainst both accusedwhen they appeared in the JohannesburgMagistrates' Court (25.11.80).Judy Favish(29).Charge: The accused was alleged to havecontravened the teems of her banning orderby being at KirstenboschGardens, which fellsout of the area she is restricted to.Evidence before the court was that, onreceiving news that heruncle had died, Fevishwant to walk among the flowers et Kiratanbaach.She was arrested by police as she got outofher car.Verdict: Guilty. Fevish admitted a previousconviction for breaking her restriction order,when she left her areaof restriction to buyChinese take-away food.Sentence: 6 months imprisonment. conditionallysuspended for 3years.("erg Regional Court, 06.11.80).David Russell (40) - appeal.As reported in 1IP 12 (pegs 47), Rev DavidRussellwee sentenced to 4J years laprisorwient,31 years being conditionally suspended, forvarious contraventions of hisbanning order.The majority of the contraventions relatedto Russell's attendance of an AnglicanSynod meeting inGrahamstown.Russell appealed against the sentenceimposed, end this was partially successfulwhen all but 14 daysof the sentence wassuspended. He has maw served this sentence.(Cape Town Supreme Court, 05.12.80).FatimaMeer and Baptists Marie - appeal.As reported in wIP 9 (pegs 3) the appellants1n this wetter ware convicted ofcontraveningtheir banning orders by attending a socialgathering. They'wsrs each sentenced to 3monthsimprisonment, suspended for 3 years.They appealed against conviction, end inan important judgement the Natal.SupremeCourt upheld their appeal. In essence, thepresiding judges found that the terms of thebanning orderswere-too a6scure to have anylapel meaning. This related especially tothe notice of 'social gathering's' endtheprohibition on then in farms of banningorders.The attorney-ganerel of Natal has appliedfor, and been granted,leave to appeal againstthe ruling of the Natal Supreme Court.(Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, 11.11.80).ZubeidaJuby Meyet (43).(, e: The accused is alleged Vo have contravenedher banning order 6y attending a servicetocommemorate the banning of various blackconsciousness orpnnisations on October 19,1977. The seating whichYeyet allegedlyattended was held et the Jlswn Centre,Lerasia, on October 19, 1980.-(Jahanneebury Regional court,12.01.81).Lawrence Molethlegi Ntldcaa (22).Chorpe: The accused, at the time of hisrestriction the youngest person tobe banned inSouth Africa, is charged with contravening his'banning order by attending a commemoration service1nKegiac on October 19, 1980.

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INDEXSCHOOLS BOYCOTT IN KIMBERLEY pageCOURTS: Treason Trial pageTerrorism Act trials pageNamibianTerrorism trial pageContraventions of banningand house arrest orders page9.......... page 10Same Some.Transkeitrials page 10Appeal proc-.1ings page 1iInternal Security Act trials page 12Trials of general interest page 13HEALTHCARE FOR PROFIT page 16CHOLERA - A TROPICAL DISEASE? page 21CASH CROPPING IN KANGWANE .page 34LABOUR ACTION page 39INDUSTRIAL HEALTH page 58SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION -Acomment . ..... ...... page 63SUPPLEMENT: THE CURRENT 'UPSWING' INTHE SOUTHAFRICAN ECONOMY AND THEINTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS: ARE-INTERPRETATION OF SOUTHAFRICAN'DEVELOPMENT'.Sabotage trials ......This issue of Work In Progress edited andpublished by an editorialcollective of40 ,jorissenstreet, 2001 breemfontain,and printed by sacked, 54 simmonds street,2001 Johannesburg.Thenature of Work In Progress, which is tostimulate debate end present controversialviews on a wide range of subjects,ensuresthat the opinions expressed do not necessarilyreflect the views of the editorial collective.EDITORIALADDRESS:PO Sax X3174, .2143 YeovilleSOUTH AFRICA.Thanks to ell contributors for articlessubmitted, to Kevinfor assistants, end toPaul for cover.RATESRates in Southern AfricaIndividuals: 85,00 per 5 issues.Organisations:810,00 per 5 issues.Group distribution: 80c per copy.Reduced rotes end/or n certain number ofcomplimentary copiescan be arrangedon request.Rates elsewhere (second class airmail)Western Europe and United Kingdom:Individuals:820,00 per 5 issues.Orgenisntiona: 828,00 per 5 issues.USA and Canada:Individuals: 825,00 per 5issues.Organisations: 835,00 per 5 issues.Important. If payment is made 1n foreign (non-Rend)currency, please addbank charges.Surface mail rotes outside of SouthernAfrican available an request.Cheques end postal orders payabletoWork In Progress.n Rates outside of Southern Africa have beenincreased to cover costs ofincreasedpostage.EDITORIALIF THERE is one unifying theme running throughthis issue of Work In Progress, it is thefocuson health, medical care end their relationshipto the various classes in society. This themewas unplanned by theeditors, end the submissionof 3 articles dealing with the arse was largelyco-incidental.The contributions on health ellpoint tothe impossibility of restructuring healthcare without a democratic restructuring ofother relations in society.Neither thepaternalistic efforts of a ruling classdominated Health Department, nor theisolated programmes of'concerned' membersof the medical profession eon make much headwayin dealing with the two mayor areas ofpoorhealth: in the rural arses where thosemarginalised from capitalist production and`reproduction struggle for dailysurvival, endon the factory floor where the direct producers.of capitalist wealth are subject to a range ofhazardousconditions and situations. The 'state of health of all classes in society cannotbe reduced to a simple,_,Vdical question,butis directly raleted~fo access to political endeconomic power, and struggles to maintain oralter that access. Theimprovement of thequality of health la accordingly tied tochanges in the balance of power betweenclasses: struggleswar health intersectwith and relate to broader struggles insociety.The editors of WIP ere vary willing topublish furthermaterial around the 'healthdebate', but at the same time would like torefer interested readers to thq Critical Health

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SUPPLEMENT TO WIP 16February 1981

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THE ARTICLE that follows as a supplement to thisWork In Progress represents a departure fromprevious editorialpolicy. It had beendecided not to include contributions in WIPwhich, because of terminology used, were notfairlyeasily accessible to those without aspecific training in the area being discussed.The contribution which follows makesuse ofcertain complex concepts, and the terminologyused and ideas explored are difficult readingfor thenon-expert.The editors nonetheless felt that thearticle was an important one, making acontribution of contemporaryvalue, and havingdefinite strategic implications. The editorswere unwilling to deprive WIP readership ofthe ideas andinformation contained in thearticle because of their complexity, and itwas accordingly decided to include it asasupplement to this issue of WIP. There arevery few, if any avenues for the publication ofthis sort of work in SouthAfrica, and thiswas an added factor in deciding to includethis article in WIP.The contribution is an exploratory one,enddoes not aim to be definitive or complete.It certainly falls into the category of workin progress. One of the reasons forpresentingit in VIP is to elicit comment and response,and the author, David Kaplan, has specificallyrequested criticalcomment on the article.This will assist in the development andfurthering of a debate which touches on thestructure ofthe South African economy, thelikely form of future capitalist development,and the implications of both structureanddevelopment.Comment can be sent to the editors, ordirectly toDavid Kaplan,Department of EconomicHistory,University of Cape Town,7700 Rondebosch,CAPS TOWN.The editors will consider runningsimilarsupplements to WIP if readership feels thatthese are a worthwhile addition to the Work InProgress project.Readers are asked to letthe editorial collective know of their attitudeas far as this is concerned..Contributorssubmitting material forinclusion in future supplements shouldinclude a non-technical, easily accessiblesummary oftheir article for inclusion in themain body of WIP.

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United States. 10The explanation for the movement in therate of profit, which is indeed the capitalistcrisis, cannot beattempted here. But itdoes seem to provide a striking verificationof the Marxian thesis of a tendency for therate ofprofit to fall in capitalism. Thistendency occurs, in .terms of Marx's analysis,as a consequence of a rising organiccompositionof capital unless offset by an equal increasein the rate of surplus value. 11 Economiccrises can functionso as to restore the rateof profit in three primary ways. First, bythe 'devalorisation' or indeed open destructionof capital- bankruptcies, plant closings, etc.Second, through raising the rate of surplusvalue - growing unemployment allowingfor alimiting of wage increases, reduction in strikeactivity, etc. Third, through a reduction inthe prices of raw materials,purchased mainlyfrom the Third World.All three occurred as a consequence ofthe 1974-75 recession, but to alimitedextent. A number of raw material pricedecreases were recorded, but 'energy-related'commodities rosesubstantially in price. 12Unemployment expanded significantly, and evenin the 'recovery' period stood athistoricallyhigh levels in the OECD countries. 13 This didallow for a tightening of labour disciplineand real wagedeductions in a number of cases 14- but labour organisation was such as to ensurethat this was not of a sufficientmagnitude torestore the rate of profit to its formerlevels.The key issue is that of capitaldevalorisation - and here liesthe explanationfor the post 1974-75 period. The devalorisationof capital was distinctly limited. There werea fewlarge-scale bankruptcies. 15 but theeffects were largely limited to the smallercapitals. The 'corporate structure',monopolycapital of the large trusts, was littleaffected.The underlying reason for the limitedeffect of the recession interms of capitaldevalorisation must rest with governmentalcounter-cyclical economic policies. 16 Variousforma ofmonetary 'pump-priming' and deficitfinancing served to ensure that the level ofoutput for the economy as a whole didnotfall too catastrophically, while the harder hitmonopoly corporations were, in addition,accorded forma of directsubsidy. 17 Thesesubsidies allowed then to continue inproduction.With the capital stock largely intact,excesscapacity, which had characterisedproduction prior to the 1974-75 recession, .continued in the 'recovery'. 18 Thesubsidisedsurvival of Chrysler and many of the Europeancar firms, for example, meant that the moatefficientcorporations were unable to operateat full capacity. The continuance of excesscapacity therefore limited the extent towhichthe rate of profit rose in the 'recovery'period.c) The limited recovery of the rate of profitin the post-recessionperiod was the principalfactor underlying the weakness of the .international capitalist economy.As was outlined above,this limitedrecovery in the rate of profit is to belocated in limited reductions in primarycommodity prices, limitedincreases in therate of surplus value and, in particular, in aseverely 'retarded' devalorieation of capital.The net effectwas to ensure that reinvestmentin productive activities was severely curtailed.This further encouraged investments ofa morespeculative character.d) Inflation is a complex phenomenon, and noattempt is made to provide an explanationhere.But it does seem that .inflation, which onceagain is a phenomenon of internationalcapitalism, is linked to twoprincipal factors.First, the economic dominance of monopolycorporations, end second, to expansionistmonetarypolicies pursued by capitalistgovernments. 19Firstly, the absence of competition hasallowed the larger firmsconsiderable leewayto utilise their power to unilaterally raiseprices without fear of retaliation. 20 Thus,even in arecession, larger corporations willtend to reduce their output, but increase theirmark-up in order to maintainprofitabilitylevels. 21 A recession will moderate priceincreases, principally via the effect of adeclining demand on thecompetitive sector andreductions in the prices of raw materials asdemand falls. 22 Generally, only when therecessionreally deepens, and the largercorporations collectively have massive excesscapacity, will this tend to provokemajorprice reductions in the monopoly sector.Secondly, the expansionist monetary andfiscal policies of the advancedcapitalistcountries have led to a massive expansion ofthe money supply - both nationally andinternationally - and thisis particularly trueof the United States post 1958 (see below).There is indeed a relation between the expansionof themoney supply and the persistence ofinflation. The development of international'monetary and capital.marketa haveprovided anadditional impetus, particularly by allowingavenues for the circumvention of tight moneypolicies. 23 Tiremassive budget deficits ofthe advanced capitalist countries in 1975-76

