wolz, henry g. - plato's doctrine of truth - orthótes or alétheia
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
1/27
International Phenomenological Societyis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research.
http://www.jstor.org
nternational Phenomenological Society
Plato's Doctrine of Truth: Orthtes or Altheia?Author(s): Henry G. WolzSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Dec., 1966), pp. 157-182Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105357
Accessed: 21-08-2015 13:16 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2105357http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2105357http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/ -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
2/27
PLATO'S
DOCTRINE
OF
TRUTH:
ORTHOTES
OR
AL]tTHEIA?
The
stagewhich
the
interpretation
f
the Platonic
writings
has
reached
is very
odd
indeed. If
we divide
the
dialogues
roughly nto
three
groups,
then
we
find that
the
early dialogues,
with their
emphasis
on
search,
are generally
said
to
be
animated
by the liberal spirit
of the
living
Socrates.'
But the
very attempt
to find a
definition
for such
terms
as
courage, self-mastery, r virtue tself, suggestsa belief in the possi-
bility
of rigid
standards
or the
conduct
of life
which
belies that
spirit.
The
dialoguesof
the second
group
are
ascribed o
the
period of
Plato's
supreme excellence
as a dramatist.
Here
one
would expect
to find
the playwright's
eachingby
indirection,
he stimnulation
f thought
which
is usually
associated
with
the
Socratic method.
Instead
the
dramatic
elements
are completelyneglected
by the
commentatorsor
relegated
to
the byplay,
and the main
purpose
of the
dialogues
s
seen in
the presen-
tation
of such
Platonic
doctrines
as
the theory
of ideas
in the
Phaedo
which serves
as the basis for a rigorousdemonstrationof the immor-
tality
of the
soul, and
the rule
of the
philosopher-kings
n the Republic,
whose insight
into the
ultimate
meaning
of the world
enables
them
to
judge
with
infallibility
in matters
both
private
and
public.
The
late
dialogues
which
are
characterized
by
a marked
decline
of
dramatic
power
one
would
associate
with
a more
straightforward
xposition
and perhaps
a
more dogmatic
attitude.
This anticipation
would
be in
keeping
with the
reason
which
is customarilygiven
for the
more
rigid
outlook of the second group as againstthe first. For if this change is
rightly
attributed o
the decline
of
the memory
of Socrates
in
the
mind
of
Plato,
then the
last
group
would
be
likely
to continue
this
trend.
Curiously
enough
it has of
late
become
fashionable
to
see much
of
the
Socratic
method
and
spirit
in
the late
dialogues.
Cornford's
om-
mentary
on
the Parmenides,
or
instance,
is
replete
with remarks
such
1
E. A.
Taylor
refers
to them
as
Socratic
dialogues.
(Plato,
The Man
and
His
Work.
Sixth
Edition.
London:
1949,
p.
XI.)
Hermann Gauss
calls
them
Friih-
dialoge and distinguishesthem from the Dialoge der literarischenMeisterschaft
and
the
Spidialoge.
(Philosophischer
Handkommentar
zu
den
Dialogen
Platos.
Bern:
1961.)
2
E.
A.
Taylor,
op. cit.,
p. 20.
3
Ibid., p.
19.
157
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
3/27
158 PHILOSOPHY
NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
as these: Faithful
o Socrates,
he would
rathermake
us think for our-
selves than tell
us what
to think. We
are ... to
draw for ourselves
the necessary
nferences. Cornford
goes,so far as, to say that at
times
Plato'spurpose is to puzzle the reader by apparent contradictions
or
that differentmeanings,
of the supposition
have
been disguised
and that he leaves
it to
us to
discover
the
relevant sense or aspect.
Hermann
Gauss, in his
six-volume
Handkommentar
nterprets
Philebus
65a
to mean
that Plato no longer
regards.
he supreme,
Good
as
directly
accessible.9
He finds that
in the-Laws
Plato has become
much
more
liberal
as
compared
with
the Republic where
he advocated
state
control of the
arts,'0 and that he
now
holds
that the founder of
a
new
state cannot simply look to the ideal but must have
regard for various
aspects of the
specific
situation, such as
the geographical
onditions
of
the site he has
chosen,
as well as the historical
tradition
n which
the
prospective
colonists have
been raised.
In fact Gauss
attempts
o
trace
a process,of
maturation
and liberalization
of Plato's
philosophy,which
finds its consummation
n the dialogues
written
toward the end
of
his
life:
It seems that when
Plato
wrote the Sophist
he
had not
yet
altogether
freed
himself from the illusion
that a
kind of permanent
knowledge
might
after
all
be accessible to us. He has not yet reached the height which he will reach
in
the
Timaeus where all our
assertions
about
reality
are
regarded
as no more
than
eik6tes
mythoi,
that is as tentative and
merely probable
assertions,
which
in principle
can be
overthrown and of
which,
in the
name
of
philosophy,
we
must
hope
that
sooner
or
later they
will
in
fact be
overthrown
and
surpassed.12
It
was,
difficult
enough
to
accept the
old
view
which
maintained
hat
one and the
same author who
so successfully portrayed
the
spirit
of
Socrates
n
the
early
dialogues
had become
so
utterly
inflexiblein
later
life. But the new
one,
which would have
us
believe
that
the wine
turned
4
F.
MacDonald
Cornford,
Plato
and
Parmenides.
New York, 1951,
p.
111.
5
Ibid.,
p. 107.
6
Ibid.,
p. 163.
7
Ibid., p. 217.
8
Ibid., p. 154
Note
also:
They
(the
students
of the
Academy)
are
expected
to
compare
the
arguments
of each
Hypothesis
with
those
of the
others and
to
find
out
for
them-
selves
the
distinctions
that
must
be drawn.
(Ibid., p.
130.)
9
Zuerst
werden
wir
darueber
nicht
erstaunt
sein,
wenn es
von
diesem
obersten
'Guten' heisst, dass wir zu ihm keinen direkten Zugang haben. Das ist, was
wir
beim
spaten
Plato seit
dem
Parmenides
ohnehin
erwarten.
(Hermann
Gauss,
Handkommentar
zu
den
Dialogen
Platos. 3. Teil. Zweite
Haelfte.
Bern,
1961,
p.
43.)
10
Ibid.,
p. 70.
11
Ibid.
12
Op. cit.,
3.
Teil.,
Erste
Haelfte, p.
223.
My
own
translation.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
4/27
PLATO'S
DOCTRINE
OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES
OR
ALEiTHEIA?
159
sour had miraculously egained
ts
sweetness,
places
an unbearable
train
on
our
credulity.
A
field
of inquiry
which has reached
such
a state
of
confusion
calls for
a
radically
new
approach.
To many interpretersof Plato, Heidegger's essay entitled Platons
Lehre von
der
Wahrheit
3
seemed
to open
the
way toward a radical
reappraisal
of
the dialogues.
