wir wollen sein ein einig volk von brüdern - a nation of united brothers we will be history and...
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Wir wollen sein ein einig Volk von Brüdern - A nation of united brothers we will be
History and Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
Bianca Rousselot, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne
Visit of the Bulgarian DelegationState Chancellery of the Canton of Berne4th of March 2010
Overview
1. History of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
2. Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
3. Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
4. Summary
5. Discussion
Overview
1. History of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
2. Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
3. Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
4. Summary
5. Discussion
Two Roots of Swiss Democracy
Tradition
Generally:> Germanic Thing as an assembly of free
peasants for the election of the king, decisions on war and peace, dispensation of justice
> Depoliticized or abolished by European aristocracy, partly surviving as Markgenossenschaft
Switzerland: > corporations in Alpine areas have regular
assemblies> Landsgemeinden (assemblies) remain in
place as local forms of self-government until 1848; after 1848 gradual decline at the cantonal level
Revolution
Enlightenment:> Ideas of natural law and popular sovereignty
change ideas about divine right of kings> American Declaration of Independence and
French Revolution heavily influence Switzerland
> Liberal, radical, democratic, social and national movements take up the idea of popular sovereignty and (further) develop the idea of popular rights
> Most developed and extensive form of direct democracy worldwide
National Myths and the Origins of Switzerland
> 1291/1307 Rütli-Oath and Letter of Alliance of the Eternal League of the Three Forest Cantons (Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden)
> Mythification of 1st of August 1291 as founding date of Swiss Confederacy
> Friedrich Schiller‘s William Tell as national myth
Territorial Expansion and Structure of the Old Confederacy 1291-1798
> Territorial expansion by annexation, voluntary accession, and alliances— 1291–1332 III Orte: Uri, Schwyz,
Unterwalden— 1353–1481 VIII Orte: Luzern, Glarus,
Zürich, Zug, Bern— 1481–1501 X Orte: Freiburg, Solothurn— 1501–1513 XII Orte: Basel, Schaffhausen— 1513–1798 XIII Orte: Appenzell
> Structure of the Old Confederacy— Sovereign cantons— Associates— Condominiums— Protectorates— Separate subjects
Territorial Expansion and Structure of the Old Confederacy 1291-1798
The Old Confederacy 1291 - 1798
> Old Confederacy = set of overlapping pacts and separate bilateral treaties (1st common treaty Sempacherbrief 1393)
> Common interests: preservation of peace (trade routes through Alps), defense of imperial immediacy
> Limited power of the confederacy, autonomous cantons> Diet (Tagsatzung) since 15th century> De facto autonomy from German Empire after Swabian War
1499> Formal independence and sovereignty of the
Cantons at Peace of Westphalia 1648> Unequal status of different territories> Voting rights only for representatives
of the 13 Orte
Structure of the Old Confederacy in the 18th Century
Helvetic Revolution, French Occupation and Helvetic Republic
> Ideas of French Revolution spread> 1798 revolution and independence of
subject territories> 1798 French occupation> Confederacy becomes unitary state under
Napoleon, Cantons now administrative units, territory reshaped
> Constitution similar to French, central government, code penal, abolition of serfdom
> But: “Parisian” Helvetic Constitution lacks support
> 2nd Helvetic Constitution 1802: 25th of May first national referendum in Switzerland - «qui tacet consentire videtur»
Mediation 1803 - 1813
> Withdrawal of French troops leads to return of ancien regime and Stecklikrieg (civil war) against Helvetic Republic
> Napoleons returns and „mediates“> Act of Mediation 1803 and new
constitution> Cantonal autonomy re-established> Confoederatio helvetica =
confederation> Tagsatzung (Diet) instead of central
government> Quasi-protectorate of France until 1813
> 1813 Constitution of 1803 suspended by Diet