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were the real reason for the subsequent'recovery'. But they added further impetus toinflation.Apart from the state'sgeneral monetarypump--priming, in order to maintain the levelof total demand, the other principalmechanismsdesigned to limit the recession by reinstatingthe rate of profit are also clearly inflationary.Directsubsidisation of inefficient firms, taxreductions on coed profits, assuming moreof the costs of private capital eg bysubsidisingor taking over scientific research. and variousunproductive state expenditures which allow anoutlet forcapitalist production eg defence,all contribute to inflation. The persistenceof a condition of stagflation (if notslump-flation) - the coexistence of stagnant productionand rising prices - reflects the contradictorycharacter ofcapitalism in its monopoly phase,viz a tendency for the rate of profit to fallwhich produces stagnation, and anopposing set ofcounter-tendencies, primarily initiated by thestate, which produce inflation.These are structural, andhence endemicfeatures of advanced capitalism. If inflationpersists in the advanced capitalist countries -the continuingdevalutaion of paper currencies -this will clearly have major long-ternrepercussions for South Africa, theworld'sprincipal producer of gold. 24e) But the value of the key official currency,the international currency, the USdollar, isof particular importance. The declining valueof the dollar is-one reflection of the limitationsof US imperialisthegemony.The agreement reached at Bretton Woods in1944 had as its bedrock the convertibility ofthe US dollar intogold at the fixed price of$35 per ounce. This price had in fact been setas early as 1934 when the RooseveltAdministration,in the context of the US holding massive goldstocks, had raised the price of gold. It hadarbitrarilystopped at $35 per ounce. 25The strict convertibility of the dollarinto gold depended on two basic factors.First,maintaining a continuing supply of newly-ained gold, which could be purchased at that fixedprice, ie a regulation of thegold marketsuch that newly-mined gold would be offered tothe Central Hanks at $35 per ounce. Second, andcloselyinterrelated, that the supply of dollarswas restricted. 'the latter was the crucialcondition - an over-supply of dollarswould leadto a swapping of dollars for gold and a drainupon the US gold reserves.The US, in particular, sought tocontrol themarket for newly-mined gold by attempting toenforce sale through the Central Banks or theIMF at the fixedprice of $35 an ounce - apolicy which was strongly opposed by SouthAfrica. 26Hut the crucial factor whichfinallydestroyed the Bretton Woods Agreement was thepersistence of massive US Balance of Paymentsdeficits.Whereas in the first decade or soafter the War there was a severe dollar shortageinternationally, this gave way to everlargerdollar surpluses. 27 The key turn-around datewas 1958. In that year, US gold reserves fellbelow the level of itsofficial liabilitiesdenominated in dollars. At the same time theUS Balance of Payments produced a very largedeficit.From this date, large outflows ofgold from the US continued unabated, asdollar holders sought to exercise their righttoacquire gold.The US responded by progressively andunilaterally cutting the links between thedollar and gold. Thisoccurred in three majorsteps. In 1961 the 'Gold Pool' was createdwhereby several European countries madeacommitment to sell sane of their gold stocksin order to maintain the dollar price for gold.In 1968 the US ended itscommitments to privateholders of dollars who now could no longeracquire gold for their dollars. In 1971 the'goldwindow' was closed to official purchasersas well.In very broad terms, both the persistenceof the US Balance ofPayments deficit, and themeasures taken as a consequence by the US tocut links between the dollar and gold, are tobeunderstood in the context of US imperialisthegemony. At the same time, it points to someof the limitations iq`,^^entin this hegemonicposition.The Balance of Payments deficit must beunderstood, in part, as a consequence ofUSmilitary expenditures. Such expenditures,particularly during the Vietnam War, led to amassive drain of dollarsabroad directly, whileindirectly funnelling much of the R and D,skilled personnel etc away from the productionofmarketed commodities. 28 US 'aid', specialtrade relations with 'strategic' countries likeSouth Korea and Taiwan, andother factors linkedto the US imperialist presence made furthercontributions to the deficit. The challengesto UShegemony - the direct resistance of Cubaand Vietnam for example, and the challenges posedby its economic rivals,the other developedcountries, were severe threats to that hegemonicposition and inter alia contributedverysignificantly to the deficit.Hut the US response reveals that, whilechallenged and circumscribed, itshegemonicposition within the international capitalistsystem has, in essence, been maintained. 29Instead of abiding bythe rules of BrettonWoods and exercising expenditure reductions in

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order to limit its payments deficits, so stemmingthe outflow of dollars - a policy which wouldhave entailed economicrestraint at home and/orcurtailment of US 'activities' abroad - the UShas essentially adopted what became known as'apassive strategy' for the Balance of Payments.In essence, this strategy - given elaboratetheoretical justification by theeconomic'establishment' 30 - was that the US shouldcontinue to run its economy at an 'optimal'level. The resultantoutflow of dollarsabroad would have to be 'absorbed' by othercountries. The 'pressure' on other countries,notably theadvanced capitaiist country rivalsof the US, arises in two rays. First, they wouldbe forced to buy dollars in order tomaintainthe value of the dollar because the dollarrepresented much of the backing for their owncurrencies. Second,an effective devaluationof the dollar or revaluation of their owncurrency would severely jeopardise their tradingpositionvie-a-vie the US. Finally, a severemonetary crisis, brought on by a major declineof the dollar, would jeopardise thewholeinternational economy.The economic rivals of the US have thusbeen forced to accept a situation whereby theUSrune persistent deficits, and to absorb theresultant dollar surpluses. 31 But the fact thatthe major capitalist countryoperates outsidethe monetary rules, in order to ensure itscontinued hegemony, 32 has injected a tremendousnote ofuncertainty into monetary relations andthe stability of the system. There clearly arelimitations to the process of dollarabsorptionand the spectre of a monetary collapse isconsequently a real one. In addition theoutflow of dollars hasadded tremendously tointernational liquidity, and is the principalfactor in the rapid growth of the Eurodollarmarket. Toreiterate, these developments havewade a significant contribution to fuellinginternational inflation. Monetaryinflation,end the threat of a monetary collapse, are theprincipal factors. encouraging 'alternative' formsof wealthholding.The major conclusions to be drawn from theabove analysis are awrmariaed here:Inflation, the devaluation ofmonetaryassets. is a persistent and a structuralfeature of advanced capitalism. It has its rootsin the very structures ofcapitalism. Firstly,as a consequence of monopoly control of markets;secondly, as h result of_governwentalpoliciesdesigned to ensure the maintenance of demand;thirdly, at en international level, as theconsequence of amassive increase ininternational liquidity which must be groundedin an analysis of US imperialist hegemony. 33At the'national level', it represents theoutcome of forces, principally directed by thestate, designed to counteract thetendency ofprofit rates to tall. At the 'internationallevel', it reflects the persistence of, butat the same ties growingthreat to, USimperialist hegemony.One consequence of the latter feature hasbeen the instability and devaluation ofthedollar - the international reserve currency.There la an analogy here with the situation ofthe early 1930s. In 1931 thedevaluation ofthe key reserve currency, the pound sterling,led to the first substantial price increase forgold. 34 WhileBritish hegemony in the imperialistsystem was uncontested, a strong currency couldensure a fixed relation between itand gold.Devaluation of the pound sterling reflected thedecline in British imperialist hegemony. WithAmericanimperialist hegemony undisputed and thedollar strong, a similar period of a fixed pricefor gold could be maintained.The challengesto US imperialist hegemony in the contemporaryperiod have once again lifted the ceiling on.gold.At thesave time as monetary assets havebeen subject to devaluation, the rate of profitin direct productive investment hasbeen for anddeclining. This decline was only partiallyreversed by the major recession on 1974-75,end the fact that thereversal vas only partialwas due primarily to the limited valorisation ofcapital. As a consequence, capital issearchingdesperately for profitable avenues for 'investment'in order to ensure an adequate return.Since neitherproductive investment, normonetary assets yield adequate returns, thesearch has been directed elsewhere. 35 Awiderange of possibilities exist - property, antiques,certain raw materials, etc, end even worecrucially, gold andsilver.The US has nor cut all effective linksbetween the dollar end a fixed quantity of gold.The controlled market forgold gave ray to atwo-tier market, and now effectively a free-market for gold. The price of gold is not norsubject to anymajor manipulation designed tolimit its exchange price. Thus, so long asthese features of advanced,capitaliam whichIhave analysed as structural, persist, theinternational exchange price for gold, itsoverall purchasing power in terms ofnationalcurrencies will tend to remain strong. Whilelarge fluctuations are indeed very likely,since this is nor aspeculative market andsubject to many determinations, 36 theunderlying trend for the gold price is likelyto remainstrong.That this increase in the price of gold isnot likely to be a passing phenomenon, since itis linked to structuralfeatures of contemporary

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p 5capitalism, has major implications for thetrajectory of future capitalist development inSouth Africa.3. PRINCIPALFEATURES OF THE CURRENT UPSWINGIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY.THE FIRST fruits of the increasein the price ofgold are to be seen in the current upswing inthe South African economy.Two features of the upswingstand out.Firstly, the high rate of economic growth, whichhas accelerated lately. Real GDP rose by3,75% in 1979, andin the first half of 1980real GDP was 8,5% higher than the correspondingperiod of 1979.37 Industrial production inJune1980 was fully 13% higher than a year earlier.This is in marked contrast with the steepdeclines for the sameperiod registered for mostof the developed capitalist countries. 38 The .second outstanding feature of the upswing isitsduration. Three years of uninterrupted expansionmade it one of the lengthiest upswings of thepost-World War IIperiod - exceeded only by theupswing lasting from September 1961 to April 1965.There are some signs of the rate ofgrowthmoderating in the short term. Capacity utilisationin. manufacturing is at high levels,39 skilledlabour is inever-shorter supply, exportindustries are likely to perform poorly as a resultof the weak economic position of theadvancedcapitalist countries and finally, interestrates are likely to rise. However, at presentthere is little danger of amajor economicdownturn.The key impetus to the upswing and thereason for its long duration and likelycontinuance is,of course, provided by the highergold price. It is worth charting, albeitbriefly, the principal ways in which the goldpricehas acted as a stimulus to the economy.First, it has added substantially togovernment revenue. In 1971 governmentrevenuefrom gold mining (tax and share of profits) wasabout 8120-m.40 By 1975 this had risen toR745-m, but itdeclined to R320-m in 1977.In 1978 the state's share rose dramaticallyto 8937,3-m.41 In 1979 state revenue rose82%to R1 703-n (state assistance to marginalminds declined 70% to a mere R8-m),42 and inthe first 6 months of1980 the amount paid wasR2 006-m - an increase of 222,5% over the sameperiod in 1979.43This has allowed foreasier taxationpolicies in .regard to the rest of the economy,and provides much leeway for future tax concessionsinthe event of an economic downturn.Second, as a direct contribution to GDP,gold's share rose from 5,7% in 1970, to8,7% in1978 and 9,7% in 1979.44 Further increases areanticipated for 1980. Total mineral earningsrose from R1563-m in 1970, to an estimatedR14 000-m to R15 000-m in 1980.45Third, the indirect contribution gold mininghasmade to the rest of the economy by providinga source of final demand. 46 The multiplier issaid to be large, and thedomestic value addedcomponent of gold mining production is as highas 93,7% - with the import leakage thus verylow.47 The domestic value added is likely tohave risen as the mines employ a higher proportionof local labour and asmore intermediate andcapital goods are produced locally. There isalso some indication that foreign shareholdinghasdeclined marginally. 48Finally, and most critically, the increasedprice of gold has had a profound effect on theBalanceoi' Payments. Soutn Airlca-n tradesurplus was approximately R3 786-m in thefirst 7 months of 1980 - or 26% higherthan inthe same period in 1979.....this year's surplus (1980) is entirelyattributable to buoyant gold export earnings'.49The gold price has more than kept up withinternational inflation and comparing gold andoil prices over a 10 yearperiod,from 1970,gold has increased more. 50 The terms of tradeincluding gold stand at 138 - as compared to .1 000for 1972.51 Moreover, the market value ofSouth Africa's official gold stocks alsoincreased substantially..In the past,economic upswings have beenlimited in their duration and extent byemerging 'foreign exchange bottlenecks'. Astheeconomy has expanded so has the propensityto import, while to a lesser extent exports haveincreasingly beendiverted to the home market.Abstracting from gold, this phenomenon is alreadyvery evident. 52 The non-gold currentaccountis significantly adverse, and has been since thebeginning of 1979.53 But the high price for goldhas produceda substantial surplus, and officialcalculations show that a gold price of $570 perounce will be sufficient to sustain agrowthrate of 5,5%.But the higher gold price has even moresignificant implications which go beyond itsimmediateimpact. The medium to long termimplications for capitalist development inSouth Africa are equally profound.Thehigher gold price has occasioned verysignificant gold mining reinvestment. Thecapital expenditure of the gold minesrosefrom R448,31n in 1978 to R689-m in 1979 -an increase of 53,7%.54 In the first 6 monthsof 1980 capitalexpenditure has been estimatedas increasing by a further 21%.55 While thesurge in gold mining investment has beenmostdramatic., increased investment is also verysignificant in other mining - particularly coal.Capital expenditure bythe mining industry as a