For
when
coming to
terms
with the great
thinkers
of
the Western
tradition,
Heidegger
does
not rest content
with
surface
meanings,
but penetrates
o the very
foundation,
o the
usually
unexpressed round
upon which
the philosophy
under consideration
ests:
Die Lehre eines
Denkers
ist das in
seinem
Sagen Ungesagte,
dem der
Mensch
ausgesetzt
wird, auf dass
er
daffir sich verschwende.
Damit wir
das
Ungesagte
eines Denkers, welcher
Art es
auch sei,
erfahren und
inskiinftig
wissen k6nnen, miissen
wir sein Gesagtes
Bedenken.'4
In
his essay
Heidegger
sets
out
to show that
the
unheralded
but fateful
event
in
the dialogues
ies
in the transition
o a new conception
of truth,
a
conception
which
has controlled
philosophic
hinking
o this
very day.
Truth as
aletheia
(unhiddenness),
according
to
Heidegger, is
the older
and more basic
notion.
It is
situation-directed
nd hence
requires
a
flexible
mind,
sensitive to
the flux
of things.
Truth
as orthotes
(correct-
ness) presupposes
fixed standards
of
judgment
and
is therefore
likely
to foster a certainrigidityof outlook.'5 Heideggerfurtherclaims that
13
Martin Heidegger,
Platons Lehre
von der
Wahrheit. Zweite
Auflage,
Bern,
1954.
14
Ibid., p. 5.
The 'doctrine'
of a thinker
is that which
is left unsaid in
what
he says,
to which man is
exposed in
order to expend himself
upon it. In order
to
learn and henceforth
know what a thinker
has left unsaid,
whatever
it
may be,
it
is necessary
to consider
what he has
said.
(Transl.
by John Barlow in Philosophy
in the
Twentieth Century ed. by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken.
New
York,
1962, p. 251.) Translations
cannot adequately
reflect the power
and
suggestiveness
of Heidegger's language. It seemed therefore justified to cite the original German
in the
text of this paper and
add the
translation in the
footnotes
as an aid to the
reader.
'5
It should be
noted that
Heidegger does
not simply
substitute one conception
of truth for another.
Instead
he tries to show
that truth
as orth6tes or correctness
is merely
part
of or derivative from
a more
integral -phenomenon,
namely,
truth
as
aletheia.
Consider,
he
suggests in Sein
und Zeit (Sechste
Auflage.
Tfibingen,
1949,
p. 217) a man with
his back
turned toward the
wall making
the assertion:
The picture
on the wall does
not hang
straight. The assertion
is found
to be true
if, upon
facing
the wall, the man discovers
the
picture in the condition
described.
The assertion -does not refer to representations or images, but to the concrete
situation
and
nothing else:
Jede Interpretation,
die hier
etwas anderes einschiebt,
das im
nur
vorstellendenAussagen
soil gemeint
sein, verfilscht den
phenomenalen
Tatbestand
dessen,
worilber ausgesagt
wird.
(Ibid., pp. 217-218.)
The
assertion
may
be merely thought;
or
it
may
be expressed in
a
sentence
which
allows another
to
share
in
the view of reality
to
which
the assertion leads.
The
sentence may be
passed
on
from
person to person,
without a
renewal of the contact
with
reality.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
5/27
160
PHILOSOPHY
NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
becauseof
the decline
of aletheia
and the simultaneous
ise of
orthotes
there
is in Plato's
writings
a persistent ambiguity.'6 Now if
Heidegger's
findings should prove
correct,
then one
would
expect the confusion
in
the conceptionof truth to be reflectedin Plato's attitudeof mind, and
we
would
then be able to
put our
finger on the
cause of the
perplexing
fluctuation
between
a liberal and
a dogmatic
spirit which seems to
run
through
all the dialogues.
The subtlety
of Heidegger's
analysis
and the
suggestiveness
and rich-
ness
of his
thought sorely
tempt
the reader simply
to
accept his con-
clusions. But were
he to
do so, he would
overlook
the fact
that
the
Allegory
of
the Cave, a
small and
relatively
unimportant
portion of
a
single dialogue, forms the main basis of Heidegger's argument. In order
to do justice
to his
claim, Heidegger,
as
he himself admits,
would have
to
examine
all the dialogues.'7
So quite apart
from
the light which
all
of Heidegger's discussions
of other thinkers
shed
on
his
own
thought,
the
'essay on Plato
can be
considered
as no
more than a
Hinweis,
an
indication
as to a possible
fresh
approach
to Plato.
And of these
Hinweise Heidegger
himself
has said in
another
connection hat
they
are
too
often unthinkingly
passed on
as the opinions
of
their
author when
they
should serve as
Weisung
... sich selber
auf den Weg
zu
machen,
um der gewiesenenSache selbst nachzudenken directions or the road
of
independent
reflection on
the
matter
pointed
out which
each
must
travel for
himself.)
18
What militates
most
strongly,
however, against
an uncritical
accept-
ance
of the
result of
Heidegger's
investigation,
is the
fact
that
he
approaches
Plato as
he
had
previously
approached
Aristotle,
Descartes,
and
Kant. These thinkers
make
an effort
to
give
a
clear
account of
their
position,
and so
it
is
proper
for
Heidegger
to
start with
their
explicit
utterancesand then attempt to penetrate
to, the
implied, unexpressed
ground.
Plato, by
contrast,
not
unlike
the
great
tragedians,
eaches
by
While
it still
refers
to
things,
to
concrete situations,
these
are no
longer
experienced
by the
one
hearing
or
seeing
the sentence.
The assertion
now
hardens
into
some
sort
of
independent
reality,
and
in
that independent
state
it
may
be
said
either
to
conform
or
not to
conform
to
things.
Only
in that secondary
sense can
it be
said
that
truth
lies
in the
assertion.
But to regard
truth
of the
assertion
as the
only
truth
is to
lose
sight
of the original
heuristic
and
apophantic
function
of
the
asser-
tion:
Die
Aussage
ist wahr,
bedeutet:
sie
entdeckt
das
Seiende
an
ihm
selbst.
Sie
sagt aus, sie zeigt auf, sie 'Thsstsehen' (apophansis) das Seiende in seiner Ent-
decktheit.
Wahrsein
(Wahrheit)
der
Aussage
muss
verstanden
werden
als ent-
deckendsein.
(Ibid.,
p.
218.)
16
Heidegger,
Platons
Lehre Von
Der Wahrheit,
p.
42.
17
Ibid., p.
5.
18
Heidegger's
Preface
to:
William
J.
Richardson,
S.
J.,
Heidegger:
Through
Phenomenology
to Thought.
The
Hague,
1963,
pp.
viii-ix.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
6/27
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?
161
indirection.
As
a result he usually does
not immediately eveal his posi-
tion, for
he is concerned more with
the stimulation
and subsequent
direction
of thought rather
than with the advocacy
of specific
doctrines.
And so the insight which Plato is tryingto convey is somethingwhich
must happen
in the
mind of the reader, as the result
of a clash
of ideas
which
occurs in the dialogue.'9
It is doubtful whether
the dramatic
aspects of Plato's dialogues
can
be ignored
with impunity.
