wolf creek generating station - integrated inspection report … · 2020. 3. 31. · may 7, 2020 ....

May 7, 2020

Mr. Cleveland Reasoner III Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2020001

Dear Mr. Reasoner:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station. On April 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.

C. Reasoner III 2

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, “Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.”

Sincerely, Neil F. O'Keefe, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000482 License No. NPF-42 Enclosure: As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

C. Reasoner III 3

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2020001 – May 7, 2020 DISTRIBUTION: SMorris, R MShaffer, DRA AVegel, DRP MHay, DRP RLantz, DRS GMiller, DRS DCylkowski, RC OLópez-Santiago, RIV/OEDO VDricks, ORA LWilkins, OCA BSingal, NRR AMoreno, RIV/OCA BMaier, RSLO AAgrawal, IPAT NO’Keefe, DRP DProulx, DRP JMelfi, DRP NBrown, DRP DDodson, DRP JVera, DRP SGalemore, DRP PJayroe, IPAT BCorrell, IPAT MHerrera, DRMA

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML20125A233

■ SUNSI Review

■ Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

■ Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI:DRP/B C:DNMS/RIB C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2

NAME DDodson JVera GWarnick VGaddy NTaylor

DATE 04/27/2020 04/29/2020 04/27/2020 04/27/2020 04/27/2020

OFFICE C:DRS/OB TL:DRS/IPAT C:DRS/RCB SPE:DRP/B BC:DRP/B

NAME GWerner AAgrawal MHaire DProulx NO’Keefe

DATE 04/28/2020 04/27/2020 04/27/2020 04/20/2020 05/07/2020

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000482 License Number: NPF-42 Report Number: 05000482/2020001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0008 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, KS 66839 Inspection Dates: January 1 to March 31, 2020 Inspectors: D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector B. Baca, Health Physicist J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist J. Vera, Resident Inspector Approved By: Neil F. O'Keefe, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee’s performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Identify Low Electrolyte Level in Battery Cells Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting

Aspect Report Section

Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000482/2020001-01 Open/Closed

[H.13] - Consistent Process

71111.13

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” when the licensee failed to identify a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, maintenance technicians discussed low electrolyte level in safety-related cells from battery bank NK014 with the battery system engineer, but this condition was not entered into the corrective action program or corrected. The inspector subsequently identified two cells with electrolyte level below the Technical Specification Category B limits, which necessitated entry into a Technical Specification action statement to promptly correct this degraded condition.

Inappropriate Use of Informal Processes to Complete Maintenance that Rendered Safety-Related Equipment Inoperable Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting


Mitigating Systems


[P.5] - Operating Experience

71111.13

A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when the licensee failed to properly preplan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, a non-licensed operator identified a burned-out light bulb on a local status panel associated with the safety-related train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and replaced the bulb. The bulb broke, creating a short circuit that blew fuses that rendered the pump and the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable. The inspectors determined that this maintenance activity was performed informally using skill-of-the-craft despite the existence of operating experience at Wolf Creek indicating that this type of activity was known to render associated safety-related equipment inoperable.

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html

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Failure to Control the Work Hours of Maintenance Supervisors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting


Mitigating Systems


[H.1] - Resources

71111.20

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26.205(d) when the licensee failed to control work hours as required by the licensee’s Procedure AP 13-001, “Fatigue Management,” Revision 20D. Specifically, four maintenance department supervisors had instances of excessive turnover and 35 instances when work hour requirements were exceeded were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

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PLANT STATUS Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 1, 2020, the licensee conducted a Technical Specification-required shutdown to repair containment purge valve leakage. The reactor was restarted on February 3, 2020. The unit returned to approximately rated thermal power on February 4, 2020. On March 6, 2020, an instrument air tubing leak caused a main turbine seal steam supply valve to fail open, causing reactor power to increase 2 MWth above 100 percent before operators reduced power to 96 percent. The reactor was returned to approximately rated thermal power on March 7, 2020, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period. INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, “Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase.” From January 1 – March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, “Plant Status,” and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution.” The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; and observed risk-significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.” REACTOR SAFETY 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: (1) Safety injection train B on January 14, 2020 (2) Safety injection train A on January 28, 2020 (3) Essential service water train B on February 11, 2020 (4) Containment spray train A on March 11, 2020