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whole rose from R693-m in 1978 to R1 013-m in 1979,56and according to the President of the Chamber ofMM.57ines could top R3 OOO-m in 1981. The valueof new mining ventures already announced andscheduled tocommence production on or before1985, is well in excess of R6 000-m atcurrent prices. 58The effects of this massivecapitalexpenditure will be felt after a number of years.It will provide impetus to accelerated growththroughout theeconomy and ameliorate any downturnthat might occur. The boom in South Africa post-:962 was the outcome of boththe crushing ofpopular resistance and the removal of anyimmediate political threat, but also the increasein mininginvestment which occurred during themid-1950x.59 There is a significant laggedrelationship between increases inmining andnon-mining investment.Increased capital investment has been farmore significant in gold mining thaninmanufacturing. For the year ended June 1979,gross domestic fixed investment in gold miningrose 23%, and for theyear ended June 1980, itrose 39% - a massive increase caning on top of amajor increase the year before. Inmanufacturing,gross domestic fixed investment declined by9% in the year ending June 1979. By June 1980,it hadincreased by 27% - but this is lesssignificant: given the declines in 1976 and 1977.60One of the features of thepresent upswing wasthe initial slow rate. of growth of fixedinvestment in manufacturing. While this rateof increase haspicked up very markedly recently,this has been after years of decline, and forthe metal and engineeering industries,forexample, projected capital investment for 1980is still below the figures for 1974-76.61Whatever the final outcome ofthe differentsectoral investments, it seems clear that mining,and gold mining in particular, has an increasingrelativerole to play in the future - both interms of contribution to GDP, and even moreespecially as an earner of foreignexchange.This broad conclusion is further underlinedby the increasing concentration of gold mining onthe lower gradeores. Grams per ton milleddeclined steadily from 13,28 in 1970, to 10,03in 1974, 8,19 in 1979 and 7,45 grams inthefirst 6 months of 1980. This has had the effectof firstly very substantially increasingtotal mineable reserves, andsecondly ofsubstantially extending the working lives ofthe existent gold mines. As a consequence, allpreviouspredictions about future output andthe exhaustion of gold deposits have had to besubstantially revised. 62 Theperrenial predictionof the coming exhaustion of the gold miningindustry, so often made in the past and uponwhichmuch of South Africa's economic policieshave historically been partially based, againproves to be a mere chimera.4.CONCLUSION.THE EXPANDED role for gold mining, and miningin general, in the South African economy willcriticallyaffect the whole pattern of socialrelations in a wide variety of ways. I want hereto only broadly sketch out someimplications forthe overall process of capitalist development.In particular, I want to examine critically someof thosewritings which have seen South Africandevelopment as necessarily bound up with theexpansion of manufacturing.Inthe early 1970s, while the US was finallyclosing the 'gold window' and before anysubstantial increase in the gold pricehadoccurred, the influential Reynders Commissionreported on South Africa's export trade. Throughthe 1960s. themanufacturing industry which wasa substantial net importer, had grown fasterthan the primary industries of agricultureandmining, both substantial net exporters. Thishad produced a 'structural imbalance in theBalance of Payments'. 63The dynamic sector inthe economy, manufacturing industry, was thuslikely to be severely curtailed in its futuregrowth,in the absence of greater export earnings.The solution was seen to lie in the rapid growthof manufactured exports.64The Commission's analysis and conclusionsin this regard were readily accepted by a numberof writers operatingwithin a Marxist framework.Writing in 1978, by which time the price of goldhad already risen very substantially,SimonClarke reiterated the Commision's view: 65If South Africa is not to rely on acontinuing run of unlikely accidentstor'ustain accumulation, it is necessary tosolve the basic problem of the South Africaneconomy: the problem of theuncompetitivenature of South African manufacturingindustry on world markets.'For Clarke, as for the ReyndersCommission,the expansion of manufacturing exports was thecrucial sine qua non of further South Africancapitalistdevelopment. Increases in the priceof gold were, in Clarke's analysis, simplyrelegated to the never-never land of'unlikelyaccident' and given no further consideration, whilethe Reynders Commission reached its conclusionswithreference to a forecast of an increase inthe gold price to $80 per ounce - a forecastconsidered optimistic. 66But theiranalysis of the immanent crucial'barrier' to further capitalist development inSouth Africa was not simply inadequate asaconsequence of a refusal to consider thepossibility of a substantial rise in the priceof gold. Both Clarke and theReynders Commissionpresent an analysis of the manufacturing sectorand its export propensities that is highly

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questionable.Clarke's anslyeis of why the South Africanmanufacturing sectorhad not up to 1978, andrill not in theforseeable future. be able toincrease its export earnings, nests an a .viewof the labour force as Undisciplined':67....the weakness of South Africanmanufacturing was never a technologicalweakness but always hoe been aweaknessin the social relations of production. ThusSouth Africa has been technologicallybackward because capitalhas not installedmodern technology (sict). This is certainlyin part because labour in the past wascheap, Industry wasprotected, and thelabour force was not highly skilled.However modern technology also requires a'disciplined''responsible' work force,and this South Africa did not have.Faced with this, Clarks states that capital andthe SouthAfrican state will be forced to under-take a process of 'resttucturing'. 'Thisrestructuring involves primarily the,intensification of labour and the tightening ofwork discipline in the manufacturingsector'The crisis is therefore one ofproduction,particularly production in the manufacturingsector, which finds its expression an an acutemonetary andbalance of payments crisis, 69In their attempts to resolve this crisis,' capital and the state in South Africa haveto takethe initiative in intensifying theclass struggle, tightening labour controlat the point of production and increasingthereserve army by the creation of a relativesurplus population. At this level there isno possibility of compromise, nobasis anwhich concessions can be made to defusethe.growing political crisis.Each of these suppositions ishighlydubious. By what standards is South Africanindustry technologically backwards? Mostcentrally, what is meantby a 'disciplined'and 'responsible' labour force? Surely,throughout the 1960s and up until at least theDurban strikes of1973, the period that Clarksis concerned with in respect of the developmentof manufacturing, South Africa had,fromcapital's viewpoint, an extremely 'disciplined'and 'responsible' rock force? This can bemeasured in terse of strikeactivity, tradeunite regulation, the functioning of labourallocation mechanism, etc. 70The Reyndera Commission'sanalysis of thebarriers to exporting on the pert of themanufacturing sector stipulated a number offactors - a lack ofexport consciousness, thesoap size of firms, lade of knowledge,activities geared to import replacement and arapidrise in domestic demand: 71...the Commission has concluded that theindustrial philosophy of a fairlysignificantnumber of local businessman is not adjusted/attuned to exporting, and they are notequipped mentally,psychologically orphysically (plant, equipment etc) to enterthis market.When the Commission wade reference tothelabour force, it tended to stress the shortage ofskilled labour, the inadequate training of blacks;statutory barriers to'Black advancement' andthe gap between earnings and productivity.Labour 'indiscipline' or its equivalent didnotfeature in its analysis. 72One very central feature ... .,outh Africanmanufacturing, namely the presence ofextensiveforeign ownership and control, nowhere featuresin Clarke's analysis of the barriers toincreasedmanufacturing exports. This is not at allsurprising. Clarke's analysis of the 'Crisis' inSouth Africa 73concludes an article designedto decay the validity of a so-called 'fractionalistanalysis of South African capitalism', theso-called fractionall.sts having put particularemphasis on the divisions existent betweenforeign and local/nationalcapital in SouthAfrica's historical development. 74 Clarksstrongly denied the validity of this distinction,and substitutedan analysis based on 'capital ingeneral' in which no distinction is sods betweensuch fractions.75The ReynderaCommission, working within aNeo-Classical theoretical framework, -also has noconcept of foreign capital central to itsanalysisof the operations of South African manufacturingindustry. But, at a significant number of pointsin its report, theCommission records empiricallythe Importance of this division.Thus, in respect of the automobile industry,theCommission noted that 76Apart from cost disadvantages, localwerwfacturera/asseablers are all tied tooverseasprincipals who are generallyunwilling to allow the local firms toexport. ?his state of affairs moat beregarded asdisadvantageous .... especiallyas regards exports.In regard to the factors impeding South Africancapital goodsexports to less developed countries,the Commission again noted the importance offoreign ownership end control:77There is also the fact that a notinsignificant proportion of themanufacturing sector is controlled byinternationalconcerns; which naturally(sic) give first priority to internaloperations. The result of this practice isthat South Africansubsidiaries of someinternational concerns do not export at all,although it is also true that others,because of theirinternational character,are exporters of save significance.In respect of firms which utilised importedresearch anddevelopment in the form of franchisesetc, these were frequently accocpanied byrestrictive clauses: 78Marketrestricting clauses ...limited theability of local users to benefit frogeconomies of scale by exporting; this wasparticularlyvalid in those cases where theuser had achieved some success in thedomestic market - the restrictingclauseprecluded him (sic)-from expanding hisoperations and achieving greater success...It was furthermore submittedthat SouthAfrica was at times looked upon as an