We propose, therefore,
to test
Heidegger's
theory
of a change in
the conceptionof truth in
the light of
an inter-
pretation
which attempts to allow
full sway to
the dramatic elements
of
the
dialogues.And
if we take as our point of
departure
a
view which
emerges from the dialectical interplay of opposing positions, we are
likely to
reach conclusions
which are quite different
from those
which
Heidegger derives from
a literal
reading.
In
fact it might well
be
that
Plato
and Heideggerare then found
to be allies
rather than adversaries
in the
struggle to
attain to
a
satisfactory
conception of
truth. Since
a
considerationof
all
the dialogues
is
impossible,
we
shall
try
to do
the
next best thing, namely
to discuss
those dialogueswhich
most
obviously
seem to confirm Heidegger's
contention.
But
first, merely
by way
of
reminder,
a few words about Heidegger's
analysis
of the Allegory of
the
Cave.
The
very locale
of the allegory,
as
Heidegger
points out,
suggests,
ruth
as unhiddenness:
he
dark cave, the sunlit world
outside,
various
levels
of
light
and darkness between
the two.
Each
stage
in the
paideia
of
the inhabitants
of the
cave has
its own
truth,
its own
revela-
tion of
reality. The
shadows which
the
chained
prisoners
see on
the wall
are not simply nothing.
These
shadows
offer
themselves
or their
reality
to
the
understanding
f
the
prisoners.
The latter
perceive
19This
is clearly
enough
stated in the Seventh
Letter,
which
is
generally
regarded
as
authentic:
....
in regard
to ...
the subjects to which
I
devote
myself
-...
I
certainly
have composed
no
work
in
regard
to
it,
nor
shall
I ever
do
so in
the
future,
for there
is no way of putting
it in
words
like other
studies.
Acquaintance
with
it comes
after
a long
period
of attendance
on instruction
in the
subject
itself
and
of close
companionship,
when,
suddenly,
like
a
blaze
kindled
by
a
leaping
spark,
it is
generated
in
the soul
and at
once
becomes
self-sustaining.
(Seventh
Letter,
par.
341c-d. Translated
by L. A. Post.
The Collected
Dialogues
of
Plato.
Including
the
Letters,
edited
by Edith
Hamilton
and
Huntington
Cairns.
Bollingen
Series LXXI, New York, 1961, pp. 1588-1589.) Italics added.
Note
also the
remarks
on
the
indirect
method
of
teaching
in
Republic,
Book
VII,
par. 518;
Vol. I,
p.
777;
Apology
par.
31,
Vol. I, p. 414;
Theatetus
par.
149,
Vol.
II,
p. 150.
The Dialogues of Plato,
translated
by
B.
Jowett,
in two
volumes.
New
York,
1937.
Unless
otherwise
indicated,
all
quotations
from
Plato's
dialogues
refer to
this
edition.
20
Platons
Lehre
von
der
Wahrheit,
p. 33.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
7/27
162
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCH
them, but do not or cannot inquire into the
ground of their
being,
that
is, the fire and the objects which make them
mere shadows. The cave
dweller who is released from his, chains,but
confused by the brightness
of the fire in the,cave does not at once experience
a higherkind of truth
or
reality;
in fact he considers. he shadows
which he saw before his
release as more true and more real than what confronts and
bedazzles
him now. It is only when he gets outside the cave and becomes accus-
tomed to the sun in whose light real things present themselvesthat he
is face to face with genuine truth and reality.
After he has reentered
the cave and overcome the first few moments
of confusion, he sees the
shadows again,
but
now he knows them as shadows, with merely
a
borrowedkind of reality.
There
is, however, also the fire, the
things outside the cave which
stand
for the ideas and the sun which represents
he
idea
of
ideas,
the
source of intelligibility and reality for all
things. The ideas are
the
standardson a higher level to which beings
on a lower level
must
con-
form. And
according o Heidegger he emphasis
s being placed,
not on
the levels of truth, but on the ideas:
Die
Unverborgenheit wird zwar
in
ihren verschiedenen Stufen genannt, aber
sie wird nur daraufhin bedacht, wie sie das Erscheinende
in seinem Aussehen
(eidos) zugiinglich und dieses Sichzeigende (idea) sichtbar macht. Die eigent-
liche
Besinnung geht
auf das in der Helle
des Scheins gewiihrte Erscheinen
des Aussehens. Dieses gibt die Aussicht auf
das, als was jegliches Seiende
anwest. Die eigentliche Besinnung gilt der idea.21
A
more
shift of
emphasis
alone
would,
of course,
not
be
very
con-
vincing,
and
so
Heidegger
points
to the well-known
heory
of
ideas,
and
especially
to
a
passage
from Book VI
of the
Republic
which
seems
to
eliminate
all
doubt.
There
the
philosopher-kings
re,
described
as
men
who have
in their soul a clear
pattern
of
perfect truth,
which
they
might study
in
every
detail
and
constantly
refer
to,
as a
painter
looks
to his model, before they proceed to embody
notions of justice, honour,
and
goodness
in
earthly
institutions.
2
The paideia
is now
understood
to consist
in
turning oward
and
steadfastly
adhering
o
the
ideas,which
21
Ibid., p. 34.
To be sure unhiddenness
is named in
its
various stages,
but one can only
con-
sider it in
the way it makes
the
phenomenal
accessible
in its outward appearance
(eidos) and
the way
it makes this
emerging
(idea) visible.
Consciousness,
properly
speaking,
has to do with
the
way outward
appearance
manifests itself
and is
preserved
in the brightness
of
its steady appearance. Through
this
one can
view
whatever each being
is present
as. Consciousness,
properly
speaking,
applies
to
the
idea.
(Transl.
John
Barlow, in
Barrett
and Aiken,
op. cit.,
p. 261.
22
The
Republic
of Plato. Trans. by F. M. Cornford.
New
York, 1945,
Book
VI,
par.
484, p.
190.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
8/27
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR
ALETHEIA?
163
serve as a standard
n the light of which
all
human activity
is to be
evaluated:
Die Befreiung
ergibt sich
nicht schon aus der
Losldsung
der
Fesseln
und
besteht nicht in der Zuigellosigkeit,sondern beginnt erst als die stetige Ein-
gewdhnungin das Festmachen
des Blickes auf
die festen Grenzen der in
ihrem
Aussehen feststehenden Dinge.
Die
eigentliche
Befreiung ist die Stetigkeit der
Zuwendungzu dem, was in
einem
Aussehen
erscheint und in diesem Erschei-
nen das Unverborgenste ist.23
The notion
of truth inherent in the theory
of ideas, together with its
corresponding
attitude of
mind, seems in fact to be the very
opposite
of aletheia. Instead of turning
to things,
to'
the concrete,
ituation, the
inquirerturns.
o the
ideas;
instead of flexibility
and malleability,
here
is now rigid adherenceto set standards.Heidegger'sconclusion seems
inescapable:
Indem Platon von
der idea sagt, sie sei
die Herrin, die Unverborgenheit
zulasse,
verweist
er in
ein Ungesagtes,
dass namlich
fortan sich das Wesen
der Wahrheit
nicht als das Wesen der Unverborgenheit aus
eigener Wesen-
fiulle
entfaltet,
sondern sich auf
das
Wesen
der
idea
verlagert.