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html




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71111.05 - Fire Protection Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas: (1) Auxiliary building, elevation 1,974 feet, fire area A-7, on January 23, 2020 (2) Auxiliary building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas A-13 and A-15, on January 30, 2020 (3) Auxiliary building, elevation 1,988 feet, fire area A-1, on February 19, 2020

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an

unannounced fire drill on February 5, 2020, and an announced fire drill on February 21, 2020.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in: (1) Essential service water train A electrical cabling manhole MHE2A on

January 20, 2020

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control

room during control rod operability testing and parking operations and during a power reduction associated with planned main turbine valve cycle testing on January 16 and 23, 2020, respectively.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator training activities

that included reinforcement of communication standards, team dynamic standards, response to control room habitability issues, and self-contained breathing apparatus training on February 24, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

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(1) Essential service water train B heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system

recirculation damper failure on January 28, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed; (1) Planned diving activities associated with circulating water bay C and temporary fire

pump testing on January 6, 2020 (2) Unplanned and emergent work activities associated with loss of control power to the

emergency diesel generator train B fuel oil transfer pump on February 3, 2020 (3) Planned turbine driven auxiliary feedwater system maintenance on February 25, 2020 (4) Unplanned inoperability associated with NK14 and NK11 battery cells beginning on

February 25, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: (1) Main steam isolation bypass valve status panel indication in alarm and possible loss

of control power to the valve on January 6, 2020 (2) Emergency exhaust auxiliary building differential pressure testing failure on

January 17, 2020 (3) Containment cooler train B drip pan misalignment on February 2, 2020 (4) Containment cooler train C failed surge test on February 10, 2020 (5) Steam generator blowdown isolation valve spurious closure on February 19, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality: (1) Safety injection pump A discharge accumulator injection isolation valve following

planned maintenance on January 14, 2020 (2) Emergency diesel generator train B following planned maintenance on

January 29, 2020 (3) Component cooling water train A valves following planned maintenance on

February 10, 2010 (4) Containment cooler train C following planned maintenance on February 10, 2020 (5) Component cooling water pump B following planned maintenance on March 3, 2020

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71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated applicable portions of activities associated with an

unplanned outage on February 1 and 2, 2020.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) STN IC-460, "Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0016,"

Revision 7C, and STN IC-461, "Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0017," Revision 9, on January 2, 2020

(2) STS EN-100A, "Containment Spray Pump A Inservice Pump Test," Revision 30, on February 13, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) STS BG-100B, "Centrifugal Charging System B Train Inservice Test," Revision 54, on

January 8, 2020 (2) STS AL-210A, "[Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater] Pump A Inservice Check Valve

Test," Revision 14, and STS EF-210A, "[Essential Service Water] System Inservice Check Valve Test," Revision 12A, on February 18, 2020

(3) STS EF-100A, "[Essential Service Water] System Inservice Pump A & [Essential Service Water] A Check Valve Test," Revision 48, on February 19, 2020

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) STS PE-015, “Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test,” Revision 23, on February 13, 2020

RADIATION SAFETY 71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of

radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.

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Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples) The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material. (1) Observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the

radiologically controlled area (2) Observed workers exiting the radiologically controlled area and worker responses to

contamination alarms (3) Observed radiation protection technician surveying items for return to the tool room

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities. (1) Observed operators moving irradiated items in the spent fuel pool under Radiation

Work Permit 200016 (2) Observed radiological controls for High Radiation Areas/Locked High Radiation Areas

during walk downs of the auxiliary and radwaste buildings under Radiation Work Permit 200001

(3) Observed the survey and release of seventeen barrels of potentially contaminated charcoal from the radiologically controlled area under Radiation Work Permit 200007

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas: (1) Auxiliary building, volume control tank room 1313, elevation 2,000 feet (2) Radwaste building, high level storage room 7235, elevation 2,000 feet (3) Containment personnel hatch room 1507A

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician

performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems: (1) Control room emergency ventilation system (2) Fuel building ventilation

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Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples) The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems: (1) Hot machine shop spray booth (2) Hot machine shop test stand

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee’s use of respiratory protection devices. The

inspectors observed one full face mask fit test and six donning and doffing practicals. The inspectors also reviewed seven workers' medical, training, and fit testing information.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee’s use and maintenance of self-contained

breathing apparatuses. The inspectors also reviewed the independent testing for grade D breathing air quality of the air filling station and the maintenance and testing records for the air filling station.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE 71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

(1) January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)


IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)


OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2019, through December 30, 2019

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2019, through December 30, 2019

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71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues: (1) Steam generator 3 steam outlet flow unexpected decrease as documented in the

corrective action program on January 13, 2020 (2) Emergency diesel generator train B fuel oil transfer pump loss of control power on

February 3, 2020

71153 – Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's entry into a Technical Specification-required

shutdown and outage on February 1, 2020, to correct excessive leakage from the containment purge system during testing.