> Treaty of Vienna 1815 recognizes territory of the 19 cantons of the Act of Mediation, permanent Swiss neutrality
> 7 August 1815: Federal Treaty> Restoration of the old order> Cantonal autonomy, limited power of
the Diet> Cantonal constitutions re-organised
along old feudal lines, re-establishment of old privileges
Restauration 1815
> 1830 July Revolution in France> Liberal forces in Switzerland assemble and demand
sovereignty of the people, rule of law, freedom of the press, separation of church and state
> Liberal constitutions established in Zürich, Berne, Lucerne, Fribourg, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Aargau, Thurgau, Waadt, Basel-Land and Glarus
Regeneration 1830
Confoederation helvetica 1848
> 1845 Separate Alliance of Catholic-Conservative Cantons> 1847 Sonderbundskrieg (civil war)
> Federal Constitution of 1948 (compromise modeled after the US American Constitution) turned Switzerland into Federation, but “Nightwatchman-State” with limited powers
> Apart from obligatory referendum on complete/partial revision of the constitution Confederation = representative democracy
The Democratic Movement of the 1860s
> Conflict between Liberal and Conservative forces continues after 1848 on cantonal level
> Concentration of power in hands of Liberal-Radical Party / industrialists
> From 1863 Democratic Movement (farmers, workers, craftsmen, intellectuals) pushes direct democratic reforms and social policy (new cleavage: capital – labour)
> 1869: Zurich introduces popular initiative, obligatory referendum and direct election of the government, direct democratic reforms follow in other cantons
> Complete revision of the Federal Constitution 1874: facultative legislative referendum
> Partial revision 1891: popular initiative
From Representative to Consociational Semi-Direct Democracy
> From 1848: Representative democracy with a majority/opposition system
— liberal-radical majority, conservative opposition in both chambers of parliament, elections do not bring about a change of majority
> From 1891: Representative democracy with popular rights
— conservative majority (2 parties: FDP, KK), social democratic opposition
— 1918: general strike, climax of the class struggle— 1919: National Council elected by proportional representation, change
of party system (SP, BGB)— 1927: extension of conservative majority (3 parties: FDP, KK, BGB),
social democratic opposition— 1939: abrogation of elections (until 1943) and referendums (until 1947)
From Representative to Consociational Semi-Direct Democracy
> From 1947: Consociational democracy with popular rights
— 1947: return to and further development of direct democracy, beginning of concordant government, initially instable
— 1959: Stabilization of the government system by integrating SP, “magical formula” (2 SP, 2 CVP, 2 FDP, 1 SVP)
— concordance by issue area, changing majorities: FDP/CVP-coalition normal case, CVP/SP-coalition special case
— 1971: introduction of female suffrage— 1975: new instability due to new parties and social movements— 1995: beginning of bi-polarization between SVP, SP and Green Party— 2003: arithmetic concordance (SVP wins CVP seat), SVP/FDP-coalition
normal case, temporary instability— 2007: Federal Councillor Blocher not re-elected; SVP „opposition”— 2009: SVP returns to Federal Council, 5 party government (2 SP, 1
CVP, 2 FDP, 1 SVP, 1 BDP)
The Federal Council 2010
From left to right: FC Didier Burkhalter (FDP), Chancellor Corina Casanova (CVP), BR Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf (BDP), FC Ueli Maurer (SVP), FC Micheline Calmy-Rey (SP), FC Hans-Rudolf Merz (FDP), President Doris Leuthard (CVP), FC Moritz Leuenberger (Vice-President, SP)
Direct Democracy in Switzerland - Overview
Year Instrument Application Requirements Majority required
184819211977
Obligatory referendum
Complete/partial revision, accession to supranational or collective security organisations
Obligatory Double majority (cantons and people)
1874 Facultative referendum
Any legislation or directive subject to referendum
50,000 signatures or 8 cantons
Simple majority (people)
19211977
Referendum on international treaties
International treaties 50,000 signatures or 8 cantons
Simple majority (people)
1949 Resolutive referendum
Urgent federal decrees if non-constitutional: obligatoryif constitutional: 50,000 signatures