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outlet for relatively obsolescent products,techniques and processes which would have inany case have left littleleeway for localusers to compete in the international marketeven if there were no restrictive arrangement.Lastly, it wasstated that where the productwas composed of a number of components, theuser was allowed to manufacture alimitedrange only and then required to import fromthe supplier at high prices certain vitalcomponents which wererelatively easy andlucrative to manufacture.Foreign subsidiaries were often reluctant toexport: 79Witnesses alsoallegOd that the actions ofmany of these subsidiaries were determinedby the interests of the parent companyegshould the local subsidiary wish to exportit might be precluded therefrom by the factthat the parent companyalready had a plantin the territory concerned.And, in respect of foreign subsidiaries overall: soIn regard to subsidiariesof foreign concerns,the Commission was told that only a smallnumber of these participated actively inexports, and thatin these cases only arelatively small percentage were positiveexporters, is exported more than theyimported...Moreover, very few of them whichmanufacture intermediate goods hadinvestigated the exporting of their productstothe parent company ...A large numberappear to be restricted to the localmarket or are restricted to export tocertaincountries only. No statisticalevidence is available to substantiate thesetendencies, but the Commission is satisfiedthaton the whole, they do present a fairlyvalid picture of the situation.In a world in which almost half of all tradeisconducted by MNCs, and with about 40% ofinternational trade by capitalist countriesaccounted for by intro-firm tradeor tradewith related parties, 81 it is clear that theoperations of MNCs play a critical role in theregulation end limitationsconfronting countries'capacities to expand their export earnings. Itwould seem clear that, in the case of SouthAfricanmanufactured exports, and the ReyndersCommission findings support this albeit thatspecific micro studies arelacking, 82 exportersare constrained by a range of technologicalagreements that prohibit/inhibit export, bythe'unwillingness' of subsidiaries to export tomarkets where another subsidiary is already inexistence, and the generalglobel_profitabilityconsiderations of the MNCs which regulate inter-affiliate trade. The other side of the coin isthat thehigh import propensity of themanufacturing sector, just as its low exportpropensity, cannot be seen apart fromextensiveforeign ownership and control which tiesubsidiaries to import from Head Office, or otherrelated subsidiaries,even where such productsare locally available. 83Foreign control -whether exercised viaa majority or minorityownership or via formaof licensing agreements - is particularlyprevalent in the South African manufacturingindustry. Inagriculture foreign participationis very small, while in mining, although foreignfarms are not insignificant, the sector isin thecontemporary period predominantly owned andcontrolled by South African capital. 84 Apart fromdividendpayments, the earnings of the mininghouses are not subject to significant remissionabroad.Backward end forwardlinkages are likely tobe effected with domestic producers and notsubject to transfer pricing. 85 At the level ofresearch,development and technical contracting,the South African mining industry is itselfpioneering much new innovation. TheChamber ofMines is at present directing a major 10-yearprogramme of collaborative research which hasalreadyyielded many significant innovations. 86Technological 'independence' is thus far morepronounced in this sector thanin manufacturingand the subsequent remissions abroad in theform of technology payments will be far lessthan inmanufacturing. 87The expansion of exports from the miningsector, gold mining in particular but notexcluding othermineral products such as coal.in the situation of higher 'energy' prices,is thus not only likely to continue, giventhecontext of the continuing international capitalistcrisis, but is indeed, from the standpoint ofcapital, likely to containconsiderably greater'benefits' than an expansion based on manufacturedproducts. Moreover, in a world inwhichinternational trade amongst capitalist nationsis dominated by the MNCs, it is by no meanscertain (contrary towhat Clerks argues) thatany amount of 'restructuring' performed at anational level can yield a significant expansioninmanufactured exports.Eurocentric models prescribe a single pathto capitalist development - that of industrial-isation.Hut, precisely because suchindustrialisation can today only occur at the'periphery', under the domination of theMNCe,is what is frequently termed 'dependentindustrialisation', 88 the development ofmanufacturing tends toaccentuate rather thanmitigate the Balance of Payments crises thataccompany high rates of growth. 88 As theworld'sprincipal producer of gold and with a miningsector which is domestically owned and controlled,the trajectory ofcapitalist development inSouth Africa is 13kely,to follow a significantlydifferent path. 90David KaplanFOOTNOTES.1.But even in 1929 a few countries, eg Sweden,did not experience major decline in output.2. DECD: 'PerspectivesEconimiques' No. 19,July 1976.

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3. With the exception of the UK, which had itslowest industrial production in the 4thquarter of 1974, all the OECDcountries had their .lowest industrial production within the first3 quarters of 1975.4. United Nations: 'Economic Surveyof Europein 1976', New York. Quoted in Mandel,1978:147.5. For a simple account of the development oftheEurodollar market, see Tow, 1977, chapter 136. 'National nonetary'nanagement has been mademore difficult mainlybecause of the increasedopportunities (and profitability) opened up byEurodollar dealing for arbitrage operations.Inthis way it has increased the internalconstraint on the use of monetary policy as aweapon for internal economicstabilisation...'Strange, 1976:186.7. Murray, 1980:76-77. In 1973, the GermanBundesbank calculated that changes inmethodsof payment by MNCs had been responsible for avery significant movement in the Balance ofPayments.8. Ofcourse, Central Hanks too can and havebeen involved in speculation.9. See in particular Nordhaus, W: 'TheFallingShare of Profit'. Brookings Papers onEconomic Activity No. 1, 1974. For the UK seeGlyn and Sutcliffe, 197 2,and The Economist,September 6, 1975. For references to studiesinter alia on Vest Germany, Italy and France,seeMandel, 1978:24-26.10. See Business Week for Quarterly tables onthe profitability of US corporations.11. In Marx'sanalysis the rate of profit ris given by the following formula:r = s/c+v.Dividing through by v,r = s /vc /v + 1. 'le the rateof profit varies proportionatelywith the rate of.exploitation and inversely withthe organic composition of capital.12. Theincrease in oil prices was not theprincipal cause of the onset of capitalistcrisis in the developed countries. Itdidcontribute to it, but the falling rate ofprofit, the root cause of the recession, wasalready evident well before 1973.Withsubstantial investments in energy projectswhich are only viable at a high price forenergy, many advancedcapitalist countries,and particularly the important 'energy',companies within them, are not likely to ,welcome a fall in oilprices.13. Mandel, 1978:88.14. Eg in the US real wages for workers tendedto fall.15. Eg the WT Grant company in theUS or theKoh,jin company in Japers.16. Also with the banks according credit veryliberally to their largercustomers.Castello 1980:116.17. Governmental support for 'lame ducks' resultsnot pre-eminently from 'politicalfactors',but from the fact that their survival is often asine qua 'non of maintaining an integrated nationaleconomy. Theloss of British Leyland, forexample, would have manifold effects upon allof British capital, increasing Britain's degreeofintegration into the world economy.18. Mandel, 1978:94.19. The power of organised labour !s ofteninvoked as afurther, if not principalfactor, causing inflation. With wage increaseslagging well behind price increases forseveralyears now in many of the advanced capitalistcountries, this explanation is hardly adequate.Demands for wageincreases are often defensive -a reaction to, rather than a cause of pricerises. However, the power of organisedlabourhas acted as a break on capital's power toreduce the level of real wages and so raise therate of profit via costcutting. Castello putsit this ray: 'Because markets are controlledlargely by monopoly capital, corporations areable toimpose the prices they want. Theincreasing cost of living triggers workers',demands for more wages at the level ofproduction.The rages obtained through struggle and bargain-ing will be added by monopoly capital to thepricescharged for commodities. This does notmean that workers' depends are the cause ofinflation, as capitalistpropaganda argues.What it does mean is that one of the causes ofinflation is that corporations find itincreasinglydifficult to raise their-profitsthrough direct exploitation and therefore raiseprices for the whole 'society in ordertopreserve their privileges'. Castello. 1980:64.20. ibid:62.22. In the 1974-75 recession, prices of rawmaterials tendedto decline and somoderated inflation.23. See Strange, 1976:186.24. 'The major factor causing the exceptionalrise ingold price has been the world demandfor_gold as a hedge against economic uncertaintyand, in particular, currencyweakness, with theprice of gold accelerating in terms of all major.currencies'. Chamber of Mines, PresidentialAddress,1979. At the same time, industrialdemand for gold has been price inelastic.25. Strange, 1976:67.26. ibid:69.27. Totalofficial dollar balances were $3-bin 1949, 010-b in 1960, and $51-b in 1971.28. This point was made as early as 1963,by theso-called Fairleigh-Dickinson study -Fatemi, NS, T de Saint Phalle and GM Keefe:The Dollar Crisis.Fairleigh-DickinsonUniversity Press, 1963. ,29. For an analysis of US monetary policy whichclearly examines this asan aspect of USimperialism, see Block, 1978.30. Economists associated with this strategy .include Kindelberger,Krause and Salant.31. This absorption is not 'complete' sincemuch of the dollars were required tofinance expansion inworld trade.32. There are some signs that this 'monetaryhegemony' may eventually be challenged by aEuropeancurrency, the European Monetary Unit.See Fitt, Fair and Vigier, 1980:poetscript topart 2.33. The distinction betweennational andinternational is not clear cut.34. Between 1884 Then significant gold productionin South Africa began until1932, with theexception of the years 1919-24 when gold earneda fluctuating premium, the money price of goldvasfixed. '35. One manifestation of this has been the massiverise of loans to the LDCs.

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36. Especially in respect of changing interestrates, which affect the opportunity cost ofholding gold in the form ofinterest paymentsforegone.37. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,September 1980:6.38. For the sameperiod, the US decline was 7,3%,the UK 6,4% and West Germany 1,5%. BarclaysBank: Business Brief. September1980:7.39. ibid:2.40. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis:'The Gold Price Bonanza', No. 25, March 1980.41.Chamber of Mines. Annual Report, 1978:8.42. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2,March 25,1980:4.43.Chamber of Mines: Newsletter. Vol 3, no 6,September 22, 1980:3.44. Bureau for Economic Policy andAnalysis(BEPA), op cit.45. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7,page 1.46. BEPA op cit.47. Chamber of Mines.Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7,page 5.48. Chamber of Mines. March Report, 1979:1.49. Standard,Henk Reviei, September,1980;4.50. BEPA op cit.51. SARH, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1980:table 9.1.52. 'The sustained current accountsurplus .during a period of cyclical upswing did notconform to the historical cyclical pattern,according to whichsurpluses emerge during theadvanced stages of cyclical downturns and disappearrelatively early during thesubsequent upswings...The progressively larger surpluses up to thefirst quarter of 1980 were predominantly theresultof an'exceptionally strong rise in theprice of gold'. South African Reserve Hank:Annual Economic Report, 1980:19.53.'When gold is excluded, the balance oncurrent account has deteriorated significantlysince early 1979'. Standard Hank:Review.September 1980:2.54. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2,page 4.55. ibid. Vol 3, no 6, page 3.56.South African Reserve Hank. QuarterlyBulletin. September 1980: table 5.32.57. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3,no 7,page 1.58. ibid.59. For which the decisive precondition was thedefeat of the corking class in thepoet-carperiod.60. Standard Bank Review, September 1980:4.61. Stets, September 1980:141. Figures derivedfromSEIFSA: Survey of Now Capital Investmentin the Metal and Engineering Industries in 1979and Protections for1980.62. ?he Chamber nor estimates that gold productionrill be steady at approx. 700 tone per annumuntil 1987. Itwill then decline to 350 tone bythe end of the century. But this is based ongold prices which are fairlyconservative.Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 1,1980:2.63. Reyndera Commission (RC): 15.64. '...even amaximum exploitation of SouthAfrica's mineral wealth will not adequatelyprovide in (sic) the foreign exchange needsofthe country, so that the extent of manufacturedgoods will have to be increased as rapidly aspossible'. RC:19.65.Clarks, S. Capital, Fractions of Capital andthe State: Neo-Marxist Analysis of the SouthAfrican State. Capital andClass, Summer 1978:69. (SC). In the accompanying footnote, Clarksquotes Reyndera with unreserved appruval.66.eg see RC:246.67. SC:70.68. ibid.69. ibid:71.70. Further points could be made about Clarke'spolitical conclusions anda reductionism 1nrespect of the class struggle.71. RC:273.72. ibid.73. ibid.74. eg see Davies. R, Kaplan, D, O'Meara.Dand Morris, M: Class Struggle and thePeriodiantion of the State in South Africa.RAPE no 7, 1977.75. Absence ofthis distinction, I believe,leads Clarks to ultimately ignore imperialismaltogether - both hi6torically.and inthecontemporary period.76. RC: 232.77. RC: 219.78. RC:610.79. RC:611.80. RC:609. is it affects not only thepropensityto export, but also raises their propensityto import.81. Murray, 1980:chapter 2.82. ibid. A related party isone in which a firehas anything above 5% shareholding.83. Thus, the 'foreign connection' is just asvital in theexplanation of the high importpropensity of the manufacturing sector (somethingthat Clarks, and to a lesser extent theReynderaCommission simply accept as.intrinaic) as anexplanation of its for export propensity.84. Particularly with therise of Anglo-American~to dominance.85. For reference to low import propensitysee footnote 47.86. eg see Chamberof Mines: Annual Report, 1979:13.87. See RC here, chapter 14.88, eg N Poulantzas.89. As has moat clearlyhappened in the caseof Brazil.90. But 'development' should be understood not