(2) The inspectors evaluated the licensee’s response to an instrument air tubing leak, which caused a main turbine seal steam supply valve to fail open, causing reactor power to increase 2 MWth above 100 percent before operators reduced power to 96 percent on March 6, 2020.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Identify Low Electrolyte Levels in Battery Cells Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting


Mitigating Systems


[H.13] - Consistent Process

71111.13

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” when the licensee failed to identify a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, maintenance technicians discussed low electrolyte level in safety-related cells from battery bank NK014 with the battery system engineer, but this condition was not entered into the corrective action program or corrected. The inspector subsequently identified two cells with electrolyte level below the Technical Specification Category B limits, which necessitated entry into a Technical Specification action statement to promptly correct this degraded condition. Description: On February 25, 2020, the inspectors were walking down protected equipment during turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater train maintenance, which included walking down the safety-related 125 Vdc battery banks. The inspectors identified that cells 20 and 42 (non-pilot cells) associated with battery bank NK014 had electrolyte level at and below the minimum level indication mark. Technical Specification 3.8.6 requires battery cell parameters for train A and train B batteries to be within limits of Table 3.8.6-1, “Battery Cell Parameters Requirements.” Table 3.8.6-1 specifies that electrolyte level for each connected cell (non-pilot cells) shall be greater than the minimum level indication mark.

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The inspectors promptly informed the shift manager and noted that other cells were also very close to the minimum level indication mark. At 8:42 p.m., on February 25, 2020, the licensee entered Technical Specification 3.8.6, Condition A. The required actions of Technical Specification 3.8.6 were completed on February 26, 2020, after battery cell parameters were restored to within limits. As a result of the inspectors’ questions, on February 27, 2020, the licensee also documented Condition Reports 140916 and 140931, which identified an additional cell on safety-related battery bank NK011 below Technical Specification 3.8.6 electrolyte level requirements and numerous other cells “near the lower limit” on safety-related battery bank NK012. The inspectors reviewed the results of the weekly battery surveillance, Procedure STS MT-018, “Weekly Inspection of 125 VDC Lead-Calcium Batteries,” Revision 23A, for battery NK014 performed on February 24, 2020. The inspectors determined that the procedure required checking parameters for the four pilot cells, but was vague with respect to how to check for abnormal conditions in the rest of the battery. Additionally, licensee interviews determined that maintenance technicians had noted that the electrolyte level in a number of cells was close to the low limit and called the system engineer to report this, but neither the technicians, nor the system engineer, wrote a condition report. Corrective Actions: The licensee completed the required actions of Technical Specification 3.8.6, which included verifying pilot cell electrolyte level and float voltage within limits, verifying each cell met the Category C limits of Table 3.8.6-1, and restoring battery cell parameters to within Category A and B limits. Additionally, the licensee performed extent of condition walkdowns and maintenance activities and documented an Operations Department “Essential Required Reading” associated with operator walkdowns of protected equipment. Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 140860, 140916, 140931, and 141859 Performance Assessment: Performance Deficiency: The station failed to adequately monitor, identify in the corrective action program, and correct safety-related battery parameters approaching and exceeding technical specification limits in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, which was a performance deficiency. Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, normal evaporation in battery cells along with the failure to identify the low electrolyte level in battery cells could lead to the battery becoming inoperable. Significance: Using Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of a single train technical specification system or a multi-train technical specification system; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours or a probabilistic risk assessment system and/or function for greater than 24 hours; and does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensee’s maintenance rule program for

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greater than 3 days. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, maintenance and engineering department personnel did not demonstrate an understanding of the decision-making process and use it consistently. As a result, the licensee failed to identify and correct a degrading condition before battery cells’ electrolyte levels fell below Technical Specification required ranges [H.13]. Enforcement: Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, from February 24–25, 2020, the licensee failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, until the inspectors reported the condition to the shift manager, the licensee failed to identify and promptly enter into the corrective action program low electrolyte levels in safety-related 125 Vdc battery NK014 cells, which was a condition adverse to quality. Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Inappropriate Use of Informal Processes to Complete Maintenance that Rendered Safety-Related Equipment Inoperable Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting


Mitigating Systems


[P.5] - Operating Experience

71111.13

A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when the licensee failed to properly preplan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, a non-licensed operator identified a burned-out light bulb on a local status panel associated with the safety-related train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and replaced the bulb. The bulb broke, creating a short circuit that blew fuses that rendered the pump and the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable. The inspectors determined that this maintenance activity was performed informally using skill-of-the-craft despite the existence of operating experience at Wolf Creek indicating that this type of activity was known to render associated safety-related equipment inoperable. Description: On February 3, 2020, a non-licensed operator noted a burnt-out bulb associated with the train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump motor. In the process of removing the bulb, the glass shattered, and the fuel oil transfer pump control circuitry was shorted, which blew the breaker’s fuses. Control room operators declared the train B emergency diesel generator inoperable. Following troubleshooting, the blown fuses were replaced, and the train B emergency diesel generator was returned to service about 2 hours and 15 minutes later.

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The inspectors noted that the non-licensed operator replaced the bulb with the panel energized and without entering the maintenance process. In subsequent discussions with the inspectors, the operations manager, current and former shift managers, and licensed and non-licensed reactor operators indicated that they expected non-licensed operators to replace light bulbs as part of their rounds without the use of a work order. The inspectors interviewed multiple licensed and non-licensed operators and noted that the only instruction or procedure operators referenced for changing out light bulbs was Work Order 19-451293-000, which is an open-ended preventive maintenance work order for changing out safety-related panel indicating light bulbs in the control room and applicable remote panels as required. The inspectors noted that Work Order 19-451293-000 did not identify any safety-related functions that may be adversely impacted by light bulb changes or identify precautions to be used when safety-related functions may be impacted. This work order was not utilized for changing out the subject bulb. Interviewees also indicated that normal station practice is for non-licensed operators to replace burnt out local light bulbs unless the non-licensed operator notes a reason to elevate the light bulb changeout activity. The licensee noted that AP 21-001, “Conduct of Operations,” Revision 84, Attachment C, “General Inspection Items,” describes non-licensed operator tour activities, and includes validating that local control panel lights are not burned out and that “replacement bulbs are correct size and style.” However, Procedure AP 21-001 does not include instructions, precautions, or limitations to be used when safety-related functions may be impacted when light bulbs are changed. The inspectors noted that this guidance appeared to rely on the individual operator to recognize the risk and act appropriately to mitigate that risk rather than properly preplanning those light bulb replacements that involved risk. The inspectors and the licensee’s equipment performance evaluation also noted substantial internal and external operating experience existed related to light bulb changes impacting safety-related equipment. However, this operating experience was not used to ensure this activity was properly preplanned and implemented or to identify equipment where a safety-related function could be adversely affected. For example, the licensee did not provide instructions or establish precautions or limitations that might help minimize the chances of breaking the bulb or blowing the fuse(s), nor were the susceptible components identified and required to have light bulb changes properly preplanned. Corrective Actions: The licensee performed troubleshooting, replaced the blown fuses, restored the emergency diesel generator transfer pump to service, and declared the train B emergency diesel generator operable on February 3, 2020. On February 6, 2020, the licensee issued an essential required reading entry and an “Operations News” to operators directing that light bulbs associated with the main feedwater isolation valve hand switches, main steam isolation valve hand switches, and condenser vacuum breaker valve hand switches not be changed until additional evaluation is conducted. Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 140271, 140353, 140866, and 141862 Performance Assessment: Performance Deficiency: The licensee’s failure to properly preplan maintenance that could affect safety-related equipment in accordance with Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was a performance deficiency. Specifically, a non-licensed operator changed a light bulb relying on skill-of-the-craft that rendered the train B fuel oil transfer pump and emergency diesel

14

generator inoperable despite having internal and industry operating experience that indicated that replacement of certain incandescent light bulbs can cause blown fuses that render associated safety-related equipment inoperable. Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the lack of appropriate preplanning and procedures led to an emergency diesel generator being inoperable for a period of approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes. Significance: Using Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined this finding: is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of a single train technical specification system or a multi-train technical specification system; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours or a probabilistic risk assessment system and/or function for greater than 24 hours; and does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensee’s maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, internal and external operating experience associated with light bulb changeouts impacting safety-related equipment was not effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs. As a result, the train B emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a period of approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes [P.5]. Enforcement: Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Section 9.a of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, which requires, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, on February 3, 2020, maintenance that could affect the performance of safety-related equipment was not properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the safety-related train B emergency diesel generator and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump functions were affected by a light bulb changeout completed by relying on skill-of-the-craft rather than with appropriate work instructions to prevent an unintended functional impact. As a result, an emergency diesel generator became inoperable for a period of approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes.