Simple majority (people)
1848 Popular Initiative Complete revision
Complete revision of the constitution
100,000 signatures Majority of people => parliamentary re-election, complete revision
1891 Popular initiativePartial revision
Article constitutional amendment
100,000 signatures Double majority , counter proposal
20
Direct Democracy in Europe
Direct Democracy in Europe
Overview
1. History of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
2. Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
3. Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
4. Summary
5. Discussion
„All highly important decisions by the people, important decisions by the parliament, other decisions by the government.“ (Linder, 1999)
> Central element of Swiss political culture: popular decision = highest legitimacy
> Selective control of all highly important decisions by the people> People = institutional opposition
The Principles of Swiss Direct Democracy
• +26.5% restrictive policy on
foreigners• -22.3% open foreign policy• -18.7% economic liberalisation• -18.2% strengthening of
government and parliament• +10.8% strong army and law and
order• -10.1% environmental protection• - 8.6% social liberalisation• +3.4% tax reduction• -2.4% strong welfare state
Hermann/Leuthold 2007
Popular and Parliamentary Decisions: Differences
Popular Rights in Practice 1848-2008
Quelle: C2D
Table of Direct Democracy Use at the Federal Level
The last update is based on the official publication of the Federal Chancellery of December 24, 2008 (Feuille Fédérale/Bundesblatt No. 51 )
PeriodTotal Mandatory Referendums Optional Referendums Initiatives
Voted Accepted Rejected Voted Accepted Rejected Bills Passed Voted Accepted Rejected Submitted Withdrawn Voted Accepted Rejected
1848-1860* 1 1 0 1 1 0 - - - - 0 0 0 0 0
1861-1870* 9 1 8 9 1 8 - - - - 0 0 0 0 0
1871-1880* 12 5 7 4 2 2 63 8 3 5 0 0 0 0 0
1881-1890 12 5 7 4 3 1 75 8 2 6 0 0 0 0 0
1891-1900 24 10 14 9 6 3 74 10 3 7 5 0 5 1 4
1901-1910 12 8 4 5 4 1 59 4 3 1 4 1 3 1 2
1911-1920 15 12 3 9 8 1 57 3 2 1 9 0 3 2 1
1921-1930 28 11 17 10 8 2 94 5 1 4 8 0 13 2 11
1931-1940* 23 10 13 8 8 0 73 9 2 7 21 6 6 0 6
1941-1950 21 9 12 7 4 3 104 7 4 3 11 8 7 1 6
1951-1960 42 18 24 22 14 8 205 11 4 7 23 12 9 0 9
1961-1970* 29 16 13 14 12 2 213 8 4 4 16 8 7 0 7
1971-1980 87 47 40 47 36 11 278 18 11 7 40 9 22 0 22
1981-1990 66 27 39 25 18 7 259 12 6 6 45 16 29 3 26
1991-2000 106 55 51 36 28 8 504 36 25 11 54 10 34 2 32
2001-2008 67 30 37 12 6 6 312 24 20 4 32 10 31 4 27
TOTAL 554 265 289 222 159 63 2370 163 90 73 268 80 169 16 153
Total Accepted Rejected Rate of Acceptance
Obligatory referendum
222 159 63 72%
Facultative referendum
163 90 73 55%
Initiative 169 16 153 10%
Counterproposal 15 6 9 40%
Total 554 265 289 49%
1848-2008, BFS.
Popular Rights in Practice 1848 - 2008
Total Accepted Rejected Rate of Acceptance
Facultative referendum
163 90 73 55%
Initiative 169 16 153 10%
> Facultative referendum used in 7% of cases => only 3% of legislative proposals are vetoed by referendum
> Initiative only successful in 10% of cases
Popular Rights in Practice 1848 - 2008
> The “opposition of the people” is selective and limited> In approx. 50% of cases (90% in case of initiatives) the people
agree with the majority in parliament/government
> However: the instruments of direct democracy also have important indirect effects
The „Opposition of the People“ and the Indirect Effects of Direct Democracy
Legislativ Proposal
Parties
Associations
Cantonsopinion
opinion
opinionEvaluation
Law
Direct Democracy and Concordance – The Sword of Damocles (Neidhart 1970)
Legislative proposal
Parliamentary debate
Consultation process
referendumno referendum
agreementno agreement
ag
ree
me
nt
no
a
gre
em
en
t
Groups capable of launching a referendum not included in consultation process
Opposition
Simplified Model of the Facultative Referendum
> In the 1970s, the referendum was considered as a political tool of the Conservatives
> In recent years used by social democrats for the defense of the welfare state
> Initiatives used to be part of the toolbox of left-wing groups> In recent years used frequently by right-wing groups (SVP,
AUNS)
> Rawl’s way of ingnorance: not always the same groups benefit from the status-quo bias
Who Launches Referendums and Popular Initiatives?