Das
Wesen
der
Wahrheit
gibt
den
Grundzug
der
Unverborgenheit preis....
Wahrheit
wird
zur
orthotes,
zu
Richtigkeit
des Vernehmens
und
Aussagens.24
The
theory of ideas is generally regarded
as established
Platonic
doctrine,so that a contention,such as Heidegger's,which is implied by
it, should
have no difficulty
in
finding
acceptance.
But what happens
if
we
tear ourselves oose
from
the accustomed iteral
reading
of the
text
and hold ourselves
open
and
receptive
to
the
possible
effects of the
dialectical
nterplay
of idea?
The
Euthyphro
seems
particularly
uitable
for
making
the
experiment;
it contains
strong
evidence in favor of
Heidegger's thesis
and
at the same
time
is not
lacking
in dramatic
elements.
The dialogueshows us Socratesengagedin the search for the defini-
23
Platons
Lehre
von
der Wahrheit,
p.
30. Italics
added.
Liberation
does
not take
place
in
the mere act
of getting
free from
the
chains
and
does
not consist
merely
in being
untrammeled,
but
begins
first
as
the
steady
orienting
of
oneself
so
that
one's
gaze
is made
fast to the
firm
limits
of the
things
standing
fast
in
their
outward
appearance.
Actual
liberation
lies
in the
steadiness
with
which
one turns
towards
what manifests
itself
in its outward
appearance
and
is in
this
manifesting
the
most unhidden.
(Transl.
by
Barlow,
in
Barrett
and
Aiken,
op. cit.,
p.
259.)
24
Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,pp.
41-42.
When
Plato
says
that
the
idea is
the master permitting
unhiddenness
he
banishes
to something
left
unsaid the
fact
that
henceforth
the
essence
of
truth
does
not
unfold
out
of
its own
essential
fullness-as
the
essence
of
unhiddenness,
but
shifts
its abode
to the
essence
of
the idea.
The essence
of
truth
relinquishes
the.
basic
feature
of
unhiddenness....
Truth
becomes
orth6tes,
correctness
of the
ability
to
perceive
and to
declare something.
(Tr.
Barrett
and
Aiken,
p.
265.)
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
9/27
164
PHILOSOPHY
NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
tion
of
a
virtue,
namely
piety. Euthyphro,
who
is not very bright,
needs
to
be
told
what
a definition
is:
Is not piety in every
action
always
the same? And
impiety,
again
-
is it
not
always
the
opposite
of
piety,
and
also
the
same with
itself, having,
as
impiety,
one
notion
which
includes
whatever
is
impious.25
And
then Socrates
describes
the
function
of
a
definition,
which
when
found
would
make
moral judgments
so simple
and so
reliable:
Tell me
what is
the
nature
of this
idea,
and
then
I shall have
a
standard
to
which
I
may look,
and
by
which
I
may
measure
actions,
whether
yours
or
those
of any
one
else,
and then
I shall
be able
to say
that such
and
such
an
action
is
pious,
such
another
impious.26
The enquiryhas beenoccasionedby a concretemoralproblem.Euthyphro
is
about
to institute
proceedings
against
his father
for causing
the
death
of
a
serf
through
gross
negligence.
To
the
objections
of
his family
that
a
son
is impious
who
prosecutes
his
father,
he replies
with
an
appeal
to
the behavior
of the
gods.
Do
not
men,
he
argues,
regard
Zeus
as
the
best
and
most
righteous
of
the gods?
-
And
yet they
admit
that
he
bound
his
father (Cronos)
because
he
wickedly
devoured
his
sons,
and
that
he
too
had
punished
his
own
father
(Uranus)
or
a similar
reason.
7
Through
his
insistence
on a
definition
as a
norm
of
judgment,
Socrates
extricatesthe problemfrom the realm of religion and mythology and
raises
the
discussion
to
the
level
of
rational
inquiry.
And
what
if
Euthyphro
does
prove
to me,
he
asks,
that
all the gods
regard
the
death
of the
serf
as
unjust,
how
do
I
know
anything
more
of
the
nature
of
piety
and
impiety?
28
From
Mythos
to
Logos
one
might
be
inclined
to name
the
theme
of
this
brief
dialogue.
Of course,
a definition
is not actually
found,
but
this
is usually
thought
to be
attributable
to the Socratic
method:
Socrates
meansus to find the definitionfor ourselves.As againstthe doctrinaire
position
of
Euthyphro,
Socrates'
call
for a definition
is very
alluring.
Leaving
dark superstition
ar
behind,
one
feels transported
nto the
clear
light
of
reason.
The
fact,
however,
that we
have
left behind
not
only
superstition
but the
concrete
situation
as well should
give
us
pause.
Just
how,
we
might
ask,
would
the
definition
of a moral excellence
function
in
the
kaleidoscopic
lux of
human
relationships?
Would
it tell
us
that
such
and
such
an
act is
good
or
bad and therefore
ought
to
be
pursued
or
shunned regardless
of
the
consequences?
What
would
happen
to
human responsibility?Could we simply say that our task is to adhere
25
Euthyphro,
par. 5,
op.
cit.,
Vol.
I,
p.
386.
26
Ibid., par.
6, p.
387.
Italics
added.
27
Ibid., par.
5-6,
pp.
386-387.
28
Ibid.,
par.
9,
p.
390.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
10/27
PLATO'S
DOCTRINE
OF
TRUTH:
ORTHOTES
OR ALETHEIA?
165
to
the
definition
or rule, and
that
the
consequences
are
not our
concern?
Does
not the
successful
use
of a fixed definition
presuppose
a
stable,
unchangeable
world,
that
is,
one
in which
we clearly do
not live?
More
often than not we must choose not betweengood and evil, but between
the
greater
of two
goods
or
the lesser
of two evils.
But just
what
will
turn
out to
be
the
greater
good
or lesser
evil only
the given
circum-
stances
will reveal.
Unless,
he
whole
history
of the
world
is spread
out
before
us,
we
can
never
say
once
and for
all that
such and such
an
evil
will
never
be outdone
by
a greater
evil and therefore
must be
shunned
always
and
no matter
what the
circumstances.
Let
him know
how
to
choose
the mean
and
avoid the extremes
on
either side, as far as possible,
9
Socrates warns
at the end
of
the
Republic.
But in
the
Euthyphro
he
himself
proposes
an
extreme.
Shall
we
say that
when
Plato
wrote
this dialogue
he
had
not
yet
attained
to
the wisdom
shown
in
the
Republic?
Or would it
be more reasonable
o
assume
that he
had
Socrates
play
the
devil's
advocate?
Then
the
Socratic
method would
not be
directed
at
Euthyphro,
who
evidently
learns
nothing
from
his
encounter
with
Socrates,
nor would
it consist
simply
in the question
and
answer
method.