15

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Control the Work Hours of Maintenance of Supervisors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting


Mitigating Systems


[H.1] - Resources

71111.20

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26.205(d) when the licensee failed to control work hours as required by the licensee’s Procedure AP 13-001, “Fatigue Management,” Revision 20D. Specifically, four maintenance department supervisors had instances of excessive turnover and 35 instances when work hour requirements were exceeded were identified. Description: The inspectors reviewed a sample of reported work hours by operations, maintenance, and fire brigade personnel following the fall 2019 refueling outage. In response to the inspectors’ questions, the licensee identified a temporary maintenance supervisor that had greater than 1 hour of turnover per day on three separate occasions. The individual and individual’s supervisor were coached, and the licensee performed an extent-of-condition review of all maintenance personnel. Three additional maintenance supervisors with excessive turnover—greater than 1 hour of turnover on any given day—were also identified. Of these three, two of the supervisors also had one instance of greater than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period. One of these two supervisors also had 33 instances when the supervisor’s work hours exceeded 72 work hours in any 7-day period. The licensee determined that the supervisor with 33 instances when work hours exceeded 72 work hours in any 7-day period was heavily loaded with lifting/rigging duties and did not understand how working on administrative tasks following turnover impacted work hour limits. The supervisor’s activities were described as “heavily loaded” and “overloaded” in a performance assessment worksheet and during inspector interviews of the maintenance manager. The licensee also determined that the individual’s supervisor did not identify the issue during timesheet review. Corrective Actions: The licensee performed extent-of-condition reviews of maintenance supervisor work records, the supervisors were coached, and performance assessment worksheets were completed. Additionally, the licensee documented Condition Report 141125 to capture lessons learned associated with the fatigue rule compliance issues. Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 139349, 139867,141125, 141623, 141625, and 141860 Performance Assessment: Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to ensure that four maintenance supervisors understood and implemented work hour controls in accordance with 10 CFR 26.205(d) during the refueling outage, which was a performance deficiency. Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

16

consequences. Specifically, exceeding the allowable work hours increased the likelihood of human error and associated potential to adversely impact equipment maintenance such that these systems would not be available, reliable, and capable to respond to an initiating event and prevent undesirable consequences. Significance: Using Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system and component (SSC); does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of a single train technical specification system or a multi-train technical specification system; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours or a probabilistic risk assessment system and/or function for greater than 24 hours; and does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensee’s maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, managers did not ensure there were sufficient qualified personnel to maintain work hours within working hour guidelines during all modes of operation. As a result, maintenance supervisor work hours were not controlled adequately [H.1]. Enforcement: Violation: Title 10 CFR 26.205(d) requires, in part, that licensees control the work hours of individuals who are subject to the section. (1) Except as permitted in § 26.207, licensees shall ensure that any individual's work hours do not exceed the following limits: (ii) 26 work hours in any 48-hour period, and (iii) 72 work hours in any 7-day period. Contrary to the above, from September 28–November 4, 2019, the licensee failed to control the work hours of individuals who are subject to the section. Specifically, the licensee did not control the work hours of two maintenance supervisors that directed the maintenance of SSCs, and the individuals exceeded 26 work hours in any 48-hour period and one of the individuals exceeded 72 work hours in any 7-day period on 33 occasions. As a result, the likelihood of human error and associated potential to adversely impact equipment maintenance increased the likelihood these systems would not be available, reliable, and capable to respond to an initiating event and prevent undesirable consequences. Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On April 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

17

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Inspection Procedure

Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date

71111.04 Corrective Action Documents

Condition Reports 139871, 139875, 139876, 139877

71111.04 Drawings M-12EM01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

45

71111.04 Drawings M-12EM02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

23

71111.04 Drawings M-12EM03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line

4

71111.04 Procedures AP 21G-001 Control of Locked Component Status 77A 71111.04 Procedures AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment 38A 71111.04 Procedures CKL EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup 55A 71111.04 Procedures CKL EM-120 Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists 33 71111.04 Procedures CKL EN-120 Containment Spray System Lineup 15A 71111.04 Procedures STN LV-001 Weekly Audit of Selected Accessible Locked Valves 9 71111.04 Procedures STS EN-100B Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test 34 71111.05 Corrective Action