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as-development for all, but as capitalistdevelopment. For example, even with the currentupswing. employment isgrwing at less than halfof the rate of population increase. Sanlam_Sconoaic Survey, quoted in the FinancialMail,31.10.80:505.BIBLIOGRAPHY.(These references are to works not cited infull in the footnotes).Bloc, FL - TheOrigins of the InternationalDisorder: a study of US internationalmonetary policy from WW II to thepresent (Universityof CaliforniaPress).'Ca stells, M - The Economic Crisis and American1980 Society (Princeton University Press).Fitt, Y,A Fair and J-P Vigier - The World1980 Economic Crisis: US imperialism atby (Zed Press).Glyn. A and B Sutcliffe-British Capitalise,1972 Yorkers and the Profit SqueezePenguin).Mandel, E - The Second Slump (NLB).1978Murray,R - Transfer Pricing, Multinationals and1980 the State (unpublished manuscript,publication forthcoming).Report of theCommission of Inquiry into theExport Trade of the Republic of SouthAfrica (2 vols, RP 69/72; theReyndersCommission).Strange. S - International Monetary Relations1976 (in a series, Shonfield, A (ed) -InternationalEconomic Relations ofthe Western World, 1955-71)1977Ter, H - The Evolution of the International1977 MonetarySystem (Hutchinson).

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THE CURRENT 'UPSWING' IN THE SOUTH AFRICANECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONALCAPITALISTCRISIS: A REINTERPRETATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN'DEVELOPMENT'1. INTRODUCTION.THISPAPER attempts to situate the currenteconomic 'upswing' in the South African economyin the context of the ongoingeconomic crisiswhich is plaguing the international capitalisteconomy. I will argue that the two phenomenon'areintegrally linked. The principal featuresof the international capitalist crisis and, evenmore centrally, the measureshitherto taken toresolve this crisis, are the principalfactors contributing to the present 'upswing'in the South Africaneconomy.The first section of this paper outlinesthe major features of the internationalcapitalist crisis and the measurestaken tocounteract it. The second section examinessome aspects of the current 'uawing' in theSouth Africaneconomy. In the final section,in the form of a critique of soave writings onthe subject. some implications of thefuturetrajectory of capitalist development in SouthAfrica are drawn.Clearly, there are highly complex issuesinvolved,and a short article can only hope toprovide same fruitful points for departure.2. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THECONTEMPORARYINTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS.I WOULD suggest that the following are thecentralspecific features of the current crisis:a) This is indeed an international andcapitalist crisis. The downswings and (toalesser extent) the upswings in the economiesof all the advanced capitalist countries areclosely synchronised.b) Therecession of 1974-75 was preceded byalong period in which the rate of profitwas tending to fall in the advancedcapitalistcountries. In the post-recession period,rates of profit were increased somewhat,but not dramatically.c) Theupswing following the severe recessionof 1974-75 has been weak, hesitant and ofshort duration.d) Inflationarypressures are internationaland endemic. They are only somewhat moderatedwhen recession deepens.e) The crisis isassociated with a changingconfiguration of imperialist forces. This isoften summarised as 'a decline in thehegemonyof the United States'.These features are all closely inter-related. However, for ease of exposition, Iwill dealwith each in turn.a) Capitalism is an international system andsevere recessions - 1929 for example -havealways beenexperienced simultaneously invirtually all capitalist countries. l In themore minor recessions however, contractionsinone country were frequently offset by expansionin other countries. The expansion of exportsserved to limit therecession in the former.But the 1974-75 recession was felt everywherein the,,capitalist world, if not in thesamemagnitude. Of the OECD countries, the declinein industrial production iron peak to troughwas greatest inSwitzerland and Japan (about20%) and least in Sweden (49i), Canada (7%) andSpain (10 %).Z However, the degreeofsynchronisation was very marked. 3The capitalist character of the crisisis revealed moat starkly by the fact thatnoneof the principal planned economies suffered adecline,in industrial production in 1974-76.While their rate ofgrowth certainly declined,it was still distinctly positive. 4 Theuniversality and synchronisation of therecession amongstthe developed capitalistcountries is a testimony to the growinginternationalisation of the capitalist system.Thisinternationalisation has acquired a wholenew dimension with the spectacular rise of theMultinational Corporations(MNCs), particularlypost-1960, and the contemporaneous developmentof the international capital and money markets-notably the Eurodollar market. 5 One majorconsequence of these developments, significantfor the analysis here, isthat national monetarypolicies are likely to be rendered far lesseffective. s The Eurodollar market allows forthe rapidand unregulated switching ofcurrencies, while national credit controlscan be circumvented by companiesborrowingabroad. Similarly, MNCa are able, usinginternal accounting changes, to transfermoneys into anticipatedstrong currencies.?At the same time, and for the same reasons,as nationally based monetary regulation hasbecomeincreasingly ineffective, thepossibilities for private 'speculation'in currencies has much increased. 8b) Themeasurement of profit rates is difficultand there is no universal agreement of profittrends. However, moat studies ofthe rate ofprofit have revealed a general tendency for therate of profit to fall from circa the early1950s. This isparticularly true for therate of profit in the principal capitalistcountry - the United States. 9The 'recovery' of the rate ofprofit inthe 1974-75 recession and the subsequent periodwas real, but by no means restored profitrates to their poetWorld War Two peaks.Again, this is particularly true of the

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36. Especially in respect of changing interestrates, which affect the opportunity cost ofholding gold in the form ofinterest paymentsforegone.37. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin,September 1980:6.38. For the sameperiod, the US decline was 7,3%,the UK 6,4% and West Germany 1,5%. BarclaysBank: Business Brief. September1980:7.39. ibid:2.40. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis:'The Gold Price Bonanza', No. 25, March 1980.41.Chamber of Mines. Annual Report, 1978:8.42. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2,March 25,1980:4.43.Chamber of Mines: Newsletter. Vol 3, no 6,September 22, 1980:3.44. Bureau for Economic Policy andAnalysis(BEPA), op cit.45. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7,page 1.46. BEPA op cit.47. Chamber of Mines.Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7,page 5.48. Chamber of Mines. March Report, 1979:1.49. Standard,Henk Reviei, September,1980;4.50. BEPA op cit.51. SARH, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1980:table 9.1.52. 'The sustained current accountsurplus .during a period of cyclical upswing did notconform to the historical cyclical pattern,according to whichsurpluses emerge during theadvanced stages of cyclical downturns and disappearrelatively early during thesubsequent upswings...The progressively larger surpluses up to thefirst quarter of 1980 were predominantly theresultof an'exceptionally strong rise in theprice of gold'. South African Reserve Hank:Annual Economic Report, 1980:19.53.'When gold is excluded, the balance oncurrent account has deteriorated significantlysince early 1979'. Standard Hank:Review.September 1980:2.54. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2,page 4.55. ibid. Vol 3, no 6, page 3.56.South African Reserve Hank. QuarterlyBulletin. September 1980: table 5.32.57. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3,no 7,page 1.58. ibid.59. For which the decisive precondition was thedefeat of the corking class in thepoet-carperiod.60. Standard Bank Review, September 1980:4.61. Stets, September 1980:141. Figures derivedfromSEIFSA: Survey of Now Capital Investmentin the Metal and Engineering Industries in 1979and Protections for1980.62. ?he Chamber nor estimates that gold productionrill be steady at approx. 700 tone per annumuntil 1987. Itwill then decline to 350 tone bythe end of the century. But this is based ongold prices which are fairlyconservative.Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 1,1980:2.63. Reyndera Commission (RC): 15.64. '...even amaximum exploitation of SouthAfrica's mineral wealth will not adequatelyprovide in (sic) the foreign exchange needsofthe country, so that the extent of manufacturedgoods will have to be increased as rapidly aspossible'. RC:19.65.Clarks, S. Capital, Fractions of Capital andthe State: Neo-Marxist Analysis of the SouthAfrican State. Capital andClass, Summer 1978:69. (SC). In the accompanying footnote, Clarksquotes Reyndera with unreserved appruval.66.eg see RC:246.67. SC:70.68. ibid.69. ibid:71.70. Further points could be made about Clarke'spolitical conclusions anda reductionism 1nrespect of the class struggle.71. RC:273.72. ibid.73. ibid.74. eg see Davies. R, Kaplan, D, O'Meara.Dand Morris, M: Class Struggle and thePeriodiantion of the State in South Africa.RAPE no 7, 1977.75. Absence ofthis distinction, I believe,leads Clarks to ultimately ignore imperialismaltogether - both hi6torically.and inthecontemporary period.76. RC: 232.77. RC: 219.78. RC:610.79. RC:611.80. RC:609. is it affects not only thepropensityto export, but also raises their propensityto import.81. Murray, 1980:chapter 2.82. ibid. A related party isone in which a firehas anything above 5% shareholding.83. Thus, the 'foreign connection' is just asvital in theexplanation of the high importpropensity of the manufacturing sector (somethingthat Clarks, and to a lesser extent theReynderaCommission simply accept as.intrinaic) as anexplanation of its for export propensity.84. Particularly with therise of Anglo-American~to dominance.85. For reference to low import propensitysee footnote 47.86. eg see Chamberof Mines: Annual Report, 1979:13.87. See RC here, chapter 14.88, eg N Poulantzas.89. As has moat clearlyhappened in the caseof Brazil.90. But 'development' should be understood not

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as-development for all, but as capitalistdevelopment. For example, even with the currentupswing. employment isgrwing at less than halfof the rate of population increase. Sanlam_Sconoaic Survey, quoted in the FinancialMail,31.10.80:505.BIBLIOGRAPHY.(These references are to works not cited infull in the footnotes).Bloc, FL - TheOrigins of the InternationalDisorder: a study of US internationalmonetary policy from WW II to thepresent (Universityof CaliforniaPress).'Ca stells, M - The Economic Crisis and American1980 Society (Princeton University Press).Fitt, Y,A Fair and J-P Vigier - The World1980 Economic Crisis: US imperialism atby (Zed Press).Glyn. A and B Sutcliffe-British Capitalise,1972 Yorkers and the Profit SqueezePenguin).Mandel, E - The Second Slump (NLB).1978Murray,R - Transfer Pricing, Multinationals and1980 the State (unpublished manuscript,publication forthcoming).Report of theCommission of Inquiry into theExport Trade of the Republic of SouthAfrica (2 vols, RP 69/72; theReyndersCommission).Strange. S - International Monetary Relations1976 (in a series, Shonfield, A (ed) -InternationalEconomic Relations ofthe Western World, 1955-71)1977Ter, H - The Evolution of the International1977 MonetarySystem (Hutchinson).