It would
rather
seem
that
by
pitting
one
extreme
against
the
other,
Plato
is trying
to make
the
attentive
readersee that it is not enoughto abjuresuperstitionand have recourse
to
reason.
For
the appeal
to
a
rule
divorced
from
life
can
spring
from
as
ruthless
an attitude
as that
inspired
by
superstition.
And
just
as
Euthyphro's
unshakeable
onviction
s
unjustified
ince it implies
famili-
arity
with
the will
of the gods,
so
intellectual
certainty
n moral
matters
presupposes
a
definition
which
the
world
in which
we live
does
not
allow.30
Toward
the end
of
the
dialogue,
Socrates
suggests
that piety
be
defined
as
a kind of
justice
or
ministration
with reference
to
the
gods.
But what
benefits can possibly accrue to the gods from the,deeds of
men?
Is
there
anything
which only
men
can do? Tell
me,
oh
tell
me,
Socrates
urges,
what
is
that
fair work which
the
gods
do by
the
help
of
our
ministrations ?
1
Euthyphro,
of course,
does
not know
the
answer,
and
Socrates
refuses
to
give
it.
It seems
plausible,
however,
that
this
task
has
something
to do with
bringing
order into one's,
own
life
and
helping
in the
establishment
and maintenance
of order
in the
com-
munity.
For
neither
the individual's
ife nor the life
of the
community
29
Republic,
Book
X,
par.
619,
p.
876.
30
Plato
says
as
much
explicitly
in
a
later
dialogue:
The
difference
of
men
and
actions,
and
the endless
irregular
movements
of
human
things,
do
not
admit
of
any
universal
and simple
rule.
And
no
art
whatsoever
can
lay
down
a
rule
which
will
last
for
all
time.
Statesman,
par.
294,
Vol.
II,
p.
322.
81
Euthyphro,
par.
13,
p.
396.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
11/27
166 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCH
is provided n a ready-made orm. And how
can there be free
men in
a free society, unless they are accountable
or their own way
of life? It
is as if the, gods
who are responsiblefor
the order in the world, had
stopped short of humanaffairs and imposedupon men the task of com-
pleting the ordering
process..
To bring about
and preserve proper relations,among men
is a con-
tinuous,never-ending
ask. Neither cherished raditions, or deeply rooted
desires are
a
reliable
guide. We must tear
ourselves, oose from habitual
modes
of
behavior
and from the immediateneeds arisingout
of the con-
crete
situation n order to gain
a
wider
perspective or successfulaction.
But neither can we expect to discoverfinal
answers in an abstract
realm
of ideas. Only the kind of reflection which allows for the intricate
interplayof idea and situation offers any
hope for the establishment
of
satisfactoryhuman
relations.
If we are willing to accept this, nterpretationhen we identify Plato's
position with neither
of the two adopted
by the participants o
the
dis-
cussion. We would
rather see it midway between the blind
superstition
and traditionalism
f Euthyphroand the rigid rationalismwhich
in this
dialogue Plato chooses to place into
the mouth of Socrates.
And then
the Euthyphro would
not confirm the, findings
of
Heidegger
in the
Allegory of the Cave. For while Heidegger there sees aletheia under the
yoke
of the
idea,32
it now
appears
hat the idea stands in the
service of
aletheia, helping the
truth of things to
shine forth in its own light.
While
the
Euthyphro,
on a literal
reading,
would
place
moral
behavior
under the
control of
a
definition,
the
Crito
would subject
the
individual
to the rule of law.
Socrates
s,
usually
thought to have
died rather
than
break
the law which
condemnedhim to death
in
spite
of
his
innocence,
and this
view
can
be amply supported
by
references o
the text. Socrates
stresses
the
importance
of
the
laws
for
the welfare
of the citizens.
They
regulate the
marriage aws
and
provide
for the education
of the child.
Well
then,
since
you
were
brought
into the world
and nurtured
and
educated
by us, Socrates
has
the laws
say,
can
you deny
in the
first
place
that
you are
our child and slave,
as
your
fathers,
were
before
you?
And if this is true
you
are
not
on
equal
terms
with
us;
nor
can
you
think
that you have
a
right to do to us what
we are doing
to
you
...
Has
a
philosopher
ike you failed to
discover
that our
country
is more to
be
valued and
higher
and holier
far than
mother or
father or
any
ances-
32
Indem
Platon
von
der
idea
sagt,
sie
sei
die
Herrin
die
Unverborgenheit
zulasse,
verweist
er
in
ein
Ungesagtes,
dass
niinlich
fortan
sich
das
Wesen
der
Wahrheit
nicht als
das
Wesen
der
Unverborgenheit
aus
eigener Wesensfillie
ent-
faltet, sondern
sich
auf
das Wesen
der idea verlagert.
Das Wesen
der
Wahrheit
gibt den Grundzug
der Unverborgenheit
preis.
Platons
Lehre
von
der Wahrheit,
p.
41.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
12/27
PLATO'S DOCTRINE
OF TRUTH:
ORTHOTES
OR ALEfTHEIA?
167
tor...
. 33 The
modem reader
might
stir uneasily
at this
point, for
he
is wary
about too
submissive
an
attitude
toward
the state. But
the
next
few
lines are
bound to make
him cry out in
dissent:
And
when we
are
punished
by
her, whether
with
imprisonment
or stripes,
the
punishment
is
to be
endured
in silence;
and if she leads
us to wounds
or
death
in battle,
thither
we
follow
as
is right;
neither
may any
one yield
or
retreat
or
leave
his
rank,
but whether
in battle
or in
a
court
of law,
or in any
other
place,
he must do what his
city
and his country
order
him.34
Such
a
principle
could
have
exonerated
he worst of
the war
criminals
after
the
last war,
aside
from
the
dictator
himself.
It is true that
the
imaginary
aws
try
to
mitigate
the
harshness
of their
demand
by
pro-
claimingto any Athenian
by
the
liberty
which
we allow
him, that if
he
does
not
like
us
when
he
has become
of
age
and has
seen
the ways
of
the
city,
and
made
our
acquaintance,
he
may go
where
he pleases
and
take
his goods
with
him.
35
But
even
with
the best
of laws
it
can
come
about
that
strict
application
of the
law
would
work
an
injustice
so
severe
as
to
make
disobedience
a
moral
obligation.
Nor can
it be
rightly
claimed,
as the
laws
do,
that
he
who has
experience
of the
manner
in
which
we
order justice
and administer
he
state,
and still
remains,
has
entered
nto
an
implied
contract
hat he
will
do
as
we command
him.
36
A citizen can never, without forfeitinghis freedom and responsibility,
give
such
a blank
pledge
of
obedience
in
complete
disregard
of
existing
circumstances.
Even
more
embarrassing
o
a literal
interpretation
s
the
fact
that
at
the
beginning
of
the
dialogue,
just
before
the discussion
with
Crito gets
under way,
Socrates
adopts
a
position
which
is the very
op-
posite
of
an
unquestioning
ubmission
o law:
And
therefore
we
ought
to
consider
whether
I shall
or shall
not do
as
you
say.