Documents Condition Reports 139621, 140393, 140394, 140395, 140396, 140397, 140767,

140768

71111.05 Drawings E-1F3301 Fire Detection/Protection System Control Bldg., Diesel Gen. Bldg. & Comm. Corr. - El. 2000'-0" & El. 2016' -0"

7

71111.05 Miscellaneous APF 10-105 Fire Drill Scenario and Critique Report: 2000' B Diesel Room 02/05/2020 71111.05 Miscellaneous APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist: On-Coming CRS/WC

SRO/RO/BOP Review 02/05/2020

71111.05 Miscellaneous CPIP 18 - Fire Leader

Coffey County Emergency Management Office Contingency Plan Implementing Procedure No. 18

14

71111.05 Miscellaneous K02-001A Shift Manager Relief Checklist: Shift Composition 01/30/2020 71111.05 Procedures AI 10-001 Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, Maintenance and

Cleaning 13A

71111.05 Procedures AI 10-107 Care & Maintenance of Firefighting Personal Protective Ensembles

2A

71111.05 Procedures AI 21-017 Timed Fire Protection Actions Validation 8 71111.05 Procedures ALR KC-888 Fire Protection Panel KC-008 Alarm Response 30A 71111.05 Procedures AP 10-105 Fire Protection Training and Drills 24

18

Inspection Procedure


71111.05 Procedures AP 10-106 Fire Preplans 18A 71111.05 Procedures AP 10-106 Fire Preplans 19 71111.06 Drawings C-K209 E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plan Sections & Details 9 71111.11Q Corrective Action

Documents Condition Reports 140845

71111.11Q Miscellaneous APF 30E-003-05 Lesson Plan Cover Sheet: Control Room Not Habitable Lab (OFN RP-013)

01/09/2020

71111.11Q Miscellaneous APF 30E-003-05 Lesson Plan Coversheet: Crew Team Building 02/03/2020 71111.11Q Procedures AI 30B-005 Development and Conduct of Simulator Activities for

Licensed Operator Training 31

71111.11Q Procedures AP 17C-014 Superintendent Operations Support (Training) Duties and Responsibilities

7

71111.11Q Procedures AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations 83A 71111.11Q Procedures AP 30B-001 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program 29 71111.11Q Procedures AP 30E-005 Systematic Approach to Training 15 71111.11Q Procedures STN SF-001 Control Rod Parking 21A 71111.11Q Procedures STS AC-001 Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test 55 71111.11Q Procedures STS SF-001 Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification 30 71111.12 Corrective Action

Documents Condition Reports 125201, 125518, 127109, 129174, 129920, 136650, 140135

71111.12 Drawings M-K2GD01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water Pump House HVAC

12

71111.12 Procedures AP 30B-006 Shift Engineer/Shift Technical Advisor Requalification Training Program

12

71111.12 Work Orders

07-293274-000, 07-293274-001, 07-293274-002, 18-434809-000, 18-445407-016, 18-445407-017, 18-445407-020, 19-451102-000, 19-451102-002


Condition Reports 7324, 18933, 24748, 130400, 140353, 140844, 140852, 140855, 140860, 140866, 140872, 140881, 140902, 140916, 140931, 2006-003632

71111.13 Drawings E-13JE01A Schematic Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil Transfer Pump PJE01B

2

71111.13 Miscellaneous APF 22C-003-01 On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment: Schedule Week 2020-0109

02/06/2020

19



71111.13 Procedures AI 05-023 Conduct of Engineering 1 71111.13 Procedures AI 22C-013 Protected Equipment Program 22 71111.13 Procedures AP 16C-006 MPAC Work Request/Work Order Process Controls 23 71111.13 Procedures AP 22C-003 On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment 23 71111.13 Procedures AP 22C-007 Risk Management and Contingency Planning 11 71111.13 Procedures STS MT-018 Weekly Inspection of 125 VDC Lead-Calcium Batteries 23A 71111.13 Procedures SYS FP-280 Temporary Diesel Fire Pump Installation and Removal 8 71111.13 Procedures SYS FP-290 Temporary Diesel Fire Pump Operations 26 71111.13 Work Orders