SP/ Gewerk.21%
rechte Kleinstp.10%
Umwelt26%
Frauen/ Konsumenten9%
FDP/ CVP/ SVP/Wirtschaft
3%
Andere31%
Quelle: App, Rolf (1987): Initiative und ihre Wirkungen auf Bundesebene seit 1974, in: SVPW 27/1987.
Who Launches Popular Initiatives?
A referendum is less likely if
> The legislative proposal does not deviate strongly from the status-quo
> No group looses in comparison with the status-quo (pareto-optimum)
> The legislative proposal is a compromise taking into account the interests of a important groups, including extra-parliamentary interests
How to Avoid a Referendum
Referendum = integrative mechanism
> All groups capable of launching a referendum are included in the legislative process
> No group of sufficient size is permanently excluded from the decision making process
> Compromise = result of direct democracy without its instruments being used (“Sword of Damocles”)
> Consensus/Concordance pressure (“blackmailing power” converted into “coalition power”, Papadopoulos 2001)
> Also government parties have to reach a compromise
> Changing majorities depending on issue-area
The Effects of the Referendum
Bemerkungen: Konfliktkonstellationen, erhoben anhand von Stimmempfehlungen der vier Bundesratsparteien. 1994-2004. Eigene Berechnungen.
19%
47%
7%
3%
24%
Centre-right coalition
(CVP/FDP/SVP vs. SP)
Centre-left coalition (SP/CVP/FDP vs. SVP)
„Grand Coalition“ (consensus of
government parties)
„Unholy Alliance“ (SP/SVP vs. FDP/CVP)
„SP/CVP vs.FDP/SVP“
Changing Coalitions 1994-2004
Referendum = brake
> Status-quo bias> Necessity of compromise curbs innovation> “No” heuristic> New federal competences require double majority => limited
centralisation, low public spending ration > Reforms slower, but greater legitimacy
The Effects of the Referendum
Referendum = “substitute” for elections
> “Trade-off” between elections and referendums: importance of elections lower => low participation in international comparison
> Power of parliament limited> Role of political parties limited – role of associations
strengthened (NZZ 21.2.1973: “Sword of Damocles” turned into “Dagger in the Sleeves of the Lobbyist”)
The Effects of the Referendum
Quelle: Bundesamt für Statistik
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Durchschnitt 1931–1950: 60.5% Durchschnitt 1951-1970: 47.8%Durchschnitt 1971-1990: 40.9% Durchschnitt 1991-2006: 44.0%
1. Überfremdungsinitiative (1970)
2. Überfremdungsinitiative (1974)
Armeeabschaffungsinitiative (1989)
EWR (1992)
Average Participation 1950-2006
Highest and Lowest Participation - Issues
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Schutz der Währung 1972
Stabilisierung des Baumarktes1972
Bildungsartikel 1973
Änderung der Volksrechte 2003
Bildungsartikel 2005
Armeeabschaffungsinitiative 1989
Überfremdungsinitiative 1974
Überfremdungsinitiative 1970
EWR 1992
86%
73%
50%
36%
34%
46%
53%
84%
88%
Ja-Stimmenanteil in %
Selective Participation
Initiative = Valve
> Objective: direct success> Popular discontent and outrage can be expressed and
integrated into the political system> Interests can be directly enforced
The Effects of the Popular Initiative
The Effects of the Popular Initiative
Initiative = Catalyst
> Objective: indirect success> Agenda setting> Provocation, social change
Initiative = Canvasser
> Objective: indirect success> Internal mobilisation and PR for parties and
social movements> Centralisation of SMs
The Effects of the Popular Initiative
Initiative = Gas pedal?
> Yes, when the constitutional amendment is directly accepted> Yes, when the demands are partially accepted (counter-proposal)
or later taken up in parliament > Yes, when agenda-setting is taking place> Yes, when there is social change
The Effects of the Popular Initiative
> Often, a popular initiative takes up an issue that worries the public, but the proposed solution is radical
> Generally, the status-quo is stronger than change> The process of opinion-formation typical for initiatives:
Why the Low Success Rate of Popular Initiatives?