For I
am
and
always
have
been
one
of those
natures
who must
be
guided
by
reason,
whatever
the
reason may
be which
upon
reflection
appears
to me to be the best.37
And just
as
the Eichmanns,
if
unquestioning
submission
to
the
law
is
made
a
virtue,
can
shift
responsibility
o,
higher
authority,
so
the
Oswalds,
if
individual
reason reigns
supreme,
can
justify
their
misdeed
by
appealing
o
the
outcome
of
their own
reflections.
In the
Crito,
even
more
so
than
in the
Euthyphro,
he
two
extremes
are clearly
stated.
It
is
reasonable'
o assume
that they serve
Plato
to
bring
home
the
paradoxical
nature
of civic
virtue.For
a
good
citizen
at
33
Crito,
par.
50-51,
pp.
434-435.
34
Ibid.,
par.
51,
p.
435.
Italics
added.
35
Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37
Ibid.,
par.
46,
p.
430.
Italics
added.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
13/27
168
PHILOSOPHY
NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
one
and the
same time must
be
obedient
and yet hold himself
responsible
for the
consequences
of his
acts. If
we ask
how this
is
possible,
we
will
find no
direct
answer in the
dialogue.
We might,
however, discover
a
hint, such as the one containedin the followingremarkmade by the
laws:
We
do
not
impose
(our
commands)
rudely, but give
him
the alternative
of
obeying
or convincing us ... that
our
commands
are
unjust.38
To convince
the ideal
laws, which
Plato
elsewhere
identifies
with
reason,39 can
only mean
that
we must
show
disobedience
to constitute
the lesser
evil.
Vital
as the
laws
may be
to
the maintenance
of order
and hence
to the
existence
of
the state,
there
may be
occasions
when
the harm which comes from the disregardor suspensionof the, law is
outweighed
by
the evil
consequences
which would
follow upon
enforce-
ment of
the
law. So laws
have
no absolute
power.
And now
in order
not to
give reason
unrestricted
ontrol
we must
add
that the
sheer
fact
that a law exists
ought
to weigh
heavily
in
the
determination
of the
greater
good
or the lesser
evil. So both
law and reason
must control
our
actions
but
in such
a
way
as to make
one
restrain
he
other. However,
as we
have seen
in
the Euthyphro,
he greater
good
or the
lesser
evil
are not
discovered
by looking
to
a
definition
or idea.
They
arise
out of
the
interrelations
of
the
various
goods,
and
evils
which are present or
likely
to occur
under given
circumstances.
And
so
by trying
to resolve
the
paradox
presented
n
the
dialogue,
and following
the
suggestion
of
Socrates to
their
natural
conclusion,
we
are led back
to the
concrete
situation.
But
this
means
that Plato's
thought
takes,
a
direction
which
is
the very
opposite
of
the one
it is
said
to
take
in the
opinion
of Martin
Heidegger.
So
far
we
have
dealt
only
with
two
of the earlier
dialogues,
n
which
the liberalspiritof Socrates s said to be still alive. In the later dialogues,
the
more
dogmatic
character
of
Plato's own
philosophy
is,
alleged
to
come to the
fore. So
it
may
well
be
that we have not as
yet
come
to
grips with
Plato's doctrine
of truth. Since
the theory
of ideas forms
a
prominent
part
of
Heidegger's
argument,40
a
brief examination
of
it,
especially
as
it
appears
n the
Phaedo,
becomes
unavoidable.
A
full
discussion
of the Phaedo
is,
of
course,
not
possible.
But
the
theory
of
ideas,
which
has
traditionally
been
regarded
as its main
philo-
sophic
yield,
should
at
least
be
placed
into
its immediatecontext.
The
38
Ibid.,
par.
52,
p.
436.
39
We
must
...
regulate
our
cities
and
houses
according
to
law, meaning
by
the very
term
'law'
the distribution
of mind.
Laws,
Book IV,
par.
713,
Vol.
II,
p.
485.
40
Platons
Lehre
von
der
Wahrheit,
esp.
pp.
20
ff.
and
pp.
38 ff.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
14/27
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR
ALUTHEIA?
169
theoryoccurs
in Socrates'discussionof his method of inquiry.He relates
how
in
his
youth he was taken in by
the nature
philosophers who
sought
for principlesof explanationamong.physical
hings.
Is the blood
the element with which we think, or the air, or the
fire?
41
these are
questions of the kind which
Socrates
said agitated him. But instead
of
seeing more
clearly he
became more confused; or rather,
becoming
aware of
the distinction between factual
juxtaposition
and causal or
necessary
connections,
he
recognized hat
what he took
to be all expla-
nation was no explanation
at all:
For I was fascinated by
them to such
a degree that my eyes grew blind
to
things
which
I
had seemed to myself,
and also to others, to know quite
well;
I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths;e.g. such a fact as that
the growth of man is
the result of eating
and drinking; for when
by the
digestion
of food flesh is added to flesh
and bone
to bone, and whenever
there
is an aggregationof congenial elements,
the lesser
bulk becomes larger
and the small man great.42
While
necessary
connections cannot be
observed
between
things,
they
can be detected
between ideas:
I was afraid that
my
soul
might
be blinded
altogether
if I looked at things
with my eyes
or tried to
apprehend
them
by
the
help
of the senses. And I
thought
that I had
better
have recourse
to the
world of mind and seek there
the truth of existence.4s
But this appeal to ideas,
as he soon
found
out,
was
not without
serious
limitations. The
ideal would
be
to, discover
an
ultimate
principle
of
explanation,
which would
assign
to
each
thing
its
proper place
in the
total scheme.
To such
a
principle
he had
hoped
to
be
introduced
by
Anaxagoas who had
said that
mind
was
the
disposer
and cause
of
all.
44
But
Anaxagoras
disappointed
him
because
he had
recourse o
air, and ether,
and
water,
and
other
eccentricities.
5
Having
to
fall
back on his own resources,Socratescould do no better than assume
some likely
principles of
explanation
and
test them
by
means
of their
synthesizingpower:
I
first assumed
some
principle
which
I
judged
to be
strongest,
and
then
I
affirmed
as true whatever
seemed
to
agree
with
this,
whether
relating
to
the
cause
or to
anything
else;
and
that
which
disagreed
I
regarded
as
untrue.46
41
Phaedo, par. 96,
Vol. I, p. 481.
42 Ibid.
43
Ibid., par. 99-100, p. 484.
44
Ibid.,
par. 97, p.
482.
Anaxagoras,
Socrates
thought,
would
give
him a
per-
fect explanation,
that
is,
he would
tell
him,
for
instance,
whether the earth
is
flat
or round,
and then
he would
explain
why
it is necessarily
so and
why
it is
best
that it should
be
so.
45
Ibid.,
par. 98, p.
482.
46
Ibid.,
par. 100, p.