19-451293-000, 19-456699-000, 20-457980-000, 20-460333-000, 20-460333-001, 20-460333-002, 20-460333-003


Condition Reports 102840, 140460, 140475, 140729, 140736, 140775

71111.15 Drawings M-12BM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Steam Generator Blowdown System

20


14


5


8

71111.15 Miscellaneous

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab: BM-SJ144 - Effluent Liquid

71111.15 Miscellaneous APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet: Steam Generator Blowdown Inservice Valve Test - STS BM-205

12/11/2019

71111.15 Miscellaneous M-620-00060C Instruction Manual for Drip Pan/Drain Modification Addendum

W09

71111.15 Procedures MGE EOOP-05 Insulation Resistance Testing 26 71111.15 Procedures STN EG-205A Component Cooling Water System Valve Test 2 71111.15 Procedures STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test 17A 71111.15 Work Orders

14-386658-000, 16-411494-000, 19-449158-000, 20-457566-000, 20-457962-000

71111.19 Procedures MGE LT-099 MOV Diagnostic Testing 14 71111.19 Procedures RNM C-0563 Auxiliary Time Delay Relay 9A

20



71111.19 Procedures STN EG-205A Component Cooling Water System Valve Test 2 71111.19 Procedures STN EM-201 Safety Injection System Valve Test 13 71111.19 Procedures STS GN-001 CTMT Cooling Fans Operability Test 11 71111.19 Procedures STS KJ-005B Manual/Auto Start, Sync, & Loading of EDG NE02 65A 71111.19 Procedures STS PE-007 Periodic Verification of Motor Operated Valves 5A 71111.19 Procedures SYS GN-120 Containment Cooling System Operation 49 71111.19 Work Orders

19-449132-000, 19-449504-003, 19-450076-000, 19-450076-001, 19-452140-048


Condition Reports 139314, 139349, 139867, 140214, 140215, 140216, 140250, 140251, 141125

71111.20 Procedures AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations 83A 71111.20 Procedures GEN 00-003 Hot Standby to Minimum Load 103 71111.22 Corrective Action

Documents Condition Reports 139631, 140703, 140708, 140712

71111.22 Drawings E-K3GD01 Schematic Diagram [Essential Service Water] Pump Room Supply Fan A

7

71111.22 Drawings M-12GT01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Containment Purge Systems HVAC

31

71111.22 Procedures MPM EF-002 [Essential Service Water] Traveling Water Screens Preventive Maintenance Activity

15

71111.22 Procedures STN IC-460 Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0016

7C

71111.22 Procedures STN IC-461 Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0017

9

71111.22 Procedures STS AL-210A MDAFW Pump A Inservice Check Valve Test 14 71111.22 Procedures STS BG-100B Centrifugal Charging System “B” Train Inservice Pump Test 54 71111.22 Procedures STS EF-100A [Essential Service Water] System Inservice Pump A &

[Essential Service Water] System A Check Valve Test 48

71111.22 Procedures STS EF-210A ESW System Inservice Check Valve Test 12A 71111.22 Procedures STS EN-100A Containment Spray Pump A Inservice Pump Test 30 71111.22 Procedures STS PE-015 Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test 23 71111.22 Procedures STS PE-261 LLRT Valve Lineup for Penetration 161 6 71111.22 Procedures SYS EF-200 Operation of the [Essential Service Water] System 44A

21



71111.22 Procedures SYS EG-201 Transferring Supply of CCW Service Loop and CCW Train Shutdown

57

71111.22 Procedures SYS EN-120 Spray Additive Tank Operations 9 71111.22 Work Orders

19-452834-000, 19-452895-000


Condition Reports 136814, 137016, 137107, 137327, 137866, 137868, 138044, 138067, 138396, 138625, 138668, 138806, 139132, 139488, 139761, 139938, 140048, 140667, 140670

71124.01 Miscellaneous

Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) Door Checks 7B 71124.01 Miscellaneous

Non-Fuel Items in Spent Fuel Pool 02/17/2020

71124.01 Procedures AP 25A-001 Radiation Protection Manual 18A 71124.01 Procedures AP 25A-200 Access to Locked High or Very High Radiation Areas 29 71124.01 Procedures AP 25B-100 Radiation Worker Guidelines 53 71124.01 Procedures RPP 01-105 Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and