Initiative potentielle de la majorité avec opposition à la solution du problème
gfs.berne, Campaigning
en % des ayants le droit de vote et qui participent certainement
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Avant la campagne Jour de la votation
Non
Indécis
Oui
Opinion Formation: Popular Initiatives
> Only initiative on constitutional amendment, no legislative initiative => demands that should be dealt with on level of law/decree are dealt with in the constitution (e.g. Protection of Swamps)
> If initiative is successful, constitutional provision still has to be implemented on basis of legislation subject to referendum (e.g. Maternity leave)
> Compatibility with international treaties and international law (e.g. Verwahrungsinitiative)
> “Flood” of initiatives overburdens political system> “Democracy vs. Federalism” problem
Problems of Popular Initiatives
Overview
1. History of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
2. Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
3. Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
4. Summary
5. Discussion
Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
> Direct democracy hampers the development of the country and leads to blockades and decline
(Borner, Brunetti, Straubhaar, Wittmann)
vs.
> Direct democracies leads to more efficiency, lean government, economic wealth, and higher subjective wellbeing
(Feld, Frey, Kirchgässner)
48
Competence dependent on:
Individual factors:• Education• Interest in politics• Subjective perception of
importance of proposal
Contextual factors:• Campaign intensity• Complexity of proposal• Familiarity of issue• Institutional context in cantons
(Bütschi 1992)
17.3
49.2 33.6
MPLK hoch MPLK mittel MPLK tief
Citizen Competence – How Well Informed are the Citizens?
Nutzung Medien 99-05 (1) "Wie haben Sie sich während des Abstimmungskampfes orientiert? Durch welche Medien haben Sie vom Pro
und Kontra vernommen? Sagen Sie mir bitte jeweils, was Sie persönlich zur Information über die verschiedenen Standpunkte benutzt haben oder nicht."
in % Teilnehmende
86 85 84 848379
67
72
80
68
74
69
75
55
68
7678
73
61 6158
64
58
878686
74
83
84 85 8790
8886 88
8587
84 84
63
78
7573
74
84
6474
79 76
74
787577
78 79
7771
73 7373
77 79
75
61
72
62
6065 60
566154 57 56
53
68
6263
48
57
12.Mär'00
21.Mai'00
24.Sep.'00
26.Nov.'00
4.Mär.'01
10.Jun.'01
2.Dez.'01
3.Mär.'02
2.Jun.'02
22.Sep.'02
24.Nov.'02
9.Feb.'03
18.Mai'03
9.Febr.'04
16.Mai'04
26.Sep.'04
28.Nov.'04
05.Jun05
25.Sept.'05
27.Nov.'05
Artikel
Bundesbüchlein
Sendungen amFernsehen
Sendungen amRadio
gfs.bern, VOX-Trendauswertungen (99-05, Vox 69-89), Stand Dezember 2005 (n = jeweils ca. 500), gewichtet nach Teilnahme a61-a72
Citizen Competence – Use of Media
Preference forparty
51% 49%
26% 25%
6% 20% 3% 22% 3%
yes no
Knows party recommendation
Most important viewpoint
46%
Quelle: Kriesi (1994): Akteure, Medien, Publikum. Die Herausforderung direkter Demokratie durch die Transformation der Öffentlichkeit
Party Heuristics
Does not know party recomm.
Most important viewpoint
Most important viewpoint
Not most important viewpoint
Not most important viewpoint
Not most important viewpoint
Direct Democracy and the Economy
> The more direct democracy on the local level, the lower public spending
> Less tax evasion in cantons with fiscal referendum and control over public spending
> Communes with strong direct democracy have less debt> Per capita GDP in cantons with strong (fiscal) direct
democracy 15% higher than in more representative systems
(Gebhard Kirchgässner, Lars P. Feld, Marcel R. Savioz, Die direkte Demokratie, Modern, erfolgreich, entwicklungs- und exportfähig, St. Gallen 1999, S. 71 ff.)
52
Anti-Minority Results in National Votes by Minority 1960-2009
VATTER, A./DANACI, D. (2010): „Tyrannei der Mehrheit durch direkte Demokratie? Neue Befunde aus der Schweiz.“ Universität Bern (unpuplished paper). Anmerkung: einige Vorlagen betreffen die Rechte von mehr als einer Minderheit, weshalb die Summe der Vorlagen in der vorliegenden Tabelle höher ist als die Gesamtzahl der berücksichtigten Vorlagen.