484.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
15/27
170
PHILOSOPHY
NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
This
second
best mode
of
inquiry as
Socrates
calls
it, cannot
lay
claim
to certainty,
since
it is not
in
possession of the ultimate
principle
nor
even of principles
or ideas
necessarily
reflecting
the essence
or
nature
of things.Someof them mightperhapsbe derived rom a higheror more
comprehensive
principle,
but the
test
would always
be in reference
to
experienced
eality:
If anyone assails
you
there (i.e.,
questions
your
principle),
you would
not
mind
him or answer
him until you
had
seen whether
the
consequences
which
follow
agree
with one
another or
not, and when
you
are further required
to give
an
explanation
of this
principle,
you would
go
on
to
assume
a higher principle,
and a
higher,
until you found
a resting-placein the
best
of the
higher.47
It would appear,therefore,that if the strictlyphilosophicalpart of
the
Phaedo
were
to
end with the
exposition
of Socrates'
second-best
method of
inquiry,the
dialogue
could
hardly
be called
upon to support
Heidegger's
contention.
For the
ideas
to which
Socrates
here refers
cannot
be said
to contain
the truth of
things.
They
are
merely postulates
which are
somehow
derived
from experience
and
whose
function
it
is
to help us
discover some
orderly
relationship
between the
elements
of
experience.
Heidegger
could,
however,
appeal
to the
argument
which
follows
and to which
the
exposition
of
the method
appears
as
a
prelude.
For oddly enough the argumentproceeds as if the second-best were
the ideal method,
as if
the
postulates
were
the essences
of
things. Only
if
Socrates
could
claim
to
possess
insight
into the very
nature
of
the
human
soul
would
it make
any
sense
for
him
to
maintain
that
death-
lessness
is one
of
its
necessary
attributes.
The
difficulty
can
not be
eliminatedsimply
by
saying
that Plato
was
unaware
of the
implications
of
Socrates'
second-best
method.48
For in
the brief
interval
between
the
exposition
and
the
final
argument,
Socrates
uses
the
method
as if
he
had a
proper
understanding
f it.
When
Simias
raises
an
objection against
Socrates'
irst set of
arguments
by
offering
a
rival hypothesis,
namely
the harmony theory,
which
would
imply
the
mortality
of
the soul,
Socrates
refutes
it
precisely
as
one
would a
mere
postulate.
He shows
that
it lacks
consistency,
that its
consequences
do
not
agree
with
the
observed
facts,
that
it is
in
conflict
with
other
postu-
lates
which
Simlias
has accepted.49
47
Ibid.,
par.
101,
p.
485.
48
Note for instance: His hypothetical method, if our analysis of the Phaedo
has
been correct,
can never
attain to
absolute
knowledge
...
but, when
we
recall
that
(Plato)
believed
in the
possibility
of absolute
knowledge
...
we must
certainly
wonder
why he
devoted
so
much
space to
its elaboration
...
(Richard
Robinson,
Plato's
Earlier
Dialectic.
Second Edition,
Oxford, 1953,
p.
146.)
49
Socrates'
refutation
can
be
summarized briefly
as follows:
The
harmony
theory leads
to absurd
consequences
since
it would
make
us
say
that
the soul
as
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
16/27
PLATO'S
DOCTRINE
OF TRUTH:
ORTHOTES
OR
ALETHEIA?
171
Before
we come
to grips
with the problem
which
arises
out of
the
discrepancy
between
Socrates'
exposition
of
his method
and its, use
in
the final argument
of the
Phaedo,
we
may perhaps
be allowed
a
brief
reference o the Protagoras.For this dialogueoffers a furtherexcellent
illustration
of
the proper
use of the method.
There Socrates
challenges
Protagoras'
claim
of
being
able to
teach political
virtue to
the
young
men
of the city,
on
the
ground
that
virtue
is
incapable
of
being
taught.
It
is significant
hat
Socrates.
does
not
turn
to
the idea
of virtue
in
an
attempt
to show
that
teachability
s
incompatible
with
it.
Instead
he
examines
the
social
situation,
or,
more
specifically,
the
behavior
of
the
Athenians
in
the
Assembly
and
the attitude
of
the great
statesmen
toward
their
offspring.
The
latter,
observes
Socrates,
gave
(their
sons)
excellent
instruction
n all
that
could
be learned
from
masters,
but in
their own
department
of
politics
neither
taught
them,
nor
gave
them
teachers.
0
The
former
accept
advice
in
technical
matters
only
from
experts,
such
as
architects
and shipwrights,
but
when
the
question
is
an
affair
of
state,
says Socrates,
everybody
s
free
to
have
a
say
-
carpenter,
tinker,
cobbler,
sailor,
passenger;
rich
and
poor,
high
and
low
-
any
one
who
likes
gets
up,
and
no one reproaches
him,
as in
the
former
case,
with
not
having
learned,
and
having
no teacher,
and yet
giving advice.
1
The reason for this unconcernabout instructionand
training
n
political
virtue
must,
according
o Socrates,
be
sought
in
the
fact
that this
virtue
cannot
be
taught.
All
that
Socrates
does
and all
that
he
legitimately
can
do is
to
show
that
on
the
assumption
hat
virtue
cannot be
taught,
the
behavior
of
the
members
of the Assembly
and
of
the
great
statesmen
which
first appeared
very
odd
indeed,
now
makes
better
sense.
Protagoras
n turn refutes,
Socrates
by appealing
ikewise
to
the social
situation,
although he
refers
not
to the
behavior
of
the
Athenians
alone
but to
intelligent
men
in
general.
He claims
that
virtue
is innatein all men,52at least as a capacity,andthat it requires eachers
to realize
that capacity.
To Socrates'
objection
that there are
no
special
teachers
as in
the other
arts,
he
replies
that
all the citizens
help
in
the
a
harmony
contains
within
itself a
discord
or a
harmony,
according
as
it
is
vicious
or
not;
its
implications
are
contrary
to
known
phenomena,
inasmuch
as
the
soul
to
some
extent
leads
and controls
the
body,
while
a
harmony
is
dependent
on
the
instrument;
it is
incompatible
with
the
theory
of recollection
accepted
by
Simmias,
according
to
which
the
soul
exists prior
to
its
entry
into
the
body,
while
a
har-
mony appears after the
instrument
has
come
into
existence.
(Cf.
Phaedo,
par.
91-95;
pp.
476-479).
50
Protagoras,
par.
320,
Vol.
I,
p.
91.
51
Ibid.,
par.
319,
p.
91.
52
For
the
manner
in
which
Protagoras
arrives
at
the
innateness
of
virtue,
see
H. Wolz
The
Protagoras
Myth
and
the
Philosopher-Kings,
The
Review of
Metaphysics,
Vol.
XVII,
No.
2,
December,
1963,
pp.
219ff.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
17/27
172 PHILOSOPHY
NDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
education
of
the young;
and
therefore
it
is difficult
to find a teacher
such as Protagoraswho has the skill to add the finishing
ouches to what
the others have done.