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United States. 10The explanation for the movement in therate of profit, which is indeed the capitalistcrisis, cannot beattempted here. But itdoes seem to provide a striking verificationof the Marxian thesis of a tendency for therate ofprofit to fall in capitalism. Thistendency occurs, in .terms of Marx's analysis,as a consequence of a rising organiccompositionof capital unless offset by an equal increasein the rate of surplus value. 11 Economiccrises can functionso as to restore the rateof profit in three primary ways. First, bythe 'devalorisation' or indeed open destructionof capital- bankruptcies, plant closings, etc.Second, through raising the rate of surplusvalue - growing unemployment allowingfor alimiting of wage increases, reduction in strikeactivity, etc. Third, through a reduction inthe prices of raw materials,purchased mainlyfrom the Third World.All three occurred as a consequence ofthe 1974-75 recession, but to alimitedextent. A number of raw material pricedecreases were recorded, but 'energy-related'commodities rosesubstantially in price. 12Unemployment expanded significantly, and evenin the 'recovery' period stood athistoricallyhigh levels in the OECD countries. 13 This didallow for a tightening of labour disciplineand real wagedeductions in a number of cases 14- but labour organisation was such as to ensurethat this was not of a sufficientmagnitude torestore the rate of profit to its formerlevels.The key issue is that of capitaldevalorisation - and here liesthe explanationfor the post 1974-75 period. The devalorisationof capital was distinctly limited. There werea fewlarge-scale bankruptcies. 15 but theeffects were largely limited to the smallercapitals. The 'corporate structure',monopolycapital of the large trusts, was littleaffected.The underlying reason for the limitedeffect of the recession interms of capitaldevalorisation must rest with governmentalcounter-cyclical economic policies. 16 Variousforma ofmonetary 'pump-priming' and deficitfinancing served to ensure that the level ofoutput for the economy as a whole didnotfall too catastrophically, while the harder hitmonopoly corporations were, in addition,accorded forma of directsubsidy. 17 Thesesubsidies allowed then to continue inproduction.With the capital stock largely intact,excesscapacity, which had characterisedproduction prior to the 1974-75 recession, .continued in the 'recovery'. 18 Thesubsidisedsurvival of Chrysler and many of the Europeancar firms, for example, meant that the moatefficientcorporations were unable to operateat full capacity. The continuance of excesscapacity therefore limited the extent towhichthe rate of profit rose in the 'recovery'period.c) The limited recovery of the rate of profitin the post-recessionperiod was the principalfactor underlying the weakness of the .international capitalist economy.As was outlined above,this limitedrecovery in the rate of profit is to belocated in limited reductions in primarycommodity prices, limitedincreases in therate of surplus value and, in particular, in aseverely 'retarded' devalorieation of capital.The net effectwas to ensure that reinvestmentin productive activities was severely curtailed.This further encouraged investments ofa morespeculative character.d) Inflation is a complex phenomenon, and noattempt is made to provide an explanationhere.But it does seem that .inflation, which onceagain is a phenomenon of internationalcapitalism, is linked to twoprincipal factors.First, the economic dominance of monopolycorporations, end second, to expansionistmonetarypolicies pursued by capitalistgovernments. 19Firstly, the absence of competition hasallowed the larger firmsconsiderable leewayto utilise their power to unilaterally raiseprices without fear of retaliation. 20 Thus,even in arecession, larger corporations willtend to reduce their output, but increase theirmark-up in order to maintainprofitabilitylevels. 21 A recession will moderate priceincreases, principally via the effect of adeclining demand on thecompetitive sector andreductions in the prices of raw materials asdemand falls. 22 Generally, only when therecessionreally deepens, and the largercorporations collectively have massive excesscapacity, will this tend to provokemajorprice reductions in the monopoly sector.Secondly, the expansionist monetary andfiscal policies of the advancedcapitalistcountries have led to a massive expansion ofthe money supply - both nationally andinternationally - and thisis particularly trueof the United States post 1958 (see below).There is indeed a relation between the expansionof themoney supply and the persistence ofinflation. The development of international'monetary and capital.marketa haveprovided anadditional impetus, particularly by allowingavenues for the circumvention of tight moneypolicies. 23 Tiremassive budget deficits ofthe advanced capitalist countries in 1975-76

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were the real reason for the subsequent'recovery'. But they added further impetus toinflation.Apart from the state'sgeneral monetarypump--priming, in order to maintain the levelof total demand, the other principalmechanismsdesigned to limit the recession by reinstatingthe rate of profit are also clearly inflationary.Directsubsidisation of inefficient firms, taxreductions on coed profits, assuming moreof the costs of private capital eg bysubsidisingor taking over scientific research. and variousunproductive state expenditures which allow anoutlet forcapitalist production eg defence,all contribute to inflation. The persistenceof a condition of stagflation (if notslump-flation) - the coexistence of stagnant productionand rising prices - reflects the contradictorycharacter ofcapitalism in its monopoly phase,viz a tendency for the rate of profit to fallwhich produces stagnation, and anopposing set ofcounter-tendencies, primarily initiated by thestate, which produce inflation.These are structural, andhence endemicfeatures of advanced capitalism. If inflationpersists in the advanced capitalist countries -the continuingdevalutaion of paper currencies -this will clearly have major long-ternrepercussions for South Africa, theworld'sprincipal producer of gold. 24e) But the value of the key official currency,the international currency, the USdollar, isof particular importance. The declining valueof the dollar is-one reflection of the limitationsof US imperialisthegemony.The agreement reached at Bretton Woods in1944 had as its bedrock the convertibility ofthe US dollar intogold at the fixed price of$35 per ounce. This price had in fact been setas early as 1934 when the RooseveltAdministration,in the context of the US holding massive goldstocks, had raised the price of gold. It hadarbitrarilystopped at $35 per ounce. 25The strict convertibility of the dollarinto gold depended on two basic factors.First,maintaining a continuing supply of newly-ained gold, which could be purchased at that fixedprice, ie a regulation of thegold marketsuch that newly-mined gold would be offered tothe Central Hanks at $35 per ounce. Second, andcloselyinterrelated, that the supply of dollarswas restricted. 'the latter was the crucialcondition - an over-supply of dollarswould leadto a swapping of dollars for gold and a drainupon the US gold reserves.The US, in particular, sought tocontrol themarket for newly-mined gold by attempting toenforce sale through the Central Banks or theIMF at the fixedprice of $35 an ounce - apolicy which was strongly opposed by SouthAfrica. 26Hut the crucial factor whichfinallydestroyed the Bretton Woods Agreement was thepersistence of massive US Balance of Paymentsdeficits.Whereas in the first decade or soafter the War there was a severe dollar shortageinternationally, this gave way to everlargerdollar surpluses. 27 The key turn-around datewas 1958. In that year, US gold reserves fellbelow the level of itsofficial liabilitiesdenominated in dollars. At the same time theUS Balance of Payments produced a very largedeficit.From this date, large outflows ofgold from the US continued unabated, asdollar holders sought to exercise their righttoacquire gold.The US responded by progressively andunilaterally cutting the links between thedollar and gold. Thisoccurred in three majorsteps. In 1961 the 'Gold Pool' was createdwhereby several European countries madeacommitment to sell sane of their gold stocksin order to maintain the dollar price for gold.In 1968 the US ended itscommitments to privateholders of dollars who now could no longeracquire gold for their dollars. In 1971 the'goldwindow' was closed to official purchasersas well.In very broad terms, both the persistenceof the US Balance ofPayments deficit, and themeasures taken as a consequence by the US tocut links between the dollar and gold, are tobeunderstood in the context of US imperialisthegemony. At the same time, it points to someof the limitations iq`,^^entin this hegemonicposition.The Balance of Payments deficit must beunderstood, in part, as a consequence ofUSmilitary expenditures. Such expenditures,particularly during the Vietnam War, led to amassive drain of dollarsabroad directly, whileindirectly funnelling much of the R and D,skilled personnel etc away from the productionofmarketed commodities. 28 US 'aid', specialtrade relations with 'strategic' countries likeSouth Korea and Taiwan, andother factors linkedto the US imperialist presence made furthercontributions to the deficit. The challengesto UShegemony - the direct resistance of Cubaand Vietnam for example, and the challenges posedby its economic rivals,the other developedcountries, were severe threats to that hegemonicposition and inter alia contributedverysignificantly to the deficit.Hut the US response reveals that, whilechallenged and circumscribed, itshegemonicposition within the international capitalistsystem has, in essence, been maintained. 29Instead of abiding bythe rules of BrettonWoods and exercising expenditure reductions in

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order to limit its payments deficits, so stemmingthe outflow of dollars - a policy which wouldhave entailed economicrestraint at home and/orcurtailment of US 'activities' abroad - the UShas essentially adopted what became known as'apassive strategy' for the Balance of Payments.In essence, this strategy - given elaboratetheoretical justification by theeconomic'establishment' 30 - was that the US shouldcontinue to run its economy at an 'optimal'level. The resultantoutflow of dollarsabroad would have to be 'absorbed' by othercountries. The 'pressure' on other countries,notably theadvanced capitaiist country rivalsof the US, arises in two rays. First, they wouldbe forced to buy dollars in order tomaintainthe value of the dollar because the dollarrepresented much of the backing for their owncurrencies. Second,an effective devaluationof the dollar or revaluation of their owncurrency would severely jeopardise their tradingpositionvie-a-vie the US. Finally, a severemonetary crisis, brought on by a major declineof the dollar, would jeopardise thewholeinternational economy.The economic rivals of the US have thusbeen forced to accept a situation whereby theUSrune persistent deficits, and to absorb theresultant dollar surpluses. 31 But the fact thatthe major capitalist countryoperates outsidethe monetary rules, in order to ensure itscontinued hegemony, 32 has injected a tremendousnote ofuncertainty into monetary relations andthe stability of the system. There clearly arelimitations to the process of dollarabsorptionand the spectre of a monetary collapse isconsequently a real one. In addition theoutflow of dollars hasadded tremendously tointernational liquidity, and is the principalfactor in the rapid growth of the Eurodollarmarket. Toreiterate, these developments havewade a significant contribution to fuellinginternational inflation. Monetaryinflation,end the threat of a monetary collapse, are theprincipal factors. encouraging 'alternative' formsof wealthholding.The major conclusions to be drawn from theabove analysis are awrmariaed here:Inflation, the devaluation ofmonetaryassets. is a persistent and a structuralfeature of advanced capitalism. It has its rootsin the very structures ofcapitalism. Firstly,as a consequence of monopoly control of markets;secondly, as h result of_governwentalpoliciesdesigned to ensure the maintenance of demand;thirdly, at en international level, as theconsequence of amassive increase ininternational liquidity which must be groundedin an analysis of US imperialist hegemony. 33At the'national level', it represents theoutcome of forces, principally directed by thestate, designed to counteract thetendency ofprofit rates to tall. At the 'internationallevel', it reflects the persistence of, butat the same ties growingthreat to, USimperialist hegemony.One consequence of the latter feature hasbeen the instability and devaluation ofthedollar - the international reserve currency.There la an analogy here with the situation ofthe early 1930s. In 1931 thedevaluation ofthe key reserve currency, the pound sterling,led to the first substantial price increase forgold. 34 WhileBritish hegemony in the imperialistsystem was uncontested, a strong currency couldensure a fixed relation between itand gold.Devaluation of the pound sterling reflected thedecline in British imperialist hegemony. WithAmericanimperialist hegemony undisputed and thedollar strong, a similar period of a fixed pricefor gold could be maintained.The challengesto US imperialist hegemony in the contemporaryperiod have once again lifted the ceiling on.gold.At thesave time as monetary assets havebeen subject to devaluation, the rate of profitin direct productive investment hasbeen for anddeclining. This decline was only partiallyreversed by the major recession on 1974-75,end the fact that thereversal vas only partialwas due primarily to the limited valorisation ofcapital. As a consequence, capital issearchingdesperately for profitable avenues for 'investment'in order to ensure an adequate return.Since neitherproductive investment, normonetary assets yield adequate returns, thesearch has been directed elsewhere. 35 Awiderange of possibilities exist - property, antiques,certain raw materials, etc, end even worecrucially, gold andsilver.The US has nor cut all effective linksbetween the dollar end a fixed quantity of gold.The controlled market forgold gave ray to atwo-tier market, and now effectively a free-market for gold. The price of gold is not norsubject to anymajor manipulation designed tolimit its exchange price. Thus, so long asthese features of advanced,capitaliam whichIhave analysed as structural, persist, theinternational exchange price for gold, itsoverall purchasing power in terms ofnationalcurrencies will tend to remain strong. Whilelarge fluctuations are indeed very likely,since this is nor aspeculative market andsubject to many determinations, 36 theunderlying trend for the gold price is likelyto remainstrong.That this increase in the price of gold isnot likely to be a passing phenomenon, since itis linked to structuralfeatures of contemporary