28
30
31
47
55
57
60
11
0
33
42Total (N=295)
Übrige (n=3)
Homosexuelle (n=6)
Sprachminderheiten (n=9)
Behinderte (n=25)
Religiöse Minderheiten (n=17)
Frauen (n=61)
Jugendliche (n=64)
Ausländer (n=76)
Ältere (n=30)
Militärdienstverweigerer (n=5)
Anti-Minderheiten-resultat in %
Tyranny of the Masses or Protection of Minorities?
> No discrimination of linguistic minorities by (Swiss German) majority due to hight acceptance
> French- and Italian-speaking Swiss profit as citizens from direct democracy in opposition to the government/parliament
> But: some minorities are discriminated against in popular votes, e.g. Foreigners, Muslims
> The protection of minorities in popular votes depends on the perceived degree of integration of the minority in society, the compatibility of values, and individual preferences of the voters (conservative/liberal)
Tyranny of the Masses or Protection of Minorities?
Tyranny of the Masses or Protection of Minorities?
The Decision of the Sovereign
The Sovereign has very keen sense of truth, of arguments, and of credibility, but also of deception. For decades the Swiss people have been sharpening their eyes for campaigns. Thanks to this, they have developed a considerable political judgement and the ability to objectively assess a situation. The recent votes in particular have shown that the citizens are able to separate the wheat from the chaff and to tell facts from misleading statements and weigh them accordingly.
„Der Souverän hat ein sehr feines Gespür für Wahrheit, für Argumente und für Glaubwürdigkeit, aber auch für Irreführung und Täuschung. Während Jahrzehnten haben die Schweizerinnen und Schweizer ihren Blick für Abstimmungskampagnen geschärft. Dank dieser Tatsache sind ein bedeutendes politisches Beurteilungsvermögen und die Fähigkeit zur nüchternen Lagebeurteilung entstanden. Gerade die jüngsten Abstimmungen haben gezeigt, dass das Stimmvolk sehr wohl die Spreu vom Weizen zu trennen weiss und Fakten von verzerrenden Behauptungen zu unterscheiden und entsprechend auch zu gewichten vermag.“
1999 Parlamentary Initiative 99.427 (Judith Stamm) „Campaign Ombudsman“: Statement of Commission Member Eduard Engelberg, National Councillor, FDP, Nidwalden
57
Quelle: Stutzer, Alois und Bruno S. Frey (2000): Stärkere Volksrechte – zufriedenere Bürger: eine mikroökonometrische Untersuchung für die Schweiz, in SZPW 6(3): 1-30.
Direct Democracy and Subjective Well-Being in the Swiss Cantons
Inputs Throughputs
Outcomes
Outputs
Impacts
External demands due to broader participation
- elections
- referendums/initiatives
=> Agenda-setting by a number of different actors
Actors and political system
- actors: weakening of government and parliament; strengthening of associations; ambivalent regarding NSMs and political parties
- system: division of power, concordance, integration, system stability, legitimacy
Characteristics of political decisions
- referendum: status-quo, policy stability
- Initiative: innovation, policy change
Political effects
- referendum (fiscal): low government expenditure, low taxes, low debt, limited centralization
- initiative: non-measurable effects
Social impacts
- social integration
- subjective wellbeing
- ambivalent: protection of minorities
Economic impacts
- referendum (fiscal): high economic power, low unemployment rate
- initiative: non-measurable effects
Impacts
The Input/Output Model of Direct Democracy
Overview
1. History of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
2. Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
3. Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
4. Summary
5. Discussion
> Two roots of direct democracy in Switzerland: Tradition and Revolution
> Direct democracy in Switzerland demanded and fought for from below
> The instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland have important direct and indirect effects
> The break of the referendum is (to some extent) counterbalanced by the gas pedal of the initiative
> Problems: “Federalism vs. Democracy”, popular initiative limited to constitutional amendments, ambivalent protection of minorities
> Possible solutions: Reform – legislative and fiscal referendum also on the federal level, basic rights
Summary
Overview
1. History of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
2. Effects of Direct Democracy in Switzerland
3. Controversy: For and Against Direct Democracy
4. Summary
5. Discussion
Discussion