And
if everybodypossesses political
virtue, every-
body should be allowed to speak on political mattersin the Assembly.
Thus the view of Protagoras
also casts a measureof reasonableness ver
the behavior of the Athenians.
But the theory of
Protagoras
surpasses
that of Socrates n synthesizing
power, for it can accountfor phenomena
which
Socrates,
from his position, must leave unexplained.
Why, for
instance, do we not chastize
or instruct he ugly, or the diminutive,or
the feeble, asks Protagoras,
but hold men responsible for political
virtue, except
under the assumption that the latter are capable of
improvement by study and exercise and teaching,
3
Why do people
not blame a man when
he admits a lack of skill in
any particularart,
but when he lacks honesty
..
or some other political
virtue
54
and
publicly tells
the
truth
about himself, they think he
must be out
of
his
mind. For
they
consider
his virtue as so essential o
community
ife that
not even the wickedarewhollydevoid
of it. And finallyProtagoras ppeals
to the theory of punishment
which, he says, is held by all reasonable
people.
For he
who desires to
inflict
rational
punishment
does
not
retaliate for
a
past wrong
which cannot be undone,
(but)
has
regard
to
the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished,and he who
sees him punished, may be deterred from doing
wrong again
...
thereby
clearly implyingthat virtue
is capable of being
taught.
5
Thus Protagorashas won the
first
roundof
the
argument
with
Socrates
not by showing that he is right and his opponent
wrong in the
light
of
some set standard,but
by leading his audienceto
a
point of view
from
which
they discover
a
higher degree
of
intelligibility
over
a
wider
range
of
human
experience
than was obtainablewith
the
theory
of Socrates.
Both attack and defense show
a
keen awarenessof
the
interplay
of
fact
and
idea.
The
idea does not impose
a
structureupon
reality,
but
merely
aids
in the
discovery
of whatever structure he
concrete situation
may
exhibit.
The digression o
the
Protagoras
seemed
necessary
n order to direct
the spotlight of attention on
the
conception
of
truth which
is
implied
by Socrates'
so-called second-best
method of
inquiry.
For those
who
see the
Phaedo
mainly as the
source
of
the
theory
of ideas
usually
over-
look
or
minimize
the
importance
of this
conception,
and
consider
only
or at least place the main stress on the other conception which is
implied by
the final argument
for the
immortality
of the
soul. These
53
Protagoras,
par.
323,
p.
94.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.,
par.
324, p.
95.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
18/27
PLATO'S DOCTRINE
OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES
OR ALUTHEIA?
173
two conceptionsare not
intermingled o that
one could seek a way out
of
the difficultyby
maintainingPlato
confusedthem. In fact the change
from one to
other is so abrupt56 that one
can hardly
help seeing in
this juxtapositionof incompatibleviews an analogue to the juxtaposi-
tion of
traditionalismand
rationalism n the Euthyphro
or of radical
freedom and
responsibilityas against
unquestioning
obedience to
law
in the Crito. The present
problem is
complicated,however, by the fact
that we are
confrontednot
with two extremeswhich of
themselves sug-
gest
a
mean,
but with an authentic and
an
unauthenticconception
of
truth.
We
should
now
be willing
to
face
both aspects of the
paradox which
Plato creates
by having Socrates
expound
a
method operating with
postulates and having him
use it in an
argument which presupposes
insight into
essences. And
with the fuller understanding f
the problem
at hand, we
should now also have a better
chance of
finding a satis-
factory
solution.
When
Socrates,
after his
disappointmentwith the nature
philosophers
and expecially with
Anaxagoras,had
decided that he had better have
recourseto the world of
mind and
seek there the truth,of
existence,
7
he
might have
done so for one of two
reasons:He might
have expected
to find in the ideas the true reality or the essence of things, and truth
would then
have
become
the
conformity
of the
mind
to
the ideas.
In
Heidegger's
erminology, ruth would have
become correctness
Richtig-
keit,
orthotes).
By contrast
he might have seen the ideas.
as devices, as
instruments
which, though
rooted in reality, have as their
primary
unc-
tion
to stimulate
and
direct
thought, so that
it
places itself
in
the
proper
perspective
and
thus
discovers
he truth shining forth from
things.
Then
the ideas would be in
the
service
of
truth,
and
the truth
thus conceived
would be
Heidegger's
ale'theia
r unhiddenness.
In spite of the seeminglyradicaldifferencebetweenthe two views of
truth, they are not
unrelated.
History
has in fact
shown
that
one
can
easily
lead
to
the
other. Scientific
postulates,
for
instance, may.
at
a
given period
and in
regard
to specific aspects
of nature
appear
so suc-
cessful that
the
inquirer
s
temptedto, regard
hem
as
revealing
he
very
essence of
things. This temptationmay
prove irresistible
when coupled
with the common
tendency of
the
scientist to allow
as real
only
that
5
In this connection note: It is well that we should be reminded that the
doctrine of Forms as
causes is put forward by Socrates as a second-best doctrine
relative.
to that which
he had hoped to build on the principle
suggested by
Anaxagoras. Nevertheless
Plato seems, in our
present section, and indeed through-
out the rest of the argument which gives his
final proof of immortality,
to have
forgotten
this.
(R.
Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo.
Cambridge, 1955, p. 146.)
57
Phaedo, par. 99-100,
p. 484.
This content downloaded from 200.130.19.143 on Fri, 21 Aug 2015 13:16:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/24/2019 WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthtes or Altheia
19/27
174 PHILOSOPHY
ND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ESEARCH
which
falls within the range
of his method and conforms
to his
postu-
lates,
and
to regard
as
'mere' appearance
that
which does not.58
To
those
who
believed themselves
n the
possession
of definitive
ruth
about
the cosmos, Galileo was a dangerousheretic;and many of those who
felt
comfortably
at home
in the
world of Newton must have looked
upon
Einstein
as a subversive
ntruder
and a disturberof the scientific
peace.
Now
it is
hardly necessary
to point
out
that Socrates
devoted
his
life
to the
task
of ferreting
out
and exposing
the, false pretenders
to,
wisdom.
But it
is perhaps,
ess
readily
recognized
hat at
least
the first
half
and
probably
the
whole
of the
Phaedo
concerns
itself
in
the main
with
the
flaw
of overconfidence
based
on the
wrong
conception
of
truth
and the
baneful effects it may have on inquiry.This will not become,evident,
however,
unless we
are willing
to call into
play
the usually
neglected
dramaticelements
of the
dialogue.
Far
from
promising
a
compelling
demonstration
or the
immortality
of the soul,
Socrates
at
the,
outset had
merely
wanted
to converse
a
little
of the
probabilities
of these
things.
59
One
of his
two
young
Pythagorean
riends
warned
that
it
requires
a
great
deal of
argument
and
many proofs
to
show that
when
the
man is dead
his soul
yet
exists,
and has any
force
or intelligence.
0
And
after
the first set of proofs
the otherremarkson howhard or ratherimpossible s the attainment
of any
certainty
abou