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p 5capitalism, has major implications for thetrajectory of future capitalist development inSouth Africa.3. PRINCIPALFEATURES OF THE CURRENT UPSWINGIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY.THE FIRST fruits of the increasein the price ofgold are to be seen in the current upswing inthe South African economy.Two features of the upswingstand out.Firstly, the high rate of economic growth, whichhas accelerated lately. Real GDP rose by3,75% in 1979, andin the first half of 1980real GDP was 8,5% higher than the correspondingperiod of 1979.37 Industrial production inJune1980 was fully 13% higher than a year earlier.This is in marked contrast with the steepdeclines for the sameperiod registered for mostof the developed capitalist countries. 38 The .second outstanding feature of the upswing isitsduration. Three years of uninterrupted expansionmade it one of the lengthiest upswings of thepost-World War IIperiod - exceeded only by theupswing lasting from September 1961 to April 1965.There are some signs of the rate ofgrowthmoderating in the short term. Capacity utilisationin. manufacturing is at high levels,39 skilledlabour is inever-shorter supply, exportindustries are likely to perform poorly as a resultof the weak economic position of theadvancedcapitalist countries and finally, interestrates are likely to rise. However, at presentthere is little danger of amajor economicdownturn.The key impetus to the upswing and thereason for its long duration and likelycontinuance is,of course, provided by the highergold price. It is worth charting, albeitbriefly, the principal ways in which the goldpricehas acted as a stimulus to the economy.First, it has added substantially togovernment revenue. In 1971 governmentrevenuefrom gold mining (tax and share of profits) wasabout 8120-m.40 By 1975 this had risen toR745-m, but itdeclined to R320-m in 1977.In 1978 the state's share rose dramaticallyto 8937,3-m.41 In 1979 state revenue rose82%to R1 703-n (state assistance to marginalminds declined 70% to a mere R8-m),42 and inthe first 6 months of1980 the amount paid wasR2 006-m - an increase of 222,5% over the sameperiod in 1979.43This has allowed foreasier taxationpolicies in .regard to the rest of the economy,and provides much leeway for future tax concessionsinthe event of an economic downturn.Second, as a direct contribution to GDP,gold's share rose from 5,7% in 1970, to8,7% in1978 and 9,7% in 1979.44 Further increases areanticipated for 1980. Total mineral earningsrose from R1563-m in 1970, to an estimatedR14 000-m to R15 000-m in 1980.45Third, the indirect contribution gold mininghasmade to the rest of the economy by providinga source of final demand. 46 The multiplier issaid to be large, and thedomestic value addedcomponent of gold mining production is as highas 93,7% - with the import leakage thus verylow.47 The domestic value added is likely tohave risen as the mines employ a higher proportionof local labour and asmore intermediate andcapital goods are produced locally. There isalso some indication that foreign shareholdinghasdeclined marginally. 48Finally, and most critically, the increasedprice of gold has had a profound effect on theBalanceoi' Payments. Soutn Airlca-n tradesurplus was approximately R3 786-m in thefirst 7 months of 1980 - or 26% higherthan inthe same period in 1979.....this year's surplus (1980) is entirelyattributable to buoyant gold export earnings'.49The gold price has more than kept up withinternational inflation and comparing gold andoil prices over a 10 yearperiod,from 1970,gold has increased more. 50 The terms of tradeincluding gold stand at 138 - as compared to .1 000for 1972.51 Moreover, the market value ofSouth Africa's official gold stocks alsoincreased substantially..In the past,economic upswings have beenlimited in their duration and extent byemerging 'foreign exchange bottlenecks'. Astheeconomy has expanded so has the propensityto import, while to a lesser extent exports haveincreasingly beendiverted to the home market.Abstracting from gold, this phenomenon is alreadyvery evident. 52 The non-gold currentaccountis significantly adverse, and has been since thebeginning of 1979.53 But the high price for goldhas produceda substantial surplus, and officialcalculations show that a gold price of $570 perounce will be sufficient to sustain agrowthrate of 5,5%.But the higher gold price has even moresignificant implications which go beyond itsimmediateimpact. The medium to long termimplications for capitalist development inSouth Africa are equally profound.Thehigher gold price has occasioned verysignificant gold mining reinvestment. Thecapital expenditure of the gold minesrosefrom R448,31n in 1978 to R689-m in 1979 -an increase of 53,7%.54 In the first 6 monthsof 1980 capitalexpenditure has been estimatedas increasing by a further 21%.55 While thesurge in gold mining investment has beenmostdramatic., increased investment is also verysignificant in other mining - particularly coal.Capital expenditure bythe mining industry as a

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whole rose from R693-m in 1978 to R1 013-m in 1979,56and according to the President of the Chamber ofMM.57ines could top R3 OOO-m in 1981. The valueof new mining ventures already announced andscheduled tocommence production on or before1985, is well in excess of R6 000-m atcurrent prices. 58The effects of this massivecapitalexpenditure will be felt after a number of years.It will provide impetus to accelerated growththroughout theeconomy and ameliorate any downturnthat might occur. The boom in South Africa post-:962 was the outcome of boththe crushing ofpopular resistance and the removal of anyimmediate political threat, but also the increasein mininginvestment which occurred during themid-1950x.59 There is a significant laggedrelationship between increases inmining andnon-mining investment.Increased capital investment has been farmore significant in gold mining thaninmanufacturing. For the year ended June 1979,gross domestic fixed investment in gold miningrose 23%, and for theyear ended June 1980, itrose 39% - a massive increase caning on top of amajor increase the year before. Inmanufacturing,gross domestic fixed investment declined by9% in the year ending June 1979. By June 1980,it hadincreased by 27% - but this is lesssignificant: given the declines in 1976 and 1977.60One of the features of thepresent upswing wasthe initial slow rate. of growth of fixedinvestment in manufacturing. While this rateof increase haspicked up very markedly recently,this has been after years of decline, and forthe metal and engineeering industries,forexample, projected capital investment for 1980is still below the figures for 1974-76.61Whatever the final outcome ofthe differentsectoral investments, it seems clear that mining,and gold mining in particular, has an increasingrelativerole to play in the future - both interms of contribution to GDP, and even moreespecially as an earner of foreignexchange.This broad conclusion is further underlinedby the increasing concentration of gold mining onthe lower gradeores. Grams per ton milleddeclined steadily from 13,28 in 1970, to 10,03in 1974, 8,19 in 1979 and 7,45 grams inthefirst 6 months of 1980. This has had the effectof firstly very substantially increasingtotal mineable reserves, andsecondly ofsubstantially extending the working lives ofthe existent gold mines. As a consequence, allpreviouspredictions about future output andthe exhaustion of gold deposits have had to besubstantially revised. 62 Theperrenial predictionof the coming exhaustion of the gold miningindustry, so often made in the past and uponwhichmuch of South Africa's economic policieshave historically been partially based, againproves to be a mere chimera.4.CONCLUSION.THE EXPANDED role for gold mining, and miningin general, in the South African economy willcriticallyaffect the whole pattern of socialrelations in a wide variety of ways. I want hereto only broadly sketch out someimplications forthe overall process of capitalist development.In particular, I want to examine critically someof thosewritings which have seen South Africandevelopment as necessarily bound up with theexpansion of manufacturing.Inthe early 1970s, while the US was finallyclosing the 'gold window' and before anysubstantial increase in the gold pricehadoccurred, the influential Reynders Commissionreported on South Africa's export trade. Throughthe 1960s. themanufacturing industry which wasa substantial net importer, had grown fasterthan the primary industries of agricultureandmining, both substantial net exporters. Thishad produced a 'structural imbalance in theBalance of Payments'. 63The dynamic sector inthe economy, manufacturing industry, was thuslikely to be severely curtailed in its futuregrowth,in the absence of greater export earnings.The solution was seen to lie in the rapid growthof manufactured exports.64The Commission's analysis and conclusionsin this regard were readily accepted by a numberof writers operatingwithin a Marxist framework.Writing in 1978, by which time the price of goldhad already risen very substantially,SimonClarke reiterated the Commision's view: 65If South Africa is not to rely on acontinuing run of unlikely accidentstor'ustain accumulation, it is necessary tosolve the basic problem of the South Africaneconomy: the problem of theuncompetitivenature of South African manufacturingindustry on world markets.'For Clarke, as for the ReyndersCommission,the expansion of manufacturing exports was thecrucial sine qua non of further South Africancapitalistdevelopment. Increases in the priceof gold were, in Clarke's analysis, simplyrelegated to the never-never land of'unlikelyaccident' and given no further consideration, whilethe Reynders Commission reached its conclusionswithreference to a forecast of an increase inthe gold price to $80 per ounce - a forecastconsidered optimistic. 66But theiranalysis of the immanent crucial'barrier' to further capitalist development inSouth Africa was not simply inadequate asaconsequence of a refusal to consider thepossibility of a substantial rise in the priceof gold. Both Clarke and theReynders Commissionpresent an analysis of the manufacturing sectorand its export propensities that is highly