Code of Conduct 21

71124.01 Procedures RPP 02-105 RWP 49A 71124.01 Procedures RPP 02-210 Radiation Survey Methods 49B 71124.01 Procedures RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas 34B 71124.01 Procedures RPP 02-405 RCA Access Control 21 71124.01 Radiation

Surveys 19-0164 Airborne Radioactivity Record 09/23/2019

71124.01 Radiation Surveys

19-0483 Airborne Radioactivity Record 10/19/2019

71124.01 Radiation Surveys

M-20191027-3 Lower Cavity: Rinse and Run, Blind Flange, Bird Cages 10/27/2019

71124.01 Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)

191101 Under RV Cavity Seal Ring Inspections (Annulus) Access. 0


191102 Incore Tunnel Inspections, Maintenance & Decon. This RWP to be used for all entries into Incore Tunnel.

2


192220 Insulation removal and replacement for outage activities. 1


196000 Lower Refueling Cavity Pre & Post Flooding Maintenance Activities

1


196031 RV Head Lift, Transfer, & Set. 2

22




200001 Radiation Protection Activities 1


200007 I&C and Electrical Maintenance Activities 0


200008 NRC Access to the RCA for Surveillances and Inspections 0


200016 Routine SFP Activities & New Fuel Receipt 0

71124.03 Miscellaneous 19-03566 Trace Analytics, LLC - Certificate of Analysis NFPA 1989-2019(N)

02/05/2019


05/10/2019


08/20/2019


12/12/2019

71124.03 Miscellaneous Posi3 USB Test Results - Functional Test

115S1542005578-FO-11, 115S1543010751-FO-15, 115S1543010757-FO-19, 115S1543010756-FO-31, 115S1543010758-FO-16, 115S1543010759-FR-04, 115S1543010761-FO-03, 115S1543010762-FO-01, 115S1543010764-FO-10, 115S1543010765-F, 115S1543010766-FO-18, 115S1543010768-FO-24, 115S1543010769-SO-30, 115S1543010779-FO-26, 115S1543010787-FO-22, 115S1543010804-FO-17, 115S1543010805-FO-21, 115S1543015307-CR-04, 115S1543015308-CR-02, 115S1543015309-CR-06, 115S1543015315-CR-03, 115S1543015331-CR-12, 115S1543016861-CR-13, 115S1546088357-01, 115S1547008391-03, 115S1547008384-02

08/15/2019

71124.03 Miscellaneous Posi3 USB Test Results - Functional Test

115S1534010749-FR-08, 115S1536136471-CR-01, 115S1536141987-FO-23, 115S1543010748-FO-14, 115S1543010750-FO-12, 115S1543010752-FO-09, 115S1543010753-FO-27, 115S1543010755-FO-20, 115S1543010767-FR-02, 115S1543010770-FO-06,

08/14/2019

23



115S1543010774-FO-28, 115S1543010775-FO-29, 115S1543010778-FO-25, 115S1543010782-FO-05, 115S1543015313-CR-11, 115S1543015316-CR-05, 115S1543015329-CR-08, 115S1543016859-CR-09, 115S1543016860-CR-10, 115S154003219-02, 115S154003221-01

71124.03 Procedures AI 10-004 Air Fill Station Operation 4 71124.03 Procedures AP 25A-001 Radiation Protection Manual 18A 71124.03 Procedures AP 25B-600 Respiratory Protection Program at Wolf Creek 9 71124.03 Procedures RPP 02-210 Radiation Survey Methods 49B 71124.03 Procedures RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas 34B 71124.03 Procedures RPP 03-310 Respiratory Protection Equipment 21 71124.03 Procedures RPP 05-205 AMS-4 Operation 10 71124.03 Procedures RPP 05-920 Use of Vacuum Cleaners and Portable HEPA Ventilation

Units in the RCA 6A

71124.03 Procedures STS PE-001 Visual Inspection of Nuclear Safety Related Filter/Adsorber Units

8A

71124.03 Procedures STS PE-002 Charcoal Adsorbent Sampling for Nuclear Safety Related Units

15

71124.03 Procedures STS PE-005 HEPA Filter In-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units 13 71124.03 Procedures STS PE-006 Charcoal Adsorber In-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units 17 71152 Corrective Action

Documents Condition Reports 141111

71152 Procedures STN IC-417F Calibration of Steam Flow Transmitters 7 71152 Work Orders

19-456165-000

71153 Corrective Action Documents

Condition Reports 140565, 140866, 140894, 140899, 141138