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questionable.Clarke's anslyeis of why the South Africanmanufacturing sectorhad not up to 1978, andrill not in theforseeable future. be able toincrease its export earnings, nests an a .viewof the labour force as Undisciplined':67....the weakness of South Africanmanufacturing was never a technologicalweakness but always hoe been aweaknessin the social relations of production. ThusSouth Africa has been technologicallybackward because capitalhas not installedmodern technology (sict). This is certainlyin part because labour in the past wascheap, Industry wasprotected, and thelabour force was not highly skilled.However modern technology also requires a'disciplined''responsible' work force,and this South Africa did not have.Faced with this, Clarks states that capital andthe SouthAfrican state will be forced to under-take a process of 'resttucturing'. 'Thisrestructuring involves primarily the,intensification of labour and the tightening ofwork discipline in the manufacturingsector'The crisis is therefore one ofproduction,particularly production in the manufacturingsector, which finds its expression an an acutemonetary andbalance of payments crisis, 69In their attempts to resolve this crisis,' capital and the state in South Africa haveto takethe initiative in intensifying theclass struggle, tightening labour controlat the point of production and increasingthereserve army by the creation of a relativesurplus population. At this level there isno possibility of compromise, nobasis anwhich concessions can be made to defusethe.growing political crisis.Each of these suppositions ishighlydubious. By what standards is South Africanindustry technologically backwards? Mostcentrally, what is meantby a 'disciplined'and 'responsible' labour force? Surely,throughout the 1960s and up until at least theDurban strikes of1973, the period that Clarksis concerned with in respect of the developmentof manufacturing, South Africa had,fromcapital's viewpoint, an extremely 'disciplined'and 'responsible' rock force? This can bemeasured in terse of strikeactivity, tradeunite regulation, the functioning of labourallocation mechanism, etc. 70The Reyndera Commission'sanalysis of thebarriers to exporting on the pert of themanufacturing sector stipulated a number offactors - a lack ofexport consciousness, thesoap size of firms, lade of knowledge,activities geared to import replacement and arapidrise in domestic demand: 71...the Commission has concluded that theindustrial philosophy of a fairlysignificantnumber of local businessman is not adjusted/attuned to exporting, and they are notequipped mentally,psychologically orphysically (plant, equipment etc) to enterthis market.When the Commission wade reference tothelabour force, it tended to stress the shortage ofskilled labour, the inadequate training of blacks;statutory barriers to'Black advancement' andthe gap between earnings and productivity.Labour 'indiscipline' or its equivalent didnotfeature in its analysis. 72One very central feature ... .,outh Africanmanufacturing, namely the presence ofextensiveforeign ownership and control, nowhere featuresin Clarke's analysis of the barriers toincreasedmanufacturing exports. This is not at allsurprising. Clarke's analysis of the 'Crisis' inSouth Africa 73concludes an article designedto decay the validity of a so-called 'fractionalistanalysis of South African capitalism', theso-called fractionall.sts having put particularemphasis on the divisions existent betweenforeign and local/nationalcapital in SouthAfrica's historical development. 74 Clarksstrongly denied the validity of this distinction,and substitutedan analysis based on 'capital ingeneral' in which no distinction is sods betweensuch fractions.75The ReynderaCommission, working within aNeo-Classical theoretical framework, -also has noconcept of foreign capital central to itsanalysisof the operations of South African manufacturingindustry. But, at a significant number of pointsin its report, theCommission records empiricallythe Importance of this division.Thus, in respect of the automobile industry,theCommission noted that 76Apart from cost disadvantages, localwerwfacturera/asseablers are all tied tooverseasprincipals who are generallyunwilling to allow the local firms toexport. ?his state of affairs moat beregarded asdisadvantageous .... especiallyas regards exports.In regard to the factors impeding South Africancapital goodsexports to less developed countries,the Commission again noted the importance offoreign ownership end control:77There is also the fact that a notinsignificant proportion of themanufacturing sector is controlled byinternationalconcerns; which naturally(sic) give first priority to internaloperations. The result of this practice isthat South Africansubsidiaries of someinternational concerns do not export at all,although it is also true that others,because of theirinternational character,are exporters of save significance.In respect of firms which utilised importedresearch anddevelopment in the form of franchisesetc, these were frequently accocpanied byrestrictive clauses: 78Marketrestricting clauses ...limited theability of local users to benefit frogeconomies of scale by exporting; this wasparticularlyvalid in those cases where theuser had achieved some success in thedomestic market - the restrictingclauseprecluded him (sic)-from expanding hisoperations and achieving greater success...It was furthermore submittedthat SouthAfrica was at times looked upon as an

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outlet for relatively obsolescent products,techniques and processes which would have inany case have left littleleeway for localusers to compete in the international marketeven if there were no restrictive arrangement.Lastly, it wasstated that where the productwas composed of a number of components, theuser was allowed to manufacture alimitedrange only and then required to import fromthe supplier at high prices certain vitalcomponents which wererelatively easy andlucrative to manufacture.Foreign subsidiaries were often reluctant toexport: 79Witnesses alsoallegOd that the actions ofmany of these subsidiaries were determinedby the interests of the parent companyegshould the local subsidiary wish to exportit might be precluded therefrom by the factthat the parent companyalready had a plantin the territory concerned.And, in respect of foreign subsidiaries overall: soIn regard to subsidiariesof foreign concerns,the Commission was told that only a smallnumber of these participated actively inexports, and thatin these cases only arelatively small percentage were positiveexporters, is exported more than theyimported...Moreover, very few of them whichmanufacture intermediate goods hadinvestigated the exporting of their productstothe parent company ...A large numberappear to be restricted to the localmarket or are restricted to export tocertaincountries only. No statisticalevidence is available to substantiate thesetendencies, but the Commission is satisfiedthaton the whole, they do present a fairlyvalid picture of the situation.In a world in which almost half of all tradeisconducted by MNCs, and with about 40% ofinternational trade by capitalist countriesaccounted for by intro-firm tradeor tradewith related parties, 81 it is clear that theoperations of MNCs play a critical role in theregulation end limitationsconfronting countries'capacities to expand their export earnings. Itwould seem clear that, in the case of SouthAfricanmanufactured exports, and the ReyndersCommission findings support this albeit thatspecific micro studies arelacking, 82 exportersare constrained by a range of technologicalagreements that prohibit/inhibit export, bythe'unwillingness' of subsidiaries to export tomarkets where another subsidiary is already inexistence, and the generalglobel_profitabilityconsiderations of the MNCs which regulate inter-affiliate trade. The other side of the coin isthat thehigh import propensity of themanufacturing sector, just as its low exportpropensity, cannot be seen apart fromextensiveforeign ownership and control which tiesubsidiaries to import from Head Office, or otherrelated subsidiaries,even where such productsare locally available. 83Foreign control -whether exercised viaa majority or minorityownership or via formaof licensing agreements - is particularlyprevalent in the South African manufacturingindustry. Inagriculture foreign participationis very small, while in mining, although foreignfarms are not insignificant, the sector isin thecontemporary period predominantly owned andcontrolled by South African capital. 84 Apart fromdividendpayments, the earnings of the mininghouses are not subject to significant remissionabroad.Backward end forwardlinkages are likely tobe effected with domestic producers and notsubject to transfer pricing. 85 At the level ofresearch,development and technical contracting,the South African mining industry is itselfpioneering much new innovation. TheChamber ofMines is at present directing a major 10-yearprogramme of collaborative research which hasalreadyyielded many significant innovations. 86Technological 'independence' is thus far morepronounced in this sector thanin manufacturingand the subsequent remissions abroad in theform of technology payments will be far lessthan inmanufacturing. 87The expansion of exports from the miningsector, gold mining in particular but notexcluding othermineral products such as coal.in the situation of higher 'energy' prices,is thus not only likely to continue, giventhecontext of the continuing international capitalistcrisis, but is indeed, from the standpoint ofcapital, likely to containconsiderably greater'benefits' than an expansion based on manufacturedproducts. Moreover, in a world inwhichinternational trade amongst capitalist nationsis dominated by the MNCs, it is by no meanscertain (contrary towhat Clerks argues) thatany amount of 'restructuring' performed at anational level can yield a significant expansioninmanufactured exports.Eurocentric models prescribe a single pathto capitalist development - that of industrial-isation.Hut, precisely because suchindustrialisation can today only occur at the'periphery', under the domination of theMNCe,is what is frequently termed 'dependentindustrialisation', 88 the development ofmanufacturing tends toaccentuate rather thanmitigate the Balance of Payments crises thataccompany high rates of growth. 88 As theworld'sprincipal producer of gold and with a miningsector which is domestically owned and controlled,the trajectory ofcapitalist development inSouth Africa is 13kely,to follow a significantlydifferent path. 90David KaplanFOOTNOTES.1.But even in 1929 a few countries, eg Sweden,did not experience major decline in output.2. DECD: 'PerspectivesEconimiques' No. 19,July 1976.

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3. With the exception of the UK, which had itslowest industrial production in the 4thquarter of 1974, all the OECDcountries had their .lowest industrial production within the first3 quarters of 1975.4. United Nations: 'Economic Surveyof Europein 1976', New York. Quoted in Mandel,1978:147.5. For a simple account of the development oftheEurodollar market, see Tow, 1977, chapter 136. 'National nonetary'nanagement has been mademore difficult mainlybecause of the increasedopportunities (and profitability) opened up byEurodollar dealing for arbitrage operations.Inthis way it has increased the internalconstraint on the use of monetary policy as aweapon for internal economicstabilisation...'Strange, 1976:186.7. Murray, 1980:76-77. In 1973, the GermanBundesbank calculated that changes inmethodsof payment by MNCs had been responsible for avery significant movement in the Balance ofPayments.8. Ofcourse, Central Hanks too can and havebeen involved in speculation.9. See in particular Nordhaus, W: 'TheFallingShare of Profit'. Brookings Papers onEconomic Activity No. 1, 1974. For the UK seeGlyn and Sutcliffe, 197 2,and The Economist,September 6, 1975. For references to studiesinter alia on Vest Germany, Italy and France,seeMandel, 1978:24-26.10. See Business Week for Quarterly tables onthe profitability of US corporations.11. In Marx'sanalysis the rate of profit ris given by the following formula:r = s/c+v.Dividing through by v,r = s /vc /v + 1. 'le the rateof profit varies proportionatelywith the rate of.exploitation and inversely withthe organic composition of capital.12. Theincrease in oil prices was not theprincipal cause of the onset of capitalistcrisis in the developed countries. Itdidcontribute to it, but the falling rate ofprofit, the root cause of the recession, wasalready evident well before 1973.Withsubstantial investments in energy projectswhich are only viable at a high price forenergy, many advancedcapitalist countries,and particularly the important 'energy',companies within them, are not likely to ,welcome a fall in oilprices.13. Mandel, 1978:88.14. Eg in the US real wages for workers tendedto fall.15. Eg the WT Grant company in theUS or theKoh,jin company in Japers.16. Also with the banks according credit veryliberally to their largercustomers.Castello 1980:116.17. Governmental support for 'lame ducks' resultsnot pre-eminently from 'politicalfactors',but from the fact that their survival is often asine qua 'non of maintaining an integrated nationaleconomy. Theloss of British Leyland, forexample, would have manifold effects upon allof British capital, increasing Britain's degreeofintegration into the world economy.18. Mandel, 1978:94.19. The power of organised labour !s ofteninvoked as afurther, if not principalfactor, causing inflation. With wage increaseslagging well behind price increases forseveralyears now in many of the advanced capitalistcountries, this explanation is hardly adequate.Demands for wageincreases are often defensive -a reaction to, rather than a cause of pricerises. However, the power of organisedlabourhas acted as a break on capital's power toreduce the level of real wages and so raise therate of profit via costcutting. Castello putsit this ray: 'Because markets are controlledlargely by monopoly capital, corporations areable toimpose the prices they want. Theincreasing cost of living triggers workers',demands for more wages at the level ofproduction.The rages obtained through struggle and bargain-ing will be added by monopoly capital to thepricescharged for commodities. This does notmean that workers' depends are the cause ofinflation, as capitalistpropaganda argues.What it does mean is that one of the causes ofinflation is that corporations find itincreasinglydifficult to raise their-profitsthrough direct exploitation and therefore raiseprices for the whole 'society in ordertopreserve their privileges'. Castello. 1980:64.20. ibid:62.22. In the 1974-75 recession, prices of rawmaterials tendedto decline and somoderated inflation.23. See Strange, 1976:186.24. 'The major factor causing the exceptionalrise ingold price has been the world demandfor_gold as a hedge against economic uncertaintyand, in particular, currencyweakness, with theprice of gold accelerating in terms of all major.currencies'. Chamber of Mines, PresidentialAddress,1979. At the same time, industrialdemand for gold has been price inelastic.25. Strange, 1976:67.26. ibid:69.27. Totalofficial dollar balances were $3-bin 1949, 010-b in 1960, and $51-b in 1971.28. This point was made as early as 1963,by theso-called Fairleigh-Dickinson study -Fatemi, NS, T de Saint Phalle and GM Keefe:The Dollar Crisis.Fairleigh-DickinsonUniversity Press, 1963. ,29. For an analysis of US monetary policy whichclearly examines this asan aspect of USimperialism, see Block, 1978.30. Economists associated with this strategy .include Kindelberger,Krause and Salant.31. This absorption is not 'complete' sincemuch of the dollars were required tofinance expansion inworld trade.32. There are some signs that this 'monetaryhegemony' may eventually be challenged by aEuropeancurrency, the European Monetary Unit.See Fitt, Fair and Vigier, 1980:poetscript topart 2.33. The distinction betweennational andinternational is not clear cut.34. Between 1884 Then significant gold productionin South Africa began until1932, with theexception of the years 1919-24 when gold earneda fluctuating premium, the money price of goldvasfixed. '35. One manifestation of this has been the massiverise of loans to the LDCs.

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